I don't think you've understood what I've said, at all.

Everything you've said applies what I am noting, and exactly what makes it unattractive to me.

Yes. Funnily enough, i actually picked up Tractatus for hte bus this morning, so read these exact passages before responding.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.

Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'.

I think pretty much that, yes. Nice :)

Sort of (I can't immediately override an existing value), but yeah, that seems to be what morality amounts to to me, so I'm not perturbed by that.

I act from (or maybe, act out?) values. So my values, wherever applicable, are what will 'inform' me as to which action should be undertaken. But 'should' can only be read "Should, if one held these same values with the backing of my same biography' to me.

I'm unsure, as it's never been particularly attractive to me, but it sounds that way.
A person steeped in Wahabi teachings couldn't be "virtuous" as compared to a Catholic vicar. Or, for that matter, a physicist. LOL.

please explain that to me? — Jeremy Murray

My understanding of hte way virtue ethics work is that its a non-religious moral system that allows someone to say "The type of person i ought to be is *insert religious ideal*" and so work toward that, under the guise of non-religious development.

I think you are the first person I've encountered who has used the word zeal. which is awesome. — Jeremy Murray

haha, awesome!

That is what determines maleness. What maleness is, is the active presence of SRY. There isn't a further answer. The 'further answers' are the ones for which you find all these holes (rightly - they are not the correct way sex is determined, but differentiated, and that is liable to wildly disparate outcomes. Though, it is to be noted the vast majority of people do not go through that).

You missed the preceding sentence: — Michael

I didn't. But those responses make it quite clear. I didn't htikn "No" was required, given those statements. Apologies.

what is the connection between an active SRY gene and being biologically male? — Michael

They are synomymous. That's the connection. We call "active SRY gene" maleness, in a human. I assume you're looking for a form and function response. And it is clearly true that males are supposed to have a certain form and function, and females are supposed to have another with genetic aberrations interrupted the processes.
What's the connection between "human" and human genetic material?

If you disagree with his position then my question isn't relevant, so I'm not sure why you answered it. — Michael

"Who decides who passes" didn't seem a policy question, but fair enough. Sorry.

The deduction of biology is that an active SRY gene is responsible for the development of testes. — Michael

False. SRY determines maleness. Male phenotype (including testes) is derived from genetic material, which can result in aberrations in genetic expression.
Which means your next two questions are not relevant.

Then someone with ovotesticular disorder is both biologically male and biologically female, and someone with gonadal dysgenesis is neither biologically male nor biologically female. — Michael

Neither of these is true. Both of these aberrations occur during sex differentiation, not determination. A good way to know htis is that the second of these sometimes manigests as Turner syndrome. Turner Syndrome can only affect females.

The maths of the situation makes it appear that trans women are much bigger criminals than they are, and the amount of exaggeration depends entirely upon the unobserved trans population, which committed petty crimes. — fdrake

You're right - but it is patently, and unequivocally irrelevant how many trans woman carry out petty theft, or public nuisance (which isn't linked to identity such as auto-gynephiles who present publicly as such) or whatever. What matters is what's harming females. And there, there is clearly, inarguably a propensity over females, and very strongly arguably a propensity over non-trans males. This may be true for pedophilia as well, but I actually don't even care to look into that further than what I've seen. The point isn't that that is true, the point is that if we want to protect children crimes against shop owners isn't relevant.

Edited in: Someone asked about htis:
trans men in male prisons would be at serious risk. That's why they shouldn't be there.

Potentially not 'on a whim' because values tend to be a bit more deep-seated. But I can do it while sitting quietly in my bedroom, unconnected to media or other people. However, I take that to be changing my values. My 'morality' is a system that says those values inform my actions. Not something like "my moral views" which seems unreal to me.

We can just leave it at that. No need to make peace with a worldview. Is there? — frank

No, there isn't, but we're discussing it, so why not take stabs?

I don't feel morality comes from without, and never have, besides watching religious people go about their business. My experience tells me, more, and more than people are making shit up morally as they go. Only my interactions on TRP, with my wife and one of my brothers seems to indicate any notion of stable, well-developed moral thinking and all three are quite different to one another (I should add, i am ignoring "group" morals here, for which I have different assessments and different experiences).

But I did resonate with the idea of historically formative ethical principles, and see more value, today, in the aspirational 'working on' of virtue ethics as opposed to the binary 'right and wrong' of deontology or utilitarianism. — Jeremy Murray

:up:

If virtue ethics weren't so caught up in allowing religious zeal, i'd be well on board.

To me, they can only possibly imply a fuller thought of the person. They may use a term like 'ought' but in reality, that cannot be more than a suggestion to placate their discomfort with such and such.

An active one, yes. That seems to be the deduction of biology.

I believe that Jane passes as a woman. John believes that Jane doesn't pass as a woman. — Michael

Are you using the women's bathroom? If not, you're not relevant. I know that's not your point, so to address your issue:

In the hypothetical, no, she shouldn't, assuming she is male. Passing isn't a criterion for me, though, so unsure why I'm asked to defend it. All i meant is that "who passes" is up the person assessing you. What to do, policy wise, is another question and I think one that appearance wont resolve.

You could not have found trans women in it if they'd served time for petty things with minimal sentences. — fdrake

Which are sentences we don't actually care about, for this assessment. Perhaps that's why I saw no relevance. I cannot understand why you would care about other crimes, when we're tlaking about propensity to commit sexual assault.

Tell me if this is this a fair characterization of your view. — Leontiskos

I don't think so, overall, but i'll be specific.

and the values never change — Leontiskos

Values constantly change. This is another reason its somewhat arbitrary, even on some shared value basis (on my view, obviously). This says to me the overall thrust of this conception is not what I'm going for.. but...

