How do you know that "how matter becomes conscious ... just is" and cannot be explained (even, if only, in principle)? Describe which laws of nature both allow "matter to become conscious" and yet prohibits us from explaining "how matter becomes conscious." — 180 Proof

1. 2 entities or states can only be identical if they share all properties, including that of location in space and time. This isn't true for mental and physical states, since the physical state is just matter and the mental state has qualia.

So you can either assume the physical state does have mental properties (panpsychism) or you deny the existence of mental states.

2. Here is another problem. You don't and can never have a single law in physics which deals with mental states. Why ? Because laws in physics only deal with entities and states that can be measured and quantified. So physics doesn't help you here.

Okay, so (as far as you/we know) our 'theories' are incomplete and data insufficient – but no "magic" involved or assumed as you've suggested. We learn from We don't know yet and not from appeals to ignorance just-so stories like "panpsychism" & other metaphysical fairytales — 180 Proof

This isn't even a question of insufficient data. Its not that consciousness is a physical stuff and we don't have enough data about it. That would be a categorical mistake.

As for the combination problem, why is it so hard to understand the scientific method only works for physical stuff that can be measured and observed (directly or indirectly). Consciousness isn't anything like this. Its not that we are invoking magic, we are just saying science has its limitations. You can't appeal to science when our metaphysical theory tells you science won't help you out. You should first tell us how can science quantify and measure subjective phenomenonal experience.


The hard problem of consciousness won't be solved by more data and science.

Just meditate

These are the 3 stages you will go through during and after death

Wakeful state
Dream state
Dreamless state

Then comes the unconditoned state, which isn't even a state, but it goes beyond all the 3 stages above

You will return to who you were before you were born, bare consciousness. This consciousness is present behind even rocks and trees

So monism? Is non-dualism supposed to be a translation of advaita? — Lionino

Yeah, I'm talking about Advaita. I would not use the word monism cause it implies Brahman is a substance of some sort, when he isn't even a mental substance. He is pure unfiltered consciousness with no hint of mental and physical attributes

How can you even comprehend the meaning of "change" without a before and after, future and past? Which implies dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no before and after, past and future, from the perspective beyond space and time. Not only that, the temporal realm is immaterial and illusory. Like a dream which disappears after you wake up. This makes sense if you understand space doesn't exist within space, nor does time exist within time.

However, for those who are stuck within the regions of spacetime, change is real and it is observed.

So think of 4 dimensionalism, with the caveat of the physical and mental worlds being nothing more than an illusion from the ultimate perspective

Well, glad to have come across someone who actually knows who John Hick is. (And Paul Knitter.) But I don't necessarily agree that he's guilty of the kind of relativism that Nagel critiques. I would have thought in our pluralistic world that a philosophical framework which allows for many divergent perspectives would be something of value. Many here regularly say that, as all religions claim to have the absolute truth, and they all disagree with one another, then in effect that cancels out the entire subject matter (not in those exact words, but it's a frequently-expressed sentiment.) I rather like the expansive view of John Hick (and Huston Smith and Karen Armstrong, to mention a couple of other names.)

That's not to say I subscribe to the kind of 'many paths up the mountain' approach, either. I think there are genuine and profound distinctions to be made between different religious philosophies. But then, there are also genuine and profound distinctions between different cultures, but they're still human cultures. But, we're called upon at some point to make a decision as to which we belong in, I guess. — Wayfarer

Whilst l like John Hick's kantian distinction between appearance and ultimate reality. The problem is he relegates the truth claims of all world religions to the domain of appearance or mythological claims. To give one concrete example, he was famous for denying the literal incarnation of God as the person of Jesus in Christianity.

This would not be a problem if the partial truths found in all world religions could be combined together to give us a vision of the ultimate reality without any logical contradictions.

Does this happen ? Nope. John Hick was aware of this problem and he suggested we should make use of dialetheism. Maybe, the ultimate reality doesn't abide by the laws of logic. But even dialetheists aren't prepared to grant so many true contradictions. Given we can't contain the contradictions to ultimate reality alone, it does spill over to the world of appearance.

Religious pluralism also suffers from something similar to the paradox of tolerance. Religious pluralism by definition views religions exclusivism to be wrong. So it ironically ends up excluding the great majority of religious people in this important aspect of their faith. Ofcourse, people who believe in religious pluralism won't ever likely persecute those who believe in religious exclusivism, but there is definitely an intellectual confrontation.

Changing recognition of facts (e.g. "cultural / historical lineages") do not change facts as facts. Ignorance afflicts both "religious people" and "progressives" alike so the cognitive faculty is neither "defective" (as you suggest) nor "mysterious and undetectable". The difference is that "religious people" (i.e. supernaturalists) tend to eschew techniques of rational self-correction (i.e. learning) – relying on fallacious appeals to tradition, authority, popularity, incredulity, etc – much more than "progessives" (i.e. naturalists) do.

