The spirit of my idea is close to the Kantian model, but it adds new layers. Kant’s noumenon can be compared to what I call the modus, and his phenomenon is similar to what I call a property. But note this small, crucial detail: properties are relational.
The property of redness or hammerness can be objective (for a carpenter, a hammer is a useful tool), or it may not be (someone who has been hurt by a hammer may see it as a source of pain). However, in my case, properties are more deeply relational; they are revealed in an act of participation, which can even occur between two objects without an observer present (for example, two rocks striking each other, revealing hardness).
Furthermore, the modus may be change over time. An apple is red, perhaps because this color is evolutionarily more attractive to animals that disperse seeds, who might have been more inclined to eat red apples. My modus is not a static thing-in-itself. So a car can be red because red cars were in demand earlier (and green cars weren't), and this became the result of earlier interactions.
I am defending the subject, but not to the degree of anthropocentrism seen in Kant, whose phenomena are an act of cognition.

I just discussed the same topic in another thread. I think you'll find it interesting, so I'll just copy my answer

My fascination with the processual approach to ontology is a kind of response to speculative ontology (object-oriented ontology and so on). I believe that the "subject" today needs philosophical defense more than ever before. If you're familiar with the works of us contemporaries, I think you'll understand what I'm talking about.
Harman, for instance, argues that the "hammerness" of a hammer is always withdrawn. "Hammerness" is the real being of the hammer as a unified object, which can't be reduced to its relationships with other things (e.g., a hand, a nail, or our thinking). We can't know it completely because:
Objects have "real qualities" that aren't exhausted by their "sensual" manifestations.
Any kind of knowledge is a relation that only reveals aspects of the object, but not its holistic essence.
This withdrawal occurs in three dimensions: the object transcends any attempts to grasp it; it retreats into the background during use; and as a tool, it's always on the verge of breaking, yet remains partially inaccessible.
Harman emphasizes that this isn't skepticism (objects are real) but rather realism: objects exist independently, but their depth is infinite and inaccessible. This distinguishes OOO from relational ontologies, where everything is reduced to connections.


What I Propose:
The modality (or the name can be changed to your liking) of a hammer is its "shadowy depth" (like Harman's), objective and inaccessible in isolation. But when the hammer is used, "hammerness" as a property emerges as an event—dynamic and contextual. This explains why we can't know hammerness statically: it doesn't exist "in the hammer" as a substance, but is born at the boundary of interaction, much like how for Harman, an object is only partially revealed in relationships.

For Harman, the hammer is revealed in its use—we see only one aspect. I propose to refine this: "hammerness" as a property is revealed in an act of participation, an act of encounter, and depends on the participants in the interaction (the hand, the nail, the task, the lighting). For another participant (e.g., a child playing with the hammer) or context (the hammer as a weapon), a different property is revealed, but the hammer's modality remains the same. This helps explain why complete knowledge is impossible: properties infinitely vary in processes, but they never exhaust the modality.

For Harman, the subject is a passive object, equal to others and withdrawn from access. The subject is unremarkable and unnecessary (why do we need it if everything is an object, and the method is objective). In my opinion, on the contrary, the subject (the observer or the "I") is a fully existent being with its own modalities (objective structures, such as the visual system or consciousness). It doesn't disappear or become fully flattened: the subject actively participates in the act of Participation, where properties are revealed. For example, in the case of a red apple, the subject (observer) is one of the participants in the interaction (along with the apple and light), and their modalities (cognitive structures) determine how the event of the property emerges. This overcomes Harman's radicalism, returning a role to the subject in reality, but without idealism: the subject doesn't create properties; it co-participates in their actualization

