For humans, it rests on that memory, yes. Without it, there'd be no acts for which we can be held responsible. But the amoeba people (sentient, but reproduction by mitosis) share memories. The life remembered (including the act for which responsibility seems to need to be taken) is not unique to any individual. Perhaps 17 of them remember doing it, so did they? Did they all? Hence my claim of their lack of the concept legal identity.
I think people reproduce that way via Hilbert space, but so does the act, so the definition is not shaken. All 17 of us actually did it, and must individually be held accountable. All 17 get to keep their job. Numeric identity is in shambles, but the legal one works for humans.

And that's why they don't allow philosophical testimony in court, and also why the amoeba people wouldn't have a legal system recognizable to us. I did in fact perform my past actions. It all rests on the legal definition of identity, not the mathematical one, nor the qualitative one. The legal definition depends on the historic causal continuity of identity which currently happens to be a trait of humans, but not of amoebas, and not of humans if subjective cloning or surgical part swapping is sufficiently advanced.

Subjective cloning (my term) is what an amoeba does. It splits in two, and while neither is more obviously the original, both can look at (be in the presence of) each other. Non-subjective cloning is where you can't look at your clone, so functionally, each clone proceeds as if the event never took place. Typically, moral responsibility is cloned along with the the subject, so legal responsibility is not challenged by this sort of cloning. Each clone must account for the now cloned offense, without ambiguity about which one is the actual guilty one. Either form of cloning makes a hash of numeric identity, but the latter does not destroy legal identity. Hence my being guilty of the cookie pilfering decades ago despite not sharing numeric identity with that 7 year old. I share legal identity with him, meaning I did in fact do the act. That's what legal identity is. I in fact did this. I own this, and this is my job, spouse, etc.

I also mention 'historic causal continuity' above. The concept only works in the past. I, in fact, am a causal result of the state of noAxioms at the beginning of 2015, despite not sharing numeric identity with that state, nor qualitative identity. I only share legal identity. It doesn't work in the future view. Not even an all-knowing God can know what my personal future holds because I don't have one if that numeric-identity non-subjective cloning is possible. So there is 'the future' for me, there is only several different futures, each of which (not one of which) can claim me now as their direct-causal past self. 10 different people will in fact share identity with me, which is why the identity is not mathematical.

For the record, I think I very much get cloned, and often. I find the alternative even harder to swallow. Hence my being forced into philosophical separation of numeric, qualitative, and legal identities. This totally mucks with the concept of objective identity, meaning if dualism is a thing, the mind needs to be cloned with the physical, and I cannot have a relationship with a singular objective entity like God. There is no unique me to get into heaven.

"In other words, I can remember only my own experiences, but it is not my memory of an experience that makes it mine; rather, I remember it only because it's already mine. So while memory can reveal my identity with some past experiencer, it does not make that experiencer me." (Stanford) — Cavacava

About this Stanford quote, I would have said "reveal my relation with some past experiencer..."
The quote seems concerned with numeric identity, but I don't see the logic here being useful in deciding why some human should be held responsible for an action taken by that past remembered experiencer. The legal definition is not a qualitative one either. I am qualitatively little like my 7 year old self with whom I don't share numeric identity, but I'm still guilty of stealing that cookie that day.

As for the brain switch, such scenarios challenge the legal definitions which depend on a more cohesive causal continuity between the act and the person being held responsible for the act. So the legal definition is suddenly open to challenge, as it would be with several other scenarios involving copies and merges. We're forced to ask the amoeba people how they've dealt with such problems all along, but they just have no concept of legal connection to an event done by a different identity.

The numeric identity is unaffected by any of this, at least the way I define it. Each separate instance (event) of a person is a separate identity. The surgery is irrelevant to it.

The identity question has to answered if ethical responsibly is to be asserted. How am I to be held responsible for my actions if I am not the same person today as I was when the action was performed. — Cavacava

I don't think ethical responsibility hangs on the same sort of identity as numeric identity.

