I am the first to admit that the feeling is not entirely rational, also not philosophical... So I wonder, I have that feeling based on gut instinct, but have we all? Or is there something I have maybe missed that others do see? The meta question here might be philosophical or psychological, on what do we base our predictions of future events?

I am derailing actually, just wanting to say that, no, my feeling is not rational. It is very firm though :smile:

I really wonder on what people base their predictions, including myself actually. To me there is no shadow of a doubt that Trump will win. There are authoritarian tendencies rising in the world and the economy is hurting many people. Those two tendencies lead me to think Trump will win and there is a high turn out among republicans... Of course, the polls are even and I am not even American so what do I know. Still, not a shadow of a doubt... My feeling must be based on instinct, a hunch, some sort of worldview perhaps, but cannot be fully rational. So, my question to you, on what information / knowledge / feelings do you base your confidence that either Trump or Harris will win?

Thanks for the mention Javi, but I know nothing of corporate law. Benkei is a much better source here for Dutch law on crypto...

Indeed it is. What many don’t realize, though, is that he isn’t simply repeating Leibnitz’s question, he is deconstructing it. What he is really asking is , ‘why do we exclusively associate the copula ‘is’ with the notion of something, of presence, and not also the Nothing’? — Joshs

Thanks! I did start reading it once, (never finished) so I must have read this passage. Apparently it did not stick with me as it should have. :)

Oh yes, he "tried" this "modern idea" like a few others, iirc: Laozi-Zhuangzi, Heraclitus, Socrates, Pyrrho, Epicurus-Lucretius, Seneca-Epictetus, Sextus Empiricus ... Montaigne, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Peirce-Dewey, Wittgenstein et al — 180 Proof

Hmm, I think there is a difference. I do not know about Heraclitus, Epicurus, Seneca. The ancients are interesting, but this sweeping comparison I dare not make because it may well be anachrinistic. I do think he does something different from Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and something very similar to Merleau Ponty, Gadamer and even Foucault. I think Nietzsche is his closest predecessor. He does not ground his phenomenology in logic and thought. He decenters res cogitans in favour of res extensa. Akin to Spinoza, but Spinoza held on to a geometric method. I do think he tried to overcome dualism, while putting practice ahead of logos.

I am a historical person and, of course, he owes a lot to others. Moreover, I do not share his craving for authenticity. I think philosophy took a wrong turn in that respect. A wrong turn with which it still wrestles, considering how many words thought is spend on the notion of 'identity' and not in a logical sense. I do think his influence on modern thought is undeniable and for that alone he deserves study.

"What is the meaning of Being (or Seyn)? I believe is Der Rektor-Führer's "main question"↪180 Proof ... At any rate, "why is there anything at all?" on my profile page is just a prompt, or TPF conversation starter – dismissal of the Leibnizian (ontotheo) fetish – and has never been my aporia¹. :smirk: — 180 Proof

I know 180, it was meant in jocular fashion. The aversion against 'onto-theology' you actually share with Heidegger. And yes, his view on authenticity you do not. Yet I think, Heidegger and you are not that far off in thinking, but are in writing and fortunately, in political belief... What Heidegger tried to do was to root thinking in practice, which is a rather modern idea. The way he did it... well, we will not quibble there I think.

Are you saying Heidegger’s main question is ‘ why is there something rather than nothing’? — Joshs

I do not know if it is 'the question'... it is his opener in his 'einführung in die Metaphysik" I believe...

No doubt, Heidi is very important but, imho, more as a negative example – how not to philosophize – than anything else. — 180 Proof

Ahhh 180 proof, bashing Heidegger again?

From your profile:
i. "Why is there anything at all?" Because
(A) 'absence of the possibility of anything at all' – nothing-ness – is impossible, to wit:
(B1) there is not any possible version of the actual world that is 'the negation of the actual world' (i.e. nothing-ness);
(B2) there is not any possible world in which it is true that 'a possible world is not a possible world' (i.e. nothing-ness);
(C) the only ultimate why-answer that does not beg the question is There Is No Ultimate Why-Answer.

You do realize you are introducing your readers to your thought, via Heidggers' main question? In good German I would say: "was sich liebt das neckt sich" ... :wink:

My criteria for uninteresting here:
1) The subject matter is small/pedantic/minutia-mongering
2) The answers to the problem are not new or informative but a rehash of what we already think, or a rehash of previous philosopher but in drag (e.g. We must take for granted certain things like "Other people exist" in order to move on with our language games.. this is already our common sense notion made writ large into a profound statement- Hinge propositions). — schopenhauer1

The guy who said snow is white if and only if snow is white... That's like ... deep ... ya know...

Thank you for being such a nice and well-informed person. — Athena

Thank you for your nice compliments! And of course for this interaction. :)

I appreciate the distinction you made between the candidates. They are both stupid promises! Can I please have another choice? :lol: — Athena

No you cannot. They are not both stupid promises. One is a danger to democracy the other might be unwise, though I do not really know, I do not know nearly enough about US the economic situation. In any case the two promises are on utterly different scales, that is the problem. So no, there is no 'other choice', there is a rather existential one to make.

Please tell more about Germany because this is so paradoxical. The US adopted the German models of bureaucracy and education and picked up German military ideas as well. However, I have come across info that makes me think the Germans are doing better. Such as you saying the German president does not have as much power as a US president and I think that means the Germans are doing something right that US is not doing. I read education in Germany encourages the young to pay attention to their personal experience instead of the US's excessive focus on empirical information. — Athena

Well, I do not know about 'better' but they are different forms of government and that is because they have a different constitutional system. The constitution has everything to do with the amount of power a president has and also which checks and balances are in place. Not just the constitutional document as such but the whole constitutional order. Now in the German constitutional order the president is mostly a ceremonial figurehead, an elder statesman. Currently it is Walther Steinmaier. He is not the head of government though, the head of government is the chancellor, similar to a prime minister, a title unknown in the US. It is precisely the constitution that creates such differences. Now the German constitution (Basic law) has been written just after the second world war, with the prime imperative being to prevent a power grab by any one person or party. Germany has coalition governments also something unknown in the US. That is because it does not have a 'winner takes all' constitutional system. The funny thing is the German basic law has been inspired by the constitutions of the allied nations, including the US.

See, things are never clear cut. Of course the US has taken over ideas from German education because Germany was arguable the most advanced country in the 19th century, However, the Germans must have learned a thing or two about bureaucracy from the French, bureau being a French word after all.

Currently I think serious flaws in the US constitutional system are appearing, but so are they in Europe. Constitutional systems and institutional designs can add to the resilience of a political system, but they can never make it endure. The US constitution is actually a logical one given the US history and the wish to curb the dominance of the most populous states, but it ends up being a system in which only a few votes from people in a few states really matter. The US system, especially the politicization of the supreme court, leads to a very partisan and competitive democracy. It has its good sides, people are connected to their politicians, but it also has its bad sides, a tendency for polarization.

As for the minimum wage question, I am no economist. I will therefore pass on that question. I think there might be options though, you could for instance bring top tier incomes down through taxation to name one...

What a delicious question. :nerd: Also what does the US Constitution have to do with the power of a president? US presidents gained a lot of power during the Roosevelt administration and again with Reagan and again after 911. Hum, I am thinking I need to be more careful because this is a serious subject and I hope you demand a good reply and don't let me slide with unsupported insinuations. I found a link that makes my point. — Athena

What I mean is, you seem to equate the promise 'you will never need to vote again' on a par with the promise to raise minimum wages. The first comes down to the abolition of democracy the second may have good or bad economic consequences. They are not on the same level. You seem to present them as a dilemma, but they are not. One is an outright attack on the constitutional order the other a rather mundane policy proposal. The constitution has everything to do with the power of the president as the constitution circumscribe his or her power, that is what constitutions do, among other things.

That is not a full explanation but I doubt anyone regular citizen can provide a more detailed explanation and it is citizen ignorance and complacy that gives the President so much power. We are not politically aware and Trump shares a lot with Hitler. If you want to question me, I will attempt to give answers.

