Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. — Hume

So, here Hume is practically 'chastising' the "habit" of ordinary way of looking at things. Whom is Hume referring to? Who is it that draws an inference without first negotiating a process of reasoning that does not involve his own experience? Can you think of a philosopher who does that?

I can think of a school of thought that could satisfy Hume's dissatisfaction here. Realism.

Some of us are dealing with crap elsewhere and we don't have the time, energy or interest to participate here in depth. — darthbarracuda

:smile: I have been gone a long time. I've been so busy -- and tired at the end of the day to engage fully. I also stayed away previously from the other forum (where a lot of us came from). I find that the absence made me realize how much philosophy forum and the people who participate here matter.
I'm still trying to find a balance between spending time here and dealing with things in private life.
But I will.

From what I see, it's not only that Hume uses induction when he argues that induction is unjustified, Hume goes on to use induction pointing out evidence that our use of induction is on shaky ground (habit, custom). — Purple Pond

This is incorrect. Hume is pointing out the error of human understanding.

Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. — Hume

Please read this again. And again.

Your opening post is really good. I don't have time tonight to expand on this. But you just demonstrated the kind of thinking Hume is critiquing above.

I'll come back to this again.

I'm not sure the meaning of humanistic to you.
If you mean that because philosophy is practiced/followed/thought of by humans only, that it is, in effect, humanistic, then I don't understand you.

I mean to imply that philosophy which is deeply humanistic, — Posty McPostface

Is it?

Is that the end result of the attitude that a philosopher ought to be is cynicism? If that's not true then, what ideal for a man or woman ought to be? — Posty McPostface

You've lost me there.

The future that I can picture in as a solipsistic mind is self-defeating and negative.The solipsism constantly must always wonder that she can think whether she is solipsistic or not. — Posty McPostface

Solipsistic view does not need to be negative, although common sense is gonna get you.
Maybe you're just cynical?

I don't know what that future will look like and that causes me great distress. — Posty McPostface

The future of humanity, of civilization, causes you great distress?

Now, having that great piece of information in your working memory, I want to ask if it's possible to be nostalgic about the future .......you've never experienced; but, would like to? — Posty McPostface

I'm afraid not. Nostalgia is akin to grieving about the past. One cannot grieve over something that hasn't happened yet. What is it, then, that you feel about the future? Dreaming, imagining? Fear of the future? Perhaps, you are longing about the future.

But look at what we can do. We can even have ideations of suicide. — schopenhauer1

Dolphins beach themselves. What to make of this?

What motivates us to do anything in the first place? Well, we usually have to have, at the last, a short-term/temporary goal in mind, and move towards that. — schopenhauer1

It's called satisfying an instinct. People naturally move towards a source of food, like the refrigerator.

Where does this goal originate? — schopenhauer1

Biological needs.

Well, that is where we put our fiat-value on something, to make us feel the impulse to move towards it. — schopenhauer1

Nah. It takes very little to do what we do most of the time. We move towards the door when we hear knocking without thinking of meaning or value.

Further, this derives from preferences that we have cultivated over time. — schopenhauer1

No. Loud sound, strange sound, or banging will make us move towards it. We didn't prefer it or prepare for it at the dawn of civilization.

Hope is in the equation, perhaps for evolutionary reasons. It could just be a coping mechanism we happened to have developed in order to keep the goal-factory moving along. — schopenhauer1

So, you are willing to allow that hope is evolutionary, but in the same breath brush off our coping mechanism as something we invented? Honestly, Schop. Why do you do this? I know you from before. Early onset of imbecility is not part of your condition.

adding more needs alongside food and water does not make those needs meaningful. The commenter is saying that we deceive ourselves when it comes to believing that there is a reason to follow our instincts of survival. Adding more instincts does not invalidate his claim — khaled

Sometimes I wonder why talking past each other is an acceptable method of argumentation to some people.
I did not say that what we do needs to be meaningful. I was refuting Schop's assertion that we pretend that what we do is meaningful. Repeatedly pushing the button does not make the traffic light change faster, yet many people do it. Do they think it's meaningful? No. Do they do it out of sense of primal survival? No. What is being tested there, then? Patience. Not meaning. Not survival.

Now that we've gotten this out of the way, let me ask you, do you think our need to be busy everyday can be blamed on evolution? Answer wisely, please.

