I took the point of the observation to be that we can deliberately use what is not experienced (for the most part) to imagine a scene that is neither false nor meaningless.

The sword cuts in two ways. Separating truth from falsehood belongs to some activities but not to others. There is something about this constraint that invites other ways of making sense. — Paine

Succinct. The fairy tale is a context that we all understand to be something that is fantastic and imaginative. So within this context, we can't assign lies or nonsense -- or at least, it's not an appropriate critique.

But the competition aspect of final exam systems is very very negative, towards the mental health of the majority of able and less able pupils imo. — universeness

Anyhow, a couple of points, the first is yes, competition wasn't eliminated, but, as I said "purposely downplayed". That is, the result, winning or losing, was made less important.

But this wasn't done in order to get more entrants (my initial concern was that being less competitive would result in less entrants because I was also looking at it overly superficially). In fact, the idea of adjusting the activity purely on that basis rather than focusing only on what would make for a good activity parallels the idea of entering such an activity to "win" as opposed to participate. — Baden

Very good points! Lesson in life.

I am interested in seeing how creativity develops without the "risk" of losing -- What would happen if we remove the restrictive best, and focus, instead, on "I got this!" attitude by everyone.
A variation of that victory cry is "Let's do it!" (This cry implies they know what they're doing, and they've got the drive to do it).

Hi Benk.

In case no one has mentioned yet, the trilogy by Niels Arden Oplev (or four).

The Girl With a Dragon Tattoo
The Girl Who Kicked The Hornet's Nest
The Girl Who Played with Fire

Doesn't this just say that definitions are meaningful because they state what the object in question is? And that knowing what things are is the basis for creating definitions? — Wayfarer

No. This is only half correct. The quote reads:
the activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the same; and hence each of them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition...
He concedes this much: some things just cannot be defined as what they are in themselves. For example, what's the definition of 2? You can't really define it without implicating the existence of 1 or 3 or both. That's what a definition is when we really can't say the thing in itself. Or, we can say what is a water molecule, and that should suffice as a definition.
The singleton Socrates could be defined as Socrates in himself or provide a definition of a man. (Obviously, I am not as eloquent in elucidating this point).

My response is: so what? What is the point? — Wayfarer

The point is, he is arguing against the strict analycity of meaning. He rejects that the derivation of truth in logical statement gives a meaningful definition. Just define what an object is directly. That's meaningful.

I'm struggling to understand why this is significant. After all, Socrates is ostensibly a real being, it could be any person whatever. But 'a set' is a concept. When he asks 'does this set exist', the question I would pose is, 'does any set exist?' - at least, does it exist in the same sense that a real person (e.g. Socrates) exists. This is why it seems a rather artificial example, but I could be missing something basic about it. — Wayfarer

See the last line I posted above.

'All bachelors are unmarried men' can be used to define either "bachelor" or "Unmarried" and "man", so there is an ambiguity inherent in the equation used to set out a definition. Fine rejects a holistic approach. too fast for my liking; presumably a rejection of Quine's first dogma. — Banno

His point is, the terms "unmarried" and "man" cannot be used to define "bachelor". In that sentence, only "bachelor" can be analytic, but not "unmarried" and "man" -- remember the parts of a proposition? Or do you remember "concepts"?

But if we say "unmarried man" to define "bachelor", then we relativise the analyticity, (not "revitalise" as you seem to say), which he has no problem doing.

That is, I cannot see how synonymy can be used to provide the meaning of a term, and hence it's essence, since any statement of synonymy must depend on our already having the meaning of the. terms involved. Providing definitions does not get started on providing meaning. — Banno

Then don't use synonyms. Define the concept or describe an object and you achieve the meaning of a word or essence of an object.

Here's the last line:

If I am right, there is more to the idea of real definition than is commonly conceded. For the activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the same; and hence each of them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition*

Good essay! And thanks much!
I'm placing a passage here cause I might need to use it in another thread. :smile:
I'm trying to explain to my interlocutor that the below is more appropriate than any other means of explaining something as simple as thinking.