No, I think your quote is spot on and actually chimes in will with insights from political science. There is a shift from legislative to administrative power. Actually we may witness that in Europe as well. The US system though is already strongly presidential. The president of the US has a lot more power institutionally speaking than say, the president of Germany.

From the rest of your post I think we agree. But then, if we do, why would you say you do not support Harris? You might dislike her political views but at least she allows for the possibility you vote her out of office again... I do not know if Christian nationalism is 'unamerican', neither do I know if fascism is 'un-german', or that war crimes are 'un-dutch'. I do not think there is anything like an immutable character to a nation. All I know is that institutions need to be defended, because the institutional structure can come down. I'd be be worried of any candidate that promises to overturn the constitutional order.

Trump goes so far as to claim we will never have to vote again if he is elected because he will resolve all our problems for us. Kamala Harris promises to raise minimum wages but I don't know how this can happen without inflation and closing businesses that depend on cheap labor. I don't think we know enough to make good judgments and this thread is about global ramifications. — Athena

If you weigh the two options, one promise is that you will never vote again, indicating Trump will become ruler without any election and the other is an economic policy that may or may not have adverse consequences for businesses, do you think they are on the same level of constitutionality?

Policy choice A: the abolition of a fundamental tenet of democratic rule, free elections
Policy choice B: an economic measure within a package of a whole lot of others that might have adverse consequences for business.
.......
The two cannot be compared in relation to the threat to democratic government.

Through this forum, I have learned what I consider a fascist order is throughout Europe and this must be so because of the competition for world resources. We must have strong governments to compete and that is not the democracy that came out of the Enlightenment. Technology is changing our lives a lot and that includes the power of governments. Elements of fascism and for sure technology make a government strong. Education is very important to all this. — Athena

What would make you say that? A fascist order is an order in which the state is held in supreme regard. The body politic is mass mobilized for the good of the state and individual rights are abolished in name of some kind of social unity, it is generally a nationalist and militarist creed.

This encyclopedia Brittanica's definition: "Although fascist parties and movements differed significantly from one another, they had many characteristics in common, including extreme militaristic nationalism, contempt for electoral democracy and political and cultural liberalism, a belief in natural social hierarchy and the rule of elites, and the desire to create a Volksgemeinschaft (German: “people’s community”), in which individual interests would be subordinated to the good of the nation."

I assure you no government is as of yet fascist in Europe. Sure we have a state bureaucracy, thank god, but we are allowed to own businesses, we have human rights and thank heavens they are even oftentimes respected. We can vote our leaders our leaders out of office, express opinions contrary to the state and in many countries military service is abolished. You might think every infringement on the free market is 'fascist', but that is a mistake. Actually every type of market economy needs a substantial amount of regulation to keep markets at least semi-free.

We must have strong governments to compete and that is not the democracy that came out of the Enlightenment. — Athena

What just say now, uttered in a side sentence, is actually a deep seated fascist belief. Our nation is necessarily in competition with yours and it cannot be any other way. That is a fascist line of reasoning because it legitimates authoritarian state control. However even the history of the United States itself shows that cooperation trumps conflict. Fascism might be closer to your home than you may think...

We are getting to the heart of the matter I think and there we find edges. Not everything here will become clear or fit perfectly, but that is what I like to do here, argue and see how far we can get in understanding things. it is a caveat though, some things appear not well worked through and that is possibly because the forest here gets thicker and the cutting of a path harder.

Such as, the authority in the previous element of the discussion. That exists. It's authority exists (perhaps by consent, so it's some levels above the mechanics of an interpersonal obligation) and is arbitrarily enforced to the emotional contentedness of the majority of it's subjects and little, if anything else, is involved. In this case, I can't quite see how you could then still claim obligations exist. — AmadeusD

I do not think that entirely fits. On two accounts actually. Also a government that is not chosen by its people, say the government of the Soviet Union, still promulgated law and therefore on this positivist account you now seem to embrace (if only for the sake of argument perhaps), that law also backs up obligations. Secondly, obligations may also arise due to customs and not backed up by sanctions, at least not formal sanctions. For instance if you enter into a promise with your brother to return you the book. Whether it is legal or not is I think overly formal. The obligation arises out of the institutions of promising, contracting perhaps even principles of good conduct, legal or otherwise. The are institutional, so historically grown ways of speaking and acting that causes people to expect certain ways of speaking and acting. I think institutions are historically grown and determined in continuous practice so much so that they become part and parcel of our everyday world. That is where I part ways with the positivist.

The same can be said of an "obligation". It's an empty space between commitment and expectation. But there is nothing there. I guess, while this example is pretty parochial in terms of what concepts its engaging:

Person A promises;
Person B that they will attend X event on date Y specifically to accompany/support. Meaning B being present is crucial.
Person B, unfortunately, perishes on date V (i.e prior to the maturity of the 'promise').
Person A feels their promise is unfulfilled.
Person B is ... dead. There is nothing to oblige. They couldn't feel one way or the other. There is no obligation. — AmadeusD

I would say the obligation ended with the death of B. In this case I would construe the obligation as conditional, namely "I will be at event X under the condition that you will also be there". It does not change the fact that there was a promise between A and B and that A incurred the obligation to be there in order to assist B. That part of the promise being unfulfillable the promise becomes moot and so does the obligation that resulted from it. I have no qualms about saying an obligation exists and now does not exist anymore, due to some sort of circumstance ending it. Things pop in and out of existence all the time, they break, die, melt, etc. Obligations do not physically die but they may end, as the statute of limitations proves time and time again. (Although as mentioned very early on, in the Netherlands we have the legal figure of the 'natural obligation', an obligation which is unenforceable but still on the subject, also after exceedance of the statute of limitations, for instance on someone that stole a bike 20 years ago, he is still under the natural obligation to return it to the original owner)

The situation has not changed for person A. They mentally/emotionally feel their 'obligation'. — AmadeusD

I would not see why ... If they do, it is fine of course, but every good friend would tell them that under this condition they have no obligation anymore, at least I would assume...

1. Obligations do not exist. People with commitments and expectations exist; or
2. Obligations can exist in a positivist sense only.

Now, that gets messy - the kinds of 'authority' vary, and the enforceability varies etc.. etc.. etc. etc.. but the overall point seems clear to me: the obligation only exists as an instrument of authority and does not obtain without it. However, I now anticipate some type of "well, your emotional reaction is a kind of authority". Yes, it is. But it is not an obligation. It's an enforcement mechanism. So, "obligation" is the wrong word, I'm just trying to be least-confusing. — AmadeusD

I am actually with you on 1, People with commitments and expectations exist. But between them certain relations are established. Your account, like those of Michael and Frank, still seems to individualistic to me and committed to the idea that things exist but relations do not. I feel like echoing Wittgenstein suddenly(something I really rarely do :eek:) "The world is the totality of facts not of things" (prop. 2 of the Tractatus). They live within a wholly constructed world of relations. My questions would be, why deny them existence?

I know this view does not solve all problems. As you rightly state, there is some sort of 'authority' needed. I seem to hold a very broad view of authority, but there are limits. Fortunately you seem to also agree that authority varies and enforceability varies. I would not put all my eggs in the basket of enforceability though. I think the enforcement mechanism is actually logically posterior in the sense that we feel some obligations must be protected and cannot be ignored. To ensure that we impose a system of sanctions on some. Yet, to have an obligation I think there must be a relation to the other person perhaps or to so third party, which may be a community or whatever. I am with you that merely an emotional state does not bring on obligations. They are not private they are public in the sense that they must have a moment of externalization, often by certain procedure. That can be an elaborate and public procedure such as a marriage, or a very small and informal procedure by uttering the word 'I promise'. Also not all obligations are equally serious, like not all doors are equally heavy.

