Only one. You are only one, and what is most important to you is singular. Don't worry about everyone else, unless humanity is the most important thing in which case it is still one god. Everyone else may give importance to trivia... Indeed, if you look around there are worshippers of money, power, beauty, tradition, science, sex... too bad for them, and not worth further consideration. — unenlightened

When one wonders about what is most important, we may well initially think of a singular thing or somebody. We soon realize though that that something or somebody does not exist in a vacuum. Not when you embrace something more base as most important, like money or sex, since money is only important because you can buy something for it, or because it provides you prestige in the eyes of others and for sex you need someone else to have it with.

When we think of something commonly held in higher regard, like one's loved one or child, we have to acknowledge that we value its importance as well within a relational network. Your child is not just 'a child' but your child, whom you begot or in any case raised and moulded. Your lover is important because she is her own person, with little traits and habits that endear her to you and whom you feel for, at least in part because of how she relates to you.

When one considers that which is most important, to be God, or actually 'that which is most perfect' as is a more common proof of God, we notice how these traits always point to their relationship to you and to the world, in other words, to a network of things that is in itself embedded within a larger network and so on. If one caries this train of thought further, one will have to acknowledge that the world or 'reality', the unity of al 'res', 'all that there is', is itself of supreme importance or perfect, because nothing can be substracted from it, or it would not be 'all that there is' and nothing can be added to it, because than there would be something laying ourside of 'all that there is'. And so, you have to come to conclusion, as Spinoza came, that 'Deus sive Natura', God or nature. It is the real that one embraces in last instance.

Hmmm, I was also there during the old PF days and I still miss it at times. It is like an abandoned café with lights out, chairs on the table and a notice saying it has permanently relocated. I wonder how the TPF originals will feel. In any case, a lot of kudos to Jamal for making this move possible. It is a lot of work you are willing to put in for this place. It is appreciated.

This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world. — Banno

Wow... I find that more ... idealist than I would ever dare to be ... :wink:

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

Because if it would be something than it would literally be 'some thing', meaning a thing we can identify. Something beyond our reality is exactly that, beyond our reality and then it would not be recognizable as something for us. The speculation therefore is idle. Of course there may well be a lot of things that are not part of our reality yet, just like iron was beyond the reality of the people in the stone age. At such a point though, it is not 'not part of our reality per se', but 'not yet part of our reality'.

Yes. Because I believe theoretical knowledge is the purest form of knowledge. — Copernicus

Ohhh Copernicus just believes it. Well that takes away any need for the justification of the claim. Great that that is settled!

Does it pay enough to never having to get a job? — Copernicus

In my neck of the woods, that is considered a job. Full-time, I might add. It pays enough to live happily. As you are a student, maybe you should try talking to someone like that since it seems some further edification on the subject is in order.

So, setting aside the question of what a good capitalistic, socialistic, or even communistic country ideologically might be inclined to do, shouldn't we first decide if need more of X before we produce more of X? — Hanover

The problem is who or what decides what we need? Do we need more content managers? Do we need more diversity officers? Do we need more oil drillers, do we need more art historians? The need for X is defined by the institutional structure of society.

No one is paying for the end of, "pushing back the frontiers of ignorance." Ignorance is in a very real sense infinite. We could redirect all intellectual effort in the world towards studying ants, and we would never learn all there is to know about ants. The aim is not to, "push back the frontiers of ignorance," but rather to learn some specific thing for some specific reason, such as developing technology for the sake of human prosperity, national security, etc.

But sure, if the OP wants to work at a research institute or a think tank, then he could be paid to "study." Presumably he wants to study whatever he wants to study, not what some institution or think tank tells him to study. — Leontiskos

The subject of philosophy does come to mind. There are other directions in which one performs research without having a direct practical implication in mind, for instance archeology or history, literature studies and what have you. It is just that society can spend some amount of money for such endeavours, but indeed we also need defense, sewage, court houses and what not. Of course, we could nationalize the field of robotics. Private property in itself is not a necessary institution, though it would entail a lot of restructuring of the economy. If scarcity is thoroughly eliminated than your endeavor might work Copernicus but until then we need to set precious funds aside, no matter the property regime.

