It is trying, but can't. — Banno

You're anthropomorphising, projecting human emtions on to a device. A signal is not being sent, due to the conditions for its transmission not being present. Nobody is trying to do anything, unless a technician is trying to repair it.

You're anthropomorphising, projecting human emtions on to a device. — Wayfarer

Yep. Further, that's what you do when you say someone overdosed on oxytocin is in love. :kiss:

#2 The object can indirectly perceive its content, and that requires another substance to perceive the information and change accordingly, such that the object can then perceive the content of another substance. — MoK

In other words, the subject consciousness' substance content is qualia, which the object subconscious substance doesn't have, but if the brain's internal language is qualia, then when the qualia is broadcast at large, the brain indirectly learns about the information the object contains.

In many discussions of 'substance' in philosophy, this distinction is lost, leading to the question of what kind of 'substance' the mind might be, which is an absurd question. It is the fatal flaw in Cartesian dualism, one which Descartes himself could never answer. The mind is not a 'thinking thing' in any sense other than the metaphorical. Reducing it to a 'thinking substance' is an absurdity. (This is why Aristotle's matter-form dualism retains a plausibility that Cartesian dualism never exhibited.) — Wayfarer

I agree. Consciousness does not fit into what Aristotle called Ousia. In fact in his writings on time Aristotle stated that beings (Ousia) are not in time and exclude it. Another approach is needed that considers the temporality of consciousness as something that constitutes it. If the being of consciousness is closely related to temporality it is difficult to understand why we are still speaking in Aristotelian language.

You are proposing that a qual can move between the ghost and the machine?

So of what substance is the qual - is it mind, or is it object? Or is it something else, a third substance, in which case we presumably need a forth and fish substance to explain how qualia interact with ghosts and with machines...

What is mental substance?

The object cannot directly perceive its content, the information — MoK

It doesn't—stiumulus happens at the extroceptors (external senesory organs). And moves internally...through physical substances. Perceptions ARE physical realities. There are irreducibly many mental ways of organizing physical perceptions though, which give perceptions a mentalistic air about them.

You always have something solid to say, even when I'm like wtf... no... a moment of ruminating and I'm like, wait wtf... yes... you ever teach before? If you don't mind, @ me in the shout box with some book recommendations?

Consciousness does not fit into what Aristotle called Ousia. — JuanZu

The term nearest to 'consciousness' in the Greek lexicon (incidentally I'm not schooled in Greek, but this passes as general knowledge) is 'psuche', which is usually translated as 'soul', and which has come down to us as 'psyche'. And that fits perfectly well into the Aristotelian corpus. There are two principle sources, D'Anima ('On the Soul') and one of the books of the Metaphysics. But the cardinal difference between the Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophy, is that Descartes' depiction of 'res cogitans' as 'thinking thing' ('res' means 'thing'.) There's nothing like that in Aristotle. Rather in Aristotle the rational intellect ('nous') is what is capable of perceiving essentials and universals. That capability is fundamental to Aristotle's hylomorphism (matter-form dualism), which is very different to Descartes' matter-mind duality, because it depicts intellect (nous) more in terms of a capacity than as some ethereal 'thinking substance'. //very roughly, the correspondence between intellect and body, is analogous to that between form and matter. Which is why the soul (psuche) is called 'the form of the body.' Here, 'form' does not mean 'shape' but 'organising principle'.// That's why hylomorphism is still a live option in current philosophy. See Contemporary Hylomorphism (.pdf file) for a long bibiography.

I brought this up, because the Cartesian 'thinking thing' is still very much written into the way we think about mind-body relations, often without us being aware of it. It provides the 'grammar', so to speak, of the way it is thought about. That is the origin of the 'ghost in the machine' allegory (@Banno)

the Cartesian 'thinking thing' is still very much written into the way we think about mind-body relations, often without us being aware of it — Wayfarer

I mean, Nietzsche dispels that quite well enough with BGE 17. Furtherstill in Ecce Homo when detailing how he wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra. "When" is to say, akin to one meditating and not identifying wtf they're hearing, but rather just hears it without consciousness without analysis... it becomes a sort of white noise, a sort of music and melody. That is when your inner thoughts really come to you, without thinking... one merely becomes the mouth piece of internal unconscious forces.

That capability is fundamental to Aristotle's hylomorphism (matter-form dualism), which is very different to Descartes' matter-mind duality, because it depicts intellect (nous) more in terms of a capacity than as some ethereal 'thinking substance'. — Wayfarer

This reminds me of Kant's critique of the Cartesian cogito. Kant said that we cannot perceive ourselves except as phenomena and not as things in themselves. Not to mention that in Kant there is no treatment of the mind but a treatment of faculties. In that sense Kant is Aristotelian following what you are saying.

