Certainly, there is a connection between the two concepts. For any essentialist attribution will give rise to a necessary truth; if certain objects are essentially related then it is necessarily true that the objects are so related (or necessarily true given that the objects exist). However, the resulting necessary truth is not necessary simpliciter. For it is true in virtue ofthe identity ofthe objects in question; the necessity has its source in those objects which are the subject of the underlying essentialist claim.
Thus different essentially induced truths may have their source in the identities of different objects - Socrates being a man having its source in the identity of Socrates, 2 being a number having its source in the identity of 2. In particular, an induced truth which concerns various objects may have its source in the nature of some of these objects but not of others. This is how it is with our standard example of Socrates being a member of singleton Socrates; for this is true in virtue of the identity of singleton Socrates, but not of the identity of Socrates.
I'm not seeing much that concerns simples. — Banno
Thus different essentially induced truths may have their source in the identities of different objects - Socrates being a man having its source in the identity of Socrates, 2 being a number having its source in the identity of 2. In particular, an induced truth which concerns various objects may have its source in the nature of some of these objects but not of others. This is how it is with our standard example of Socrates being a member of singleton Socrates; for this is true in virtue of the identity of singleton Socrates, but not of the identity of Socrates.
↪Shawn I'm thinking it's that lack of symmetry - the set [Socrates} is dependent on Socrates but Socrates is not dependent on {Socrates}. — Banno
But, more significantly, we must give up the traditional idea that the logical derivation of an analytic statement from the definitions of its terms constitutes an analysis of that statement, one which may enable us to see that it is true. For there is nothing in the underlying conception of definitional truth which will force the resulting derivations to be analyses in any meaningful sense of the term. Indeed, as far as this conception goes, one might as well extract any predicate P from the given analytic statement and use the artificial "definition" above to provide it with a trivial pseudo-analysis.
These difficulties are avoided if we require the definitional truths which figure in the account of analyticity to be true in virtue of the meanings of their defined terms. For the account is then as about as direct as it could be; and real content is given to the idea of analysis. The given analytic statement is derived from definitions which in a significant sense provide one with the meanings of the individual terms.
Fine argues, on plausible assumptions, it is also necessary that Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. And so, by the modal conception, it follows that Socrates is essentially a member of {Socrates}. This, however, is highly implausible: it is no part of what Socrates is that he should be a member of any set whatsoever.
As one who appreciates and practices later Wittgenstein philosophy, I am particularly suspicious of 1 and 2. And 3 looks like a pill for what some may say is a medication to treat “Wittgensteinian brainwashing”. — Richard B
But that seems unwieldily. It does not seem to be part of what Socrates is, that he be a member of such a set. — Banno
It is not critical to the example that appeal be made to an abstract entity. Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality
Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it has never been suggested that in order to understand the nature of a person one must know to which sets he belongs. There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I may put it this way, which demands that he belongs to this or that set or which even demands that there be any sets. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality
We have seen that there exists a certain analogy between defining a term and giving the essence of an object; for the one results in a sentence which is true in virtue of the meaning of the term, while the other results in a proposition which is true in virtue of the identity of the object. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality
So, why shouldn't the response to this be simply 'so much the worse for "set theory"?' — Wayfarer
So what is an appropriate specification of the meaning? The only satisfactory answer appears to be that the specification should make clear what the meaning (essentially) is; it should provide us, that is to say, with some account of the meaning's essence. Thus we find again that in giving a definition we are giving an essence - though not now of the word itself, but of its meaning. — p.11
One of Fine’s distinctive contributions to rehabilitating essence was to argue against the modal conception of it (1994b). To do so, Fine introduced what is now a famous example. Consider the singleton set {Socrates} (the set whose sole member is Socrates). It is necessary that, if this set exists, then it has Socrates as a member. And so, by the modal conception, the set essentially has Socrates as a member. But, Fine argues, on plausible assumptions, it is also necessary that Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. And so, by the modal conception, it follows that Socrates is essentially a member of {Socrates}. This, however, is highly implausible: it is no part of what Socrates is that he should be a member of any set whatsoever. — IEP
Modal logic is a type of formal logic that studies reasoning about necessity and possibility. It is used to formalize reasoning about the modalities "it is necessary that" and "it is possible that." Modal logic is often used in philosophy to study issues related to knowledge, time, and causation. Some important concepts in modal logic include the notion of a possible world and the concept of a modal operator, which is used to indicate necessity or possibility.
His point is, the terms "unmarried" and "man" cannot be used to define "bachelor". In that sentence, only "bachelor" can be analytic, but not "unmarried" and "man" -- remember the parts of a proposition? Or do you remember "concepts"?'All bachelors are unmarried men' can be used to define either "bachelor" or "Unmarried" and "man", so there is an ambiguity inherent in the equation used to set out a definition. Fine rejects a holistic approach. too fast for my liking; presumably a rejection of Quine's first dogma. — Banno
Then don't use synonyms. Define the concept or describe an object and you achieve the meaning of a word or essence of an object.That is, I cannot see how synonymy can be used to provide the meaning of a term, and hence it's essence, since any statement of synonymy must depend on our already having the meaning of the. terms involved. Providing definitions does not get started on providing meaning. — Banno
If I am right, there is more to the idea of real definition than is commonly conceded. For the activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the same; and hence each of them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition*
See the last line I posted above.I'm struggling to understand why this is significant. After all, Socrates is ostensibly a real being, it could be any person whatever. But 'a set' is a concept. When he asks 'does this set exist', the question I would pose is, 'does any set exist?' - at least, does it exist in the same sense that a real person (e.g. Socrates) exists. This is why it seems a rather artificial example, but I could be missing something basic about it. — Wayfarer
I suspect that were I to attempt to address this you would simply double down, so I'll leave you to your own devices. — Banno
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