Because you're an enlightened being, not a motoric unicell organism. — Copernicus

I do not know if I can be called enlightened. But still, just like motoric unicell organisms, enlightened beings need to eat. Still, you assume that knowledge is the highest good. It may be, and it is in any case reiterating a frequent assumption in both philosophy and religion, but two questions remain: a. Why do you think the pursuit of knowledge is the highest goal? Isn't the pursuit of love perhaps greater? b. Why do you think someone else should fund your pursuit of knowledge? I very much agree that we should make space for knowledge, but we simply cannot afford to have everyone lead lives in pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake.

At this point, humans need to develop advanced robotics to let them do all the physical and mental labour and let humans enjoy the fruits of production in their own bubbles (libraries, vacations, drug addiction, etc). — Copernicus

Even if that were possible, then you might unwittingly deprive people of a great source of knowledge. Practical skill, getting to know the world through work, may well be a source of knowledge. Not only are you prioritizing knowledge, but also a specific kind of knowledge. Your preference is for theoretical knowledge, not practical.

- What do you do for a living?
- I'm a student. — Copernicus

I teach students and I am a researcher. It comes as a package deal.

There is infinite knowledge to acquire and discover out there. Even from a solipsistic or nihilistic perspective, pursuing occupation doesn't make sense other than the fact that we humans must pursue subsistence.

So, if I wish to pursue a postpostpostpostpostpostpostpostpostdoc study, I'll likely live starving, not to mention having no family to provide for.

The only logical thing a sane, educated, and enlightened society can do is pay people for both study and jobs and let them choose what they wish. — Copernicus

I do not see how the second paragraph follows from the first. If you merely study the universe and everything, what do you bring to the table other than development of your own knowledge of the world? Your knowledge, though is not mine, so why would I, through taxes, fund you? I am all for free education, but why should that be beyond the level at which you, with your talents and abilities, can make yourself useful?

The hidden assumption is here that knowledge is the supreme good in itself. It may well be, but then, why should such a good be personal? What you can do is pursue a career as an academic. When you succeed you get paid to think of all kinds of things, design your own research, get funding for it and off you go :starstruck:

That's not a formal profession like lawyer or doctor. — Copernicus

I beg to differ... why would it not be?

Or in terms of a relationship generally, I mean we are happy to see the person and like being around them right? And I know that people like to do things for other people they care about, but is that because it's out of something like love or is it some selfish motivation to not see the person you like suffer because it hurts you? — Darkneos

The funny thing with all those questions is that it takes the 'me' (or in this post formulated as 'you', but for all intents and purposes the first person singular) as the self evident locus of agency. There is a 'me' and a 'not me' and then the question becomes, do I care for the 'not me' for its own sake or for the sake of the 'me' who is interacting with it. However, asking this question already implies prioritization of some kind of self independent of the relationships it has with the world.

That perception is, I think, not warranted, because the only sense of self we have is through interaction with the other. We are relational beings. A sense of self is constituted in interaction with the other. From that perspective, a relationship, or better, falling in love, is a thorough identification with the other in the sense that what happens to her, happens to you and vice versa. It is a unity with the world, with that considered other than you. If that is the case, the question becomes moot. There is no self independent of its relationships and so the question whether a relationship is really selfless or selfish is moot. Relationships are what constitutes the self. A meaningful question to ask is whether this person or that, as a pole of a relationship, is a pole that keeps the relationship intact or not. In the first instance, it is an altruistic person, in the second a selfish person. Those are just figures of speech, though.

en passant. — praxis

Ohh no... now you've done it, in some sections of the internet this leads to pipi brick... google en passant if you dare...