Friday saw you and other participants in this thread ask me some interesting questions, but I wanted to take a short break before I answered. I'll get back to those questions later. But here's what I want to say right now.
My fascination with the processual approach to ontology is a kind of response to speculative ontology (object-oriented ontology and so on). I believe that the "subject" today needs philosophical defense more than ever before. If you're familiar with the works of us contemporaries, I think you'll understand what I'm talking about.
Harman, for instance, argues that the "hammerness" of a hammer is always withdrawn. "Hammerness" is the real being of the hammer as a unified object, which can't be reduced to its relationships with other things (e.g., a hand, a nail, or our thinking). We can't know it completely because:
Objects have "real qualities" that aren't exhausted by their "sensual" manifestations.
Any kind of knowledge is a relation that only reveals aspects of the object, but not its holistic essence.
This withdrawal occurs in three dimensions: the object transcends any attempts to grasp it; it retreats into the background during use; and as a tool, it's always on the verge of breaking, yet remains partially inaccessible.
Harman emphasizes that this isn't skepticism (objects are real) but rather realism: objects exist independently, but their depth is infinite and inaccessible. This distinguishes OOO from relational ontologies, where everything is reduced to connections.


What I Propose:
The modality (or the name can be changed to your liking) of a hammer is its "shadowy depth" (like Harman's), objective and inaccessible in isolation. But when the hammer is used, "hammerness" as a property emerges as an event—dynamic and contextual. This explains why we can't know hammerness statically: it doesn't exist "in the hammer" as a substance, but is born at the boundary of interaction, much like how for Harman, an object is only partially revealed in relationships.

For Harman, the hammer is revealed in its use—we see only one aspect. I propose to refine this: "hammerness" as a property is revealed in an act of participation, an act of encounter, and depends on the participants in the interaction (the hand, the nail, the task, the lighting). For another participant (e.g., a child playing with the hammer) or context (the hammer as a weapon), a different property is revealed, but the hammer's modality remains the same. This helps explain why complete knowledge is impossible: properties infinitely vary in processes, but they never exhaust the modality.

For Harman, the subject is a passive object, equal to others and withdrawn from access. The subject is unremarkable and unnecessary (why do we need it if everything is an object, and the method is objective). In my opinion, on the contrary, the subject (the observer or the "I") is a fully existent being with its own modalities (objective structures, such as the visual system or consciousness). It doesn't disappear or become fully flattened: the subject actively participates in the act of Participation, where properties are revealed. For example, in the case of a red apple, the subject (observer) is one of the participants in the interaction (along with the apple and light), and their modalities (cognitive structures) determine how the event of the property emerges. This overcomes Harman's radicalism, returning a role to the subject in reality, but without idealism: the subject doesn't create properties; it co-participates in their actualization.

I apologize in advance for any discrepancies that may arise due to the translator, as I am not a native English speaker.

Something cannot be named, thought, represented, or manifested if it does not have a finite existence. Infinity, as a mathematical model, can only exist as a cognitive construct, not as an independent entity (similar to zero). In my opinion, the concept of "infinite consciousness" is a speculative idea, and here's why: Even when we refer to something as infinite, we are defining it. Defining something is the task of establishing limits or boundaries. I don't know what mathematicians will say about this, but the very concept of "infinity" seems like a logical error, but I agree that it is necessary as an imaginary concept for building other cognitive constructs. I suggest that you define the concept of "infinity" in terms of your approach and the constructs you are developing.

Wouldn't surface texture also count as a property? Can we think of surface texture as a realized event? — frank

Every being has embodiment - its flesh, structure, potential.
But embodiment itself does not yet generate a property.
A property arises when a being enters into active Participation - into interaction with another being.
A property is not something that a being "has", but something that "happens" when they meet.

That was the idea

But at the same time it is difficult for a philosopher to stop in his criticism. The philosopher begins to ask - "What is "is"?", "What does "to be" mean?" And so on ad infinitum. As they said above - you can't put the genie back in the bottle =)))

"potential for redness" is of course not an academic term, but simply my way of expressing the idea. In this case, it is the potential inherent in an apple to be perceived as red by a non-colorblind subject in sunlight. That is, the very texture (embodiment, flesh) of the thing. As opposed to a property that manifests itself exclusively in dynamics and interaction.

