Produce eudaimonia? — Agustino

Says you.

See the problem here?

Of course, for a serial killer, eudaimonia will probably be different than for you or me.

I am surprised - people are normally not so open about such opinions. — Pneumenon

Yep. I'm basically the only open anarchist that I know of in real life, if you don't count family members influenced by my ideas. I've met others online, though.

Ah, well you should have clarified that. Now why is ethical freedom a value? I think the freedom in question is the necessary presupposition of any value, but it is not a value itself. — Agustino

What are the necessary traits for some X to be "a value"? If ethical freedom is really freedom, the answer is "none". No one can say that X cannot be a value because of some structural defect in the constitution of X.

This is the theoretical aspect. The practical aspect of the same phenomenon is that if we don't consider ethical freedom a value, we'll boss people around. The disregard for ethical freedom produces orcs.

Ethical freedom is the freedom to pick your own hierarchy of values. This is what I'm talking about -- it is a freedom that prisoners in a dungeon, or castaways in a distant island, enjoy. Dead people don't enjoy it.

Yes, because it is the foundation of any value. The freedom to murder is a value just as existence, rationality, agency, are values. Without these realities, there are no values.

Note that a freedom that does not include "to murder" is not really a freedom.

Telos and subjectivity are not necessarily conjoined.

Okay, cool! So how does it work out using your hierarchy of values? — Pneumenon

In my hierarchy, democracy is not a good, and therefore the question becomes unanswerable. I don't think it is even a necessary evil -- in my appraisal it is a quite unnecessary evil.

Therefore, from my viewpoint, the real question is, "how far are you willing to go to foster the downfall of democracy?" My answer is, not very far. There are more pressing concerns in my life. The extent of my efforts is to discuss the matter with interested people. I won't found parties, write books, or demonstrate against democracy.

In your scenario, by the way, if some agency has the power to decide that an election can be postponed for some undemocratic reason, it is doubtful to claim that the scenario is a democracy.

The essential question here is how far are you willing to go to ensure the survival of democracy, either in one country, or globally? — Pneumenon

This depends on a hierarchy of values, which was not presented in the reasoning, and cannot be deduced by an interlocutor.

It is easy to see this if you switch your undisputable-by-assumption good with any other good, say, chocolate milk. How far are you willing to go to ensure the supply of chocolate milk? Slavery, mistreatment of cows, unethical market practices, invading cocoa-producing countries...

In other words, your question, to be properly answered, requires a hierarchy of values -- implicit or explicit, depending on the philosophical acumen of the one answering. But this hierarchy will be imported by the people doing the answering, it is not a given in the assumption.

Nope, killing (a human) is intrinsically wrong inasmuch as it deprives him of his freedom. This is inescapable, regardless of the juridical gradations.

This is not to say that the law should not concern itself about the juridical gradations. But it is to say that when the law does that, it is grading evils, and the scale never reaches a killing which is so "slight" that it becomes a non-evil.

@Thorongil, to clarify, I meant any killing of a human life. I don`t think that killing animals or plants is intrinsically evil.

Nope.

By the way, @Wayfarer, I`m familiar with Feser`s site and argument about the death penalty. I agree with it (namely, that it [death penalty] is not opposed, in principle, to Church teachings).

Where are you getting the idea that all killing is wrong? — Thorongil

I got it from introspection.

@Wayfarer

Calvinism is a good example of the stupidity that St. Paul warns us against.

Luke 22:36 - Then said he unto them: But now he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip; and he that hath not, let him sell his coat, and buy a sword.

Then his disciples say, Master, here are two swords, and he says, that's enough.

At least it is enough to open up an interesting debate on PF :D.

Sure, and I have already acknowledged that. But this does beg the question as to what exactly constitutes salvation. If you think it only consists in genuine repentance, then I would ask you whether you believe a genuine repentant would bear arms against others under any circumstances. And more broadly I would ask you whether you think there are many genuine repentants among us. Or does 'salvation is for everyone" mean something else? — Janus

Repentance is not the same thing as salvation. One can repent some sin and still refuse the gift of Christ. And similarly, one can accept the gift of Christ and keep on sinning, since salvation and sanctification are also not the same thing.

Salvation is that you accept that Christ died for your sins (past, present and future), and that your sins are blotted out to the extent that you adhere to Christ. It is not a magic trick like the cartoon conversion (hey, I was baptized, so let me sin a lot). St. Paul has a lot to say about this stupidity. It is a constant, lifelong endeavor for most good Christians.

