I can see where you're coming from. But can we agree to disagree on whether AI has the ability to create novel ideas? — Bret Bernhoft

By an idea, I mean a mental event that is not reducible to something else, yet it is meaningful to us. For example, when I say "cup", we both understand what we are talking about. "Cup" in here is referring to an idea. The idea is something more than the word. In the same manner, a sentence refers to something more than the proper combination of words. So, given that we agree with what the idea means, I don't think that AI has the capacity to create a new idea since it cannot experience an idea. We experience ideas, work with them, talk about them, and create new ideas always. Thinking to me is a process in which we work with old ideas and create new ones.

Your point is an important distinction to draw; between using AI as a crutch or tool. It can be difficult at first to know where the line in the sand is, but it's there. — Bret Bernhoft

The difference between humans and AI is that humans have the ability to create new ideas, whereas AI does not.

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Happy with what you say, MoK. — Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Hope to get you in another thread! :wink:

Second, there's no need to try and come up with an argument against divine intervention when there's no sound argument and/or evidence for divine intervention. — night912

I have an argument for the Mind is the cause of change in physical that you can find it here.

Lastly, if we don't currently know something, in regards to physics, then our conclusion should be, "we don't know." It's not, "we don't know, therefore, it's divine intervention." That's the philosophy of science. — night912

Our instruments have certain precision, so it is not about whether we can say "We don't know". We can say this for sure: one cannot exclude the role of Divine intervention when it comes to life!

Yes, but my point is that an idea or a thought cannot exist without a material substrate to support and contain it, such as the brain. — punos

I agree that the brain is required for thinking. What I am saying is that thinking cannot be done solely by the brain.

Again, you are confusing God willing evil and doing evil. Persons in creation would have the free will to do evil in virtue of merely having it. — Bob Ross

How about God? Is God free?

I don’t understand how that challenges the view of God I exposed before. — Bob Ross

You propose a God who has foreknowledge. If I know about God's foreknowledge, I can do the opposite since I am a free agent.

It does not logically follow from a mere definition that any specific case meets that definition. So no, it is not true given the definition. For it to be true, it must be the case that consciousness is a function of human parts that have certain relevant properties, and in complete contradiction, not a function of non-human parts that have the same relevant properties. — noAxioms

I invite you to read the OP again.

It's ineffable, but it's totally logical? — frank

You cannot prove such a God since you cannot discuss it!

According to Aquinas, God's essence is ineffable!

The same applies to God's essence!

The point is that ideas are not causally efficacious within materialism since an idea is a mental event only. We know that ideas are the key elements in thoughts. So, materialism fails to explain how we could have thoughts.

We have two things, the mind and the brain, when it comes to thinking, as follows. I am a substance pluralist, so I am sure that the mind exists; by the mind, I mean a substance with the ability to experience and cause. We experience many things, including thoughts. Thinking is a conscious activity; therefore, the mind is involved. We know that the brain is also involved in thinking since thinking in a person with brain damage is impaired. I am sure that other minds, such as the subconscious mind, are also involved when it comes to a complex thought process. What I am interested to say is what the mind and the brain do when it comes to thinking. Let's think of a simple word that your conscious mind can comprehend at the moment that you perceive it: Cup! This word refers to an idea as well. I think a new idea is created at the moment when a sufficient amount of proper ideas are perceived by the mind. For sure, other minds are involved in understanding a complex idea, given the fact that the mind is simple. Your conscious mind, for example, has very little memory, so you cannot even understand the idea that a long sentence is referring to! I think the brain is an infrastructure in which information is exchanged between the conscious and subconscious minds. So, we cannot think when a certain part of our brain is damaged.

What is the duty of the brain when it comes to thoughts, if the mind is the thinking thing?

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okay, you've obviously developed your entire unique language for talking about this, that uses the same terms other people use but with entirely new meanings unique to you. I don't think I can wade through it. — flannel jesus

As you wish!

Mind is the faculty of knowledge. — Wayfarer

How does the mind create thoughts?

then you're not talking about properties — flannel jesus

I am talking about the properties of parts and how they are related to the quality of experience, so-called Qualia. I am saying that Qualia are a function of the properties of the parts of the brain.

