I find neither are a good basis for ethics. Majority opinions have been terribly wrong in their collective judgement countless times. — Tzeentch

You confuse intersubjectivity with majority opinion. Not every vote counts in this forum as not everyone has the moral maturity or argumentative acumen to value and weigh the reasons set forth. You may not find it a good basis for ethics, but it is the only basis we got in a real world instead of an ideal one.

Principle: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning. — Tzeentch

In that sense we do not have such fundamental truths. All truth is temporary, especially those concerning the social world and ethics is social, ethics is about the way we comport ourselves to that which is 'other'. Therefore it takes two to tango.

What context do you propose, then? Whenever our subjective judgement deems it desirable to commit violence? Whenever a lot of people agree it is desirable to commit violence? I find none of these particularly convincing. — Tzeentch

Whether the arguments that I propose for me committing violence are sound or not, meaning that they are understandable and plausible for others who have seen enough of such situations to be able to weigh them and imagine what they would do were they in my shoes. My outlook on ethics seems rather Aristotelian in that sense.

That does not mean I absolutely shun your preference for 'principles' in the sense that you like to use them. However they have to be applicable to the real world. Say you and I agree that 'violence is unethical', what can it mean? In your view it means that every use of violence is unethical. I find that unconvincing because I can citer many instances in which it seems that violence is not only the right thing to do, it seems even the necessary thing to do in such a situation. If we than say "ahhh but it is unethical!", then ethics simply becomes a system of restraint, kind of like the place of sin in religion.

What it means to say that 'violence is unethical' in a way that it can be informative and yet retain some of its context inependent quality is to say that "we should strive for a world without violence, because in an ideal world violence is not necessary". In that sense I would agree with you. In practice however we need rules to allow for violence when necessary. In a sense this ethical discussion mirrors he perennial problem of metaphysics how to cross over from the ideal into the real.

You don’t know right from wrong? You can study laws until the cows come home, but if you do not know right from wrong, just from unjust, you could not know whether the laws are right or wrong or just and unjust. You’re simply abiding by dictate, not reason or any sense of justice. The idea that law dictates right or wrong, Justice or injustice, is not only absolutist, but an appeal to authority. — NOS4A2

We have an intuition of right and wrong, we feel pleasure we feel pain. However, we will have to teach a child to share the things he gets with others, we teach kindness, we teach also how to punish in moderation. Both ethics and law are not learned by just being in the world. Which is good or I'd be out of a job.

I’m not speaking about the state, though it is certainly one arbiter of justice. Anyone can be just and any amount of people can determine whether an act is just or not. To leave all that to the state is not too bright, for the reasons you mention. — NOS4A2

Great, sure any amount of people can do it right, like the KKK, marvelous at determining what is right. angry mobs in general, such judge of character. Do tell, what innate wisdom has granted each individual man the ability to tell right from wrong and the ability to meat out fair and just punishment? In my nick of the words, we feel that a law study and then an extra three year education is on order.

The principle is justice. With his actions he has proven he isn’t deserving of human life and dignity. — NOS4A2

And who defines what justice is? Probably in your case the belove framers... why anyone would consider the word of 18th century well to do farmers as gospel is beyond me, anyway, different topic. Problem is that if the state likes to show it cares so much about human life and dignity, why does it act in flagrant and open contradiction of it? The state sends mixed signals. Categorically unethical that is ;) No, simply not warranted on whatever ethical maxim there is. There might be only one, the crudest one, the satisfaction of the brutish masses.

The issue is that in this example, one is using their own subjective judgement to determine what is merited. By doing so, one must also accept when another uses their subjective judgement to do the same, unless one wishes to argue their judgement is somehow more special than others.

What you end up with is a world in which people constantly use violence against one another, and wonder why others are doing the same to them. That's what we see throughout history. — Tzeentch

No. I use my subjective judgment and I am prepared to defend it in front of an intersubjective forum of people who get to judge my actions and I provide reasons for it in full conviction that they will agree with me. It is not my subjective judgment that is key here, but intersubjective judgment. That is why the question is important that Proof would accept my reasoning or not for not saving him. (sorry 180 Proof you are under constant threat of death in my examples, fortunately it is only an example.) I use my judgment in the service of people (or other creatures) not ethical maxims.

What you end up with is a world in which people constantly use violence against one another, and wonder why others are doing the same to them. That's what we see throughout history. — Tzeentch

No, what we see throughout history is the constant marginalisation of violence as a means to settle interpersonal conflict.

