They will almost certainly argue that "the Democrats," (Biden, Clinton, etc.) and maybe other parties accused of rigging the election and the 2020 Riots like the Chinese Communist Party, sanctioned and helped to organize the assassination attack. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Bolsonaro was stabbed in 2018 by a member of the Communist Party. They denied any involvement and life carried on. Not gonna happen.

Crooks is a registered Republican — Wayfarer

Guess why :rofl:

come the conspiracies — Mikie

If anyone is conspiring in this context, it is the Democratic party. Learn to use words, Mikey.

New rule: There is an integer that is neither a Fhorrest integers nor a Gill integer. — Banno

I think that is contradictory with Fhorrest's rule.

The quoted argument assumes that all words are universals — Ourora Aureis

It doesn't. It doesn't assume 'of' or 'tomorrow' is an universal — there is no of-ness or tomorrow-ness.

an arbitrary definition for it — Ourora Aureis

If you can make up a definition for it, is it arbitrary? Does it not exist in relation to other words, which refer to things in the world?

The hysterics are amazing. — Mikie

Not the guy who thinks the world will end because of combustions engine cars.

Derivative problem. If you are a platonist, you think math is discovered, if you are a nominalist or conceptualist, you think math is invented.

Free will is a property of a process making choices. If it impossible to predict what choices this process will make, then it has free will.
— Tarskian

Oh for gosh sake. That's not true. A coin doesn't have free will when you flip it. And if you say that deep down coin flips are deterministic, so are programs. — fishfry

Chaos theory has already been brought up twice, which he ignored, like he does everytime his incorrigible nonsense is challenged. Prediction of choices has nothing to do with free will — and this is nonsensical woo disguised in logical language. If you know your friend likes cake over pie, it is possible to predict he will choose cake, it doesn't mean he has no free will.

Meanwhile, a few months later a bunch of white people storm the Capitol building in an attempt to stop the electoral college vote, and they were “let in” — Mikie

It is okay when we do it. Get the memo, Mikie-chan.

That is true if "both props" is understood as (A → B) ^ (A → ¬B) and "imply ¬A" as the proposition being True means A is False. — Lionino

((a→b)∧(a→¬b))↔¬a is valid

6 pages too many on this thread.

Adderral:

To whom would the proposition "men exist" be addressed? What information does it convey that we do not already know? — Fooloso4

Well, not my reply of choice, but since I can't think of anything else: people who think sex is a spectrum.

Rule 1: The sum of any two integers is 0 — Moliere

That was me referencing jgill, not making up another rule :^)

Not so strange. — Fooloso4

Zeno was a merchant until he was exposed to the teachings of Socrates (l. c. 470/469 to 399 BCE), the iconic Greek philosopher through a book by one of Socrates' students, Xenophon (l. 430 to c. 354 BCE), known as the Memorabilia. This book contained conversations with Socrates, his philosophy, and Xenophon's memories of the time spent as his student. Zeno was so completely captivated by the work that he left his former profession and dedicated himself to the study of philosophy, eventually becoming a teacher himself. — WHE

I didn't use the word problem at any point. Anscombe is wrong if she is using that etymology for an argument, because the etymology presented is wrong. The meaning of "binding" no longer existed in French, which is where obligation comes from.

"proposition" here refers to "(A → B) ^ (A → ¬B)", not to "imply ¬A"

Anyway we clarified that here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/916729

Doch, the beginning is missing:

c. 1300, obligacioun, "a binding pledge, commitment to fulfill a promise or meet conditions of a bargain," from Old French obligacion "obligation, duty, responsibility" (early 13c.) and directly from Latin obligationem [...]

Which is what I say.

I didn't say it is.

But that is not "necessarily implies' or 'necessarily leads to'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Yes, the first phrase means □(p→q), the second means nothing to my knowledge.

