People don't believe in God based on arguments, because arguments are not the proper tools to establish the existence of anything. Arguments only unpack what is present in their premises. The premises bring with them, implicitly, the stuff whose existence is being "proven".

Of course, many people are not aware of this, and perhaps there are a sizeable minority of believers who thinks that they believe "based on arguments", but they are mistaken.

To "believe in the existence of X" is a movement of the soul that rests on two legs:

1. Experience
2. Discourse

If you want to explore why someone believes in X, these are the fields that must be explored. "Argument", of course, is a kind of discourse, but the discourse being singled out here is more akin to poetry. How to express experiences. I have no doubt that some 99% of the disagreements between believers and non-believers are based on disputes about that.

The confusion between one's country and one's government -- a confusion which is actively promoted by the government, of course -- is at the root of problems of this kind.

Debates are quite useful, but not for approaching discursive truth :D.

They are useful for teaching humility and tolerance. They are useful for teaching good practices (organization of ideas, methodical reasoning, politeness).

All of these, perhaps, are shades of truth.

The diversity of ideas reflects (1) the diversity of experiences and (2) the development of consciousness (both individually and as a species). The bias is only natural, given that we (3) love truth, (4) resent being proven wrong and (5) use knowledge -- and the reputation of knowledge -- as social markers for excellence.

It may sound funny, but it it still a brute fact that we need brute facts to kickstart any reasoning (conscious or not).

A good illustration of the entire point of our conversation. Expression and interpretation diverging, based on the different experiences of speaker and listener. You say you said nothing, I say you said something quite correct.

Reality is.

One may think that this is "saying nothing", another may think it is saying something. Reality is, whatever anyone thinks. Subjectivity and Objectivity.

@Srap Tasmaner Yes.

Just to leave a few more words in this short post :D:

The consubstantiality of all being is the ground of our experiences.

Either this ends up as Bateson's infinite regress that forever keeps the territory out of the map, or it ends up trivially as the claim that I experience what I experience as I experience it. — Srap Tasmaner

That may be a trivial claim, but it is far from being a trivial fact. That we are beings capable of experience, and of experience of a given kind (for which we can use the shortcut, "human experience"), is certainly remarkable.

When a non-trivial fact becomes a trivial claim through the activity of verbalization, we are only underlining how limited language is.

All we did was allow the possibility that experience was experience of something. — Srap Tasmaner

No, that isn't just a possibility. That's how we experience our experiences. They are always experiences of something, and usually of something extrinsic (we can easily distinguish -- in normal conditions -- dreams from interactions with external objects). Experiences are intrinsically intentional.

(Or, another way to put it would be: our selves are zero-dimensional; when we say "I experience X", X is always something apart from the self).

When we begin to discuss the experience-of-something, using this as a general descriptor, as a "possibility", this is our use of reason leading us away from the direct experience.

So the natural conclusion is that if experience is irreducibly subjective, that either says nothing or it says experience cannot be experience of something. — Srap Tasmaner

And once we reach this conclusion, we trace our steps back, check the conclusion against our direct experience (which is, in normal conditions, clearly, immediately, "experience of something"), and when we see a tension between the conclusion and the experience, we give greater weight to the experience. (That's anamnesis in a nutshell).

Now, this does not mean that we should mistrust reason in general. But it does mean that whatever we presented to reason was somehow slanted.

I think one of these slanted points was this:

Perhaps all that matters is that we keep in mind that, having somehow picked out something as an experience, we could make different choices that would be just as valid, or that we recognize that how we circumscribe an experience will depend on our purpose in doing so, rather than on something intrinsic to the experience. — Srap Tasmaner

You are distinguishing between "our purpose" (in categorizing experiences) and "something intrinsic to the experience". And they should be distinguished. But a distinction is not a separation. If we start to treat this pair as an opposition rather than a gradient, we can reach paradoxes. It is a fact that "our purpose" when categorizing experiences is remarkably consistent across cultures, times, moments of life, etc. etc. Sure, there is great diversity between viewpoints, but this diversity is constrained within some boundaries that are only very rarely expanded. It is great to read Lakoff (are you familiar with his work?) and to observe that a culture uses the same word to denote Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (google that if you don't know the work), but after smiling we can see the common root between these three seemingly disparate things. This common root is not merely in us; it is also in the objects.