The point of an ethical principle is that it is context independent.

Like I said to ↪john27, if we need to ask why following ethical principles is even important at all, then this will not be very constructive. An ethical discussion presupposes they matter to us. — Tzeentch

Yes principles matter to us, but I disagree that ethical principles are or can be context independent. Principles are rules of thumb, accepted wisdom that holds true most of the time, but not all the time. They guide our courses of action, not prescribe them.

Of course what is up for debate is what these ethical principles are, and I've just shared a rather bold one; violence is categorically unethical. I'm sure you will try to find grounds to disagree, and that is why we're here. — Tzeentch

Yes, but the disagreement lies not in challenging the notion that if there are categorical principles, than violence may be considered categorically unethical. I argue on the other hand that there are no context independen principles, or at least that context may require us to act not in accordance to a principle. Therefore it may be ethical to act in disregard of the principle that violence is unethical. i.e. to commit violence.

So the state responds by showing disregard for human life and dignity.... great.

I would even say it is ethical when used in the service of justice, for instance, with the death penalty. — NOS4A2

Under what principle, context dependent or otherwise would the death penalty be justified?

↪Tobias If one believes violence can turn into a right whenever it suits one's desires, then we've entered the typical slippery slope that ends at "might makes right". — Tzeentch

Yes, but that is a big if. I do not think that violence can turn into a rigt whenever it suits me or my whims. My desire must be one that itself aims at the greater good. Is that hard to establish? Yes sure. That is why I would answer negative to John's latter question, is violence ethical when it is used to steer a society in a good direction. However not all situations have that degree of difficulty. the weighing of interests between Proof's life and John's broken nose is a pretty easy one to make. (provided that proof is not threatening to blow up a city or whatever). Why should I refrain from making this calculation and acting accordingly, in the name of some kind of pie in the sky context independent ethical maxim?

No, but my wrong was the right thing to do. That might make it a right.

I imagine how this conversation would go. "Sorry Proof, I have to let John slit your throat from ear to ear... I could nog John in the face I could, would knock him out cold, but that would be kinda unethical, I am sure you would understand right, being a long term member of PF and all"

You think 180 Proof would understand my reasoning?

Violence is categorically unethical. While in some cases its use may be understandable it does not change its nature, namely to force someone to act in accordance to one's own desires through physical force. If that is not unethical, nothing is.

Even in the case of self-defense, its use must not be regarded as a victory, but as a personal defeat. — Tzeentch

What if the desires of the other are unethical and my violence stops him from bringing these desires into effective action?

No, I see what you're saying. Perhaps in the question of ethical reform, or societal reform, are acts of injury permissible? — john27

Ahhh, see that is a different question and will indeed beget different answers. None of mine yet as I have to get back to work.

I suppose then it wouldn't necessarily be violence, but a physical act of control. However, violence is often brutal, and sometimes justifiable not necessarily ethical. I guess maybe a more accurate question would be, is the act of inflicting injury upon someone else ethical? — john27

Same answer. When your threaten to slit Proof's' throat from ear to ear with the flick knife you are wielding and I punch you in the face disarming you, then my 'act of control' amounts to inflicting injury aka violence, maybe even public violence if this were to happen in the street. Is this justified? Legally it is. (I know of no legal system which would convict in this case). Is it ethical? I think saving Proof''s life is an ethical action. hitting you might be unethical in normal circumstances but it was the appropriate means to a right end. In my book this would be a form of ethical violence.

How could we complete/reform the question? — john27

Well first I think you need an indication beyond yes and no. Is violence always ethical, sometimes ethical, never ethical, now it becomes a yes or no question as if there are two flavours possible, yes violence is ethical, no it is not. Whereas here I think midddle grounds are possible. I think the responses would also be batter if you limit the question to a certain ethical theory. "I violence always unethical according to Kantian ethics?" The problem here is that people will jsut tell you there own observations but as you yourself pointed out already, many meanings are still unclear, for instance the difference between justifiable and ethical.

s justifiable and ethical the same thing? — john27

Well justifiable is a legal term, so when violence is justified depends on the system of law. Whether violence is ethical depends on what ethical theory one follows. "is violence ethical?" Is actually an incomplete question. Firstly because the answer is rather straight forward, in no ethical system is violence per se ethical, all frown upon it, but then the thornier question becomes: when is violence considered ethical. This depends on one's system of ethics. A utilitarian might for instance argue in favour of torturing a terrorist in case of a ticking time bomb scenario, whereas a Kantian would argue against.

