Here, you imply that we cannot see objects, for the reason that light intervenes between the objects and the visual system. If that is not what you meant, and there is some other argument here, I cannot see what it could be. — Jamal

Thank you for going through and finding the relevant passage. I cannot understand how you're getting there, though:

for the reason that light intervenes between the objects and the visual system — Jamal

Not at all. The inference (and, from what I see, the only reasonable one) is that I deny that we directly perceive objects because the light is what is affecting hte visual system - not the object. You can glean this easily by noticing the following:

I'm still wanting an explanation of how it's possible we're seeing "actual objects" that i can explore. Every explanation attempting to do so just ignores entirely that we literally do not see objects, but reflected/refracted light which in turn causes us to 'see' a visual construct. No one seems to disagree, but still reject the fact that we cannot ever access external objects. — AmadeusD

I even scare-quoted 'see' because of the linguistic issues. This is your use of hte term not mine. I would have used 'perceive' if I was writing to an open audience. Light doesn't intervene - it is the vehicle by which the object reaches the sense organs. Space intervenes, I guess. There is a distance between the object and our eye/s. Light traversing that distance is mediated by the environment, in most cases, which we've not touch by further goes to my point that we do not directly perceive objects, nor could we. I also highlight, again, the underlined above as its required for an adequate alternate view to consider. I notice, from the comment box, you are bowing out. So be it.

f you don’t actually mean what you say, and you can’t remember what you said, and you’re unwilling to read over what you’ve said before to understand my objections, then it’s not surprising that I’m not getting through to you. — Jamal

You are simply not reading very well, and choosing passages you think support some 'gotcha' around what im saying. Aside from the fact that i've been very open about re-defining the terms to make sense of the ideas as I go, this is a very bad-faith way of going about things. I get that you don't want to, anymore, but just ask me to clarify if you have issues. here, though, I already did - twice, so you're still remaining in a box of your own creation, if you're taking obviously badly-formulated statements over the clarifying ones. It is not that you're not getting through to me, my friend. It is that you are not adequately engaging what i've said.

I can’t tell if it’s just that your reading comprehension is bad or if you’re intellectually dishonest. — Jamal

Oh, my. LOL. It's neither. But, I also note that you think directly addressing objections, and clarifying my position is "ranting and raving". I have no idea why you're bringing such emotionally charged language into an exchange that should be about achieving clarity, if not a coming to terms. You seem to me more than happy with obstructing clarity, and then concluding its my issue to overcome.

I was right to note that "This bodes extremely badly..". I should have left it there.

I don't think you're in touch with the facts on teh ground, in this case.

The analogy is between feeling (pain) and seeing (objects). — jkop

Yes, but I do not see any analogy between them, as noted, for the reason noted. I think your terming of the sides of the analogy is inaccurate to what they represent.

Is visual data not the result of certain biophysical causal chains? Or do you just mean that it's the result of other causal chains? What Is an example of positive empirical evidence for visual data? — jkop

Well, when i refer to 'visual data' I mean the electrical information being passed from whatever the light rays have reflected off of, into the eye, through the cones etc.. and then into the brain - the data itself is not experienced at all. The brain forms an experience-apt representation of that data. I guess I'm trying to delineate between the electrical 'fuel' fed into the brain, and the experience of it. Similarly with pain - pain is an experience of C-fibres firing in the absence of a brain or neuronal aberration. This may be coarse or imprecise, so I apologise if its hard to grasp what im saying - haven't gotten a great handle on translating thought to clear language in the philosophical context, as is probably obvious LOL.

What is the light reflected/refracted by? — wonderer1

No idea. My part in the process(and as such, the point at whcih I could say anything about it) comes after that, as best I can tell. I could say "the objects" but then im stuck with literally nothing else to say about it.
==============================================
Hi Jamal; it will become quite clear throughout my response that I'm of the view you have misread (and, from what I can tell, willfully) large parts of my responses throughout the last couple of pages evidenced by 1:0 matches in your response to specific passages. Forgive any instances where I appear to have my back up. I do. You do not appear to be dealing with my positions properly, and its difficult to get through as I'm being forced to discuss views I don't hold, in the context of a defense. But know that I appreciate any words anyone is willing to bother putting down for me.

Ah, so you’re one of those guys! — Jamal

This bodes extremely badly for whatever you have to say...

Your questions imply that you consider the seeing of a thing to require that there be no light passing between the thing and the eye; that if there is a physical process involved in the perception of a thing, that thing is not being perceived. — Jamal

This is not my position and I have absolutely no clue how you could possibly glean this from anything I have said. I've not intimated anything of hte sort. I want an explanation, from someone who claims visual access to the external objects "behind" perception (as it were, on my account) about how that happens. Really simple, if you have a theory about it, lay it out. If not, I will assume you have none. But, ironically in comparison to a quote of yours further down this response, your uses of 'seeing' and 'perception' here are extremely confusing.

You say we see light — Jamal

I do not. I have been clear to point out that uses of the word 'see' in conflicted instances have muddled the entire thing and attempted to clear up my terms that 'see' are used for into "look at" and "see". I did this very recently in the exchange and apologise for any preceding confusion. I'll leave that there.

I would have expected this to be your kind of position. — Jamal

It is. And having gone back through my posts, I have to say its bizarre to me to have gotten something other than this from my writing. If you could please outline for me precisely where this idea has come from, I'd be more than happy to clarify wherever I misspoke (as must be the case given this is exactly my position), or adjust/reject my clearly erroneous utterance at the time.

why does your personal use of the word differ so much from everyone else’s? — Jamal

If you mean 'see', its because its used in an extremely bad way and the colloquial meaning is usually taken on, even here, and I've merely done what most philosophers do (though, I am not one, obviously) and defined my terms - just happened to be part-way through the exchange because this isn't an academic exchange in the sense that I needed notes beforehand. We "look at" objects, receive the light being reflected and perceive the internal mind-produced representation. Provide another mechanism, if you don't think this is correct...

Of course, the particular problem here is really just linguistic — Jamal

Yes, and that has been my position since realising no one has provided anything resembling an objection. This is why i defined terms, and Why its really hard to read this all in good faith.

