as above, my support for the morality of any nations border is its purpose and use. If the purpose or use is moral, the border is moral. — Rank Amateur

So Israel, killing 100 Gazan protesters and maiming 14,000 with butterfly bullets is OK.

USA dealing with invaders lawfully is not.

Go figure.

Human beings of equal moral value should be free to move about the world to maximize
The value of their lives, as they define it. This freedom should only be limited by the inherent
conflicts of similar freedoms in others. The nature of a particular political border may or may
not be a moral entity to the extent it is justly or unjustly resolving the issues of just conflicts of inherent human freedoms from the equivalent human beings it separates. — Rank Amateur

So, you support open borders for Israel?

Please state the good arguments physics has to offer concerning the Conscious Universe? — Pattern-chaser

That has got to be the dumbest non-sequitur I have seen on this forum for several days!

Now, you claim physical objects can create a separate conscious universe. Back it up or retract it.

I suggest that physics is not a good yardstick in the consideration of qualia, and the like. Physics is about the Physical Universe, while qualia belong to the Conscious Universe. Physics cannot address qualia. — Pattern-chaser

But of course, you claim that certain objects in the physical universe, create the conscious universe, but have no clue how or why.

Physics, however, has good arguments how and why.

Yes, and they go on to experience Redness, which I should've emphasised. :blush: Robots can't do that. Even if, one day, they become conscious - the robot version of consciousness - they won't experience Redness as humans do. Redness is a uniquely human experience. — Pattern-chaser

According to known physics, robots can experience everything a human can, and since their hardware is more flexible, they are quaranteed to possess the qualia of ultraviolet, and infrared.

This confuses two things. The ball is not red; the ball reflects electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength around 700 nm. "Red" is a label that humans give to that radiation when they see it. The human eye and the robot's circuits detect electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength around 700 nm. But, later in the chain, and only in the human, this simple act of detection becomes a perception, and that somehow leads to the conscious experience of Redness. The robot does not experience the latter. — Pattern-chaser

So, red objects reflect or emit photons of predominately red energy. Humans label photons of this energy (or the black-body spectrum centred on red) as "red".

Robots can be programmed to do that too. They can even detect red, perceive it, and take action on that, including saying, "I perceive red" or driving off if it is a Tesla.

What robots and even human brains (as bare physical objects) cannot do, is create "what-it-is-like" knowledge to see red - i.e. the red quale.

If what we know about Reality is correct, robots could create the red quale, and humans do create the red quale. Both have sufficient hardware, so what is missing? Hint: it's not a soul.

As a diversion, consider these remarkable facts about qualia: they cannot be predicted; they cannot be described.

I happen to think the above observations are a profound hint as to their nature.

I think it was the last sentence that got me off on the track I went on. It seemed like you were saying that the snooker ball actually had the Redness property itself. — SteveKlinko

The ball is red. The redness of the ball begins a causal chain by which certain neurones fire in a human or certain circuits fire in a robot.

The Brain converts the Red Light into the Conscious experience of Redness. — SteveKlinko

So, your claim is that a physical object can convert light into conscious experience.

Redness does not exist in the Physical Universe. Redness only exists in the Conscious Universe — SteveKlinko

So, your claim is that a physical object can convert light into something that does not exist in the physical universe? That seems pretty outlandish, if not impossible.

While Trump is making babies cry, here in Europe we have a more robust approach to the problem of immigration. — unenlightened

So did Obama. He just handed the children over to human traffickers.

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/did-obama-administration-children-human-traffickers/

It is interesting to note, that the gradual, incremental process of evolution has produced at least two universal leaps.

Initially the genetic code itself was subject to natural selection. It was varying along with the phenotype, and at some point switched from RNA to DNA encoding.

Then something remarkable happened - the code itself stopped evolving, but the phenotype did not. This change occurred when life was no more than single-celled organisms, but has created the biodiversity we have today. Somehow the particular encoding achieved universality in its domain.

The second leap we know of is the leap to universality of the human brain. There are ideas of the selective pressures that favoured efficient knowledge transfer, and in keeping with the gradualism of evolutionary theory, the phenotypical changes resulting in a computationally universal brain may be relatively small.

I'm going to investigate this, but I think the changes Babbage made to the design of his Difference Engine (not computationally universal) to create his Analytic Engine (computationally universal) were relatively modest.

The existence of free-will is of course contentious, but the fact that the creation, transfer, and application of knowledge, not encoded in the genome, may confer a survival advantage, seems uncontentious.