I tend to take a rather casuistic approach in such matters, because I do not believe in context independent ethical systems and generally take recourse to law, a field that has more experience in casustic conflict resolution than ethics. Therefore my argument would be that the default position is that violence is unethical, but there might be cases in which it may be ethical to use force.

Is violence ethical, and if so, when and where? — john27

Well in general it is not, it hurts people. Generally it is not nice to hurt people. It can be ethical, when it saves someone (or many) from a greater hurt. Even in that case it not always is, but sometimes violence is justified, unless you are a very strict Kantian perhaps.

There is no way we could keep the mass of humanity alive, that fills the earth today, without technology. We would not have growing populations of long-lived people without technology. We could not have the economies that enable us to provide a decent standard of living for so many people without technology.
However, technology is not science, and technology without wisdom can destroy life on this planet.
We need more than education for technology. We need a classical/liberal education as well so we have the wisdom to use our technology well. If we can achieve this before it is too late is questionable. This is going to be a tight horse race and either we will enter a New Age, a time of high tech and peace, and the end of tyranny, or we won't. It depends on how well the masses are educated. With the media we have today, there is no excuse for doing as poorly as we have done. — Athena

It is a funny thing. Athena is also my favorite Greek goddess and if I will ever have a daughter I will lobby to give her the name Athena. I do see the value in a good classical education which I too have enjoyed. Therefore, I am not attacking democracy or enlightenment values. I look at these things from a sociological perspective, which type of society do I see emerging and what lines of argument do I see 'winning' in the argumentative arena. In your OP you called for a more ecological worldview, at least it seemed to me and you used arguments which you seemed to hint at argument which you also see (rather crude) environmentalists make. "Our technology is upsetting the natural balance of life and in order to avert destruction we have to use technology differently, namely in the service of the environment and restore the balance with nature that was present in the past". I do not know if you were going along that path, but it seemed like it.

You do argue in a similar vein as they do. They of course have the best intentions with this world, as you undoubtedly also do. The problem is that they often use terms that remain vague or obscure. For instance 'wisdom'. sure, we need wisdom, what can be wrong with that? But what does it mean in this context? You say science is not technology, but they are often intertwined. The vaccine against corona is a cooperation between the science of biology and the technology to use this science in an applied way. One is not seperable from the other. Education is another term you keep vague. Yes, a liberal education, but what will be in it? Will we tell the tale of how we managed to increase longevity eradicate hunger and poverty from large sections of the world, or will we tell the tael of ecological degradation, nuclear warheads and the eradication of cultures and biodiversity?

My warning to you is, maybe you cannot have your cake and eat it too. You want democracy and humanist values and you complain that we have now 'become like Hitler Germany', but especially the manichean battle against chaos you mention was a trope for Hitler Germany. The relationship between National socialist thought and green thought is far from clear. You equate national socialism with blind technology, but especially that is what a thinker like Martin Heidegger characerized the US in the 1930s of. In Hitler Germany he saw a 'third way', a rejuvenation, against technology! If anything Hitler Germany was not anti-Green. So the problem is, even though you want the good for the world and you think your points are helping it come about, you might end up with something that is not so amenable to democracy and enlightenment at all.

Well, fate might dictate that I die tomorrow because (parts of) a satellite came down from the sky. That was not in my or anyone's plans, actually a rather rare and random freak accident, yet fated. Free will is even more disorderly. Suddenly someone might decide to change plans and crash the airpane in which I was flying into a mountain range. Again not part of anyone's plans but the pilots and probably causing massive disruption to all kinds of neatly ordered time tables. Very disorderly this free will is.

Personally, I do not believe in free will, read intention, nor do I believe in fate. It all seems much less orderly to me. — boagie

Fate is not necessarily orderly. Free will seems very disorderly... Even less orderly? You believe you might be a pink fluffy elephant named FuFu tomorrow?

If you don't believe me, look at the contents of your hard drive on your computer. Does not the signed copy of your mortgage agreement occupy kilobytes of space on your drive? — Harry Hindu

If that be true than whether the morgage is stipulated in Word or in PDF would make a difference to the motrgage, since it will occupy a diffferent amount kilobytes of space on my hard drive. However, it does not. Likewise if Banno's morgtgage would somehow be eradicated from his harddrive and from the hardrive of the company he has a mortgage from, that would somehow destroy Banno's obligation to pay. That however is false.

