my “seven” is a real object (from materials existing in space and time) inside my brain — bioByron
In connection with numbers, one strategy is to take numbers to be universals of some sort — e.g., one might take them to be properties of piles of physical objects, so that, for instance, the number 3 would be a property of, e.g., a pile of three books — and to take an immanent realist view of universals. (This sort of view has been defended by Armstrong (1978).) But views of this kind have not been very influential in the philosophy of mathematics. A more prominent strategy for taking number talk to be about the physical world is to take it to be about actual piles of physical objects, rather than properties of piles. Thus, for instance, one might maintain that to say that 2 + 3 = 5 is not really to say something about specific entities (numbers); rather, it is to say that whenever we push a pile of two objects together with a pile of three objects, we will wind up with a pile of five objects — or something along these lines. Thus, on this view, arithmetic is just a very general natural science.
definitely disagree that 'all heterogenous societies are chaotic.'... — Shawn
The problem wouldn't be that these beliefs are arbitrary, but rather that they are determined by a biology, social and personal history, etc. that can be completely explained without any reference to "goodness," — Count Timothy von Icarus
I interpret these to mean the same exact thing: am I missing something you are trying to convey? How have I changed it? — Bob Ross
then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinct from the belief — Bob Ross
The point you--in my opinion, correctly observed--supports, for me, the conclusion that the "reality" we are trying to decipher, is as it turns out, "causily connected to itself," a "loop," all of it, the "thing," the proposition (about thing)and the belief, taking place as a single process "appearing" as separate, giving rise to more propositions about subjects, objects, Beings and Truths. — ENOAH
Pimps and organ traffickers too?Every job that exists exists for a reason — finarfin
If this description is accurate, could this result in a mathematical realism that is not platonic but physicalistic? — bioByron
what role does education have in society and perhaps more importantly in our daily lives? — Shawn
Germany started an evil war of aggression. Nothing they did once they went down that road was justified. — RogueAI
Everything is fair game in total war. — RogueAI
Is it a moral thing to be hard?
[It seems extremely incongruous that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes could ever be justified or excused by ‘defensive force’ — self-defence, defence of others and defence of property. Nonetheless, art 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codifies defensive force as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility — https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1681146/Tonkin.pdf
Truthity is whether or not something has truth, and not that it has truth. — Bob Ross
it is an uncontroversial claim that the stance taken on something is distinct from that something — Bob Ross
This is internally inconsistent — Bob Ross
But please keep speaking of things for which you’re humiliatingly ignorant. — Mikie
Because I read Twitter. — Mikie
an articlecompletelydebunking the stupid — Mikie
But please keep speaking of things for which you’re humiliatingly ignorant. It goes in line with…literally everything else you post. — Mikie
Nasty anti-semite — BitconnectCarlos
Heidegger’s point about science is that it is not equipped to question its own presuppositions, and that when it does so it is no longer doing science but philosophy. — Joshs
What does "full of holes" mean? — RogueAI
Was there also only a 70% chance that Obama was the rightful winner in either of his elections? — RogueAI
Heidegger’s point that a science presupposes as its very condition of possibility a set of metaphysical assumptions about how the world ought to be understood, which implies an ethics — Joshs
Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York, was initially attracted to Platonism—but has since come to see it as problematic. If something doesn’t have a physical existence, he asks, then what kind of existence could it possibly have? “If one ‘goes Platonic’ with math,” writes Pigliucci, empiricism “goes out the window.” (If the proof of the Pythagorean theorem exists outside of space and time, why not the “golden rule,” or even the divinity of Jesus Christ?)
If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them
And by identifying the indispensable components invoked in the explanation of various phenomena, and noting that mathematical entities are among them, the platonist is then in a position to make sense of the success of applied mathematics.
[...]
to accommodate that success is often taken as a significant benefit of platonism. Less controversially, the platonist is certainly able to describe the way in which mathematical theories are actually used in scientific practice without having to rewrite them. This is, as will become clear below, a significant benefit of the view. — SEP's Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
I would agree with Lionino here, that this isn't capturing the position very well. — AmadeusD
One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary. — AmadeusD
There is moral proposition X.