The game between Mikie and myself @Mikie

Hmmm or did I play @boethius ... :yikes: anyway, it was a nice tense game... :)

Feel welcome to add me too, and also anyone else. — boethius

I have added you :)

Sure! What is your handle? I sent you a friend request on chess.com Mikie / seinsfrage

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I'm sure it's just a coincidence that they're all funded by the US department of state. :rofl: — Tzeentch

I hope they are funded; they need to be! It's not that the free market would cater to them. But if they are indeed all funded by the US state department (which I doubt in some cases), isn't it all the more impressive that they are also quite critical of developments in the US?

The academic world is dead, my friend. — Tzeentch

What makes you say so?

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Your OP is as much sociological as it is philosophical. I will then riff on it sociologically instead of philosophically, though the two are very close.
It is an interesting hypothesis you posit @Number2018, that the woke movement is predicated on the same "forces that shape identity and visibility in public life" as those that celebrate success. The implication is that both movements, the celebration of the marginalized, the victimized, is dependent on the same subjectifying forces that have characterized the postmodern age, social media, pop culture on steroids. I think that is true, but I think it is dependent on some other force too, the disenchantment with progress.

Understood in aesthetic terms, woke culture is the opposite of the aestheticization of violence and conquest. The violent aesthetic goes back to time immemorial. The jousting matches of old were little more than the aestheticization of violence. The Olympic Games of old and maybe sports in general is nothing but the aestheticization of violence. It is the celebration of activity, of subjugation and conquest. In this aesthetic, the victim had no place. The victims were always the masses, they had no face. They were like the nobodies in the wrestling matches of the 80's. The woke movement arose out of an identification with the marginalized, be it women, people of color or the environment. People in the thread here have explained it as a kind of celebration of victimhood and I think they are right in a sense. It is an aesthetic of identification with the victim.

As such it harkens to an undercurrent that has always had appeal. We find an aesthetic of the victim, potentially very powerful, in the figure of Jesus Christ. The aesthetic of the victim personified. However, this aesthetic was never dominant. The cross quickly turned into a symbol of dominance itself. In its name crusades were fought, witches were burnt, and churches were erected. All of these were never in the spirit of the victim, but always of the victor. Churches were erected on the burial grounds of the vanquished, trials were inquisitive, treating the suspect as an object and the crusades were little more than an excuse to plunder. Nietzsche wrote about the herd mentality cultivated by Christianity, but this herd was only a herd because it had a leader. The herd never led itself but always embraced the principle of the strong man. In short, the aesthetic of victory always dominated. So, for 2000 years we have lived with an aesthetic of violence, conquest, and growth.

The question is, in such an atmosphere of superiority of the aesthetic of victory, how could another aesthetic ever come to rival it? My answer would be the onset of the age of risk. We learned after the Second World War that our scientific progress and our conquering abilities could be self-defeating. The most destructive weapon of conquest ever conceived could wipe the entire human race out altogether. Insights of the science of ecology taught us that by vanquishing species, we might end up eradicating ourselves. Overpopulation, that biblical exhortation of conquest, could lead to ecological collapse and a miserable struggle for survival, doomed by resource depletion.

Two lines then converged here: the increased aestheticization of everyday life through social media and the critique of the aesthetics of victory and conquest. This created room for another aesthetic to play a more dominant role, the aesthetic of the victim, the aesthetic of marginalization. This aesthetic draws on a different register than that of growth. It draws on the notions of compassion, on the cry for justice, on leaving each other in peace. The aesthetic of 'small is beautiful', an aesthetic of innocence, an aesthetic of the loser as the one treated unfairly.