Using these definitions of object and space, objects and space would be the medium of change. — Harry Hindu

I could subscribe to this though. Every change has a certain material aspect. Even if I conclude a mortgage, it will have some effect on the pathways engraved in my mind. That oes not mean a mortgage is that pathway or that change is a property of space.

I'm more after a humanistic positivity, something that stems from ourselves, something we can relate to. Kind of like an atheist dream: to live efficiently and well, even if there is no purpose. — john27

Yes, but is that not what environmentalism might offer? If you are after a rejuvenation of the enlightenment spirit of progres, then I think you are fighting the rear guard battle as we say in the Netherlands. It is twilight of the enlightened idols my friend.

Well, what kind of positivity do you need? I think the ecological shift brings great possibilities and threats. One of the questions I am grappling with is the question whether ecological thinking can provide new ideals that can give us a unified sense of purpose. To me ecology is metaphysics, 'deus sive natura', but not thought from God as the main point of departure, but nature, natura sive deus. Ecological awareness may well lead to a new kind of relationship between man and his surroundings, much like Athena describes in the OP and present in the thought of indigenous peoples. They are all the rage nowadays in academia. So it might well lead to a more kind world, hopefully.

What I am suspicious of is using the old Crhistian or Manichean tropes to think of this relations. It is all fire and brimstone, war, and if we are lucky, mercy by a force which we cannot tame. These types of thought are cause of all this mishap, not the answer I think.

If we don't want birds to fall from the sky, seas to devour, superstorms to rage, sweet water to taste bitter, unworldly screaming to be heard from within, the last trees to burn, the dark to enter daylight, and the light to ruin the night, the pace must be lowered this very moment. It will be too late tomorrow. Zeus' creation from Kaos will return to the Kaos it came from prematurely. Zeus won't give a damn. He will only laugh he created such stupidity and try again. — Raymond

Oh dear. Did anybody else notice how the descriptions of environmental degradation mirror the descriptions of the biblical plagues from the deluge, to the fall of Sodom to the apocalypse? If only we turn away and repent... there will need to be a vanguard of the truthful, the spirited to guide us from our wicked ways and we might still be spared. This type of environmentalism is modern day soteriology.

Not necessarily no? Ataraxia is just the condition of accepting this very situation, aka, amor fati, the skeptic is fated to ask these questions and has come to grips with this predicament.

Well, it is 180's description so he is in a better position, but I agree with him and I do see a certain sadness here. One knows that there is no solid foundations on which to build our assumptions of the world and worse, one also knows that the other does not know as well. There is therefore no hope of redemption. You can ask every wise man or woman, but you will only end up asking questions and trouncing him or her. The victory is a pyrrhic one though because the certainty one seeks is not there.

Sceptic: I know that I am ignorant of most knowable things, whatever I do know most of which I'm not certain of and, frustratingly, even my few certainties could still be false – ergo, with sufficient grounds, I question myself and others who do not. (re: "a sad Socrates")

Ignoramus: I do not want to know that (what) I do not know; therefore, 'illusions of knowledge' suffice – I'm content. (re "satisfied swine") — 180 Proof

:100: :up:

I am a bit puzzled with the way this topic is treated. I feel it is very much couched in the metaphysics of old, the nominalists and medieval realists, the rationalists and empiricists etc. I think Kant convincingly cleared up the matter when he deduced the categories of thought. The latter idealists refined these ideas considerably, but the gist is the same. Change, as well as space and time are categories. They are the fundamental structures that have to be presupposed if we are able to experience a 'world' at all. Relating them to each other, as if one is substantial and the other is a property seems to me mistaken. It is like asking: what is the quantity of time? Of course we think temporally and quantitatively and therefore we can devise a clock, but time as such has no quantity. there not multiple times or multiple spaces. Every hour is still time and every room is still space.

In the same way we think of substance and properties, and the relation between each other but do not for a moment think that these notions have any meaning outside of frame of reference. They are needed for us to think at all, operators, but I never saw a property as such, I only saw some definite properties. I also never saw substance as such, I only saw definite substances.

Change therefore is not a property, not of space, not of anything else. Change is a category of thought. I would even argue it is a-priori since change is not something learned by being experienced, but change is what experience is, aka it makes experience possible.