New York I’m travelling to, directly. — Jamal

Practically, sure, and 'practically', I don't walk around noticing that I'm not in touch with my environment, directly. But you are patently not traveling 'directly' to New York if you're passing through other spaces between your current, and New York. That would be indirect, obviously. Colloquial uses of words are a serious issue, and apparently, not cleared up on a forum like this, ironically.

how incredulous you are — Jamal

I literally pointed out that I am not incredulous, and apologised if I appeared so. This exchange is becoming more and more clearly a punt on your part.

but it does show that your incredulity is inappropriate. — Jamal

There is none, as above. It would be helpful (and I am not at all being facetious here) if you could carefully read what I've typed before replying to it - the number of patent errors in terms of your groking my passages is uncomfortable.

And didn't you see my quotation from Kant himself, arguing against two worlds? — Jamal

Unless I'm misremembering, yes, and I responded to it directly and we exchanged on it. Kant contradicts his own system in such a claim. So, again, the above interpretation.

Kant is not any kind of idealist at all — Jamal

Yep, I know. Indirect Realism seems both Kant's position, and the best representative of the scientific facts of our visual/perception complex. If this entire exchange and objection/response flow actually just boils down to an unfortunate assumption on your part that "two worlds" in my mind means literally two separate worlds, then that's a shame and perhaps I underestimated the stupidity of certain philosophical positions. The idea that there are literally 'two worlds' is utterly bizarre to me and it hadn't occurred to me it was being used this way.

The idea that there are clear two absolutely distinct aspects to reality from a human perspective, seems undeniable. If this murky use of words has been the issue then, returning to your claim that its a linguistic problem, yes. End of.

If there is any particular statement of mine about Kant's philosophy that strikes you as outrageous — Jamal

Given that I began my substantial replies with something to the effect of 'everything you have said is fair enough and reasonable' I feel fairly justified in just saying, nah dude. Please read more carefully. Nothing you've said about Kant is anything but reasonable, even if I think its wrong.
===============================

properties of the external world objects. — Michael

Is this to say things like 'redness' and 'warmth' inhere in the objects (on this account)?

3. — Michael

fwiw, and maybe this will help Jamal, this is closest to where I am currently.


"What does it mean to literally see an object?" (sorry, had to copy from my notifications as I couldn't find hte post

Well, yeah, that's a serious issue given we seem to all mean different things. And the definition of 'to see' includes two separate concepts: to look at something (i.e "with the eyes") and "perception" which is an act of the mind. So, its an incongruent complex imo and largely is hte reason for what I take to be Jamal's misapprehensions of my position, let alone my arguments.

On my use of the word, it would mean to have a visual experience without any mediation from the object to the experience. My preferred terms, as noted, work thus:

To Look: To turn one's visual sense organ to an object (obviously, thats redundant.. our eyes work lol).
Conference: An event, in which photoreceptor cells/cones etc.. respond to light by shunting electrical signals through various apparati to the visual cortex.
To See (perceive): To have a visual experience which the visual cortex has produced from that received data.

I don't note any objection to this formulation of how sight works. So I can't understand objections to the position that "to see" is not to directly perceive an object. Im not sure how you can claim that we 'perceive' objects.
==============================

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68232883

"There is no other solution but a complete and final victory"

It is very, very hard to have sympathy for the Israeli state at times like this, despite under standing full well they were provoked into this military action.

Went to a random thread. Was not disappointed. First time i've felt like responding the way Banno does.

Is the general consensus around here that social hierarchy is not either default, or efficient?

the doctrine is secondary to an attitude and a way of life and derives from that, rather than the other way about — Ludwig V

Does this explain some of the cognitive dissonance required for specific religious claims counter to empirical evidence forr you?

Ah! Fair enough - well glad to have a cordial 'proper' intro.

Welcome to the forum Dan :) I can see you're going to really contribute a lot here. Unfortunately, my interests and proclivities aren't around mathematics or modal logic per se so we may not interact too much - but very glad to have you here, from what i've seen :)

Stream of consciousness is cool in modernist fiction but confusing in this context. :wink:

Anyway, it’s rhetorical bluster with a hint of bullshit, but it seems good-natured so you’re forgiven :grin: — Jamal

I can't grok what you're getting here, but there's no bullshit to be found. Using analogies isn't bullshit, and neither is what im trying to get across. Appreciate being forgiven for something I didn't do, though :)

The key secondary text is Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. — Jamal

It is, if you want to support that position(im joking; I'm not up at all enough to say something like that - However, from what I know of this text its main thrust is purely to point out that Kant isn't denying external reality). But, having recently come to the CPR I literally have never seen a respected philosopher claim what you're claiming. Perhaps 'patent' is a touch far, but as I see it, this is the standard for anyone not trying to be edgy. It also seems to be actually be what Kant said he was doing. So, fair play, if there is an entire swathe of top notch fellas/fellettes who are saying what you're saying. I am unaware and plead ignorance on that one. I would also note that post-hoc discussions about Kant aren't what I'm referring to anyhow - though, I appreciate that to your mind that's a problem. For me, it would be a problem had i read a number of secondary sources and then pretended their interpretation was bunk on its face. Trying to illustrate that I've not got that option open to me, currently.

(at this stage, I just want to say I really appreciate the tone and engagement in the remainder of your post. Not sure how I'll be responding but I appreciate it)

Talk of a noumenal world looks plainly wrong to me, since noumena are objects of thought — Jamal

I agree with this. Mww sorted me out in terms of when and when not to refer to Noumena, though, that seems to be a real debate among 'scholars'. But, i run with the idea that yes ding-an-sich is 'actual object', 'noumena' are conceptual as are beyond our perception, but not conception, whereas phenomena/possible phenomena are wholly ours to perceive and conceive as we wish. Unsure what that does for our discussion, but i definitely didn't do anything to help myself there lol.

BTW I have personally found LLM AI tools to be sometimes bad with philosophy so I suggest you avoid them except perhaps for guiding your study—certainly don’t give them the last word. — Jamal

I don't use them for anything except summarizing passages/chapters/sections in my 'academic' life :) Appreciate the advice!