I agree with you. In this sense, philosophy is a dude who sits in your head and criticizes you. In psychology, this is called self-reflection (if I'm not mistaken). Education in general (including philosophy itself) teaches a person to be friends with this dude, and not shut his mouth =)

This is the problem I had in mind when I spoke about interaction with others. Many people are driven by prejudices. As Gadamer says, this is not bad, since it gives a person the very possibility of knowledge. But often these prejudices become reinforced concrete for their bearer. In this sense, I often have a contradiction in the relationship between me and others.

The question arises: Is it worth undermining their prejudice, although it does not stand up to criticism? This is exactly what I mean when I say that I am forced to "step on my own throat"

A very subtle definition for philosophy that you voiced: "therapy aimed at developing clarity of thinking."

An interesting approach—formally elegant and convenient, especially from the standpoint of set-theoretic formalization. It allows properties to be neatly defined through their instances and resolves the problem of uninstantiated properties via possible worlds.

However:

The set of all red things does not quite align with our intuitive grasp of “redness” as something unified and shared. A set is merely a collection of objects, whereas a property seems to be something more abstract—something that binds those objects together.

Identifying properties such as “equilateral triangle” and “equiangular triangle” as one and the same disregards their contextual distinctions. In geometric analysis, for example, whether emphasis is placed on sides or angles can carry significant implications, even if the extension is the same.

In the end, your approach requires a metaphysical commitment to the reality of possible worlds, which is itself a contested position.

I propose we step away from a substantialist approach to ontology and turn instead toward a processual one, which I am actively developing.

Rather than conceiving of properties as static characteristics inherent in objects—or as sets of such objects—we can understand them as dynamic events that emerge through acts of interaction (or, if you will, participation) between beings. A property is not something a thing has, but something that happens at the threshold where it encounters other beings.

Take “redness” as an example. Under the substantialist view, redness is either an inherent trait of the object or the set of all red things. In processual ontology, redness is an event that unfolds through the interaction of:

The thing (e.g., the apple, whose structure determines how it reflects light);

The light (photons of a particular wavelength);

The observer (a human or other creature interpreting that reflected light through their perceptual apparatus).

Redness, then, is not inside the apple. It is born from the interplay of all three participants. This makes the property contingent: for a different observer (say, someone with color blindness), or under different lighting conditions, redness may not manifest at all.

Another example: “a pleasant scent.” Scent is not a static attribute of a substance. It is an event arising from the interaction of molecular structures, olfactory receptors, and a brain interpreting those signals within the context of memory and experience. What smells pleasant to a human may signal danger to an insect.

But how should we treat uninstantiated properties—without lapsing into subjective idealism?

To relieve this tension, we can distinguish between modes and properties:

Mode (internal disposition): This is the objectively existing structure of the apple’s embodied being—its surface texture and chemical composition—that predisposes it to reflect light of a certain wavelength. This mode exists independently of both light and observer. It remains even in complete darkness. This aligns fully with realism.

Property (realized event): This is the event of redness, which only occurs when the apple’s mode enters into participation with light and an observer. This property does not exist in darkness.

The unactualized mode remains. The potential for redness (the mode) is always there, as long as the apple itself exists. But the redness (the property) is an event that may or may not come into being.

I just read this thread. I remember how in rhetoric classes at the university we spent the whole semester chewing over 2 questions: 1. Should prostitution be legalized? 2. Should the death penalty be used/not used as a form of punishment?

At alumni meetings we always remember these questions with warmth and continue the discussions.

It is interesting that over the years, most of them have changed their minds more than once.

At the university we played out scenes of a trial. I was the "defense attorney" for prostitution. I managed to convince the jury then =)

my interest in academic philosophy began with a visit to the Kant Museum in Kaliningrad (Königsberg) about 5 years ago. Although Kant was part of the curriculum back in university, to my shame I couldn't remember what he wrote about when I was in the museum, and thanks to the interactive whiteboard installed there I was hooked by what he wrote about.

Although psychology promised to teach what a person thinks on every corner (and this turned out to be exaggerated), studying Kant promised to teach how a person cognizes. Since then, I began to greedily absorb Kant, then Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Le Bon, and finally Heidegger, while studying academic sciences such as epistemology, axiology, rhetoric, ethics, where the ideas of different philosophers were presented in the form of a system.

