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I'm sure it's just a coincidence that they're all funded by the US department of state. :rofl: — Tzeentch

I hope they are funded; they need to be! It's not that the free market would cater to them. But if they are indeed all funded by the US state department (which I doubt in some cases), isn't it all the more impressive that they are also quite critical of developments in the US?

The academic world is dead, my friend. — Tzeentch

What makes you say so?

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Your OP is as much sociological as it is philosophical. I will then riff on it sociologically instead of philosophically, though the two are very close.
It is an interesting hypothesis you posit @Number2018, that the woke movement is predicated on the same "forces that shape identity and visibility in public life" as those that celebrate success. The implication is that both movements, the celebration of the marginalized, the victimized, is dependent on the same subjectifying forces that have characterized the postmodern age, social media, pop culture on steroids. I think that is true, but I think it is dependent on some other force too, the disenchantment with progress.

Understood in aesthetic terms, woke culture is the opposite of the aestheticization of violence and conquest. The violent aesthetic goes back to time immemorial. The jousting matches of old were little more than the aestheticization of violence. The Olympic Games of old and maybe sports in general is nothing but the aestheticization of violence. It is the celebration of activity, of subjugation and conquest. In this aesthetic, the victim had no place. The victims were always the masses, they had no face. They were like the nobodies in the wrestling matches of the 80's. The woke movement arose out of an identification with the marginalized, be it women, people of color or the environment. People in the thread here have explained it as a kind of celebration of victimhood and I think they are right in a sense. It is an aesthetic of identification with the victim.

As such it harkens to an undercurrent that has always had appeal. We find an aesthetic of the victim, potentially very powerful, in the figure of Jesus Christ. The aesthetic of the victim personified. However, this aesthetic was never dominant. The cross quickly turned into a symbol of dominance itself. In its name crusades were fought, witches were burnt, and churches were erected. All of these were never in the spirit of the victim, but always of the victor. Churches were erected on the burial grounds of the vanquished, trials were inquisitive, treating the suspect as an object and the crusades were little more than an excuse to plunder. Nietzsche wrote about the herd mentality cultivated by Christianity, but this herd was only a herd because it had a leader. The herd never led itself but always embraced the principle of the strong man. In short, the aesthetic of victory always dominated. So, for 2000 years we have lived with an aesthetic of violence, conquest, and growth.

The question is, in such an atmosphere of superiority of the aesthetic of victory, how could another aesthetic ever come to rival it? My answer would be the onset of the age of risk. We learned after the Second World War that our scientific progress and our conquering abilities could be self-defeating. The most destructive weapon of conquest ever conceived could wipe the entire human race out altogether. Insights of the science of ecology taught us that by vanquishing species, we might end up eradicating ourselves. Overpopulation, that biblical exhortation of conquest, could lead to ecological collapse and a miserable struggle for survival, doomed by resource depletion.

Two lines then converged here: the increased aestheticization of everyday life through social media and the critique of the aesthetics of victory and conquest. This created room for another aesthetic to play a more dominant role, the aesthetic of the victim, the aesthetic of marginalization. This aesthetic draws on a different register than that of growth. It draws on the notions of compassion, on the cry for justice, on leaving each other in peace. The aesthetic of 'small is beautiful', an aesthetic of innocence, an aesthetic of the loser as the one treated unfairly.

This aesthetic that was already gaining in strength from the 70s onwars, allows another perspective to seriously rival the growth paradigm of 'creative destruction', and that is a paradigm of harmony. This paradigm is described in the sociological work of Aaron Wildavsky, but was considered impotent by him. However, in an age in which we have seen and experienced the dark side of progress in the atom bomb, in the gruesome pictures of My Lai, in acid rain and in Covid19, harmony might be considered a serious alternative to progress. 'Woke' then, is nothing but a backlash against the symbols of the growth paradigm, denunciation of colonialism, of racism, of the market economy, of the state and of education, now conceived of as inculcating 'traditional' values. It is no wonder that it targets the aesthetic symbols of the old order, the statues of the heroes of old, the language of the old order, its role models of classic literature and cinema.

What happened next is what always happens when a new challenger emerges, the challenger faces the wrath of the old order. What to make of the recent backlash against 'woke'? To me it is no coincidence that the right aims its arrows against all symbols of harmony, the acceptance of refugees, recognition of climate change and recognition of institutional racism. Its mantras are closing the border, or better, conquering more land, 'drill baby drill' and that woke is an enemy of freedom. In sociological terms, it is nothing but the mobilization and banding together of the forces that see their hegemony threatened. When there was no alternative to industrial capitalism, in the 1990s, they could afford to show nothing but a benevolent face. However, now they face opposition from a worldview that is gaining momentum. That is I think what @Joshs means when he says that in 50 years the ideas now espoused by 'woke' will be mainstream. I think he is right to intuit that its perspective chimes with the tide, but I doubt his prediction will come true. It depends on the political power of the backlash. I think that the resources at the disposal of the traditional order currently far outweigh the resources that 'woke' may mobilize.