Likewise — jkop

This is an extremely loud red flag to me. There is no analogy between 'pain' and 'actual objects'. That was actually the entire point of the rhetoric i put out. No one claims there's 'pain' out there not being experienced.
The same can't be said for objects. It's not like there is pain, which enters the brain, and is projected into experience. Pain is the experience of certain biophysical causal chains. Not so with visual data, imo.

The experience has a mind-to-world direction of fit. — jkop

Agree, and noted earlier (repeating as its relevant, not out of annoyance) that the direction of fit in terms of us thinking we 'see' things is one of evolutions greatest feats. That says nothing for us 'seeing' objects. Though, again, use of the term See, as Searle quite rightly points out, is extremely difficult here. 'see' might only refer to receiving light rays. 'experiencing' might be more apt for the experience of the mind-created visual. I would prefer "look at" to represent the act of turning ones eyes to an object, and 'seeing' as the process of world-to-mind and 'visual experience' as .. well, what it is :P

Not directly at anyone:
I'm still wanting an explanation of how it's possible we're seeing "actual objects" that i can explore. Every explanation attempting to do so just ignores entirely that we literally do not see objects, but reflected/refracted light which in turn causes us to 'see' a visual construct. No one seems to disagree, but still reject the fact that we cannot ever access external objects. It's an odd thing to note. Seems to always boil down to 'we look at something, therefore...' with no treatment of the intermediary..

While we see eye-to-eye on a lot of this, it is patently hte case that there is no analogy whatsoever between Native Americans who were purposefully killed through many avenues, with the express aim of their absolute removal from the Earth - and largely succeeding - and Palestinians who are growing, as a population.

Your defence amounts to no more than that only because Israel is not killing them fast enough to keep up with the birth rate it's not genocide — Benkei

I think you are unfortunately playing the same weird equivalence game the 'other side' does here. That's not what the defence amounts to, whatsoever. It is a fact that a genocide isn't occurring when a culture has retained its status and grown in population.

I may need to ;)

Corrections are intended to correct. I do not see that you've done this. Asking to be corrected is not asking to be either taken for a ride, or to accept any objection on its face. I've tried to explore the ideas you've put forward and tehy are left wanting to me. If you see this as you describe, far be it from me :)

Yes. They are. Unsure why you're somehow using that as the examplar of the argument, rather than a fairly direct and illustrative couple of analogies. Which you've said it is. So, at a bit of a loss mate :\ They illustrate well that aspect of what I've put forward that you are not getting. If you're not wanting to explore that, then so be it! No issue :) Perhaps I just don't understand - and if that's the case, I couldn't accept what you're putting forth anyway so please don't fault me for either 1. disagreeing with you; or 2. Not understanding you. I am trying to be honest, not difficult.

But as an example, it seems patently incorrect when you reject the notion that Kant uses the 'two worlds' model. It is clear he does, and this is expressed by other philosophers constantly (most recently for me, in episode #063 of Philosophize This!) as "Noumenal world" and the "Phenomenal World". This sits well with my reading. As does this response from DeepAI:

Q: does the Critique of Pure Reason set out two worlds, one being Noumenal and one being appearance? (i purposefully formulated this badly to see if It required any massaging to get the answer I 'wanted'.

A: Yes, the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant does set out two distinct worlds: the Noumenal world, which is the world of things as they are in themselves beyond human perception, and the Phenomenal world, which is the world of appearances as they appear to us through our senses. Kant argues that we can never know the Noumenal world directly, as our perceptions are always shaped by our mental faculties and categories of understanding. The Phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the world as it appears to us, and is subject to the limitations of human perception and cognition.

If, to you, this isn't exactly what i've been putting forward, im unsure where we could go.

Thanks for the walm welcome. — DanCoimbra

I assume you're taking it in good humour, but i am sorry. I should've been more cordial in a first comment!

at least conceivable that there could be cognitive machines (functional minds) outputting false beliefs about there being ineffable experiences. — DanCoimbra

I suppose to me, that is true, but its not worth pursuing given we haven't got started as to how to attempt to move toward bringing it about, really. But you're right - it is conceivable and imo, logically possible. I bite the p-zombie bullet as it is atm

a more expansive view of civil rights. — Relativist

Not always going to be a good thing. But hte former is definitely true, and good (in the sense that its worse to have a Republican swaying reproductive legislation).

prima facie, I'd agree, thought intl law isn't my area. It seems quite clear that this would need to be 'heard'. I do have serious reservations above proving criminal intent though. All the statements i've seen from Israeli officials, while uncomfortable to me, appear to be sane, if heavy handed, responses to a terrorist attack aimed at maiming your population and geopolitical stability.

Sure. That's not relevant though. It could have been purely a development in tactic, route-setting (int he sense of knowing other's attempts) or body type. It doesn't say anything about competition - particularly considering this is an outlier. As an example, Caldwell has freed the Nose twice in less than half the time it took Lynn.

I also note Angela Eiter as an exceptional contemporary female climber. Again, I am not knocking female climbers. But they are just plain and simple on different levels to males, and they know this. Female bouldering problems are notoriously easier than males in competition.

Thank you for the link. I will make comments as going through.

I think the use of 'see' throughout this essay is misleading. It assumes direct perception, instead of 'proving' it.

"If the perceptual experience could talk it would say, “If I am to be satisfied (veridical) I must be caused by the very object of which I seem to be the seeing.”

Why would we need this to happen, unless you're trying to prove direct perception? This seems to reverse engineer a situation that supports the conclusion. It seems to be that Searle has, here, smuggled in the requirements of his fourth element (intentionality). That seems to be lifting everything from that bullet point forward.

"Confining ourselves to seeing the tree in front of me we can say that the conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience are that there has to be a tree there and the fact that the tree is there is causing in a certain way the current visual experience. "

but this artificially removes the aspects of perception that would dog this account...like the mediation of the senses as delusion (sans brain aberration) shows.

"but when I see the tree I cannot separate the visual experience from an awareness of the presence of the tree."