We humans are placed in a precarious spot at almost every moment of the day. By this I mean that we have to deceive ourselves that what we are doing is meaningful, or is something worth doing, or is just what must be done in our role as (place arbitrary role here- citizen, learner, responsible adult, employee, etc.). Beyond the aversion to discomforts like hunger, heat/cold, and no shelter, we are in a constant state of having to believe that any move or decision is one even worth making. — schopenhauer1

I think you should only argue this way after you've explored the evolutionary theory of perception.

For a start, how did you come to the conclusion that beyond satisfying our hunger and the need for proper temperature and shelter, that human actions are nothing more than self-deception or pretending to do something meaningful? That we have a propensity for 'hope', or an urge to explore what's beyond, or even philosophize could be very well be on par with satisfying our biological need for food.

I refuse to believe that human efforts and activities are, at best, a bullshit refinery that runs twenty-four hours a day to keep our mind at peace.

he explains why donations of food to Africa end up suppressing small scale trade. — frank

I can see the reasoning behind this -- although I have not read Weatherford.

But can markets also be a sign of disintegration? — frank

You tell me. That's a broad question. Care to bracket it?

90% of all of my OPs have failed to appeal to more than a few people. Either it's the way I pose topics, the topics itself, or personal animosity toward me. — Bitter Crank

I laughed at this! :grin:

Who needs to snap out of it? Me or them? — frank

No one. It's not like your idea is different from their idea. You guys are looking at different angles of the same elephant.

So the flint has value prior to being recognized as having value? Some sort of mind-independent value? — frank

No. The flint is seen as a whole object, the same way we see a "chair" -- you can't separate the idea of chair with "sitting", can you?
Be courageous now, frank.

But then sometimes our uses do have a bearing on what?. — frank

On taxanomy of objects.

Intrinsically? — frank

No. Valuewise, as they are.

Sure. — frank

So, it's your perception that changed.

When I decide to trade the flint, it's a part of me that is lifted up from a kind of unconscious obscurity to be witnessed as a thing of value. Trade takes things out of the shadows. — frank

Okay.
But I disagree with the above. I disagree with your contrasting "unconscious obscurity" and "thing of value", and caling things being in the shadows until you removed them from their base usage. (Correct me at this point, if this is not what you meant).
What I want to say to that is, objects we own (and I'm not referring to them as in ontology) do have value as they are. A change of ownership does not mean a change in base use of that object -- the other person who traded the necklace would still consider the flint as a thing to make a fire. Unless that person was a collector, in which case, the flint had met its demise.

Do you own a fire hydrant? I hope not. But if you do, and you got it by trading with someone else, where do you keep it now? To me it had lost its value, its true essence, because it's now being used as a display item, a curiosity, instead of sitting on a sidewalk connected to a water source, ready anytime in case there's fire. Its essence had been lost in your possession. It had not lifted anything by being uprooted from its habitat.

But note that in the moment I exchange my flint for a shell necklace, the flint changed for me. My use for the flint has nothing to do with fire. If has to do with coming to own the necklace. — frank

This is a mish-mash assertion. ...The flint changed for you, your use for the flint has nothing to do with fire .....
Either your use for the flint changed or the essence of the flint changed. Which one?

For my own learning's sake, How would it have to look in order to hit the threshold of a phenomenological thread? I know of Husserl and his bracketing approach, but I was using the term loosely, not strictly Husselerian. How would the methodology look to be officially phenomenological? — schopenhauer1

I don't know, Schop. You are bracketing, that could not be avoided.
Pin point what the experts in the past had focused on when talking about human actions. Be honest on this as this is your starting point. Is it towards conformity and uniformity or plurality? Then state where they made a mistake. Why would they say such a thing?
Then, how do we lead ourselves to uniformity -- through creativity and creation (or building) of things and stuff that take the shape of one thing -- technology? You can illuminate how creativity itself is an instrument towards greater conformity, not the other way around. Develop your semantics on "technology". Develop your ontology around technology. Even language is technology itself.
You could incorporate what @Akanthinos had said.

No choice- we need minutia mongerers. — schopenhauer1

What are minutia mongerers? Sorry, I saw this in one of your posts, but still didn't quite absorb it.

