• What is an idea's nature?


    Hmm I think I was quite aware of your definition for consciousness as I stated it as subjective experience.
    I just assume for now that we need neurons for a subjective experience.

    But this is a reasonable conclusion. (For me as a non expert in subjective experience and what gives rise to it)

    As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely,
  • How Does One Live in the 'Here and Now'? Is it Conceptual or a Practical Philosophy Question?


    I think "to be now". Means to be aware of what you are doing currently mentally. Or to be acutely aware of your direct environment. But in any of these cases I think it's often important that you are alternating between these states of awareness. As to not forget where your attention is. (Which is what the salience network helps with , so I have heard).

    But there's also your body. Which is always here and now. Your thinking, even if it is about the future happens here and now. You can be highly aware of potential future related thoughts and objects of awareness in the now. So since your attention can seemingly be elsewhere. Your body isn't. So in meditation circles they seem to define you as your attention or most intense awareness.

    I would ask. Is it really a problem that your thinking about the past or the future? When thoughts about the future or past arise. They are an opportunity to analyze them. To revisit them and learn from them.

    You could interpret your thoughts as an automatic mechanism. It brings up thoughts that are true or false. When memories arise they can be dug for knowledge. They shouldn't just come and go necessarily.
  • What is an idea's nature?


    I see you're saying something similar as Nietzsche. He would probably say. "Platonists misinterpret their body".

    I'm not a Platonist. I don't believe in a separate realm or magical dualism as far as I know.

    But at the same time. It seems clear that when reality is configured as it is in you and me. And when it thinks of i.e. the idea of a dragon. Then it isn't just electrical signals and chemicals. A dragon doesn't exist. Yet these signals and neurons which do exist and are thus reality somehow create non reality. As if experience and neurons at this level almost create a new dimension in which this non reality is possible to exist. But it happens in that physical anchor somehow.

    We can't say that ideas are merely a fiction and all that exists is those particles. Those particles re-arranged rocks willingly, intentionally to create the first pyramid out of an idea. It didn't do it by not imagining something that wasn't there.

    It's just mind boggling.
  • What is an idea's nature?

    To answer:
    "What knowledge does my theory contradict?"

    The knowledge we currently have. Which is tentative is that consciousness/subjective experience is not something that is possible without some neurons. A quark has no neurons hence a quark wouldn't have subjective experience/consciousness.
    You could say that ultimately we don't know. But practically we can tentatively claim to know.
    Just like ultimately we don't know whether five seconds from now the earth will spin. But practically and tentatively we do know.

    .....

    Ok so subjective experience is consciousness. And the quark would be experiencing that it exists. (Something you might hear in a meditation retreat. Especially a non dual one). The issue with that is. When we experience in meditation, the sense of just existing. We have quite the system to back it up. Neurons.

    Now you mighty say that our non dual meditation successes are still taking in sensory data so it's not a good analogy. Fair enough.
    So we should ask. How do we know that a chair which gives no sign of subjective experience has subjective experience? A human in a coma we might keep alive even if they aren't having any dream or anything. But a chair... Is not something we would consider having such an experience. In fact if they do. Then they become moral beings worthy of consideration. A chair would be a living being. Since to experience requires to be alive. By definition. It would mean quarks have to be alive. No such indications are there. They just move. So yes it's the more radical view given our knowledge.

    To be honest I do ..like.. the idea. It would be beautiful it is true. If all energy and matter is alive and having subjective experience. Which through merging and complexity becomes able to increase its ability to experience with more complexity. It is a extraordinarily beautiful idea. And in some sense I even hope it's true. But I can't let that be a bias. With current knowledge it's more reasonable to tentatively hold that subjective experience requires neurons. Or maybe so with my current knowledge. Maybe AI experts would say something different. Maybe neural simulations can have a cognitive subjective experience. But then again because they would be simulating neurons (to a degree).
    I'd say I am not entirely closed to the idea. But extremely skeptical.

    A question. Can you have subjective experience without any kind of awareness? It seems unlikely. You would need to be aware of yourself existing if you are to be aware of the fact that you simply exist.

    How would that work without some form of cognition or mind? How would that work without more complexity then just a quark? Where does the quark get it's self awareness? And wouldn't that contradict the more complex animals that aren't self aware but only outwardly aware even with their complexity?
  • What is an idea's nature?