Seems to me here you've inadvertently dropped your point here, and picked up mine? I'm only hearing, as conclusions to these points "It leaves a bad taste" or "It would hurt the relationship between entity X and entity Y". Yep. Not an obligation? Onward... — AmadeusD

No, as per my view outlined above, there is something more than "it leaves a bad taste" or "it would hurt the relationship between X and Y". The law might demand it, or custom might demand it. I might even go as far as saying 'the social order demands it', though I also feel antsy with such sweeping reifications. Yet I think the point of an obligation is exactly that. The institution of promising is violated when promises are not kept. That is not only a private issue between people, but a social issue because the institution of promising is an important pattern by which we govern our conduct and negotiate our journey through the world.

This explains a whole lot about your responses around Marriage, but this just makes it all the more obvious there exists a legal obligation and where there is no enforcing authority, there is no obligation. And, here, "obligation" actually just means "threat of consequence". — AmadeusD

I think I addressed this above. Threat of sanction does not explain it and I think sanctions are posterior. If it was mere sanction you and probably the others would be right. The word usually used in jurisprudence and in socio legal studies is legitimacy, but that is a beast that does not clarify much. I would hold that legitimacy derives from adhered to procedure, the notion that this is they way things should be done.

Only hte brainstate changes, and (in this story) only for the promissor. — AmadeusD

The funny thing is that here our disagreement has some interesting consequences. To me a false promise (a promise one is not intended to keep) is still a promise as good as any. That the brainstate differs for me matters nothing. To me it is actually a dire consequence of the idea that promises are related to brain states that one must say that whether a promise is made or not is totally subjective (depending on the brain state of the promisor. As we do not have access to it we never know whether a promise is real or false. What is false is actually not the promise, that is real and should be kept, what is false is the intention of the promisor.

If you, personally, jettison your promise you have no obligation. Even if we're going to grant the obligation "thing" status, its collapsed because you pulled your support out from it. — AmadeusD

I truly wonder why you would hold on to a theory that grants this result. "If I feel I have no obligation, I have no obligation". That is odd because an obligation is almost by definition a burden. Why would one want to keep a burden? If that would be a convincing position the whole notion of obligations and promises and what not, would collapse no?

It doesn't. One is simply "legitimate authority". The behaviour is the same (i touched on this earlier in this post, funnily enough). What could possibly be said to be different?

"Do this or I'll break your legs" - Dealer
"Do this or I'll take your kids and give them to another set of parents temporarily" - Gov'munt

I may prefer my legs broken, personally. But that aside, there are given rules, and given consequences to not following them. The "culturally embedded" concept of promise functions the same in both of the above scenarios. In fact, I would argue that both of these scenarios exist precisely because the obligation itself is no where to be found. Enforcement solves that. — AmadeusD

There is a world of difference and your example makes clear you see the difference too. you do not say: "Do this or I'll break your legs" - Dealer
"Do this or I'll break your legs" - Gov'munt

That is logical because a government does not say that. If it does it acts no better than the dealer and its exercise of power is wholly arbitrary like the dealer's. The taking of your kids is probably an action to protect them, taken in accordance with proper procedure and therefore legitimate and therefore you have the obligation to do so. What the government does is to force you to adhere to a norm, in this example it is not clear to what norm, but probably something relevant to your kids' well being. The dealers' threat is a means to force you to carry out an action brought force by his whim. I think an argument can well be made that if a government would behave like a dealer and threaten in the same vein, the obligations its command are moot as its reign lost legitimacy. (The sanctions of govt could be every bit as severe, often even moreso, but that is not the issue I think.)

Purely on a legal mind-to-legal mind basis, what do you mean here? Is the assertion that there is some kind of legal principle which actually transcends human minds? I have never been able to get on board with anything remotely close to "natural law" type arguments so Im really curious. — AmadeusD

I am not a natural law theorist. The legal principles I hold to exist stem from the coherence, consistency and goals of the body of laws itself. They might not be stipulated as such, but they are the principles in accordance to which our law is laid down and can be construed by comparing and interpreting its rules in a consistent manner. A legal principle for instance is the notion that promises should be kept. One is also that "no one may profit from his own wrong" as in Riggs v Palmer. I am not going further into Dworkinian philosophy of law though. The difference though between these and natural law principles is that these principles stem from the law itself, our customary interpretation of it and even from our customs themselves, but they are not transcendental. They are immanent.

It has been a long post but worthwhile to write. Now I am off to bed...
Take care,
Tobias

You could (and please don't take this is prickly... it really is not) — AmadeusD

It is, but I dislike using shorthand. Usually it is just to show off your knowledge and send a reader into the woods, because something like legal positivism is stated all sorts of ways. I believe in explanation, not some reference to a certain position. Though, yes, this is a simplistic legal positivist account. However, I am also not necessarily a legal positivist. I am more Dworkinian in any case as I do believe in the reality ;) of legal principles and reject judicial discretion in hard cases but I think I hold a different position from Dworking as well, as will become clear from this post.

This is also true. This speaks to our previous fracas but not directly. You can establish the existence of some 'obligation' in the sense of "you promised X" happened in time. You cannot establish "the promise" as it's own entity(this to me seems beyond discussion. — AmadeusD

Yes, but I do not think that is at all necessary. It seems that you and Frank and Michael are under the assumption that to be really real entails mind independence. I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make.

There is no logical compass that lands on "fulfill your promises". — AmadeusD

It needs no logical compass. It simply needs a society in which one expect from one another that one fulfills his promises. Of course other societies are thinkable in which the notion of promise does not exist. However we live in ours. The fact that some concept is dependent on our societal interaction doesn't make it any less real. The 'I do' establishes a marriage under the right procedures. That marriage is as real as say, a doorknob. We live in a world with doors, similarly, we live in a world with marriages. In an apocalyptic world in which our institutions have broken down, I am still married, because in the world that preceded the apocalypse the marriage was duly ordained. However, I might die and all the people remembering the institution of marriage might die. Than indeed, there is no marriage anymore. Same holds for the doorknob, in a world without doors, the material shaped in what we have known as doorknob is meaningless matter.

That's only ever going to be relevant case-by-case and is, in fact, a moral decision which only exists at the moment it is made. — AmadeusD

This I really cannot follow. At what time does it exist then? There is a moment it existed and was real and then, poof, it is gone? And when is the decision actually made, when it is made in my head or when it is uttered? I think one would prefer a theory that avoids such questions... I also actually would not know what is implied with it. The decision can be undone at any time? If it cannot and you are still bound to the decision, what is it then that binds?

What is the promise? There is no possible answer to this without simply describing something else (a brainstate, a decision, or one's personally 'ought' motivation - Banno likes to fulfill promises, it seems. Fine). — AmadeusD

It is not Banno that holds Banno accountable. Others do. Promises are relevant within a network of people for which they are relevant, but see above. What I think is the problem is that you want an explanation in terms of some sort of individual thing to which it refers, a brain state or one individual decision by an individual person. Promises, just as obligations are relational and come into being within a network of relations. I would really not know why one would hold a position that cannot make sense of obligations. I see it as a flaw of the metaphysical position in question, not the flaw of the notion of the obligation.

It does not create an obligation beside you wanting to keep your promise, as it were. It is yours. It isn't 'out there' as anything. — AmadeusD

This displays the previous point aptly. It is not me wanting to keep my promise. I might not want it at all. I might have to and legally I might well be forced to. Promises do not rest on the individual will of the promisor, but on the relationship the promise has established between promisor and promisee. I think law and actually all social rules emerge out of patterns of behavior of people. It is culturally embedded. That does not make it arbitrary, it makes it historical. It is different from 'command of the sovereign', it is also different from: "rules made by a competent authority", it is also not "the heaven of concepts above", it is a set of culturally developed practices that have attained consistence and resilience over time. My position comes down to what I know as 'interactionism', but I do not know if that is a thing in American jurisprudence, or rather native to my law faculty.

Well, the answer there is pretty simple. You see an obstacle he (we) don't. Is that a bit more diplomatic here? — AmadeusD

Yes, but I think missing the obstacle causes you to stumble. You need to hold on to all kinds of obscure positions, namely that a promise exists one moment and stops existing the next or that a promise should really be conceived of as a brain state or that an obligation only reaches as far as I am willing to be bound to the promise. That is incoherent because the whole notion of promise exists to make sure I perform the task promised even if I am unwilling to. Michael apparently thinks it does not matter whether one is ordered by a gang of robbers or whether one is taxed by legitimate authorities. If a theory causes me to have to embrace such notions, I consider the theory implausible.

