I don't think it's paradoxical. — flannel jesus

It is. The cat in the box cannot be in both states of alive and dead.

If it's deterministic, it ain't partly random. — javra

It is not at all random. Randomness only exists in other interpretations, Copenhagen interpretation for example.

I think it is the right thread to discuss this issue since you are using an interpretation of quantum mechanics for the sake of your argument which is unfortunately paradoxical.

Then why don't accept the De Broglie–Bohm interprertation which is paredox free and determinsitic?

i feel like what I said about quantum crap is a good example, no? — flannel jesus

If you with quantum crap mean the Copenhagen interpretation then it suffers from many paradoxes such as Schrodinger's cat paradox and particle-wave duality. So this interpretation cannot be the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Because if I think incompatibilists understood free will incorrectly, — flannel jesus

I think they got it right.

because they understand it in such a way that it's incompatible with determinism, then it doesn't matter if I'm a determinist or not, it doesn't matter if the world is determinist or not. — flannel jesus

Why bothering to discuss compatibilism if it does not matter that the world is deterministic or not?

If they have the wrong concept of free will, then it's wrong, regardless of what I think about determinism or randomness separately. — flannel jesus

Where do you think that they got the concept of free will wrong?

I don't agree — flannel jesus

Why?

Compatibilism is about conceiving of free will in such a way that it's compatible with determinism — flannel jesus

Yes.

which is distinct from an explicit claim that determinism is in fact the case. — flannel jesus

Well, if you deny determinism then there is nothing to discuss when it comes to compatibilism.

that's correct — flannel jesus

But compatibilism is about the existence of free will in a deterministic world rather than a random world.

Adding a little randomness to the world means that it is not deterministic anymore.

I know what compatibilism means. Compatibilism is however nonsensical.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism. — flannel jesus

It is. If you have some other view in your mind please be more specific and use other terminology.

In trying to stave off potential headaches, he's a compatibilist in the sense of free will being defined as "anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" — javra

Cool.

which would then be a free will notion that is perfectly compatible with realty being "causally inevitable". — javra

I think we first have to agree on how options could be real in a determinist world. Once that is established then we could understand that decision is not possible in a deterministic system.

flannel jesus is of course free to correct or else modify this if wrong. But I've had my headaches in the past in trying to discuss with him the difference between c compatibilism and deterministic compatibilism - which he seems to conflate into the same thing. He sticks to everything necessarily being either "causally inevitable" or else random. And hence to compatibilism only making sense within this framework. — javra

Are you saying that in his opinion the decision is the result of randomness or else is determined? I think we can simply exclude the latter because both options are real. The former also can be excluded as well because of the correlation between the time of decision and action.

So to you, the world should be deterministic. Why do you bother with randomness?

Aren't you a compatibilist?

asked you if you know why many of us think systems can either be deterministic, or must be in some part random — flannel jesus

You didn't say that. You said that two options are determined or random. I then mentioned that options cannot be random or determined.

you don't understand why people think that — flannel jesus

What is the thing that you think I didn't understand?

ok I guess that's a no. — flannel jesus

What do you mean?

Do you know why a lot of us think the two options are determined or random? — flannel jesus

Options cannot be random or determined. Whether the decision is random or determined is another topic. I however argue that decisions cannot be generally determined since the future as I mentioned is uncertain so you may face a situation with options that you have never experienced in the past. That is where the mind comes into play and gives you the ability to choose between options.

nobody is saying anything like that though. Nobody is saying people decide things before being presented with options. I don't know why that's your question. — flannel jesus

I am asking this question to argue that the mind is not a determined entity. If you have one option, then you just follow it. The future however is uncertain. It might contain options or not. You have to wait for it and see whether you are presented with options.

I don't know why that's a question. The question doesn't connect with anything to me. — flannel jesus

Could you decide before you are presented with options?

Let me put it this way: How could the mind be determined before realizing options?

Well, if the mind was determined then you could not possibly decide in a situation with two options. We also don't toss a coin when we decide. We just pick the option that we please and want.

No, I am talking about what I wrote in this thread.

I don't think so. Whether it's physical or some other substance is just an implementation detail. That other substance faces the same determined/random dichotomy as physics — flannel jesus

Did you read my explanation? The mind is not determined or random.

I think we can eliminate all troubles if we accept a form of substance dualism, in which matter is deterministic, whereas the mind can experience options and decide freely. The problem that is left is how can we have options in a deterministic world. I have discussed this in another thread of mine entitled "On the existence of options in a deterministic world".

Anastacia - I'm Outta Love

@javra @Pierre-Normand Unfortunately, after some thought, I realized that the suggested network does not work as I thought it should. Please disregard my previous post.

Elisa - Dancing

@javra @Pierre-Normand By the way, I found a simple neural network that can perform a simple sum.



The weights are all 1 and the inputs are 0 or 1. I thought that you might be interested so I shared it with you.