If you think my more general commentary is not sufficient, please provide an example of how a proper phenomenological account would go to make the title worthy. — schopenhauer1

You got it backwards. In my opinion, you do not need a phenomenological method to make a claim about something that could be measured sociologically and psychologically -- and yes (!), with all their interpretive instruments. You are, in fact, if you haven't noticed, performing hermeneutical analysis of what you yourself see around you. You are interpreting the condition of our society as

Happiness is really a front for the child’s ability to consume and produce technology by way of outright consumption (passive) or by way of originating or furthering technology. The child is de facto a means to this end. — schopenhauer1

..and

But this is why I specifically called out technology- it is not the output aspect or the economic indicator that represents output. It is the technology that is the basis for the output. — schopenhauer1

Why not use sociological analysis instead? Of course, a cynical observer could reduce any human action to technology. But is this reasonable?

The problem is having no choice.
Back to your point about the reduction..more technology producers why? — schopenhauer1

First off, what causes the no-choice world?

Second, according to the State Department of Thread Title, you should remove the word "Phenomonology" from your title. It doesn't fit your topic. A socio-ecopolitical observation of our civilization does not need such word to be understood.

Third, have you ever considered, I mean stopping even for a brief moment to ponder, whether humans actually enjoy conforming to the same thing? Have you ever thought that doing similar things and following similar path are actually happiness-inducing endeavour?

We would need to log in to read the article.

What evidence? The point of this discussion is to ask how we deal with speculations for which there is no evidence. — Pattern-chaser

Sheesh! I just said, you do not need evidence to build a critique. But you'd be welcome to take advantage of the other person's arsenal, if you'd like.

OK, then I apologise to all for my imprecise use of words, and re-present the topic as: how should we deal, logically, with speculations that are possible, but that come without evidence? — Pattern-chaser

Good question.
First off, metaphysical theories, as always, either illuminate, strengthen, or cast doubt on our established beliefs. We take them seriously, regardless of their disconnect with physical realities. You could build your own metaphysical speculation -- with one requirement, it must be coherent. ( I'm not going to define here what coherence means, you could look it up yourself).
So, how should we treat these speculations? As a critique of our own belief. You do not need to provide evidence to build a critique -- use the other person's evidence if you'd like. (Critique of pure reason, as they say). Here's an example in action. @BrianW is actually critiquing here:

This

I believe the brain-in-a-vat theory only addresses the idea of our perception of reality and cannot, due to its many deficiencies, form any lasting imprint on reality. — BrianW

this,

For the brain-in-a-vat to create any illusion, it must have perception for its raw materials. Therefore, what part of its reality is it perceiving? That connection between illusion and reality calls for a mechanism which governs their interrelation. — BrianW

and this,

Personally, I choose to accept a theory which states that illusion is a part of reality, in that, it is a representation of it, though with certain modifications which may distort or disguise the relation. Nonetheless, they are always related. — BrianW

Finally, let me name drop some astrophysicist by the name of Arthur Eddington who wrote Science and the Unseen World. Apparently, he is known for his "other ways of knowing." And again, don't ask me to quote from his book, I have not read it substantially, but feel free to browse it yourself.

Does it really matter whether we call it a thought experiment, a theory, a hypothesis or a fairy story? — Pattern-chaser

It matters. Metaphysical theories are often, if not always, indifferent to facts or actual events. That they are indifferent is an issue of contention, but not of confusion. Let us make this one thing clear.

What metaphysical theories try to achieve is coherence.

This seems to imply that reason itself can reduce or eliminate the emotions... — ChatteringMonkey

Heavens, no!
He is explaining that our fear of reason -- fear that by being rationalistic, we inadvertently also minimize the "good emotions/passions" -- is unwarranted.

Can we justify - logically - dismissing theses which account for all available evidence, just because we don't like them? — Pattern-chaser

You know it's okay to quote the participants of this thread verbatim. I don't see anyone here saying he is dismissing the theory cause he dislikes it.

I like the brain-in-a-vat theory, but I don't defend it.
Maybe I should ask you. What what would be the proper treatment of such theories after they'd been argued a thousand times and no one had managed to escape the vat universe to show its reward?

Besides dismissing them, or calling them frivolous, how should such theories guide us? -- that we shouldn't be choosing at all? I am inclined to believe that such a theory's adherent could also be returning the favor by calling our claims of real trees, roads, and water ridiculous and frivolous because such claims lack proof besides the mere existence of trees, roads, and water -- which, by the way, are perceptible by our senses. What would that sound like to you? -- foolishness, because our senses are playing tricks on us!

