I'll vote other/confused.

Free will is axiomatic in science, and explicitly so in quantum mechanics. The experimenter has to be able to set up her apparatus as she wishes.

However, many scientists (maybe even most) deny free will. Very odd!

This is how you do it: Take a set, S. Then, you find the compliment of S, which just so happens to be the empty set, ∅ (S-S = ∅). Now that you’ve done this, you’re in a great position because the empty set plays a double role. Not only is it the compliment of S, it is also a subset of S, to the extent that every set contains the empty set. Note that the empty set is thus is both ‘inside’ and ‘outside of S, occupying exactly the paradoxical place which we said a rule for distinction would occupy.

Having done this, you can generate the entirety of the number line by asking how many elements belong to the empty set (=1), and then recursively asking how many elements belong to that set and so on ad infinitum. Ta da. You’ve now digitised the continuum. — StreetlightX

Not quite sure what's supposed to be going on here, but whatever it is, you can't generate the Reals that way.

Yes, I have encountered that opinion and worse. While I could accept, for the sake of argument, that robots are "aware", I am not prepared to surrender to panpsychism.

I thought this was a philosophy forum where people are motivated by something other than instinct?

When animals create knowledge and in particular when they transfer this knowledge by creating cultural artefacts, then there will be no explanation for that phenomenon other than they possess qualia. Same goes for robots.

Is "empirical confirmation" ever possible? What do your instincts tell you?

Finite spacetimes can expand just as well as infinite ones. There is no need for them to expand into anything and no need for anything to be outside it. Things just get farther apart, is all.
Put differently, the length of the shortest straight-line trip around the universe (analogous to circumnavigating the Earth along the equator or another Great Circle) increases. — andrewk

What is the shape of a finite, flat, homogeneous, isotropic universe with dark energy?

Mentalizing, rudimentary or not, necessitates at least some awareness of the other. Agree? — Baden

You could argue that this robot is aware:



After all, if it was not aware of itself and the environment, then how could it possibly do what it does? Someone might even claim the robot is conscious, which I might accept for the sake of argument. However, if you claim that the robot possesses subjectivity, that there is a "what it is like" to be that robot, that it can suffer, I would disagree.

Animals are exquisitely evolved robots.

A robot can be programmed to pass the mirror test.

It's not a paradox, it is a property of infinity.

If the universe is finite, then what's outside it? What does it expand into?

If you really think this, that mentalizing (in whatever form) does not necessitate at least some awareness of the other (in this case, that an animal can mentalize with regard to another animal without being aware of that other animal), I would say that you're simply wrong. Mentalizing necessitates awareness of the other by definition. If you can't accept that, fine, we'll agree to disagree. As for the rest of your post, the broader issue of animal intentionality is worthy of a separate thread. I'll get involved if you want to start one, but we're somewhat off-topic here. — Baden

The fact that a non-aware machine can defeat the 2nd best human at an incredibly complex game should give you pause for thought.

No. Was AlphaGo aware of its opponent? No ape could even begin to understand the rules to Go.

All animals have a set of genetically determined behaviour primitives that they are capable of arranging in a variety of ways. They have no idea what they are doing or why. Apes cannot parrot, and parrots can't ape.

Non-human animals do not create knowledge; of themselves, of others, of "what-it's-like", or anything else.

But the paper you cite here in defense of that claim doesn't defend it. Byrne is dealing with the issue of "mentalizing" i.e. attributing intentionality to others not mere awareness of others, and he admits of rudimentary mentalizing capacities in other animals in any case. — Baden

Those rudimentary capacities, which obviously have to exist, do not include intentionality.

You can't account for the rich social life of many animals without positing awareness of others. There's also the mirror test, which suggests self-awareness in some higher mammals such as chimpanzees, elephants and maybe even birds. — Baden

Really? This psychologist would certainly disagree:

https://sites.google.com/site/rwbyrnepsychology/publication-downloads

The classic "Byrne, R W (2003) Imitation as behaviour parsing." shows that awareness is not required for learning complex behaviours.