In the final analysis, the subject-object dichotomy breaks up whenever we try to handle it as a separation rather than a distinction. They are both parts of our experience, poles which can be manipulated for our symbolic convenience.

And perhaps that's where we want to end up. If "experience is the constituent of reality for us," then experience just is, we might say (if we were comfortable saying things like "reality just is"). If experience could be experience of something, then surely those somethings would figure large in reality. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure.

Reality just is. But that does not mean we should not experience it in its diversity, nor that we should not talk about it (and for talking about it we require reason, representation, symbolization).

@Srap Tasmaner

There comes a point in which the territory is the territory, i.e., it is not a map. With beings like us, this point is experience. Experience cannot be representational; it is the constituent of reality for us. Any representation of ours begins with experience and is only valid inasmuch as it keeps consistency with our experience.

When you mention "experiences we cannot have" (your proposition E), you are drawing a map. The conception of experiences we cannot have already goes beyond the territory. But this does not mean it is not valid. The faculty which we use to talk about experiences we cannot have is reason (or, logic). We experience the existence of reason in our psyches, and its reach. But we also experience the existence of error in our psyches, and its reach. Given that our reason is fallible, we must be careful when employing it; and "to be careful" in this context means to always go back to direct experience.

This is basically what Plato taught as "anamnesis". The practice of anamnesis, of attending to the experience underneath the words (mental words as well as spoken words), is our best safeguard against error.

Let me address some questions of yours with that in mind.

But how is the word "experience" being used here? Do you know that you had the experience? Do you have a memory of the experience? A memory of having the experience? If you had the same or a similar experience at another time, would you know it was the same or a similar experience? Did you, in the first place, know that the experience you were having was a "territory" experience? If so, how? By trying to conceptualize it and failing? — Srap Tasmaner

Experience is the territory. It precedes conscious knowing. Babies have experiences before they know any words. In theory, it also precedes conceptualization, although it is never easy to distinguish between the two -- our psyche is very fast.

(The best source for this, by the way, is the huge book by Lonergan, Insight).

When I say that "experience is the territory", I'm underlining the fact that our viewpoints are irreducibly subjective, and that objectivity is already an extrapolation (guided by reason) of our experiences. Being that, it (the notion of objectivity) can always be mistaken, and it is always risky to invoke it in dialogues between two irreducibly subjective beings.

Obviously then there's the question of how to characterize the experience, and some people object to some characterizations. That may be a claim that there is a kind of experience you cannot have had, or it may a sort of "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Also, the Christian tradition, for instance, isn't exclusively mystical. On what grounds could you connect an unconceptualizable experience to a thoroughly conceptualized theology? There may be apophatic elements within that theology, but what about the rest? (Mystics have also had to face charges not only of heresy, but worse. How do you know what you experienced was not the Deceiver?) — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't accept the notion of an objectively unconceptualizable experience. I can accept the notion of an experience which we, average human beings of 2017, could not conceptualize. But the idea of a purely unconceptualizable experience appears to be a limit upon reason that I do not ... experience ... in my dealings with it.

That said, reason is not the only way to refer to stuff, and symbols are very handy for that. The "unconceptualizable experience" can be symbolized and referred to. What matters is that both the "expresser" and the interpreter keep in mind the use and scope of symbols, and do not confuse them with direct language.

As for how to distinguish between sources of experiences, that is a very serious matter in Christian theology, and as you point out any experience can be fostered by the Deceiver. There is only one sure guide to be followed, according to the tradition, which is "by their fruits you shall know them".

I'll have more to say but have to leave right now :).

None of what I mentioned was in what you said — Sapientia

Yes. Remember my comment about private, unexpressed notions? Why should I try to guess what is important to you? It's much better that you ask about your ideas regarding God.

However, the salient point (and it is so salient that I stress it again) is that the Agathon is not incompatible with everything that you mentioned (omni, eternal, trinity, oneness), and it is also not incompatible with many other Christian notions (incarnation, sovereignty over nature, good will towards men, etc. etc.). This means that there is no equivocation (nor pretence).

What?? I don't know why you'd think that [about love and light]. — Sapientia

Because I reflected on it, and experienced it. You are free to disagree, of course. But you are not free to impose your ideas of how to experience the world upon me.

This is basically the problem with discussions like this one, incidentally. Instead of trying to understand how others understand the world, people prefer to dictate how other people should understand the world, and to rail against people who understand the world differently.