So we can mutually influence people who have overlapping values, but we cannot mutually influence people who do not have overlapping values. — Leontiskos

That seems right.

It sounds like you agree with the conclusion, but you think it does not lead to some other, unmentioned conclusion. — Leontiskos

Yeah. I can't see the point of the argument if its just to assert that we have shared values. Obviously we do, even if we didn't know that empirically. I can assume anyone striving to stay alive shares that avlue with me, whether i know htem personally or not.

Everyone has them, but nothing guarantees that one person's set of values will overlap with another person's — Leontiskos

This seems true on any view of anything moral lol. So, yes.

I guess I would want to know your criteria for determining whether moral influence has occurred. — Leontiskos

This is a tricky one, because it causes me to have considered how other minds can access other minds. I think it would be extremely hard to ever tell but the criteria would be if you've influenced another's values. Then, their values, being the basis for their moral system, subsequently influences their action. Does that make sense? I still have no idea how you'd know, in the event, other than verbal report.

Or do you want to proffer an entirely different understanding of incoherence than the one I have offered? — Leontiskos

I'm unsure whether or not, on this, but for the sake of ease i'll attempt this, regardless:

If "right" and "wrong" are to inform moral systems (all common understandings seem to think so - so this isn't a comment on your system, which i take to be non-moral, and instead a better concept that morality for describing behaviour anyway) then that supposed fact is contradicted by the obvious fact that 'right' and 'wrong' give us nothing which could inform the system as they are too ambiguous and essentially self-referential. This is why i say 'brute' in the face of people's use of those words. If someone says "My moral system rests on "right and wrong"" and hten I ask "What do they mean" they will tell me the same thing in a different word order. Recursive, perhaps, and a dead-end rather than incoherent.

Do you think regrets are hypothetical? — Leontiskos

Yes. You can only regret something on the hypothetical basis something else could have been done. I note that you say all human acts are moral. I can't get on with that. If that's the case, there's no discussion. That's just how it is, and no version would move that needle. They all apply to all acts. Fair, but not what I would assent to, I don't think. Rubbing my nose is not moral.

You thought it was right (or at least permissible) to drink the water, and he led you to believe that it is not right (i.e. not the right thing to do). — Leontiskos

I don't think those words are usable here. It was either a helpful, or non-helpful action for me to take toward myself. Again, if you take all acts to be moral, fine. I don't take myself acting toward myself to be a moral act. But I also don't quite understand what's being said here - perhaps that[s because (as outlined above) changing someone's action isn't a moral influence, but an empirical one. My values aren't involved in whether or not I act on such and such (that I have incorrectly assessed) and someone's putting my assessment right. My values remain exactly the same, but the data is fixed. In the Egypt example, had I perhaps not even known that drinking water in Egypt could lead to sickness, all he's done is given me information in a really weird form (that socially, I can understand).

You told me that we need to use words like "right" and "wrong" if we are to talk about morality, and now I am using those words. — Leontiskos

And they make no sense in this context, to me. Yay!!! LOL.

Okay, but why not? Do you have an argument? — Leontiskos

I take it your answer is, 'yes' then?
I see nothing moral in it. It's information exchange. No one's values are involved. In fact, I may refuse the umbrella based on my values.

What is a morally forceful suggestion and when does some suggestion fail to count as one? — Leontiskos

I don't know what this would mean. I don't think the concept obtains, in reality. I think you can make morally forceful arguments about what you think is right and wrong to potentially influence another's values. Suggestions about acts don't do this.

You are saying <If death is not a possible outcome, then the suggestion which bears on the outcome is not moral> — Leontiskos

Not quite. The point is more to delineate between types of suggestion. If death is a possible outcome, then even the suggestion to avoid a behaviour is moral given the 1 or 0 nature of death. In other contexts, only the suggestion to shift the value underlying an action would be a moral suggestion as there are disparate and potentially infinite possible outcomes/attitudes. But that certainly comes close.

If I am right in this, then it seems that your values or value-hierarchy has been influenced by the Egyptian. — Leontiskos

You are, and I concede this point. If I have changed my value assessment, then he's influenced me morally. But coming back to the example, he's just given me information by inference. he knows something I don't. My values didn't change.

You shouldn't have to do that if morals are a choice. Morals seem to come from outside, that was my point. — frank

I understand they seem to, but there's no way to assess this beyond "people influence each other". If that's morality for you, all good. Then we're on the same page. There's no particular reason to be moved by that (or, more properly, those influences). This is just a description of what happens, not a principle for moral thinking). I think....

I don't accept 2, so I cna't say much.

Hehe I guess if all you go on it Wittgenstein, then yeah. But who would do that, when, yeah - there it is.

Yeah. It's the difference between being cautious around men for good reasons and assuming that men are latent rapists, the former's something behavioural and can {and usually is} done without prejudice, the latter treats men as if they are always on the verge of boiling over into rape as if it's an essential facet of masculinity, just waiting to get out — fdrake

I hear you, as the latter causes suffering for men, generally. But I do not think that is what's happening here. Otherwise, the general separation of males and females would suffer the same objection. I don't htink it does, or can.

In the discussion, the latter move also calls trans women men — fdrake

Yes, and that can be truly problematic in a social sense. But I do not think it wrong. If your conception is that men are male, then they are men, on their own logic.

responds to trans women as if they are latent rapists on the basis that they are men male. — fdrake

This is what I think is happening, and what gets said to me/in the media etc. If the word "man" is equated with "male" for the speaker in question, that's worth noting. This does also make me want to throw out, what would normally be, a confrontational challenge:

Are you happy to accept the "not all men" movement as legitimate and a reasonable objection to the feminism concept that "Not all men, but always men""? I find both true, but hte latter is what matters for safety.

rape anpossible aspect of every man's personality — fdrake

I think that's functionally true, and that is why females take it to be "latent". No one thinks all men are rapists unless they're insane or trolling. But most females have had unwanted sexual contact with a man. It is justified.