Your finite hotel has nowhere to expand to. Hilbert's hotel can accommodate any number of extra guests, including an infinite number, at any time.

The ever wonderful Edge website posted a wonderful little article by the neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran regarding the neuoscience of self-awareness. In it, Ramachandran argues that evolutionarily, it's probable that we learnt to recognize 'other minds' long before we learned to recognize our own, and that in fact, self-awareness in fact 'piggy-backed' on our ability to recognize others in the first place. In his own words: "I suggest that "other awareness" may have evolved first and then counterintutively, as often happens in evolution, the same ability was exploited to model ones own mind — what one calls self awareness." The full article is a worth a read, and it's only about three or so pages long. — StreetlightX

But animals aren't aware of themselves OR any other animal. They do not possess the quale of self-awareness or the quale of other-awareness. Imputing subjectivity to animals is about as scientific as imputing them a soul.

From another perspective, if an animal becomes aware of something - such as the fact that other animals are independent beings - then what law of physics or epistemology prevents it from awareness of anything?

Even those tragic souls who spend their time trying to convince themselves and others that apes and dogs can "talk", have never reported a single question ever being asked. The animals literally are unaware of the existence of the researcher, or themselves.

It is almost irresistible for humans not to see a (crippled, disabled, imprisoned) human-like entity behind a furry face. Thankfully, it is not there!

But an expanding (or shrinking) universe can only be finite, for physicists and lay people alike. — jkop

Seems you might think that Hilbert's Hotel can't take any more guests?

Because all evil is due to a lack of knowledge, there is only one moral imperative: Do not destroy the means of error correction.

Right, certain things cause this "red" thing which is unique in the fact that it is a what it's like experience, something that is radically different than any other physical phenomena. If you cannot see how this is so radically different that pit is not like other physical phenomena of nature- even other very unique phenomena — schopenhauer1

When you say that the quale "red" is unique, do you mean unique to you, to humans, to all animals?

It is not the 'local' (here, now) claims of hypotheses and/or theories which are not verifiable in principle; it is global or universal (everywhere, always) claims that are not verifiable. The 'local' claims may be either verified or falsified, but the global claims may only be falsified. — John

Nothing can be "verified" including 'local' statements, because all observation is theory-laden and therefore fallible. Also, because of the Duhem-Quine Thesis, (which I have mentioned more than once) there is no such thing as an experimental result logically contradicting a theory.

Perhaps it is best left to Popper to explain to us what his theory actually is:

As I tried to make clear in 1934 (L.Sc.D., p34 ; and sections 10 and 11), I do not regard methodology as an empirical discipline, to be tested, perhaps, by the facts of the history of science. It is, rather, a philosophical - a metaphysical - discipline, perhaps partly even a normative proposal. It is largely based on metaphysical realism and the logic of the situation: the situation of a scientist probing into the unknown reality behind the appearances, and anxious to learn from mistakes

That's from the preface to Popper's "Realism and the aim of Science". And I bolded "normative proposal".

Well, you're going to hate this:

"If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn how wrong you are."

I have no idea what Solipsists might make of that though.

So you think the Duhem-Quine thesis is false for Solipsists?

"These objections of an imaginary conventionalist seem to me incontestable"

Again, provide the full context: — Michael

Why don't you then?

I admit, a conventionalist might say [your emphasis], that the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert [my emphasis] that they are not falsifiable either. — Popper

And the solution is in the next section (20).

So he's accepting the logical possibility that any "falsification" is mistaken, just as the realist might accept the logical possibility of solipsism or skepticism, but it doesn't then follow that he rejects falsification, just as it doesn't then follow that the realist rejects the veracity of our everyday perceptions and beliefs. — Michael

Not sure what the scare-quotes are for, but according to Popper, all falsifications are tentative. And of course he does not reject falsification, but rather offered a methodological approach towards making such a decision. As I said, the Quine-Duhem thesis is true.