Is all this question about subtances a pre-Kantian discussion?

In that sense Kant is Aristotelian following what you are saying. — JuanZu

Quite. Kant did, after all, adopt Aristotle's Table of Categories practically unchanged. But the main point I am trying to draw out, is the nature of this 'substance' in 'substance dualism'. It's important in relation to philosophy of mind, generally.

... you ever teach before? — DifferentiatingEgg

Not professionally.

... some book recommendations?

Suggest a topic.

You are proposing that a qual can move between the ghost and the machine? — Banno

There's no ghost.

We wonder what qualia are good for, since consciousness comes too late in the process for it to be causal (of the result already formed by the subconscious brain analysis object 500 milliseconds previous); so, aside from life's great benefit-feeling of experiencing, perhaps qualia get utilized as a kind of short-cut brain-language clear summary for the brain at large to use as input, or at least for memory to store and objects to know as input for further analysis, since qualia combine everything into unity,

So of what substance is the qual - is it mind, or is it object? — Banno

It's physical information in a different form than the same information in the object's form.

We wonder what qualia are good for... — PoeticUniverse

They are not good for much at all. If they are internal sensations unavailable to others, then they are private in the sense dismissed by Wittgenstein, and unavailable for our public discourse. If they are available to others, then they are no different to the sensations we call "red" and "rough' and so on, and we may as well simply use those.

At best the idea might be operationalised as a correlation between a sensory input and a neural pattern. But that would be to use the notion of qualia in a very different way to the philosopher who sees it as the epitome of conscious experience. If qualia are mere neural patterns, then they cannot take on the task of showing that there is something special about mind that is not found in physics.

We wonder what qualia are good for, since consciousness comes too late in the process for it to be causal (of the result already formed by the subconscious brain analysis object 500 milliseconds previous); — PoeticUniverse

I think this is a mistake. The idea that consciousness is not causal. It seems to me that it would be a very strange for the world to be full of people writing about consciousness, writing about qualia and the ineffable experience of consciousness, if consciousness were not casual.

It may not be the immediate cause of any action, but it doesn't need to be immediate to be causal.

In that case, it is nothing to do with coherence. You cannot claim coherence from experience when you are not interested in right or wrong. Something is coherent if it makes sense. Making sense is possible when something is reasonable. — Corvus

As I said, the reason can be right or wrong, so it is not a good example for our discussion. The rest of our experiences are, however, coherent. For example, the cup of tea on my table has a specific location, shape, and color. These properties are not subject to change unless I intervene and change the location of the cup, for example. The cup does not move on its own, it does not disappear, etc. When I move the cup, the motion is as I intended. To summarise, our experiences are coherent, excluding thoughts that are sometimes coherent and sometimes not.

What is the substance? — Corvus

A substance is something that exists and has a set of properties.

Would it be objects in your experience? — Corvus

I perceive the object by this I mean I get access to its content, the information that it carries. The object is not in my experience.

Why use the word substance? — Corvus

Because it is needed for the sake of discussion.

The word substance is not clear in the context. — Corvus

I hope it is clear by now.

As I said, the reason can be right or wrong, so it is not a good example for our discussion. — MoK

Reason is not just for right or wrong. It is the general faculty for all knowledge.

The rest of our experiences are, however, coherent. — MoK

How do you know they are coherent? What is the ground for your experience being coherent?

A substance is something that exists and has a set of properties. — MoK

Is Mok a substance? He exists and has a set of properties.

The object is not in my experience. — MoK

Where is the objects then? What does the object denote in actuality?

Because it is needed for the sake of discussion. — MoK

Substance is an abstract concept which has no reference, hence it sounds vague and ambiguous. Not a good word to use for the discussion.

I hope it is clear by now. — MoK

Not quite.

Got anything for me on ontological realism?

Might be an existential generalisation: Experience is "informative and coherent" therefore something is "informative and coherent"

Experience is coherent, therefore something is coherent. — Banno

I am not a logician but from what I read on Wiki P1 and C1 are not an example of existential generalization since the subject and object are two different things. Here, I want to argue the existence of a substance that carries the information and is coherent from the fact that experience is informative and coherent.

...is pretty obtuse. However, a thermostat "perceives" the temperature, it's content. If the information is not "perceived" by the thermostat then it could not turn on the heater. — Banno

By perceiving here I mean the object gets access to the content it carries, the information, in the form of experience. The thermostat in this sense does not perceive anything since its perception is not a form of experience.

