It strikes me that the claim could not be made, but for a subject perceiving it's value. That, to my, suggests it is a subjective judgement on the harming of 'others' and couldn' be otherwise as it's necessarily a posteriori

Is there supposed to be come correspondence between the so called true statement and the world? Or does truth just have a social function, as a deflationist might say? — frank

This sounds a little JPB :P

Truth being functional, to my mind, removes all real meaning from the word. Then again, 'my truth' tends to be an accepted social norm these days. I just think that's bogus.

But it patently is not a state of affairs, and at very, very best, a description of one. What state of affairs outside of the mind indicates that command is universal? As far as i know, realists don't make absolute claims to a state of affairs, by noting a perception.

Sure. I have no problem with that formulation, i would just prefer to not use the term 'objective' as neither my example, or stretching to obligation, actually speaks to a state of affairs. It speaks to a sentence uttered in command. It doesn't boil down to a state of affairs, and couldn't, given that there are no objects which aren't pure mentation except 'another' - which is still a perception, tbf, but runs into no obstacles in 100% of observations lol

I've not made those assumptions. But my guess is that those earlier claims are general - they are objectively true, because they are ill-defined.

E.g Gravity exists as a brute fact - but we can't explain what it is. But we know it's there, having it's effect, whatever it may be. So i think that's a bad example because i would just agree its only objective in the most general possible sense (and, tied directly with language).

That Pi is irrational is actually subjective, in the sense that the criteria for a number being irrational (no a/b integer status) is just something we've decided to use that term 'irrational' for. But it is objective, in the sense that, it is - given that artificial definition - inarguably and necessarily in that category.

But i see your discomfort, and i outlined a similar feeling in another thread (or maybe it was earlier here? I forget). Discussion artificially 'true' statements can't be considered objective because without hte subject, the criteria being met vanishes.

Perhaps that one ought not harm another. — Michael

I don't understand this to be a 'feature' of anything, but a subjective judgement. I'm wanting to know what is at the bedrock of that claim, to support it, in objective terms?

Perhaps not all truths come to our sensibility through phenomenal interpretation. — Michael

I very much agree with this, though im somewhat murky on how that's the case - It seems unavoidable, despite not really groking a mechanism by which is could 'come to our attention' as opposed to assuming some innate knowledge of certain 'facts'.

I'm fine with the concept of a sort of epigenetic predisposition to certain behaviours because they are conducive to survival, let's say (though, that discussion could get very complicated in it's own right) but i can't understand that they could be 'information' or 'truth' in the sense that it's independent of the subject.

From a practical perspective, whose ethic is the more trustworthy? Materialists seem to lose interest in the consequences of their actions, inasmuch as they will ultimately not be around to see them. — Pantagruel

Hmm really? The population ethics boom and subsequent altruism movements stemming out of Oxford seem purely materialistic to a fault (my view).
The claim generally held there that morals are objective is a doozy in this sense...

You beat me to these questions... LOL.

gue that some statements of this kind are true and are made true by some mind-independent feature of the worl — Michael

Which ones, what mind-independent feature, and how could that come to our sensibility if not through phenomenal interpretation (i.e not a fact about anything but perception in an individual)?

This isn't really aimed at you - i just saw this comment and have never heard anything come close to justifying it.

Writing off the whole subject on that account just turns out to be a dodge a lot of the time. — Wayfarer

I think that if youre not talking to physicists or academic philosophers, thats probably a good move for self-preservation and time-saving :P

All metaphysical notions are pure speculation. We can still evaluate their internal logical and the extent to which they explain and reconcile with what we observe. Newness and novelty are NOT flaws any more than age supports a theory. — ken2esq

I think its entirely possible you have been refuted in this exact way. The logic and explanative power have been found wanting. I tend to agree.

simplicity gives it greater credence, all else being equal. — ken2esq

All else is never equal.

the overall process of spiritualization I grasp as the inherent positive energizing force of the cosmos. — Pantagruel

Ok, this is certainly a clearer handle. Thank you for that.

I assume that there is something like a collective consciousness happening at some material level to be sure.

@Pantagruel

Ah, okay so you take it that (in reference to later comment) socially-reinforcing 'right' actions are those which are reinforced by virtue of being aligned with that collective unconscious/conscious?
Doesn't this just make it a transcendental relativism?

I think that is the key is that it is defined by practices, practices which are in concert with the most enlightened goals of humanity. — Pantagruel

Just to be sure, this is how you're defining "spirit"? As a connotation of certain actions over time? Or as teh source of those actions?

Can you be sure you're not just referencing inter-generational awareness? There's nothing per se spiritual to that notion - though, as @javra noted above, most indigenous cultures do hold something of this view. It is largely not a reflection of corporeal or terrestrial responsibilities, though, in my experience.