The big problem here is you begin with the assumption that, not only do mind-independent moral facts exist, but that we can arrive at all true moral facts with your flavor of critical reasoning. Take Elizabeth Anscombe, an incredibly intelligent lady who was well versed in philosophy, a literary executor of Wittgenstein, and largely responsible for reviving virtue ethics in the 20th century. She was vehemently opposed to abortion, which many other philosophers regard as good.

From my perspective, l don't need to take sides at all. But l can say, the catholic background of Anscombe influenced her decision, whereas the progressive/feminist tradition informs the decision of many philosophers who support abortion.

This has to do with the philosophy of disagreement.

If your epistemic peers, with similar evidence, reasoning abilities, dedicated time, self-criticism + other criteria, disagree on X, then you should suspend our judgment on X

So harm (e.g. theft via hacking micro-transactions, betrayal of a country, rape of a coma patient or infant) happens to the victim only when it is observed by the victim? :chin:

I will repeat what l said earlier on and add clarification to it

"Do not harm others" or in general "X is bad" does not supervene on any natural fact apart from the linguistic + non-linguistic practices in a community. These practices are shaped by non-moral natural facts ( evolutionary adaptability ) and historical/cultural circumstances.

Here's a thought experiment. Imagine if we lived in a planet where torturing the elderly helped our adaptability, for whatever reason, then we would have evolved to see torturing the elderly as good. We will still have meta-ethics and normative ethics in that planet , but we would look at an old man and think, it's good to torture him.

If this is too difficult to imagine. Then just look at how historical and cultural circumstances change many moral facts.

Do you believe some religious people claim "Homosexuality is bad" because "bad" supervenes over "homosexuality" ?

Or does "good" supervene over "Homosexuality" for progressives ?

Or maybe, progressives relate to a different cultural/historical memes compared to religious people ? This is the simplest explanation

If not, then l will wait till eternity for you to explain which defective cognitive faculty in religious people or progressives makes them make the wrong judgment. Is this cognitive faculty mysterious and undetectable ?

Statements are true, states of affairs obtain. A statement is true if it describes a state of affairs that obtains, and false if it describes a state of affairs that doesn't obtain.

There are a finite number of statements but (possibly) an infinite number of states of affairs. Statements depend on "cognitive content" but (some) states of affairs don't.

I believe there is a fundamental disagreement between us regarding the ontological and logical status of possible states and actual states of affairs.

Here is what l hold onto


1. If A is a possible state of affairs, it was always possible. Possible states of affairs don't come into existence as a possibility.

2. Before this universe or any other universe existed, the possible states of affairs in reference to our universe and other universes out there existed, alongside all the possible states of affairs of universes which never came into existence.

3. Each possible state of affairs is either true or false. For mathematical statements, this is determined by logical necessity. As for empirical statements, they are assigned T/F in a brute manner, whether you believe in a God or not. Even if God assigned truth values to possible states of affairs related to the physical reality, it would be brute.

4. A true possible state of affairs is actual. What is actual, was never not actual. What is not actual is false. Otherwise, a possible states of affairs would be true and false.

Not in the Platonic sense. Numbers don't exist. Rather, when we say that there are infinitely many numbers we are just saying that we can (in principle) keep adding 1 forever.

What do 2, II, { { }, { { } } } , apple apple

all share ?

These objects don't belong in the list just because we wanted them to be in this list. The symbols are designed by us, but they represent something which isn't our construct, or else we would be able to do anything with them, such as equate 2 with 3, given the usual notation, bit this isn't possible.

If you are a strict nominalist who believes math is entirely our own construction, then you will need to explain why mathematical statements are not contingent and why do the laws of physics depend on them ?

As for infinity. Mathematicians never state, there are infinite possible numbers. Nope. They say

Take N = { 1, 2, 3... } , then N HAS an infinite number of elements

When we write lim x -- > inf 1 / x = 0 , we don't only mean as x approaches infinity, then 1 / x approaches 0, but when x approaches infinity, 1/ x does approach 0

The equality sign isn't there to represent an approximation. It isn't the job of philosophers to tell mathematicians what they can or cannot say.

What is f=(x,y)? A function is a certain kind of collection of ordered pairs. I suspect you are tacking on a vertical line segment to link the two end points

Yeah, l am treating them as an ordered pair. f(x,y) is different from f:= (x,y)

The first is basically z = f(x,y) whereas the second is y=f(x)

Yeah, I gave f and a line segment to a higher order function to give me a continuity at x=1 and return f elsewhere

How can one "broaden" the definition of nature without requiring repetitions of miraculous events? And when the first such event cannot be verified where can one go?

Nevertheless, interesting idea.

Well, for every "miraculous event", which is violated at a lower order law, we would keep digging deeper ( or higher ) for higher meta laws.

