Identity

Moliere

By identity I mostly mean the psychological phenomenon where we, as humans, feel like we are this or that category, or the kind of person who does such-and-such, or expresses in particular ways, and expresses those expressions in these particular ways -- things of that sort. I don't know what all would be included as part of a discussion on or analysis of identity so I'd be open to hearing other things added to the mix that you believe should be included in understanding identity. I understand that the psychological phenomena is not so easily separated from philosophical thoughts on identity, or political thoughts on identity which is why I say "mostly". These other lines of thought will probably influence anything we might say about identity, and probably what we say about identity in this context will also influence what we might say about identity in a "philosophical" context or "political" context.

But I'd like to start a discussion on the nature of identity, while sharing some thoughts that I had, and asking to hear other's thoughts -- or at least, if a post would not suffice, book or paper recommendations on the topic.

I take it that identity is not something basic to our psychological makeup, even as individuals. There are more basic operations of the human mind than our identity, such as perception, memory, desires, or inclinations. I don't necessarily want to break identity down into these constituent parts because it seems plausible to me that even if identity is not "basic", it becomes something other to these basic psychological "preconditions" for identity -- it operates on rules of its own, rather than being just an epiphenomenon to more basic things. Perhaps I could call this the emergence-assumption for ease, mostly stated merely by intuition on my part (hence why I call it an assumption).

There seems to me to be three levels on which identity operates. There are the basic parts out of which identity is formed. There is the identity formed from these basic parts. And then there is the leap from said identity to an expressed identity. "basic parts" seem to consist largely of memories, stories about those memories (such as sequencing events and placing descriptions and people), and interpretations about said stories (what this story means). The basic parts are things we can reflect upon but which we don't strictly identify with. They are too impressionistic to identify with. But from a series of said basics, and through social pressures as well (which can certainly influence these basics) we form an identity. At this level of identity it seems that identity is that which is constructed, by social pressures we aren't really aware of as we develop, out of the basic impressionistic landscape of our memory. I would say this identity is quasi-subconscious, in the sense that we could set out to define it and discover it, but we don't need to. In fact it seems to me that in trying to find our identity we usually are engaged in the third level of identity, identity-expression. Here I would say that identity is a filter. We have our impressions coalesced into parts, as in the expression "a part of myself" (I wouldn't say the second level of identity is necessarily univocal, though it could be made so), and these parts are what we filter in particular situations, or in particular moods, or through mere experimentation, to have our identity-expression. This level of identity, so I would say, is recognizable by others. It is the journey from a "part of myself" to an expression that this layer of identity sits between, and is usually what we associate with individuality.

So, there are three levels of identity. There is the impression-identity, the social-parts-identity, and the expressive-identity; where each layer of identity emerges from the one prior.

Thoughts, recommendations, or isolated rants on the same subject are all encouraged ;). I'd be happy to read anything on the topic.

Mongrel

I take it that identity is not something basic to our psychological makeup, even as individuals. There are more basic operations of the human mind than our identity, such as perception, memory, desires, or inclinations. — Moliere

There's food for wonder there.... the notion that perception, memory, and desire are more fundamental than identity. Do you mean that a creature could have these things without being aware of being a unique individual? That would mean that what you mean by identity is awareness of it?

Cavacava

Identity is a logical concept x=y, the relationship between x and y is timeless. Persons exist in time and any attempt to explicate how the consistency of personal identity must be able to show how that consistency can persist over time. How a person at a certain age can possibly be construed to the same same person at a latter point in time.

You suggest that it involves three parts which are related to one another, with each emerging from the other:

There is the impression-identity, the social-parts-identity, and the expressive-identity; where each layer of identity emerges from the one prior.

So, physicality, social or psychological and a synthesis of these two, as the "expressive-identity".

If I've got that right then the question is how this stands up to the consistency of personal identity over time.