Is that a bit more diplomatic here? — AmadeusD

Even though we still disagree, it is in any case a lot nicer to answer this post, so I do appreciate your effort at diplomacy :flower: :wink:

So you are chasing your own tail when you ask what 'ought' means? I also do not know why you keep repeating the question in that case...

Anyway, we are back to the difference that is in play, between a command and an obligation. Well, that we went over already. Being obliged is different from being commanded, because a command is uttered by whim of the commanding entity while an obligation is incurred by following specific procedures, such as promising or contracting etc. What I do not understand is why you would hold on to a theory that does not explain a certain distinction we all feel that is relevant in favour of a theory that cannot make heads or tails of it.

No, it's not. I want to know what "you ought do this" means. I don't know why I need to keep repeating this? — Michael

Yes and it can mean different things in different contexts, that is why no one can give you an exact definition. That is actually more often the case with concepts. If I tell you 'you ought to lose weight' I might mean 'it is good for you to lose weight'. If I tell you 'you ought to see this movie' I might mean that you will certainly enjoy this movie. If I tell you, you ought to pay the fine it means you are obliged to pay the fine.

It's not divine command theory, but it is a command theory. Ought-claims are commands phrased as if they were truth-apt propositions. — Michael

Well, on some version of social contract theory maybe. In any case the agreement is implied when following the procedure and cannot be retracted. For instance you cannot say: I promise to bring to back book X, but do not want to be bound to do it". That would be contradictory.

I don't understand what this means. Is this a physical compulsion? A , psychological compulsion? — Michael

Well, you tell me. You would like to bring it into agreement with a materialist worldview I guess. Use some introspection, how do customs compel? If you see an outstretched hand with the intention to shake yours, by what force do you feel compelled to shake back that hand? In any case you know you have a choice, so how does that outstretched hand compels you to choose? I do not feel the need to psychologize of physicalize behavioral patterns.

Because you engage in the circular claim "you ought do what this authority tells you to do". I want to know what the "you ought" part of this sentence means. A reference back to this authority is no explanation at all. — Michael

Legitimate authority. I do not know what you really want, as an explanation, but as I said one can only explain by reference to certain kind of distinctions. I can tell you the difference between a command and a legal act, or a command and a contract, or promise. What you want is an explanation why we ought to do things. The reasons are different, sometimes we ought to do things to stay alive, sometimes because some bandit threatens to do it and sometimes because you are under an obligation to do it. Such an obligation may be incurred by your promises, or your contracts, or by damages you caused another party. The difference is that you incurred am obligation because of submission to legitimate authority (whether agree or disagree in that particular instance is not relevant, you submitted yourself under its rules), you ought to keep yourself alive because of some psychological drive I guess and you ought to obey the commands of the bandit because of the same reason. They are different though from obligations. That was the point.

I addressed this here. All this talk of "violating obligations" and "being bound" is vacuous and superfluous. It is just the case that the law says "anyone who is found guilty of murder is to be imprisoned". We then choose to murder or not with this knowledge in mind, and will inevitably face whatever consequences follow if we choose to murder. There's nothing more to it. — Michael

You think it is vacuous but it is not. Your view of punishment is misguided. We do not punish because we like to do so, but because murder is wrong. On your view law is simply arbitrary. It is not. There is a pattern to it and conforms by and large to the way we treat other and like to be treated by others. this congruence between law and morality is inexplicable in your scheme. Hence, it lacks any clarificatory strength. But hey, if you want to use a scheme of thought which cannot make sense of the world as it is, be my guest.

Which just means that I agree to do what some outside authority says. — Michael

And indeed command theory as a theory of jurisprudence has been rendered obsolete after the Hart Austin debate. But as said, hold onto it if you must...:ok: Here it is in very simplified form. https://carneades.pomona.edu/2016-Law/04.HartAustin.html

What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean? — Michael

I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures, that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x. This is different from the command to do x. A command is based on whim and therefore arbitrary whereas a promise or any speech act that incurs obligations is based on procedure. I can only explain distinctions by focusing on its differences. Of course you can ask me what compels means and what power means but than you are like the child that just goes nahnahnahnah when something is explained.

Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else". — Michael

Yes, that is commonly what you understand, and what many people at face value understand. Even Austin did. Yet the distinction between a command and legitimate authority needs to be made when one wants to make sense of law and obligation. Your everyday understanding of those terms is fine in general, but not when engaging in conceptual analysis.

If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. — Michael

I just did. You just do not accept the explanation and want something more. I cannot force you to accept anything, in other words, you are not obliged to ;) However, if you like to make sense of law and obligation it is wise to accept it.

What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim. — Michael

No it does not. That would be spanning the horse behind the carriage. You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. The imprisonment is also not arbitrary and based on some whim but again on legitimate authority and proper procedure.

So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told? — Michael

Even if you agree or not you ought to do what you are told, because the authority that governs your conduct is legitimate. I might like to not fulfill the terms of my contract, but that is irrelevant, because I am bound by the terms of it. It is not mere whim, not by me, or my counter party. but my submission to a relevant institution.

Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we say we will do? — Michael

No, even when it is not pragmatic for you to do what you are told you ought to do it. If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.

And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and instead of saying "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? — Michael

It makes known your intention to oblige. I will do it given an indication of your conduct. I promise to do it expresses your wish to also be bound to do it (as you signal your acceptance of the institution of promising). Imagine the following perfectly believable conversation: "Will you help me move the house next month?" "sure I will!" "You will?" "yeah yeah, sure!" "You promise?" "Well, I can't promise it at this point because my father is ill and I might need go to the hospital at exactly that day, so I can't promise anything, but if there is a chance, I definitely will".

This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then also entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise? — Michael

Like I said, words are always context dependent. Sometimes an "I will" is construed as a promise. Certainly during a wedding ceremony. The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. In general though, no, that is the difference between expressing an intention and a promise.

This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?

You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command. — Michael

That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. One that can of course be countered, for instance by appealing to 'force majeure', but that in any case the claim itself is not illegitimate. That is different from the orders of a gang leader when he robs the bank and tells you to give him the money.

I think we're just going to disagree here. I said earlier that what exists is people saying and doing things. The rest is feelings and ad hoc explanations. I was hoping you'd agree that obligation comes down to personal sentiment because we could finally explore the way the private language argument blasts away the veracity of the stories we tell about obligation. But instead, you're saying the binding is out there for all to see. I'm not sure what you're talking about. — frank

Of course people say and do things, but what they say and do has consequences for the rights we bear, the debts we owe, and indeed the marriages we conclude. Because that is the case, because language is public, an obligation does not come down to personal sentiment. If that was the case we could change our obligations at whim and we cannot. The whole notion of an obligation is that it is not your personal sentiment but an outside force that imposes it on you. If it were different the notion would be meaningless and the notion is not meaningless. The binding is indeed there for 'all to see' at least for two people to see and maybe more. An obligation always has an outward component. Of course you could impose one on yourself, but that you could change at whim.

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference between them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. It’s make-believe a la fictionalism. — Michael

Perhaps this has been cleared up earlier. As a caveat I have to say that what both propositions actually means, depends on context. They might come down to the same thing, for instance when a police officer utters the sentence, but they might also not. the different is that the first proposition appeals to an outside authority or process that has caused you to you being ought to do a certain something. The second proposition appeals to no such authority. It has al sorts of ramifications, the most important being that propsition 1 may be questioned and countered: "Why ought I to do it?, on what authority, for whom?"
The second proposition does not allow that.

As in, "If I don't build the house on time then some authority will fine me."

This is true if in the terms of the contract. But this does not prima facie entail "I ought build the house" (or "I ought pay the fine"). — Michael

You are fined because you disregarded an obligation and that is call for punishment. The punishment is the fine for breach of contract. It is not a sum of money you can or cannot pay. There is a moral dimension to it, which you disregard. Ultimately this moral obligation depends on the social rule that we should keep our promises, or in Latin, Pacta sunt servanda.