Only IFF you're directly perceiving (i.e he's referring to the tree, not the representation of the tree.. Important below).. as above.

"This is true even if it is a hallucination and even if I know that it is a hallucination... I have the experience of the perceptual presentation of an object even though there is no object there."

True. Which is why the initial contention doesn't make a lot of sense to me. You could just plum be hallucinating a tree looking out your California Coast window. Would this just collapse into a representation? Then how do you know the difference, in practice? Seems tautological or requiring an unstated axiom, which is that there's a 1:1 match between reflected light and visual experience. That seems an odd contention well-guarded against by the reality of our visual system.

"but when I see the tree I cannot separate the visual experience from an awareness of the presence of the tree. "

I seem to be capable of this. My visual experience gives me awareness of my visual experience. Not whatever caused it (on my account). As noted elsewhere, its unavoidable that something caused you to experience the perception of anything, other than pure hallucination (dreams, for instance, where no empirical avenue is available). But directly perceiving it...

"What is the relationship between the sense data you do perceive and the real world that you do not perceive?"

I'm not all that interested in this question, but I have no idea why the rejection of it.. Is it because its hard, or devalues philosophy generally as discussion of hallucination? Doesn't strike me as particularly an issue..

"these visual experiences. Call them ‘sense data’."

Not how i'd use the word. The "sense data" is fuel for the experience - its fed into the machine of our cognition and output as a visual experience - but we're not seeing our own photoreceptors or brain-regions when we 'experience' vision. We're seeing a coherent set of data represented to our visual faculties - only made coherent by the activity of our cognitive faculties. Thus, stroke patients do not have a coherent visual field (by accounts i've heard) while their brain is unable to adequate synthesise the sense-data into a coherent experience. I have had that experience, though not by stroke but by drug use and mental exhaustion (separately).

"The crucial step in the argument from illusion as stated is step 4."

And there we have it.

"In the hallucinatory case, there is no independently existing object causing the experience"

I think this relies on a misuse of the word "hallucinatory". Hallucination is defined as he posits... it can read across (as a negation) to "actual perception" as such without his take. If you, without adequate empirical reason, immediately note what is already understood as a hallucination, to be importantly different to "seeing" then you just might be defining-out actual visual experience without noticing. On my account, it's quite likely. Though, I don't see 'hallucination' in quite the denatured light Searle appears to. My response would, prima facie be "yes, that's right. And while you're recognising that, by definition, an hallucination is not the same as 'seeing' that's just linguistics being tricky".

"The visual experience is a conscious event going on in the brain but, and this is the important point, visual experiences cannot themselves be seen because they are the seeing of objects and states of affairs in the world. When you see something, the seeing itself cannot be seen, just as when you hit a nail with a hammer the hitting cannot itself be hit."

This is true whether an object is there or not(hence, the immediately-previous comment) - it just presupposes that in use of 'see' Searle has established an object is there, actually. Definitionally, within this essay, sure, but its not supportive of the thesis imo.

Ok, so it appears this essay isn't dealing with the problem I'm identifying at allllllll:

"The scientist says we are trying to explain the cause of your visual experience and what we discovered is neurobiological processes cause a conscious visual experience. But then, surely, it seems that the visual experience is the object of your capacity of perception. It is what is seen. This last sentence embodies the mistake. The visual experience is not seen because it is the case of seeing the object. "

This isn't an issue for me. Obviously the "visual experience" isn't seen. It is the experience of seeing. But again, Searle would fall back on a definition of 'see' that requires direct perception - I can't see that he's gotten past the mediation required for visual experience to happen at all. I really hope to learn to write Philosophy well, specifically to counter-act this type of jiggering and misunderstanding within a piece of writing. Conflating an 'experience' with it's contents is a real problem, imo.

"The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain."

Duhhh. They are identical in that there is only the experience of pain... there is no "the pain" to my mind. Who claims that "the pain" is different to the experience of pain? I've not seen that anywhere. Is someone claiming there's 'pain' out there not being experienced?

"Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving."

This strikes me as if Searle confused himself, then tried to untangle his own confusion. The "experience of perceiving" is not an "experience" in-and-of-itself. It consists in its contents. So, that's a misnomer. Perception is a biophysical process which results in an experience - but an experience must be of something. He's rejected sense-data and then just not dealt with it at all... Interesting read. Of what, John?

I'm getting a bit too busy at work now to read more at the present moment. Probably everything above is nonsense and I look forward to being told why :)

Isnt this merely the difference between an implicit and an explicitly articulated overlap between Rawls and Hegel? — Joshs

Not to my mind, but a fair objection. Being influenced by someone's thinking or writing doesn't mean taking on their positions, whether philosophical or otherwise, to me. Even 'heavy' influence doesn't mean you're going to even appear related. What I would say is that had Rawls explicitly written on Hegel and Hegel's work itself I would then have no choice but to judge Rawls work as inextricably connected with Hegel's and that they stand together, in some sense. As it stands, I see influence in his separate, and unique work which is 'Rawls work on Legal and Political philosophy", rather than "Rawls work on Hegel" and do not see them stand together. A good personal example is my current "being influenced" by Alfred North-Whitehead whos thinking I am coming to really enjoy and probably will take on some aspects of - but his theses? Not my bag at all, in terms of conclusions.

If I tell you I am strongly indebted to the work of Kant, and you then claim that Kant’s work is non-philosophy, then it seems to me you're indirectly invalidating or failing or understand an aspect of my own work. — Joshs

This doesn't hit at all for me, so I guess that's the difference. I cannot see how they connect - Eg. If you incorporate George Lucas into your work, and it's insightful philosophically, that's a good thing and a success for you. But it doesn't make Lucas a philosopher(or Gaarder, or Gibran, or Bulgakov (or all of hte Russians lol)).
If you are somehow offended (not emotionally, but in terms you supplied) by my denying that Kant is a philosopher (lol.. nice eg) then that appears to me something you should work through. It smacks of taking your ball and going home because someone said your wooden plank isn't actually a baseball bat.