To me, it seems rather far-fetched to see woke as more powerful and more authoritarian than the backlash against it, if only because it can marshal far fewer resources of power, for now at least. Being too vocally anti-woke might get you vilified and cancelled in certain circles, but it will not get you expelled from the country. Being too woke nowadays might. The point is that I am not sure if philosophy matters a great deal in this struggle. It is political more than philosophical, and a matter of mobilization and counter-mobilization of resources of power. On the side of woke, we may find academia and a plethora of NGOs. That might be highly troubling for academics who feel more inclined towards a growth perspective, but in society at large, institutions that see woke as an enemy far outnumber academia and NGOs. Nationalist and populist parties win; they are not losing, nowhere in the world, actually. Yet, the old order, dominant for now and for a long time to come, will run up against its limits. We are in an 'unstoppable force' meets 'unmovable object' kind of situation. This clash will release a lot of societal energy.

Sounds simple enough, thanks a million Clark!

An interesting question Banno, There are times I freaquently use the PM function and there are times I rarely use it. For me though its function is much more social than philosophical. I also like the input of a variety of views, although my tendency to respond gets me in trouble often.

↪Tobias Lol. If anything, Christiana is a functioning illustration of how liberty is sustained by shared norms, internal constraints and community accountability. — Benkei

Well possible. I have no idea how people do things in Christiana. I would like to know what radical indivdualism actually means. If it is simply a belief that 'my' existence precedes community existence, then it may be that certain hippy communities conform to that notion. I still think the notion, also in that very imprecisely defined form is incoherent.

I am still missing where the paradox is. — RussellA

Well, one of them is for instance the idea of a shared meaning of the word 'radical individualist'. If I tell you I am a radical individualist, you can only know what I mean if we share the same discursive understanding. Such understanding does not come about out of nowhere but is dependent a system of education and a history of ideas to which we both refer. Both of those came about through cooperation, through funding, to some extent coercion and to a certain cultural proximity. Even to discuss the subject of radical individualism coherently requires access to collectivities.

Of course I offer a very radical form of radical individualism, someone who rejects all forms of social commitment. Benkei's 5 characteristics describe a thicker version in some respects and in some respects thinner. What would you consider radical individualism to be?

Yes, but that does mean that an unworkable philosophy must be a paradox. — RussellA

No, but it is an indication that there might be paradoxes or incoherences within the theory. That is why I urged to focus on those theoretical inconsistencies.

I'm not so sure. There are plenty of hippy communes in Europe who could be called radical individualists. They renounce the power structure of institutions and the constraints these institutions put on their lives. — RussellA

Yes, but they seldom embrace notions of unbridled private property, quite the contrary. The libertarian conception of the individual extends to the assertion that self-ownership entails ownership of the fruit of one's labour. Hippy ideology, if there is such a thing, is indeed individualistic but has a less thick conception of the self.

For example, there is the "free town" of Christiana in Copenhagen. It was founded in 1971 by a group of anarchic squatters and artists who took over an abandoned military base and proclaimed it a “free zone”.

Radical individualism is a coherent political theory that can work in certain contexts. — RussellA

That might well be true, but that shifts the terms of the debate right? Also Benkei did not attack all forms of radical individualism, but a specific libertarian variation of it, if I understand correctly. As for Christiana, I would be interested to see how the inhabitants view their community. I have an inkling that they reject interference by the Danish state and what they perceive to be its oppressive structures. I wonder if they extend that rejection to the notion that community itself plays no part. There must be sociological research on it, but little time to really dive into it.

That radical individualism may in practice be unworkable doesn't make it a paradox. It is no more a paradox than Icarus' attempt at flight using a pair of wax wings made by his father Daedalus. — RussellA

If a philosophy is in practice unworkable, it may mean that its assumptions are flawed. If the idea that we are sovereigns is in practice unworkable, that may be because there are some mysterious mechanics at work preventing us from realizing our true selves, or it may simply mean we are not individual sovereigns. You may like it to be the case, but then your theory is a moral theory, about which values institutions should incorporate. Why you would like to accept it is beyond me though.

However, it seems that the author of the essay is not attacking radical individualism in itself, but rather is attacking the hypocrite who purports to be a radical individualist, yet in fact does not believe in it. — RussellA

I agree with you there and therefore I advise turning it around. Find problematic, counterintuitive or incoherent notions within the theory and then focus on how they shape the thoughts of notable figures. Otherwise your assertion that the essay uses straw man reasoning is correct.