I think obligation is something people feel sometimes. "He didn't want to go to the party, but he felt obligated.". Or it could be something that people in the area believe. "Most Americans believed he was obliged to resign.". It's just describing how people feel or attitudes they have. — frank

There are of course multiple senses in which we use the word obliged. One indeed often feel obliged to do x. But consider the difference between these two sentences: "He felt obliged to go to the party" and "he was obliged to go to the party". They are not the same sentences, but in your account of obligation they are. That is because you think an obligation is subjective. The obligation though has an objective side to it. We are bound to certain acts and that bind we call an obligation. They arise out of certain procedures, being you signing a contract, or a legislator promulgating a law.

I've offered my own understanding of obligations; they are commands treated as if they were truth-apt propositions, but as commands are not truth-apt propositions obligations are a fiction, and barely even sensible. — Michael

Obligations are not the same as commands and the difference lies in the legitimacy of the procedure by which they are issued. A command makes no appeal to legitimate procedure whereas an obligation does. This discussion actually mirrors the Hart Austin debate on whence the law derives its legitimacy from. To Austin law was merely the command of the sovereign. Hart contested that and won, at least that is the current view of jurisprudence. https://thecolumnofcurae.wordpress.com/2020/07/20/h-l-a-hart-his-criticism-on-austins-theory/

1. You will love this movie
2. I promise you that you will love this movie — Michael

Nothing, just a figure of speech. I promise you ... here means: "I am sure you will..." You can though never promise someone else will like something. You would also never see someone asking for indemnification. With a marriage proposal it might be different though there may well be laws guarding against asking for indemnification in such cases. However, for instance if you promise to sell me X and I contract with Y that I will deliver him X after I have gotten it from you and you do not deliver, I might well ask for indemnification, under circumstances, even Y might.

What does "if someone is drowning then you have a duty to jump into the water and save their life" mean?

Does it just mean "if someone is drowning then jump into the water and save their life" but phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition? — Michael

No, it means there is some rule that states that one should save drowning people. This rule may either be customary or codified somewhere. In the second case I might also be appealing to such a rule, but I might also be appealing to just my whim. In case one, we can try to find out if such a duty is there or not, by looking at law or custom.

I’m not really sure how your comments are related to mine? I am simply asking what “obligation” means, and how the sincere use of the verb “promise” entails an obligation. — Michael

Like in many cases of speech acts it depends on context. It may well be just a figure of speech, it may also put you under a pretty heavy legal obligation. Obligations are such are simply burdens imposed on you by way of legitimate procedure, are because you bound yourself to a certain course of action or because a legitimate outside force did so, such as the organs of a recognized state, or recognized custom.

It's like when Margaret Thatcher said, "There's no such thing as Society." If you really don't understand what she was saying, that's your choice. Most of us understand it perfectly. — frank

The question is, was she right? Of course I understand what she was saying. I also understand what it does when saying that. It was a way to get rid of social policy. I think that is always. Metaphysics, the question what is really real, is idle speculation. What we need to know is, what does ascribing 'reality' or 'existence' to a certain something do? The question is not 'does a promise exist'.

Sure. Oaths, covenants, verbal contracts, and promises are ideas that come to us as parts of a religious heritage. — frank

That seems a sociological claim, and to me a rather dubious one. Aren't covenants, verbal contracts and promises not just very handy devices by way of which we structure our relations towards one another? We do not need God to make them handy.

I think promises are for societies where people lie all the time. If you make an oath, you're signaling that you're telling the truth for a change. Otherwise, there's no difference between giving a promise and just doing as Jesus advised, "let your yes mean yes:" — frank

Welcome to current society. Lying is actually pretty common, "Does my ass look fat in that dress, no of course not honey", or "I will be at your brothers party on Saturday" When push comes to shove it is raining... Promising is a way to make the other reflect on his/her yes or no, it lends emphasis and indeed brings forth obligations, in more or less strong degrees of enforceability. That is also why parents ask their children "do you promise to be good?" . They know what a promise is before they had any religious education.

For us, all the divine trappings have fallen away. There's nothing but people talking, people behaving in a certain way. — frank

I would leave the 'nothing but' out, but for the rest I agree with you. Though stating that institutions are products of social action is something else than stating that therefore they do not exist. Thatcher's quote is often used as an example of methodological individualism. That position is not unproblematic. The 'I' that does things is also shaped by the institutions in which it exists. I am myself much more partial to Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.

People don't usually talk about whether promises exist somehow, but if we had to make sense of that, we'd say the proposition involved in the promise exists as an abstract object. — frank

No, they do not and probably for good reason. The only reason I can think of why it might be meaningful to discuss the existence of a certain something it to know what it does when we ascribe or take away the quality of existence of that something. If we decide on God not existing, prayer makes little sense. For this reason the existence of God is hotly debated I guess. What one does when one denies existence is to decrease them in importance. That is also what denying the existence of promises does. What holds for promises actually holds for all other concepts. Truth is also never found 'floating around', kindness is not, 'principles of good governance' aren't and so on. Yet all these concepts do things in the world.

it's an element of intellectual life. So yes, they exist. In another sense, they don't. — frank

If that is the conclusion I would think it merits some investigation in what you consider meaningful for existence. What does it matter for the existence of something to be an aspect of intellectual life? My hunch is that it is 'dirt and dunamis' as you put it in an earlier post. What advantage does it have to hold on to a position that cannot make sense of the distinction between rules of evidence and existence?

Perhaps we are indeed running around in circles, but I would like to know what attracts you to such a physicalist position? Materialism is all back in favour, but I am trying to wrap my head around why one would go out of his or her way to absolutize this position and rather deny the existence of anything else or relegate it to 'existing in some sense'. But well, if you see nothing in it feel free to disregard.

If you're not reading my posts, don't talk about htem - particularly using terms like 'trolling' which you are doing with that exact sentence. Tsk tsk. Civil discourse and all. But, in all honestly Tobias - your posts are crap. This has nothing to do with your mental abilities or you as a human. Your posts are crap. I'm allowed to say that. You taking personal offense is something you're going to need to work on. — AmadeusD

Of course you are free to point out that you think my posts are crap. I disagree with that assessment but that is to be expected. What is uncalled for is your incessant stream of arguments ad hominem and your condescending tone. Those are not needed and uncivil. I have every reason to take offense when I am talked to with disrespect. Of course probably in your world there is no such thing as rules of civil discourse as rules altogether lack the quality of existence, but in the real world they are certainly there. So, may I ask you kindly to please leave me be and go away?

↪Tobias You misunderstood me. No offense, but I'm not interested in pointing out how you misunderstood me, only to have you respond with the same misunderstanding. I'll leave it there. — frank

Fair enough. I would like to know where I misunderstood you, because indeed that does happen. But if I do not get to find out, alas. I honestly tried to address the points you made, that is all I can say. Philosophy, in my view, is the examination of one's propositions. In that vein my posts were written. If you find them unhelpful, you are free to disregard them of course.

Your point seemed to be that a marriage (that is without any other kind of evidence) may be a feature of the world by virtue of your attitude: — frank

Ohh no, that is not what I tried to convey. So maybe I did not formulate it aptly. A marriage is not constituted by my attitude, it is constituted by a certain procedure. It is an interesting procedure, it culminates in a 'speech act', as Austin called it. Me saying 'yes I do' has consequences for the state of affairs in the world, namely that I am no longer a bachelor, but a husband. The following of proper procedure causes a marriage to exist, not my attitude.