Having spent a large amount of time in those communities and specifically attached to spiritual pursuits (as part of about a decade working within the 'psychedelic' industry') i've found that most of those views are anything but philosophical. They are doctrinal, and based on personifications and anthropomorphising most aspects of the environment to the point that an analysis of their views is actually extremely hard to do - because almost everything ends up jettisoned. There is priestcraft, oppression, manipulatiion, misogyny and all kinds of other ills we find everywhere else. But they are defended on spiritual grounds, not relativistic ones.

However, i take that (and it appears your last comment above confirms this) that you're only wanting to take out of those thoughts, that which actually appeals to 'spirit' per se, and not any view point.

In that sense, how would you define it in practice?

https://philosophynow.org/issues/115/Is_Morality_Objective

Just thought i'd throw this in for comments.

They all appear to be badly argued responses, and apart from one they all conclude that morality is objective. An interesting proclivity..

Likewise, drugs sort of provide support in both directions. On the one hand, persons seem less than basic if they can be disrupted. On the other, you have the fact that persons seem to reconstitute themselves despite disruptions, so they aren't easily dispelled like many illusions, but remarkably robust. Plus, people with NDEs and drug experiences of "ego death" still tend to describe these experiences as "theirs," which gets back to language.

I've been interested in how people find drugs affect personhood ever since finding out some people truly believe a loss of consciousness constitutes death.

Is that reconstitution a rebirth? Or is that a new person, marginally different, from the one who existed before the break in consciousness (or even just conscious state)?

Jason Werberloff doesn't drink because he believes he would die through the process of becoming drunk, and a new person born, through the process of becoming sober. I don't take that line, but i find it very interesting.

This is something i've been stuck on thinking about identity. I start with that there is no personal identity - Occaming everything away... but in moving forward to explain aspects of experience - it falls entirely flat where we can discern between 'persons'.

And your example is perfect - a word doesn't 'know' its meaning, or even 'misunderstan' it's meaning - a person does (or some lower form of consciousness such as Elephants or Dogs). We can even posit that 'more than one person' knows a particular thing, and it is, short of speculation about honesty or really strong pan-psychism, not easy (or possible?) to defeat the idea that a piece of information can be known within 'more than one person'. The fact of interpersonal misinterpretation might bolster that. This could boil down to 'mind' rather than person - and there we're at a loss again since mind is so ill-defined.

This is only one avenue i sometimes venture down from that starting gating...

Have you any/many thoughts around that?

A mere comment after reading through (most) of the thread:

I'm noticing a number discussions are not about things that could be called objective, even in light of the arguments for and against.

A example is one poster (cannot recall - apologies) discussing that H2O is an 'objective' (or not) property of water.

If your concept is a clearly defined, artificial object, then of course you can get artificially objective ideas about it. We have dictated that the two objects we have observed to make up the most abundant fluid we know of, are 'atoms' and for various other reasons, that those atoms 'are' Hydrogen and Oxygen.

Since we observe there to be One Hydrogen and Two Oxygen 'atoms' we can, based on our artificial scheme of (admittedly, extremely well-ordered) objects, pronounce the initial claim. However, per @Count Timothy von Icarus in the comments a few above this one, that seems to be essentially a universally accepted artificial symbolism and not anything objective in the sense of 'it would be true without human/sentient perception'.

Without a sentient (possibly human) being with the exact perceptual circumstance as to

1. Know those terms/concepts and how they fit together;
2. Know they apply to (what we are calling) water symbolicly; and
3. Be in a position to point that out

there could never be a claim that 'H2O is/describes/identifies water'. It is only true in light of those three requisites.

But, there seem to be two 'something' s that make up 'something' that we call water. So, the door is not closed. I just noted that particular move being made often...Really enjoying the extremely well-thought-out and time-intensive discussions here.

I'm also not very experienced in writing long-form responses so please take it easy if i made some rookie errors, or misunderstood something wholly. I'd like to learn :)

I think this depends on whether you're asking a genuinely racialised question (i.e i want to hear from non-white people) or whether you're talking about ideas per se (i.e I want to hear ideas from non-Westerners).

It seems the former to me, and in that sense, i would imagine it very tough to find an outlet that serves to publicise purely racialised views on anything but race itself.

That said, I would suggest as @Sir2u did, to survey as much as you can and perform some kind of ongoing synthesis.

If it helps, the schematic Wayfarer linked includes, without any confusion, my understanding of hte first fifteen pages :)

I'm finding that as long as i read slowly, it really isn't that hard to grasp. The schematic above is helping my trust that intuition.

Bump ? Haha... Bit late to the party, but late enough to start another!