The essay is about individuals who pretend to be radical individualists but in fact rely on authoritarian, collective institutions that wield immense power.

This is not a problem particular to the USA. — RussellA

No, hypocrisy is not particular to the USA, but that does not prove or disprove anything, right? :chin: There is less of a following for radical individualism in Europe, though, so also public figures will not as easily espouse it. It is an interesting observation, maybe, but that does not seem to add or detract anything from the essay.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

The institutions mentioned in the essay are as diverse as the (federal) state, the corporation and academia. None of the three people discussed though, draw any power from the European Union :grin: These institutions that wield immense power themselves are also dependent on institutions. The corporation for instance is dependent on law, the state on a form of nationalism and academia on the notion of education. Each of the three institutions shape modern life and hence 'wield immense power'. You think the European Union is suspect, but you claim all institutions are suspect, that is simply too unnuanced of a claim, so needs qualification.

The EU in their publicity material may say that their goal is the benefit of its citizens, but in practice, the EU acts as if its citizens are there for the benefit of the EU. This is why institutions with immense power such as the EU are suspect. This is the type of institution referred to by the essay. — RussellA

Equally fascinating as off topic, so I will not go into it much. Funny that you have such a beef with the EU though it is nowhere to be found in the essay. From what perspective do you approach the EU? Is it public policy, or law, or economics? The EU is also not a monolithic entity, so do you focus on the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, or the European Court of Justice? Or do you think the fault lies in the EU constitution, which comprises the Treaty, its annexes and court judgements such as Van Gent & Loos and Costa Enel? All these are actually institutions in their own right and wield power. We can discuss them in a separate thread. This small break down just goes to show one simply cannot escape institutions, just like one cannot escape gravity.

One more reflection @Benkei. The essay is a great read as it is, but it would be even stronger I think if you consistently first examine doctrines of libertarianism and then tie them to the three figures. First find doctrines in libertarianism that you see as conceptually incoherent or as justifying the undue exercise of power, and then trace them to Musk/Trump/Peterson to show out how they play out in practice.

I am thinking for instance about the idea of the first appropriation and the Lockean proviso: 'take what you want but leave enough and as good to others to take likewise'. This may work in a world of infinite natural resources and a finite amount of human beings, but we have realized we live in a world of finite resources with infinite (human) beings if you take future generations into account.

It seems that in the essay you sometimes employ this strategy, but sometimes also go to libertarianism based on what these three do. By the way I think that for a more comprehensive history also Ayn Rand must be mentioned and the influence she wielded through US think tanks. I find it fascinating how a philosophical theory not taken seriously at all in Europe may be so influential in the US. That is not to bash the US, the reverse is also true, Europeans have doctrines that Americans find utterly bollocks, but, interestingly, ostensibly rather similar people can differ so much about what constitutes s strong political theory.

Ohh, I just read this news now. What a sad message. Vera was a great contributor and seemed to me like a wonderful and wise person. She brought a unique voice to the forum. Rest in peace Vera.

A very nice essay, it is a good read as a critique of libertarianism. For me it is a bit parochial of course, because the holes in liberarianism are so glaringly obvious. To that extent, the essay would benefit from a bit more focus on some of thee arguments. It sometimes tries to do too much in a short text. I also do not know if all the protagonists are well chosen. Jordan Peterson is an academic and to the best of my knowledge also inspired by Christian teaching. I have no idea if the other too really have a 'worldview'. They argue for certain things, but I would not take their arguments as a sign that a certain political ideology is incoherent. For instance that Trump argues for tariffs is not a sign that libertarianism is incoherent, it is a sign that Trump does not embrace it to the fullest extent.

It sees the social world not as the ground of freedom but as its main obstacle. Institutions are not tools of liberty but threats to it. What this view overlooks, and what the next sections explore, is the extent to which individuality is socially and historically formed and how real freedom depends on shared conditions, not their absence. — Moliere

This statement for instance lacks nuance. Also a libertarian loves the social world because where else can she or he practice trade? Also liberarianism contains within it the concept of recognition. The shape of that recognition takes the shape of the free individual contracting with the other free individual. Through the contract the other as an owner is recognized. I say specifically 'as an owner' because that is what the other is, an owner of possessions, of herself, her labour, etc. Within the contract both parties affirm their being owners in their bartering with each other. Institutions must exist but to the extent that they enable this recognition and not compromise it. It actually comes worryingly close to the classical conception of the individual in private law, the indivdual as a bundle of rights. That conception is I think flawed, you think so as well, but in the context of the essay it merits some more treatment.