You can just believe that without doing a Dworkin and saying penis = rape. — fdrake

I more-or-less agree, because I've suffered both rape, and false rape claims against me. That said, there is nothing wrong with point out "Someone with a penis = vastly more likely to rape". that seems empirically true, and justifies a lot of this type of reaction.

The lobbyists here were calling trans folk rapists loudly in the street and handing out pamphlets to that effect. — fdrake

I spoke about violence and (impilictly) property damage. Being a dick is fully allowed in society. Violence and property damage are not. This is why "gender critical" speakers regularly win legal battles about platforming, and trans activists are (semi)regularly losing legal battles around their activities ( one in NZ was quite the to-do given how low-level it was - but this came after several groups failed to prevent a women from coming here and speaking her mind. We can see a single direction that the unacceptable aspects of that issue are - preventing the free speech of a woman, and assaulting her when you couldn't shut her up. There are plenty of these examples like Stock, Maya Forstater, Hollow Lawford-Smith, Alison Bailey and many others

I also looked at your spreadsheets — fdrake

The UK MOJ statistics? That's what I used for my assessment and even calibrated 50% of hte raw numbers to be favourable to trans women. I noted the Fair Play source wasn't as good, but gave some further info. I wouldn't rely on that to present hte "table" i gave.

There is provision for any female prisoner - trans or not - to be housed in a men's prison if she's deemed especially dangerous.

Yet the furor over Isla Bryson? Please notice that statements aren't hte whole picture. You might trust the scientist, but I've outline very good reason for the author to state what they did, despite their paper showing something else. This also happened with that Scientific American infographic a few years ago that seemed to say that because intersex, sex wasn't binary - the author said as much. The author was not a scientist, but that aside, the infographic itself required a sex binary to make sense and stated exactly that.

I hope the analogy is sufficiently on the nose that I don't need to substitute things into it. — fdrake

I have literally no clue how this analogy relates to our stats.

The MoJ is hesitant to conclude that the trans folk in the data are representative of trans folk's patterns of offending, why? — fdrake

To avoid the inevitable backlash. The courts are dealing with it now, including several attempts to have it reversed on EHRC appeals (absolute nonsense, and I think none will go far). If you don't think this is likely, I can only say "hehe". The fact which you put forward doesn't actually change anything - these are the prisoners we care about. The ones who end up not included in the data don't move the needle on what the data is telling us (particularly as the 100% is a calibration favourable to trans women at an exceptionally generous degree)

particularly dangerous sex offenders of women in men's prisons. — fdrake

Ambulance, meet bottom of hill. As the facts show, on those many cases I provided.

So what was the purpose of the bill, if we need to talk about it in terms of trans women in prisons? — fdrake

Trans women are male. Males are housed in male prisons. This isn't hard, is it?

Determined by what? — Michael

SRY.

They’re intersex — Michael

Intersex is a misleading term. No one is neither male or female - almost all intersex conditions are conditional on which sex you are.

s a transgender woman more likely to sexually assault a cisgender woman in a women's prison than a cisgender man to sexually assault a transgender woman in a men's prison? — Michael

It seems so, yes. But I do not have data on that. It is also not quite the right question, and this wants us to retroactively assess whether or not X is occurring. What the policies on "this" side, let's say, want to do is avoid the risk entirely. I understand you're putting forth a separate risk that might outweight this one, so putting aside the retroactivity, I think its patently clear males are a higher risk to females than they are to other males, regardless of identity. Your point is not lost, though. It is far more likely that consensual relationships between non-trans males and trans women would occur in my view, than assault. So it may be that your scenario plays, but I have no reason to think so. Particularly as this was the case, for decades with no notable uptick in those types of assault, from what I can tell.

What about biology determines if someone is male or female? You don’t seem to recognise that being intersex is a biological condition — Michael

It is a biological condition which affects phenotype due to aberrations in sex differentiation, after determination is complete.

biological sex is determined by outward appearance — Michael

Humans are (around) 91-99% accurate in predicting sex from facial appearance alone

the English words "male" and "female" refer to two clearly defined, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive biological qualities — Michael

They do. It is easy to think otherwise, given the potential for aberration. And it is reasonable to take those aberrations into account in terms of how to deal with those categories in society. But they are 'true' categories, in that they admit of no exceptions (that I am at all aware of, even conceptually).

every human is either male or female, even if it's difficult for us to determine which. And that's simply not the case. — Michael

It is the case, though, Michael. Ambiguous phenotype doesn't affect sex. Otherwise particular phenotypic aberrations within unambiguous sex would alter sex determination, but they don't. Intersex is phenotypically intersex. Not that you are literally between the two sexes.

Why should transgender women have to be exposed to cisgender male violence for cisgender women to be protected from transgender female violence? — Michael

Because they are male. This is, obviously, uncomfortable but the reverse risk is perverse. All males run that risk in prison with males. Females do not, as they are not housed with males. Perhaps comes down to any opinion.

This is the incorrect way of assessing sex determination. SRY is the correct way, with other genetic abnormalities appearing during sex differentiation. You can tell, because the article runs its premise on: "determines the development of sexual characteristics in an organism.." and that: "Some species (including humans) have a gene SRY on the Y chromosome that determines maleness." further on.

