How can you tell it happens inside the lung and not inside the intestine? — Lionino

You can't. You can infer based on a pretty nifty evolutionary trick of pain signalling through neurons. But pain signals get mixed up all the time and we perceive pain incorrectly as to the injury that caused us to feel any pain at all. I've given a few examples. Feelings of pain are patently not occurring inside the injured area for two reasons:

1. The above - pain signals are not apodictic indicators of anything; and
2. An injured body part doesn't 'feel' anything. The perceiving mind does.

Of course it is to do with truth. But you can't say that because it undermines your antirealism.

The cup is in the dishwasher. — Banno

Again, a bare assertion.

It has nothing to do with truth. You have described why not consistently questioning our apprehensions is helpful for washing cups. All good my friend.

Ok. There's no reply to that, it's so far off track. Central to the experiment are reports of colours seen. — Banno

It's directly on track, for the discussion - but you're right, there is no response. If what you're trying to point out is that my use of 'Red' runs up against this, because we're relying on self-report. Yes. Yes, that is the point. Red doesn't obtain other than as an agreement between self-reports and so is instantiated only in the experiences we are agreeing about. Clear?

You can't live without it. Indirect realism inevitably opens up into global skepticism. It's an unsolved puzzle. — frank

This is, to me, a complete and utter cop-out. YOu seem to accept that indirect realism is actually hte case, but that we have to pretend direct realism. This is, I would think, the position of indirect realists in geenral? Not the debate here, but that struck me as odd.

But the argument being presented by Michale, Amadeus and perhaps yourself has the pretence of being scientific. — Banno

Which, as far as defeating the notion of Red being 'out there', it is. The discussion you're having (which is a bit muddled and equivocal - might be hte point, though) is about how we use the word Red. Fine. That's not what Michael and I are getting at. We're talking about the colour 'red' as-experienced. That has been clear for pages and pages.

Then you render your position unfalsifiable? Or you classify Subject 1001 as abnormal?

You see, it's not only about biomechanics because it involves the subject's report. This is the bit that goes unrecognised in the "mental percept" account. — Banno

Ok, this clarifies what you're trying to say which I very much thank you for.... But this is just a silly as the previous version.

It is about Biomechanics. Otherwise, your TE is pointless. If it were about self-report the first 1000 are unreliable anyway.

What are we to make of this? Will we be good scientists and acknowledge the theory falsified, because Subject 1001 reports that they see blue? Or are we going to say instead that Subject 1001 is mistaken? — Banno

You would investigate a biomechanical reason for this. If V4 firing causes X cascade in the brain(resulting in the 'Red' experience, that is to say) for all other subjects, then subject 1001 is an anomaly and we would be bad scientists for thinking they were mistaken as opposed to different. Is what we're calling V4 the same

And yet there are red pens. — Banno

This is bare assertion; the responses to it going ignored. Hand waved, if you will.

To point out that red does not "exist" in "the" mind. — Banno

Red doesn't 'exist'. It consists in an experience we've termed Red. That this is a purely mental phenomenon doesn't disappear because you've chosen slightly less rigid language.

That seems to apply equally to C4 fibres and pain as well as V4 and seeing red. — creativesoul

Yes. I cannot fathom how this, if taken as true, allows Banno to pretend Red is in the pen. It isn't even part of hte process that gets us to Red, in this context.

Now the word "red" is no longer in books, on paper, spoken aloud for everyone to hear, or on our screens... it exists only in the mind. — creativesoul

This seems to be the (honestly, stupid) mis-interpretation Banno is running with. Its a bizarre one, and not hte position being put forward.

I'm sorry, but I'm not sure exactly what you are saying. Too many dots. — Ludwig V

Incredulousness. It's utterly insane that cyclists are legally allowed in bus lanes. Utterly bewilderingly dangerous - and it encourages cyclists to blame everyone else.

Huh. Interesting.

I'm unsure why this is written this way. This is actually encouraged in standardized Police-led cycling classes in Primary schools because children cycling on the road is an utterly deranged thing to push. This was true when I took those classes in 1996 and was true when my son did in 2017. Well see when my step son gets them next year. It may be that the wheel diameter regulation is to capture this.

Both law firms i've worked at are not under the impression this is an illegality LOL. Fair few fines being handed out for this in Wellington though (no surprises).

We can firm it up. There are true statements about unobserved things. "The cup is in the dishwasher" is true, even though we can't see the cup.