Srap Tasmaner, along those lines, take a look at http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

Sapientia, for there to be equivocation and pretense, there ought to be some incompatibility (or at least some tension) between the Agathon (as a short index of everything I said earlier) and "eternal being, the creator, the omni-attributes, the trinity, oneness". I don't see any incompatibility or tension. Can you explain what tension you see there?

As for love, well, I know that love is light (the physical light, that we can see with our eyes). If you prefer, "light is the physical manifestation of love". (This is not the only thing that love is).

It is quite emphatically not "just a feeling".

See how we can have difficulties of communication even while we use the same words?

***

Srap Tasmaner, take a look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map–territory_relation

If there can't be a perfect map (and maps are visual, 2d objects), why would there be any hope for a perfect language (note that languages are 1d, auditory objects, far less suitable for representing reality -- at least to visual beings like us -- than maps; which is why we use maps to navigate, after all).

The fact is that reality is multidimensional; for all practical purposes, it is infinitely multidimensional. And we are not even getting into the problem of different sensorial apparatuses; and I'm focusing only on observables, leaving to the side the problem of concepts. The idea that such complexity can be encapsulated in a one-dimensional sequence of sounds is so far-fetched that I'd say the onus is on the other shoe. People who want to claim that language can, in principle, represent the entirety of reality have a huge claim to find evidence for.

The first question would be whether there is experience or knowledge that cannot in principle be verbalized. — Srap Tasmaner

Maps and territories come to mind.

I'm telling you that I, a Christian, believe in God exactly as was explained above. And I'm 100% Christian, quite traditional in my beliefs. I pray everyday, I try to go to Mass weekly, etc.

Where is the equivocation, if not between what I am saying and some independent notion of yours, about "what Christians believe in". Place it in the open and we can examine whether there is equivocation and pretense. As your post stands, to complain with your interlocutor that what he presents is not consistent with your private, unexpressed notions strikes me as wrongheaded.

I don't think much of self-identified theists who can only vaguely list things which aren't even controversial to a typical atheist and merely stick onto them the label "God". — Sapientia

While to me, what is interesting is how people can react so strongly to the belief in things "which aren't even controversial".

Yes.

What you refer to as "reasoning" is the bridge between experience and discourse; the origin is in experience, always in some experience, never in reasoning, nor in discourse.

"O taste and see that the Lord is good", said the psalmist. "Taste", here, is an index for intimate experience. One must taste before he sees; and as for "reasoning", it is not in the picture.

...they are lacking in linguistic ability in terms of vocabulary and finding the right words to explain things well... — Sapientia

I thought that the mention of Shakespeare was clear enough, to the point that this is not what I'm talking about.

The intrinsic limits of language are not present only in deficient users. They are limits of language, not of language users.

And this is quite on-topic if you ask me. Remember, my first intervention is the thread was to point out that atheists are defined by disagreement with a given linguistic expression (for example, "God exists"). Another point made in that first post was that there are theistic, orthodox expressions (apophatic theology) which deny, just as atheists do, that "God exists".

Which goes to show that there's more going on here than what can be expressed linguistically. When a traditional Christian (like me) says "Yes, God does not exist, not as other things which we call 'existents' ", we are not suddenly turned into atheists.

my understanding is roughly that you have spoken of a truth that can be pointed to behind language, and that this can be accessed somehow through certain experiences and by doing stuff. — Sapientia

Yep. Though I emphasized that "certain experiences" and "stuff" are far from being esoteric activities; I mentioned that they are accessible to toddlers, and, in reply to Agustino, I mentioned clear and methodical reasoning as part of the "stuff".

I've criticised that on account of being too vague and for other reasons, which I don't think that you've properly addressed, so I think that in your next reply you should go back and start from there. And don't forget, this is about atheism, so of course, I expect this to be about things like how one can know whether or not a certain experience is an experience of God and not something else. — Sapientia

Why is it "vague"?

How can it become crisper? What kind of claim of mine would be crisper?

Let me try another tack.

Whenever an atheist says "I don't thing God exists", he is bringing into the word "God" a lot of experiences, right?

And whenever a theist disagrees and says, "Well, I think God exists", he is bringing into the word "God" another set of experiences.

Is it not obvious that, barring bad faith or plain stupidity, both parties are talking about different referents (though they are using the same word)?