Note that what actually exists here is you demonstrating the behavior of assertion making. Compare this to the value of a currency. Literally the only fact regarding this kind of value is the way people behave. Imagine this exchange: — frank

Well, what makes the marriage exist or not is whether this procedure has actually taken place. If it has taken place, I, with good cause, attest and vouch for the presence of my marriage. Whether I can prove it is a wholly different matter, as provability is, at least under Dutch law, not a precondition for marriage. However, of course, it had to be registered. It not being provable anymore has no impact on the actual existence of my marriage. The ritual has been followed, the speech act has been uttered. I am married and the marriage has not been dissolved also according to procedure. Think of it this way: is there for you a difference in my utterance that I am married in case that: A the proper ritual has indeed been followed and B. the proper has not been followed? My argument is that I am telling the truth in case A., whether or not I can prove it and I am not telling the truth in case B, irrespective of proof. Therein lays the crux of the matter.

Compare this to the value of a currency. Literally the only fact regarding this kind of value is the way people behave. Imagine this exchange: — frank

Yes, but so what? Currency is a piece of paper to which we attach value, because it has been issued by a certain procedure. That is why currency which has been minted according to proper procedure has value and currency not minted according to proper procedure is actually valueless, the possession of which may actually cause legal trouble for you. Now of course, in a world that is blown to bits and is reduced to barter economy the value of that piece of paper might well become 0. No one wants to trade anything for it. But that does not mean that somehow its existence is of any less status than, say, a doorknob, which is also only a real doorknob because of the very existence of a door in which it has its proper place. It is also only a certain something within a network of all kinds of things. that is why I keep saying that at the core our disagreement is about metaphysics.

We could say value exists as part of an explanation for certain kinds of behavior. As such, it's an abstract object because it's possible to be wrong about value. It's like numbers, sets, propositions, etc. It's a resident of complex intellectual activities that bear on interactions with one another and with the world. But that's their only domain: intellectual activities. They don't exist out there with dirt and dynamos. So we have two ways of talking about existence. — frank

We do have come to the heart of the matter. That is that you feel you need some kind of material substrate for something to really exist, 'dirt and dynamis'. If there is not some material thing, it cannot really be a certain something. I think that is actually a metaphysical assumption which is not needed. It does not matter whether something is made out of wood or stone or whether something is made out of numbers on a bank account. A certain phenomenon is always a certain something in virtue of the network within which it has a place. You want to restrict existence to something existing as stuff, something tangible, material. I do not see a good reason to speak about existence in such a way. It leads to confusion and the instability of institutions. When you are asked 'are you married?', you would have to answer with: "well really not, you see, because actually marriage is unreal, there is no dirt involved (though I hope for you there is, but I digress ;) ) but we behave as if we are married". I would answer the question much simpler: "yes". (Or in my case, "no", but that is again beside the point.

This would require a dive into Wittgenstein's private language argument with a little help from Saul Kripke. Is that something you're interested in? — frank

I might though my vocabulary may well be different stemming from a different tradition. I do not see the link to private language though because the very existence of such institutions displays that we have no private language. We actually share a public like mindedness which makes such institutions possible. They are not subjective, they are the product of interactions. That is why I think here you mistake the horse for the carriage:

We could say value exists as part of an explanation for certain kinds of behavior. — frank

No, I think, value has come into existence because of certain kinds of behavior.

Can someone stop @AmadeusD from trolling about? He seems unable to discuss matters without peppering his responses with invectives on his interlocutor's mental abilities. I have not bothered to read his last post because it annoys me to be insulted.

Yea, I don't think he was being disingenuous. He just wasn't up for a discussion about ontology. He didn't seem to understand that his points were irrelevant. — frank

Maybe you can explain to me how they are irrelevant? I thought I was discussing ontology. The point I make and Banno agrees with is that in the posts of some people here the quality of being provable is mistakenly identified with the quality of existing or not. (Not sure if I have my analytic phil. terminology straight but you know what I mean.). That is an ontological point I would think.

Exactly. What exists in the world is you behaving as if there are certain rules you ought to follow. — frank

I am having trouble unpacking this. Are you referring to the existence or non-existence of rules? I am not trying to misrepresent your point, but from this it seems that you feel a rule does not exist perse but what exist is 'me behaving 'as if' there are such rules'. Why though would you hold that these rules do not really exist?

As far as I can tell...
Are morals arbitrary, random, mere matter of whatever opinion? No.
Are morals existentially mind-dependent? Yes.
I'm not seeing a problem with that, though. — jorndoe

Agreed.

I think he meant there is no fact regarding the existence of X. X does not show up in any way in the world. If something belongs to the set of all things that exist in our world, one expects there to be facts associated with this existence. This is not about knowledge. It's about the state of the world. — frank

But there is such a fact, namely my assertion that I am married. I attest to it, vouch for it, plead with my audience. I am simply not believed because others cannot corroborate my assertion and there are no records of it.

With regard to a promise of which there is absolutely no evidence, you might think your memory of the making of the promise would stand as a fact. Surely your mental states are facts of the world. But let's look more closely (with Kripke's help). How would you, yourself determine if your memory was correct? How would you answer that? — frank

I cannot know if my memory was correct. All I can do is remember something. I also know my memory is mostly correct. Of course, I might well be wrong and there are good reasons for the audience not to believe me. However, if I indeed made that promise, I have said "I will return the book to you", there simply is a promise whether it is recorded or not. I just cannot convince anybody else of it, and for good reason. Rules of evidence are important, but not to establish the ontological status of X, but merely whether I should or should not believe X to be the case.

In everyday practice we constantly end up in such situations. Let's say you told your friend you'd return him some money you owe, what do you do? I think you will return the money. Or will you think: "Well there is no written record of me owing the money and hey my memory may be wrong and so might his, so there is no need to return the money, the promise does not exist". No, of course not.

For example. I tell you there is a little man on the stairs, but this doesn't show up in any facts of the world. He's invisible and he leaves no trace anywhere. You can safely assert that the man doesn't exist. The same would be true for promises and marriages. — frank

I can safely assert it and I would probably be believed by all. However, if there really was such a man, I would still be wrong. He did exist, he just didn't leave a trace. You who told me there was such a man, were right, I was wrong. You won't be believed though, however, that is sad, as you were right all along. The same holds for promises and marriages.

Then you're flat-out wrong because the second part is false. — AmadeusD

And on what metaphysical theory are you basing that assertion? Common sense speaks against it. When I open my eyes the first impression of it is that what I see is real. I am not thinking, 'fuck, what I see here is amazing, but is it really real? I must find some evidence for that? Moreover, most of us assume that reality goes on being there after I die and I am not anymore around to perceive. However, any conclusive evidence for that is lacking. Your assertion collapses into the modest crude form of idealism.

If I promise my brother I will return a book to him I borrowed from him, I made that promise, no matter whether he can prove it in court or not. — Tobias

So you really want to hold on to the view that I did not promise my brother to return the book when there is no record of it? Even though I told him: "I promise i will return this book"? It 'poof', magically, just did not happen? Best not to take your word for anything then.

I don't care. You're stubborn in your incoherence so this is par for the course. — AmadeusD

You should care because you are violating rules of civil conduct. Last time I checked they were taken seriously on this website.

The President of the United States is the most powerful person in the country, and possibly the world. When he uses his official powers in any way, under the majority’s reasoning, he now will be insulated from criminal prosecution,” she wrote. “Orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival? Immune.

It seems to me odd that contravening the democratic process (as assassinating a political rival clearly is) could be construed as an official act falling within the duties of the executive. But hey, I am not sure if under US law this is impossible. I find it odd, but I do not know.