Would a genuine repentant bear arms against others "under any circumstances"? Sure. I used to present the thought experiment of someone getting home and finding a guy raping his wife or child (or both). Would not most people use violence (and most likely lethal violence) to stop this? Note that I say this as someone who has publicly (in the old forum for those who remember) defended the notion that any killing is evil, including the killing of the rapist in this scenario. If I met this scenario, I don't know what I would do. I'm quite sure that I would violence, I don't know whether I could restrain myself to non-lethal violence, and I'm absolutely positive that killing the guy would be wrong -- even though it is a live possibility that I would kill him.

Are you familiar with the Catharist heresy?

No, my point is that the Catholic Church has not institutionalized and practiced non-violence. I don't count, and am not concerned with, the "recommendation" of non-violence in familial and societal contexts; that is simply a normal prescription for social and familial harmony — Janus

Your claim was, and I quote (again): Take, for example, Christ's teaching of non-resistance to evil by violence, or resistance to evil by non-violence, if you prefer. That teaching, which is absolutely central to the gospels, has never been institutionalized, practiced or even recommended for practice by any ecclesiastical or political authority.

You were concerned with recommendation back then.

The Catholic church (and other mainstream churches) have never advocated that its members refuse to bear arms or go to war in the service of the state. For another example, the churches have never come out strongly against gun ownership. Another historical example: the Vatican failed to speak out against Mussolini. — Janus

You are, as I pointed out, confusing the Church hierarchy and the Church authority. They are not the same thing. In a Christian Church (including the Catholic Church), the highest authorities are the saints -- which is why they often rebuke priests, bishops and popes (in the case of the Catholic Church, of course).

In any case, the idea that the evangelical counsel against violence is translatable into "let us not have guns", or your other points, is clearly debatable. (Christ said that his disciples should acquire some swords, remember?)

I have also been concerned with what I see as the irrelevance of the religious institutions to spiritual aspirants who can and will think for themselves, and are genuinely willing to practice what they preach in good faith. — Janus

Not all people are spiritual aspirants who can and will think for themselves, and salvation is for all, not just for an elite.

can you think of any examples of non-resistance being "institutionalized, practiced or even recommended" by the mainstream churches? — Janus

That was from a catechism from the Catholic Church. You italicized mainstream. Is your point that the Catholic Church is not a mainstream church?

Incidentally, there is similar language in the Catechism of Trent (16th century):

Freedom From Violence, Anger, Hatred And Inhumanity

There are some crimes, such as violence and murder, which are in a special way obstacles to the efficacy of our prayers, and we must, therefore, preserve our hands unstained by outrage and cruelty. Of such crimes the Lord says by the mouth of Isaias: When you stretch forth your hands, I will turn away my eyes from you; and when you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood.

Anger and strife we should also avoid, for they have great influence in preventing our prayers from being heard. Concerning them the Apostle says: l will that men pray in every place lifting up pure hands, without anger and contention.

Implacable hatred of any person on account of injuries received we must guard against; for while we are under the influence of such feelings,- it is impossible that we should obtain from God the pardon of our sins. When you shall stand to pray, He says, forgive, if you have aught against any man; and, if you will not forgive men, neither will your heavenly Father forgive you your offences.

So, the Catholic Church has clearly recommended, consistently, a non-violent approach.

As for "practiced", of course hundreds of thousands of Christians (a conservative number by the way) have practiced non-violence since the beginning of Christianity.

Then we come to "institutionalized". Yep, the Church has also institutionalized non-violent practices, again from its early beginnings. To cite only one example, Christians have been building and supporting monasteries (an intrinsically non-violent institution) for centuries. The first "armed monks" in Christianity appeared with the Crusades, more than 1000 years after Christ; and they are gone, while the non-violent monks remain.

I have a scientific background. I find it useful, when one is studying ideas, institutions, and history, to imagine a "control group". The question is not "was institution X recommending non-violence" -- I'm sure we can find, if we dig deep enough, some Nazist statements that can be interpreted like that, and it becomes the proverbial "table tennis without nets". The question must be, "if that period, with those peoples, did not have institution X, would their behavior be better or worse than it actually was?"