At the same time it elevates figures who use public power for private gain and disguises domination as freedom.
The ideology enables policies that weaken safety nets, disenfranchise the vulnerable and concentrate power in unaccountable hands. It fosters political apathy and strengthens demagogues who promise freedom while dismantling its foundations. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just a contradiction. It is a script for democratic decline disguised as moral clarity. — Moliere

It enables it, but more by accident. Its ideal is the world as a market place where each of the participants realize their inner being, namely as contracting parties, rights wielders.

2.2 Liberty Through Coercion
Trump’s trade war illustrates liberty asserted through force. Tariffs and trade barriers, classic interventions, are reframed as tools of sovereignty and pride. That self-described libertarians embrace them shows how flexible freedom becomes. What matters is not principle but the actor. Coercion becomes liberty if used by the right person. Hierarchy is acceptable if it matches their ideals. — Moliere

If Nozick is consistent it does not. In fact, libertarianism might well argue for rather wholesale redistribution based on a large trajectory of coercive trades. The people you take issue with are bad libertarians, but making an example out of a weak opponent does feel a bit 'straw manish'.

2.4 Justice That Begins After the Crime
Nozick’s justice assumes holdings are legitimate if acquired justly, with a vague nod to rectifying past injustice. In practice, this clause is ignored. The theory becomes a cover for inequalities rooted in historical theft. Property is treated as legitimate unless clearly stolen. This conceals injustice rather than addressing it. — Moliere

Here too, Nozick could counter this. 'Real existing libertarianism' pans out this way but that does not necessarily harm the theory. My qualm would be with its unreflective acceptance of the notion of property and its defense of it. I believe the case for property rests on the fact that one 'mixes one's labour' with a good. However, if that is the case the good owns the person mixing just as much, because if it is a mix, who says only one party acquires the right to do with the good as she pleases? The problem with libertarianism is that it lacks awareness of ecology. You also treat this in your essay strongly, but sometimes a bit too cursory for me. I think two ideas within libertarianism merit further discussion, individual autonomy and its concept of 'the other'. As your correctly argue, both of these doctrines in liberarianism are deeply flawed I think, but why is a nice question.

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution. — RussellA

I would disagree with that. Why would institutions be 'suspect'? It is akin to saying gravity is suspect. Also the second part of the sentence is questionable. There are all sorts of examples of people sacrificing themselves for a higher goal and lo and behold, they are not derided but revered as heroes.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. — RussellA

The view of Mr. Mill here is absurd. The first counterexample pertains to children. You do feel it is ok for a parent to restrain a child when he considers crossing the road do you? Yes you do. You might object, 'but they are not individuals yet!', sure but in all kinds of settings, old age, psychological ailment, physical impairment, we allow others to make decisions for individuals. And that's okay; it's good when you prevent a friend from jumping in front of a train, really!

The second counterexample pertains to criminal law. If we consequently follow Mill we cannot punish, say a war criminal, if there is no danger of recidivism. Many war criminals led perfectly normal lives afterwards; should they really not be deprived of their liberty?
I make this point not just to quibble with Mr. or Mrs RusselA here, but to point out the gross simplifications that liberals and libertarians tend to make. Which the author indeed unmasks very strongly. Just like in many other contexts in which the word 'sovereignty' is used, in the context Mill uses it too, it is but a fiction. We are not sovereigns. That is the whole point of the essay and the point so sadly missed by libertarians.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. And our own Tobias, of course. — Banno

Thank you for the compliment Banno, *tips hat*. As for Hegelian rhetoric... might it not be that both ways of philosophizing as you sketch them are incomplete? Nitpicking, plumbing, dissecting etc. is also always done from a background of assumptions, even if it would simply be reducible to the laws of logic, it still assumes that logic is the proper pickaxe to perform philosophy with. Usually much more is assumed, though I think. Also, the Socratic or the Cynic erects a world, albeit not very explicitly. The system builder and discursivist tries to make these intuitions explicit. This renders them visible and therefore also more easily picked apart.

The nitpicker and the builder are sides of the same coin. One may prefer this style, the other that one, but both are in the business or clarity, and in the process between the two, inadvertently display all those things that are still unclear... Just my two cents during a late evening...

That Dante was written by the Count was beyond a shadow of a doubt...