Our basic physicality changes over time. A man's body changes over time, how does one identify with what he was at 17 from what he is at 50? Perhaps this is where the social construction comes into play. We become identified by others in a kind of history of narratives we tell and we hear about ourselves from others. Maybe it is by intersections of these narratives that we form our self, which is constantly changing yet the dominant narrative remains the same. How we translate these narratives is based on our physical characteristics, our memory, our desires, our feelings, the characteristics that are given to us by genetics and the environment context where we find our self.

I think that personal identity is not so much identity as it is difference. Our ability to differentiate between one moment and the next, what we were versus what we are now. So the logical basis become that of non-contradiction and not equality.

Or perhaps our personal identity is not ours, but arises solely from what others tell us, their memories, their desires and their feelings. We learn a language, and we learn to associate words with referents and give them meanings, feelings, desires that are normative, but are felt to be particular to our self, even though they originate outside of us, and we construct our self and limit our self in this manner.

BC

I take it that identity is not something basic to our psychological makeup, even as individuals. There are more basic operations of the human mind than our identity, such as perception, memory, desires, or inclinations. — Moliere

I take it that identity is the core of our psychological makeup, and I agree there are more basic operations then identity. The most basic component of the mind are the genetic instructions that produce our bodies and shape the kinds of experiences we each can have. Sensory apparatus, memory capacity, desire--a host of features--rest on DNA.

Physical experiences, imagination, acquisition of knowledge (and exactly what knowledge is acquired), insights, social interactions (and exactly what social interactions), exactly what is learned (and not learned) and so forth contribute to a kernel of identity that is present from the beginning of a life. Children are evidently NOT blank chips which can just be encoded by parent, siblings, school, the community, religion, the military, et al--though everyone wants to take a crack at it. Each child is different at the beginning of the growth and maturation process and each one comes out the other end as unlike all the others. Among other things, each one's identity of "who I am" is unique--for better or for worse, stronger or weaker, pure or corruptible, controlling or live-and-let-live, shallow or deep, and so on.

Identity is always complexly multiply dimensioned, not entirely fixed, not entirely fluid. There are questions one can inquire of a person: "Do you put on different masks for different situations, or are you the same person from one situation to another" for example? Whether one has a closet full of masks or only the one face isn't 'good' or 'bad' but it reveals an important difference. "When may one lie and when must one tell the truth?" is another. There are many.

It is a mistake to say that one's identity is "gay" (or something else). I am Gay, and a couple dozen other attributes that are about as non-negotiable. I "let go of grudges", I am "risk tolerant", I am thrifty. These are parts of my identity that have been there for as long as I can remember. DNA might very well determine whether we are gay or straight, risk tolerant or not, and how much we are able to forget. Out of things that DNA can determine come features of identity that DNA can't determine, like "being a Republican" and "a fundamentalist evangelical" which are tied to low ambiguity tolerance, a streak of authoritarianism, and at least mild stupidity.

Moliere

There's food for wonder there.... the notion that perception, memory, and desire are more fundamental than identity. Do you mean that a creature could have these things without being aware of being a unique individual? — Mongrel

I would agree with that statement. Certainly perception and memory, though I'm a little more uncertain about desire -- however, for the sake of argument and consistency, I'm happy to adopt that stance. It certainly fits what I've said.

That would mean that what you mean by identity is awareness of it?

I don't think so. Could you explain how that follows?

It seems to me that awareness of our identity is separate from the tripartite division of identity-formation and expression. Awareness of one's identity would probably fit in with identity-expression, in that these tokens would be our first indicators about who we are when we reflect upon who we are and want to know that. But it seems to me that a person could get along with their life without self-awareness while still having a complete identity.

mcdoodle

what you mean by identity is awareness of it? — Mongrel

That certainly seems to apply in dementia: one's self-identity floats away, sometimes with traumatic interruptions en route. 'You are not my child,' says the mother to the daughter, 'she never comes to visit.' If one no longer has anchoring longer-term memories to which to relate one's perceptions, one loses one's self of oneself. And yet, as Moliere says (interesting thread Moliere), up to then the person might well have got along without thinking much about self-awareness.