I think plenty of super-bright per se philosophers are influenced by plenty of per se non-philosophers. I don't deny this one is a controversial claim to that though :P

Is this quote to insinuate that I am somehow wrong to posit that Rawls didn't write about Hegel in his career generally? I want to be clear: It could be that Rawls only citation is Hegel - but unless he's specifically trying to elucidate Hegel in his own work, I can't rightly justify a reading-acorss. That's all.

I imagine Rawls protesting vigorously to your characterization of Hegel’s thinking as non-philosophy — Joshs

For sure. I estimate some 65% of Philosophers proper would. But I wouldn't shy from that..

depends on in how high of a regard you hold Rawls’s judgement on such matters. — Joshs

I don't think it should. Rawls is obviously an absolute powerhouse of Legal and Political Philosophy. But whether I take him to be X level of successful in his work shouldn't reflect his influences unless they are seriously direct influences (i.e he was writing about Hegel in his career generally

Even if you take out all the supernatural elements from the Bible, there is still no evidence to believe those stories happened. — Lionino

I repeat my first: It seems you haven't actually looked into these discussions past your fairly uninterested (meaning dispassionate) glancings. Your rejections seem to be based on distaste.

At risk of sounding defeated, nothing in your above comment seems to be more than your distaste for either a method or a source. I will remain on the side of the overwhelming consensus of historians.

Lets leave it :)

Interesting turn in the last page or two. I see Dennett rearing his head in these discussions.

I think it is, even after reading Dan's elucidative posts, a really hard sell that Dennett even gets off the ground in reducing qualia to something other than qualia. The idea that "unification", "access" and "temporality" of conscious states is amenable to change doesn't at all infer, to me, that qualia are not qualia as currently understood. Its not just counter-intuitive, but counter possible-experience. In that way, even if it were true, I don't think its actually reasonable to expect a human mind to discuss the fact of its non-existence - given we operate via qualia at levels from sense experience to thought.
It may not be virtuous to be dismissive, but I do think it's virtuous to not waste time discussing something that, at it's base, appears to be not possible.

I would say that quotation (and what I take as implications of it, for your views) comports with what I had taken them to (very vaguely) be, so that's cool. I would agree.

While it pains me to do so, I must disabuse you of the notion I am a lawyer - I am a legal professional working towards becoming a lawyer. I am partially qualified and have a cool certificate from a University to that effect - just not an LLB degree. Though, should say, I have more experience than most lawyers i've worked for hehe. In fact, the guy who lent me his textbooks for my first year (he is in his final year and will be a lawyer by August) interviewed for my job last week (I am being internally promoted). So, an odd situation - but please don't take me to be a lawyer!! It would be illegal by my country's laws to hold myself out as such.

Re Rawls: Hmm I wouldn't say so but I do think he posits "morality" where its absolutely unwelcome, in a similar way to Hegel.
That said, I do not take "influence" to be a reason for such a rejection. If Rawls stands on his own, and works Hegel into reasonable insights, that's his success, rather than Hegel's. The Dialectic might be really useful for working through potential legal ramifications of legislation. That would be Rawls' achievement to be proud of.

There are transsexual climbing groups now. Problems within the climbing community. — jgill

It is utterly insane to me that anyone takes seriously the concept of males crying victim because they're prevented from victimising females. I can't take it seriously. I just can't. Call me whatever you want. Its laughable that this is an issue.

Sorry but 1 hour about a topic that is not horribly important to me seems a bit much. — Lionino

Fair enough. We need not care about much :D

profoundly alien to what you are used to — Joshs

Not at all. His mode of thinking is what I was stuck in for a decade or so. That's why i recognize how ridiculous much of it is. I recognize my own errors in his writing.

I consider him to be without question among the greatest thinkers of the modern era. — Joshs

You may, and that's fine. Plenty don't. I am one(though, I note, there are others with exception philosophical acumen(not me) who also don't). He is a confused theosopher, to me, who couldn't write a coherent paragraph to save his child.
But, As i take it, you are very much a thinker of the left where writings of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Zizek and continental philosophy, generally, have a fairly high status. We're just running in dissimilar circles intellectually, I think. I take Lionino's line on Marx too.

I don't see how the crufixion of Jesus is externally supported. — Lionino

Then I don't think you've paid cursory attention to the topic.

See also : The Cambridge Companion to Jesus by Tuckett. Historians generally agree it occurred (Our friend Bart, here too).

It is not about theology. — Lionino

it is, though. So im unsure why you'd wade into this pretending it isn't. It is squarely theology, and perhaps this is what you've missed. The historicity of Jesus is a study theological in nature, and at the very, very least "biblical scholarship" can't be left off the description. But, in any case, this is actually pretty much settled history.

Thank you guys :) Just to preface, for you all, absolutely everything you've said is 'fair enough' and I don't mean to sound incredulous, if I do, below.

I am not aware of any competing theories. And as I have already acknowledged scientific theories are never proven; it is always the case that they may be wrong. — Janus

And this seems, clearly to me, but perhaps not others, because we have no direct access to confirm or deny any findings. We are necessarily precluded from 100% certainty for this reason. Inference can never be 100%.
Maybe I'm picking up something irrelevant to your formulations? could be, and if that's true, we may not even be disagreeing. But, I mean, I agree, carving off theologica, with your assessment. That's not really relevant. It could be that even the theologica didn't exist, and this theory could be un-ensurable.

I don't think you have grasped it — Janus

I understand (it's clear) you think this, but it is inaccurate. It doesn't change my position whatsoever. That said, I disagree with Kant, using his own account. Its not possible, from CPR, to conclude there is "one world" where somehow our intuitions (which are not the objects they represent) actually are those objects. This is probably something beyond this discussion..So, idk. Maybe I'll leave that one here because it doesn't seem we'll come to terms.

then in that connection we have access to them — Janus

Disagree and have outlined in detail why not, in previous replies. Will leave this one.

we do not know, and do not have access to what and how they are in themselves. It's really not that hard to understand. — Janus

According to your responses, it's extremely difficult :smirk: I am genuinely joking - I don't know what to do with this passage given my position. I don't think its well-placed.