This aesthetic that was already gaining in strength from the 70s onwars, allows another perspective to seriously rival the growth paradigm of 'creative destruction', and that is a paradigm of harmony. This paradigm is described in the sociological work of Aaron Wildavsky, but was considered impotent by him. However, in an age in which we have seen and experienced the dark side of progress in the atom bomb, in the gruesome pictures of My Lai, in acid rain and in Covid19, harmony might be considered a serious alternative to progress. 'Woke' then, is nothing but a backlash against the symbols of the growth paradigm, denunciation of colonialism, of racism, of the market economy, of the state and of education, now conceived of as inculcating 'traditional' values. It is no wonder that it targets the aesthetic symbols of the old order, the statues of the heroes of old, the language of the old order, its role models of classic literature and cinema.

What happened next is what always happens when a new challenger emerges, the challenger faces the wrath of the old order. What to make of the recent backlash against 'woke'? To me it is no coincidence that the right aims its arrows against all symbols of harmony, the acceptance of refugees, recognition of climate change and recognition of institutional racism. Its mantras are closing the border, or better, conquering more land, 'drill baby drill' and that woke is an enemy of freedom. In sociological terms, it is nothing but the mobilization and banding together of the forces that see their hegemony threatened. When there was no alternative to industrial capitalism, in the 1990s, they could afford to show nothing but a benevolent face. However, now they face opposition from a worldview that is gaining momentum. That is I think what @Joshs means when he says that in 50 years the ideas now espoused by 'woke' will be mainstream. I think he is right to intuit that its perspective chimes with the tide, but I doubt his prediction will come true. It depends on the political power of the backlash. I think that the resources at the disposal of the traditional order currently far outweigh the resources that 'woke' may mobilize.

To me, it seems rather far-fetched to see woke as more powerful and more authoritarian than the backlash against it, if only because it can marshal far fewer resources of power, for now at least. Being too vocally anti-woke might get you vilified and cancelled in certain circles, but it will not get you expelled from the country. Being too woke nowadays might. The point is that I am not sure if philosophy matters a great deal in this struggle. It is political more than philosophical, and a matter of mobilization and counter-mobilization of resources of power. On the side of woke, we may find academia and a plethora of NGOs. That might be highly troubling for academics who feel more inclined towards a growth perspective, but in society at large, institutions that see woke as an enemy far outnumber academia and NGOs. Nationalist and populist parties win; they are not losing, nowhere in the world, actually. Yet, the old order, dominant for now and for a long time to come, will run up against its limits. We are in an 'unstoppable force' meets 'unmovable object' kind of situation. This clash will release a lot of societal energy.

Sounds simple enough, thanks a million Clark!

An interesting question Banno, There are times I freaquently use the PM function and there are times I rarely use it. For me though its function is much more social than philosophical. I also like the input of a variety of views, although my tendency to respond gets me in trouble often.

↪Tobias Lol. If anything, Christiana is a functioning illustration of how liberty is sustained by shared norms, internal constraints and community accountability. — Benkei

Well possible. I have no idea how people do things in Christiana. I would like to know what radical indivdualism actually means. If it is simply a belief that 'my' existence precedes community existence, then it may be that certain hippy communities conform to that notion. I still think the notion, also in that very imprecisely defined form is incoherent.

I am still missing where the paradox is. — RussellA

Well, one of them is for instance the idea of a shared meaning of the word 'radical individualist'. If I tell you I am a radical individualist, you can only know what I mean if we share the same discursive understanding. Such understanding does not come about out of nowhere but is dependent a system of education and a history of ideas to which we both refer. Both of those came about through cooperation, through funding, to some extent coercion and to a certain cultural proximity. Even to discuss the subject of radical individualism coherently requires access to collectivities.

Of course I offer a very radical form of radical individualism, someone who rejects all forms of social commitment. Benkei's 5 characteristics describe a thicker version in some respects and in some respects thinner. What would you consider radical individualism to be?

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox. — RussellA

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory. That is why I urged to focus on those theoretical inconsistencies.