So it's good to be careful whether you're wanting to assert determination or development are variable. Only the latter is.

There is no single determinant in these cases. — Michael

There is; as above.

This is simply not a complicated topic, until you want to pretend Sex isn't binary. Then it gets weird. Luckily, that's not the case.

Who gets to decide whether or not someone is passing? — Michael

The person who can tell that they aren't. That's what passing is about, no? :up:

And yes, unisex toilets are one way out of this difficulty. — BitconnectCarlos

Unisex + female-only.

Your thesis here seems to be that you have a moral system and your wife has a moral system and everyone else has a moral system, and that none of these moral systems really interact with or shape one another (e.g. you say the Christian and the Muslim have different values and that's that) — Leontiskos

No quite, but that they do so brute. There's no particularly convincing principle that would ensure people are moved by anyone else's moral views, but to become closer to avoid rejection (I assume you would agree that this is visible in social groups whereby the opinion of the group prevents members from dissenting at risk of either ejection or abuse). There's development, but it seems lateral to me. So maybe I'm being a little hasty, and merely positing that moral progess isn't coherent.

If the “rhymes and reasons” were arbitrary then none of this interaction between moral systems would be possible — Leontiskos

This makes no sense to me. There's nothing in your argument that makes the agreement/disagreement non-arbitrary and prescriptive. Its a description of two independent systems happening to overlap. I understand that this creates what you're calling 'force' but it is plainly self-referential and it is your own system which is influencing you to give a toss about old mate's suggestion. I do thikn I've been over this though, so if we plum disagree that this creates what you're suggesting, I can't see we can go further.

Specifically, my contention is that <If there were no substantially shared values, then moral persuasion and influence between individuals would be impossible; But it is not impossible; Therefore, there must be substantially shared values>. — Leontiskos

Ah. Well, i think that's silly. The first seems correct. The second is non sequitur in a sense. That we influence each other's values doesn't give me a reason to think there are any moral facts about the interactions. All we do is describe them, post-hoc. That could be wrong, but it is why I can't get on with the transition being made to the conclusion here. I agree, there are substantially shared values and I'd be an idiot to deny that - but that this makes interpersonal communication moral doesn't work for me. We can only predict people's responses to NHOs with respect to their pre-existing values. The "influence" you speak of only seems to occur in intellectual exchanges, not moral ones. And there, rarely, as this exchange is showing hehehe.

I'm not convinced that something which is incoherent can be described as a unity. The only way to rigorously define an system which is thought to be incoherent is to delineate its contradictions. An incoherence is a mishmash, and thus if the description does not point up the mishmash it is not a description of an incoherent system — Leontiskos

I have done so, though, plenty of times, throughout this exchange: The reliance on "right" and "wrong" are incoherent in a theory which requires that they are set by the theory itself. And this is described, at least in my version of morality, clearly. It seems implicit in the standard tellings ("system for delineating right and wrong" and all similarly-worded concepts).
Basically, the tautology of a " moral 'right' " means that, while we can describe people's morality, as it occurs, we cannot predict it because these terms gives us nothing with which we could apply some rule/law/principle to aught but our own sense of morality. We can only predict it statistically. I do not think this provides us 'force' in the way you speak of it.

With respect, "A set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character," actually strikes me as considerably different than, "The debate between right and wrong." — Leontiskos

Understandable. The former is simply the result of the latter, and given there is no universal moral system, that seems implicit, and hte only thing available for discussion. Perhaps I should have noted this.

For example, when you regret a past action and judge that you should have acted otherwise, you are engaged in a non-hypothetical ought-judgment, but not an imperative or a prescription. — Leontiskos

That is plainly hypothetical?

(A) requires that you think drinking water is right. (B) requires that the Egyptian thinks it is not right. (C) requires that you are persuaded that it is not right. (C2) requires that you are not persuaded that it is not right. — Leontiskos

I don't see this moving my comment on the structure of that exchange. B to C is a matter of fact. Would this apply to whether or not to go outside without an umbrella? Would you say that someone saying "Hey, its raining, take an umbrella" and you doing so, means that was a morally forceful suggestion? I don't, so I can't apply it here either (again, other than over a 'death'. So your (A) being simple, yeah, I think drinking water is good. Not poisoned water, though. So I want to avoid death, not poisoned water per se. I realise that's a bit recursive, but I think it illustrates that the point is the 'ought' is about avoiding death. If death isn't a possible outcome, then the suggestion is arbitrary in a moral sense (for me, and on
my understanding of common conceptions)).

And if you give his NH due consideration then you yourself are assuming a shared value — Leontiskos

Or, I am considered their values as compared to mine and understanding whether or not, in the exact context, their value might be more practically effective. Is that still moral, to you?

I think NHs really exist. — Leontiskos

As do I. just don't see them as moral propositions.

you can't make the guilt go away by changing your morals, right? — frank

Yes. I was a sociopath for several years, partially to achieve this.

"A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic."

LOL.

"Although ‘possible world’ has been part of the philosophical lexicon at least since Leibniz, the notion became firmly entrenched in contemporary philosophy with the development of possible world semantics for the languages of propositional and first-order modal logic. "

Just finished re-reading The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

About to start The Sceptical Feminist.

The plain fact that one believes in a personal God is enough to dismiss their arguments about said God. It doesn't even get of the ground as a concept, so the arguments around what the God should or shouldn't do are basically a way of making fun of those types of people.

If you truly think the Christian God is the author of reality, whether or not he likes priests to bum infants is hte least of your worries.