=================================

but since we don't know the limits of nature, we shouldn't invoke the miraculous — Manuel

I certainly agree with this, so perhaps I just misunderstood.

But if you are a panpsychist in general — Manuel

I think I'm leaning this way, but i'm not all that well versed in metaphysics thus far. Panpsychism, on its face, seems to solve a few problems i see. Not tied to it.
=================================

You’ve said it yourself: you think an external object just is a thing as it is in itself. — Jamal

My position is that that is the a fact. A version of 'external object' which resides in the head(i.e experience) is quite plainly nonsensical. I think claiming this isn't Kant's position, even with Kant possibly not owning it, is tantamount to being dishonest (more on why, below, after you quoted something which seems to ensure that this is the case). His writing is known to be confused in places, and this seems to be one. He does not give us room to make this chess move in the CPR.

He is saying that inner experience — Jamal

Which is literally all we have. I'm having a lot of trouble understanding what you're objecting to...

Then he goes on to present his own contrasting position — Jamal

The quote you presented is a perfect example where I am arguing against Kant, partially because he makes no sense, and partially because I think he's wrong.
The quote posits that, somehow, even though internal experience is all we have to judge (which Kant accepts) we have 'direct' access to external objects, not found in experience. Totally incoherent on his account itself.

Since we have direct access to external objects, their existence is not merely inferred — Jamal

We don't. I think you're making a misreading of Kant either way. The quoted does not infer that we interact directly with external objectsin experience but via our sense organs, prior to experience (hence synthetic a priori). Our experience is necessarily internal. We do not even have an external experience on his, or most people's account because it makes no sense at all if our experience is mediated by sense organs. Kant's rather extreme and important addition to this scheme is to show (and I take this to be true, essentially) that we can infer without doubt that those objects exist through the synthetic a priori. But, he still concludes, even with this certainty, that we can't even conceptualise anything about them (aside from Noumena.. not available to humans, it seems).

I have never claimed anything like that — Jamal

If this were the case, we'd have nothing to discuss. We would agree. So i'm unsure how you can claim that... So if that is the case, I apologise, and must have missed something extremely important. Perhaps you could assist?

What’s the tide thing? — Jamal

The example was in response to (i think Janus) positing that via the senses, the inference we make to external objects is essentially 'perfect' and provides 'direct access' to those objects in some way.
My response was to deny this categorically, and the examples used were:
A shadow does not give us any access to the object that caused it to appear, despite (possible) a 1:1 match in dimensions.
The second example was that if you're standing in a bay (A) and a tidal wave hits (lets assume you're Dr. Manhattan) this gives you no access whatsoever so the empty bay(B) across the ocean whcih caused it. While crude, I think these hold for Experience (A) and ding-an-sich (B).

============================

We should not expect to have access to such a thing. — jkop

Fully agreed. I'm unsure why others seem to think my position is otherwise. It's a mere observation of this fact.

A better assumption is, I think, that the processes that occur in our perceptual faculties and brains constitute the accessing of things. — jkop

I think that's a ridiculous assumption (well, if your adding 'direct' to the formulation) for reasons previously stated. But, that may just be a disagreement of kind. If you're not positing 'direct access' by our mind to the thing perceived, I have no issue. If you are, I can't get on the train.

conscious awareness of *what I see* — jkop

*the sense-data your brain is decoding into a visual experience it provides for you, a posteriori. I don't see how this isn't the case, given what we know about how our senses and perception work.

My visual access to the tree is direct in the sense that the tree is not seen via something else that represents the tree. — jkop

It is, though, empirically. It is 'seen' by your mind only via sense-data mediated by sense organs, and possibly aberrations in the brain, into your experience. This explains visual delusion, for instance, well.

The tree presents itself in my visual field — jkop

Absolutely not. Your visual field is produced inside your mind. Nothing is presented to it except impressions/sense-data/perceptions. Objects in-the-world aren't available unless you're collapsing the non-physical experience into the physical world. I would again, not get on the train.

conscious awareness cannot be separated from what it is awareness of, e.g. a tree. — jkop

It can though. Visual delusion(without qualifier - could be drugs or whatever else causing the aberration), is again, a great exemplar. If different people can be seeing something empirically different in their experience, then our perception seems mediated in an unreliable way. This is to say that in most cases, a shadow seen by any person might accurately represent the thing it is a shadow of. That much is fair enough. But it does not follow that this is reliable or that it is access to the thing. Plainly, when an aberration of the brain can result in an individual receiving and decoding ostensibly the exact same sense-data and experiencing something different, we're seeing something less-than-direct going on. If we lived in a world of shadows, and literally never encountered the objects, not a lot would change except the number of 'delusional' individuals.

I would certainly be open to exploring whether that latter issue is actually additional and sans aberration there's some way to assert reliability in perception. I've yet to see that though. unsure what it would look like, either. No one has taken that route, so hard to know how I would feel about it. I would not be an adequate fellow to follow it from this conversation..

You have heard of Bart Erhmann because of Christians who bring him up, am I right? — Lionino

Very wrong.

Bart is a guy who takes the Bible to be historical evidence, that much is silly. — Lionino

A feel a cursory scan of Bart's work ensures one that the historicity, or not of the Bible is one of his central tensions. He takes elements that are externally supported, in some way as historical, in light of the external support. I see no issue.

The fact that the Gospel of Mark mirrors so strongly Jewish Antiquities by Josephus (ironically used by Christians as well) tells you that the new testament is fabricated. — Lionino

I do not agree. But i am not a theologian.
I would highly, hgihly recommend watching this before responding, if you want to continue about Bart. it seems to contradict your impressions.

You are saying that Hegel’s work is not philosophy? — Joshs

Very much so. It is an attempt at philosophy by a theosopher.

You seem to be entirely resistant to sense, empirical data and being confronted with the incredibly obvious failings in your writing. I do not mean to be rude, but it has become impossible not to be on-the-nose about how utterly bereft of coherence your side of this exchange has been.