Call me daft if you want Arne, but you'll have to explain this to me. In my usage 2 stands for two distinct things with spatial separation between them, and 3 stands for three spatially separated things, etc.. Therefore, contrary to what you say, numerals seem especially useful when they refer to things with spatial existence. And I really don't see how they would be at all useful (except for the purpose of deception) to refer to things without spatial existence, i.e. fictitious things. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not seem very correct, or at least it seems only a way to imagine something. such as numbers. 2 and 2 is 4 independent of there being 2 things and 2 other things. In the same way that in the syllogism If p. then Q, p. Thererfore Q, does not have to be rephrased as: "If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore he is mortal". Quantity and space are not relatable to each other because they are both necessary categories. (I believe that for Kant space was a category of the intuition and quantity of thought, but that does not matter and I am not very certain about it and the picture I paint is more Hegelian than Kantian anyway). Maybe I missed something, or maybe the categories got jettisoned by the analytics in concert with the phenomenologists...

I think Zeus's concern, that with the technology of fire we would discover all technologies and then rival with the gods, forgetting the wisdom of the gods and thinking ourselves the ultimate power and destroying nature to satisfy ourselves, was a justified concern. We have confused technology with science and now have technological smarts but not wisdom. — Athena

What you describe is I think currently being developed. It has always been there in Western thought actually but it has not always been dominant. Schwarz and Thompson, two economists and sociologists define it as an 'egalitarian perspective', Sociologist Aaron Wildavsky defines it as a perspective of harmony. Traditional enlightnement values, values we still live with today proritize control of nature through technological means and progress through economic an cultural development.

The harmony perspective on the other hand is the one embraced by ecology. The sociologist and ecologist Anna Bramwell calls much of ecological reasoning and environmentalism 'manichean', presenting a battle between good nature and evil techno-science. Much of philosophy now is busy transllating philosophical ideas to the realm of the environment and to our relationship between man and nature. Martin Heidegger's essay on technology is an early example. Then came Hans Jonas 'The principle of responsibility'.

You might want to delve in ecological thought for answers to your question. I do think currently that we gradually see a shift in perspective, from individualist to egalitarian. However, do not have many illusions about this shift, like every revolution there will be a lot of struggle. Ecology is not necessary friendly to your enlightenment values and your love for democracy.

Hi @Reformed Nihilist, good to see you :) I would take an approach rooted in the history of philsoophy, which other posters also have done in this trhead. Philosophy started with the question what was really real, what, if all the fleeting and temporal was stripped of from this world, would remain. Parmenides argued for an unchanging abstract whole, Heraclitus argued that what was real was change itself.

This discussion, only fragmented delivered to us set the stage, because we have a paradox here. If what is really really real is an unchanging hole than why does everything exhibit one quality, namely that of change. If movement itself is realy real, how is movement possible withou something fixed relative to which there is movement? Philosophy has tried to come to grips with that paradox, Plato's dualism, Aristotle's attempt at reconciliation in the 'this here', the medieval philosophers who turned to God as the source of that which moves and Descarte's turn to the subject. Certainty is one of those concepts that emerged in trying to get to grips with this paradox because when we have something certain we could define every other thing, concept or experience relative to it. - Whether we were dealing with things, concepts or experiences, was itself dependent on the epoch in the history of philosophy one finds itself in. - Subject and object, essence and substance, phenomena and noumena, all those terms emerge from that endeavour.

As Joshs and Ciceronianus pointed out, philosophy moves and changes. I do not know about the analytics, but the continentals have by and large abandoned the quest for certainty. Joshs would say it was Nietzsche probably, I would say it was Hegel, who lay this quest to rest. There is no 'thing in itself', there is only 'the movement of the concept', the articulation of ever new and according to Hegel more sophisticated ways to try to resolve the ancient paradox. Partly building on this notion, partly out of a counter reaction to it, phenomenology emerged. We have learned something however from this history. Like you state for science, truth in philosophy depends on an "intricate webs of probabilistic relationships". Truth is 'preliminary', the best we have at the time, 'vorläufig' as they say in German, it stakes its claim in advance and has to retract when something better comes along.

That does not mean this preliminary truth can be put forward willy nilly, it has to be acceptable according to the rules of the game played at the time, the 'economy of truth'. Some articulations are taboo, some just fail in the conffrontation with our bodily experience, some get forgotten because we are busy dealing with something else. Truth making, meaning making, is a social affair and the second order rules of argumentation decide what is accepted as true and under what conditions.