Take, for example, Christ's teaching of non-resistance to evil by violence, or resistance to evil by non-violence, if you prefer. That teaching, which is absolutely central to the gospels, has never been institutionalized, practiced or even recommended for practice by any ecclesiastical or political authority. — Janus

Those who renounce violence and bloodshed and, in order to safeguard human rights, make use of those means of defense available to the weakest, bear witness to evangelical charity, provided they do so without harming the rights and obligations of other men and societies. They bear legitimate witness to the gravity of the physical and moral risks of recourse to violence, with all its destruction and death. — The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2306.

It is worthwhile to read the entire chapter:

http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm

Would it be fair to say that in the same way that an average Joe sees the world through the lens of "naive realism", that what you're talking about as the unified outlook on the spirit/matter question pre-Descartes might be described as "naive monism"? That people in general neither saw a distinction between the two, nor did it occur to anyone to question if there should be a distinction. Is that correct? Is that what you are suggesting I need understand before I can understand what spirituality is? — Reformed Nihilist

Naive monism is a great expression.

But let me parse this sentence of yours:

"... people in general neither saw a distinction between the two, nor did it occur to anyone to question if there should be a distinction."

I'm with you on the first clause, but I disagree with the second one, and the reason is that the subject of the phrase is not the same in each clause. People in general did not saw a distinction between the two, and people in general, therefore, did not question whether there should be a distinction... but to say that it did not occur to anyone would be going a step too far, because it did occur to someone, or rather, someones (different someones in different cultures). The someones to which the issue presented itself were -- pretty much by definition -- extra-ordinary personalities. We know some of their names, and some of their titles. Poets. Philosophers. Prophets. These were the guys who perceived room for an unfolding of possibilities in the compact (i.e. naively monist) experience. (At least in proto-Western societies -- those same social functions would have different names in India or China, and I'm not sufficiently well versed in the history of those cultures to comment further in that direction).

The main point as regards a proper (if by proper we mean a historically and psychologically grounded) understanding of spirituality is that the plain word refers to a symbol (rather than a concept), and that this symbol was developed, by those P-guys, out of an experience. That experience was present in them (again, pretty much by definition -- no one can unfold the compact meanings of an experience if he did not have that experience); and, perhaps more importantly, they apprehended it [the experience] as universally human. The three classes of P-guys were in the business of educating their contemporaries as to what these contemporaries should be experiencing; their actions were overwhelmingly characterized as being in opposition to the "common sense" of their time.

The P-guys were successful in their endeavor, otherwise we would not be talking about this. And they still are the best conduit that leads from the compact experience to the unfolded symbols of spirit and matter, which is why one great avenue for understanding those symbols is to study them, placing yourself in the position of their interlocutors. Homer and Hesiod, Isaiah and Jeremiah, Plato and Aristotle, and their peers. It is not simply a matter of reading their works (you of course have read at least the philosophers, and perhaps also the poets and the prophets), but of re-enacting the social conflicts being addressed by those works. When Plato (to use an example that is surely well known to you) addresses Euthyphro (in the person of his Socrates), what is he arguing against? What is Euthyphro lacking? Euthyphro, to be sure, would certainly claim to understand spirituality (if he were presented to that word in its prima facie meaning), and perhaps to understand it better than Socrates... but it is up to the reader to decide whether Euthyphro's understanding of spirituality is better or worse than Socrates'. The main difference between the two is that Socrates' is open, and Euthyphro's is closed (and the Israelite prophets would achieve great clarity regarding this particular issue). While Euthyphro claims to be in possession of "knowledge" (about 'spirit'), Socrates denies it, while claiming to be able to recognize it and to yearn for it.

A psychological comparison between the fictional characters (Socrates and Euthyphro) would be greatly illuminating for the understanding of spirituality, spirituality-according-to-Plato. And this ugly construct (X-according-to-Y) becomes less ugly once we realize that the intersection of the understanding of the great Y's in the history of mankind is luminous for meaning -- that the poets, prophets and philosophers basically agree on the meaning of spirit, and that the way for us to understand it is to follow their lead.

P.S. Note that I'm using "philosophers" here as a class of thinkers that were devoted to wrestling meaning out of compact experiences, just as poets and prophets were. The term is not equivalent to the dictionary definition, and many great thinkers, particularly modern ones, who would be considered by you and I to be 'philosophers' would not fit so well into this class, because they were devoted to different problems.