What did this give me? First of all, the ability to evaluate judgments: for me it became easy to distinguish speculation from assertion, check them, separate them from emotions. This also affected my persuasion skills. The I-State relationship changed significantly: my ideas about the actions of the state acquired structure and clarity, which allowed me to predict the behavior of the state or the development of international relations with greater accuracy (as time has shown).

The skill of separating emotions from events, manipulation from facts, propaganda from events.

From the point of view of my own life: right now I am writing a paper on ontology, with my own approach to the I-others relationship, my own development, life and death, being and nothingness, time and space.

All this allows me to more accurately understand what I want, what I want from life, from work, from others, from raising my children, to understand why I make this choice and not another.

New difficulties arose because you begin to see a little wider. But along with this came the skill of letting go: allowing something to be as it is.

In relations with loved ones, it became easier for me to calm their existential anxieties, to help them cope with depression. But, as I wrote above, I had to step on my throat more often in communication. Otherwise, I feel like I'm suppressing them.

I think philosophy did not become the author of my portrait, but it added subtlety and detail to this portrait

It is interesting to observe how each of those who spoke, possessing extensive knowledge in the field of philosophy and a long history of philosophizing, nevertheless in everyday life remains a simple person, with ordinary views, with simple desires and good intentions. Perhaps philosophy teaches us this?

How did you manage to connect all this with the people around you? Did they start listening to your wisdom, or on the contrary, moving away from you? Or did you manage to separate philosophy and interaction with others? Or surround yourself with people like you?

I tend to value approaches which minimise suffering and promote flourishing. — Tom Storm

It would be difficult for me to assess in your place what exactly is minimizing suffering: letting someone commit suicide or letting someone live :grin:

The root for wise traces back to the Proto-Germanic wis-, meaning "to see" or "to know". This Germanic origin is seen in words like the Latin sapientia ("wisdom") and the Greek sophia ("wisdom"), both connecting to discerning or tasting meaning.' In Sanskrit, 'vidya' is 'wisdom' or 'true knowledge' (more often encountered in the negative i.e. 'avidya', signifies lack or absence of wisdom). Also from the root 'vid', meaning 'to know' or 'to see'. — Wayfarer

In Russian, this also finds its development. "Видеть" (videt') - that is, to See and "Ведать" (vedat') - that is, to Know.

Both words come from the Old Slavonic root вѣдѣти, which means "to know, to be familiar with something."

there's no putting the genie back in the bottle. — boethius

:lol: :rofl: :up:

I’m at ease with being, to a significant degree, an expression of the values of my time. — Tom Storm

Have you ever felt the urge to take stock of your own paradigm?

I mostly just act. — Tom Storm

Thought experiment: You walk into a room where a stranger is about to commit suicide. What do you do?

I admit honestly. Often I deliberately reject any rational knowledge and make a decision simply on the basis of what I want (without explaining the reasons) without relieving myself of responsibility for such a decision. In the end, I am just a person. I believe that it is very important to allow myself this.

I really like your approach to this issue. It is multifaceted and takes into account different views.

However, the thing is that if you imagine yourself as a dictionary compiler: you need to somehow accurately, briefly and meaningfully state the definition of the concept so that anyone who reads it can grasp the meaning, and the definition itself at least does not contradict itself. It is for these reasons that I gave my own definition.

In this case, if we take a chaotic world order as a starting point, then "system" = A, if we take an ordered world order as a starting point, then "system" = B

But what if the system is just our idea? Chaos or order - our idea? Maybe everything is somehow different? Science is built on the basic assumptions that the universe has some kind of order. But this is precisely an assumption, which is confirmed by the existence of paradoxes.

So in this case, all our judgments are nothing more than opinions.

I do not earn my living from philosophy and philosophizing in the literal sense. Unless, of course, you consider my regular work as a lawyer as philosophizing, when I use epistemology, rhetoric, axiology and ethics as an everyday applied tool.