Mahalia has to be one of the most underrated artists/singers of all time. And she's fairly well known, so that says alot.

which actions are generically moral and which actions aren't. — Leontiskos

yeah, nice. And I think the fatal objection here is that this isn't how morality is thought of. It is better, though, i'll absolutely give you that.

it still seems like color exists. — Leontiskos

This is a good analogy. And I think its perfectly parallel with morality. I do not think colours exist in the sense that they inhere in objects. I also do not think morality exists in that it inheres in the universe. We make our own, and you want a universal one (i have already admitted I do think morality exists, but on different terms than universal ones).

I suspect that even you, when you look back on a bad mistake you've made in life, could catch yourself half-consciously saying, "That was the wrong thing to do." — Leontiskos

Unhelpful is probably as far as I can get there. "bad" in terms of having been mistaken, perhaps. But not a moral bad or wrong on any of yours, mine or the general conception of moral.

So you want to criticize people who use the words "right" and "wrong," because you think the words are meaningless. And then when I avoid using these words that you deem to be meaningless, you criticize me for not using them? It seems like you've erected a game where I lose by default even before I begin. — Leontiskos

No, no. People use those words and I have no criticism of that. I criticise using those words to defend a moral theory (you have neglected this, which has its own problems, but not why the above is occurring).
When you avoid using them, I want to know why you think this is 'moral' if it doesn't have to do with right and wrong (our impasse addressed in my response immediately prior in the other thread. It is a plain disagreement in terms I think).

What "conception"? — Leontiskos

That it is the tension, and systems for resolving tension, between right and wrong. That is a conception, regardless of whether it has particular meaning. I do not know how your objections here get off the ground. I don't defend that conception as a coherent theory - it just, plain and simple, is what people mean when they speak about morality. It is defined as such in several places.

then we have no candidate which could exist or not exist. — Leontiskos

What? No. That I don't understand this the way those who defend that conception do has nothing to do with whether it exists. It exists, and is 'used' constantly by most people. That is what people mean when they say 'moral'. It is 'right'. What they mean you are free to interrogate. I did, found it wanting, and rejected it as a coherent theory. So, the option remains that morality doesn't exist on those terms. I take it you more-or-less feel the same and want to propose a system on other terms. That's fine. No one will understand you to be talking about morality - as I clearly do not.

Cambridge entry — Leontiskos

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/morality here it is, and the first entry contains exactly my conception in slightly more verbose terms. I take things like "action" or "behaviour" are built into the discussion and do not need re-stating every time.

What is its fatal flaw? That it doesn't mean anything? — Leontiskos

That right and wrong are insufficiently clear to be useful for the definition of morality. I had thought, in several places, this was explicitly clear. I think it needs to be clarified again:
My system of morality is not something you have asked about. What i consider right and wrong is bespoke, as I take it to be for everyone. That doesn't mean people's 'right' can't overlap, or that the ydon't regularly do so - that is how morality works.
But I couldn't possibly argue that anyone else need care what I think. If right and wrong are just so, no theory can move someone. That is my contention. We just do our best to find people with whom our bespoke boundaries work well. There is some force in this - societies have a profound effect on what people think is right and wrong, personally. But there are no universals there, imo.

First note that the claim, "That's [inadmissible]" is a NH, and every negative NH entails the claim, "You should not do that." — Leontiskos

Hmmm, it doesn't seem to prima facie as I see it. "That's inadmissible" is a pure observation. There is no imperative in that statement. There is, hiding, the potential for the next move to be prescriptive. This is purely descriptive. That utterance doesn't even require that someone intended to admit the item in question. Just that someone noted it wasn't admissible. Herein lies the problem with almost all 'ought's, even NH ones. "That's inadmissible. Don't attempt to admit it, as you will be admonished by the court and waste your client's money" for instance. I might just disagree that it's inadmissible. I disagreed with the Egyptian gentleman in his assessment of my drinking water in Egypt. But in any case, there's nothing in it that makes any action 'correct' or 'right' other than in terms of some arbitrary end (other than, as noted, death).
Maybe I find it extremely hard to understand where the notion that these sorts of values are universal comes from, or that shared values provides morality per se, rather than a working execution or moral concepts which may be quite disparate (and in fact, need be given the ambiguity of 'right' and 'wrong'. But there's intuition there).

I'm not quite sure what you meant by this. — Leontiskos

www.terfisaslur.com - I don't think ever TRA is this type of TRA, but they are worth mentioning.
And the reason for this is exactly what you've outlined in your post :)

Nevertheless, to say, "I don't believe in morality because I don't believe in categorical/exceptionless norms," is not right, given that morality is not reducible to categorical/exceptionless norms. — Leontiskos

Very fair, but that isn't my position. My position is that "wrong" and "right" are ambiguous, amorphous and probably indefinable terms which create a problem for morality to do what it purports to do. Your concept is askance from this, but it seems tp want the same security people find in :

takes themselves to be doing and seeking things that are right and not wrong, good and not bad — Leontiskos

you could say that what ought to be done is the right thing to do — Leontiskos

You could and I assume that's the transition your system wants to make. But that is not the way 'right' tends to be used, so I think a theory which violates the normal use of these words can't be helpful. Perhaps that's where my back is up.. I can't relate to it, at all, despite it being relatively sound in form. It doens't speak to me about right and wrong, and therefore doesn't seem to be a moral system. It's a system for making decisions based on data towards what can, in most instances, be considered arbitrary ends. I know you feel that a collective agreement shifts that. I do not, so impasse there for sure .

This is why I quoted her about it. — fdrake

Yep but that flies in the face of both the empirical evidence, and the work in that paper. You should read it throroughly (I have, but its been some time). The Dutch Protocol and surrounding work is also an interesting tidbit in this area..

