I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought" vs. "is"s--but the english language has many examples of ought statements which aren't, in-themselves, moral statements.

Also, inferring "You should kill Tom" from "Today is Tom's last day on earth" is just an inference from colloquial speech: technically, one cannot logically nor coherently derive, all else being equal, the former from the latter. It is only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

The usage of "ought" for general normative statements is correct, since Hume wasn't only concerned with moral statements.

I don't see a problem with using colloquial language. In the philosophy of language, we don't look for a perfect language anymore. All we do is explore how language works in real life, following the example of Wittgenstein, who reminded everyone to let philosophy leave everything as it is

As for imprecise language, didn't Wittgenstein say it is friction that allows to walk ? A smooth floor would not allow us to walk. The fact is language is imprecise, but it works.

There is no technical issue here. It's not like l have uttered nonsense.

A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is in right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

Whether the "ought" we derive is correct or not is a seperate question. I am only addressing the claim that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"

Hume's distinction goes beyond morality. Normative commands don't need to be related to morality.

Nevertheless, addressing your concerns. Your objection only holds for those who are moral realists, who believe mind-independent moral standard is given and we can judge what is right or wrong in reference to it.

But a moral irrealist would simply tell you, moral statement are mind-dependent (non-objectivists) or moral statements are not truth apt (non-cognitivists) or moral statements are all false (errror theorists ).

It doesn't follow from any of this that any particular statement (concerning a necessary truth or something else) necessarily exists.

Can you point out the specific flaw. Saying the conclusion doesn't follow isn't helpful.

I actually want to improve this argument. So you can even critique the weak point and suggest how l can improve it.

What change to this argument would convince you its correct ?

That (which exists as pixels on a screen) is not a true statement?

I would like you to imagine a world in which there are no minds. You will imagine our world as it exists minus the minds, and you will use the knowledge we have ( intentional content ) to infer what would be true in such a world, depending on whether you are a direct/indirect realist or irrealist and your metaphysical commitments to what exists independent of the mind

But hold on.

All you did in this thought experiment is imagine a mind less world from a world in which there are minds and languages. In other words, you mentally allocated to the world which had no minds with your mind to describe it.

Using your mind to describe a mindless world ( in which a mind doesn't exist ) is a wrong step.

This tells us there cannot be any true or false statements about a world in which there no minds.

Possible Retort : But you just made a true statement about this world. No, l haven't. I have stated a condition for semantics. If such a world existed, its description would be impossible

How does it follow from your premises that the statements (already) exist? - Echarmion

To show : All (neccesarily) true statements exist as cognitive content

Reason : Whatever theory of truth you pick (Correspondence theory, pragmatic theory, coherence theory, deflationary theory etc) , its definition and operation can only be the evaluation of a mind. So to say, "X is true" is to evaluate X as T in your mind in reference to some truth-criterion

I will elaborate on the paragraph above

A true statement presupposes a truth-criterion. A truth-criterion doesn't tell us what is the case, only how it is to be determined. Moreover, truth-criterion requires the existence of a language in which the world can be described. Language rests on intentional content (esp meaning). Intentional content is a cognitive content, even though it can be determined by the world.

Note : I am not saying our mind plays the only role in determining the intentional content, but that intentional content doesn't exist without the mind.