Feynman did suggest this as a possibility, that nature is like an infinite onion. With each new experiment, we peel another layer of reality; because the onion is infinite, new layers will continue to be discovered forever. Another possibility which l reject is that we’ll get to the core, and arrive at the most fundamental laws and complete physics.

A moral realist might claim that the statement "one ought not harm another" is made true by the mind-independent fact that one ought not harm another (much like someone might claim that the statement "electrons are negatively charged particles" is made true by the mind-independent fact that electrons are negatively charged particles).

I don't see how you've shown that this can't be the case

1. Naturalism is true

2. The linguistic and non-linguistic practices which do not refer to or supervene on any natural fact outside the linguistic and non-linguistic practices must solely depend on the collective mind judgements of the community. These mind-dependent judgements were shaped by our evolutionary history, but you would have to show evolution's main job was to ensure we arrive at true moral statement, even if it harmed our adaptability, which is clearly false.

3. "Do not harm others" does not supervene on any natural fact apart from the linguistic + non-linguistic practices in a community. Were a community to adopt "Do harm others", there would be no natural fact to which one could point to show "Do harm others" is false, whereas in the case of electrons, we could refer to the electron field, upon which "electrons are negative charged" does supervene. Or to give a better example, if someone said, "the trees don't have leaves", we would point to the tree to show it is false.



Conclusion, moral facts are mind-dependent, moral realism is false

And you have no interest in being free from that? Or is it you don’t believe it’s possible? Do you think that condition is a factor in your judgement as to what constitutes Nirvāṇa?

My mental health does influence my judgments. But the ideas in my OP have occurred to me repeatedly.

Actually, the problem isn't with nirvana itself. As a goal , it is not only conceivable, but a select few do manage to attain it.

The problem has more to do with how it's projected or sold as a goal to everyone, which included myself. I firmly believe it's incredibly unhelpful and even harmful to become a Buddhist for the purpose of attaining nirvana. It's akin to studying maths to win the fields medal or solve one of the 7 millennium problems. I can almost guarantee disappointment to anyone who does this.

People just don't seem to take the spirtual traditions seriously anymore, not even monks ( I notice this despite being a nobody, a novice )

On the bright side of things, I noticed people in Buddhist countries usually aim to be reborn in a better state next life. In fact, meditation isn't even a common practice and the religion mostly serves ritual and ethical roles. It's no different from Abrahamic religions. The average Muslim isn't aiming to attain fana either and it is makes sense.

TLDR : For those who are not meant to attain nirvana, going for it is akin to an inexperienced climber aiming to reach the peak of K2. It will be nothing short of a disaster

But again, as poetic as this looks, as I indicated in that quote, it loses any explanation outside of theistic speculation. Theism would denote that God (All-Will) wanted to reveal himself to himself and thus individuated himself via emanations into lower worlds via some Platonic unfolding from universalized Forms to gross individualized forms in the world of time and space. This is all Platonic/Neoplatonic.

Schop is advocating for non-theistic All-Oneness that individuates into multiplicity. That is harder to explain intelligibly as to how All-Will can become multiplicity. This in the end, for all his awesome ideas, becomes a mere assertion. All he can do is point to other non-helpful assertions such as the Vedas/Upanishads whereby the idea of Maya and "illusion" enters the equation. All is one, but we don't realize it. But then the illusion becomes the thing to be explained. Why is the "illusion" so complicated in its phenomenal form if everything is at base oneness? If anything, the more complexity of scientific discoveries reveals this. You can superficially say that physics reveals a sort of "oneneess" in something like a Unified Field Theory, but that is very superficial as that itself is gotten to because of complex mathematical formulations that reveal that, not because it is so apparent because of its basicness to being.

Rather, being seems to be interminably complex and individuated, contra Schopenhauer. He (and others) take the idea of things like "ego" (individual-selfish-drive) and "compassion" (the drive to feel empathy and help people despite one's selfish pull), as some sort of reified unity, when in fact they are just dispositional psychological attitudes, nothing more. They are complex pheonemona and it's often hard to tell what is purely ego and purely compassionate. One can twist those two concepts to variations all day (loving myself is loving others is loving everything is loving myself again, etc. etc.). But this is all just word-play and concept-games at this point, not true metaphysics.

It is yet to be determined why illusion would enter the system at all for Schopenhauer. My way to try to recover this is to emphasize Schop's idea of Will's immediacy and not it's transcendence. That is to say, there can never be a prioricity in his system. This World of Appearance is literally Will-objectified/personified. There is no Will and then appearance. But again, that doesn't say much either except what we already know, that the world appears to us a certain familiar way and that there is another aspect of it that is mere unity. That doesn't explain why unity needs appearance.

Perhaps the only answer is a quasi-theological one. Will needs appearance to be its double-aspect because Will wants it in some way so as to have a way to enact its striving nature. Striving without objects, is basically nothing. But then, here we go again with a theological explanation of some sort of logos, desire, reason, etc.
— schopenhauer1

I'm always happy to see someone who admires Schopenhauer. He has played a pivotal in shaping my worldview.