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives. — RussellA

Yes, but they seldom embrace notions of unbridled private property, quite the contrary. The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. Hippy ideology, if there is such a thing, is indeed individualistic but has a less thick conception of the self.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts. — RussellA

That might well be true, but that shifts the terms of the debate right? Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. As for Christiana, I would be interested to see how the inhabitants view their community. I have an inkling that they reject interference by the Danish state and what they perceive to be its oppressive structures. I wonder if they extend that rejection to the notion that community itself plays no part. There must be sociological research on it, but little time to really dive into it.

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus. — RussellA

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. If the idea that we are sovereigns is in practice unworkable, that may be because there are some mysterious mechanics at work preventing us from realizing our true selves, or it may simply mean we are not individual sovereigns. You may like it to be the case, but then your theory is a moral theory, about which values institutions should incorporate. Why you would like to accept it is beyond me though.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it. — RussellA

I agree with you there and therefore I advise turning it around. Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. Otherwise your assertion that the essay uses straw man reasoning is correct.

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA. — RussellA

No, hypocrisy is not particular to the USA, but that does not prove or disprove anything, right? :chin: There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe, though, so also public figures will not as easily espouse it. It is an interesting observation, maybe, but that does not seem to add or detract anything from the essay.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union :grin: These institutions that wield immense power themselves are also dependent on institutions. The corporation for instance is dependent on law, the state on a form of nationalism and academia on the notion of education. Each of the three institutions shape modern life and hence 'wield immense power'. You think the European Union is suspect, but you claim all institutions are suspect, that is simply too unnuanced of a claim, so needs qualification.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

Equally fascinating as off topic, so I will not go into it much. Funny that you have such a beef with the EU though it is nowhere to be found in the essay. From what perspective do you approach the EU? Is it public policy, or law, or economics? The EU is also not a monolithic entity, so do you focus on the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice? Or do you think the fault lies in the EU constitution, which comprises the Treaty, its annexes and court judgements such as Van Gent & Loos and Costa Enel? All these are actually institutions in their own right and wield power. We can discuss them in a separate thread. This small break down just goes to show one simply cannot escape institutions, just like one cannot escape gravity.

One more reflection @Benkei. The essay is a great read as it is, but it would be even stronger I think if you consistently first examine doctrines of libertarianism and then tie them to the three figures. First find doctrines in libertarianism that you see as conceptually incoherent or as justifying the undue exercise of power, and then trace them to Musk/Trump/Peterson to show out how they play out in practice.

I am thinking for instance about the idea of the first appropriation and the Lockean proviso: 'take what you want but leave enough and as good to others to take likewise'. This may work in a world of infinite natural resources and a finite amount of human beings, but we have realized we live in a world of finite resources with infinite (human) beings if you take future generations into account.

It seems that in the essay you sometimes employ this strategy, but sometimes also go to libertarianism based on what these three do. By the way I think that for a more comprehensive history also Ayn Rand must be mentioned and the influence she wielded through US think tanks. I find it fascinating how a philosophical theory not taken seriously at all in Europe may be so influential in the US. That is not to bash the US, the reverse is also true, Europeans have doctrines that Americans find utterly bollocks, but, interestingly, ostensibly rather similar people can differ so much about what constitutes s strong political theory.

Ohh, I just read this news now. What a sad message. Vera was a great contributor and seemed to me like a wonderful and wise person. She brought a unique voice to the forum. Rest in peace Vera.

A very nice essay, it is a good read as a critique of libertarianism. For me it is a bit parochial of course, because the holes in liberarianism are so glaringly obvious. To that extent, the essay would benefit from a bit more focus on some of thee arguments. It sometimes tries to do too much in a short text. I also do not know if all the protagonists are well chosen. Jordan Peterson is an academic and to the best of my knowledge also inspired by Christian teaching. I have no idea if the other too really have a 'worldview'. They argue for certain things, but I would not take their arguments as a sign that a certain political ideology is incoherent. For instance that Trump argues for tariffs is not a sign that libertarianism is incoherent, it is a sign that Trump does not embrace it to the fullest extent.