There is a world of difference between

1 ) Talking about trans women's rates of sex offence using data.
2 ) Construing trans women as latent rapists on the basis of their {alleged} manhood. — fdrake

Yes, but they are approaching two different aspects of justification: On the one hand, here's the actual data (this is something, as a Male, i feel required to provide in lieu of talking for females) - on the other, there is hte fact that males, in aggregate cause almost the entirety of social harm to females. So, lets not allow males into intimate, close-quarter spaces particularly where nudity is required in several respects... I think both are totally legitimate, if different types of justification which I fully accept.

the latter can suck a bag of dicks — fdrake

This reads as "Females concerned for their safety based on millennia of data, and their collective lived experiences can suck a bag of dicks"

I assume that's not your intention, based the previous exchange around the same thing - but I find it very, very hard to see a justification for dismissing female concerns based on millennia of data and lived experience as anything but "I don't take it seriously" or some such.. Could you be a bit more specific about what's wrong with that? I don't think a male has any standing to make such dismissals..

excluding people from spaces because of personal discomfort, or feelings of unsafety, can also work as a vector of discrimination. — fdrake

Because they are male. Nothing else. One need not be uncomfortable with males in their spaces to know that the propensity for violence and sexual assault comes with the males, regardless. Males are almost entirely beholden to this underlying potential for force in most situations (albeit, it becomes subconscious after a time). Why would females, the literally weaker sex, not need specific protection from same? I agree it can work as a vector for discrimination. Discrimination is not bad. Arbitrary discrimination is. We discriminate constantly.

in which everyone thinks everyone else is a reactionary blowhard centralising a clear cut issue which we should've stopped speaking about ages ago — fdrake

Cannot argue with this... My epxerience just says one side is vitriolic, tends toward violence and protects criminals and the other doesn't (in this one specific context). Conceptual example being that pro-trans protesting and agitation tends toward chaos and violence, from what I've seen. The anti(lets say) crowd doesn't, until confronted by the former. The former also seeks confrontation (at events, lectures, clubs etc..) and seeks to violate the rights of those with whom they disagree. This is why the ruling is helpful (these are not supposed to be arguments just reports).

If women are horrible to each other it's fair game, but if one {alleged} man is horrible to them it's a cause for uproar. — fdrake

Convert this to sports:

If a female boxed breaks the jaw of a female boxer, alright, that's part of the 'waiver' aspect of getting into the ring.
If a male does it (on the proviso they are competing in a female category), none of that applies to the female whos jaw was broken and I defy anyone with a shred of decency to pretend that is fair game.

The exact same logic applies to sexual assault. If you're in prison with females, and you're female, that comes with the territory (as a risk, anyway). Being raped by a male does not.

I can only return to the point that I do not see what you see in the protests of that side of the argument. If i did, I would definitely agree with you. I acknowledge a small, loud pocket of them do this - but then a small, loud pocket of trans women literally thikn they are better than biological women (superior beings, better women, whatever) and represent "womanhood" more than biological women, and suffer more htan biological women for being women. Utter nonsense, so I get the concern there in the reverse position.

I often see this as well-poisoning by association. I don't paint all TRAs in the light of terfisaslur. But they exist and are worth mentioning.

So was the quoted passage from yourself :)

You might look for information before making another argument. — Athena

I don't think this can be said of your list of people. — Athena

It wasn't. It wasn't intimated. I said something completely different.

You completely and utterly ignored literally everything relevant to my argument and started ranting about a load of other shit. I repeat:

All of the names I added result in the exact same claims from their followers. Meaning, "trump and hitler" are not unique, and it has nothing to do with their actual views. EVERYONE gets that from their idols being attacked. Your point is entirely hollow for this reason. It's just spitting in the wind. — AmadeusD

This stands. If you didn't grasp it (self-admittedly) why the heck did you bother blathering further? LMAOOOO.

A healthy body of law and regulation depends on moral realism, and in a culture where moral realism is waning the body of law becomes unhealthy. — Leontiskos

Not so, and there's no good evidence for it.

In other words, he causes himself to commit the action. — NOS4A2

Then you're simply ignoring the other half, given your objection below this is entirely hollow.

completely removing the autonomy of the listener — NOS4A2

That is, roughly, the point. We do this with mentally incapacitated people. What's the difference in your eyes?

Do the words swirl around in the head and push a bunch of buttons in the brain? — NOS4A2

All stimuli do. Words are stimuli. This is obvious biological fact.

The only cause and source of beliefs and emotions is the one who holds them. — NOS4A2

Then I guess you can just choose to never be angry, upset, pining or any other uncomfortable emotion then. Nice.

You haven't justified it. — flannel jesus

Your responses tell me you're not engaging with the arguments. I've laid them our clearly. If you;'re not convinced. So be it.

You can't judge the quality of a morality based on how conformist or not conformist it is. — flannel jesus

I didn't. I addressed this directly. I'm simply giving this as an example of why the first response. This isn't going to be helpful for either of us...

Can you show me what the source you have for being "four times more likely" is? — fdrake

It's the UK prison stats. This isn't as good, but another source

Trans women:

Total Pop: 48,000 est.
In prison: 0.27%
For sex crime: 0.16%

Non trans males:

Total Pop: 32,900,000 est.
In prison: 68,548 =0.21%
For sex crime: 12,611 =0.04%

% of Prison pop: 18.4%

NB: unfortunately, this is something I had in a draft email. my work serve wont let me open the link to add the raw numbers for trans women. Sorry, as that's absolutely fucking crucial LOL. I take it you can look at those numbers and verify though.

I should also note, looking at this, I calibrate a full 50% for sex crimes which are to do with SW and the like. It is still then 100% higher among trans women.