I take Schopenhauer's viewpoint to be identical to what is found in the Upanishads, as long as you don't talk about the personal Saguna Brahman. The will in itself has two aspects to it, it appears to be the driving source behind all that exists phenomenally, whilst being pure consciousness upon which the phenomena rests.

An apt example is that of a dream in which you exist as one character amongst many other characters. You have a body in your dream and operate with 5 senses. But once you wake up, you realize it was all an illusion, and that all the different objects in the dream were just you.

The illusion only exists phenomenally from the perspective of those who are trapped inside it. But for those who escape it, the illusion isn't real. It's like coming across a mirage. You keep going in its direction, believing it to be real, but once you reach the place, you realize it was all an illusion. The mirage doesn't exist.

Schopenhauer's ethics is based on a feeling of compassion for others due to the fact that they are not different from you. Moreover, once you start treating others as yourself, the veils of multiplicity will be lifted. Your life will become a reflection of non-dualism, where the subject is the object.

I dispute this. There may be infinitely many facts, but it does not follow that there are infinitely many true statements. Some facts just aren’t talked about.

At the very least you can say that there are infinitely many possible true statements, but I don’t think that requires an all-encompassing mind.

I take it you are willing to accept there can be infinitely many mathematical facts.

You take facts to be possible states of affairs, which must either be true or false. So given there can be infinitely many facts, an infinitely many of them are either true or false. By the law of non-contradiction, an infinitely many of them are true, likewise an infinitely many of them are false. An infinitely many true statements cannot be expressed by a universe which contains finite information. Hence, an infinitely many true statements exist independent of the universe

Note : Possible states of affairs can be false, for eg, 1+1=3 is F , given the usual notation. All actual statements are just true possible statements

If by possibly true you mean possible statements which are not actual but true, then it's a self contradiction. But if you mean the possible statement can be true or false, then you have said nothing. You are just repeating the law of non-contradiction, which is even true of actual statements.

Probably not many, because life is still far too easy and far too good for most people to become radical.

Those who experience the diminishing returns in the pursuit of the proverbial "eating, drinking, and making merry", might begin to question whether said pursuit is worth it.

If you want me to be completely honest. I have felt and do feel the diminishing returns thanks to my depression. Sometimes l wish for death to overtake me. I don't want to live, nor do l want to die.

I know what is it like for nothing to satisfy you, not even an hour long meditation session, medication, a dedicated study of the religious scriptures of all major world religions does the job for me

Why am l bitter ? Cause the medicine l was given didn't cure me of my illness. I have now come to the conclusion that to look for life-saving, life-guiding guidelines is fruitless. Life is too complicated.

There is no Jesus, Muhammad, Buddha who can guide me. No traditional religion, no secular religion, no philosophy, no arts, no literature.

Anything goes

My point is, are you asking because the tradition appeals to you, but you find it too challenging? Or because you are seeking an alternative? Or is this merely a criticism? You say "what is more terrible". This suggests to me that you have a negative disposition towards the types of practices associated with the pursuit of moksha. In which case, this particular goal isn't for you. It isn't terrible, it simply isn't for you. Why do you feel compelled to defend your choice not to pursue this particular type of goal? For some people it isn't terrible at all. Brain scans of meditating buddhist monks have demonstrated there are remarkable things going on in their minds.

The tradition does appeal to me, it is challenging, l am always seeking an alternative, this post is criticism. I don't know about my disposition, since l am all over the place, but it's not hard to find an ascetic inclination in myself. Maybe Buddhism is for me, maybe it isn't.

The above post is not sarcastic. It's a true representation.

Why do l feel the need to publicize my views ? There isn't a single motive. I just decided to vent. God knows what pushed my mind/brain to do this

I know meditation has been proven to be useful, but nirvana/moksha isn’t that. You can meditate all your life and still never reach nirvana. A lot of people seem to conflate beneficial religious practices with the goals of religions / way of life

Do you think that the answer to this question is (or should be) the same for everyone?

Nope. But it's still worth exploring. I'm sure l will find people who agree with me, and in good numbers hopefully.

An excellent demonstration of the concept of the value of moderation in all things

I agree with everything else you said, except this point. l doubt this maxim is valid. As you see, human nature is too complicated for such generalizations.

Would l tell Newton to spend less time on physics and alchemy, and more on other departments of life ?

Nope. Who am l tell a genius like Newton that he should waste his time on what he probably regarded as frivolous pursuits and not dedicate his genius to physics, pushing our frontiers of knowledge to new boundaries.

Would l tell Cioran to go visit a psychiatrist and stop being a NEET pessimist ? Never

As a side note, even if "moderation" is good, it ultimately depends and varies with the individual.