In this sense, philosophy serves me very well.

But my question is more about everyday life: choosing a product in a store, interacting with my wife, raising children, talking at the table with friends. In my case, in everyday life I have to "step on my throat", keep quiet, not get into arguments, otherwise all attention instantly switches to such an argument, and my wife has no choice but to eventually agree with my views in everyday matters (but I do not want to suppress her). This is where this topic arose. How do you combine philosophy and everyday life in your case?

I don't know how a bear understands a forest. Honestly.



Yes, it is a cognitive construct. I justify this by the fact that a system in the world itself can be both an ordered set of everything and a chaotic one. We have no evidence for either the first or the second approach. But inside our minds (or inside the systems we create, like AI), a system can be identified and exist in an organized manner. Thus, the word system itself acquires meaning exclusively in the context of epistemology

This is a great question. I really enjoy these kinds of questions because at first glance they seem self-evident, but for me, answering them is always a challenge. So, I'll try to formulate what I think about this without using any reference books, based on my own reflections.
I don't even know where to begin. The first thing that comes to mind is that a system is a construct of cognitive activity. Can we assert that something is a system on its own? For example, an organism is certainly a system, but is it truly independent, not being part of an even larger system? This leads to the conclusion that a system, in our everyday understanding, is a conscious construct. Outside of our cognition, there can't be a separate system apart from other systems.
Second, a system is a collection of elements that interact with each other dynamically, forming something new with properties that no single element possesses individually. For example, a broom is a system of twigs. Separately, they aren't a broom, but only together can they sweep. This characteristic has two conditions:
The combination of different things.
Mandatory dynamic interaction with each other.
A third characteristic I would name is a certain stability over time. If a collection of something instantly falls apart into separate parts, it's hard to call it a system.
The final definition I've arrived at is:
A system is a cognitive construct consisting of individual elements that interact dynamically, forming new properties in relation to the individual elements and maintaining stability over time.

I was unable to read your article, unfortunately. You claim that value cannot be quantified, but the question arises: why should value be quantified or ranked in the first place? If the goal is to choose the least of evils, this approach is known as utilitarianism. Are you criticizing utilitarianism?

Theoretically, if objects were seen as having consciousness it could be argued that they need to be treated with greater respect. — Jack Cummins

Dogs clearly have consciousness and even will, as they can follow human commands, sometimes against their own desires, as some studies have shown. However, people who consume animal meat, for example, rarely consider or respect the consciousness of animals. If we often disregard the consciousness of animals for practical purposes, what are the chances that we would respect the hypothetical consciousness of rocks or other objects?

He argued that, in a crowd, the individual loses his personal identity and becomes a single collective psyche. We later see these ideas developed by Freud and Jung. — Alonsoaceves

Not only that. This judgment is more like the later work "The Psychology of the Masses." I even recommend reading the first work, "The Psychology of the People."

First of all, I want to say that I was not impressed by the approach of the author you cited. "Realism vs. idealism” in their presentation is a mixture of ontology and epistemology, while phenomenology and existentialism, in principle, work on a different plane.In my opinion, this classification of ontological approaches was obviously carried out by the author for educational purposes. For me, as the author of the topic, it does not matter where the lovers of classification will place me. Creating something new is a process of going beyond any existing classifications, at least I want to believe in it.

As for your comments:

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences. — RussellA

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences. — RussellA

The text you provided says:

...Although insofar as Neo-Kantianism was a reaction mainly to absolute idealism it could not entirely reject epistemological arguments of the kind that had traditionally led to idealism, especially in its Kantian variety. Hence idealistic tendencies can be found in Neo-Kantianism too, and Martin Heidegger’s later version of realism can be interpreted as a response to the idealism in Neo-Kantianism....