I believe X is true.
Believing X makes it true (subjectivism strictly defined).
X was not true before I believed it. — Lionino
[...] especially if we accept the requirement that a belief is motivated by evidence and evidence is causally connected to the matter of fact of the belief. — Lionino
P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something. — Bob Ross
but you're certainly insinuating something. — RogueAI
Was Biden the rightful winner or not? — RogueAI
Obvious on 4Chan — Mikie
The analysis expressed “high confidence” that just 12 deceased-voter ballots were submitted in Clark county, Nevada; they said the number of possible double voters ranged from 45 to just over 9,000.
The researchers also said they believed the “potential statewide exposure” of dead voters was 23
Voter fraud — of any kind — is extremely rare — Mikie
I may say something true when I assert ‛there exists something which is a compound of this pencil and your left ear’, and in another, you may say something true when you assert ‛there is nothing which is composed of that pencil and my left ear’ — Bob Hale and Crispin Wright
XII. Y de esto se sigue, primer lugar, que aunque cada individuo sea la realidad formalmente uno, sin intervención de la consideración de la mente, sin embargo, muchos individuos de quienes afirmamos ser de la misma naturaleza, no son algo uno con verdadera unidad que exista en las cosas, a no ser sólo fundamentalmente o mediante el entendimiento. Y por eso siempre que Aristóteles dice que muchas cosas forman un uno en esencia o razón formal, explica dicha unidad en orden al entendimiento, concretamente, porque concebidos bajo una razón o definición, como se echa de ver en el lib. V de la Metafisica, c. 6, texto 11, y en el lib. X, al principio. Y Santo Tomás en el De ente et essentia, c. 4, dijo en este sentido que la naturaleza no tiene esencialmente unidad común, porque, de lo contrario, no podría convertirse en singular. Segundo, se deduce que una cosa es hablar de unidad formal y otra de la "comunidad" de dicha unidad; porque la unidad se da en las cosas, según se explicó; en cambio, la "comunidad" propia y estrictamente no se da en las cosas, porque ninguna unidad que exista en la realidad es común, según demostramos, sino que en las cosas singulares hay cierta semejanza en sus unidades formales, en la cual se funda la comunidad que el entendimiento puede atribuir a tal naturaleza en cuanto concebida por él, y esta semejanza no es propiamente unidad, porque no expresa la indivisión de las entidades en que se funda, sino solo la conveniencia o relación, o la coexistencia de ambas. — Disputaciones Metafísicas
12. And from this it follows, in the first place, that although each individual is in reality formally one, without the intervention of the mind's consideration, nevertheless, many individuals of whom we claim to be of the same nature are not one thing with true unity existing in things, unless only fundamentally or through the understanding. And therefore whenever Aristotle says that many things form a one in essence or formal reason, he explains this unity in order to the understanding, namely, because they are conceived under one reason or definition, as we see in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, c. 6, text 11, and in the tenth book, at the beginning. And St. Thomas in De ente et essentia, c. 4, said in this sense that nature has essentially no common unity, because otherwise it could not become singular. Secondly, it follows that it is one thing to speak of formal unity and another of the ‘community’ of that unity; for unity is given in things, as explained. On the other hand, ‘commonness’ properly and strictly speaking does not occur in things, because no unity existing in reality is common, as we have shown, but in singular things there is a certain similarity in their formal unities, on which is founded the commonness which the understanding can attribute to such a nature as is conceived by it, and this similarity is not properly unity, because it does not express the indivision of the entities on which it is founded, but only the convenience or relation, or the coexistence of the two. — DeepL translation, edited
It happens so seldom around here :-) — fishfry
If only I knew what "metaphysically possible" means? — Ludwig V
The most important point is that the validity of IQ tests is controversial — Ludwig V
For more details, see Wikipedia - Intelligence Quotient — Ludwig V