So if asked where the cup is, I'll say "It's in the dishwasher" rather then "I last saw it when I closed the door on the dishwasher, but I've no idea where it is now, or even if it still exists. You might try looking inside the dishwasher to see if it reappears". — Banno

This isn't anythign to do with truth, but practicality. Taking those words as true is helpful.

I see no contradiction in what you quoted of me in this post. — Apustimelogist

That's a shame. The two phrases are in direct contradiction.

you are addressing something vastly different to what I have written. — Banno

No, that doesn't seem to be hte case. It seems to be hte case that you're not really understanding what Michael and I have said in response to your position.

If you had just said "yes" in response to my question, it would have been clear. But given your response here, it remains to be seen whether you're even understanding the point.

"Red" does not exist outside the mind. This is true whether or not you take 'Red' to refer to "a" thing or "multiple" things. It isn't "out there", regardless.

In any case, I was trying to have you commit to a position on "Red" which is an apt thing to want you to do. If you position boils down to "Well, it doesn't matter - use it how you use it" then why are you here? If your position is that Red is something other than a mental experience of an "actual" thing then I would want to know what on God's Green Earth you could be referring to, given that Red is not mind-independent?

I did? Where? I'd like the context. — Banno

This is also what I got from you, so it's highly likely you misspoke if that's not your intention. Given I quoted you exactly saying colour words are used to refer to multiple things, this cannot be a failure of understanding or a confusion on our part. What do you refer to when saying "red"?

Why shouldn't we use the same word to refer to multiple, different things... indeed this seems to be exactly how colour words are used. They refer to multiple things that are quite different. — Banno

Is this to say you understand (if not accept) that Red the epxerience and Red the frequency range (if you insist on muddying hte water) aren't the same thing?

If so, the blatant confusion this is causing to erudite thinkers such as we'me (lmao) over something as simple as what Colour is should be reasno enough

Why do you trust a Geiger counter to tell you the local level of radiation? — Michael

Michael is now being slightly obtuse, but I think it's because he has answered this:

The experience resembles the cause. The reading of a Geiger counter does not resemble being irradiated.

Pretty clear Trump wont win now.

I do think, though, that it's pretty clear it's not Kamala winning but Trump leaning into all his worst aspects - as if that were the way to win an election smh. Even his voters probably prefer someone cogent, but dangerous, to someone intransigently irrational (and dangerous). And that's just perceptions - im sure the reality is worse for both.

therefore if direct realism is true then indirect realism is true — Michael

Haha, I'm not quite sure this is the conclusion that is required here - I think he's pointing out that it's likely neither are the whle story. But this was very, very funny.

I really don't like mine, so It's hard to comment but I have an (i take to be) intrinsic, unshakeable love for Ireland. I am Irish, but I've never lived there - just visited. Odd.

There should be even more pressure than there is already to separate pedal cycles from cars and other lethal heavy machinery. That's also just common sense. — Ludwig V

Here in NZ, cycles are legal on footpaths (we have a massive, shit-headed Green Lobby here that are insufferably stupid) and .......................................................... bus lanes.

That is exactly what I said you said. It is the exact same claim: You cannot infer anything objectively. So i take the inference, but you cannot add that its in an 'objective way' on the end - which is what I clarified and objected to.

you cannot know the intrinsic nature of the world but you can infer that the world indeed does exist when you are not looking at it. — Apustimelogist

What creates the depth perception of pain inside your lungs instead of a pain inside your bowels? — Lionino

You quoted from the comment which is, in almost it's entirety, a response to this:

the direction of stimulation is extremely influential on how we perceive the stimulus. Throwing one's voice is a good example of where this is writ large - despite there being no voice coming from the direction one perceives (when on the receiving end!) - that is what one perceives. We can even be tricked about hte direction stimulus is coming from. Not being able to locate an itch is another perfect example. "I can't put my finger on it" has developed out of this experiential norm. — AmadeusD

You could add phantom limb sensation to this as an exemplar of why it's totally wrong to think the pain is either occurring, or derived from, the cells you are perceiving to be hurt. They are injured. Not painful. Your mind creates the pain to alert you to the injury - and is very, very often inaccurate. Hell, seeing blood can increase the level of pain in an injury.

so too are there distinguishing properties of red and white images, and also distinguishing properties of the two sets of code that generates those different images. — Leontiskos

Those distinguishing features are not colours and we cannot accurately map them, other than standardized terminology such as ranges of frequency. It says nothing for their quality or how they have the mind (usually) spitting out a certain colour experience. "not knowing" isn't hte same as "knowing it's not".