From what I understand the word derives from obligationem — Banno

If the word derived from obligationem it would be obligationem. It derives from French obligacion (today 'obligation', English followed French in changing the spelling of the -cion suffix for -tion around the 16th century), and obligacion derived from obligationem.

From my experience, French people have little issues with their own words.

Philosophim must be talking about conditions.

If A (being True) is necessary for B (to be True), B→A. A is a necessary condition of B.
If A is sufficient for B, A→B. A is a sufficient condition of B.
Necessary and sufficient: A←→B. A is a necessary and sufficient condition of B, so A and B are in constant conjunction (queue: Hume).

Another confusion that stems from 'p'/'a' meaning "[given proposition] is True" or meaning a variable that may take values 0/False or 1/True.

but cannot be used to show truth tables within posts in TPF. — Banno

Well I screenshot, press control v on imgur.com, then copy image url address and use it on "image" button

On the other hand, Tones says that both propositions imply ¬A. That is true if "both props" is understood as (A → B) ^ (A → ¬B) and "imply ¬A" as the proposition being True means A is False. That much is accurate. But taking (A → B) and (A → ¬B) individually, neither need A to be False for them to be True (see: my logic tables in first page).

Edit: we posted at the same time.

Thanks - I concede your point. — Leontiskos

I am mostly complementing my own posts. I didn't know you were arguing the opposite, but alright :up:

It would be useful to have a page that generates an image of a given truth table. — Banno

https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs103/tools/truth-table-tool/ ?

Dictionaries should solve it — Leontiskos

I am of the same opinion. I don't think philosophy has any business dealing with analytic statements (red is a colour), that is up to lexicography in the prescriptive sphere and semantics in the descriptive — kidnapping-common-words-to-turn-them-into-jargon aside.

((p→q)∧(p→¬q)) and (p→(q∧¬q)) are the same formula — Lionino

If p is False, both propositions are true for any value of q.

Taking a look at (p→(q and ¬q)):

0 = False, 1 = True
(q and ¬q) is always 0 – definition of contradiction
a→b is equivalent to (¬a or b) – definition of material implication
our b in this case is (q and ¬q), thus b is always 0
if p is 0, ¬p is 1, so from (¬p or (q and ¬q)) we have (1 or 0)
The or operator will return 1 if any of the variables is 1 – by definition
So (1 or 0) returns 1, so (¬p or (q and ¬q)) returns 1 if p is 0, so ((p→q)∧(p→¬q)) returns 1 if p is 0

This kind of stuff is better to understand from the POV of electronics. The words "True" and "False" make things confusing. "1 or 0" is a logical gate with two inputs, returning 1, "True or False" is like "Duh, what else could it be?"

It is true you see something like JTB in Theaitetos, but I don't think what Plato and the (anti-)JTBers are doing are quite the same thing. The SEP says "It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers".

Perhaps for another thread.

Then there is the opposite attack on thought: that urged by Mr. H.G.Wells when he insists that every separate thing is "unique," and there are no categories at all. This also is merely destructive. Thinking means connecting things, and stops if they cannot be connected. It need hardly be said that this scepticism forbidding thought necessarily forbids speech; a man cannot open his mouth without contradicting it. Thus when Mr. Wells says (as he did somewhere), "All chairs are quite different," he utters not merely a misstatement, but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, you could not call them "all chairs."

Interesting, that seems to be exactly the same discussion. I think that the rebuttal is well put, in that, if there are no universals held in common by particulars, there is nothing that would cause the idea of 'chair'. Uttering 'chair' is then a self-refutation. I would argue however that the alikeness, closeness of two things may cause an idea of commonness, then allowing categorisation. Like colours, each wavelenght is its own, unique, but we group a broad range of wavelenghts under 'green' for their closeness.

Some people posit that the are only a few universals, e.g. various flavors of quark, lepton, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Enter: the preon.