I find pure materialist physics very unconvincing, worse than unconvincing - meaningless. But this is not the place to go into that. — T Clark

I was agreeing with them on this point:

On the other hand, some people understand our lack of free will to be dependent on a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. — T Clark

The lack of free will follows from a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. If one ascribes to a purely materistic ontology than accepting the lack of free will should follow from that premise. This type of metaphysics though relegates human experience to the realm of the 'unreal', only the third person perspective decides what is really really real. It is a metaphysical position. I am not saying I also ascribe to it. I do not think we are very far apart, if at all on this point.

Which of these do we take into account? The ones you and I are talking about are the medical and social forces I discussed. On the other hand, some people understand our lack of free will to be dependent on a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. — T Clark

I agree with them. Phenomenonologically, or maybe less controversially, experentially we do experience freedom of choice. We only do not experience it when under certain meical and social influences. The question is whether this first person experience of free will is illusory, or somehow contrary to the metaphyscial assumptions we accept. Criminal law takes the first person perspective, I experience free will, so assume you do too. Neurology for instance, takes a third person perspective, and accepting basic materialist metaphysics, tells us it does not exist. Criminal law though takes the circumstances that we also accept in our every day eistence into account. It will tell you it does not go into metaphysical assumptions about the nature of free will. I argue though it tacitly accepts the existence of free will as an absolute presupposition.

@SophistiCat I took a very straightforward interpretation of free will as my point of departure. There are others of course. The most sophisticated I have seen is the compatibiism of P.F. Strawson. I do feel they dodge the existential question though: do 'I' influence my life, or is all my choice in fact an illusion.

I think there are situations when people clearly are not in control of their actions, e.g. schizophrenia with delusions and hallucinations. — T Clark

Certainly and in those cases we cannot hold people account at all. This means we may take 'measures' against them, expedient actions out of social concerns such as forced care in a mental institution. We may not punish them in the proper sense, i.e. cause them harm because we resent the choices they made. (Dutch legal theory makesa difference between 'measures' and 'punishment', which is helpoful here. It does not mean measures are necessarily milder. Being locked up potentially indefinately in a mental health institution is of course onerous to the perpetrator, the rationale is different though.

I was thinking of this when I started this discussion - I've read about jurisdictions where mitigating factors; e.g. childhood abuse, poverty, hardship; can not be be brought up during the trail, but they can be considered during the penalty phase when punishment is determined. This would be especially applicable for cases where the death penalty is under consideration. — T Clark

Many jurisdictions take the circumstances of the perpetrator into account when meeting out punishment. Gradually in criminal law attention has shifted from purely reagrding the act to regarding the actor. Many people recognise that in some situations we are so pyschologically strained that we cannot think clearly. The problem is that it is not very consistent. It recognises that some circumstances influence your choice, but that that choice is then 'compromised' to some degree. It does not entertain the idea that people have no chocie at all to begin with, because they have no free will.

The law and any moral or ethical consideration at all. — T Clark

The law not necessarily. If it works to keep people from committing behaviour we consider unwanted it can still be there. also here only utilitarian concerns will count.

So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will? — T Clark

If a criminal can not avoid committing criminal acts (say, arson, rape, and bloody murder), would that not be a very good reason to lock him or her up? — Bitter Crank

The asnwer whether or not we have free will does have implications for criminal law. I would contend that in criminal law the absolute presupposition (in the sense of Collingwood) is made that we have free will. That it is such an assumption of criminal law is not uncontroversial, but I contend that it is, so will accept it for the purpose of this thread. If anyone would disagree we can discuss of course. Anyway, criminal law knows a number of justifications for punishment. One is prevention, but the second is retalliation. Prevention of course, as Bitter Crank noted, is still a perfectly justifiable reason for 'punishment'. However, the rationale for punishment shifts. It is not really 'punishment', but a policy measure. Out of policy concerns we would lock up criminals and apply the criminal law to them.

The second one though, retalliation, seems pointless without free will. Why would we reproach someone if he is not in control of his actions and free choice is illusory? It seems to be adding insult to injury because the perpetrator has not asked to have a crime prone character. Possibly that causes more harm than good and then we also reproach him for being who he is and doing what he does without a choice.