Understanding the correct cause doesn't dispel the illusion. It becomes predictable. We can now predict when we will experience a mirage based on certain environmental conditions.

What I find so odd is when someone makes these scientific explanations, like frank did above, as if that somehow makes what we experience questionable, when science is based on empirical observations. — Harry Hindu

I'm finding it hard to tell whether you're partial to an indirect, or a direct conception of perception. But, given my own position i'll respond to what I see:

The first part: Fully agree. Understanding that C fibres fire, travel to the brain, and hte brain creates an illusion of "pain in the toe" rather than "signals from the toe being translated to pain to ensure I address the injured toe" has nothing to do with whether there is pain "in the toe". There plainly is not.

However, these are scientific explanations: The way pain works shuts down the option of direct perception of it. Hanover has made a similar point, and also noted that it just goes ignored - hand-waved away instead of confronted.

The science of perception, optical physiology, psychology and (in this context) the mechanics of pain fly in the face of a 'direct perception' account. It isn't even coherent, which has been shown several times. I personally find it helpful to continue the discussion, because it helps to streamline and economize responses to clearly inapt descriptions of experience. Intuitive, yes, but as helpful as folk psychology in understanding what's 'really' going on.

BUT, even with ALL of that said, if the point is that perception is necessarily indirect, then science can only get us so far. Observations are all we have - and I think Michael and I hit a bit of a curvy dead end with this issue. But, personally, I'm happy to just say science is the best use of our perception in understanding regularities of nature. Not much more could be said, unless we're just going to take the socially-apt chats about it at face value for practical reasons. In that case "science is objective" makes sense - but is just not true.

When you dream or hallucinate seeing a colour, you have the experience, but you don't see anything, and that's why they're called dreams and hallucinations. — jkop

I want to try to clarify this before responding - your position is that despite hte experiences being (at times, anyway) indistinguishable, they are not both experiences of colour?

I need this clarified, as currently, what you've asserted is bare nonsense. Your description actually supports the idea that colour does not reside in the object, but that, even so, you require an object to instantiate the colour? Are you saying the brain "records" colour from objects and replays it to itself while dreaming? Because... Ha...ha?

I would suggest the risk of designing your life oblivious to the dangers of lethal moving machines probably influences the over-all attitude toward accommodating cars.

Why not? — Apustimelogist

Perhaps you missed the aim with that quoteset - I'm sorry if it was insufficiently clear. I was trying to clever lol. I'll remove the quotes and just assert the position I think you're committed to, so the response is 'direct'.

"An inference which you've made about the world based on repeated experience can directly translate to a conception of the world in an objective way"

To me, this is plainly untrue (I think the problem in 'the thinking' is the same in the below example, which obvs ill get to lol). You cannot "objectively" infer anything, from anything. All you can say is "this is the best assumption available". No apodicticity or veridicality in it (although, I understand that by accident, you might still be 'correct').

If you have a mere inference about some proposition about 'the world' out there, you do not have any objective way to ascertain the accuracy of your inference. This is where Science is supposed to step in - but lets not open that can. But two examples I've raised for different reasons elsewhere are tides/waves and shadows. You can't accurately infer the shape of the object which caused a shadow from the shadow. You can accidentally be right, but the angles of light, the angle of hte object, the shape of hte surface, any intermediary issues like bright light or coloured light will affect the image you receive

If the tide near you has gone out, you might be about to drown. You couldn't know by inference. You'd naturally infer "Oh, the tide's gone out" or perhaps "Oh, the tide's gone out at a weird time" but that gives you no objectivity as to whether a Tsunami is coming.

As to the second comment, it really does depend what you're asking. It could be more like "Why do people take fire to exist?" Which is easily answerable (im sure I don't even need to do it for you).

Or, you could be asking why people are certain that fire exists. That one is more awkward, but probably because the benchmark for certainty is not the benchmark for apodicticity. Being certain means "beyond a reasonable doubt" not "beyond a logical possibility" and it is entirely logically possible fire does not exist (at least not in the form we take it to, let's say). Certainty just means you aren't questoning your position. Apodicticity means your position cannot be questioned on logical grounds (think law of identity).

I don't hold that Fire doesn't exist, but i am very, very much open to it not actually being in the form we perceive. It may be that fire is colourless to many animals, for instance, and only our perceptual apparatus allows us to essentially go "BIG HOT RED BAD LEAVE NOW". We have plenty of evolutionary ways to explain why we are how we are - including why we perceive colours, shapes and difference in general the way we do: Survival. There's nothing objective in this and I think Hoffman is at the very least, thinking about hte right things in this area. Pretending we know apodictically what's going on leads to dictators lol (that is genuinely jest, but i suppose there's something in it).