I want to flag an objection from the perspective of one sympathetic to the Platonic intuitions behind this post. And that is the sense in which it can be said that such an all-encompassing mind exists. Because it seems clear to me that whatever exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and an end in time. To challenge that would require proving the existence of something that doesn't exhibit those attributes, and I cannot conceive of such a thing. Everything I am aware of, that exists, exhibits these attributes.

You might say that intelligible objects, such as logical principles and real numbers, don't come into or go out of existence, nor are composed of parts. And that is true - but do they exist? You can tell me they do, but to demonstrate them you would need to explain them to me, and I would need to understand them. But they certainly don't exist as do rocks, trees, and stars. They are real as elements of rational thought, but they're not phenomenally existent. And I'm of the view that 'what exists' pertains to or describes the domain of phenomena.

I sense this is close in meaning to your OP, and something I fully agree with. The problematical part, is the meaning of the word 'exists' in this context, so also of the existence of the mind which comprehends such relations. Which is not to say that such a mind does not exist, but that it must necessarily transcend the distinction between existence and non-existence, a distinction which characterises everything that exists.

One will sometimes encounter the terminology in philosophical theology of God as 'beyond being' - and I think this is what this expression is driving at, although strictly speaking, the expression ought to be 'beyond existence', as there is a distinction, albeit one not commonly made, between 'being' and 'existence'. What is necessarily so, cannot not be.

Ideas clearly exist. Ideas are not composed of parts. You can't divide an idea. It comes as a whole. Yes, you may have an incomplete idea or it may transform into something else as you think, but the idea as an immaterial object cannot be divided. To give an analogy from physics, think of fields. They cannot be divided into parts. Therefore, whatever exists is not neccesarily composed of parts.

( Additional remarks, our minds are also indivisible, but they exist. Though we do speak of minds in the plural, the barrier between a mind and another mind can be best described as our brain filtering out other minds, as a radio picks one signal and filters out other the rest. But this is a bit speculative )

If you still insist, then this will take you down a very narrow road. For eg, "good" and "evil" as properties are not divisible. Do they exist ? If they don't, then claiming "Murder is wrong" becomes false. You can escape this conundrum by being a non-cognitivist, but the Frege-Geach problem awaits you.

Secondly. The parts of the whole can be contingent, without the collection or the container of the parts being contingent. As for our universe having a beginning and an end in time, if time is just one of its dimension and a relational feature between events, then it's a property of events within the universe, not the universe itself. The universe itself is atemporal / aspatial. The universe doesn't exist in time or space.

Let's talk about universals. Russell's argument primarily rests on concepts being the object/essence of things around us, even though they are comprehended as ideas. I will use some insight from Wittgenstein and Berkeley to refute this misconception. Let's take the famous example offered by Wittgenstein, "game". Can we give a description of "game" which is an object/essence of all games ? We cannot. Or take the example of Russell , i.e "whiteness". There is no other concept which has taken different meanings across cultures and history. It could not have belonged to objects.

On a side note, l don't believe numbers neccesarily exist as platonic entities, though they must exist in some infinite all encompassing mind. I won't be defending mathematical platonism ( with small p, espoused by the likes of Quine )

Why should we believe in the existence of mathematical entities. Well, one of my argument in OP is the well known indispensability argument offered by Quine-Putnam

It goes as follows

(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.

I would like to modify this argument a bit to your taste

(P1) We have ontological commitment to all entities that are deeply intertwined in our (non-illusory) phenomenal experience and shape it

P(2) Mathematical entities are deeply intertwined in our (non-illusory) phenomenal experience and shape it

(C) We have ontological commitment to mathematical entities

Reasoning for P(1) and P(2) , Without mathematical concepts/intuiton already existing in our minds, we would not look at a triangular shape and see it as a triangle. We would not look at 3 apples and 2 oranges and think, there are 5 fruits infront of me. Moreover, when it comes to geometrical shapes, you cannot seperate your seeing of something as a figure from the concept of the figure.

I would like to emphasize, l don't think there is any explanation as to how material objects, such as trees, can instantiate a mathematical number. It appears to me that our minds project mathematical concepts onto the world and shape our phenomenal experience for us. Not the other way round.

Now imagine there were no minds in this world. But it surely makes sense to say, there would still be gazillions of stars in the sky. But this is information, a true meaning embedded statement viewed from the perspective of a mind which has access to mathematical concepts. Hence, even if our minds didn't exist, there must be some mind in whose conception the number describing all the stars in our universe exists.

As for existence, l believe we need to go back to the medieval philosophers, and mystics esp. If we follow their method, then to claim 'X exists' is to claim 'X can be found by a mind'

There exists a box on the table

A box on the table can be found by a mind

There exists a number "2"

The number "2" can be found by a mind

A square circle does not exist

A square circle can never be found by a mind ( except as an example of something never to be found )

There exist beauty

Beauty can be found by a mind

There exists good and bad

Good and bad can be found by a mind

There exists a mind

Each mind can be or is found by itself ( self-reflexive). As for the existence of other minds, l will show it follows quite easily.