It sees the social world not as the ground of freedom but as its main obstacle. Institutions are not tools of liberty but threats to it. What this view overlooks, and what the next sections explore, is the extent to which individuality is socially and historically formed and how real freedom depends on shared conditions, not their absence. — Moliere

This statement for instance lacks nuance. Also a libertarian loves the social world because where else can she or he practice trade? Also liberarianism contains within it the concept of recognition. The shape of that recognition takes the shape of the free individual contracting with the other free individual. Through the contract the other as an owner is recognized. I say specifically 'as an owner' because that is what the other is, an owner of possessions, of herself, her labour, etc. Within the contract both parties affirm their being owners in their bartering with each other. Institutions must exist but to the extent that they enable this recognition and not compromise it. It actually comes worryingly close to the classical conception of the individual in private law, the indivdual as a bundle of rights. That conception is I think flawed, you think so as well, but in the context of the essay it merits some more treatment.

At the same time it elevates figures who use public power for private gain and disguises domination as freedom.
The ideology enables policies that weaken safety nets, disenfranchise the vulnerable and concentrate power in unaccountable hands. It fosters political apathy and strengthens demagogues who promise freedom while dismantling its foundations. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just a contradiction. It is a script for democratic decline disguised as moral clarity. — Moliere

It enables it, but more by accident. Its ideal is the world as a market place where each of the participants realize their inner being, namely as contracting parties, rights wielders.

2.2 Liberty Through Coercion
Trump’s trade war illustrates liberty asserted through force. Tariffs and trade barriers, classic interventions, are reframed as tools of sovereignty and pride. That self-described libertarians embrace them shows how flexible freedom becomes. What matters is not principle but the actor. Coercion becomes liberty if used by the right person. Hierarchy is acceptable if it matches their ideals. — Moliere

If Nozick is consistent it does not. In fact, libertarianism might well argue for rather wholesale redistribution based on a large trajectory of coercive trades. The people you take issue with are bad libertarians, but making an example out of a weak opponent does feel a bit 'straw manish'.

2.4 Justice That Begins After the Crime
Nozick’s justice assumes holdings are legitimate if acquired justly, with a vague nod to rectifying past injustice. In practice, this clause is ignored. The theory becomes a cover for inequalities rooted in historical theft. Property is treated as legitimate unless clearly stolen. This conceals injustice rather than addressing it. — Moliere

Here too, Nozick could counter this. 'Real existing libertarianism' pans out this way but that does not necessarily harm the theory. My qualm would be with its unreflective acceptance of the notion of property and its defense of it. I believe the case for property rests on the fact that one 'mixes one's labour' with a good. However, if that is the case the good owns the person mixing just as much, because if it is a mix, who says only one party acquires the right to do with the good as she pleases? The problem with libertarianism is that it lacks awareness of ecology. You also treat this in your essay strongly, but sometimes a bit too cursory for me. I think two ideas within libertarianism merit further discussion, individual autonomy and its concept of 'the other'. As your correctly argue, both of these doctrines in liberarianism are deeply flawed I think, but why is a nice question.

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution. — RussellA

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. — RussellA

The view of Mr. Mill here is absurd. The first counterexample pertains to children. You do feel it is ok for a parent to restrain a child when he considers crossing the road do you? Yes you do. You might object, 'but they are not individuals yet!', sure but in all kinds of settings, old age, psychological ailment, physical impairment, we allow others to make decisions for individuals. And that's okay; it's good when you prevent a friend from jumping in front of a train, really!