And here's the rub; if substance dualism is correct, and there are two different substances, then the problem becomes how they interact. If mind is a seperate substance to body, how is it that a body can be perceived by a mind, and how is it that a mind can change a body? — Banno

In this thread, I am interested in answering the first question. I will open another thread in the future to answer the second question. We have three substances here, namely the brain which is a physical substance, the object, and the mind. The brain to the best of our understanding is a set of connected neurons. The function of the brain can be understood from the behavior of neurons though. The mind, however, does not have direct access to the brain or neurons by this I mean that the mind does not directly perceive the brain or neurons. Therefore, there is a substance, the object, which intervenes between the brain and the mind. The object is the substance and it changes depending on the neural processes in the brain and is the substance that the mind directly perceives. The object has a set of properties so-called Qualia simply the texture of our experiences. I have to say, that in this thread I was initially interested in discussing the mind and object only. This means that we are dealing with two substances hence the substance dualism. When it comes to a person, we however need three substances at least. So I have to discuss the brain as an extra substance since you asked for the interaction between the body and the mind.

Then there is no more to be said. — Banno

I meant that thoughts/reasons are not a good example of our experiences since they could be right or wrong, coherent or incoherent. Here, I am mostly interested in those examples of our experiences that are coherent, our experiences of reality for example.

I think I can see what you're trying to prove here, but it's very garbled. — Wayfarer

Thank you very much for your interest and understanding. I am glad that you understand what I am trying to argue here.

The first three terms, 'experience, subject, conscious event' are all very philosophically thick terms that by themselves have been subject to volumes of literature. — Wayfarer

I studied the philosophy of mind to a good extent. I know the literature is very extensive on each of these terms.

Conjoining them in such a dense sentence doesn't do justice to their meaning. — Wayfarer

I am aware of that. I normally try to provide a condensed OP as a base for the discussion and elaborate later when it is necessary.

So, is 'the subject' an 'event'? I would think not, because 'events' exist in time, they have a discrete beginning and end. Subjects of experience are different from events on those grounds in that they are persistent through time and even through changes of state. — Wayfarer

By event, I mean something that happens or takes place. The event could have duration depending on the subject of focus of the conscious mind. Perhaps there is a better term for what I am trying to say.

Experiences are undergone by the subject, and they are coherent insofar as the subject is able to integrate them with their previous experiences, so that we know how to interpret the experience. — Wayfarer

What do you mean by the subject here? Person? If yes, I agree with what you said. I however use subject as a synonym as experience. Please reread my argument given my definition of the subject and tell me what you think.

Notice that 'Substance' in philosophy has a completely different meaning than it does in regular discourse. Generally 'substance' is a 'material with uniform properties' (e.g. a liquid substance, a metal substance etc). In philosophy, the word has a different meaning. It was introduced as the Latin 'substantia' in translation for the Greek 'ousia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being' or 'subject'. — Wayfarer

By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties or abilities.

In many discussions of 'substance' in philosophy, this distinction is lost, leading to the question of what kind of 'substance' the mind might be, which is an absurd question. It is the fatal flaw in Cartesian dualism, one which Descartes himself could never answer. The mind is not a 'thinking thing' in any sense other than the metaphorical. Reducing it to a 'thinking substance' is an absurdity. (This is why Aristotle's matter-form dualism retains a plausibility that Cartesian dualism never exhibited.) — Wayfarer

The mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause another substance, the object. The object is a substance with a set of properties, so-called Qualia.

In other words, the subject consciousness' substance content is qualia, which the object subconscious substance doesn't have, but if the brain's internal language is qualia, then when the qualia is broadcast at large, the brain indirectly learns about the information the object contains. — PoeticUniverse

I think we have three substances when it comes to a person, namely the brain, the object, and the mind. The object has a set of properties so-called Qualia. The mind directly perceives the object and gets informed about the content of the object. The object is subject to change depending on neuronal processes in the brain.

What is mental substance? — DifferentiatingEgg

Up to here, I introduce two substances, namely the mind, and object. The mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause the object whereas the object is a substance with a set of properties so-called Qualia.

It doesn't—stiumulus happens at the extroceptors (external senesory organs). And moves internally...through physical substances. Perceptions ARE physical realities. — DifferentiatingEgg

Without the mind, we cannot possibly perceive anything.

How do you know they are coherent? What is the ground for your experience being coherent? — Corvus

I already elaborated on the coherence in reality when I discussed my cup of tea here.