It wasn't intended that way. — fdrake

Yeah, i definitely assumed not, to be clear.

if all that matters were odds, women who are sex offenders against women should also be excluded from women's prisons — fdrake

No. The odds are ever in the females favour for sexual assault. This is true in and out of prison. This doesn't ignore your point. If women are already being assaulted by females then absolutely fuck no to introducing males who are more likely to assault, and are more likely to cause lasting damage or to kill. These are not controversial facets of male-ness. You are not wrong, but you are not concluding something reasonable, imo.

"no, in fact there was no evidence in the paper that trans women are uniquely risky" — fdrake

Because that isn't the fucking claim. They are at least as risky as non-trans men which the Swedish paper clearly shows, in no uncertain terms. I have relied on other sources for the unique risk transwomen present.

This means that for the 1989 to 2003 group, we did not find a male pattern of criminality.

Have you read the paper? This is patently untrue and clear attempt to avoid the vitriol of trans activists who routinely harass and attempt to 'cancel' anyone saying anything they don't like in the lit
Another (damningly, the school was pinged for more than half a million pounds for not protecting Kathleen.
Another which went the same way.

There is a very, very good reason to do what those authors did. It doesn't change what's in the paper, and it doesn't change the very real fact that male are at a higher propensity for violence, including sexual violence. I'm not sure how much Twitter you've seen either, but www.terfisaslur.com is a nice little capsule of what goes on there, and routinely.

Given that plenty of trans figures (Blaire White, Debbie Hayton, Buck Angel, Brandy Nitt and a few others, at the least given this is off-top) agree with what I'm saying, and think the position put forward on the other side is the specific reason the trans community faces backlash that might otherwise be considered unreasonable (i exclude here actual bigotry, on my own terms). I don't know that that's true, but if the community itself, in some significant proportion notices this (my personal trans friends do, also) then it cannot be hte case that this is some inarguable situation where we have to just do as were told (which is the postion).
I don't have to call anyone anything they demand of me. Simple. It might be 'decent'. but its not required and there should never be policies to that effect.
Similarly, there should never, ever be policies which allow males to override the wishes of females.

that — fdrake

I have to assume this applies to the second potential statement there, about saying 'fuck no'.

They're saying it because they are male. Nothing else. They do not need to justify that further.

I'm not entirely sure I understand what you're getting at here. Trans people, for hte most part, do not pass. This is largely because humans are 99% accurate at predicted sex from facial features alone. Trans people wanting to pass (if not unusually trans in their phenotype already) is an unfortunately cruel aspiration. Similar to actually changing sex. Just, isn't gonna happen basically (though, i note exceptions to the first whereas the second admits of zero).

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/04/30/uks-only-transgender-judge-plans-to-take-government-to-echr-over-biological-sex-ruling Have just seen this.

"This makes life impossible for people like me" is perhaps the most self-demeaning, and self-defeating statement i've heard from a trans person.

No, it isn't. Something can be good and one ought not do it largely because there is absolutely no reason to think 'ought' holds any water whatsoever without a stated goal but also ecause the term 'good' is extremely ambiguous. If your use of that word leads to that conception, fine.

I don't know what you mean by 'right' and 'wrong' — Leontiskos

No one does. That's my entire point lol.

Okay, but you've defined morality as — Leontiskos

Again, not really. This is a widely accepted conception of morality. It is what people talk about when discussing morality. Given the first reply above this one, it seems pretty clear that either morality doesn't exist or you and I are trying to talk about something else, in some sense. So, I find it quite hard to discuss on the basis of well, I conceive Morality as X (you are still talking about morality, despite the claim to have dropped it... there would be no discussion here if you weren't) and that is something other than "right" and "wrong". If you wish to change the concept of morality to be more logically acceptable, sure, that's fine, and I have no real argument against that position - but my experiences tell me you are simply wrong about how these types o utterances affect people.

According to what dictionary? — Leontiskos

Oxford Languages, Cambridge and several AI models.

This seems to get close to what you're wanting to do here, but i still note phrases like this:

"obligatory concerns with others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns."

These will never be universalizable. So I think you cannot have your cake (about psychological morality, as it were) and still think it can be universalizable or unassailable. If we're both essentially saying that this is the case, we're good. I can't quite grasp where your commitment is in terms of the applicability of your system - seems you want it to apply to everyone, without fail and not susceptible to empirical considerations.

That's your definition, not mine — Leontiskos

Again, no, it's not, really. This is what the sum total of my experience of moral discourse (and several courses) has taught me. For me, 'morality' functions as something else precisely because I think this conception is fatally flawed (as noted earlier):

How can it be "right" or "wrong" particularly when you cannot(or don't, i'm unsure) sufficiently define those terms? I fully agree that ambiguity of those terms is a problem - in fact, I think it's fatal. — AmadeusD

I couldn't possibly hold a view i've noted has a fatal flaw, could I?

you want me to decide whether my conclusions pertain to your definition of "morality." — Leontiskos

Nope. I am simply pointing out that your conception is not at all what people consider when they speak about morality. For this reason, I find it completely inapt to be held under that label as something intended to be interpersonal.

I would suggest that you read the OP where I explain what a non-hypothetical ought-judgment is, and then try to figure out if it relates to your own concept of morality — Leontiskos

I've done this. It doesn't. I've been at rather extreme pains to point out why I think that conception is both functionally a bit silly, and not what you claim it to be. Being wrong, on my part, wouldn't mean I haven't given those answers.

I make no use at all of the words "right" and "wrong" in that OP — Leontiskos

Which is why the above. I have been insufficiently clear that this was a motivator, but I found it to be pretty obvious in our exchanges, that I am lambasting your jettison of those terms, and then further lambasting your use of NHO as some kind of "universal" replacement whcih I thnk it is not.