↪tim wood What's nonsense is having barely read the SCOTUS opinion is you having such strong opinions about it. The decision is fine and fully in line with what I would expect coming from a Dutch legal background. Tobias maybe you want to have a look as well but I find the media reporting on this ridiculous and dissenting opinion confused. — Benkei

I haven't read it, so I also feel unqualified to make any statement on the matter. That this case is difficult and needs a tiered approach does not surprise me. It is actually a very complicated area of law for me, even in Dutch law I am not sure I understand exactly what the doctrine actually is. I reckon in the Netherlands, administrations cannot be prosecuted when they engage in the execution of ordinary affairs of state (Based on the so called 'pikmeer II' judgment). Executives of these administrations are immune when the administration they represent is immune. When I saw the summary of the US verdict, it reminded me of the Dutch doctrine. However, I think the US legal system is a different one, the historical context is different and the evil may well be in the details. I was surprised when Sotomayor argued vehemently against it, but I have also not read her dissent. I therefore feel unqualified to comment. (A very long comment to say 'no comment', but hey I also do law ;) )

If there is no evidence you are married, the marriage doesn't exist. — AmadeusD

You keep saying that and it is at the core of this whole debate. It comes down to the maxim: "What cannot be shown to exist, does not exist". I think that claim is wrong. We do not require evidence for existence. If I promise my brother I will return a book to him I borrowed from him, I made that promise, no matter whether he can prove it in court or not. The problem is that such a view undermines the ethical dimension of promise because it leads to the view that promises have no moral force per se, but only if there is evidence for it. Most promises are made orally, without any witness and have, in your view, no claim to existence, allowing me a lot of leeway with such promises, because if they do not exist in the first place, I may disregard them. Because how can I be bound to something that does not exist?
This view is, in my opinion absurd, and rests on a mistaken conflation of existence with perception. Banno and others have also pointed it out to you but you keep holding on to it. Fine, but do not expect me to agree with what I consider to be absurd.

Enjoy your day and kind regards,
Tobi

(Edit: I find the way you write offensive, facetious and displaying an arrogance which is I think both unnecessary and baseless. Therefore, from now on, I will keep any an all interaction with you to a bare minimum).

I was just making a joke. Amadeus often seems to be under the impression that, "His saying so makes it so." — Leontiskos

My apologies, I did not get it. We do share the same impression it does seem :)

What if the nuclear weapon wipes out the entire nation and the legal order. Would you still be legally married? Or would the legality of the marriage fall away and it become a purely natural marriage? — Leontiskos

Well, for me it is hard to think of a legal order to be wiped out in any material sense. The legal order is a good example of an immaterial concept, it is a web of relations, of habits and ideas accepted by the people in a community. Of course such a community could be wiped out, as you suggest, the nation is wiped out. Ok, let's look at the scenario. Bombs fell and we stumble over the rubble of our civilisation blindly and shell shocked. With some great coincidence you find your wife (or husband) back and she is a shell of her former self, hardly recognizing you. What would you say about how you know her and to tell her who you are? I think you would say "we are married remember, you are my wife". You would not say "we used to be married, but the marriage is annulled because our civilisation has been destroyed.

But, you might object, my point is whether legally you are married. Well I would say in the circumstance that there is no legal order anymore, it does not matter. There is no 'legally married' anymore, there is married or not married, it is of no legal consequence. Yet I am right to claim I am married. There is also no instance that can annul the marriage and say I am wrong, because such an instance is only possible within a legal order. The question becomes meaningless to ask. I though, in that scenario, still hold that I am married and rightly so. There used to be a legal order and I am married in proper process.

The question becomes meaningful again if a new legal order is established. I hold that I am married and start to tell my story before the person or rudimentary institution which has somehow obtained competence. Probably, if my wife still does not recognize me and says she knows of no such thing, the 'court' would tell me I cannot prove my marriage and that clearly the other party does not know about her marriage. The court cannot establish the legal fact of my marriage and would probably state that we have never been married. From that moment on I may cry and tell my sad story, but legally my marriage is not there anymore. The court establishes the facts and established them without my marriage. That does not make the court right. It established the wrong state of affairs as fact. But alas that is how law works at times. I was right before the court, my wife was wrong. However, the rules of evidence were in the way.

You might think I am just playing with words here. I intent not to. What I take issue with is the idea that something only exist when there is a record of it. That according to me confuses evidence with existence. For me it is simply 'if a tree fell and no one heard it, did it make a sound' all over again.

Where did he do that? My claim is rather simple: when I make a promise to X to do Y, the promise is made. Now Amadeus seems to state that when the promise cannot be proven it is somehow not there. That is a bit of a big claim in the face of the undisputed fact that I made that promise. The onus is on Amadeus to show that somehow promises (or marriages) magically disappear when no proof for them can be given. Of course in a legal regime, at some point this may happen, for instance when it states that I have no given credible proof for our marriage. The court may rule that I am not and have not been married to X. Ok. That however, does not in any way mean that somehow when I said that I was married to X, I was actually lying. I was not. By definition we were married, as it is given in the facts of the case. The court has established the facts wrongly, based on of knowledge and on the rule of evidence.

I do not see any convincing point, but maybe you do. I gladly see it, so please tell me if you are willing...

Yes. That's literally what it would mean. — AmadeusD

No. The non existence of registries is not among the limititative grounds for annulment of marriages under Dutch law. Therefore the marriage is not annulled. Just you saying so does not make it so. Your point comes down to when something cannot be proven to have existed it never existed. That is why your extreme materialist position lapses into idealism, but well, that point was beyond you.

here is no marriage to be annulled in that scenario — AmadeusD

There is my GF and I were married on the 10 of the 12th, 1998. It has not been disbanded. I just have no means of proving it.

The same way if your bank loses its server, you have no money. — AmadeusD

That might be because the money stopped existing. The marriage did not stop existing. The wedding ring may well be lost in that catastrophe as well, but so what?

You are very wrong, and adamant about it — AmadeusD

Mirror mirror on the wall...

It's not easy to pretend that's a reasonable position to take. — AmadeusD

I am doing a helluva job so far.

Your inconsistency is becoming funny — AmadeusD

Your face is funny.

that's going to make me mean — AmadeusD

You are not mean, just a bully and a silly one.

As you previously stated, Tobias, it depends on the legislation we are taking into account, but since you and I live under the "umbrella" of the European Union, there is a basic principle: the company does not exist if it is not recorded. If the company is not recorded, it becomes irregular and the stakeholders respond with their goods and not with the company's goods. I mean, without a registration, the company lacks of "affectio societatis" — javi2541997

I agree. The sale of a house in the Netherlands is also not complete until the asset is transferred and its transfer is recorded in the registry. There is sound wisdom is that, especially on a corporate level. People who are dealing with the company need to know on what kind of entity it can take regress. In order to minimize confusion the rule is that there is only a company when it is registered as such.

It is obvious that you still have some obligations to your spouse, but your marriage becomes "insufficient" as the legal codes of my country says. Specifically, the 61st of the Spanish Civil Code says: For the acknowledgment of the marriage it ought to be recorded in the civil registry.
If it is not registered, or you lack some certificate, you can lose some advantages. For example, in terms of taxes, it cannot be proven you are a family unit. In terms of perceiving a pension from the state, there could be problems of evidence that marriage existed, etc.
With the aim of preventing unfair results, the Civil Code provides basic rights and principles between spouses, but these are very basic. — javi2541997

I think under Dutch law a marriage also needs to be inscribed in the registry to enter into force. What I do not know is whether the marriage is dissolved when it is not anymore recorded because no such registry exists anymore. It might be, but I do not think so. Article 1:149 of the Dutch civil code mentions that a marriage can be dissolved on a number of grounds. These grounds are summed up limitatively which means that only those grounds have legal force. The eradication of a registry is not among them. Therefore I can only conclude that under Dutch law the marriage is not dissolved.

[url=http://]https://wetten.overheid.nl/jci1.3:c:BWBR0002656&boek=1&titeldeel=9&afdeling=1&artikel=149[/url]

Of course there will be all kinds of problems with evidence. That is my point exactly. the points of evidence should be separated from the point of whether a marriage or some other promise of sorts exist or not. Of course the state might well demand proof of you being married and when no such proof can be given, the relevant institution may well treat the marriage as not having any force. That does not mean the marriage is gone though in any ontological sense. When I see my loved one after this horrendous catastrophe that destroyed all the registries, I will say "we are married". I will not say "I used to be married to you", and rightly so. The duties of the spouses to each other would still apply even though they are not enforceable in court due to issues of evidence. We still gave our word, we are married and the marriage is not dissolved, at least not under Dutch law as far as I can tell. (I am the first to admit though I am not very knowledgeable on family law).