A. I have primary ethical responsibility to myself, meaning that I eat for the benefit of future instances of me, not for myself now. I (now) must bear the consequences of decisions made by past versions of me, even if I don't share numeric identity with them. I have not starved, but this here scar is one I must bear. Secondary ethical responsibility is defined by society, and it works the same way, with no requirement for continuity of numeric identity.

B. Our society defines the ethical rules, and those rules are very dependent on a significant subjective correspondence between legal identity and numeric identity. Subjectively, a person seems to be the same legal entity throughout his life, and so concepts such as ownership and ethical responsibility have meaning. This would not work for say, a society of amoebas where there is no concept of correspondence of numeric identity between some amoeba now and an amoeba in the past who might have done something or deserves something.

My personal view assigns a numeric identity to what is effectively an event, coupled with a history of prior events in a direct causal historic chain. So since my marriage is part of my history, I can say that I indeed was married, even though I do not share numeric identity with the younger person actually at that ceremony. The definition is somewhat awkward, but it fits in better with my B-series preference as a view of time.

1 Apartments
This is a fair description of a computer task scheduler. One computer (Bob) and many tasks (one or more per application for instance) each run in turn but context switching so often that they all seem to run at once. You didn't really describe how this models reality. What is a typical physical person in this scenario? The drug-isolated chunk of data? The apartment? They each have their own apartment, so no, they're not the apartments. The data then. Each person is a task. Doesn't seem to correspond much to reality where I see multiple physical bodies in simultaneous existence. Like in the apartment scenario, no person could ever witness another since only one is active at once. Only passed messages can serve as communication (just like communication between computer tasks).

2 Experiencer
My idea of souls is a dualistic mind that is to persist and (if you're religious) be judged after end of the physical life to which it corresponds. Without that, it is just dualism, and there are plenty of secular people who are dualists. So sure, the experiencer is the same as a soul during life, and only differs in description outside of life. If it is something that retains identity and floats free after death, you might as well call it a soul. Sam Harris seems to avoid this afterlife opinion, so he's talking about just the dualistic experiencer that we feel, and he denies the necessity of it. He doesn't mention afterlife, so I'd hesitate to qualify his statement as being about a soul.

So sure, an experiencer is obviously what does the experiencing. The question remains: is it a separate thing that has a body, or is it just part of the processes of the body? My point here is, the word 'experiencer' does not necessarily imply dualism, but you seem to use the word that way since 2.1 title says they don't exist. You mean a non-physical experiencer.

There is no reason why humans at some point aren’t capable of creating something that is conscious. Unless a God is required to add the extra ingredient of consciousness,

I have trouble with that since 'is conscious' is very undefined. The word seems to have different meaning to people with different views and biases. The usual fallacious notion is something like "biological and aware", which I don't think humans are going to create from scratch (not by the usual way of creating a consciousness). If a God is needed to supply it to babies, then God is probably in charge of assigning one to my lab creation.

2.1 Humans create such a machine, one of the inputs is a camera so the experience of light can be created.

Eyes/cameras are not experience. They sense light. The experience is process that occurs elsewhere.

As far as I can see, a functioning machine utilizing a functioning camera experiences light. You can perhaps say that the machine is the experiencer Y, or that its processes are Y. As for the hardware switch, one can indeed ask if it is the same machine as yesterday experiencing X. In some cases it gets very fuzzy. What if the camera is simply plugged into a different USB port? What if each port has a separate video processor? At what point does Y become different. Answers seem arbitrary, and more clear with people only because we seem to have less swapable hardware.

2.2 If experiencers do exist, humans must be very careful when creating conscious machines. At which point do you kill an experiencer? The problem is we wouldn’t even be able to test whether the experiencer was killed or not.