Let us also conveniently deny that we could actually see the vat, brain, and tubes.

But he showed, by reason, in a self justifying manner that bias can be checked in place by reason. Meaning empirically that bias can be uneducated from a rational mind. — Posty McPostface

Okay, that does not contradict anything here, though. Meaning, we're on the same page.

Reason can definately help to loosen the grip of some negative emotion/values held... but something more is needed usually to close the deal. — ChatteringMonkey

Well, this is exactly what he's saying -- careful examination of the situation. By examination he means using reason as the method. Obviously, if someone needs treatment for a phobia, reason, as implied by his statement, should help you arrive at that decision.

"Many people have some sort of antipathy/hatred towards rationality. This reason hatred is due to a wrong conception about the nature/functionality of reason. They were thought, or in some cases they were outright indoctrinated, that reason has nothing to do with emotions, that reason has nothing to do with values. It has everything to do with both emotions and values." — Bertrand Russell, In the search of happiness.

Thoughts? Does this pertain to prejudice and bias or is it more general? — Posty McPostface

Yes, it pertains to prejudice and bias towards and against rationality, which, as Russell identifies, is this misconception about the nature/functionality of reason. But it takes two to tango, as they say, for while a group of philosophers, i.e. Thomas Carlyle, had worked overtime and graveyard shift to correct the directional error of rational argument, another group's blind spot was instrumental in driving our conception of rationality towards the mechanical and the physical.

He is doing wonderfully Paul. I can pass on a message to him for you or if you want, you can send him a PM here Paul and I will nudge him to check in on his messages here. :flower: — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Thanks, Tiff. Yes, if you could tell him. :smile:

Are you suggesting there's a ranking of value? Which ones go first? Why? How do you arrive at that ranking? — Benkei

No. It's not ranking of values. That's too simplistic -- and probably no one does that. It's deliberation of what needs to be done in the face of an ethical problem. And let's not forget fear-- we could do something about it but too fearful to do it. Or mistake in assessing the situation. Yes, we could be mistaken, too, and act according to this mistaken belief.

I miss Paul. I hope he's doing well.

Not incomprehensible by the one who experiences it — Blue Lux

But others can still relate. Ciceronianus said we have a fairly good idea of what you're talking about.
How do you think humanity survived? Animals can know when their family members are in danger. Dogs can certainly know if you're fearful.

Furthermore, this idea of an every life of ours implies that the experiences of people are interchangeable and the same. They are not. Our experiences are incomparably personal and unique. — Blue Lux

So, personal and unique, therefore, unintelligible, incomprehensible, and indescribable by us? Yet, here you are, trying so hard regardless. Are you saying that psychologists are nothing but a bunch of nonsense in concert?

Stunning revelation.

We know, as a contingent fact, that matter exhibits an orderly dynamics, which by analogy with human ordinances, we call "obeying laws." This does not imply either awareness or choice on the part of matter. Asking how the laws work is like asking what dynamics links the dynamic of a system to the system it is the dynamics of. That kind of question misunderstands what "dynamics" means. — Dfpolis

In so far as there are some quibbling and nitpicking going on in this thread, allow me to quibble in some napoleonic way. I would avoid using the word "orderly". Organized? Yes, as in quantized outcome. Yes, as in organized chaos. Nature could change, even abruptly -- so out goes your order. But we don't suppose nature could change without organization. Dynamics is organized activity, but not necessarily orderly.

We are sadistic beasts.. — schopenhauer1

No.

Think of the Viking beserkers mentality.. We are all that inside. — schopenhauer1

Not really.

Why? Because..toughen the f*** up right? The world isn't perfect so you have to LEARN through TRIAL and ERROR... — schopenhauer1

Nah. Just sit still and observe. Just learn to observe.

You have to follow some formula.. — schopenhauer1

Nah. No formula. Learn Schrodinger's cat experiment.

the Indifference of the Stoics.. — schopenhauer1

They were not indifferent. They just knew when it's a losing proposition.

You have to DEAL...Everything needs maintenance..needs fixing.... — schopenhauer1

Live under the bridge and let the engineers maintain the bridge.