You might be interested in Descartes proof of the outside world, from the MM:
I will conclude that, if the objective reality of any of my ideas is such that I clearly recognize that it is neither formally nor eminently in me and that, consequently, I cannot myself be the cause of it, it necessarily follows that I do not exist alone in the world, but that there is still something that exists and that is the cause of this idea; whereas, if such an idea is not found in me, I will have no argument that can convince me and assure me of the existence of anything other than myself; for I have searched them all carefully and have not, until now, found any.
The issue then is that the proof is only a tool to prove God. He does not see in the outside world anything that he himself could not have generated. The only idea that must come from an outside source is his/our idea of God:
Now between these ideas, apart from the one which represents me to myself, from which there can be no difficulty here, there there is another which represents to me a God, others corporeal and inanimate things, others angels, others animals, and finally others which represent men similar to me. But as for the ideas which represent other men to me, or animals, or angels, I easily understand that they can be formed by mixing and composing other ideas that I have of bodily things and of God, although besides me there were no other men in the world, neither any animals nor any angels. And as far as the ideas of corporeal things are concerned, I do not recognize nothing so great or so excellent, which does not seems like it could come from myself
Later on the sixth meditation, we see the simple argument that if there were something in my mind causing the perception of the, materially false, outside world, I would be aware of it. Not being aware of it, it must be the case that it comes from outside. However in earlier meditation he speaks about a possibly unknown part of the mind:
“Can it, however, also happen that these same things which I suppose not to be because they are unknown to me, are not actually different from me, who I know?”
and
“[…] more distinctly known than that part of myself which I do not know and which does not affect the imagination;”
Though these possible unknown parts of his nature would not affect the imagination, he claims. There is no reason prima facie that some unknown part of the mind would not affect it, but defining the mind as at least things that I am conscious of, it can't be the case. As SEP puts it:
For from the additional premise that nothing can be in my mind of which I am unaware, it follows that if sensations were being produced by some activity in my mind, I’d be aware of that activity on the occasion of its operation. Since I’m not thus aware, it follows that the sensation I’m having is produced by a cause external to my mind. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
That alone proves the outside world, be it things or an evil or good god. When it comes to a physical world, Descartes' approach is not without trouble, as is explained in the following SEP article.
The article “Descartes’ Theory of Ideas and the Existence of the Physical World” by Şahabeddin Yalçin might be useful. Also
SEP's article on that part of Cartesian philosophy.