I don't really know what you're getting at here. China is not a very atheist country, at all.

In absolute numbers, China has the largest number of atheists in the world. There are countries with a larger percentage of atheists but the actual number of individuals is always a lot smaller. — Tarskian

Then your claim was misleading. 14.3% of China is Atheist according to those numbers you gave.
The top five countries for atheist begin their ranges at 65%(Japan) upward to 85% (Sweden).

I'm not trying to jump down your throat - but you need to be careful when you make claims like that. China cannot be even vaguely thought of as an atheist country.

What is being rejected here is not the physiology. What is being rejected is a reduction of colour to mere percept, because doing so fails to account for the use of colour terms in our everyday lives. — Banno

No, it doesn't do that at all and that's also entirely irrelevant to what is, at base, an empirical question. Is a wavelength of light the colour we perceive, when we don't perceive it?

Obviously not. Additionally, several physiological descriptions of light and sight, coupled with the knows facts of perception, fly entirely in the face of your position including those provided by Michael [url=http:// ]here[/url]

You're obviously free to reject them, but there is an extremely steep uphill battle for anyone claiming the experience of red is the wavlength of light which triggered it. To such a degree that I would call you Sisyphus.

Having

an inference — Apustimelogist

made about the world translate to a conception of the world ..

in an objectuve way. — Apustimelogist

Hmmm, I'm not sure I can accept this position.

At the same time, knowing that there exists a certain thing in the world doesn't mean one has to know the intrinsic nature of that thing, in the same way that someone might know fire exists but not know what fire is. — Apustimelogist

Non sequitur with the fire part. That's because the underlined is not true. To claim that you know that something exists does entail knowing something about it's intrinsic nature (i.e non-illusory for instance) as best i can tell.

You are not making any sense. Nothing will be interesting to someone who both dismisses criticism, and can't put together coherent thoughts.

This isn't a 'me' problem, Constance.

Well. If red is part of the light spectrum, and certain things reflect that range, and we're capable of detecting that range, that's how we see red things. light — creativesoul

This struck-out seems an empirical correction, to me. It's significant to how we conceptualise, though.

They would be reflecting that range even if we were not looking. — creativesoul

They would. And if you want to say they are still Red, in the absence of experience, I then require something else to refer to the experience. Seems simple enough to me... They clearly are not the same thing, so we shouldn't refer to them by the same term. I would not want to say they are Red, in that context at least and possibly, at all (depending on whether or not I decide on some stringent version of this that I like better than others (such as a new word for stretches of the light-spectrum that aren't number ranges)).

I presume you're in agreement with his view as shared here in this thread. — creativesoul

I'm not sure we're totally aligned, but I think i'm much closer to his position than others trying to (ironically, given the post above this) equivocate between a spectrum of light, and a mental experience.

Sure seeing a red pen is not equivalent to a red pen. Moreover, seeing red is not equivalent to red. <-----that's a problem as well. — creativesoul

In the Indirect Realism thread, I noted this issue (that I think is linguistic) and posited a better form(in my opinion):

We look at objects;
We perceive the reflected/refracted/whatever light;
We see the images our mind puts together for us to make sense of the first two.

This seems to adequately delineate what i think are three distinct aspects of what we colloquially refer to as "seeing a Red pen" (content arbitrary - we're just using that example in the exchange).

Rather than claim that the pen is reflecting the red part of the visible spectrum causing us to see red, you'd rather say that there is no red part of the visible spectrum, rather there are certain ranges that cause us to see red. — creativesoul

This makes sense to me, yes. It seems a pretty good description of what's actually happening rather than some formulation of "how i think of it". I'm not suggesting you are claiming one or the other here, just clarifying.
If red is just a part of the light spectrum (x to x frequencies) that's fine - but it means our epxerience of it is something else. If we're just singularly referring to different things, I'm unsure there's a solution other htan to adjust the language to note that. Though, to my mind, that's the case. The numbers which represent the range on the spectrum are what they are. The experience which is (usually, under 'normal' conditions) triggered by objects which reflect that range can't be the same thing. So, personally, i have no issue with things how they are - they seem to encapsulate the way i think about it as well. Though, this is going to obviously influence how much weight i put on either side of the coin.

Hmm? We could, by analogy, call the code white which causes the white image, but it is the image on the screen that is white, not the code. — Leontiskos

While i understand that you've removed what was a problematic formulation, this boils down to the same problem.