But, more significantly, we must give up the traditional idea that the logical derivation of an analytic statement from the definitions of its terms constitutes an analysis of that statement, one which may enable us to see that it is true. For there is nothing in the underlying conception of definitional truth which will force the resulting derivations to be analyses in any meaningful sense of the term. Indeed, as far as this conception goes, one might as well extract any predicate P from the given analytic statement and use the artificial "definition" above to provide it with a trivial pseudo-analysis.

These difficulties are avoided if we require the definitional truths which figure in the account of analyticity to be true in virtue of the meanings of their defined terms. For the account is then as about as direct as it could be; and real content is given to the idea of analysis. The given analytic statement is derived from definitions which in a significant sense provide one with the meanings of the individual terms.

What? If I have doubts that proves that having doubt implies a thinking being? How? What is the process of logical implication? — Isaac

"Implies" as in strongly suggest the truth of.
This should not be hard to understand.
You are trying to challenge that doubting implies that that there is a human being thinking or doubting. Why? Where do you think doubt comes from? Let's talk normal language.

This, I think, is "I(I) have a doubt (D)" in Russell's notation.

∃x(Ix∧∀y(Iy→y=x)∧Dx)

I see the existence of 'I' being declared, not logically implied.

How do you render it such that it is logically implied? — Isaac

Sorry, I don't do Russell's notation. Please try again.

Or please expound on the Aristotelian account of thinking or Descartes's cogito.

Well they set it out. Set out the logical implication in one of the standard forms of logical notation so we can check its validity. — Isaac

I don't need to. Go ahead if you could do so. I'm asking if you had any doubts as to what I just said, then you were already demonstrating what you purported to deny. Simple. It's not hard to understand this.

How does doubt logically imply a sentient, self-conscious entity holding it? What logical steps form that implication? Perhaps you could render it in classical notation, that might help. — Isaac

Doubt necessarily implies a sentient, self-conscious entity holding it. Doubt is a thinking process. If you do not agree with this, then what is doubt to you?
Thinking is not just a convention or an agreement that humans hold on to. I, for example, do not need your approval or some other form of acknowledgment in order for me to claim that I am thinking or doubting. And if you tell me that you are doubting the validity of my claim, then you prove my point.

What a read. :up:

Though I will strenuously deny cartesianism if ever accused of it, I will gladly join forces with the cartesians in common ideological combat against social forces that I consider destructive. — Baden

:smile: Indeed, there are destructive social forces, as have already been proven through studies and experiments.

So, while under my conception, we don't reach all the way through the context of the social to a truly metaphysical level of self, the general contextualisation of the self in the face of the social as a self facing both threats and opportunities re its healthy realization, and much of the practical consequences of this situation, remain the same. What would form a true contrast here could be e.g. postmodern notions of identity play whereby the self is flattened out into some kind of dopamine machine around which the pinball of discourse races and the game is to get as many little lights of experience to flash up before the ball drops back into its hole of underlying meaningless. And then do it all again and accept that as all there is. — Baden

But we do have a metaphysical conception of self. And I disagree with Allan. The reason why you recognize this discordance within the social context is because you believe in a metaphysical self, too. But somehow, to some, it has become fashionable to discredit this argument.
( :wink: Lol. A true blue Cartesian here).