Properties are not shapes. — flannel jesus

I didn't say that properties are shapes. Shapes are the result of the properties of the parts having different values.

I am not talking about the number of shapes you can make by changing the location of parts. I am talking about the function that can describe all shapes in terms of the locations of the parts.

because the question doesn't even make sense. It's like a Christian asking an atheist, "oh yeah, well how many angels are there?" What the fuck do you mean how many angels are there? I'm a fucking atheist. YOU tell ME how many angels there are. — flannel jesus

There is only one function that describes the shape of a system in terms of the locations of the parts.

Why don't you answer my question?

you haven't shown that anything is complete though. You say "exhausted", it seems like you just want me to take your word for it. You're not making a case for it. — flannel jesus

I said enough, otherwise tell me the number of functions in a system that describe the properties of the system in terms of the properties of the parts, if the locations of parts are the only property that parts have?

How do you know this? There are those that disagree and say that consciousness is not a function of the properties of the parts. They also often claim to 'know' this. — noAxioms

That is true given the definition of weak emergence.

T
This seems very inconsistent. Why is one a function of the parts and the other is not a function of parts with nearly identical relevant properties? — noAxioms

What do you mean by one and the other?

Obviosly some physical change (a deliberate one) would have to lack a physical cause. — noAxioms

Such as?

The laws describing the states of matter would necessarily be incomplete. — noAxioms

What do you mean by incomplete?

I used specific when it comes to function. I don't mean that the function is one-to-one. Think of a cup of tea. There is a function that describes the shape of the cup in terms of the position of its parts. If the positions of the parts are the only property that parts have, then there is only a single/specific function that describes the property of the system in terms of the properties of the parts. If parts have other properties, then there are more functions that describe the properties of the system in terms of the properties of the parts. I call the set of all functions that describe the properties of the system in terms of properties of the parts S. This set is complete; you cannot add another function to it.

and who says the functions have to be one to one? Why does it have to be "a specific property that relates to a specific property"? I just don't think that's true at all - I think you've invented this conception of how a function has to work and you've imposed it too strictly.

Any number of properties can be combined in any number of ways to create any number of system-level properties. It's not a property-to property one to one mapping. — flannel jesus

Suppose that you move your hand slightly. The specific location of your hand is a function of the specific location of parts. That does not seem to be the case when it comes to experience at first. Does removing a neuron change your perception where there are many, many neurons involved in any stance of perception? I would say yes, the change is only innoticable. You experience a noticeable change when you move many neurons.

Think about a high level property in Conway's game of life - a glider has the property that it travels diagonally. This property doesn't come about because of a one to one mapping with some specific property of the little pieces, this property comes about because of the interactions of many of the properties of many little pieces. — flannel jesus

Do you always get the same property in this system as a function of time if you run the simulation with the same initial condition? Sure, you get the same property. It is a simulation.

I mean, whatever function you possibly could imagine, a function relates a specific property of the system in terms of the specific properties of parts, is a member of a set, let's call this set S. All functions are in S.

what I'm trying to get at is, the way you've described both strong and weak emergence, the higher level property is "a function of" what's happening at a lower level in either case. — flannel jesus

No, I am saying that the set of properties of the system exhausts all functions in which each function relates a specific property of the system to specific properties of parts. No function is left to explain experience itself. Therefore, experience itself is not a function of the properties of parts.

Chimps and cats and other animals are curious. — Athena

Correct. Curiosity is the fundamental aspect of life.

I don't think a God created humans. I think we evolved from an ape like animal and that we would make better decisions if we built our beliefs on science rather than mythology. — Athena

I have to say evolution is accepted as a scientific fact, but that does not mean that there is Divine intervention is not involved during the processes of evolution. That is true because physics is precise, but it is not exactly precise! Evolution is an imprecise discipline. So, there may be a slight change in the matter beyond the precision of physics. Consider that as fine-tuning Divine's intervention, which is necessary for the emergence of life. So, we cannot make a solid argument against Divine intervention when it comes to the philosophy of science!

We know that the quality of experience is a function of the properties of parts. We know what the properties of parts are, such as mass, charge, speed, etc., but experience. So we are dealing with weak emergence when it comes to the quality of experience. And we have an extra thing, which is the experience itself. Considering that any quality of experience is a function of the properties of parts, no extra function is left to describe the experience itself!