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@Benkeie

Everything created is a revelation of the creator. So the erotic (even in our modern sense) is not to be despised. Christians tended to be far more open to the goodness of the body and embodiment than their Pagan counterparts, and by the High Middle Ages this led to a fairly sensuous (and also cosmic) aesthetics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Benkei is right, I indeed love this essay. It is the only one I managed to read thus far, and I am sad for that. Work pulled me away from PF quite a bit and I must have missed some pearls. I am happy I caught this one, as it is a great read. Even though I read one, I think I know who wrote this piece. As Benkei knows, it does resonate with me and my own thinking about the erotic as unity. As it is deep at night, I cannot comment much. I do think that there may be one thing that deserves further deepening. That would be the attitude of the ancients towards the bodily. Indeed, the erotic took a more prominent place, but reason still was, as far as I understood the ancients, still a rather ethereal cerebral faculty. It was the higher passions leading the lower ones, love for the body of the lover was surpassed by the love of love itself, as in Plato's Diotima.

Likewise, Aristotle's God is devoid of matter and is essentially rational thought thinking itself. It is a unity and far more thick than the dry modern conception of rationality, but still matter was a subordinate category. To this extent the deflation of reason is an emancipatory move making space for the body. First in a rather contradictory way as 'will' in Schopenhauer and Will to Power in Nietzsche, but gradually as more nuanced and informed conceptions of the body in Merleau Ponty. So while I love the essay much and it is I think really a profound and deep read which I will study and if the author permits also use as a tool for reflection, the story remains one sided in the sense that it seems to yearn for a conception of reason that was more rich, more deep, more in tune also I think with an ethics of virtue and so praiseworthy, but still afflicted with a rejection of the 'carnal' as such. Carnality could redeem itself as carnal knowledge, but the rider 'knowledge' was necessary. The carnal in and of itself, devoid of rhyme or reason, the orgasmic, the 'pornographic' for lack of a better word, was still feared and subjugated.

In my conception, philosophy is fastened to the erotic, not as knowledge, but as a mode of carnality. Philosophy is lust by other means. The question is how to put that into words. For that, I will study this great piece of writing grapple with it and try to emulate it because it is way better than anything I have written so far on the subject, even though I might also disagree and take a different turn here and there. Thank you dear author!

Still clinging to the meaning of the words "must" and "philosophical essay". — RussellA

Why be so picky? Academics these days are taught how to write more creatively, more personally, and let to let go of their dry style. (Not that I myself manage, my papers are as dry as the plains of Spain in the summer heat...) And why not? Who cares if you wrote the gazillions well structured, dry and boring paper? Maybe the times they are a changin' :)

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Nope... Perhaps I can try via PM... hmm, alas... Well, there is nothing left to do then but make me a mod methinks ;) Nahh, but let me know if there is another way I can get it to you. I can access it but probably due to my uni having a subscription.

I have found it Michael, but how can I attach it here? I did not read it yet, but seems fun to get into!

Tobias That's certainly the rub. I can't think of any way other than an appeal to collective preferences. What, in the West, we consider a criminal gang is not that way framed in say the Mid East or North Africa. — AmadeusD

I am not too sure, or at least not that relativist yet. There are of course grey areas where for instance a group is considered a legitimate armed resistance while others call it a terrorist group. However, I do think that in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, the concept of legitimate and illegitimate use of force exist. In the end some appeal to 'just' violence is made. We might all judge differently, but the appeal to justice seems similar enough to me. I all countries, lobbing someone's head of without a reason is not ok. We might differ in whether the reason is good or not, but without any reason at al, that is unacceptable to all. Some thin moral like-mindedness exists, I think.

Are these exchanges equivalent? I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. So the suggestion that "X is good" is synonymous with "I ought X" doesn't seem to be consistent with how we actually understand moral language. — Michael

I agree, prima facie they are not. However, when you enquire further the first is just as meaningless as the second one. Just saying giving money to charity is good begs the question, 'why is it 'good'? You might say you saying something more, but in fact you do not. You might think it provides for a reason, but what kind of reason is it? At least, it leaves me none the wiser as to why I should give money to charity.

It seems like exchange 1 is somehow informative but it is not. It simply tells you that you ought to give to charity because it is good. In fact it seems informative because you have already an implicit sense of what 'good' is, namely something you ought to do. Other then that it tells you nothing so it is a tautology, but dressed up differently.

In fact, you already have an inkling of this problem.

I think prima facie they're not; the first appears to provide a reason why one ought give money to charity, whereas the second doesn't. — Michael

Notice your use of 'I think', 'prima facie' and 'appears'. Indeed, it appears to do something, but does not. The dialectic shows us that the abstract universal 'good', disappears and only forces one to become more concrete. I will only grant you this, the second type of exchange is more obvious and therefore does not give rise to such a dialectic. In that sense, you may say it does something different. The only difference is that it takes analysis to see that 'good' is the same as 'ought to', whereas 'ought to' and 'ought to', the tautology, does not force such an analysis. It should not distract from the fact that the question asked in the OP is equally unreasonable. It is not "reasonable to ask for a justification for A2", simply because 'good' is empty, it has no significance beyond 'that which one ought to do'.