The second train of thought I have is autobiographical. I moved to a new town where I knew absolutely no-one ten years ago. In an odd way I have constructed a new identity - while eventually emerging from the darkness I was in 10 years ago, to reconnect with friends In knew in my old identity too. Yet of course the experiencing animal feels like 'the same' one, and there are various character traits or dispositions which seem shared between the old and new fellow.

In past times, before formalised State-monitored identity developed early in the 20th century, I think this happened more often, that you could move to a new place, take on a new name and begin again, with only you knowing what was 'the same' about the two personas.

One other thought: the rational part of us has a strong urge to ascribe some logic to personal identity. But to my mind an individual human being is rarely that consistent: sometimes they will do something that directly contradicts something else they do or have done. The human creature does what it can in each particular set of circumstances to get by, and rationalisations come later.

Moliere

Or perhaps our personal identity is not ours, but arises solely from what others tell us, their memories, their desires and their feelings. We learn a language, and we learn to associate words with referents and give them meanings, feelings, desires that are normative, but are felt to be particular to our self, even though they originate outside of us, and we construct our self and limit our self in this manner. — Cavacava

I generally think that our personal identity is not ours (to who would said identity belong? Another identity? It seems that "ours" is tied to "identity" to my mind) -- but I wouldn't say that it arises solely from what others. It seems to me that people are formed by social pressures, but also -- in spite of this -- can feel alienated by their social situation, or feel that "who they are" is in conflict with society.

But, yes, I would say that my view of identity is not one of continuity. There's an odd feeling that who I am today is the same person as who I was 10 years ago, but it's an odd feeling because it's so clearly not the case. I don't think I have an explanation for this feeling of continuity. Probably a weakness in some of my thoughts there. I'd say, in general though, that my opinions about identity fall more into "it's a construct" camp, and that one of the major forces in making that construct is outside of who we are (even historically speaking, prior to there being an "I") but that we still feel like, in spite of this, it is our/my-self.

Moliere

↪Bitter Crank

I couldn't say that I believe DNA is as central to identity as you seem to. What leads you to believe that DNA is so central? When you say:

Physical experiences, imagination, acquisition of knowledge (and exactly what knowledge is acquired), insights, social interactions (and exactly what social interactions), exactly what is learned (and not learned) and so forth contribute to a kernel of identity that is present from the beginning of a life. — Bitter Crank

Are these the things which DNA builds?

Mind, I would still say there's such a thing as not choosing who you are. (choice presupposes identity -- there's an actor with agency who chooses, after all.) I just don't think I'd link it to DNA.

BC

↪Moliere

DNA sets the table. It doesn't program us, it gives us basic capacities, among which is the capacity to respond to experience. How well we can respond to experience is directed by DNA. What else but genetic instructions would guide the construction and function of the brain?

I would still say there's such a thing as not choosing who you are. — Moliere

I agree: we don't get to choose our parents. Neither do we get to choose the in utero environment; we don't get to choose much of anything for quite a while once we are born--and during that time others are making choices for us, willy nilly. Clearly, the child has been fathered by a multitude of different influences.

One could claim that it is all experience and DNA doesn't matter, if it weren't for evidence to the contrary. The lives of individual cells (gut, brain, skin, etc.) respond to the environment, but how does a cell manage it's response? DNA is always active in cells, giving instructions, suppressing one thing, expressing something else, even directing the cell to dispose of itself.

How well a neuron makes connections with other neurons (in a cascade of connections) is controlled by DNA and shaped by environment. We sadly or mercifully don't remember telephone numbers given to us at the bar because alcohol interferes with memory. We might try to remember this hunks number, but alas, our blood alcohol level is so high we won't even remember who gave us the number if we did write it down. (My number collecting days goes back to when people still smoked in bars and one had match books on which to write numbers...before cell phones that could document the whole thing.)