Interestingly perhaps under Dutch law we know the figure of the 'natural obligation'. That is an obligation that cannot be enforced but is still there. The most prominent example of it is when a thief becomes the owner of a certain good due to the statute of limitation. Since he became owner the original owner cannot revindicate his or her property. Yet, the thief/owner is still under a natural obligation to return the good to the person he/ she stole it from. A lot of law simply serves to protect economic activity and trust in the system. It does not uphold ontological truths. I think that is where lots of the confusion lays.

False. I went through this giving examples of both conceptually. You are just wrong. A person claiming bare that someone promised them something isn't even a legal consideration. It's a nothing. A nonsense. It isn't going to even get you listened to by the judiciary in any form, unless you have some evidence. Even that, usually, needs leave to be adduced. — AmadeusD

It depends on jurisdiction and on where and when it is uttered. If I interview a witness than him or her saying that something promised them something, is relevant. Of course the defense can argue it is somehow not recorded but I as a judge can take into account whether I find this witness credible or not.

If you can't prove it in court, it probably does. If there is literally no record of your marriage, you are not married. That's how a legal obligation works. If you're conflating moral obligations with legal ones, that's a bit rich. — AmadeusD

No, that is not how legal obligation works. You confuse obligations with rules of evidence. If I am married legally and the marriage is not legally dissolved I am simply married. Say a nuclear weapon wipes out all the registries, then there is no evidence of my marriage anymore, but I am still married. I still have the legal obligation to care for my partner. There is just no evidence for the marriage and if I walk away from my obligation it cannot be enforced by a court. That though does not make the obligation somehow disappear, or the marriage somehow annulled.

You could have stopped here, acknowledged you have defeated your own point, and moved on. But here we go... — AmadeusD

You could have dispensed with your silly condescending tone, but here we go...

Why you are mentioning ontological positions is beyond me so I'm just going to ignore that dumbass conclusion. — AmadeusD

It is indeed beyond you but that is not really my problem.

It literally renders them non-existent. If you have a false memory of making a promise, does it exist? No. You can't prove it. You have absolutely nothing but your memory to rely on. THe promise doesn't exist. Your apparent attachment to it does. — AmadeusD

No, it If I remembered making a promise but I did not make a promise, there is no promise. If I think I see a pink elephant but it is in fact a figment of my imagination, then it does not exist. However not because I cannot prove that there is no pink elephant but because there is no pink elephant. The same holds for promises.

@Caldwell
@180 Proof
@Paul
@hyena in petticoat
@SittinWSocratesTiff
@Banno
@unenlightened
@Reformed Nihilist

it seems you believe query of whether everything is determined or not, outweighs 'what is.' In this way you suggest that 'determinism means that you can't tell the act was willfully chosen', but what is, is a indirect change in future happening before our eyes. — Barkon

I have absolutely no idea what you mean. I will try to make heads and tails out of it, but we may be talking past each other. I do not think one question is more important than the other one. I simply mean that your defense of free will is flawed. There are many indirect or direct changes (direct being caused directly by something and indirect meaning caused by something but via something else) the onus is on you to show that some of these changes have been willfully chosen and that that will itself is not determined by something prior to it.

Various neuroscientists suggests that what is chosen is a response of the brain to some kind of outside stimulus. What sets apart humans is that they have a function in the brain which rationalizes choice and gives an account of this choice. Those choices, even if the ancient perceives having made the choice by his own volition, was actually triggered by an outside stimulus. These finding are in line with materialist metaphysics. Everything we hear, see and feel is made of matter. Matter behaves in determinist fashion, therefore it is logical to conclude that you, since you are made out of matter act in determinist fashion.

Of course it could be otherwise, but than you have to account somehow for this fee will. It is a kind of uncaused cause (If it was caused it would not be free at least not in your definition of free will as it appears to me). Uncaused causes are very very rare things. So before I conclude there is such an uncaused cause, you should give me a good argument to believe in it.

To conclude, I have proven I can change the future indirectly by interrupting the flow of the present. I also assert that at junctions we can change the future directly. This is my argument that life is both determined and has free will, but neither purely. — Barkon

You have not proven anything because you have not proven that you have willfully interrupted the flow of the present. The claim of determinism is based on materialism. All matter that we can think of reacts to outward stimuli. When a rock is pushed and rolls from the mountain, we can predict its course and speed when we have all the information about the material characteristics of the terrain and the force of the push. You are made out of matter. It follows therefore that your matter reacts to stimuli. One of the stimuli is the threat of punishment which causes you not to run around like a criminal. If you want to postulate something undetermined, such as your 'free will', you cannot lay the burden of proof on the determinist and say you have proven something. The onus is on you to show there is some matter that does not react to stimuli and makes choices out of its own volition. That is the hard part of free will.

Now I am a compatibilist so I think there are arguments, but the route you have taken is fruitless.

Was it? Ottomans were well accomplished, but they took 200 years to take over an empire that had been declining for centuries, and that had been betrayed by its supposed allies. Claiming Ottomans were militarily above Europe feels to me a bit like claiming Goths were militarily superior to Romans. War and history aren't made based on who's stronger like a game, it is full of opportunism. — Lionino

They were militarily above Europeans because after the Roman empire the Ottoman empire were the first to have a standing professional army which requires a centralized bureaucracy. European troops were recruited from the local populace. They were also among the first to employ gun powder in an effective way, integrating it relatively early in their army.

As to the claim of "administratively behind", I won't even bother with that, as it can't be measured in any significant way, and I don't think anyone here has read the slightest bit on Ottoman governance (and governance of every other European kingdom of the same time). — Lionino

Of course it can be measured. For instance by looking at the scale of the economy and effectiveness of taxation, the strength of centralized administration and so on. As for Ottoman governance and no one reading anything of it, that is a bit of a tricky claim, I at least read 'Turkey a Modern History' by Erik Jan Zürcher which deals mostly with the latter Ottoman empire and the emergence of modern Turkey, but also treats the Ottoman Golden age. Moreover I read quite a bit on state institutions, not only of Turkey.

If Ottomans were militarily superior to Europe, they would not have been beaten by Austria. — Lionino

That is like saying if Europeans were superior why did they lose Jerusalem. There is more than technological superiority, for instance the length of supply lines. In the beginning of the modern period (16th century) the ottoman empire was huge, far bigger than the European states, but even they cannot reach everywhere. The same goes for the Mongolian khanate.

You went as a tourist. Everything seems better as a tourist, especially when we come from our small towns. But by chance you were lucky and did not see some resident foreigner fighting the police or harassing locals/tourists. In any case, whatever, replace Hague with Paris or Brussels or whatever undeniably dumpy European capital, the point stands. — Lionino

I did not come as a tourist. Why do you think did? I might live there no? Why do you think I live
in a small town? (The Hague might be considered a small town, but Istanbul is not)

I don't know what threatening to oneself means. Someone said the East was more advanced than Europe until recently. That is nonsense. Let's read up some history.
What's next, someone is gonna bring the Islamic Golden Age? Totally don't look up where that Islamic golden knowledge came from, stop before that part so you can prove yourself right. — Lionino

Of course you know what it means. In fact, you understood me well. What is wrong with the Islamic Golden Age? And what is wrong with the Islamic golden age being inspired by the works of ancient Greek philosophy? I do not hold onto the thesis that everything was either this or that. Philosophy, mathematics, strategy and what not are products of intermingling. You like to hold on to some sort of European exceptionalism claiming that somehow it has fixed borders and what not. In my view history itself is a social construction, as is Europe.

Jesus Christ, you have no clue what you are talking about. You don't even need genetic studies, which I have to refute your claim, to prove that wrong. Think: did the Spartans not leave any children behind? — Lionino

Ohh they certainly did, who intermingled with Turkish children, Albanians and what not. The point is that there is no trace of ancient greece in any of the Greek people currently alive. Just like there is no trace a Roman in any Italian. People mingle. The only thing that is real is the stories they tell, but they are precisely that, stories, usually used to aggrandize some sense of national pride. "I am Greek and not Turkish", even though their ancestry may well be similar. You do the same, trying to save some image of a pristine 'Europe', essentially the same through eternity and somehow essentially Greek and Roman.