To put some flesh in the scenario. In many occasions in my PF experience, I've seen people dispute that "God exists" based on a materialist notion. It may be Daddy-in-the-sky, which is silly, or it may be the infinitely complex God of Dawkins, which is not silly (though it is wrong). I would dispute that those gods, exist, too. But that does not mean I'm an atheist; because, when I say "God exists", I'm talking about something else.

"What is this something else", you ask?

Well, to begin with the God of the Philosophers that has been brought up in the thread -- it is whatever sustains the natural framework, it is the link between our reason and the external world, it is the root of beauty, it is love, it is the Agathon. Etc. (An infinite etc.).

I think it [where "it" points at everything up there in that paragraph] exists. This is why I'm not an atheist. Can an atheist believe in that with me and still call himself an atheist? Sure. What matters is not what people call themselves, it is whether or not they understand what is being said, and whether or not they are talking about the same thing.

Sapientia, our conversation is strong evidence of a related problem, that of the limits of communication. (It is linked but it is not the same as the limits of language -- language would be limited even if we were not trying to say anything to anyone).

You have to accept the possibility that there is noise in our communication before the dialogue can proceed.

For example, you say that when I invoked toddlers, it "obviously" had to do with lacking linguistic ability. If you knew my 5-year old, who never stops talking (since he was about 3 years old), you'd see that was very far from my mind :D.

I can easily explain what it is that was on my mind when I mentioned the fact that my 5-year old can grasp the intrinsic limits of language. The point I wanted to make is that, to understand those limits, we must assume a vantage point which is (a) non-linguistic and (b) easily accessible (since even toddlers can access it easily). It was an attempt at encouragement.

But what was on my mind is less important than the obvious fact that there is noise in our communication when you say that something is "obvious" when it is simply wrong.

If you want to engage in a dialogue, we can proceed through short posts. This will minimize the noise. But it will be important, for both of us, to keep in mind, all the time, that communication also has intrinsic limits, and to refrain from jumping to conclusions. It will also help if we write carefully.

Let me know if this is acceptable to you. And since it is you who are driving the conversation through your questions, choose one, or a few, that I can answer concisely.

Okay but reason can only make do with what you've got. — Agustino

The salient point is that everyone's got what it takes to understand what theologians are talking about when they talk about God. The obstacles here are not sensorial (it's not as if theologians had better senses) or intellectual (it's not as if they were smarter). The obstacles reside mainly in the will (guided by cultural and social factors, such as a strong dislike of the historical aspects of religions), and they prevent the atheist (to get back to my first post in the thread) from reasoning clearly and methodically about the claims being offered.

Needless to say, there is a mirror image of the atheist in the theist camp, usually referred to as "fundamentalist" or "fanatic".

Yes but that's relatively unimportant. More important is the experience itself. — Agustino

For some people, perhaps better people, that is relatively unimportant. It wasn't for me, though, and I'd bet that most people who visit philosophy forums would agree.

So similarly, what Mariner means by God will be what you experience by doing the secret "stuff" he wants you to do. — Agustino

I would begin by recommending clear and methodical reasoning. (This is not about Sapientia by the way, it is about anyone who asked me how to approach God).

I'm after a specific example that is relevant to the topic which you think illustrates what you were talking about in that part of your original comment that I quoted, and I'd like you to elucidate any vague terms that you've used, like those I've pinpointed. — Sapientia

Like "American Pie"?

Or "God"?

Or perhaps you want some other example. Are not two enough?

But let's use another, since it is in my mind right now (I was reading the story to my son last night) and it is apropos.

Are you familiar with "The Little Prince"?

In that book, the Fox teaches this to the Prince:

"Whatever is essential is invisible to the eyes". (Free translation of mine there).

Here, language is being used to point to something invisible. (And I'm sure the Fox would not dispute my interpretation that "the eyes" here is a proxy for "all senses" -- it is not as if hearing or touch would be privileged).

The problem is that nothing you can tell me about or get me to do will necessarily cause me to reach the conclusion that God exists — Sapientia

I know, this is why I won't even try :D.

I'm not talking about God, but about the limitations of language, remember?