If an object around you finds you, it has a mind. Books and chairs don't find you, people and animals do. How do we know something finds us out ? From its language and behavior ( for animals it's only behavior ) which is similar to ours when we find something.

The next obvious question from an interlocutor would be what is the difference between the existence of an idea, an object out there, a value judgment and an illusion ?

The way you find it and the way your mind experiences it. Your experience is non-reductive, you cannot analyze it further. As for the mind, we can say the mind isn't a physical object, it isn't an abstract entity, it isn't a moral property, it isn't an aesthetic property. In other words, the mind can only be defined as a negation of all it experiences as other than itself. Can our minds be positively described as consciousness ? I'm not sure. So l stick with the negative approach.

( f(x)=0 if x<1 and f(x)=1 if x>=1 is already defined at the critical point. Can you cure this sick function?)

You didn't get my point

Ofc,we can

For the graph f := (x,y)

Let G ((x,y),(x',y')) := (x'',y'') be the function which pastes the graph p = (x',y') on f = (x,y) filling the discontinuous gap at x=1 and returns (x,y) at other points besides x=1=x'

Where p is x'=1 , the line segment connecting the discontinuous gap at x=1 , defined for 0=<y'<=1

I don't see why stopping here wouldn't be the reasonable solution.

Because it involves a contradiction. To say there exists ineffable truths about X world is to contradict yourself. Hence, there is no world which has ineffable truths. But a true statement depends neccesarily (not sufficiently ) on a mental evaluation, hence there must always be a mind to evaluate it

I'm fine with considering this an "ought" statement in the same way that a moral one is. I also agree that the colloquial, illocutionary nature of the statement is confusing, though I think we could sharpen it up if we needed to.

But the problem is the same old one: There's an implied hypothetical between "I command you to" and "you ought to," namely "You ought to do this IF you want to keep your kneecaps intact" or some such. It's perfectly possible, though unlikely, that the hitman could reply, "I'm OK with broken kneecaps," in which case we haven't managed to derive a pure "ought" from an "is." This example certainly clarifies that the ought-is problem is logical, not psychological. Since just about no one wants to be injured in this way, the command has a lot of psychological force -- but no logical entailment without the "if" premise,

Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-following/#NormCond

"According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. On this reading, meaning facts are normative facts—they not only sort the applications of expressions into correct or incorrect, but also prescribe how expressions ought to be applied. They issue semantic categorical obligations that bind speakers in determinate ways; the justified applications are precisely those that fulfil these semantic obligations"

Keeping the above paragraph l quoted in mind

Take this example

"This is a pencil" implies "This ought to function like a pencil"

If it doesn't, then the first statement is wrong.

With the same line of reasoning, if you claim "murder is wrong" , but you cannot derive "murder should be wrong" , then your first statement is false

Why ? Wrong comes equipped with "ought not to do"

Only if a mind is observing the pixels on a screen. Otherwise, they're just pixels on a screen. It takes mentation to turn the pixels into something else. Whenever we get into this area, I always ask, "is a simulation of a tornado a simulation if no one is observing it?" If there's no mind interpreting the results of the simulation of the tornado, it's just pixels and noise. How could it be anything else?

Excellent reply.

People confuse data with information. The latter is meaningful. I was tempted to bring up information realism and pancomputationalism , the "It from bit" hypothesis of John Wheeler, but didn't since it would cause more confusion. Nevertheless, it is a stronger version of my conclusion, in which reality emerges from an immaterial reality where Yes/No decisions take place. I am simply content with claiming the existence of a mind is a neccesary but not sufficient condition for the truth evaluation of all true statements.

What does it mean for truths to exist? Are truths metaphysically real "states of affairs"? Or are they constructions of a particular mind?

I addressed this in the beginning. Given any theory of truth, whether it assumes the truth criterion is a metaphysical representation or otherwise, its conception and operation depends on a mind.

Here is a concrete example. Take the correspondence theory

Before there was any mind, how would you tell, X states of affairs was in correspondence with actual facts of a world ? You cannot

Why ? Because to evaluate whether some statement is true or false in some world is to be a mind in that world, conceptually or actually.

This makes the correspondence theory useless. If a criterion can never be implemented, it is meaningless. The entire purpose and meaning of a criterion rests in it's possible implementation.

This does not make sense to me. The content of a statement doesn't change its ontological status.

Ask yourself. Does it make sense to say X statement was always true, but it never always existed. How can a statement be true and not exist ? And if a true statement an an evaluation must exist, it will exist in a mind

This proof only works conceptually if truths are the results of evaluation, which is to say truths are (mental) constructs.