I'm sure people of other languages make the same arguments about the words in their language — Michael

Considering that analytic philosophy, as it is today rather than relating to Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a phenomenon particular of the English-speaking world, I wouldn't say so. I at least have not seen any book written in German about what 'wissen' mean or in Spanish about 'conocer'.

The fact that two chairs can be different seems to me to say that the "realist" position is wrong. — Gregory

For Plato, the two chairs are imperfect imitations of the true chair, which is its form or idea. By that account, the existence of two chairs does not disprove the realist position.

That he thinks Kim Jong Un is a really neat guy, even saying once that they were 'in love'? Why is it that the only political leaders he's ever expressed admiration for, if not because they're role models for him? — Wayfarer

Well, actually, Donald Trump called Kim Jong-Un "little rocket man" in more than one occasion. Why is it that the only political leaders he mocked, if not because he really despises what they stand for?

Something like that. — Michael

That seems of no use to people who write/philosophise in other languages.

I don't think nominalism has anything to do with anything said here. Nominalism is the anti-realist position on the existence of universals, and it is the minimally opposite view to platonism on this issue. Descartes himself doesn't take a position in the nominalist/platonist debate.

A willow tree is simply similar to another one in how their matter is organized. — Gregory

That is a view that resembles Francisco Suarez, bold is mine:

12. Y de esto se sigue, primer lugar, que aunque cada individuo sea la realidad formalmente uno, sin intervención de la consideración de la mente, sin embargo, muchos individuos de quienes afirmamos ser de la misma naturaleza, no son algo uno con verdadera unidad que exista en las cosas, a no ser sólo fundamentalmente o mediante el entendimiento. [...] Segundo, se deduce que una cosa es hablar de unidad formal y otra de la "comunidad" de dicha unidad; porque la unidad se da en las cosas, según se explicó; en cambio, la "comunidad" propia y estrictamente no se da en las cosas, porque ninguna unidad que exista en la realidad es común, según demostramos, sino que en las cosas singulares hay cierta semejanza en sus unidades formales, en la cual se funda la comunidad que el entendimiento puede atribuir a tal naturaleza en cuanto concebida por él, y esta semejanza no es propiamente unidad, porque no expresa la indivisión de las entidades en que se funda, sino solo la conveniencia o relación, o la coexistencia de ambas.

I will leave the translation to those interested.

On the other hand, we can't say a chair is alike another chair in how their matter is organised. Different chairs have wildly different shapes and materials. So something else must make their alikeness. Aristotle's teleology is useful here.

Note: platonism and Platonism are not the same thing.

((p→q)∧(p→¬q)) and (p→(q∧¬q)) are the same formula

Both are contradictory (thus False) if A is True. But as by the definition of material implication, both are True if A is False.

Would that make a difference? 0/1=F/T as I understand it. — Moliere

No, 0/1 is exactly the same as True/False for the purpose of logic tables. What I meant to say is that some people seem to think that A here implies not a variable (that may take 0 or 1) but a proposition that is being asserted as True (which is to say that it is 1). When A is 1, A→B and A→notB give opposite results.

In the end implication must mean necessary or not necessary, in which case the answer will be different. — Philosophim

We are not talking about modal logic.

Moliere's rule has been abolished by holionino decree. All rules from before apply.

I should read that. Will dispatch a clone. — fishfry

It is the same article as the reading for my Metaphysics of Mathematics thread. Tones didn't love it.

That's not the same as "(A implies B) and (A implies not-B)" -- that'd be "(A implies (B and not-B)). — Moliere

Maybe the confusion comes from taking A as a proposition instead of a variable that may be 0 or 1.

TL;DR: Denial (¬p) and contradiction (yields false in all cases) are not the same thing. Denial is a relationship between two propositions, contradiction is a feature of a single proposition. The two propositions given are not the denial of each other, so Prop1&Prop2 is not contradictory (it can yield True for some values). Material implication (→) is defined in such a way that when the antecedent is False, the result is always True. So, if the antecedent is False, both propositions are True.