    So it seems your saying:
    1. Consciousness is fundamental.
    2. Subjective experience is fundamental.
    3. Both are thus an essential property of fundamental particles or whatever is fundamental in the universe.
    4. The fundamental particles have no mind even though they have consciousness and subjective experience. And this is because at that level , consciousness is simple existence.
    5. When fundamental particles become a process, from its configuration emerges one shared subjective experience and consciousness (i.e. in an apple or a chair or a human or a bacteria).
    6. At some point such a configuration can bring about a mind and as a result necessarily thoughts.
    7. If there are thoughts there must be a mind. If there is a mind there must be a thought.
    8. Thoughts aren't necessarily ideas, nor necessarily abstract (i.e. don't necessarily are in language form)
    9. So what you say are thoughts isn't necessarily in word form
    10. Chat gpt has an emergent shared subjective experience and consciousness arising from the fundamental particles. And because it takes inputs from the environment and outputs data in order to sustain its usefulness and thus its existence. And because it has cognition (thoughts) it's said to have a mind.

    It was definitely interesting. So a few things came to mind. The first is obviously that you're attribution of consciousness to fundamental particles contradicts current knowledge and not just current knowledge but also expectations of future knowledge, possibly even up until eternity. So it's almost a religious move.

    I think you sense this. And this is why the second issue arose. Namely the definition you use for consciousness and subjective experience for fundamental particles and everything else as a result. No longer requires the usual abilities. Such as a living real-time changing awareness rather than a dead one.
    You even define consciousness at the fundamental level as 'just existing'. Which makes sense because there's not much there at that level.

    But that means that consciousness and subjective experience now mean ''existence''. Later when a more complex thing forms like a chair or a human. Given that subjective experience and consciousness arise from the fundamental and are merely existence. Then when they combine. Their consciousness and experience is also merely existence. It's then mind that emerges from the human configuration and the configuration that gives rise to awareness and so on.

    So since consciousness and subjective experience are always present and are just existence. And chairs have consciousness and subjective experience. So in other words chairs exist.

    But animals and humans have respectively cognition, and high level cognition (mind activity, thoughts, abstract or not abstract) such that they can feel pain and enjoy pleasure. Which we used to call subjective experience. (Which now is deemed existence). We then need a new word for this activity. When animals and humans feel, and laugh, or cry and so on.

    .....

    But then we are just changing words but it won't change the content. It won't change that a fundamental particle doesn't feel pain or pleasure.
    If you were to make a new claim that fundamental subjective experience isn't merely existence, but rather that it is really feeling, sensing. Then how can we prove this? That would mean my chair is hurt by my sitting on it?
  • What is an idea's nature?


    So I said if you have the image of a marble in your head. It's the image form of the idea of a marble.

    You said there's an essential difference between other round objects and a marble. Ofcourse. I agree. And doesn't the image of a marble differ from the image of a ball of dough? It's true that the blind person only understands the difference between a small ball of dough and a marble after some sensory experience. (and given their lack of vision they would see a resembling image of a marble rather than the full image of a marble. But close enough to make one) and for all of us the experiences help us understand the meaning of the words used to describe such an image. And once these words translate into the image of a marble vs the image of a ball of dough + they "feel" that way when observing the image in our mind.
    Then do they have the imagage form of the idea of a marble or ball of dough.

    In other words. Yes the marble image is the idea. And only when you understand what a marble is through experience and reason. Does that idea become the full or really close to idea image of a marble. Before that it would be the image of a round thing. And if you never saw or felt a material substance then it would be the image and idea of a non material round thing.
  • What is an idea's nature?


    I think if you imagine a marble. It is the image of the idea of a marble. One could say the image is the idea in image form.

    The relationships are probably internal/external.

    So the relationship of the roundness of a marble. And it's texture or substance.
  • What is an idea's nature?
    I'm not sure there's a difference between mind and ideas. What mind exists when there are no ideas?

    Thank you for posting this here. It's interesting.

    I doubt the first three bullet points are so controversial?
    So I'd like to move on to the fourth.
    You said mind is the activity arising from an object. In this case a brain. But a mind exists only if there's subjective experience (which you deem to be consciousness). So a computer calculates but doesn't have a mind. Agree? If so. Now when you say that mind is not different from ideas. Then if they are the same then they are co-referential. As in they have the same properties all the way through.

    Argument:
    Suppose that mind is the same as ideas
    If something is an object or process and has subjective experience then it has consciousness or a mind.
    Chat gpt is an object or process but doesn't have subjective experience.
    So chat gpt doesn't have consciousness or a mind.
    If the mind is the same as ideas then a mind is required to produce old or new ideas.
    So chat gpt could not produce old or new ideas since it has no mind. But
    Chat gpt can produce old or new ideas.
    Therefore it's not so that mind is the same as ideas.
  • What is an idea's nature?