It was very nice chatting with you too! :wink:

Interpol - Rest My Chemistry

Jem - They

Kylie Minogue - Can't Get You Out Of My Head

I'm relatively well aware of this. Thank you. :up: It gets even more interesting in considering that, from what we know, subterranean communication between plants seems to require their communal symbiosis with fungi species. In a very metaphorical sense, their brains are underground, and communicate via a potentially wide web connections. — javra

Cool! :wink:

I in many ways agree. I would instead state that the unconscious mind - which I construe to not always be fully unified in its agencies - is instead "aware and volition-endowed". So, in this sense, it could be stated to be in its own way conscious (here to my mind keeping things simple and not addressing the plurality of agencies that could therein occur), but we as conscious agents are yet unconscious of most of its awareness and doings. This being why I yet term it the unconscious mind: we as conscious beings are, again, typically not conscious of its awareness and doings. — javra

Correct.

I basically wanted to express that, if one allows the neurons being sentient, their own sentience is part and parcel of our living brain's total physiology, this as aspects of our living bodies. Whereas we as mind-endowed conscious beings of our own, our own sentience is not intertwined with that pertaining to individual neurons of our CNS. Rather, they do their thing within the CNS for the benefit of their own individual selves relative to their community of fellow neurons, which in turn results in certain neural-web firings within our brain, which in turn results in the most basic aspects of our own unconscious mind supervening on these neural-web firings, with these most basic aspects of our unconscious mind then in one way or another ultimately combining to form the non-manifold unity of the conscious human being. A consciousness which on occasion interacts with various aspects of its unconscious mind, such as when thinking about (questioning, judging the value of, etc.) concepts and ideas - as you've mentioned. — javra

A neuron is a living cell. Whether it is sentient and can learn things is a subject of discussion. I believe a neuron could become sentient if this provided an advantage for the organism. This is however very costly since it requires the neuron to be a complex entity. Such a neuron, not only needs more food but also a sort of training before it can function properly within the brain where all neurons are complex entities. So, let's say that you have a single neuron, let's call it X, which can perform a function, let's call it Z, learning for example. Now let's assume a collection of neurons, let's call them Y, which can do the same function as Z but each neuron is not capable of performing Z. The question is whether it is economical for the organism, to have X or Y. That is a very hard question. It is possible to find an organism that does not have many neurons and each neuron can perform Z. That however does not mean that we can generalize such an ability to neurons of other organisms that have plenty of neurons. The former organism may due to evolution gain such a capacity where such a capacity is not necessary and economical for the latter organism.

Hope that makes what I previously said clearer. — javra

Thanks for the elaboration.

I haven't claimed that amebas can act collectively. — javra

I said that for amebas to learn collectively, such as neurons, they need to interact.

Here, I was claiming that the so-called "problem of other minds" can be readily applied to the presumed sentience of amebas. This in the sense that just because it looks and sounds like a duck doesn't necessitate that it so be. Hence, just because an ameba looks and acts as thought it is sentient, were one to insist on it, one could argue that the ameba might nevertheless be perfectly insentient all the same. This as you seem to currently maintain for individual neurons. But this gets heavy into issues of epistemology and into what might constitute warranted vs. unwarranted doubts. (If it looks and sounds like a duck, it most likely is.) — javra

I agree.

No worries there. But why would allowing for neurons holding some form of sentience then disrupt this general outlook regarding the existence of options? The brain would still do what it does - this irrespective of how one explains the (human) mind-brain relationship. Or so I so far find. — javra

I agree that considering neurons to be sentient and can learn may not disrupt the function of the brain but I think that it might become very costly for the organism when a small set of simpler neurons can perform the same function, learning for example.

I understand you disagree and can find alternative explanations to a single neuron learning. One could do the same for ameba is one wants to play devil's advocate. — javra

I don't understand how in the case of Ameba they could possibly interact and learn collectively.

If you're willing, what are the "serious objections" that you have to the possibility that individual neurons can learn from experience? — javra

I try to be minimalistic all the time when I try to explain complex phenomena. The behavior of an electron is lawful and deterministic to me. The same applies to larger entities such as atoms and molecules. I try to be minimalistic even in the case of a neuron unless I face a phenomenon that cannot be explained. If I find myself in a troublesome situation where I cannot explain a phenomenon, then I try to dig from top to bottom questioning the assumption that I made trying to see where is the fault assumption. I would even question the assumption that I made for electrons as well if it is necessary.

In regards to the subject of this thread, the existence of options in a deterministic world, I found there is a simple explanation for the phenomenon once I consider a set of neurons each being a simple entity and deterministic.