Just picking up the Critique for the first time. Having traversed most of it's themes and ideas in other people's work, this should be a great straightening-out for me :)
Anyone want to read along?

where I live this is true but of “sex”. It’s a bizarre thing to do if you’re dealing with a different issue (gender).

I don’t think identifying as a man or a woman means much of anything. I’d say i agree with your general point

that is not what I think it have said.

hey mate / thanks so much for such a thorough reply.

I don’t know that this is going to be a fruitful exchange because I’m seeing some talking past each other happening from each of us a bit. I shall try to give a fairly complete response to avoid further convolution…

Again you’ve identified a different problem - which is what constitutes the type which the “human” consists in. The issues discussed in both sources (but admittedly, while more succinct, the wiki page is far more cursory) are about what makes a single “one” the same token of whatever type (which seems to be the issue you’re identifying) across time. This isn’t dealt with other than orthogonally in the direction you’re going from what I can see.

Those problems I’ve outlined haven’t been addressed by either your personal comments or the discussion of other sources. It may be that you’re resistant to an analytic use of the term identity which I recognise is sort of a choice on my part - and I’d also note that I’ve outlined how and where your concern is totally legitimate and that even your comments strike me as correct / but it doesn’t address the crux let’s say of what I understand the questions of personal identity to really traverse in this philosophical context.

I understand finding certain views that comport with your intuitions - that’s what drew me to philosophy generally. But I’m unsure that’s a sufficient basis to say that the topic at hand isn’t the traditional philosophical topic and something more constructivist.

Given it’s entirely possible I’m wrong: If that isn’t true, or at the very least I’m necessarily misunderstanding you - fsir enough. I’d just then roll back most of the exchange and say “oh, all right. I’m most interested in *insert the issues I’ve outlined* within this arena” and try to go forward from there

hi again Vaskane. Forgive but that is clearly untrue.

If you have a look on that page under “characterisation” it makes the specific delineation I’m trying to illustrate - outside of philosophy personal identity is taken to be sets of properties to which we adhere and present to the world as a self-image.

That’s not wha philosophical personal identity deals with. It’s much more abstract and they can roll together in the following:

If you take the psychological theory of identity serriously this can include the phenomenological conception of self one carries over time - but that doesn’t indicate the “self” - it is, in fact, the mental continuity of the conception over time (ie you can singularly recall “yourself” at times in the past despite differences to the present you doing the recalling) which would by these lights establish a “you”. The self image does not due to its instability.

But it will also include many many other things such as your relations to others, bodily facts that you “know” etc…

Agin, really interesting area that goes far beyond a self-image deliberation

:)

I’m getting the feeling there’s been a bit of a leap-frog here.

If truth is mind-dependent even if about mind-independent objects, how are we assessing what is “true” in terms of definition?

If true statements are merely a mind communicating a mind-independent truth then none of this really works because we’re just discussing the subjectivity of lnguahe but if “true” is actually taken as a relation between the mind-independent world (ie any given object) and the mind who would potentially make a statement about it - ie that “true” just means the clearest transition from the world, to the mind, then the statements considered true require there to be nothing more than minds that can achieve a relation with the world to such a degree that other minds consider their statements to in fact carry that relation which is, to be very gentle, unhelpful in my estimation

This would metaphysically turn on whether determinism is wholly true, constrictively true or not at all true I think.

I go with the former on the information I have which says humans exist without the latter and even a single example trumps the latter imo.

thanks very much for your reply.

I still think you are seriously misapprehending what personal identity is in this context (the thought experiments). I’ve actually found the wiki page prettt darn good at explaining this concept https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity

It’s a fascinating set of questions that theoretically should have an empirical answer once we figure out the necessary and sufficients

This speaks to, but doesn't answer the problem. Multiple personality disorder is, even on a laymans interpretation, many 'personalities' within one 'person' which is why it's a disorder.

Does this entail that there are multiple persons? Or multiple personal facades?

I think your terms a little muddled here but i could be fully misunderstanding you.

I believe you're referring to what Parfit thinks 'matters' after deciding there's no such thing as personal identity. Which is to say, the psychological continuity is what matters, and that your actual identity (i.e the state of being identical with oneself) isn't important.

I take that to be somewhat a way to comfort himself after realizing we may not actually 'be' any 'one'. Which is daunting to some degree, i feel.

Hi Vaskane,

I take you to be speaking about social identity, and not numerical identy.

From my understanding the identity problem is one of what makes you 'actually' you across time - not your subjective identification, which you're right to point out is a constantly changing chimera of various elements in various ratios.

But how you are yourself (i.e, the person who is you - not the person you think you are) across time is entirely askance from your subjective understanding of yourself.

Mine is variations on the Branch Line Case from Parfit,

It’s just so juicy