    I have to agree with @wonderer1 who challenged your view that man exists and breaks the rules and is not bound by its rules.

    In this case rules are most fairly interpreted as 'laws of nature or laws of the universe' or something similar.

    Basically meaning. There's things that are possible and there's things that aren't possible. Doing the impossible would be breaking ''the rules''.
    In your response to the other person who replied to you. You change the definition/interpretation. Creating an equivocation fallacy. By method of a shifting the goal post fallacy or so it seems.

    In the response you suddenly hold 'rules' to have a definition closer to it's original meaning. Man made things. Or (if he exists) God made things. Suddenly to break to rules means to do things that some being didn't want us to do. (As seen in your use in the analogy of us polluting the air)

    But this isn't the most reasonable interpretation of your original comment. Which seemed to imply ''humans do what can't be done" which is a contradiction. (Which the other responder noticed)
    So afterwards it's redesigned to mean ''humans do what God (if he exists) didn't want us to do" but was possible to do. Which is vastly different. In the former we have a contradiction. In the latter we're just being independent and disobedient.
  • What is an idea's nature?
    Instead of thinking if X exists, I am thinking, does a safety pen exist? Safety pins did not exist until a person created one. So X can begin the mind. But if X is the rules of physics, then it exists outside of the mind until the mind becomes aware of it.

    Hmm. To be honest, I'm struggling to fully grasp your view. But it seems in the final stage of your response.(As quoted).

    You seem to posit that some mind activity discovers something about the world. (I.e. laws of physics). And some mind activity creates something. I.e. the idea of a pen or the idea of a circle.

    My question is. When we have the idea of a pen or the idea of a circle. Is there a specific way that the brain interacts. Such that it'll neural activity if reproduced would bring about the idea of a circle or the idea of a pen. In any subject where that neural activity and structure can be reproduced?

    Probably not. But. That would be something
  • What is an idea's nature?
    Nothing really is eternal, possibly not even atoms, given enough time.

    I guess you could say that ideas are accidental , non essential, fleeting properties of the universe. In that way your original claim can be true.

    However on the quoted claim.
    If nothing is eternal. Then the truth value if that claim is equally non eternal. Such that at some point it is false. Meaning at some point it would be such that some thing(s) is eternal.
  • What is an idea's nature?
    Ideas are just intelligible parts/properties of the universe as represented in the mind (as everything is).

    How are they properties of the universe? If all beings die. Where are the properties?
  • What is an idea's nature?
    The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions.
    — Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion

    Is this saying that: Inside reasoning is non meta reasoning. And must be used to determine truth of an argument generally. Rather than using a meta lens like psychology or sociology or genetics. Applied to the argument for analysis.
    I.e.

    Socrates is human. Humans are mortal. Therefore Socrates is mortal.

    Inside reasoning would be, checking whether humans are mortal and Socrates is human? And the validity of the logic.

    Whereas outside reasoning would be:
    An analysis of why we make the claim. What psychological drives make it so. Or how our senses effect us?
  • What is an idea's nature?


    So are you saying that an idea is just our nature. It's not separate. Just like if I feel annoyed about a customer standing in my way. And if I then am confused about the way things work I would say. The customer is annoying.

    Similarly we say the idea of a circle is something separate. But it's not. It's just a part of you at the time it arises and until it disappears?
  • What is an idea's nature?


    I agree with you. The brain likely works more like a quantum computer then classical computers, quits then binary. I was asking the question "Do you think an idea x has a specific structure or activity in the brain or what arises from it?" So as to take your qubit brain suggestion and apply it to the original topic...
  • What is an idea's nature?


    Yes currently it doesn't seem like there is a neural correlate or specific way reality acts when the idea of a circle arises. What would happen if down the line it turns out that this is so? That there is a specific way reality acts, when the idea of a circle forms. Such that when we let it form on a computer using binary code or as a drawing. It really is the binary and drawing, near equivalent of the idea of a circle. What would that imply?
  • What is an idea's nature?

    Our brains are not binary-coded. This is being debated, but I think we should hold the idea that our brains function like quantum cubits, giving them the experience of consciousness and making it possible for us to hear a song and instantly remember the first time we heard the song and all the memories associated with that moment in time, and even the feelings we had then and now.