The second counterexample pertains to criminal law. If we consequently follow Mill we cannot punish, say a war criminal, if there is no danger of recidivism. Many war criminals led perfectly normal lives afterwards; should they really not be deprived of their liberty?
I make this point not just to quibble with Mr. or Mrs RusselA here, but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. Just like in many other contexts in which the word 'sovereignty' is used, in the context Mill uses it too, it is but a fiction. We are not sovereigns. That is the whole point of the essay and the point so sadly missed by libertarians.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno

Thank you for the compliment Banno, *tips hat*. As for Hegelian rhetoric... might it not be that both ways of philosophizing as you sketch them are incomplete? Nitpicking, plumbing, dissecting etc. is also always done from a background of assumptions, even if it would simply be reducible to the laws of logic, it still assumes that logic is the proper pickaxe to perform philosophy with. Usually much more is assumed, though I think. Also, the Socratic or the Cynic erects a world, albeit not very explicitly. The system builder and discursivist tries to make these intuitions explicit. This renders them visible and therefore also more easily picked apart.

The nitpicker and the builder are sides of the same coin. One may prefer this style, the other that one, but both are in the business or clarity, and in the process between the two, inadvertently display all those things that are still unclear... Just my two cents during a late evening...

That Dante was written by the Count was beyond a shadow of a doubt...

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@Benkeie

Everything created is a revelation of the creator. So the erotic (even in our modern sense) is not to be despised. Christians tended to be far more open to the goodness of the body and embodiment than their Pagan counterparts, and by the High Middle Ages this led to a fairly sensuous (and also cosmic) aesthetics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Benkei is right, I indeed love this essay. It is the only one I managed to read thus far, and I am sad for that. Work pulled me away from PF quite a bit and I must have missed some pearls. I am happy I caught this one, as it is a great read. Even though I read one, I think I know who wrote this piece. As Benkei knows, it does resonate with me and my own thinking about the erotic as unity. As it is deep at night, I cannot comment much. I do think that there may be one thing that deserves further deepening. That would be the attitude of the ancients towards the bodily. Indeed, the erotic took a more prominent place, but reason still was, as far as I understood the ancients, still a rather ethereal cerebral faculty. It was the higher passions leading the lower ones, love for the body of the lover was surpassed by the love of love itself, as in Plato's Diotima.

Likewise, Aristotle's God is devoid of matter and is essentially rational thought thinking itself. It is a unity and far more thick than the dry modern conception of rationality, but still matter was a subordinate category. To this extent the deflation of reason is an emancipatory move making space for the body. First in a rather contradictory way as 'will' in Schopenhauer and Will to Power in Nietzsche, but gradually as more nuanced and informed conceptions of the body in Merleau Ponty. So while I love the essay much and it is I think really a profound and deep read which I will study and if the author permits also use as a tool for reflection, the story remains one sided in the sense that it seems to yearn for a conception of reason that was more rich, more deep, more in tune also I think with an ethics of virtue and so praiseworthy, but still afflicted with a rejection of the 'carnal' as such. Carnality could redeem itself as carnal knowledge, but the rider 'knowledge' was necessary. The carnal in and of itself, devoid of rhyme or reason, the orgasmic, the 'pornographic' for lack of a better word, was still feared and subjugated.

In my conception, philosophy is fastened to the erotic, not as knowledge, but as a mode of carnality. Philosophy is lust by other means. The question is how to put that into words. For that, I will study this great piece of writing grapple with it and try to emulate it because it is way better than anything I have written so far on the subject, even though I might also disagree and take a different turn here and there. Thank you dear author!

Still clinging to the meaning of the words "must" and "philosophical essay". — RussellA

Why be so picky? Academics these days are taught how to write more creatively, more personally, and let to let go of their dry style. (Not that I myself manage, my papers are as dry as the plains of Spain in the summer heat...) And why not? Who cares if you wrote the gazillions well structured, dry and boring paper? Maybe the times they are a changin' :)

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Nope... Perhaps I can try via PM... hmm, alas... Well, there is nothing left to do then but make me a mod methinks ;) Nahh, but let me know if there is another way I can get it to you. I can access it but probably due to my uni having a subscription.

I have found it Michael, but how can I attach it here? I did not read it yet, but seems fun to get into!