One person takes a sun bath and gets a tan; someone else does the same thing and gets skin cancer. Why? DNA.

Our identity is made for us, but it is ours none the less, and is either beyond remodeling after a certain point, or remodel-able only through the most strenuous possible efforts (and maybe not even then).

Moliere

What else but genetic instructions would guide the construction and function of the brain? — Bitter Crank

The in utero environment, for one, but also the social environment into which said brain functions is born into and develops within.

I wouldn't claim that DNA doesn't matter. Mine is a more reserved hesitation which would grant DNA, but is uncertain about its centrality, given that we don't form an identity just by having a brain but only within a social sphere. And also, merely a hesitation. It seems that there's a lot of steps from the DNA giving a basis for RNA giving a basis for proteins giving construction to. . . well, the different cells. I actually wouldn't know the steps after that. But my hesitation is based on this knowledge of the sheer complexity involved from DNA to even a single neuron forming, which doesn't touch on how multiple neurons might then be related to the formation of an identity. That isn't to say that we can't understand these things, though -- I just would say I'm ignorant and would want more information before subscribing to a theory of identity where DNA plays a central role.

I suppose I do mean a fully formed, adult identity when I say "identity". Though one could say that a minimilist theory of identity would be when a person forms a belief where the world is separate from myself. But I don't think that we are born with that belief, even if it seems to come pretty early on in our formation.

Our identity is made for us, but it is ours none the less, and is either beyond remodeling after a certain point, or remodel-able only through the most strenuous possible efforts (and maybe not even then). — Bitter Crank

What makes you say that?

I don't even necessarily disagree, mind. I wouldn't say that just because something is constructed that it is remodelable, per se. A marriage, for instance, is built by two people, but can be ruined beyond repair because we have a specific history and sequence of events which aren't ever going to change.

Moliere

That certainly seems to apply in dementia: one's self-identity floats away, sometimes with traumatic interruptions en route. 'You are not my child,' says the mother to the daughter, 'she never comes to visit.' If one no longer has anchoring longer-term memories to which to relate one's perceptions, one loses one's self of oneself. And yet, as Moliere says (interesting thread Moliere), up to then the person might well have got along without thinking much about self-awareness. — mcdoodle

Could you speak more about this? I'm still having trouble connecting awareness to identity, even with the example of dementia. Perhaps this is because I think of awareness as withing the context of Searle's discussions on consciousness -- where the term refers to our ability to focus or unfocus our mind upon various things within our environment or mind. I gather that awareness and memory are actually linked in this way of referring to awareness, though.

The second train of thought I have is autobiographical. I moved to a new town where I knew absolutely no-one ten years ago. In an odd way I have constructed a new identity - while eventually emerging from the darkness I was in 10 years ago, to reconnect with friends In knew in my old identity too. Yet of course the experiencing animal feels like 'the same' one, and there are various character traits or dispositions which seem shared between the old and new fellow. — mcdoodle

That's true. I think there's a sense of being a new person when you move like that, as you note at the beginning. I certainly empathize with what you say there.

One other thought: the rational part of us has a strong urge to ascribe some logic to personal identity. But to my mind an individual human being is rarely that consistent: sometimes they will do something that directly contradicts something else they do or have done. The human creature does what it can in each particular set of circumstances to get by, and rationalisations come later. — mcdoodle

I agree, though I might call some instances of rationlisation as going against someone's identity. I don't necessarily believe that just because someone says something about themself, sincerely, that they are correct. (which isn't to say that I'm in a better position to know what is correct, only that they can say false things).

But, yes, I think most individuals are inconsistent. I wouldn't call this a fractured identity, either, but would say that this points to the complexity of identity. As in, it's quite normal for people to be inconsistent with themselves across time in some sort of axiomatic sense of consistency.