I do not think I'd disagree ncessarily, but is there a way to discern between preferences? Are the preferences of say a criminal gang of equal value as the preferences of a congregation of peaceful monks?

Swings and roundabouts boys. No one can clearly put forth any reason to do anything but preference. Nice. — AmadeusD

What kind of reasons to do things would you like? There are many.

Is “X ought to be done” synonymous with “I ought to X”? — Michael

I do not really care about the exact relation. X ought to be done implies you ought to at least not hinder X being done. You should not oppose X, you should strive for the fulfillment of X. But again, the problem stems from your substitution of X for the unqualified, inconcrete universal 'Good'. Indeed, you should not oppose the good, you should strive for the fulfillment of good and good ought to be done. Indeed, all of these are true and all of these are also trivial because 'the good' is that which should be done. Substitute any given goal for 'the good', and ask a person why this goal should be achieved. In the end the person has nothing else but saying 'well it is good'. For Kant doing one's duty was good, for Aristotle being virtuous was good and for a utilitarian maximizing happiness is good.

“for if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings. The action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.”

As a practical example, “I ought breastfeed my child” must be false because I am incapable of breastfeeding. — Michael

No, breastfeeding is naturally impossible so you cannot breastfeed, but assuming breastfeeding is good, you should not thwart it either. You should make it possible. Against all odds? Of course not, because there are things that may outweigh the good of breastfeeding.

You again substitute again a particular kind of good, for 'good' by the way. That is problematic because any particular good is not the good in itself.

So you’ve changed it slightly. It’s no longer the case that “X is good” means “X ought to be done” but “X ought to be tried”? — Michael

X ought to be pursued, yes. So indeed X ought to be done, if possible, but might not be done. My pursuing X (if X is the same as 'good', an abstract universal indicating an unqualified state of 'goodness', whatever that may amount to) might fail.

Again, your own wording suggests that these two mean different things:

1. Ought I do good?
2. Ought I do that which I ought do?

The second isn't in question; it's a vacuous truism that I ought do that which I ought do. So if the first is in question then it isn't synonymous with the second. — Michael

They seem different, but upon analysis they are not different at all. The second is a tautology, but the first one also is. Putting it in question is equally meaningless. the OP does that and I criticized the OP for it.

In fact it seems to me that it is just a case of 'pros hen'. You think of kinds of goods, I think of 'the good'.

If "X is good" is synonymous with "we ought do X" and if "we ought do X" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" then "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X".

So we're missing a step that gets us from "X is good" to "I ought do X". That's why it matters. — Michael

Purely trivial. It is synonymous with X ought to be done.

First person plural or singluar does not matter at all.

You made the claim “we ought end world poverty”, not me. Did you mean to include me in that claim? — Michael

Yes, you should also strive to end world poverty.

And this is where the claim "ought implies can" comes into play. If "we ought do X" implies "I ought do X" and if "I ought do X" implies "I can do X" then "we ought do X" implies "I can do X", and so "we ought end world poverty" implies "I can end world poverty". — Michael

But it does not imply that you can. You ought to save your daughter from a burning house. Perhaps you cannot and you will fail, but that des not imply you should not have tried. Likewise, in many case we do not know the outcome of our actions. We simply do not know if doing X is possible or impossible. We can therefore not say a priori that ought implies can because we only know a posteriori what we can or cannot do.

1. Each person ought X
2. Humanity ought X

The phrase "we ought X" could mean either (1) or (2), but (1) and (2) do not prima facie mean the same thing, e.g. "humanity weighs 390 million tons" does not mean "each person weighs 390 million tons". — Michael

'Humanity' does not weigh anything. Only if you imply with humanity 'all human beings', I would not make that equation. Each person indeed ought to end world poverty. Not that each person can and certainly not on his or her own, but each person should indeed strive to end world poverty. If of course we think that ending world poverty is good, but apparently we are on the same page there.

But a previous comment of yours hints at "I ought to do good" not being a vacuous truism:

"So if we ought to do good...".

The conditional here is telling. You don't seem to be saying "So if we ought to do that which we ought to do". — Michael

Let me see where I wrote that, because it may well have been sloppy on my part, let's see...

I see this phrase: "So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say: "I ought to do good". Here I might have added: "If we ought to do good, and good is indeed what we ought to do, than I ought .... There also may be a problem with you substituting 'X' for good. The question is not if we need to do a specific X, the question is whether we need to do good (or: 'good ought to be done' or 'I ought to do good'). This is important. Helping an elderly person cross the road may well be considered good, but if in the meantime the house holding a couple of children is burning than not taking care of this first is not good. That is because taking care of those children is a greater good, and so should have priority. Substituting a concrete X for the abstract 'good', misses that point.