@Baden, you said:

I agree in that it is only from an analysis of the social that a coherent concept of self can arise. I don’t see how we get at any kind of purely metaphysical self. To me the self (socially named as a "person") is a social atom, the most discrete functioning social unit. As long as you are a functioning social unit (e.g. physically discrete and linguistically located) and you can make a stable and clear judgement on who you are in contradistinction to others, you qualify as a self under my conception. So, a self is a set of identities that may work well together or may not, but that can at least coherently locate itself in its social structure (i.e. among other selves). — Baden

Yet in your OP, you also said:

The thesis presented here then is that this phenomenon of multiple and fractured identity formation, the creation of self-conflictual selves (subjectively experienced in the long term as unhappy, meaningless and anxious selves, characterized by indecision, irresoluteness, and inaction) is not a bug but a feature of advanced society and the more “advanced” the society the more a feature it tends to become. — Baden

It seems we fail to connect in this train of thought what George Allan was saying. He is pointing out the flaw in our thoughts in our search for one identity conflicting with other identities. The error in thinking is this, which was included in the passage I gave you earlier:

Understanding, meaning, and purpose cannot function for us in the absence of some reality that transcends the pervasive experience of temporal passage...

.
(And btw, you write like him)

Putting it all together, it doesn't matter whether you say that the self you're talking about is within the social context, not metaphysical. But the point is, you are talking about the self-conflictual selves -- a self defeating its self, or something. It means you are positing a self that is unique and apart from the other social selves. This is a foundational view of self, social or metaphysical. You are looking for a transcendental self. You want some stable self that transcends all other social changes and complexities.

Is this a correct reading of your thesis?

Btw, I agree with your thesis.

Ok.

Great topic and OP!

Fundamentally then, modern society facilitates the greater and greater separation of identity from self, or, more specifically, the proliferation of identities that do not tend to reconcile themselves in a stable self but form unstable selves that are defined largely by inner conflict. — Baden

The freedom of identity a technically advanced consumer society facilitates (identity commodified / personal paralysis packaged as endless novelty) contains within it the anaesthetic that neutralizes a more valuable freedom, the freedom of resistance against an orientation towards the self that dictates that a self must consume even the self and in as many flavours as possible in order to fully experience itself. — Baden

A philosopher by the name of George Allan wrote about the self in a similar vein. Here I provide a passage from his essay arguing against the existence of a separate self from what the environment, society, or culture has created. This is his attempt to explain that our understanding of the world, and the continuing shaping and reshaping of this understanding is first, and foremost, "mesocosmic: -- the world as we know it. It is the world that fits our size in all its practical glory. His critique against a metaphysical view of self:
I added bolding on some words for emphasis.

Yet as we push toward the extremes of size and duration in a metaphysical attempt to comprehend and encompass the full range of actual and possible experience, this willingness to give primacy to changing complexity dwindles and finally disappears in a flurry of assertions regarding the extramundane requirements of whatever is first or last, foundation or universal. However much the world may appear to be transitory, and in significant ways is acknowledged as actually being so, we nonetheless insist that there must be a sustaining receptical within which all that flux goes on, an origin or end that lies beyond its tremulous proceedings, a truth that escapes its ever-shifting relativities. Understanding, meaning, and purpose cannot function for us in the absence of some reality that transcends the pervasive experience of temporal passage....

This line of reasoning has no metaphysical justification, however.The assertion of something at the extremes of experience is no more than a failure of nerve, a flight from reality into comforting illusion. Found order is the idol of eternity metaphysics...

What do you think?

Yo miss! — Benkei

:smile:

Sorry 'can't contribute much to this thread. I'm just here for moral support to you guys.

Please get back on topic. — Baden

:smile:

Hi Benk.

No, if v=0 then the v squared divided by c squared part of the formula would be 0, BUT inside the square root part of the formula we have 1- so we would have 1-0 if v=0. This would give the answer 1. — universeness

lol. Yeah, that's what I was thinking, but not in relation to the square root. I was thinking of something else. So forget what I said. V at zero is at a standstill. V = SOL (only kinetic energy is infinite, but not the relation).

That said:

Thursdayism says the world started last Thursday. It has nothing to do with time dilation — Gregory

This is correct.