BC

Our identity is made for us, but it is ours none the less, and is either beyond remodeling after a certain point, or remodel-able only through the most strenuous possible efforts (and maybe not even then). — Bitter Crank

What makes you say that? — Moliere

That "our identity is made for us" is an observation of other people, particularly children. One sees the parents actively contributing to the child's identity; one sees differences in newborns--they aren't all alike. One sees familial commonalities, and commonalities based on community.

That it is hard to remodel identity is a first hand experience. I have felt like the same person for a very long time (not 70 years, since I wasn't thinking about "who am I, anyway?" straight out of the womb). I don't know at what age I ceased being passive clay and started being more self directed. Too far back for reliable memory. But I have felt continuous. Changed? Sure. I've lost quite a bit of fire-in-the-belly I used to have, but the kinds of thinking I find myself doing have been going on for at least 50 years.

Nature/Nurture, Constructionist/Essentialist... We have different approaches here. You give more weight to nurture and favor a constructionist approach. Your approach is as workable as my more nature and essentialist approach. They are equally workable because in fact, both processes are always engaged in permutations often too complex for us to follow in detail.

It's possible, have to admit, that identity may not be equally fixed for every person. It's fixed and been solidly anchored for me. Bedrock stable identity may not always be a virtue or an advantage. There were times I wished I could construct a different identity -- it just didn't work.

mcdoodle

Could you speak more about this? I'm still having trouble connecting awareness to identity, even with the example of dementia. Perhaps this is because I think of awareness as withing the context of Searle's discussions on consciousness -- where the term refers to our ability to focus or unfocus our mind upon various things within our environment or mind. I gather that awareness and memory are actually linked in this way of referring to awareness, though. — Moliere

Actually this relates to something I've been mooching about and pondering: 'the familiar'. This is my keyboard that I spilt grapefruit juice on, my view out of the window, my partner downstairs. The people and trappings of my world are familiar to me, some mingling of perception and memory. When I go out walking I'm struck by how moving here to the Pennines has made the strange become familiar, and part of me: I am the landscape I move through, when I repeat and repeat and repeat. Ideas about myself are then analogous to this, an inner furniture. Ah yes: that's my sexual peccadillo, those were my most foolish moments, this is my ethical stance on this, that was what I used to think.

I presume dementia makes the formerly familiar into the unfamiliar, both in the world around us and within. And yet until it gets very bad the demented often still know their way around, with know-how, they can find the loo and the kettle for tea-making, but they can't remember how they come to know, i.e. in Ryle's terms knowing-that-for-a-reason seems to have gone. People are kind and claim they're related to you, who knows why they are doing this?

unenlightened

My favourite topic; it's all about me.

By identity I mostly mean the psychological phenomenon where we, as humans, feel like we are this or that category, or the kind of person who does such-and-such, or expresses in particular ways ... — Moliere

A great start. It follows that we are not talking directly about character as nature, or the facts of being. A stone has hardness and crystalline structure, a unique shape and size, etc, but no psychology and hence no identity, though we can identify it.

I prefer generally to talk about 'identification', something we do, to ourselves and to others, which becomes what wethink we are; note that I might think I am a jolly fine fellow, when in fact I am an arsehole, (or vice versa).

It is also important to distinguish personal identity and social identity. The writ of personal identity does not always run: I identify as a philosopher, but if the admins disagree, I don't get to philosophise here.

There is an interplay between the social and the personal identities that is crucial. This has been discussed elsewhere on the site as it pertains to race and gender. There are facts of skin colour and reproductive organs and DNA, which one would be wise to accept as part of one's personal identity. Furthermore, there are social implications of those facts that one cannot ignore; it doesn't matter how jewish or un-jewish one is or feels, if Hitler says you are a Jew, you'd better take it seriously. But in this case, one can certainly and legitimately resist the social identification becoming a personal identity. Thus one can accept the fact of a penis, and the social necessities thereof, but still identify as really a woman. One can still proclaim that black lives matter, even though it is quite apparent that they don't in the society.