    Do you think an idea X is a specific configuration X in the brain?
  • What is an idea's nature?
    An idea is an irreducible mental event that is meaningful and is distinguishable from other ideas.

    So it's a fleeting activity in the mind which can be exported and recalled (if we are lucky).

    The content of the idea will be some relationship between objects?
  • What is an idea's nature?


    Thanks. I'm sure you recognized that English is not my native language. I sure hope to increase my clarity. (Did you use chat gpt?)

    And what your thoughts on the nature of ideas?
  • On Matter, Meaning, and the Elusiveness of the Real


    You say that metaphysical statements can't have a truth value. Because they can't be verified nor be falsified.

    Do you really mean to say that. We shouldn't give a truth value to a metaphysical question for this reason? Or do you mean that they truly can't be true or false. In the sense that i.e. free will exists and doesn't exist and doesn't (exist and not exist) and so on?

    I assume you mean the former. Which I would agree with. But that would be a prescriptive claim in the form of a descriptive one. Which caused confusion.
  • On Matter, Meaning, and the Elusiveness of the Real
    What is real?" is a metaphysical question. It doesn't have a correct answer

    Would you say the question ''what is real?" Doesn't have a correct answer because it is a metaphysical question?

    As in for all x if x is a metaphysical question then the answer to that question can't be true or false?

    If so why?
  • Disambiguating the concept of gender


    I would say that people have used gender terms in some form or other across time and culture. Without necessarily being aware of it in that way.
    Quite some people across the political spectrum from the one extreme up to the other occasionally or at some point have used a gender term that they believe exists.
    Some of these are, woman, man, beta male, alpha male, "not a real woman", "not a real man" and so on.
    And some people even extremes that would call themselves alpha male. Probably are alpha male in terms of gender expression. But gender fluid (going from beta to alpha) internally.

    For sex you can choose to define it as
    woman (sex) = person with xx chromosomes
    man (sex) = person with xy chromosomes

    Definitions can't be true but they can be useful. So for different uses we can have different definitions. Surely for medical and scientific and epistemic reasons the old definition is useful.

    For social reasons a different is also useful. However if we use the same word. We are begging for equivocation fallacies and for the opposite of what language is meant to do. Namely to help us navigate and understand each other clearly. (any person less likely to exert thoughtful cognitive effort show the effects of this and I don't want to be condescending either since it is understandable)

    Feminine is now often woman (gender).

    Now the chromosome based definitions is strong it for example explain why a woman (sex) is still a woman (sex) if she loses her breasts. And why a man (sex) is still a man (sex) if he becomes a eunuch. A eunuch would be a man (sex) without a penis.
    Additionally
    Gender was used way before we used it.
    When a lesbian or "masculine" or just neutral woman was told to act more feminine. Or to act as a woman (even though she obviously was one). Or when the Godfather told Johnny Fontane to "act like a man". Even though Johnny obviously was a man.
    Clearly The Godfather didn't mean that Johnny was not a man (sex) but they did mean that Johnny wasn't acting in line with the cultural/personal idea of how a man (sex) should act. But he does say it in a descriptive way. So he wasn't acting like a man (gender).

    So this is important. It's nothing new really. We just became more aware of it. But there's a potential drawback in defining gender without ant reference point.
    Ofcourse if one were to say that a man (gender) is someone that wears pinks clothes with lace thong and has a vagina and was born with a vagina. Then that wouldn't really be in line with the common idea of what a man is. Neither sex not gender.
    We can accept someone saying this for moral reasons. But for other moral reasons we must recognize that if this is how we generally used language we'd be in the dark. And so most people don't use language in that way.

    Some frame of reference is helpful. Surely we can dismiss of genitals in the gender concept and focus gender on secondary or some primary traits. And we can cherry pick them as we please (meant in a good and respectful way). But the less we have some kind of essence the more likely people will be confused.

    I mean a person born with xy chromosomes and a penis (man sex). Who feels they are a woman (gender). And wants to express as such. In general will not want to express and transition to become a person that looks as what most people would call an alpha male. So some essence (be it without the need for genitals) is helpful and very reasonable.

    So to conclude. Gender can be filled as we want but some essence is healthy.
    Some would try to mingle sex and gender and I have noticed that this happens on either side of the debate. (Which we luckily can still have).
    I think it's useful to recognize that at some point we have to draw a line somewhere such that we can point to things in reality with words such that we understand eachother.
    Even if hormones are ultimately what makes us man or woman (sex). Since that is what DNA ultimately is meant to bring forth. And even if it is difficult to detect exactly where the distinction is. Especially then it is helpful to use genetics as a way to resolve it.