Falsification of a theory is not equivalent to disproof of a theory, and you appear to be conflating the two in you responses to andrewk. — John

LSD section 6: "...it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified."

LSD section 19: "...the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert that they are not falsifiable either."

And of course Popper provides a methodological solution to this problem. I guess that's why it's called the "Scientific Method"?

My knowledge of Popper's works is much less than that of physics, but nevertheless I think you may be mistaken here. Did you mean 'logically impossible to verify any theory'? If so, then that matches my understanding of Popper, and agrees with what I was saying.

If you really meant 'falsify' then could you please provide a direct quote from Popper where he says this. — andrewk

Do you appreciate how tedious this is?

"In point of fact, no disproof of a theory can ever be produced;...

Did you not read as far as p28 of the Routledge edition of LSD? Chapter 2, Section 9.

This truth, known as the Duhem-Quine Thesis is dealt with in several paces in LSD. The related misconception - the Duhem-Quine Problem is dealt with in 4:19 - 20.

Wow! Popper is deeper and more profound than any naive falsificationist might guess!

Sure, the Instrumentalist fallacy is a thing.

What did he argue for?

Explaining explanation:

Only if you're a scientific realist, right? If you're an instrumentalist then two incompatible theories are both valid if they both make successful predictions about their target subject matter. — Michael

If you are an instrumentalist - i.e. you believe that the role of science is to predict the outcome of experiments - or worse if you are a positivist - i.e. you believe that only statements predicting the outcome of experiments are meaningful, then the whole question of explanation is somewhat absent.

Without knowing anything about science, one can be certain from basic logic that one of those statements cannot be correct. — andrewk

You have to be pretty confused about science and logic to be unable to distinguish between "experimental evidence" and "explanation" i.e. "explicanda" and "explicans".

Adding my knowledge of physics to the mix, I can point out that it is the first one. — andrewk

Bowing to your self-proclaimed expertise in physics, I think we will have to wait until you deign to inform us of the experimental evidence that allows us to falsify GR or QM. Absent such explicanda, we may nevertheless render GR and QM problematic, due to each other's existence. The deep explanations implicit in each theory do not agree.

Philosophy's greatest (IMHO) ever contribution to science was Popper's notion of Falsifiability. Any scientist that claims to have a perfectly correct theory of reality needs to go back to university and start learning from the beginning again. ALL theories are only ever currently non-falsified hypotheses. — andrewk

But if your expertise in Popper matched your expertise in physics, then you would know that, according to Popper, it is logically impossible to falsify any theory.

For instance, in Newton's time it was postulated that matter must be (is necessarily) attracted to all other matter according to an inverse square law. Why was matter attracted to matter? Just because. Or perhaps a metaphysician/scientist can or has deduced the law of gravity from a more general law (gravity is just an example, not at all my interest here). Then this "law" is itself either deduced from yet a more general "law" or itself has "just because" status. Infinite regress or bust, in other words. Hence the "shallowness if explanation." — Hoo

If that were the case, then why has there been any progress since Newton's gravity? If, as you assert, gravity is "just because" then why would anyone (particularly Einstein) bother to question why? Moreover, in asking "why" of gravity, Einstein discovered that the force of gravity does not exist. This incredible discovery was a product of pure reason!

According to current experimental evidence, both general relativity and quantum mechanics are perfectly correct theories of reality. No measurement has ever been made to cause one to be preferred to the other. However, we know they are incompatible because their deep explanations do not agree.

You could not be more wrong about science.

NO, my point is that they do NOT treat it is unique. They UNDERMINE it to be just another physical process. But that seems unjustified based on how unique it is compared to say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle. — schopenhauer1

Sure, the Mind is just another physical process like life, creativity, knowledge, morality, and, a bit more prosaically, information and computation.