Well, "I" and "we" mean different things, so "I ought end world poverty" is not synonymous with "we ought end world poverty". So there is a semantic distinction. — Michael

I do not claim they are the same thing. I just do not see how that matters. We are discussing 'ought' and 'good'. The distinction between 'I' and 'we' is one you made and one I do not buy.

So "X is good" is synonymous with "X should be done". But does "X should be done" logically entail "I ought do X"? — Michael

Well, at least that you should not hinder X. My actions should support the coming of X into being.

Perhaps, perhaps not. It's certainly not the case that the pronoun "we" necessarily includes every human, else a phrase like "we're going on holiday" would mean "every human is going on holiday". — Michael

No, of course not, but if you state that 'we should do X', it does not make sense to say 'we', but not 'I'. I would be puzzled if you would say "We are going on holiday, but I am not".

This seems to equivocate. You've been claiming that "good" is in some sense synonymous with "ought", in which case the claim "I ought do good" is synonymous with the claim "I ought do that which I ought do", which is admittedly a truism but also vacuous. — Michael

Yes exactly and that is precisely what I told the OP and Amadeus. The mistake in the OP is that it asks for a justification for this vacuity, but it cannot be given because it is a truism.

I think that we want "I ought do good" to mean more than just "I ought do that which I ought do", in which case we want "good" to not be synonymous with "ought", even if the one does entail the other. — Michael

I do not know what 'we want' or whether it 'should' mean anything more. My point is exactly to show the statement is insufficient. It may sound good, but has no meaning. The opposite statement, the one the OP asks, is equally meaningless, without any concretization. That is what the analysis shows I think.

My post may sound dismissive, but I think there is a lot of interesting stuff in here, the meaning of 'we' for instance and I think that uncovering a truism is also interesting. The nature of obligation is also interesting, that is why I referred to Peter Singer. However, for the OP to start if meaningful discussion more work should be done.

So it's not that I ought to end world poverty, only that we ought to end world poverty. That's a pertinent distinction. — Michael

I do not see the distinction. You should end world poverty. The only problem is you cannot do it alone, so you need to find people to work with. One question is what should you do, well, you ought to do good. The other question is how you should do it.

Perhaps, then, "X is good" is not synonymous with "I ought do X" but is synonymous with "we ought do X"? — Michael

It is synonymous with ''X' should be done', I guess.

But we're still missing something from which to derive a personal obligation from "X is good". — Michael

In your example, you are part of the 'we' right? Even by definition, the I is first person singular and the 'we' first personal plural. If we ought to end world poverty than I have to aid in that cause. So if we ought to do good, than I ought to contribute to that doing of good. Since good is totally unspecified, we can just as well say" I ought to do good".

but also ecause the term 'good' is extremely ambiguous. — AmadeusD

Yes, that is what I said. Indeed, the same with ought. Without making it concrete it does not mean anything.

Which sentences are synonymous? Surely not "X is good" and "I ought do X" because ought implies can but "X is good" does not seem to imply "I can do X". — Michael

I do not know if ought implies can. If it does you have a point of course. We ought to end world poverty, no, even though it is impossible to do so for anyone in particular.

The evil, illegality, does produce anti-social and anti-economic behavior. We have to intend the good as what is legal and the evil as what is illegal. — Ludovico Lalli

Not at all. Legality simply means sanctioned by law. Reporting enemies to Hitlers regime was not only legal under Nazi German law, it was illegal not to do so. Was it good to report enemies to Hitler's regime? Of course it was not. Ought we to report enemies to Hitler's regime, of course not.

It is a simple analytic truth. What other option is there, that one ought to do what is bad? Or a certain action is good but one ought not to do it. Seems contradictory to me.

I do not understand you. I indeed think it is axiomatic, and so it is uninformative. If you ask me "What ought I to do?" and I tell you "That which is good", I am indeed not being very helpful.

The problem is always in the definition of good. You ought to do good. It does not mean that you ought to do every good thing. That would of course be impossible. 'That which is good' is an abstraction, a good thing is a particular. In abstracto it is true that one ought to do that which is good. However, particular things are never purely good or bad.

Good question. You're right to notice that "good" and "ought" aren't automatically the same.
There's a missing layer most systems skip: why value exists at all. — James Dean Conroy

No, they are perfectly synonymous. Good is what one ought to do and what one ought to do is good. How can what one ought to do be bad and how are bad things what one ought to do?