Most – including in academic circled – will acknowledge that a plant is sentient (some discussing the issue of plant intelligence to boot): It, after all, can sense sunlight and gravity such that it grows its leaves toward sunlight and its roots toward gravity. But, although this sensing of environment will be relatively global to the plant, I for the life of me can’t fathom how a plant might then have a centralized awareness and agency along the lines of what animals most typically have – such that in more complex animals it becomes the conscious being. I instead envision a plant’s sentience to generally be the diffuse sum product of the interactions between its individual constituent cells, such that each cell – with its own specialized functions - holds its own (utterly miniscule) sentience as part of a cooperative we term the organism, in this case the plant. This, in some ways, in parallel to how a living sponge as organism – itself being an animal – is basically just a communal cooperation between individual eukaryotic cells which feed together via the system of openings: with no centralized awareness to speak of. This general outlook then fits with the reality that some plants have no clear boundaries as organisms – despite yet sensing, minimally, sunlight and gravity - with grass as one such example: a field of grass of the same species is typically intimately interconnected underground as one organism, yet a single blade of grass and it’s root can live just fine independently as an individual organism if dug up and planted in a new area. I thereby take the plant to be sentient, but only as a cooperative of individual sentience-endowed plant cells whose common activities result in the doings of the plant as a whole organism: doing in the form of both sensing its environment and acting upon it (albeit far slower than most any animal). I don’t so far know of a better way of explaining a plant’s sentience given all that we know about plants. — javra

I read about plant intelligence a long time ago and I was amazed. They cannot only recognize between up and down, etc. they also are capable of communicating with each other. I can find those articles and share them with you if you are interested.

Whereas in animals such as humans, the centralized awareness and agency which we term consciousness plays a relatively central role to out total mind's doings – obviously, with the unconscious aspects of our mind being not conscious to us; and with the latter in turn resulting from the structure and functioning of our physiological CNS, which itself holds different zones of activity (from which distinct agencies of the unconscious mind might emerge) and which we consider body rather than mind. — javra

To me what you call the unconscious mind (what I call the subconscious mind) is conscious. Its activity most of the time is absent from the conscious mind though. But you can tell that the subconscious mind and conscious mind are constantly working with each other when you reflect on a complex process of thoughts for example. Although that is the conscious mind which is a thinking entity, it needs a constant flow of information from what was experienced and thought in the past. This information of course registered in the subconscious mind's memory. The amount of information that is registered in the subconscious mind's memory however is huge so the subconscious mind has to be very selective in the type of information that should be passed to the conscious mind depending on the subject of focus of the conscious mind. Therefore, the subconscious mind is an intelligent entity as well. I also think that what we call intuition is due to the subconscious mind!

So once one entertains the sentience of neurons, one here thereby addresses the constituents of one's living body, rather than of one's own mind per se. — javra

I cannot follow what you are trying to say here.

Here's an article from Nature to the contrary: Neurons learn by predicting future activity. — javra

That was an interesting article to read. I however have a serious objection to whether that is a collection of neurons that learns and adopts itself or each single neuron has such a capacity. Of course, if you assume that each neuron has such a capacity and plug it into the equation then you obtain that a collection of neurons also have the same capacity but the opposite is not necessarily true. I don't think that they have access to individual neuron activity when it comes to experiments too (although they mentioned neuron activity in the discussion for Figures 4 and 5). So I stick to what I think is more correct, a collection of neurons can learn but individual neurons cannot.

Las Ketchup - Aserejé

Same questions can be placed with equal validity of any individual ameba, for example. Point being, if you allow for "mind in life" as it would pertain to an ameba, there is no reason to not then allow the same for a neuron. The as of yet unknown detailed mechanism of how all this occurs in a lifeform devoid of a central nervous system being completely irrelevant to the issue at hand. — javra

I think that amoebas evolved in such a way to function as a single organism. Neurons are however different entities and they function together. Moreover, scientific evidence shows that a single amoeba can learn and remember. To my knowledge, no scientific evidence exists that a single neuron can learn or remember.

My bad then. — javra

I am sorry. But I elaborate a little on quantum mechanics in my reply to your post. I hoped that that was enough.

In other words, look at silicon-based systems rather than life-based systems in order to grasp how life-based systems operate. Not something I'm myself into. But it is your OP, after all. — javra

As I mentioned, I was interested in understanding whether a few or some neurons work together such that the system can realize the options. I think it would be extremely difficult to make such a setup by living neurons. That was why I suggested to focus on the artificial neural network.

I'll only point out that all of your reply addresses synapses - which are connections in-between neurons and not the neutrons themselves. — javra

That is a very important part when it comes to the neuroplasticity of the brain. A neuron mainly just fires when it is depolarized to a certain extent.

So none of this either rationally or empirically evidences that an individual neuron is not of itself a sentience-endowed lifeform - one that engages in autopoiesis, to include homeostasis and metabolism as an individual lifeform, just as much as an any self-sustaining organism does; one that seeks out stimulation via both dendritic and axonial growth just as much as any self-sustaining organism seeks out and requires stimulation; one which perceives stimuli via its dendrites and acts, else reacts, via its axon; etc.

As I was previously mentioning, there is no rational or empirical grounds to deny sentience to the individual neuron (or most any somatic cell for that matter - with nucleus-lacking red blood cells as a likely exception) when ascribing sentience to self-sustaining single celled organisms such as ameba. Again, the explanation you've provided for neurons not being in some manner sentient falls short in part for the reasons just mentioned: in short, synapses are not neurons, but the means via which neurons communicate. — javra

I highly doubt that a neuron has a mind. But let's assume so for the sake of the argument. In which location in a neuron is the information related to what the neuron experienced in the past stored? How could a neuron realize options? How could a group of neurons work coherently if each is free?