Tobias That's certainly the rub. I can't think of any way other than an appeal to collective preferences. What, in the West, we consider a criminal gang is not that way framed in say the Mid East or North Africa. — AmadeusD

I am not too sure, or at least not that relativist yet. There are of course grey areas where for instance a group is considered a legitimate armed resistance while others call it a terrorist group. However, I do think that in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, the concept of legitimate and illegitimate use of force exist. In the end some appeal to 'just' violence is made. We might all judge differently, but the appeal to justice seems similar enough to me. I all countries, lobbing someone's head of without a reason is not ok. We might differ in whether the reason is good or not, but without any reason at al, that is unacceptable to all. Some thin moral like-mindedness exists, I think.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language. — Michael

I agree, prima facie they are not. However, when you enquire further the first is just as meaningless as the second one. Just saying giving money to charity is good begs the question, 'why is it 'good'? You might say you saying something more, but in fact you do not. You might think it provides for a reason, but what kind of reason is it? At least, it leaves me none the wiser as to why I should give money to charity.

It seems like exchange 1 is somehow informative but it is not. It simply tells you that you ought to give to charity because it is good. In fact it seems informative because you have already an implicit sense of what 'good' is, namely something you ought to do. Other then that it tells you nothing so it is a tautology, but dressed up differently.

In fact, you already have an inkling of this problem.

I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. — Michael

Notice your use of 'I think', 'prima facie' and 'appears'. Indeed, it appears to do something, but does not. The dialectic shows us that the abstract universal 'good', disappears and only forces one to become more concrete. I will only grant you this, the second type of exchange is more obvious and therefore does not give rise to such a dialectic. In that sense, you may say it does something different. The only difference is that it takes analysis to see that 'good' is the same as 'ought to', whereas 'ought to' and 'ought to', the tautology, does not force such an analysis. It should not distract from the fact that the question asked in the OP is equally unreasonable. It is not "reasonable to ask for a justification for A2", simply because 'good' is empty, it has no significance beyond 'that which one ought to do'.

I do not think I'd disagree ncessarily, but is there a way to discern between preferences? Are the preferences of say a criminal gang of equal value as the preferences of a congregation of peaceful monks?

Swings and roundabouts boys. No one can clearly put forth any reason to do anything but preference. Nice. — AmadeusD

What kind of reasons to do things would you like? There are many.

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”? — Michael

I do not really care about the exact relation. X ought to be done implies you ought to at least not hinder X being done. You should not oppose X, you should strive for the fulfillment of X. But again, the problem stems from your substitution of X for the unqualified, inconcrete universal 'Good'. Indeed, you should not oppose the good, you should strive for the fulfillment of good and good ought to be done. Indeed, all of these are true and all of these are also trivial because 'the good' is that which should be done. Substitute any given goal for 'the good', and ask a person why this goal should be achieved. In the end the person has nothing else but saying 'well it is good'. For Kant doing one's duty was good, for Aristotle being virtuous was good and for a utilitarian maximizing happiness is good.

“for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding. — Michael

No, breastfeeding is naturally impossible so you cannot breastfeed, but assuming breastfeeding is good, you should not thwart it either. You should make it possible. Against all odds? Of course not, because there are things that may outweigh the good of breastfeeding.

You again substitute again a particular kind of good, for 'good' by the way. That is problematic because any particular good is not the good in itself.

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought to be done” but “X ought to be tried”? — Michael

X ought to be pursued, yes. So indeed X ought to be done, if possible, but might not be done. My pursuing X (if X is the same as 'good', an abstract universal indicating an unqualified state of 'goodness', whatever that may amount to) might fail.

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second. — Michael

They seem different, but upon analysis they are not different at all. The second is a tautology, but the first one also is. Putting it in question is equally meaningless. the OP does that and I criticized the OP for it.

In fact it seems to me that it is just a case of 'pros hen'. You think of kinds of goods, I think of 'the good'.