The question than becomes whether it matters whether you are locked up as a policy concern, or because society reproaches you for doing something wrong, which you should have avoided doing. I would reckon yes, for two reasons. The first one is practical: If punishing becomes a policy concern it means we should only look at effectivenes. Punishment should be tailored to the perpetrator solely an maybe to the obtaining the best results for society. Concerns of fairness, which are germane in criminal law, become less of an issue, because it is not out of fairness that we punish. We merely look at the perpetrator and what is a most effective means of stopping his criminal activity. Secondly we might also entertain social concerns. there might be outrage whe we do not punish a murderer because we know he does not kill again. So we should mediate social concerns with individual ones and find a tailor made pnushment in this specific case. Punishment becomes a utilitarian calculus.

The second reason is that punishment out of policy concerns relegates the perpetrator as an object of policy. The interesting thing about punishment is that it is also a kind of redemption. Yes, we rebuke what you have done but take you sseriously as a perpetrator. Contast that with peretrators that plead an insanity defense. They contend that at that point they were not being themselves, they did not have control of their actions. An insanity defense is nothing else than a request to be treated as policy concern and to be absolved from moral blameworthiness. When we judge that someone is culpable, then we also at the same time say 'we take you seriously' we accept that you are a person who is rational, who is capable of making right and wrong choices. I do think it is more humane to punish out of resentment. The perpetrator may lose his freedom but not his right to be viewed as a human being who is in control if his action. It is actually for this reason that mass murderer Aders Breivik from Norway resisted heavily to be declared insane and Ithink he is right. Calling him insane would amount to an extra punishment, above the life sentence he got.

So yes, I think it matters whether one rejects free will in criminal law. Maybe it this not totally answer your question, whether, given there is no free will, does it make sense to hold people accountable. The short answer based on the view above would be yes, it still makes sense, but only out of policy concerns. Criminal law in this case should be reformed to reflect only utilitarian concerns in dealing with perpetrators.

Out of curiosity, and I'm not asking for names, are there any forum members who you think would make A students. I realize that the format we work in is different from an academic paper. How does the writing and, more important, the quality of thought here compare to your classes? — T Clark

That is very difficult to say because this is a much more free format. I would also not know how to compare people, because everybody writes about different topics. I cannot judge many topics, for instance anything analytical. Many here also outgrew their student years. I myself joined ages ago when I just finished my university studies. Now we are more than 20 years further on. When I joined I found it to be a very entertaining and knowledgable community and was in awe of several posters. The core still is, but quality varies enormously from thread to thread. Some are really high level others are not. T

This is not an academic level forum, that is really a couple of notches higher, but that is also an unfair criterion because I am writing much more freely for instance here and do not double check everything. Submitting an academic article is a far more arduous procedure. No doubt that many here use the forum in the same way, a nice way to joust and to learn different viewpoints quickly, share thoughts etc. What I do know is that some of the posters here, past or present have the capabilities to be full professors (I am not by the way I hold a lower rank). Some even hold that position now. So, some here will make brilliant students yes, if they would be students :)

Does this lead to the requirement (definition) that "an undergraduate in writing a philosophy essay is not expected to develop new philosophical ideas but is expected to comment on existing philosophical ideas using reasoned and well-structured language, whilst including an original idea that makes the reader interested in thinking about the topic" ? — RussellA

It sounds about right I guess, yeah...

As someone searching for what makes an A, from what you say, in addition to being well written (something that can be learnt through careful study) the student should also put forward an original spark of an idea, a potential new insight into the topic under discussion — RussellA

When grading you are usually bound by criteria. I often get to write them myself now though and I regularly put in a criterion for creativity or 'argumentation' which gives me some leeway to reward originality.

Even if they don't have time to fully develop it within the confines of a particular essay, and even though the idea may ultimately prove to be wrong, its development may lead into new knowledge. — RussellA

That is never my criterion for me, because it is way too much to expect. 'New knowledge' is really rare. I do reward promise, I would feel bad rewarding a paper that is all good, but just collors between the lines over a paper that does everything well and has that bit of extra spark that makes you think. Usually such a student holds promise and should be stimulated a bit.

IE, perhaps a willingness by the student to push the boundary of what is conventionally accepted, providing they are willing to rationally argue their case - (pushing the boundary infers that they have to be knowledgeable in the first place as to where the boundary is). — RussellA

And doing things well. There might be a great idea, but if it does not answer the question it goes down anyway. Even if you are the young Wittgensteiin, the job of the student is to think within the boundaries expected. That is primary, show you can combine different pre given ideas. Do that well and I cannot find fault it may even give you an A (depends on the criteria). However, I would like it better if you combine the ideas and on the basis of those ideas make an extra observation, provide a different perspective etc.