But this means also that necessary truths only ever exist for specific minds, and a mindless world has no truths, necessary or otherwise. So a mindless world is perfectly self consistent, and necessary truths only arise for specific minds.

True statements are a mental evaluation, but what they represent isn't. A mindless world may have truths, but we cannot speak of them, which is no different from not having any truths.

Let's suppose there is no God. We can do without him actually. The only difference is we will get an infinite gradation of minds, instead of an all encompassing mind

Was "Big bang just occurred" a true statement when the big bang occurred ? Here is the tricky part. We can say it is a true statement from an evaluation in our time w.r.t the time when the big bang occurred, but it involves us taking our mind to the time when the big bang occurred CONCEPTUALLY. But even if we didn't exist, It is neccesary condition for this universe that there be a mind in the relative distant future which can evaluate the conditions of the past when there were no minds.

How is this possible ?

As you know from special relativity, the past/present/future exists on the same ontological plane. So when the big bang occurred, we were thinking of it having occurred in the future from the refrence of big bang. But even if we didn't exist, there must have been someone in the future who was thinking of the big bang. As we have eliminated God, we will need to take this universe to be infinite to have all the minds represent the infinitely many true mathematical statements and have them evaluated. So instead of an all encompassing mind, we have an infinite gradation of minds, given each mind is limited.

To sum it up, the existence of a mind is a neccesary condition for the existence of neccesarily logical truths, but not a sufficient condition.

But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.

I believe this rests on a mistaken notion of how language works. Why do we interpret sentences the way we do ? What forces us to derive conclusions ? The non-linguistic practices and contexts. That's it.

Language itself is normative. It doesn't need a force, nor does it depend on rules, for rules would require further interpretation ad infinitum. There are no gaps to be fulfilled. The wrong and right inferences from a statement depend on the community of language speakers.

As far I can see you are just begging the question that there is no such thing as a mind-independent reality. I'm sure lots of people would say that: just because truths can only be evaluated by a mind, doesn't mean there isn't some kind of objective reality beyond it.

You need to re-read my first point. My conclusion is compatible with a mind-independent reality, given a mind exists to comprehend it as a reality apart from itself

True statements are not equivalent to reality, they describe reality in a way that satisfies some "truth" criterion. But any truth criterion is mind-dependent

Mind dependent in what sense ? Its conception and operation rests on a mind

Once more, I never denied a mind-independent reality, in fact, it is compatible with my conclusion. What l claim is you cannot sensibly talk of a world in which there wasn't a single neccesary mind (whether it existed alongside the universe, beyond it, as itself )

Then l show this mind must be all encompassing and infinitely powerful given neccesarily true mathematical statements.

Perhaps if you specified exactly what "Ought" you are deriving I might be able to offer a more specific argument. If you are suggesting that "You should kill Tom" is an ought, I would respond that this is nothing more than an example of an illocutionary act (command by the boss) and that the perlocutionary effect consists of the hitman's response to the command. If this is your definition of the meaning of an "ought" then, logically, any time anyone tells us to do something and we accept, the conditions for normativity have been satisfied, which is absurd.

It doesn't have be like that. We can have conditions that the person issuing declarative statements must satisfy some objective moral criteria.

Criterion : The poor need some of our money

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person.

My point was to show, our language does allow declarative statements to function as normative statements simultaneously

But not all possible statements already exist. You would need to show that the statement about the necessary truth also necessarily exists.

I never claimed all contingent truths must exist, only logically neccesary truths. I have already given reasons why mathematical truths can not depend on material representation ( refuting logicism )

If a statement is logically neccesary, then it exists irrespective of whether there is a physical world or not, since it isn't about the physical world.

Here is a proof of the existence of neccesarily logically true statements and a mind :

Definition :

Existence for neccesarily true statements means "X is neccesarily" exists as an evaluation.

If it doesn't, then we can't say "X is neccesarily true", but X is neccesarily true, so an evaluation neccesarily exists. But if an evaluation neccesarily exists, a mind neccesarily exists for the evaluation.

What do you mean by ‘true statements’? Propositions? If so, I see no reason to believe that propositions could not exist as platonic forms (or something like that) independently of any mind.

For example, why can’t the true proposition ‘p > q’ not exist acausally as the a part of the form of reality?

Another route, is to just deny:

Not just propositions, but true propositions. Here is 2 reasons we should prefer true propositions to be cognitive content over platonic forms

1. Platonic forms lack intentional content. There is no meaning to them in refrence to themselves. Platonic forms don't think they are true. We with our minds do.

2. Let's suppose true statements existed as Platonic forms, then we would only be able to access true statements by coming into contact with platonic forms, but our minds cannot contact them or comprehend them. Furthermore, we do have experience of minds evaluating true statements, what evidence is there for the existence of platonic entities, how do you know they exist ?