    Surely if a virus breaks out that requires a different vaccine for people with xx chromosomes and XY chromosomes we would want to be safe enough to use such words. And equally we should be safe enough to have words for how one feels or wants to express.

    However I do think it is possible to be wrong about oneself. If I were to say that I have two legs. Then the only thing that makes that objectively true is me having two legs. If I have one leg then the proposition is false.
    If I a man (sex) were to say that I am a woman (sex) that's not possible. Given the definitions with chromosomes.
    If I a man (sex) were to say that I am a woman (gender). Then it's reasonable (even a duty by clinics?) to perform a Socratic questioning method.

    If I were to say that for me woman (gender) is someone that wants to wear female clothes. Someone that wants to be with men. Wants to wear makeup. Wants to have breasts and so on.

    Then whether I am a woman (gender) depends on whether I am the person that wants those things which I just gave as my hypothetical personal definition that aligns with the words in the proposition.

    But if I were a man (sex) and I were to say that I am a woman (gender). And when asked what is that for you? I respond with. A woman (gender) is a person with xx chromosomes, with a vagina.
    Then if we are equally epistemically virtuous we can recognize that if my statement is to be true. Then it would require me to have xx chromosomes, and a vagina. So in that hypothetical the statement would be false.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    We can't; there is no such book. You can point to a book full of information on some subject, if you like, or an encyclopedia that contains information on many subjects. I believe that the contributors to such a book had knowledge of their subjects. But they didn't pour the contents of their minds into the book; they wrote words that convey information.

    In order to answer the question what is knowledge. We could point to "books of knowledge" and check what most aligns with how the word knowledge was used. To get closer to a more essential definition.

    You can go such a book. You claim the sentence "I, John, think therefore I, John experience thinking" if written down is no longer knowledge, it seems. (No longer JTB). But just becomes information. And so a book filled with such sentences you say isn't a book of knowledge to begin with.

    If that was so then the information "I, John, think therefore, I, John experience thinking" wouldn't also be a justified true belief. And yet it is. Now such a book would also contain. Justified false beliefs and non justified true beliefs.

    And yet if the beliefs would be assumed to be true. Then that is the kind of book we would have to look at in order to see what essentially knowledge is. But because "belief assumed to be true and assumed to be justified" would cause trouble as a definition. We choose JTB.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)


    Who says you can know a true belief just because it is deemed justified? But not know true information if one has good justifications for believing the true information is true?

    Anyway. That rethorical question makes it clear that we are just arguing on how to use words. And what to paste to those words. Sure it's helpful to have some stability. And I am for practical reasons leaning back towards JTB. However one can't prove that the way you use the word is the only correct one.

    If we point to a book with knowledge.

    We won't find justified true beliefs. We will find justified beliefs assumed to be true
    Nor would you find in the book of knowledge true information for which they had justifications.
    But rather information assumed to be true for which it was assumed they had good justifications.

    Anyway this won't be productive beyond this. I recognize the common usage.ninhave already shifted back the common one. However I recognize its constructed nature. And the non objective nature of the current description. Which this nuanced view I have all I need and more.
  • What is Time?
    Many physicists and philosophers argue that time might emerge from relationships between events rather than existing as an independent entity.


    yes I agree. I think time isn't a thing part of space. It's just what we use to explain motion across extension (space). And motion and the natural ability to move is affected by the lack of or presence of other matter and forces. So if nothing moved at all, no time would exist.
  • What is Time?


    Without events (in a completely empty universe) what would the meaning of space be?
    Without events in relations to each other how would we measure, experience or conceive of space?

    The meaning of space if there was no matter? Meaning as in what it IS. Or what the purpose of it would be? If purpose. Does it need a purpose? If you mean what would space be without matter. Space. Rather than the three-dimensional thing we would point to in which matter is. It would be that same thing without matter.
    If it is possible for it to exist without matter. As I said I would assume space to be primary or interdependent to matter (including quantum fields and so on) But not secondary.

    Time I find to be harder. I don't know. Is it really some "thing" part of space or is it just something that helps us explain motion across extension. And which only emerges because of motion conceptually. And is there in some ultimate sense no time. That sounds very stupid even if I say it myself. But I don't know. Maybe our intuition is just of. Maybe we are bringing something to reality. Maybe everything just happens at the same moment. On the other hand it feels not intelligent to think that even though I am currently home. That when I was at work that it was just happening at the same moment and any notion of past and present and even moment is just arising from motion but isn't really there.