I like this post by RusselA and would like to discuss it from back to front...

What this means in practice is that the others use convoluted language, don't answer the question, push their own philosophical ideas, use arguments where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, where their premises are opinions rather than being obviously true, where the essay isn't structured into a beginning, body and conclusion, where they don't make use of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, etc — RussellA

Yes, very true. This is often the case and one gets tired of it, because when you want to grade well, you do give feedback. So You have to point out al of this quickly because the time to grade is always too short.

So why does one student get an A and the others get B's if all that is needed is a good paper rather than an excellent one. Because the others trip themselves up, shoot themselves in the foot, make a balls of it, run around in circles and start up the creek without a paddle. — RussellA

Yes, but do not underestimate how hard it is to write a good paper. Writing is very difficult and an A is a very hard to obtain mark. Every writer 'makes a balls of it' at some point, prof or student and students have very little experience in writing. I hope I spot out students who genuinely gave blood sweat and tears to a paper and even if I mark it down, I hope to say something nice to them. So always look upon your students kindly, they are struggling individuals like all of us are.

The Professor is not looking for an excellent paper by a budding Wittgenstein, just a good paper that he knows from his lifetime of experience is on the right lines. — RussellA

Sure, in everyday grading that is true, but not totally, you always hope to spot the new Witty.

All the professor is looking for is a workmanlike, well crafted, well written, logically argued, well researched essay that is relevant to the topic. — RussellA

That is all he hopes for, and all that the criteria tend to desire, but not all he is looking for.

The Professor, knowing his subject inside out, having read every relevant paper, attended every germane conference, and after marking thousands of essays by bright-eyed and bushy-tailed students is not looking for new ideas when marking a paper, as the possibility of coming across a new idea is pretty remote. If the do come across an idea that it is new to them, then it is more than likely to be either wrong or nonsense. — RussellA

Yes, a new idea is pretty remote and a good prof tells his students that. Not to dash their hopes, but because philosophy (like law) is simply a difficult subject, of which you need knowledge to be able to say anything interesting. However, the divide between prof and student is not that wide as you make it out to be. It depends a bit on the prof of course, but many of them marking your papers are just struggling themselves. They als need to make sense of things, grapple, form their arguments etc. There are always students who surprise you and even if an idea has a hole in it and you spot it out, you can still admire it. From personal experience, when I see a paper and think "damn, I disagree with this, I have at least three counter arguments", I will look at it again and usually award it a high grade. A paper that makes me think about counter arguments does something, it 'works' even though I think it is wrong and yes that counts in the students favour.

Quite so. People are scared of new ideas, and the most scared of the newest ideas are the most mediocre philosophers. Please see my two essays, and the comments... but I'm preaching to the choir. — god must be atheist

Yes, but that is also generally what teaching amounts to. Usually one must learn to grasp old ideas before one can succesfully evaluate new ones. Therefore I would mark an essay with an A when it is philosophically interesting and on topic and well documented. Just a new idea while the essay if about evaluating a old one does not get an A automatically. It all depends on the question asked.

In my book it would get an A, provided there are no criteria the student has missed. If a paper gets me interested and I cannot find fault with it, I award an A. I might even award it if there is one small oversight, but it is compensated for by the interesting idea the paper brings to the table.

I doubt that paying the Chippendales for visiting the elderly centers is a good way to get rid of viruses in the rooms of faint-hearted ladies of 90 years old. — AgentTangarine

:rofl:

Sure Roger, all those public health and environmental institutes know nothing about risk assessment, but luckily you found the solution. The problem is you are working with a set number of people who can be infected. However, that is not how a virus behaves. It is not like you put 50 people in a room, but there is only enough virus going around to infect 20. Than you would be right of course. Put more people in the room and the risk for each person in the room decreases. The problem everyone in the room might potentially get infected and if I get infected, the chance does not become any less for you to get infected.

You are presupposing a zero sum game where the number of possible infections is fixed. However, it is not a zero sum game but a positive sum game. Me getting infected will actually increase the chances of you getting infected because I will also start spreading the virus. Each time an infected person exhales new virus is realeased. If one does get infected one will spread the virus, even when vaccinated, albeit to a far lesser extent. That means more people may become infected increasing the risk to all of us of contamination.