The full extent never summing to anything greater than 1 from start to finish. Much like expansion of space time it’s a dilation of time within itself. So that one week is both enough to carry out a working week and also to have an entinte universe come and go. The relationship between the too is simply relative.
Thoughts? — Benj96

It can't be time dilation in a vacuum. Decomposing fractions does not have a relativity quality like time dilation where time is relative. Decomposing time into smaller and smaller fractions doesn't itself make it relative. So, the universe being created only last Thursday would have to be explained in relation to the infinitesimal fractions of time -- which confuses me.

:up:

Thank you for your explanation.

But this formula also shows that if the velocity was at light speed then the bottom line of the equation becomes square root(0), which is 0. We then have observer time = proper time / 0. — universeness

Isn't it that we could slow the v to zero meters (or miles) per second. The result is still zero, but not because velocity is equal to light speed. Trying to understand this part.

In Star Trek, it is suggested that if light speed or greater can be achieved... — universeness

Nothing can be faster than speed of light. Hence, Star Trek.

Time dilation is therefore not evidence of last Thursdayism — universeness

No we cannot use time dilation as evidence of last thursday (we're stuck with this terminology now, but okay... we both know what that means though). We could only use it to plant doubt as to the existence of the universe in billion of years.

No, we're not denying we typed a message that we just sent. This is not about concrete evidence. It's Thursdayism -- time dilation. We could have everything concrete in one half of half of a second ago.

is nothing but a paper doubt (Peirce) or pseudo-question / nonsense (Witty). — 180 Proof

Paper doubt? :smile:

For all you good people out there, this thread is about extremism. The point of view that the universe only existed last Thursday. So what could be gained from it? It is a challenge to our deep seated beliefs, the ones with absolute certainty. Nothing excites philosophers than a question of grounds for doubt -- why couldn't we just point to the sky, or to the moon as proof? Because paper doubt has that edge that we couldn't quite brush off. We have to deal with it.

It has been cited that indeed there is no way to prove whether or not this could be the case. — Benj96

This statement could have traction. Because what proof is required to show that the universe has been around forever? The books at the library? The buildings and bridges we had built? The aging parents? Fossils? Meteorites falling from space? We have nothing but tangible objects to "prove" time. But the infinitesimal time dilation could very well be felt like a year, 10 years, 100 years, or forever. And the tangible objects -- that's the product of time dilation as well, for all we know.

One of my favorites, @SophistiCat's thumbnail. Good looking cat.
That cat looks like he's reading a philosophy thread.

Good to hear you're doing well. :flower:

A resolution is a wish. Analyzing a desire destroys its purpose. Leave the analysis to Descartes or the lab. — Primperan

:smile: Good one.

Economic activity leads to carbon emissions, which in turn leads to environmental damage. — Banno

Ah. No, you're getting ahead of yourself. Remember, I said "consequence of". This is not a logical necessity, as you're trying to portray.

Hence the damage done to the environment leads to emissions reduction.

Or should that be:
[*] Hence the damage done to the environment ought lead to emissions reduction. — Banno

No and no. Remove the "hence", and remove the "leads to". Just scrap the whole statement.

Did you want something? — Banno

Yes.

I don't buy Keen's criticisms against Nordhaus simply because I myself couldn't appreciate the carbon emission damage except when quantified in monetary value. Why? Because climate change is a very, very slow death. It's hard to appreciate you're dying in a water set at a negligible temperature increments.

But there's much more compelling reason than this. The production of carbon emission is mostly due to economic activities. So emission reduction would have to happen as a consequence of, not as a solution to, the damage done to the environment and atmosphere. I hope you get the nuance of this thought.

True, scientists could factually say, "illnesses or deaths by the hundreds of thousands", or "five towns will be underwater in the next 5 years". And I'm sure most of us could understand and fully grasp what those mean. But I'm also guessing we would fail to understand the trade-off we have to accept.

It sounded like "no regulation -- emit all the pollution you want". — Gnomon

:grin:

What happened to @Banno?