I asked why the term bothered you. You said it didn't reflect reflect reality. — Reformed Nihilist

.... if used to describe what I'm suggesting to you. To interpret that sentence as meaning "any and all reasoning, in every conceivable circumstance, does not reflect reality" is very curious, particularly if you read what I read right after it (I have already presented a reasoning, you disagreed and asked for evidence, reasonings don't provide evidence, etc.). Never mind though, let's proceed.

You just state authoritatively that there is a singular worldview. I say there wasn't. — Reformed Nihilist

Ok, and now I ask for evidence. Show me one pre-Cartesian work in which the notion of spirit is not used as a polarized concept (as explained earlier in the thread). Perhaps you can do it. If you do it, then I'll be shown to be wrong. It's no big deal to be wrong -- even if one "states authoritatively", which apparently is a criticism of style, and not of content.

I want to understand the steps in thought that led from either having no conception or a previous, and different conception of spirituality, to your current conception of spirituality. I want to understand mentally how you got to where you were to where you are now. — Reformed Nihilist

And the (abridged) list of pertinent authors did not help?

What I have done so far to help you understand the steps in thought from A to B:

1. Stated the thesis (polarized concepts)
2. Offered exercises to help you retrace the path, from the "universal human experience" (experience and experienced, remember? We were on the same page there) to a consistent notion of spirit:matter
3. Offered a (quite restricted) bibliography regarding how this subject is the theme of 20th century authors.

I don't know what else I can do. From my viewpoint, you appear to be budging at the idea of executing exercises from (2), but it's the best I have to offer.

Let me give you a starting point, from etymology (as I mentioned earlier, psychology is equally useful, and if you don't care about etymology it is surely more useful). "Matter" shares a common root with "mother". Try to re-enact, imaginatively, the kind of mind which dealt with matter as if it was related to mother. "Spirit", in its Latin and Greek ("pneuma") incarnations, is equivalent -- note, here it is not a matter of common roots, but of equivalence -- to "breath" or "wind".

What you should do now is the imaginative exercise of replacing references to "spirit" by "breath" or "wind" and try to put yourself in the equivalent consciousness of someone who discusses Spirituality in those terms. When, e.g., Plato wrote "spirit is X", read it as "breath is X".

This is not yet the "achieved consciousness" that must be sought after, because "breath" has a purely material connotation nowadays that it did not have in Plato's day. Ideally, when we read a Platonic reference to "spirit", we must imagine Plato's mind as dealing with "spirit+breath", the primordial concept out of which spirit and breath (as concepts) were developed.

I hope you see that what I'm suggesting to you has nothing to do with "reasonings". But if you do those imaginative exercises, it will be easier for you to observe (and it is an observation -- a direct observation -- i.e., not a conclusion from a reasoning) that spirit:matter cannot be dealt with as if they were separate substances.

If you ask me, the main vice of post-Cartesian philosophy is to deal with delicate and mostly pragmatic distinctions as if they were absolute separations.

So you think reasoning is just make believe? — Reformed Nihilist

I'm struggling to imagine a reading of my last post that reaches this conclusion.

Also, I've been pretty laid back about this because I always remembered you being someone who was fair-minded and easy to discuss with, but I really find it hard to discuss with you when you make statements in the form that present yourself as the authority on reality. — Reformed Nihilist

That question of yours is being "laid back"?

Ok. Have fun. I've suggested a way out of your declared problem, of understanding spirituality. Whether you'll explore it or not is your decision.

I'm being pretty laid back here, and expecting an interlocutor who is willing to read the comments with a bare minimum of charity.

By the way...

You say that like there is a singular, monolithic pre-Cartesian worldview. — Reformed Nihilist

Yes, on this specific question of the nature of spirit, there was a singular, monolithic pre-Cartesian worldview. So, you don't have to read every book written before 1600 AD -- pick any book you like (including Shakespeare, incidentally) and you'll see it there.

When I give you a wide gamut of sources, you complain. If I give you my personal experience, you complain. What exactly do you expect from this conversation? (Not a rhetorical question. If you tell me what you want from me, there is a greater chance that I'll be able to deliver).