I do not know why you are doing this. You have been presented with detailed, exact (with receipts) evidence to the contrary of your claims* - and you're continuing to essentially:

1. Lie about acupuncture* and Qi;
2. Make up new points that don't related to our actual discussion and pretend they are relevant***;
3. Continually posit empirical false claims, in the face of contrary evidence, and pretend to be tryign to be 'open minded'.
4. Provide links that are not in any way helpful. The most recent being an inaccurate and dishonest overview of work done in Korea, and a massaging terms to make it seem, extremely dishonestly, as if there is some support for supernatural crap from cultures(meaning ancient) that do not understand how to overcome bad practice and Mysticism, with no references or links to anything in support of it.

If you take 'evidence' be purely some horse crap posted on a website selling shit to you, I can only laugh and hope you get over your extremely deficiency in credulity.

*your own link directly contradicted the incredibly dishonest quoting you did from it....
**in what delusional world do you live, where we do not consider Christians superstitious? Are you literally fucking with me?

Given that we're no longer discussing the original issue, It seems fairly reasonable for me to point these things out. These failings will make it impossible to have productive conversations with anyone who doesn't share your peculiar distortions of logic, evidence and grammar.

Most historians agree that Jesus was a historical person (this is a claim that is unfounded, but let's say it is true) because most historians who even engage with the topic are those that have skin in the game. — Lionino

Im unsure that's true. Bart Erhmann is a prime example of someone who would rather Jesus didn't exist as it would be a smoking gun for his career succeeding.

But he accepts, on the historical evidence, that it's most likely Jesus existed as a human person. It would be a little cynical to conclude the opposite for a lack of photographs ;)

Hegel — Lionino

Who could easily, and often is, termed a Mystic. After going through the first 15 episodes of the Cunning Of Geist and scanning all of Spirit in hte last three months, I have to agree. Whether its philosophy is debatable, at best.

My take on humour is that is essentially represents some degree of 'short cut'. This might only apply to certain types of humour - But i'll address others a bit further in this post.

Generally, I consider 'humour' to stem from somethign unexpectedly concluding. Think:

Man up a ladder, painting a house. Two possible bits of humour could stem here, immediately:

1. A can of paint falls/tips covering the painter in paint - without going through the boring process of gradually accruing rogue paint from the actual job of painting.
2. The painter could fall down the ladder, to the ground, skipping the boring step of actually using hte ladder.

A second 'issue' i've noted is that there are kind of humour well-represented in a few examples: Monty Python, The Mighty Boosh, Tim & Eric... Hopefully this gets the picture across. These, in contrast, to something like Kevin Hart/Jim Carrey/Michael McIntyre type of comedy.

The former case presents metaphysical jokes. Propositions that cannot be true. "A motorbike made out of jealousy" as an example. Its funny because of its absolute absurdity.

The latter case/s don't present this kind of situation. They present entirely corporeal/physical/psychologically standard situations and inject some unexpected element (as above, around the 'short-cut' idea). Frankie Boyle once stated his style of comedy as "thinking of interesting ways for sentences to end" and that perfectly encapsulates the latter style. The former takes a far higher-level organisational acuity to pick out what was meant to be funny in a sentence that, from word one, made no sense, but did appear to. The joke, it seems, is that you were grammatically/visually/aurally tricked into taking a metaphysical impossibility as possible. It's a 'cosmic joke' type of thing.

Trying to get people who enjoy the latter, to enjoy the former is like pulling teeth. The opposite direction is usually fairly easy to do, in my experience.

However, as an ex-professional comedian, I am likely the nerd on this one and will likely suck the life out of hte concept.

Percy Jackson and The Olympians.

Weirdly compelling watch, for what it is - pre-teen mythical drama.

Prior to any further search, it would depend what you mean. 'Dynamic movement' is pretty vague and could be thought to be involved in the initiation of rock climbing up to 200,000 YA. But then, John Gill is fairly globally considered 'the pioneer' in the 50s.

If you mean the 'dyno', this originated most likely in California in the 70s where some of the newer boulders at the time required these dyno moves. In sport climbing, Patrick Edlinger is generally considered the originator of 'dynamic movement', though, through the 80s. DeepAI confirms this, for completeness ;)

Was there another inference you meant to ... infer?

and I know that from my own ample stock of such experiences. — Janus

:wink:

he point about these states is that they do not yield determinate knowledge of anything — Janus

*yet. We may be merely embarking on an arena for which we have no handbook. Definitely less likely though.

"Could care less" is both wrong and incorrect.

I would do 15 consecutive muscle-ups as practice for that explosive power (dynamics, which I eventually introduced to rock climbing). — jgill

Very good call. I got my 'athletic start' with Rock Climbing. The explosive power there is absolutely immense (bouldering particularly). It has translated into Gymnastics, parkour and Jiu Jitsu very, very well and we essentially did rope climbs as warm ups for rock climbing when i was a kid :) Unsure of the length but my guess is 20' as it was a warehouse building.

tangentially, RC is now in the Olympics :) Very much hoping Adam Ondra doesn't drop the ball this time around.

Back on the topic, though, I just cannot see how its possibly fair to pit females who are at a considerable disadvantage, against males at a significant advantage, in any athletic sports beyond social/grassroots sports.

I've been told to use Discord, thus far. I've also been working 16 hr days :P

uneven bars, — jgill

Uneven bars - different set of skills imo, rather than just two high bars. Very different, imo. Though, I would personally assume females would clean up on UEB against males at least half the time. High bar, though? Requires far too much explosive power to be compared, imo.

I was astounded at the strength moves the Canadian female gymnast did on the balance beam. — jgill

Absolutely. I have never intended, and should not be taken as, in any way knocking elite female skills per se. But the average strength of an elite female gymnastic is just not on the same level of an elite male. They just aren't at all comparable pound-for-pound. My point has more to do with disparity than anything else. They are all incredible athletes.

Though, as you say - never say never. But, until the time its not obviously an extreme disadvantage to females, I'm going to probably be fairly hard-line on this i'd say.