Wosret

Identities are the categories we instinctively subsume ourselves under in discourse. They're a history of making friends and enemies, receiving positive and negative re-enforcement, being inspired and enchanted, horrified and disillusioned.

Because things are largely superficially identified, we stack the deck by exaggerating, and performing what we think exemplars of our identities are, and when we think we've nailed it, or at least good enough, then we just do that forever now, and don't really think about it.

photographer

We are who we are Moliere: this is the truth of existentialism, that while there is no escape from what we are, there is no refuge there either. The paradox of identity, perhaps best viewed as autopoesis, is in becoming who we are: it is an unfolding. Without delving too deeply into the philosophical problem, identity straddles logic, appearing both as a pre-logical capacity and as an attribute - but always as a trivial or contradictory one.

Cavacava

The identity question has to answered if ethical responsibly is to be asserted. How am I to be held responsible for my actions if I am not the same person today as I was when the action was performed.

My psychology, my history and my body all change over time, yet I am held responsible for what I have done...how is that possible given that I am not what I was.

I think ethical concerns must yield a theory that is logical/metaphysically based if any idea of a moral agent is to make sense. There are logical issues with identity as psychological, biologically, or narratively considered. Derek Parfit's arguments are daunting http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/

unenlightened

Personal Construct theory was never very popular, in large part, I think, because the statistical analysis of repertory grids is fairly horrendous for us soft-scientists. But its mere existence as the formalisation of metapsychology is interesting in this context. It concerns itself with the analysis of the conceptual foundation of the individual's classification scheme for themselves and others.

Two particular aspects are particularly significant for questions of identity: (1) the dimensionality of one's schema, and (2) the 'distance' between oneself and one's ideal.

I can say a bit more if anyone is interested, but it is the 'meta' aspect that I want to draw immediate attention to. To identify is to differentiate; to have an identity is to identify and distinguish others also. It is, therefore, to already have a theory of mind.

noAxioms

The identity question has to answered if ethical responsibly is to be asserted. How am I to be held responsible for my actions if I am not the same person today as I was when the action was performed. — Cavacava

I don't think ethical responsibility hangs on the same sort of identity as numeric identity.

A. I have primary ethical responsibility to myself, meaning that I eat for the benefit of future instances of me, not for myself now. I (now) must bear the consequences of decisions made by past versions of me, even if I don't share numeric identity with them. I have not starved, but this here scar is one I must bear. Secondary ethical responsibility is defined by society, and it works the same way, with no requirement for continuity of numeric identity.

B. Our society defines the ethical rules, and those rules are very dependent on a significant subjective correspondence between legal identity and numeric identity. Subjectively, a person seems to be the same legal entity throughout his life, and so concepts such as ownership and ethical responsibility have meaning. This would not work for say, a society of amoebas where there is no concept of correspondence of numeric identity between some amoeba now and an amoeba in the past who might have done something or deserves something.

My personal view assigns a numeric identity to what is effectively an event, coupled with a history of prior events in a direct causal historic chain. So since my marriage is part of my history, I can say that I indeed was married, even though I do not share numeric identity with the younger person actually at that ceremony. The definition is somewhat awkward, but it fits in better with my B-series preference as a view of time.

BC

DNA, of course, maintains cellular continuity. Our neurons in the brain don't turn over, apparently, but some new ones can be added, and the connections among the neurons change as we learn and forget. What specific individuals perceive and remember varies from person to person. Ten eye-witnesses of one event sometimes have very divergent accounts of what they "saw". Sometimes people don't see anything, even though it is happening right in front of them.

It's possible our mental continuity is weaker than we would like to think. It's quite possible (probable?) we aren't experiencing what the quite similar person sitting next to us is experiencing. Worse, it's possible that we aren't even experiencing what we think we are experiencing. Still, we feel that our identity as such-and-such-a-person is stable now, was stable yesterday, and will be stable tomorrow, within a reasonable confidence level.