What is making that image white? Is it that "it reflects xxxx under normal circumstances"? Well, no. It is the light itself... So, the question is weirder now.
But for either the light, or a reflective surface of X property/ies, normativity is doing a lot of work there, and it also does not describe what we're trying to describe in any way. I find this a real problem. It may simply be that colours cannot be described other than by way of examples being generalised.

:up:

Then how do you not confuse a stubbed toe with a headache? — Harry Hindu

The same way you don't confuse the car on your left from the car on your right: the direction of stimulation is extremely influential on how we perceive the stimulus. Throwing one's voice is a good example of where this is writ large - despite there being no voice coming from the direction one perceives (when on the receiving end!) - that is what one perceives. We can even be tricked about hte direction stimulus is coming from. Not being able to locate an itch is another perfect example. "I can't put my finger on it" has developed out of this experiential norm.

On-point to your comment, your internal depth perception is what creates the experience of distance - not the distance itself. It is your mind interpreting it which is why perspective can get really fucked up really quickly in the right physical circumstances. The mind does what it thinks it should be doing. It is not veridical in the philosophical sense.

I should say, if your argument is in line with Banno's hand-waving idea that we can somehow magically see things veridically, despite that being in direct contradiction of hte science of perception, I'm unsure we'll get far - which si fine, just want to avoid you wasting your time here if so.

Hard to respond nicely. The bottom line is this: you really don't demonstrate any knowledge of the issues. Yet you have opinions. This is a very bad situation.

No offense intended to Americans, really. Just pretentious people and the hobgoblins of their little minds...... unless, that is, you actually have something to say about metaethics. — Constance

I see you have chosen to do nothing but slide further into ad hominem(and this time, it's outright racist). I am, again, not surprised. Please don't be surprised when you're treated the way you behave. It seems you're not even reading the comments you're responding to...

I am neither American, nor live in America. — AmadeusD

science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist

No, and that's fair but not quite relevant. My point is the clear contradiction in the two quotes i put forward. If the above is your position, then the second of those quotes needs to hold while the first needs to be let go. We cannot know anything about hte intrinsic nature of things = we cannot know there is an objective world out there. I take no position, for the sake of this discussion, just point out the break in the line of thinking there. You can't have both, basically.

I should point out that when I stub my toe, I feel the pain in my toe, not my head. — Harry Hindu

No, you don't. You feel the pain in your mind. Pain doesn't obtain in the cells of your toe. This kind of confusion is not unsurprising, or without its reasons, but is clearly wrong. A toe does not feel pain without a mind.

has a property of redness — Leontiskos

That is definitely not what "this pen is Red" means, or what a specialist is explaining. The specialist explains that Redness doesn't reside in the pen - redness is an experience triggered by the properties of the pen. The is how most experiences work. Why would colour be different? Joy isn't in a dog, or a child. It is triggered in me by the properties in those things. Similarly with satisfaction due to say symmetry. The symmetry isn't satisfying - my mind is satisfied by the properties instantiated in the symmetry. Symmetry is a good example, because we're usually visually fooled into the experience of satisfaction by symmetry. Actually symmetry is very rare in the world, but our minds 'create' the experience when triggered by certain external properties. They can't refer to the experience - they are the basis for it. Are we trying to create a circular relationship?

Consider two pens, a red pen and a white pen. Is it your claim that there is no external difference between these two pens? Or: that the only difference between the two pens is something the mind projects into the pens? — Leontiskos

It's neither. THe difference in teh pens is their respectively ability to reflect wavelengths of light. Unless you're equating the visual experience of Red as a 1:1 match with 430 THz of light, I'm unsure what's being posited... And if that is being posited it may be worth leaving off this discussion.

How can I experience colour!? What if I never experienced red colour, and you asked me for a red pen? I would feel a big feeling of anxiety in my chest because I would not know what to hand you. But I know that pens are for writing. Why do you want it red? Choosy boy. — javi2541997

Yes, this is a profound issue with claiming Red is 'out there'. If it were, the description would pick it out from the world. But it doesn't. It picks it out of experiences which is why we don't all agree on what Red is (or, at least, what shades come under the banner). If Red is only in the experience, then your anxiety is, while misplaced imo, reasonable. The problem of other minds rears it's head...
But, I did note somewhere (i think anyway lol), that Red as 'out there' is optimal, in the sense that it allows us to actually refer to it without consistent skepticism. Every now and then something comes aong with the blue/black white/gold dress phenomenon though, and somewhat brings this to light.