Let's not give-up on Economic or Ecological relative regulation. ....
PS___Let's not debate Freedom from Determinism here. That's a topic for another thread. — Gnomon

I think you misunderstood my response. Both the absolute emission and intensity emission are technical terms used in economic/regulatory measure of carbon emission. It has nothing to do with philosophy. Absolute emission reduction being that the reduction is based on total carbon emission, say of a country, and from that they determine a business organization's percentage of reduction, say 10%. (This is simplifying it). Intensity emission reduction, as I already explained previously, is emission reduction based on economic output of a business organization.

Now I haven't read up on ecological relative regulation you alluded to. I'm not sure what that is. Maybe that is another model that we could discuss.

but this class will be more pure math, and less real-life application. — Zolenskify

I had a great prof, but didn't listen in class. I studied the textbooks off-class, then went to class to take the quizzes, exams, and submit homework. (Participation was graded, lol). The way I learn did not fit with the way he taught it, but I had no complaints.

Carbon emission per American is about 20 metric ton.
Or total emission in America is about 5 billion metric ton. Let's say $50 per metric ton is the cost of carbon emission. That's $250 billion in social cost per year -- health, decreased productivity, the ocean, the air, etc. You don't think that's a lot? Europe's cost is about €71.

Monetary Economics is not a logical physical system, like Thermodynamics; it's a passionate Prey versus Predator ecosystem that sometimes gets out of balance due to selfish human interference. — Gnomon

In that case, let's shoot for absolute emission then, which would not excuse production output as an anchor for reducing or increasing CO₂. As a business organization, you are given a percentage of reduction.

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.” — Gnomon

Good quote. So true.

That's rather the issue in question, isn't it? Is the market taking care of itself a conclusion, or an assumption? — Banno

You have to give tangible incentives for business organizations to reduce emissions -- namely, measurables in relation to their output (this is the intensity emission reduction). This might be the only meaningful measure for those entities. Contrast that with absolute emission reduction.

So, maybe it's an assumption that the market will take care of itself, and thermodynamics, in conclusion gets taken care of?

Forecasts by economists of the economic damage from climate change have been notably sanguine, compared to warnings by scientists about damage to the biosphere. — Keen

Is this right? I didn't know about, or never paid attention to, opinions by economists about climate change.

So, with your responses in mind I am thinking that I could just hack through the issue by seperating the questions.

Do you believe it's more likely than not that God/s exists?
Do you believe it's more likely than not that no God/s exist?

This way, I cannot be seen to be limiting their choice or assuming they have one belief, as there is no implication that i've presupposed there are only two options. The real issue is that "or". — Jon Sendama

Yes, you can say that. This is called modality. When you present an inquiry or a problem this way, you are implying the modal auxiliaries.

Surely it's their burden to demonstrate that their objection has grounds by showing that there could be other options, rather than just claiming, — Jon Sendama

The idea is that in argumentation, the one who presents the scenario that there's only two options/choices has the burden to avoid the fallacious argument of false dichotomy. You're not supposed to present a scenario where you artificially limit the choices of another to force them to answer one of only two ways.

However, if there really are only two choices, you still need to present your argument in such a way as no one really has more than two choices. An example of this is dead or alive. There really isn't a half-dead, or half-alive, or another state in which a human being can be cast.

I'm interested to know would you say in response to the hypothetical situation where someone were poor in performance everywhere they went. If they tried as much as possible to correct it themselves on some grounds they would turn around and say, "This is not my fault." As far as the expectation/reward scenario goes it doesn't seem like this person would ever be qualified to say this; only the authority would have that power. — kudos

Only the authority would have the legitimacy to judge whether it's the participant's fault or the problem is with the rules themselves (assuming no bias, prejudice, or discrimination happening). And this is because that person is being compared to other participants. I don't think we're getting closer to understanding the word evaluation here. One's performance is being compared to others doing the same thing based on some rules.