I myself don't see why any of the three words are necessary at all — Leontiskos

Because this is precisely what people mean when they speak about morality. "That's immoral!" means "that's wrong" or bad. And that's clearly an emotional plea. That's another conversation though..

he problem with this would be that I still don't know what you mean by "right" and "wrong", and I can't imagine why an argument would be required to include the five-letter tokens r-i-g-h-t and w-r-o-n-g. — Leontiskos

I'll reverse this section, because it is extremely important to notice that these words are required if you want to talk about morality about actions. That is literally what morality is - the discussion of right and wrong actions. Even your take imports that to ignore a NHO would be 'wrong'. You don't use that word, but without it you have no basis to claim any kind of coherence between the theory and actual actions. We can simply kill ourselves, and there's no valence to it.
I agree with the problem in terms - but those terms, being so ambiguous, are a fatal flaw in there being a stable concept of morality beyond this (which anyone with half a brain can understand the intent of, even without decent definitions. We all conceive those words clearly for ourselves). If you are trying to entirely overhaul the concept of morality to fit something people do not usually talk about under that head, so be it. Its just not in any way convincing to me and doesn't seem to pertain to anything one would normally consider moral. Not sure why you're trying to avoid that word, though. It is hte basis of what we're discussing after all..

<Morality requires X; Your argument omits X; Therefore your argument does not pertain to morality> — Leontiskos

It requires a concept of right and wrong. Yours doesn't even attempt one, other than a potentially hidden 'right' in following what you deduce to be an 'ought'. But that is tautological.

You’re incapable of showing cause and effect, — NOS4A2

Mate, this is so bizarre.

There is a legal doctrine known as "If but for". This means that "if but for X, Y would not have happened". This applies to behaviours. "If but for your father's advice to beat the intruder to death with a candlestick, he would still be alive. Your culpability is therefore reduced" is one way this washes out.

If someone tells you there is a good reason to believe your wife is cheating on you, and you investigate - thus causing some other outcome negative to her (perhaps inadvertently running her off the road when you were under the impression its the other man's car), you were acting in good faith on the bad faith say-so of another. That is incitement. Actions which are rational in the face of certain advice are less culpable than those which are not rational. There are entire literatures on this..

Can you make it explicitly clear why you think this does not obtain?

P.S You'll love this passage, i'm sure:

Perhaps the causal connection from inciter to incitees shouldn’t be thought of as direct, having
only one link as it were: strong or weak. We might try to envision incitement as requiring a
complex causal connection with several steps. First, the inciter utters language intended to
cause certain beliefs and emotions in the incitees. (The inciter might but need not hold these
beliefs or experience these emotions.) Next, once the incitees accepts the beliefs and
experiences the emotions, this mental state causes the incitees to commit wrongful actions.
The recent example that seems to fit this model is that of former President Trump’s
impeachment for inciting the crime of insurrection. Trump addressed his supporters and
convinced them that his loss of the 2020 Presidential Election was actually a case of theft; his
audience accepted the belief that a Second Term Presidency was stolen from Trump. Trump
then used language intended to cause anger in his listeners that the election was stolen from
someone (Trump) they supported. Once their mental state was sufficiently strong, it caused his
listeners to act criminally: they violently attacked the Capitol Building trying to stop the Senate
process for officially making Biden US President

Okay, but it's an important issue. If we don't mean the same thing by 'morality' then we will be talking past each other. — Leontiskos

Yeah, definitely. I think we have been to some degree. Initially it was grating, but now I see it clearly, it's interesting and revealing :)

until it is further clarified. — Leontiskos

That's fair. And I think if that clarification were universalizable, we wouldn't be having this discussion.
But my conception is a generally accepted take, not just mine (it is hte first dictionary definition, and what Google's AI throws out)

That said:

"There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions, even within philosophy."

Two forms are given. We may be speaking about two distinct uses of the same word. Mine is definitely descriptive. I use "morality" to describe the systems by which groups co-operate. It is observational, and not "moral" in the normative sense. It just is what people do to get on with each other. No need for any kind of objective or actual value. Just agreed behavioural norms and boundaries (though, obviously, at some point htis will boil down to values. The problem is there are no homogeneous societies** of that kind other than cults).

"descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct endorsed by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior

whereas I think you may be using a proscriptive/normative form:

"normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be endorsed by all rational people."

I suppose at base, **I don't think version 2 obtains in the real world - we just talk about hypothetical imperatives of that kind. Kant wakes from his slumber...

5c is really my primary conclusion. — Leontiskos

I understand. I even (to some degree) agree. I just don't think this butters your bread, I guess. Fwiw, I wrote this before reading the following "option" table. So, there we go LOL.

Perhaps I need more reasoning to justify 5c; perhaps I need more reasoning beyond 5c to reach a substantial conclusion — Leontiskos

I think either could be true, but I see a much bigger problem. On what basis are you justifying that conclusion as a moral one? How can it be "right" or "wrong" particularly when you cannot(or don't, i'm unsure) sufficiently define those terms? I fully agree that ambiguity of those terms is a problem - in fact, I think it's fatal.

It's an uncomfortable reversal of a norm. We wouldn't expect people to call white people Black because they want to be Black (actually, a better example is the N word. Something I was routinely called in an ingratiating way when I was a battle rapper). I am not, and could not ,be an N word, even if that group wants me to be one. All i can do (and did) is get a 'pass'. There is no violation, just an exception.

Providing exceptions is far less uncomfortable, and far less controversial. I think. But your general premise is spot on.