....In so-called “continental” philosophy, we might suggest, the main alternative to the idealism of the nineteenth century and lingering tendencies to idealism in both Neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology has not been any straightforward form of realism, but rather the “life philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie) pioneered by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1916), then extensively developed by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and, without Heidegger’s political baggage, by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961).... https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

In my opinion, this is written quite accurately and agrees with the comment:

Heidegger’s Idealism puts into question the priority of mind, reason and consciousness, associating all of these with the Cartesian subject, which is still operative in Kant and Hegel. Dasein is more radically in the world than any notion of a conscious subjectivity perceiving objects can convey. — Joshs

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. Before you is the text of my work. Did you like it or not like it? What do you agree or disagree with? Destroy my arguments or approve them. My text is here precisely for this

There are two distinct lines of enquiry, the ontology of being within a Realist framework and the ontology of being within an Idealist framework. — RussellA

Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it

I was just wondering how we can approach the ontology of being, something that is external to our language and thoughts, without using language or thoughts. — RussellA

The question of how to approach the ontology of being that which exists beyond language and thought—is a central one in philosophy, since language and thought inevitably shape our perception of reality. However, a number of philosophical traditions, both Western and Eastern, suggest that being can be accessed through direct experience that transcends conceptual and linguistic structures.

In the West, phenomenology, developed by Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, offers ways of understanding being through intuitive, pre-reflective awareness. Husserl, for example, proposed the method of epoche the suspension of judgments about the world in order to focus on pure phenomenal experience. Heidegger, for his part, in Being and Time emphasized the importance of Dasein (being-in-the-world) as the way in which being is revealed in immediate experience rather than through abstract reflection. Kierkegaard emphasized the existential leap of faith that takes one beyond rational analysis to the authentic experience of existence.

In the East, similar ideas can be found in Buddhism and Taoism, which emphasize overcoming dualistic thinking and linguistic categories to achieve direct contact with reality. In Buddhism, especially Zen, meditation practices are aimed at achieving a state of "emptiness" (shunyata), where conceptual differences between subject and object disappear, allowing one to experience being in its purity. Taoism, through the teachings of Lao Tzu, offers the concept of Tao as the unnameable basis of being, which is comprehended not through words or thoughts, but through intuitive adherence to the natural order of things. These traditions converge in the belief that language and thought, although powerful tools, limit our understanding of being, and that only through practices that go beyond them—whether phenomenological contemplation or meditative absorption—can one approach the true ontology of being.

In my opinion, the consensus that red is red for everyone is sufficient for everyday life. Let's look at the consequences: (although this seems a bit pragmatic), but based on the fact that green usually has a calming effect, while red has a somewhat stimulating effect on everyone, including, for example, insects, we can safely assume that red is equally red for everyone.


For example:
Elliot, A. J., & Maier, M. A. (2007). Color and psychological functioning: The effect of red on performance attainment. Psychological Science
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17324089/#:~:text=Red%20is%20hypothesized%20to%20impair,outside%20of%20participants'%20conscious%20awareness

Both are valid concerns, but I'm more inclined to focus on how our predictability is being exploited. I'm not saying social physics isn't useful, but I'd prefer to see applications that go beyond profiting from our behavior. — Alonsoaceves

Is state activity itself a form of profit? Is creating harmony in society a privilege reserved for the elites? However, it is through technology that today's state management takes place. There are remarkable works such as Le Bon's "The Psychology of the Crowd" and Lippmann's "Public Opinion." These two books have played a significant role in shaping our understanding of public opinion management.

"Oh, gentlemen, what kind of free will is there in arithmetic, when only twice two makes four? Twice two will make four without my will. That's what free will is." (Dostoevsky)

Let's say I enjoy tickling a pebble. But will that stop a person from grinding a thousand cute pebbles into powder to obtain a chip for an iPhone?

What would change in our way of being if we were to think of things as possessing consciousness?

Thank you for the excellent essay! I'm so glad to read a contemporary author who doesn't succumb to the trendy currents that proclaim the "death of the subject," which is typical of movements like Object-Oriented Ontologies or Meillassoux's correlationism. On the contrary, you defend the subject, and I completely agree with your position.

It seems to me that today, the subject has become an incredibly fragile construct that is frequently under attack, and therefore, it needs philosophical protection now more than ever.