Why should one do that which is good? No, I don't think that good is synonymous with, "something one ought to do". For example, most people would agree that selling all your worldly possessions and donating the money to charity is something that would be good. However, that doesn't mean that one is obligated to do so. Please input into this conversation with your own takes. — Hyper

The problem is that 'good' is a matte of perspective. The tacit assumption that is made in the OP and which is the heart of the problem is that there is some independent 'good', one ought to do in each and every situation. Selling all of your wordly belongings might well be good in some respect, say because you feed a starving child with it. However, it is bad for you yourself. We can try to weigh these goods and indeed if push comes to shove and you can rescue someone from certain death, the right thing to do might indeed be sell your worldly belongings. See here :
The problem is situations are never that clear cut. Moreover the equation is not that easy to make. You might have special obligations to persons near you. You may legitimately prioritize your own good ahead of the good of others if the difference is not exceedingly large. It is not that ought and good are not synonymous it is just hard t determine what the good is since good is a matter of tradeoffs and perspectives.

@Moliere and others, what do you think of the approach taken in this one:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1804114

Yes, but also these are not philosophical questions. Sure we can speculate about the consequences, but those remain idle conjecture because we probably make less good guesses than geo-political strategists. Given these consequences, we may ask what the right thing to do it, or why we believe these will be the consequences and not others, or what kind of leadership may be necessary to navigate the crisis. What I keep cautioning against is idle conjecture on our part.

My intended role is to allow others to bring up the philosophical questions that ought be explored while maintaining a thread which basically respects the scientific consensus -- so less a contributor on where the conversation goes and more a contributor of where it cannot go (a moderator). We already have threads where the scientific consensus can be questioned, so this is a thread for philosophical questions under the assumption that the science is more or less right. — Moliere

Ok, fair enough. Then I will also assume that for the sake of argument at least you also accept the images of a hothouse world, the disasters, droughts, changing weather patterns etc. that accompany this narrative. (I do not use 'narrative' pejoratively, as if it were 'just a narrative'; I mean it in the sense of a coherent set of storylines that present to us a problem, its origin, the solution, and its key protagonist.) There is little more we can do in terms of truth claims. We are philosophers and not natural scientists, so basically any prediction of what will happen in detail transcends the limits of our abilities. Questions of ontology and epistemology are then mostly sidelined and the issue becomes one of ethics.

Ethical questions I can think of are questions related to whether our moral imperatives still hold under the threat of imminent catastrophe. For instance, is begetting children the right thing to do towards future generations? We know they will inherit a world of imminent catastrophe. Is such a life worth living, or are they better off not being born? Second to what extent is deontological ethics affected by imminent catastrophe? Kantian doctrine of imperfect duty holds that one should not violate imperfect duties because it will make the world unlivable, but if it already is, or becomes, are we still bound? Thirdly, to what extent may we suspend ordinary freedoms and civil rights to avert catastrophe? Does imminent catastrophe, which renders civil rights moot, present a state of exception under which civil rights should be conditional anyway?

In all of these questions, a time dimension comes in. The threat is imminent but has not realized itself yet and we do not know if there may be solutions in the future. What is the measure of certainty we need to have before fundamentally altering our legal and moral order?

I do not know the answer. No one does. Not knowing the answer also does not make a question philosophical.

There is the philosophical issue of whether humanity has it in itself to survive. — Punshhh

That is a factual question, not a philosophical one. It is just as factual as whether water boils at 100.C.

Or do we just turn on each other and collapse civilisation again like we have done many times in the past. — Punshhh

The question of what the ties that bind us are, may be philosophical, yes. The question of how we can reinforce them is more sociological or a matter of political science. Whether this might involve the widespread use of technoregulation for instance, that might be an ethical question. There are many philosophical questions relating to climate change, but that an issue is important does not make it inherently philosophical. I do not want to derail the thread to the question 'what is philosophy'. I would just like to know what philosophical issues relating to climate change would the OP like to discuss? As it is, the questio: 'how should we deal with the common disruption?' is philosophical perhaps but rather broad.

For example, how much do you value future generation compared to living generations? Or how much do you value nature, only instrumentally or is there something more inherently valuable?

Seeing this purely as a scientific question, as if we can just ask scientist what to do about it, has been one of the problems it seems to me. — ChatteringMonkey

Ohh, yes, I agree with you. There are philosophical questions related to climate change certainly. It needs a rephrasing of the question, or at least, a question more focused. 'Rights' of future generations is a philosophical question, the designation of this era as 'the anthropocene' is a philosophical question, intrinsic value of nature is a philosophical question. Indeed, the framing of the question as a scientific queestion, is a philosophical question. To me, the way the question was phrased, was unclear. What philosophical question are you (OP) after? It was phrased in scientific terms.