Is there a reason why you are so resistant to adopt that term? — Reformed Nihilist

I'm resistant to use a term that does not describe reality. I already presented the reasoning:

1. There is a whole family of pairs of concepts, which may be called polarized concepts (examples were given). A concept belonging to this family cannot be properly understood or employed without a full knowledge of its polarized nature.
2. Spirit:matter is one such pair.
3. Therefore, a discussion of spirituality cannot proceed without an analysis of the full pair, and without an acknowledgment that the concept of spirit, in its origin, is not a separate substance.

You rejected this reasoning, focusing on the lack of evidence for (2). To provide evidence for (2), what is necessary is not a further reasoning (because reasonings don't provide evidence). What is necessary is the gathering of data. Hence, the proposed exercises.

Is this [metaphysical model] something that doesn't already exist in the broader philosophical canon? I might already know it, or could read up without having to take every small step with you. If it does, give me the origin, and we can save some possible confusion. — Reformed Nihilist

Well, the entire pre-Cartesian worldview (which is more than a metaphysical model, of course) is grounded on the polarity of spirit:matter. Which means that your Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Scholastics, falsafah, etc. are grounded on that.

If you want more modern sources: Joseph Campbell, Jungian psychology (ironically, stripped of its metaphysical model -- Jung, like Freud, was much better observing than theorizing), Mircea Eliade, Ernst Cassirer, Eric Voegelin are some of the authors I've read who, coming from very different vantage points and objectives, highlight the polarity of spirit and matter.

If you aren't presenting your reasoning to me, then what are you doing, and (honest question) why should I care? — Reformed Nihilist

Well, you should care because philosophers care to know about stuff they don't know, particularly when it is stuff that encompasses the entirety of reality, and even more when they are asking about it.

What I am presenting to you is a way to understand what spirituality is, by retracing its origins, historical and psychological -- I'm presenting two congruent ways because this reinforces the truth of what I'm presenting, and because you may be more inclined to pursue one of them. What I am presenting is not a reasoning, it is an exercise.

It doesn't change the fact that to many of us, we believe that those experiences that people have can actually be best described in terms of material causes. — Reformed Nihilist

Spiritual experiences are best described in terms of material causes;

Material experiences are best described in terms of spiritual causes;

Spiritual experiences are best described in terms of spiritual causes;

Material experiences are best described in terms of material causes.

These four options are wrong. The way out of this is to recognize (by the study of etymology or psychology) that spirit and matter are derived concepts, and to look for the primitive concepts out of which they arose.

But I said that already :D.

Earendil's landing on the Uttermost West. An image of my life (and of anyone's life if they wish to).

The next step in symbolization, you mean. To insist on a reasoning before we straighten that out would skip the important steps.

How would one name the experiencer? How would one name the experienced? These are the questions to be addressed now. These questions are historical in nature. History can be of two kinds: personal (psychological) or social (i.e. cultural). Both processes exhibit the same structure, and so either one is sufficient to clarify the subject. What is needed now is the study of how (a) a baby learns how to develop the notions of experiencer/experienced (and what are the names given), or (b) the etymology of the words matter:spirit.

Note that this approach is prior to any questions regarding argumentation or reasoning. We are trying to understand the origin of the symbols being used, and to trace those symbols to the underlying experience.

So, if I am reading you correctly, the shared point of agreement in my experience is that I have experiences? — Reformed Nihilist

Yes, though it is also important that these experiences are human. It is important for our communication, but not for the exploration of matter:spirit; alien experiences, bat experiences, etc., would be equally open to that exploration.

Any experience, in effect, involves an experiencer and an experienced. And these are the seeds of spirit:matter.

I pointed out that they don't actually fit coherently into the framework you suggested, and gave you a reason why. — Reformed Nihilist

But you were wrong.

When a pair of polarized concepts (north:south, natural:artificial, spirit:matter, etc.) is developed out of our still-compact experience (of spatial coordinates, of objects-for-use, of the constituents of reality, etc.), it is impossible to understand them, as a pair of concepts, without grasping the subjacent experience (space, instrumentality, substance, etc). To deal with them as "concepts" detached from the subjacent experience is to confuse the symbol with the symbolized.

How is that a fact? — Reformed Nihilist

By being a fact. By happening. By being how things are. Etc.

I think you mean that is your premise. — Reformed Nihilist

No, I meant that it is a fact. Premises are used in reasoning. I'm not proposing an argument. I'm explaining to you how the concept of spirituality (and materiality) is derived from the universal human experience. No reasoning involved. The activity being explored here is that of symbolization. Matter and spirit are symbols. They become "concepts" when they are detached from experience, and this is a sure recipe for (at least) confusion and possibly serious errors.