Memory ties identity together over time. We know this, because when people lose their memories (like from alzheimers disease, they forget their children, their spouses, and eventually, who they are. They don't know, anymore. Their identity has disappeared for them--and if it has disappeared for them, hasn't their identity disappeared for us to? Who is a person who no longer knows who they are? Memory isn't perfect, even in very healthy people with otherwise excellent brain function, and therefore our identities can't be "perfect".

Are the imperfections of memory, and identity, the reason many people hold on to many mementos of their past--the first grade report cards, early toys, and all that 'stuff' from their life? Does it help assure them of who they are? My own belief is that none of this stuff is necessary as long as one's memory is working reasonably well. when memory fails, these mementos aren't going to help very much. One has to remember the significance of the memory aids.

Cavacava

Yes & no to numerical identity, rather sameness. Both quantitative and qualitative sameness seem to rely on the notion of numeral identity.

A) You are assuming what needs to be proved.
"In other words, I can remember only my own experiences, but it is not my memory of an experience that makes it mine; rather, I remember it only because it's already mine. So while memory can reveal my identity with some past experiencer, it does not make that experiencer me." (Stanford)

B) Suppose I am a criminal who is close to capture. I find a brilliant neurosurgeon capable of transferring my brain into the body of someone who's brain is dead, at the same time putting the dead brain into my body. Both transfers are successful, then which one is me (legally or logically)

Mongrel

Their identity has disappeared for them--and if it has disappeared for them, hasn't their identity disappeared for us to? Who is a person who no longer knows who they are? — Bitter Crank

They're kind of child-like because we have to feed them. Violently insane people seem more like wild animals... but again, like adults do with children, we keep talking to them... as if maybe they'll spontaneously start understanding and become a person again... when actually we're just waiting for the sedation to start working.

I think talk of identity is so embedded in language that things start becoming circular when we try to discuss it (or just dead-end in ontology which is apt to be no more than posturing).

It's better to aim at it with fiction or poetry. Or some other strange artform like the movie Synecdoche, New York. Anybody see that?

Cavacava

Hey Mongrel.

I have not seen Synecdoche, New York, but I am watching Awake on Netflix. In Awake a man his wife and their son are involved in a car accident. He awakes to two distinct 'realities', in one his wife dies and he is left with his son, in the other their son dies and he is left with his wife.

He still lives basically the same reality. He is a detective and is forced to under go therapy in both realities. His respective therapists tell him the other reality is unreal, a psychological preservation technique. He apparently likes to still have his wife & son still around.

It gets kinda trippy at times but which one is 'real'...I am on episode 6, I think...and there is no clear winner at this point. I am enjoying it.

Mongrel

↪Cavacava

I saw that a while back. I remember it being weird and poignant.

Wosret

The core identity is made of values (the character of a person), which are all but unalterable, even to the alzheimer sufferer. The narrative identity is constantly in flux, for everyone. Memory facilitates the continuity of narrative identity through selective forgetting just as much as remembering.

Unluckily for my deceptive biology though, I have a photojournalistic memory.

noAxioms

"In other words, I can remember only my own experiences, but it is not my memory of an experience that makes it mine; rather, I remember it only because it's already mine. So while memory can reveal my identity with some past experiencer, it does not make that experiencer me." (Stanford) — Cavacava

About this Stanford quote, I would have said "reveal my relation with some past experiencer..."
The quote seems concerned with numeric identity, but I don't see the logic here being useful in deciding why some human should be held responsible for an action taken by that past remembered experiencer. The legal definition is not a qualitative one either. I am qualitatively little like my 7 year old self with whom I don't share numeric identity, but I'm still guilty of stealing that cookie that day.

As for the brain switch, such scenarios challenge the legal definitions which depend on a more cohesive causal continuity between the act and the person being held responsible for the act. So the legal definition is suddenly open to challenge, as it would be with several other scenarios involving copies and merges. We're forced to ask the amoeba people how they've dealt with such problems all along, but they just have no concept of legal connection to an event done by a different identity.