    If there was no motion anywhere in the universe. Does time still exist? (Remind yourself if you imagine that scenario that you observing that state assumes motion and you'll probably assume as a result that time would still exist. But does it really since there would be no observer?)
  • What is Time?


    So I walk. My friend walks two meters away from me..the space we occupy and between is. Is secondary to my friend and I?
    What would that mean. That first matter existed and space is just something that existed afterwards as a result from matter existing and changing?

    I get that there is a relationship between them. In the traditional sense. in space exists matter and it changes. But I can't imagine matter existing first. It seems more that the relationship is interdependent or that space is primary.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    But what can we say about the difference between these and justice? Or information?

    Justice initially arose as a feeling reflecting a sense of retribution. But later we started to feel that maybe retribution isn't so fair. Definitely if our will is not free or could be not free.

    So some will say justice is an eye for an eye or an eye for a lifelong prison sentence or a humane death penalty or something like that.

    And some will say justice is whatever you say it is (but does seems to forget the initial foundation completely)

    And some might say justice is trying to find a middle path between humane retribution, avoiding future immoralities, teaching better beliefs and skills to change harmful beliefs (if said immoral behavior comes from habits that are engrained and we aren't so free than that is more just than mere retribution).

    So I think there's an essence that we should respect. Not sure what it is. I sense I am on the right track going from the foundation to the more advanced notion of justice. "Solving problems related to morality in order to get a better society while doing so fairly and taking into account a lot of data and understanding"

    Maybe that's the essence.
    So how is justice different from knowing?

    Knowing is an experience of conceptually being in line with reality in a minimalist way (p if p). And having good reasons for claiming you are and being certain you are beyond any serious doubt.

    Whereas justice starts as an experience. But is more of an ideal to strive for.

    (Sidenote. May I ask. Are you a professional philosopher or student or professor or autodidact?)
  • What is Time?
    Time exists only for as long as things move. It's an emergent abstract property that we detect. It's what follows from movement intensity. So if everything keeps moving and has moved in some form somewhere then time is eternal. And if at some point nothing moved or stops moving time stops existing.

    So things just exist and move and the velocity changes we recognize which we call the adjustment of time. Is really just matter and forces interacting on the capacity to move. Just like matter affects matter with gravity. So does matter affect matter by changing it's capacity to move. Movement creates time. Time need not and doesn't exist separately without movement. Unlike matter or space. Hence I don't think that time is part of the fabric of space. I think matter just affects things such as matter and space which then affect their ability to move through gravity or other means
  • What is Time?
    Empty (don't know how to delete comment)
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)


    I agree. We see something. We coin a new word. People ask us to define it and it will fall short. Over time we use the word in different ways. And we give different definitions. And the different definitions help us bridge some of the imaginary boundaries we create in our sense of reality.

    So yes I agree it's useful to see different ways words are used then to argue about a definition being the absolute king. One definition won't describe everything the word game or knowledge is used to describe.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    I was arguing your idea that my proposition regarding me being new was "made true by direct experience"
    — Jack2848
    If it is true, it was made true by taking place in your consciousness. It still your knowledge, and no one else's, so stop dancing around that mulberry bush.

    So you meant it like this then?

    Me:
    "I rode a bicycle"

    You:
    Sez you who made it true by direct experience. For all I know. You didn't ride a bycicle. (Added: I can have no knowledge of it even if it is true)

    So you meant that if I rode a bycicle the riding (experience) made it true but it doesn't mean you can know.

    If that is what you meant form the start, honestly. Then I misunderstood you. (To be frank there are those that would conflate truth perception with separate truth value) I thought that was you
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience
    — Jack2848
    Why should I care how true it is for you? You made the statement and I had no reason to disbelieve it. That's where its importance begins and ends.

    Hence the cat is on the mat is true not if you believe or not believe it but if the cat is on the mat.
    — Jack2848
    I don't see a cat or a mat. I have only your word. I have no reason to doubt your statement and, since its truth or unrtuth doesn't matter to me, I am not motivated to investigate further. Whether it's true or false, I don't know.

    The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience
    — Jack2848
    Why should I care how true it is for you? You made the statement and I had no reason to disbelieve it. That's where its importance begins and ends.