You are essentially saying that the spirit exists, therefore the spirit exists. — Reformed Nihilist

No, I'm essentially saying that spirit and matter are mixed in our (quite-ordinary) experience, before we ever worry about concepts.

Just as our temporal persistence is present in our experience, our sensations are present in our experience, our fellow human beings are present in our experience, etc. Some -- actually, most -- of these experiences are developed into polarized symbols, some aren't. No one supposes that claiming those X's "exist" is tautologous. There is litte reason to single out spirit (or matter) and to explore these as "concepts" rather than aspects of our experience;

unless you have an approach that includes starting from some shared point of agreement and reasoning outward from there. — Reformed Nihilist

That's exactly what I'm offering. The shared point of agreement is the universal human experience (including your own). But we must beware of calling this activity "a reasoning", because if we do that, then we will be begging the question. Reasoning-as-an-activity is construed as purely mental (or, spiritual; this would be the word chosen by 17th century thinkers, and the evolution of language since then, not coincidentally, is an important piece of data for grasping the whole picture); if we try to do this by "reasoning", we'll be discarding an important aspect of the experience.

***

Observe that all of what I'm saying is equally applicable to the problem of understanding "materiality". If one thinks that materiality is simpler or more easily understood than spirituality (so much so that this thread is called Spirituality instead of Spirituality:Materiality), he is most likely being deluded by the "commonsense assumptions" of his time. A visit to the nearest quantum mechanics lab would do him well.

The body, or matter, can clearly exist without spirit (we call that a corpse, or an object) and we can also conceive of the spirit existing without the body (Life's a dream, brain in vat, matrix, evil demon). The notion of polarity just isn't consistent with our conception of the body and the mind. — Reformed Nihilist

I have never experienced matter without spirit, and neither have you. I have never experienced spirit without matter, and neither have you. What we can 'conceive of' is fairly irrelevant to the problem at hand -- that of understanding what is spirituality and materiality. The fact is that both spirit and matter are conjoined in our experience. And it is from that fact that we must proceed in order to apprehend what spirituality (and materiality) means.

It is for that reason that I'm talking about a polarity rather than an opposition.

That's the dualist definition I am familiar with and understand clearly. It is the most common use of the term by those who ascribe to a religion. I am asking about what the term means by those who don't necessarily ascribe to, or are unwilling to commit to, that sort of dualism. — Reformed Nihilist

A conceptual polarity is not an indication of ontological dualism. On the contrary, a polarity pretty much eliminates the possibility of dualism (e.g., there is no "dualism" between North and South -- these are not two different and incommunicable substances).

I was explaining how spirituality is incomprehensible if the student does not explore a time (historical or psychological, both avenues are fruitful) in which spirituality and materiality were merged in a single, unnamed concept -- before the inquirer even knew what a concept is. It is only by exploring that country that one gets a firm grasp (by contrast) on what is spirituality and what is materiality.

Both comments were added now (I didn't think that RN's comment was supposed to be an addition to the list. My mistake).

By the way, I editted the OP to include many contributions from the thread. It's growing to be a nice User's Manual :).

Seeing as though I have literally no clue what spirituality might reefer to if not to a dualistic nether-world where our vaporous homunculus reside, I am asking for a definition that at least gives me a succinct and graspable starting point... — Reformed Nihilist

Spirituality cannot be "defined" in the absence of its counterpart (materiality), and the same goes for materiality. There are many kinds of polar concepts like these (freedom:determinism, God:man, world:society, natural:artificial -- just to brush on other themes besides 'religion'). Matter:spirit is just another example.

The only way for a mind to grasp one of these poles is not to try to define it "from the viewpoint [or, vantage point] of the other"; it is rather to envisage the mindset which produced both concepts -- a mindset which experienced something compact out of which the two concepts could be developed and, centuries later, contrasted. It is not a "primitive" mindset -- primordial would be a better word.