Up top, let me point out, as i tend to do at roughly this point, I am new to figuring out 'what I think' as such. A lot of my language may be imprecise, or necessarily under-developed. I apologise for that. I do understand basic sense and internal consistency though.

because this is a really odd thing to say about Kant — Jamal

It seems so. But i find that very odd. It seems like some kind of idolatry to think he did this. Though, that may not be far off - he appears to inspire as much stupidity as insight.

You are most definitely arguing against me too. We are animals in direct sensorimotor engagement with the environment. To deny this like a 17th century philosopher is perverse. — Jamal

So you say. But you have no addressed anything I've put forward as reasons for my position, so far. The tide example is a really good one, to my mind because (to the bolded) that isn't access to external objects. And your formulation earlier in this same comment seems to agree with that.
To the underlined: This seems to be an extremely restricted way of considering different view points. It's not idealism to contend that while we're able to reliably infer external objects (and take them as 'given' in some noumenal sense), we cannot access them. In fact, as best i can tell, that is exactly what 'transcendental idealism' amounts to. Again, why I think Kant's intention was never to pretend to overcome the mitigatory fact of sensory organs producing experience 'of the world'.

external objects, which we do have access to, are mere phenomena — Jamal

This is fully self-contradictory to my mind. If they are "mere phenomena", they are not external objects(this seems as simple as "cold is not heat"). This is why I am pretty hard-up in accepting Kant intended to establish that. It is nonsensical in his language, and his own claims. Also, why i've asked for passages. Having very recently finished (in a three-month go) the CPR, it is incongruous with even the most basic reading of hte overall thesis to think he's trying to, or has established that necessarily internal phenomenal representations could possibly be external objects, rather than the result, we know not how, of external objects. He seems to explicitly acknowledge that we have no access, and require reason to infer anything about hte external world. Is he not illustrating hat the upper limits of pure reason are within? It seems unavoidable... as an eg Kant relies in many places on the concept of mathematical a priori to ground the limits of his own system in cognition of intuitions, not objects "as they are":

"Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience. Now it is occupied, to be sure, with objects and cognitions only so far as these can be exhibited in intuition"

It's funny - you're, I think, the third poster with what I take to be some serious understanding of these things to deny this denial (my denial of Kant's either project, or success in it) and yet none have proposed any possible solution to the mitigation depriving us of access to the external world. Only externalities. I am, in my 'heart', as they say, fairly sure I must be wrong. Yet, I take up the horn, and nothing comes of it...

Again, if the argument is that synthetic a priori's give us access, my response is "No, they very, very clearly do not and that would, to my mind, make the mistake Kant spends his entire introduction trying to avoid".

I know I said enough Kant — Jamal

This is all Kant :)

“inner experience is itself only indirect and is possible only through outer experience.” (B277) — Jamal

This seems to be a fairly direct explication of what i'm positing - we can be 'sure' that intuition is 'caused by' external objects of whatever, unknowable, kind. But our experience is indirect and we do not have access to those objects.

Whether he carries the argument from the existence of external things to the experience of those things, it’s obvious that he thinks the latter is possible. — Jamal

For sure. But its a mediation which necessarily precludes us, as thinking beings, access to the 'cause' of our intuitions.

you are not precise enough in saying what you object to — Jamal

I'm unsure that's true - I'm wanting something from Kant that indicates he thinks we have an access to things-in-themselves.
Would be weird if there was such a passage, right?

Very basically, a diletante.
More complex-ly, a well-meaning moron with low filtering skills. Though, that last one is a virtue, in my mind.

We do what, perceive and think? Sure.

But if it's a miracle (meaning, minds are not part of world-stuff), then maybe it happens once ever, in the whole history of the universe.

But if it happens several billion times, as is the case with our species, it can't be a miracle and thus our minds are a property of the world.

I don't see an alternative between these two options — Manuel

I'm unsure why - this seems to define miracle as rare. As i understand, we could get a miracle per moment; as long as it's something which requires the suspension of established natural law, it would just be a lot of miracles. Though, this does go to the origin of those laws - and a force which overcame them. I don't think I either know enough, or care enough, to go further but 'being common' doesn't seem a defeater, to me. Might be misunderstanding!

I do, though, presuppose that if mind-at-large is a thing (in mind of panpsychism, lets say) then there will be natural laws regulating its behaviour and so there's no miracle in it. If it is somehow totally inexplicable, then yeah, it would have to be an ingression to reality, rather than some discreet aspect of reality.

Which formulation, exactly? — Jamal

Of Kant's project (though, i refer to success./failure rather than intention) establishing access to the external world. I just can't get that from anything in the CPR, as my understanding currently sits. It seems patently., inarguably clear that Kant does nothing but outline teh exact problem with the claim that we have access to the external world. This said, I also think his intention was not to establish that, but to remove the basic scepticism of Hume in the sense that Kant's system allows us to not doubt external existence, but still remain totally out of touch with it. I do not think he intended, and absolutely reject that he succeeding, in establishing any way to access external objects.

in a certain way, or expressed more generally, as phenomena, it does not follow that we do not perceive external things. Kant is explicit that external things are things we can possibly experience. External = empirical, and Kant is an empirical realist. — Jamal

Again, I would need passages. This is alien to my reading, and through conversations with Mww, seems to contradict the practical use drawn from the synthetic apriori. It seems to be that the synthetic apriori is the only possible way to gain reliable information about external objects to which we have no access - logical consistency derived from inferential experience. I do not see Kant anywhere inferring, much less stating, that this consistency traces up access to those objects. Quite hte opposite, to my mind.

in which he argues that perceiving your own inner states is dependent on the existence of objects in space — Jamal

Absolutely. And again, we have no access to those objects (on my, and I am weakly confident, Kant's account).
Edited after Jamal replied (and I haven't read it): "in space" is the giveaway here. That means he's definitely not referring to the external world, in which he seems to believe time and space are incoherent.

And If I am wrong, then I am arguing against Kant, not you. But I maintain that we do not have that access. As noted earlier with, i think Janus, You absolutely cannot access an empty bay in Bengal by experiencing a tidal wave in Chile.

I am likely an outlier in this conversation. — EricH

We're fellow travelers. I just enjoy pressing people on their views here.