    I'm not arguing for the importance of whether I was on this forum before or whether you should care. That would be a strawman of my intent.I was arguing your idea that my proposition regarding me being new was "made true by direct experience"

    To which I said that it isn't.

    Whatever is the case is the case. Regardless of direct experience or justifications. That is what I was arguing for. And that was I brought up the example of the cat on the mat. Not to assume that you can know whether I am new or not.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    That’s why belief and justification were part of the traditional definition: not because they’re philosophically tidy, but because they reflected what it means to know in actual life. We’re not passive containers of truths—we’re engaged agents who must assess, trust, challenge, and risk loss in the pursuit of knowledge.

    That’s why Gettier cases are troubling. They show that something can check the boxes—justified, true, believed—and still feel wrong. The problem isn’t just with the definition; it’s with how knowledge is entangled with our perspective, our stakes, and our vulnerability to error.

    Gettier cases show not that we can have "justified true belief" and still don't have knowledge.
    If so define me the word you assume we don't have when we have a gettier case.

    Ofcourse what we really intuitively grasp is that the gettier cases show us that having knowledge (having justified true belief) doesn't mean that you know you have knowledge (doesn't mean you know you have justified true belief.

    Whereas if you said knowledge is true information.
    Then in a gettier case. You'd have someone have true information. And of they then say that they know they have true Information. We could say you don't know even if you have a strongly justified belief.

    It is not that the gettier cases show us that

    A.
    we can't have knowledge (justified true belief)
    nor that

    B. we can't have knowledge (true information) and know (have good justifications for it) we have knowledge (true information).

    Gettier cases show us that even with extremely good justifications and true believe or true Information. Our claim that we -know- could still be false. If -know- means to have good justifications and true believe/information. It humbles our ability to know regardless of how you define knowledge as true information and add the requirement for justification to the act of knowing or of you add that requirement to both knowing and knowledge as with JTB.

    This obvious since we don't have direct awareness which would be required for ultimate rather than practical knowing.

    However I do agree with you that it wouldn't be practical to change the definition. And it seems more accurate to include justification requirement in the act of knowing AND knowledge assumptions. Even if one could easily separate the act of knowing from a piece of true information.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

    Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience

    You did. I've tried as best I can to clearly layout what I mean when I use words like knowledge. (Even if implied this is problematic.
    And I have stayed clear from mixing truth perception and actual truth).
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience.
    — Jack2848
    Not that much earlier, and not quite as you put it. The experiencer of a sensation knows that sensation to be true, without making any statement. It's not made true and it's not information; it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else. It can be communicated to others and they may believe it, but they cannot know it.

    The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience

    a. The experience makes it true in my experience unless I don't have that critical thought so I can't necessarily know. As I said earlier (if that final statement is true depends on how you'd define "know")
    B. It may be so that it isn't true in the perception of everyone else , but as I said earlier that doesn't make it actually true or not true

    Whether or not you believe that a cat is on the mat. It is or isn't there.. or in other words it is true regardless of your or anyone's perception. Because it refers to a part of the universe that is a way that is different from the rest at some level of that universe.

    Hence "the cat is on the mat is true" not if you believe or not believe it but if the cat is on the mat.

    P if p

    Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

    Well if you say :
    it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else

    It's true BECAUSE it is in the experiencer and not true for anyone else.
    Then hopefully you mean that it is true regardless of anyone. And it is perceived of true or not true depending on a subject

    I'm all too keenly aware of that. If it gets much more lax, we might as well give up on verbal communication, since any word can mean whatever anyone chooses

    How do we know if a word necessarily means what you say it means? How do we know this? Do we look at instances of knowledge? Because if so turns out as I said. That those instances are more "akin to information assumed to be true" or "beliefs assumed to justified and assumed to be true"

    Definitely not justified true belief.
    At least not if we are to take a purely descriptive account.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    Are you familiar with the idea of a family resemblance? How much success would you have if you set out to define your family by listing their attributes? Blonde hair and a hooked nose, maybe, except for cousin Philippa, with their less aquiline features and mousy hair. Or all descended from Grandpa Jerome, except the adopted twins. Supose that for whatever feature you choose, there are exceptions, or you include folk that you would not want included.

    The idea is that we can talk about our family, despite not being able to give a strict and explicit definition that includes all and only those members we want; and this can be generalised to claim that for some terms there is no explicit definition that sets out all and only those things that are to be included. The other example is "game" - without resorting to mere stipulation, can we provide a rule that includes all and only those things that we have described as a "game"? Not all games involve winning, nor competition, nor amusement. And yet despite this we make good use of the word.