In this regard, I have an idea I'd like to share. What if we were to view this historical path not as a change of participants (subject-God-object in premodernity, then subject-object in modernity), but as a change in the methods of knowledge acquisition?

In premodernity, the primary method of knowledge was religion: knowledge was given through divine revelation.

In modernity, this method was discarded and replaced by objectivism—the belief in an independent reality knowable by reason. As Nietzsche said, "God is dead, and we have killed him."

Today, when we see the limitations of objectivism but can't return to religion, we find ourselves at an impasse. This is where radical ideas like the "cancellation" of the subject arise.

What are your thoughts on whether this view of the history of philosophy is justified?

To me this suggests that the human being ‘I am’ identifies themself as a being in the world, ‘I am that’. This informs the personality which reflects on what it is (It is that which it is). Which results in when that personality is acting in the world, it acts as a thing (that thing it realises it is)*. But this personality is its own interpretation of itself, so is never actually being itself. It is always its own idea of what itself is. It is always acting out (as if on stage), what it thinks it is, or would be. This means that what is experienced as the self is all the baggage from the past, being projected into the future. A future which is anticipated to be a continuation of what happened in the past. — Punshhh

This is very important. This is exactly what I am talking about at the start: Not "what I am," but "how I being." It is in this act that our above-mentioned reflections are realized: Substantia is not a noun. Being is not a noun. (which, in my opinion, is a given for languages that do not require a copula)

Is it possible to identify a process? Rather than identify, it is more accurate to compare. Compare, but not with a thing, but with a process.

Asking about "how I being?" we must have something as an example, an image, a template. In this way, one of the key signs of being (which I will propose later) is realized - involvement. That is, something can be itself only on the condition that there is something else or different, from which I deduce that any existence is impossible in a single instance, but is something exclusively in relation to another (Being together).

Based on this, the act of self-identification with something is meaningless. You can compare your process with another process, finding similarities or differences, but they are always different processes, separate processes, but interconnected processes

I had to make some simplifications to explain things to Russell.

How can you speculate about the ontology of being without using language or thought? — RussellA

This was the starting point for my article.

In no way — it’s all speculation, in the sense that any scientific postulate is, at its inception, a conceptual construct accepted without direct proof, but rather on the basis of its explanatory and predictive power. For example, the law of conservation of energy and momentum holds true in the overwhelming majority of observed cases, yet in certain quantum systems these laws are formulated differently or have limited applicability. The same applies to many fundamental notions of modern physics, including descriptions of particles and fields that cannot be directly perceived by our senses. If one assumes that the absence of direct verification renders a concept “nonfunctional,” then by that logic we would have to discard a substantial portion of theoretical science.

We simply ask: “What if it’s not at all the way we think it is?” — and then proceed to test the persuasiveness of the arguments for self-contradiction, falsifiability, and so forth, employing every known epistemological tool at our disposal.

I probably won’t surprise you by saying that I am neither a philosopher by profession nor by my initial education. Only now, after many years of working in my field, am I trying to earn a philosophy degree, seeking to substantiate my ontological intuitions, using this forum, among other things, as a tool for development. I am a lawyer, or more precisely, a specialist in legal proceedings (or, more broadly, a specialist in the process of law enforcement). Since my student days, when out of five hundred people in my cohort I was the only one who chose the direction of legal process rather than substantive law, I have always been more interested in how something works rather than what it is made of. Apparently, this inclination has unconsciously carried over into my philosophical pursuits.

It seems to me you are confining “being” to the realm of linguistic tokens and mental concepts, and therefore discussing only our representation of being, not being itself.

But philosophy has long asked whether there is an ontological reality — “what is” — that exists independently of language, mind, or concepts.

If you reduce being to a concept in the mind, you’ve already answered the question in advance: it exists only as a mental construct. That’s a legitimate position, but it’s not an inquiry into being — it’s an inquiry into thought.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology.

I have already told you above, and I will tell you again. I am not diminishing your reasoning, because it is correct within your paradigm. You are talking about epistemology, but I am talking about ontology.