Is Mok a substance? He exists and has a set of properties. — Corvus

My body is a substance, it is a physical substance. There are two other substances that are discussed in the OP, namely the mind and the object. The mind is a substance with the ability to perceive and cause the object. The object is another substance with a set of properties so-called Qualia.

Where is the objects then? What does the object denote in actuality? — Corvus

The object is a substance that is perceived by the mind. Please see the last comment.

The mind is a substance — MoK

So then the mind is physical?

So then the mind is physical? — DifferentiatingEgg

No, the physical substance is another category, such as my body, a cup of tea, etc. so to summarize we have at least three substances, the mind, the object, and the physical.

I think this is a mistake. The idea that consciousness is not causal. It seems to me that it would be a very strange for the world to be full of people writing about consciousness, writing about qualia and the ineffable experience of consciousness, if consciousness were not casual. — flannel jesus

Indeed. If consciousness isn't causal, what causes us to write about consciousness?

I question the interpretation Libet's study. It seems odd to say that the task, flexing the wrist, was well-defined; they talked about moving the wrist; and the subjects sat thinking about moving the wrist. Consciously thinking and talking about it, and consciously debating when to do it. But when it happened, it wasn't a conscious decision? Seems very suspicious.

I'd be more convinced if the brain made a decision with no involvement from consciousness. Like if they're all watching for the wrist to move, but the ankle moves instead. Or the hand picked up a pencil and started writing.

But when it happened, it wasn't a conscious decision? Seems very suspicious. — Patterner

I personally don't care if that particular movement was conscious or not. I've come to view conscious decisions as something separated in time from when they're actually realized. I believe the majority of actions are subconscious, and the conscious part of us is almost like a feedback system for our subconscious decision mechanisms.

So imo it's pluasible that your conscious mind has almost no direct control of what your body does, but it can command your subconscious to do it. Most of the stuff your body does doesn't get mediated by the conscious part at all, it's mostly subconscious, but your conscious mind can choose to send immediate commands (which have to be mediated first by the subconscious, and then go to your muscles), or - and this is even more important - can tell your subconscious when it did something wrong, and should do something different the next time a similar scenario arises.

I actually think the point of consciousness is mostly that last thing, somehow signaling to your subconscious to do something different, because your conscious analysis determined it wasn't optimal.

Hrm, what is substance then?

A substance is something that exists and has a set of properties or abilities. The physical substance has a shape, location, etc. as its properties. The object has the properties of the so-called Qualia. The mind has the ability to perceive and cause the object.

I already elaborated on the coherence in reality when I discussed my cup of tea here. — MoK

It does not make sense to say, your seeing a cup with a set of properties in a location is  the ground for the experience being coherent.  You are bound to have plenty of other experiences that are incoherent such as what other people feel, believe and think in their minds, and how they will act, decide or behave in the future etc etc.  You won't quite be sure why you dreamt what you dreamt in your sleep, and you won't know what you will see in your dreams in the future etc etc.

Another problem is just saying, your seeing a cup in front of you, cannot be the object ground for your experience being coherent, because no one knows what you are seeing or perceiving in your mind just by listening to your statement or claim on what you were seeing.

There is also possibility that what you were seeing was an illusion, not real perception too.

The object is a substance that is perceived by the mind. Please see the last comment. — MoK

It would be far more clear to say, body, mind or object than substance, because substance can mean many other things, and it doesn't not directly denote or refer to any particular objects. It is an obscure word which has wide scope on its meaning from ancient times.

we have at least three substances, the mind, the object, and the physical. — MoK

"I feel happy." (subject verb object)

'I' (as the conscious awareness subject of consciousness,) 'feel' (experiences) 'happy' (the qualia object content of consciousness result produced just previous by the subconscious neural analysis).

So, awareness experiences the qualia-form information given from the neural-form information. note that the information has two forms.

What is the nature of consciousness?

It intrinsic (here and now, no extrinsic factors), compositional (various sources of distinctions), informational (cause–effect), integrated (irreducible), whole, and exclusive (nothing extra).

Further, it has being, but has no direct doing, although it may be used as a future reference for indirect doing, which wholly leaves intelligence for the doing.

It makes no reference to the neural brain states that gave rise to it.

It has mental unity, which is a unified field, as called the “grain argument,” meaning that while the brain objectively appears like grains of sand, consciousness is subjectively experienced like the whole beach. It's kind of like linear-sequential vs. parallel-holistic, or as brain matter is divisible into parts and extended, while consciousness is unified into one central experience.

So, qualia unify and centralize the brain matter parts; this seems useful for something.