There's a big difference between, on the one hand, the difficulty of a young child, or someone with a learning disability, or a poorly educated adult, struggling to explain or put into words something which is sensible and capable of being explained, and, on the other hand, people who just have vague, muddled, nonsensical thoughts and feelings, and cannot explain them properly or put them into words because of the very nature of those thoughts and feelings. It seems clear to me, although I could be wrong, that you have in mind some sort of special and profound truth which is being pointed to, rather than the truth that these people are simply confused and emotional. — Sapientia

False dichotomy. It is not "either disabled or confused".

What I have in mind is not "some sort of special and profound truth", it is the very ordinary and commonplace phenomenon of observing the limitations of language. My 5-year old kid can grasp it. I'm sure you can too. It is, after all, observed in any internet conversation, including this one.

Even if I was lacking in linguistic ability, I might nevertheless notice the causal relationship between flicking the light switch and the light coming on, but that's a world apart from having a funny feeling and leaping to the conclusion that God must exist. — Sapientia

It is not about lacking any linguistic ability -- how could it be? If I'm talking about intrinsic limits of language? Not even Shakespeare could defeat intrinsic limits of language.

Knowing you to be a theist it seems like you want myths to be true. Perhaps to justify your own beliefs?? — TheMadFool

Knowing logic, this is not relevant.

Whether or not I want myths to be true is not relevant. And whether I want to justify my beliefs is also not relevant.

Take a look at the wiki entry for "myth". Or at Joseph Campbell. Or at Carl Jung. Or at René Girard. Etc.

Personally I think there are elements of truth in all myths, religious or otherwise. It only takes a bit of exaggeration to change truth into a myth. So, to devalue myths would be mistake, running the serious risk of losing valuable information. — TheMadFool

If you are saying that a myth is an account that became untrue because of exaggeration, you are going against scholarship on the subject.

What are you talking about in particular? Can you give an example? And if you're talking about God, which, in the context of this discussion, would not be unusual, then why don't you just say so plainly? What do you mean by the phrase "point at" truth? What is that exactly? How does it work? — Sapientia

If I were talking about God, I'd have written "God". I wrote "X" precisely because the problem is not limited to theology.

We can analyze "American Pie" and the problem will be the same.

And obviously, if we were to have any hope of getting to the truth of the matter, then merely saying so wouldn't do. It would have to be put to the test. — Sapientia

Sure. But not here, since here we are using language to communicate, and since I'm not talking about any particular X (which is why the symbol X is being used).

If you want me to talk about God, there is no problem with that. But talking about God will not "put it to the test", ["it"=my experience of God], due to the limitations of language. If you want to put this specific "it" to the test, you'll have to interact with me in other ways than merely linguistically. For example, I'd mention that I did some stuff, and that if you did this stuff, perhaps you'd experience something similar.

(Note that I'm answering here one of your earlier questions, "what do I mean by the phrase 'point at truth'" -- I mean the use of language to point to non-linguistic sources of truth).

In addition, if you say that you can't put something into words or explain it properly, then that is certainly no where near being enough to warrant that this is indicative of some kind of significant truth that's being pointed at. On the contrary, nonsense cannot be true. — Sapientia

I didn't say that "if something cannot be put into words, then it points at truth". I said that sometimes truths cannot be put into words, and must be pointed at. The important thing is that there is no linguistic criterion to distinguish which is which. Whenever you see someone claiming that language has hit a wall and that therefore you must transcend language to get to the truth, you have to verify the claim (by following its non-linguistic aspect) by yourself.

Note that "to transcend language" has a weighty sound but it is nothing mystical or extraordinary; toddlers do it, all the time.

You obviously believe that Christianity IS The answer. Not everyone agrees with you. — anonymous66

Sure. I wouldn't say it is "THE ONLY" answer, though. I would merely say that it is the most complete and satisfying answer, for me; and that it is the most philosophically sound answer (and this is not simply "for me").

However, "philosophical soundness" is a very unimportant criterion compared to effectiveness. What matters is whether the remedies employed help the sufferer.

That looks to me very much like "heads I win, tails you lose." — anonymous66

Yep. Life's tough. :D

So, it looks like Christians have this great text... they just can't be sure what it's really saying. — anonymous66

Regarding Christianity (this is not so applicable to other religions), the text is quite secondary. The main thing is the experience of Christ's life in the believer. Institutionalized Christianity is a series of methods to foster that experience.