Another route, is to just deny:

3. There are infinitely many statements that are necessarily true, independent of spacetime itself

For your argument to work, one has to be a mathematical and logical realist—i.e., one has to believe that math and logic pertain to the structure of reality and are not our mere estimations of it—which I am not seeing why this would be implausible.

Mathematics isn't an estimation of the world. You are confusing physics with mathematics. Yes, numbers may represent apples and chairs, but it's ludicrous to conflate them.

Mathematical theorems rest on axioms and inferences our minds derive from them. That's it. The axioms are taken as self-evident, not some a posteriori fact about the world.

You are conflating the map with the territory: just because I can measure a door with a ruler and get a rough estimate of its size it does not follow that the door has a fixed size (mathematically). However, if one is a mathematical realist, again, they could just say that numbers, math operators, etc. are platonic forms (or something similar), which doesn’t require a universal mind.

If you say your door is 2 meters long and "2" doesn't exist, then your statement is false. But you do have a mind which can conceptualize "2", even if it's a rough approximation, so your statement is somewhat right. If you improved your instrument, you would get a better measurement, but it still depends on the existence of some number inside your head.

Now, look at physics. It describes the universe with numbers before any mind existed in the universe. Such a theory is wrong if there were no numbers, the theory can't even be approximately correct. So there must have been some mind which comprehended mathematical numbers/concepts

As for numbers being platonic entities, refer to my objection above

What we estimate about reality will always be an finite underestimate of what is happening: no matter how precise it is.

And ? Are you saying there are only finitely true mathematical statements because of that ? If not, then it's a point in my favor. There must be a mind beyond the universe which can comprehend all the infinite true mathematical statements. ( I have already objected to platonism, so it is not a reasonable alternative )

I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought" vs. "is"s--but the english language has many examples of ought statements which aren't, in-themselves, moral statements.

Also, inferring "You should kill Tom" from "Today is Tom's last day on earth" is just an inference from colloquial speech: technically, one cannot logically nor coherently derive, all else being equal, the former from the latter. It is only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

The usage of "ought" for general normative statements is correct, since Hume wasn't only concerned with moral statements.

I don't see a problem with using colloquial language. In the philosophy of language, we don't look for a perfect language anymore. All we do is explore how language works in real life, following the example of Wittgenstein, who reminded everyone to let philosophy leave everything as it is

As for imprecise language, didn't Wittgenstein say it is friction that allows to walk ? A smooth floor would not allow us to walk. The fact is language is imprecise, but it works.

There is no technical issue here. It's not like l have uttered nonsense.

A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is in right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

Whether the "ought" we derive is correct or not is a seperate question. I am only addressing the claim that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"

Hume's distinction goes beyond morality. Normative commands don't need to be related to morality.

Nevertheless, addressing your concerns. Your objection only holds for those who are moral realists, who believe mind-independent moral standard is given and we can judge what is right or wrong in reference to it.

But a moral irrealist would simply tell you, moral statement are mind-dependent (non-objectivists) or moral statements are not truth apt (non-cognitivists) or moral statements are all false (errror theorists ).

It doesn't follow from any of this that any particular statement (concerning a necessary truth or something else) necessarily exists.

Can you point out the specific flaw. Saying the conclusion doesn't follow isn't helpful.

I actually want to improve this argument. So you can even critique the weak point and suggest how l can improve it.

What change to this argument would convince you its correct ?

That (which exists as pixels on a screen) is not a true statement?

I would like you to imagine a world in which there are no minds. You will imagine our world as it exists minus the minds, and you will use the knowledge we have ( intentional content ) to infer what would be true in such a world, depending on whether you are a direct/indirect realist or irrealist and your metaphysical commitments to what exists independent of the mind

But hold on.

All you did in this thought experiment is imagine a mind less world from a world in which there are minds and languages. In other words, you mentally allocated to the world which had no minds with your mind to describe it.

Using your mind to describe a mindless world ( in which a mind doesn't exist ) is a wrong step.

This tells us there cannot be any true or false statements about a world in which there no minds.

Possible Retort : But you just made a true statement about this world. No, l haven't. I have stated a condition for semantics. If such a world existed, its description would be impossible

How does it follow from your premises that the statements (already) exist? - Echarmion

To show : All (neccesarily) true statements exist as cognitive content

Reason : Whatever theory of truth you pick (Correspondence theory, pragmatic theory, coherence theory, deflationary theory etc) , its definition and operation can only be the evaluation of a mind. So to say, "X is true" is to evaluate X as T in your mind in reference to some truth-criterion

I will elaborate on the paragraph above

A true statement presupposes a truth-criterion. A truth-criterion doesn't tell us what is the case, only how it is to be determined. Moreover, truth-criterion requires the existence of a language in which the world can be described. Language rests on intentional content (esp meaning). Intentional content is a cognitive content, even though it can be determined by the world.

Note : I am not saying our mind plays the only role in determining the intentional content, but that intentional content doesn't exist without the mind.