"Laws of nature" is a metaphor. It is good to keep that in mind, and to retrace the birth of the metaphor. For example, watch Francis Bacon trying to convey the notion (before there was the expression "laws of nature"):

Although it is true that in nature nothing exists beyond separate bodies producing separate motions according to law; still for the study of nature that very law and its investigation, discovery and exposition are the essential thing, for the purpose both of science and of practice. Now it is that law and its clauses which we understand by the term 'forms' -- principally because this word is a familiar one and has become generally accepted. — Francis Bacon

If he were using 21st century internet conventions, he would place "law", in that sentence, in quotation marks. The "proper scientific term" for whatever it was that he was interested in was, as he explains, "forms" (Aristotelian forms).

An interesting experiment (and one which runs along Leibnizian tones) is to replace "law" for "custom" in the Baconian quote. The worldview arising from that is quite different than the one that uses "law".

The solution to this clash of beliefs? Maybe God only knows. Even so, we best hazard an educated guess. Flexibility? Compassion? Non-literal interpretations? Another possible view of the "holy writ"? Something else? Your educated guess is as good as mine. — 0 thru 9

Getting back to the experience behind the texts. For those who are hooked on texts, of course.

Atheists tend to neglect the nature of religious feeling.

Believers tend to exaggerate the importance of rational-sounding arguments. — mcdoodle

Good ones. I think the second is more prevalent than the first (at least in the case of, er, rational atheists :D).

It depends on how one is using the word "existent". Mathematical proofs refer to [the necessity of] non-existent relationships, if we are using "existent" to mean "perceptible by the senses" (which is one way to use that word). The most that any argument focusing on necessity can do is to emulate mathematical proofs. In order to establish that the so-called necessary object (or relationship) exists just as object X, Y, Z, or relation A, B, C exists, a further step is required.

If by begging the question you mean the petitio principii fallacy, then I disagree. There are plenty of arguments for God that don't commit this fallacy. Even the ontological argument, if phrased in a certain way, can avoid it, despite being the classic example of an argument that allegedly commits said fallacy. If by begging the question you mean that they fail to define God, then I agree. A lot of arguments are vague on what it is they're proving. — Thorongil

They beg the question as much as any argument that intends to prove the existence of X (rather than the possibility of X, the necessity of X, or the impossibility of X) must necessarily import, with its premises, some extraneous info about the existence of X. Arguments are not instruments to prove the existence of anything.

Curiously, only the ontological argument (which intends to prove the necessity of X) would escape this verdict :D.

Determinism and free will are not opposites. They are polar complementaries. One does not make sense without the other.

Free will requires predictability to be meaningful, and predictability is dependent on [a degree of] determinism. But absolute determinism (the clockwork universe, down to and including individual decisions and fleeting thoughts) lacks truth-value, since truth is a property of propositions, and the link between the terms in a proposition must be free (else the proposition is not a proposition, but rather a term-disguised-as-proposition).

If we want our dialogues to be meaningful, we must accept both free will and determinism.

Paul is our first source (but Paul never met Jesus) and the Gospels (formed up and finished later than Paul) are the "authoritative" story of Jesus. There wouldn't have been a Jesus movement for Paul to first resist then join if Jesus had not existed. — Bitter Crank

BC check out From Jesus to Paul, by Martin Hengel. A bit dry, stuffed with footnotes, and with a lot of interesting information about this period.

In reading your post the word that come to my mind is "paradigm" : some people experience the world through one paradigm and for others they see it through a different one. However the one wrinkle that kind of remains; are these paradigms (which may be created through experience and discourse as you say and/or through other means) supported merely through "appeals to authority"/"proof by assertion" or is it done through something else? — dclements

Appeals to authority and proofs by assertion belong to a typology of arguments, and therefore are not invoked in the activity of "supporting a paradigm". Arguments do not support a paradigm. Arguments are useful to (a) root out inconsistencies in paradigms and (b) to enhance communication of viewpoints.

What supports a paradigm is experience. This does not mean that all believers have "experienced God" in a mystical sense, but it does mean that the support of their paradigms is rooted in things they lived, not in things they heard or read. "Things they lived" can include events which, if analysed thoroughly, would fall under "appeal to authority" -- all of us are inordinately influenced by our early childhood, and in functional families, this will include the transfer of paternal viewpoints.

What is needed for interfaith dialogues (including here dialogue between believers and non-believers) is the discarding of the "argument" fetish as a foundation for criticizing other viewpoints. Argument is great for criticizing your own viewpoint. That we enjoy so much using it against the other guy's viewpoint, rather than our own, is just another indication of our fallen nature ;).