So, your dialogue with a Christian could be like this:

Christian: I have some good news for you.
You: ?
Christian: Are you suffering?
You: Not really.
Christian: Oh well. Call me later.

or...

You: Yes, I'm suffering.
Christian: Well, Christ can help you with that.
You: Christ? Isn't he long dead?
Christian: let's talk about that...

Christ came for the sick, not the healthy.

It is good to quote Kierkegaard about that, though. The man who thinks he does not live in despair is in the most despairing condition.

Your original comment was very vague. — Sapientia

On the contrary. It was very specific, talking about the limitations of language. Don't you think it is curious that you then ask me to give a... linguistic account of "some kind of private mystical experience"?

This was not the subject of my post. The subject of my post was that language has limits, and that both sides (atheists and theists) should recognize that and take it into account when trying to understand the other side.

The obvious thing to do would be to get the person to tell us of this supposed truth which is "pointed at" by X, and demonstrate how the one does indeed "point to" the other. If they can't, then that's that. — Sapientia

And if they can, that's also that.

Do you mean that Dawkins could change his views or that Dawkins' comment about deism is irrelevant to his overall stance? — Chany

The former. Dawkins' ideas about the matter are evolving in his ripe old age, but age by itself is rarely enough (unless one has many lifetimes available).

This seems like an oxymoron. How can ''myths'' ever be true. — TheMadFool

Strangely enough, the idea that myths cannot be true is a... myth.

By which I don't mean it is false; I mean it is a foundational story for many groups.

This reply is a beginning (as good as many others) of the answer to an inquiry about the relationship between myth and truth.

I find it encouraging that even New Atheists as strident as Richard Dawkins have gone on record as saying they don't have an issue with certain concepts of God... Dawkins admits he is just fine with what he calls a deistic God or the God of the physicist. — anonymous66

If he had a few more lifetimes, or more interest in studying what the major traditions say about God, we could even imagine him saying that he has no problem with the Christian or the Hindu or the Muslim or the Cheyenne (etc. etc.) concept of God.

It is a pre-socratic argument. Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Parmenides (at least) would vouch for that statement (about how the mythical presentation of gods is flawed because it presents the gods as immoral). To be sure, the undertones would be different in each (Parmenides basically ditched the idea of gods-of-the-myth as simply false, while Xenophanes berated the myth for misrepresenting them).

The opposition between the philosophers and the mythmakers precedes Plato. But we must note that Plato (and Aristotle too) would later find a middle ground that allowed them to give to myths their proper value, at least as precursors of philosophy. Indeed, Plato is the greatest mythmaker, precisely because he understood the value of myths and the limits of human discourse.

I wonder what anyone would have against the God of the philosophers. — anonymous66

Atheisms, even serene atheisms, are always phrased as "I don't agree with that". They reject a given linguistic expression. In practice, this is often a semantic problem -- the atheist is interpreting a given linguistic expression in one way, and the believer is interpreting it in another way.

It is ironic to observe that the shortcomings of language as a medium for expressing divine truths are acknowledged by basically all of the major religious traditions. Many atheists suppose that rejecting the expression X is enough to convince someone that the-truth-pointed-at-by-X is nonexistent, but this is a clear error.

It is also ironic to note that well-established traditions usually give preference to apophatic expressions, i.e., basically agreeing with atheists regarding the shortcomings of language.

The whole issue can be softened, and often dismissed, if both sides give up trying to rule on how people should use their words, and focus on what is being said underneath the words.

Wrong arguments are excluded in logical explanations. — some logician

How come no one thought of that before, eh?

The list of logicians who support the claim that logic is part of science includes: Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Willard Van Orman Quine, and so many others. — some logician

Hmmm... nope, no scientific explanation here either.

It ought to be easy.

Can you answer my question?

Are you withdrawing your criterion, from the OP, regarding how a scientific explanation is a requirement for a true belief?

So far, I haven't seen any scientific explanation for the belief that logic is part of science.

Many logicians support the claim that logic is part of science. — some logician

So what?

Many theists support the claim that God exists.

Are you withdrawing your criterion, from the OP, regarding how a scientific explanation is a requirement for a true belief?

I just claim that logic is part of science. — some logician

As a scientist, I don't place any weight on unsupported claims.

By 'logic' I meant formal logic with natural deduction, such as first-order predicate logic. — some logician

That is still no scientific explanation as to why we should believe in logic (or care for it anyhow).