This can be a thread unto itself. Stick with people for the time being. Under various scenarios of teleportation/cloning/merging/part-swapping, at which point has murder been done? How is murder defined given the viability of such identity scrambling games? Our current definitions only work because these things are not currently possible except some of the part-swapping to a point. Can you define murder without dependence on one's philosophy of mind?

2.3 We can’t even confirm that you are the same ‘person’ as your yesterday self .

Indeed. Numeric identity seems to be an academic exercise without necessary direct correspondence to reality. I actually found a way to assign identities to people/things without violation of branching physics or other identity scrambling scenarios. That identity is not the Y however, but it usually corresponds to Y so long as you behave.

Maybe deep sleep (S) kills the experiencer and this morning when you woke up you actually got ‘born’, and this is the only day you will live.

What would sleep have to do with this? Any argument that works here also works for identity being changed every 13 minutes. Clearly any experiencer serves no purpose under such scenarios.

2.4 On top of that, a universe without experiencers works, the apartment thought experiment shows this.

It does? I thought Bob was the experiencer.

3 The 10 persons thought experiment is set up so that there aren’t two people awake at the same time.
Physics tells us that time is an illusion;

Physics does not say that. And it certainly does not have all events occurring at the same time. The Einstein/Tegmark/Carroll quotes refer to the nature of past/present/future, that they are not different. And that is physicists saying that, not physics. The actual physics behind these assertions is there, but is quite subtle.

This means that sure you are conscious at the same time the person you are talking to is conscious. But you are also conscious at the same time your baby is conscious, and at the same time your 12 year old self is conscious.

It means no such thing. It presumes a 'you' that is the same identity in all these moments, and it incorrectly asserts that now is the same time as when you were 12. Those physicists don't state that all things happen at the same time.

Do I consider myself my baby? No, but I also don't consider myself the 12 year old version of me. I don't see out of my baby's eyes, and I don't see out of the 12YO eyes. I have memory of the latter, but my memory is not that identity.

4. Conscious experience doesn't necessarily imply complexity. Perhaps complex conscious experience does. So it comes down to how simple it can be before no longer falling under your definition of consciousness.

5. The <Mars> robot is highly intelligent, it has a bunch of sensors as input signals and multiple mechanic arms and tripod like legs as output possibility’s. Its central ‘computer’ processes the input signals and creates a proper output to guide it over Mars’s surface.

Consider also that the processor might be in a lab, and the robot part is just a remote extension with only limited capabilities. The one consciousness might have several such robot 'hands' which may or may not have built-in senses. The sensors could instead be mounted at multiple fixed points all over the place.
Or the processors might go with the robot and be a temporary consciousness that merges with the central one when it returns. Think alien here when you play such games.

Is robot (B) robot (A)?

To what would this matter? It seems a mathematical designation that has no practicality. To me, matching my altered identity with that of the version yesterday has legal practicality. This stuff is mine. Here's my job. I bear the responsibility of the acts done by that yesterday me. I draw breath not for the benefit of me, but for the benefit of a me 10 seconds from now. These relations don't exist between me and somebody else. But I have heightened interest in my baby since the baby represents a continuation of my DNA pattern, and I expend effort for the baby for the same reason I draw breath.

So think of such relations that have practical implications between robots A and B so the question can be answered.

That was the IP yesterday, after f.FP had been down a couple days, but was still recognized by the name server. Now both URLs are the new IP. It seems to be back without significant data lost, but I see no new posts. I see no announcements about what's going on.

OK, the latter is recognized, but in "please stand by" mode.
It is 104.27.132.146 whereas the former was 159.203.90.37 . New server??

Thanks for the welcome Tiff!. I've had a helluva time signing up for some reason, but it worked without a hitch today. And this site has on the fly spell check!

Has probably been mentioned, but the posts are not dated. Impossible to search for where one might have left off, and I'm never sure if I'm responding to a years-old thread.

Edit: OK, it looks different. I see 6-months ago... That's a date I guess.

Finally migrated over. Never could get past the London question.
PF is no longer recognized by the name servers. Not good.