Because I see that Quine has read Nietzsche and I see Quine attempting to overcome aspects Nietzsche would harp on doesn't mean I see everything through Nietzsche. That means I know Nietzsche's phrases and when I read it in another author, I'm like "ah, hes read Nietzsche." Because it's a stimulus that triggers a total set of receptors...
Just as I realized Quines philosophy is based on Set Theory and Mathematics to inform him on linguistics... with hardly any ability in set theory none the less. I simply realized that what I was learning about Ordinals is how Quine orders linguistics from the top down. His "total set of receptors" was the same as the total set of nodes in which one can say this references that
1. I'm going to throw shit on you vs. 2. I'm going to throw "shit" on you... what am I referring to by "shit" in number 2? I'll give you three guesses. If you can not get it right, then it's likely cause it's incoherent because I quoted shit... and thus, modality and reference do not trigger all the same set of receptors from De Re vs De Dicto.
That I detail every language as its own quotational account... well, you cannot know wtf "hintegedanke" means without knowing it in German because there is no word for it in any other language, or even "Aristeuein" for that matter but for the Greek. Even without that... how many words are there for a Bird? In other languages? I don't know... and I dont even know 1/10th or probably 1/100ths of all the words for Bird... the different modality of a language can render something incoherent just as a quotational account...
Unless you know the meaning within that modality... the same total set of receptors wont fire...
And thus if I switch modalities from English to French w/ That oiseau is flying... the plane? the insects, ... what exactly is flying when I don't know what "oiseau" is? I can make an educated guess based on faith and "what I know that can fly?"
Thus modalities have a certain resisting against identity when substituted...
The modalities of necessity and possibility are not overtly mentalistic, but still they are intensional, in the sense of resisting substitutivity of identity. — Quine's Pursuit of Truth.
If that's opaque then I can see why you take Russel's boneheaded criticism of Nietzsche. Because you're out here substituting your meanings and words for Nietzsche's own...
And as Wittgenstein shows us, every philosopher has his own language, a language that you have to familiarize yourself with otherwise you wont know wtf they're saying.