I also had a realization last night: My right eye is significantly worse than my left. It cannot perceive colours as brightly or as saturated as my left eye, and it also perceives objects as smaller than does my left eye.

Which one is 'correct'? Is 'worse' the right word? I have no idea, but i like the bright saturation of my left eye more. But it feels artificial now, like saturation level on a television.

What’s the ‘free miracle’? — Wayfarer

Where i put that, I just mean to indicate that we don't know (which ironically, is Carroll's view, elsewhere) and 'miracle' is a placeholder for whatever the answer is...could think here of the breathe-in-breathe-out view of the big bang, but we don't know whether or not that's the case. It would solve the 'miracle' is my point. Anything that answers the question is the 'miracle' until it's found. — AmadeusD

Please take notice, AmadeusD, That after reading your post, twice, I find nothing at all that is responsive to the idea you quote. Do read this thing you wrote, and ask: Did you address, or even mention, the claim made in the quote to target for criticism? What does Sartre have to do with it? Self involved, preening narratives?? These are just words thrown.

You do sound like someone who posts on social media a lot. Ah America, the vast land of the mostly unread! — Constance

Let's work through this:

1. I am in no way surprised;
2.

continental philosophy is rhetoric only. — AmadeusD

- you said literally nothing of substance. I doubt you could tease apart what you meant from all this. It appears whenever challenged, you just blurt out more vaguely-philosophy-sounding lines probably taken from other's texts. It's nonsensical (the quote i responded to). So, I have responded to it directly;
3.

What does Sartre have to do with it? — Constance

- find it extremely unlikely you can't see what Satre has to do with a criticism of Continental philosophy - that would be bizarre, given your reliance on it but ignore if you want;
4.

self-involved, preening narratives — AmadeusD

- this is the form of the majority of Continental Philosophy, on my view - again, a direct response to the obvious nonsense you've written - it is self-obsessive and devoid of any openness or willingness to be discussed. Granted, I've been dismissive - you haven't attempted to defend yourself philosophically, so it's quite easy to do so;
5. This is my 'social media'. I would avoid ridiculous ad hominems like this, particularly when you are dead wrong;
6. I am neither American, nor live in America. Once again, do not make ad hominem assertions when you are A. on the lower end of clarity, and B. clearly wrong (my bio would have stopped you from this one).

Please avoid devolving into comments about me rather than my comments. I have stuck to commentary on your comments. I'll do so again:

On order to take metaethics seriously, one has to look, not to the concept, the understanding's counterpart to the living actuality, but to just this actuality. — Constance

This is risibly incoherent, and means nothing. As noted, rhetoric is hte language of the Continentals. You've used that form, and it's glaringly devoid of any substance. Let's look at a couple of other passages from yourself:

so in the "argument" of our ethical lives is upended by evil. — Constance

But God, divested of the usual anthropomorphic features and all the absurd narratives, reduced to its essence, remains, as does the authority it possesses. — Constance

The only way I can confirm such an idea evil is a privation would be to ignore the direct evidence of suffering. But is this reasonable? I do think it right that ordinary lived life is a privation of certain possibilities, among which are positively extraordinary and important in ways impossible to assimilate into familiar assumptions. — Constance

These are assertions with no logical, or practical support in your comments. Your conception of "evil" is such that it is a self-evident truth. This is.. to put it mildly... ignorant to 2000 years of thinking on the subject.

And this line about 'God' is pure nonsense. It makes absolutely no sense other than to say that when you, personally, think about God and choose not to imagine a Human embodiment, you get the same Character as would any other conception of God (the omin's, the dictatorial ethical norm etc...). This is bizarre, to say the least, and philosophically, I would say, embarrassing.

The bolded (and surrounding quote) is akin to a random word generator given the prompt "use some big words". This one doesn't even make grammatical sense. And while i accept there may be a typo, the lack of coherence in the majority of your comments leads me to believe that is not the case..

:

I would appreciate if my thread didn't turn into a discussion around someone else's nonsensical pet theories. — Lionino

That's fair.

Well, yes. It's not my position, to be clear.
But if you're invoking something which does not have duration or, at least, has a different sort of duration (think multi-dimensionality, i guess) then the two 'sets' could, in theory, proceed without interacting (which would cause one, interrupted duration as I see it).

The basis for this breaks down into Humean skepticism nevertheless.

I agree, it's a better model, but a model nonetheless. I don't think it gets closer to any kind of certainty. We're just saying "Okay, let's run with it until we stab ourselves".