    Point being that we do not need to be able to present a definition as a prerequisite for using the word.

    We use the word "knowledge" quite adequately, and widely, and yet when we try to tie it down we end up in these interminable philosophical meanderings.

    So, do we need to provide a definition of knowledge at all? Perhaps it would be better to just map out the different ways we use the word, as you have begun to do.

    One thing we can do is to mark the difference between knowing an believing. We can believe something that is not true. We can't know something that is not true. If you thought you knew something, but it turns out you were mistaken, then you didn't know it at all.

    .........
    We don't always find it easy to have a clear definition yes. We teach kids what a tree and a car is by showing them pictures of different trees and cars. And then of toy cars and so on.
    So we intuitively understand the pattern but it's much more difficult to explain it. However suppose someone called Jack says to his daughter: ''I'll give you a present next year and it will be a car''. Then since he means a car in GTA 6, he'd better mention to his daughter that he means a car in GTA 6. Otherwise she might assume from context that he meant an actual car. Similarly we use the word 'knowledge' in similar ways. Hence sometimes it's better to move beyond the word.

    (Although the family description example begs to be vague. I would say a family is a descendant (or we can say descendant until x generations). Trying to define family by their attributes is pointless as mutations probably happen and culture effects individuals and so on. And for game. One could choose to only include games where one can win and have a different name for the others such as recreational activity that isn't a game. but I get your point and I did fairly address it above)

    And I agree. We can map out different ways the word can be reasonably used. So we all are more aware that we are arguing on definitions to attach to a word rather than over what the actual thing is.

    Although one pattern arises across them all. ''Knowledge is something assumed to be true by an individual or by a group''. And the something for some is JTB or it can be true information. Or something other. So it's the most likely descriptive candidate.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.
    — Jack2848

    Knowledge claims are sometimes disputed, disclaimed, or proven wrong, as the case may be. The JTB proponent would deal with this issue by emphasizing the distinction between knowledge claims and knowledge as such. Justified Belief is sufficient for a knowledge claim. The Truth requirement is what is supposed to certify that the claim is merited.

    With JTB.

    'the earth is flat' would have been assumed to be knowledge. But then layer turned out to be justified belief. So not knowledge.
    With 'true information' as definition the same would have happened.

    It would have been wrongfully (but understandably) assumed to have been knowledge (TI) but then later shown wrong.

    The same happens really. It's just that TI there's a clear distinction between knowing and knowledge. Knowing requires (if one is less stringent) justified belief.
    And if more stringent, direct awareness of said true information.

    I'm definitely not advocating (although in my initial post I seem to have had a different mood) for it having to be defined differently. But I felt like maybe we have strayed to far from a more simple definitional approach. (And this also further from applying Occam's razor)

    By recognizing that for knowing we require justifications or direct awareness or x. So that we can know or reasonably assume that we have knowledge (TI). We simplify the definitions.
  • Knowledge is just true information. Isn't it? (Time to let go of the old problematic definition)
    To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.
    — Jack2848

    But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

    So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

    And if JTB does reflect the current use, then what is that point of your definition? Do you wish to reform language? Clarify an ambiguity? But defining "knowledge" as, essentially, fact, true proposition, is not only redundant, but confusing as well. According to the usual meaning, knowledge requires a knower, naturally enough. But with your proposal, most of what qualifies as "knowledge" is not known to anyone!

    I wouldn't say most common people would say knowledge requires a knower. If you ask someone on the street and as them. ''Can I put knowledge onto a piece of paper. whilst not knowing for myself it is knowledge?"

    I imagine many saying something like this. "Yes because if it is knowledge as you say. Then since it is true (information). Then whether you know it or not doesn't matter. It is still true."

    I've the luck in this case that I have a very ordinary job. And yet when I tell people knowledge is defined as ''justified true belief''. It doesn't sound like the first thing they think of.

    Ofcourse if you ask people. Do you have knowledge? And then ask them how do you know you have knowledge? They might say . Because I have good reasons to believe it.

    So knowing then is 'personally assumed justified belief' that they have knowledge (true information).

    But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

    So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

    Hmm.
    ''belief assumed to be true and assumed to have justifications for"

    ''information assumed to be true''

    ''Information assumed to be true''

    Those seem like the most descriptive options for what knowledge ultimately is.

    Whereas JTB and ''true information'' would be more (useful) inventions rather then descriptions.