You think consciousness is amazing, but I think Life is also amazing, and we know that Life is a physical process. It is a physical process we are beginning to understand rather well, but if you look at the physical theory that explains it, there is no mention of "say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle". It is a theory of replicators subject to variation and selection. But look - a "physical" theory of abstract objects!

To claim that "just another physical process" undermines anything, is simply vacuous.

My qualia is part of my existence. We can't discuss someone's qualia without talking about a part of the world which is them. It is unique. There no other state of the world is my qualia. — TheWillowOfDarkness

According to physics your qualia are not unique, even without simulation. It's a consequence of the Bekenstein Bound in an infinite universe.

By definition the scientist and robot do not possess equivalent hardware. One produces their quale of blue when given the pill, the other does not. The difference is already within their existence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If they both possess computationally universal hardware, then they are equivalent. If only the robot does, then that makes matters easier for the simulation. Once you achieve universality, there is nowhere else to go.

You ask what could bring about the difference, but we already know: a human body with the pill produced the scientist's blue quale, while in the case of the robot body, there was no production of quale. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, the scientist and the robot are running different software. Qualia are a software feature. It cannot be anything else!

You clearly want to change the topic from your qualia to your existence by conflating the two. "Being" and identity are interesting topics of course, but I'd rather avoid them as the conversation is inevitably bogged down by an adolescent attachment to the idea of one's uniqueness.

It might be useful to remind ourselves what qualia are. Consider a scientist who is a colour expert and a robot. Neither can detect blue due to a genetic and a wiring fault respectively. A doctor gives the scientist a pill that cures her, and an engineer fixes the wiring in the robot. They can both now detect blue, but only the scientist has the subjective sensation of blue. Only she has a "what it is like" experience. There are a couple of other interesting aspects of the scientist's quale of "blue": that she could not predict it, and that she can't describe it.

Both the robot and the scientist possess computationally universal hardware, which are by definition, equivalent. Both the computer and the brain have identical repertoires. So, what could bring about this difference?

I missed the part where I claimed that the exact rendering of your qualia would BE you.

Image recognition software doesn't possess qualia either.

It is a consequence of the laws of physics that you, or any aspect of you, including your qualia, can be rendered exactly by a virtual reality generator. We don't know how to achieve that yet, but it is guaranteed possible under known physics.

Alternatively, we could make an AI that experiences your qualia, for whatever reason. Perhaps she wants to know what it feels like to be human.

Of course, it is not possible to render exactly your soul, because that does come under a different category i.e. "things that don't exist".

Suppose we concede the point that evolution and the origin of life has a Godel incompleteness problem and let's ask what that would imply about computational theories of evolution, the origin of life, or even the mind.
Chaitin, I believe, offers a good example of the computational view surrounding that issue. — m-theory

As I mentioned in another thread:

"Von Neumann showed that an accurate self-reproducer must consist of a replicator and a vehicle."

Of course Chaitin takes the computational view of life, because Von Neumann *proved* that it cannot be otherwise, before the discovery of DNA.

I would argue that animals do have subjectivity- they have a "what it's like aspect". It may not be self-awareness though. — schopenhauer1

I wish you would. I have never seen an argument for qualia in animals beyond sentimental anthopomorphising.

Animals cannot create the sort of knowledge to possess qualia. If they could create "what it's like" knowledge, then they could create any sort of knowledge, including knowledge of themselves.

Quaila belongs by definition. I am my experience, not yours or anyone else's. You can never access my quaila no matter how much you feel or think like me. It's MY Being and cannot be anyone else's. That's what it means to exist as being of experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If this were so, it would need to be encoded in the laws of physics or declared a new law of physics. For the moment, there is no indication that physical processes that create qualia and even any particular quale you might possess is inaccessible. Furthermore, there is no reason why I (with suitable augmentation) could not experience any of your qualia exactly.