The numeric identity is unaffected by any of this, at least the way I define it. Each separate instance (event) of a person is a separate identity. The surgery is irrelevant to it.

Cavacava

I think to hold a person responsible for his actions that person must have performed those actions. There seems to be a need to identify a moral agent as the same person over time.

These concepts form the basis of the legal system, how we asses blame and why a person can be held liable for their actions. A concept of identity must be integral to a system of law, as a necessary condition for any laws.

noAxioms

And that's why they don't allow philosophical testimony in court, and also why the amoeba people wouldn't have a legal system recognizable to us. I did in fact perform my past actions. It all rests on the legal definition of identity, not the mathematical one, nor the qualitative one. The legal definition depends on the historic causal continuity of identity which currently happens to be a trait of humans, but not of amoebas, and not of humans if subjective cloning or surgical part swapping is sufficiently advanced.

Subjective cloning (my term) is what an amoeba does. It splits in two, and while neither is more obviously the original, both can look at (be in the presence of) each other. Non-subjective cloning is where you can't look at your clone, so functionally, each clone proceeds as if the event never took place. Typically, moral responsibility is cloned along with the the subject, so legal responsibility is not challenged by this sort of cloning. Each clone must account for the now cloned offense, without ambiguity about which one is the actual guilty one. Either form of cloning makes a hash of numeric identity, but the latter does not destroy legal identity. Hence my being guilty of the cookie pilfering decades ago despite not sharing numeric identity with that 7 year old. I share legal identity with him, meaning I did in fact do the act. That's what legal identity is. I in fact did this. I own this, and this is my job, spouse, etc.

I also mention 'historic causal continuity' above. The concept only works in the past. I, in fact, am a causal result of the state of noAxioms at the beginning of 2015, despite not sharing numeric identity with that state, nor qualitative identity. I only share legal identity. It doesn't work in the future view. Not even an all-knowing God can know what my personal future holds because I don't have one if that numeric-identity non-subjective cloning is possible. So there is 'the future' for me, there is only several different futures, each of which (not one of which) can claim me now as their direct-causal past self. 10 different people will in fact share identity with me, which is why the identity is not mathematical.

For the record, I think I very much get cloned, and often. I find the alternative even harder to swallow. Hence my being forced into philosophical separation of numeric, qualitative, and legal identities. This totally mucks with the concept of objective identity, meaning if dualism is a thing, the mind needs to be cloned with the physical, and I cannot have a relationship with a singular objective entity like God. There is no unique me to get into heaven.

mcdoodle

Or some other strange artform like the movie Synecdoche, New York. Anybody see that? — Mongrel

I saw that. If I close my eyes I still see the real world of that movie crumbling, revealing itself to be a set. I assume this may happen at the moment of death: suddenly strips appear in what you thought was the endless sky, and the cars turn into papier mache.

Most recently by the same Charlie Kaufman creature, 'Anomalisa' was somewhat about identity too, the subtlest puppet work since I don't know when :)

mcdoodle

Personal Construct theory was never very popular, in large part, I think, because the statistical analysis of repertory grids is fairly horrendous for us soft-scientists. But its mere existence as the formalisation of metapsychology is interesting in this context. — unenlightened

Thanks for this, I'm afraid I was previously ignorant of the whole theory. I like the whole concept that each person's psychology might be built up from how they regard the identity of others - if I've grasped it aright (and I've looked it up on Wikipedia, so now I'm an Internet expert). Running with the idea, it strikes me that big P Psychology might be a whole matrix of everyone's theories about other people.

photographer

On a very simplistic level, our ability to narrativize ourselves requires speech, which is inherently social. But on a deeper ontological level there's a need to at least examine the possibility that there is an anonymous self that precedes the narrative. In general the post-structuralist answer is no, we (like everything) amount to a web of differences.

Identity

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