Even the way you use the phrase "a function of", now that I've realised what you've been saying the whole time, turns out to be off from how everyone else uses it. — flannel jesus

I explained what I mean by function in the example of antiferromagnetism.

Consciousness emerges out of a subtle interplay of electrical states and processes within the cells of the body. This life then animates the body (a colony of cells). Resulting in sentient conscious beings. — Punshhh

Is consciousness emergence weak or strong?

I truly think that you've got entirely turned around on what the difference is between strong and weak emergence. In your op, you worded certain things that made it sound like you got it right, but since then you seem to have doubled down into what looks to be interpretations that are the direct opposite of what those two terms mean. — flannel jesus

I am a substance pluralist. I am not discussing here that the experience is the result of the mind perceiving the object. I get their definition of experience as a mental event, which is due to properties of parts in the brain. They call this strong emergence. Why? Because they believe that the parts do not experience anything at all. I am saying that consciousness, given my definition of weak emergence, is weak emergence. Therefore, they are wrong.

To them, the phenomenon of experience is the result of strong emergence, by which they mean that the experience is the result of the properties of matter in the brain only. I am, however, arguing that consciousness, defined as the set of all experiences, is a function of the properties of the brain; therefore, we are dealing with weak emergence at least when it comes to consciousness.

I don't see how those two questions are related to each other. — flannel jesus

Physicalists claim that consciousness is the result of neurons firing. So consciousness to them is the result of the motion of electrons and chemicals.

Somebody first needs to explain why emergence should be considered to refer to a physical or metaphysical property, as opposed to referring to grammatical structure. — sime

I am not a language expert, but this is my understanding of language. Any meaningful sentence in any language is made of parts, but it can create a new idea that the sentence is referring to in the mind of an intelligent creature once the parts of the sentence are arranged in a proper order and observed by the creature. So there is a relation between the idea that a sentence is referring to and how the parts of a sentence are arranged as well. So, the ideas are weak emergent things as well.

We say that we are dealing with weak emergence when the property of a system can be simulated in terms of the properties of parts as well. The problem with a large system is that we cannot find an analytical solution for the properties of the system in terms of the properties of parts, given that the behaviors of parts are lawful. So, we have to use a simulation, which is a numerical method for deriving the properties of a system in terms of the properties of its parts. Therefore, strong emergence cannot be simulated since all properties of the system that can be simulated are sort of weak emergence properties.

that's not what "strong emergence" is saying. — flannel jesus

What is the difference between a dead brain and an alive brain to a physicalist, then?

I don't think this is correct. — flannel jesus

It is correct. If matter moves on its own, and experience is the result of how matter moves, then how could experience be causally efficacious? Experience is not a real thing in itself, yet it exists. Experience is a mental event only and cannot be a direct cause of change in matter.

This definition would be more precise if we would substitute "is deducible from" or "is grounded in" for "is a function of". — Pierre-Normand

I am happy with my definition. I also gave the example of antiferromagnetism, which clearly demonstrates what I mean by function. So, I won't accept your definitions unless you demonstrate what you mean by those terms. I have to stress that in the example of antiferomagnetism, the property of the system is only a function of the properties of parts. There is nothing more left when it comes to the property of the system to demonstrate it with something else.

That's because, as I've suggested, many proponents of strong emergence, who we may call "compatibilists" (by close analogy with the corresponding stance in the philosophy of free will and determinism) grant both the causal closure of the micro-physical domain and the thesis of the supervenience of high-level phenomena such as mental acts over the physical domain. — Pierre-Normand

I think that we can describe the behavior of proteins in terms of the properties of parts since we can simulate them. The scientists in the link that I provide do approximation here and there, though, since we cannot perform a full simulation. A cell is a more challenging thing to simulate. Etc. So, scientifically speaking, we have to make an approximation here and there to describe the property of any system in terms of simplified parts at the end. We have had great success by now, scientifically speaking, but we have a long way to go to understand how different complex systems function. We can understand and explain things that function somehow. So, philosophically speaking, if the property of any system is not a function of the properties of parts, then what is the missing thing in the system that cannot be explained in terms of the properties of parts?