Of course if you think humans are not finite physical entities, you'll probably disagree.

Your original question was "So you don't think that humans are finitely realizable physical systems?" responding "No" to that question does not entail that MN thinks that humans are not finitely realizable physical systems - it's a subtlty concerned with the scope of negation which may have escaped you. He may believe, for instance, that the notion of a finitely realizable physical system, or indeed even the notion of a human being, is not clear enough to be able to reach any reasonable conclusion concerning whether one is an instance of the other or not, and in which case the reasonable position is probably to suspend judgement. — jkg20

I'm sure the damsel in distress is grateful for your white-knighting, but if someone declares that humans are not finite physical systems, then I prefer to take them at their word.

Recourse to semantics is often available if you wish to squirm out of a corner, but in this case it is not. The meanings of "finite" and "physical" are precise.

I would have preferred if this nonsense position had been made clear from the start.

No. — MetaphysicsNow

Wow! The laws of physics don't apply to humans. Now, that really is funny.

Wrong, the Deutsche principle applies explicitly to two things and two things only, finitely realizable physical systems — MetaphysicsNow

You don't think humans are finite physical systems?

Look, there's no point in us arguing about it when we can easily settled the absolute, final and unequivocal Truth of the matter by simply asking David Deutch's opinion. — Pseudonym

Well, you have no defense, have no interest in a defense, can't point to a defense, but quibble with term "indefensible" to describe an indefensible position.

And yes, Deutsch is quite right to identify such creation myths and explanations from outside as variants of Solipsism, and as such refute them.

Take it up with Akl and co. - the paper I linked to draws a parallel between Godel's work on completeness and consistency in arithmetic and the impossibility of acheiving a universal computer. I have not read Rosen, but given what StreetlightX says, it seems he (Rosen) also thinks there is an implication of that work on the Turing-Church thesis. Curious that Deutsche did not make any reference to Rosen's work. — MetaphysicsNow

It's clear you don't know what Godel has to do with any of this, so let me explain. The laws of physics are written in a mathematics which is consistent, complete and decidable. Any calculation that you have ever carried out, or that a computer has carried out, or any finite state machine will ever carry out, in the entire history of the universe, will use a mathematics that is consistent, complete, and decidable.

So Godel has literally nothing to do with this.

And, universal computers can emulate any finite physical system.

You don't seem to understand that in the Deutsche principle which you presume to be relevant to this thread, the universal model computing machine he is referring to is an abstract model, he is not using the term to refer to actual nuts and bolts and silcon-chipped physical machines. — MetaphysicsNow

You really are a comedian! Yes, he has a model of a real computer that can be built. That is why there is an entire academic industry focused on trying to construct a quantum one. We have classical machines already.

The real point here, anyway, and one which you seem to be overlooking by getting bogged down in nitpicking about technicalities - presumably the aim being to catch me in an outrageous error - is whether the Deutsche principle applies to human beings andthat question turns on the philosophical question whether human beings are finitely realizable physical systems, about which the Deutsche principle has nothing to contribute. — MetaphysicsNow

The Deutsch Principle applies to all of Reality, even humans.

It's a defensible position because people defend it. I't just basic empiricism. — Pseudonym

No one defends that position. Basic empiricism.

I don't believe it myself. I'm a fairly committed naturalist so I've no interest in defending it. — Pseudonym

But yet co claim it is a defensible position. How do you even know that, or are you just guessing?

You've slipped in the word 'indefensible' here without justification. — Pseudonym

Why don't you defend it then?

None these politicians enacted a policy to separate families at the border. Looks like your just another 'Google Search Conservative'. — Maw

Why should the USA not be allowed to police its border?

You just don't understand Trump's Zero Tolerance policy at all, do you? — Jeremiah

Whose zero tolerance policy?

Trump signed an EO ending child separation at the border. — Jeremiah

Why was no one complaining when Obama separated children at the border?

http://dailycaller.com/2018/06/19/photos-obama-immigration-detention-facilities

So we can discuss the physical world as much as we like but we will never reach any conclusions without employing probability. — Devans99

I'm not sure that probability is of any use to you. It cannot be applied to explanatory theories (i.e. scientific theories), and it even doesn't work for your two non-explanatory theories.

E.g. you claim that p=0.9375 for there being a creator, which means chance has p=0.0625, even if there is a mature explanatory theory of the origins of the universe that involves something like quantum tunneling. We end up with a fully developed explanatory theory compared with nothing more than "God did it". Are "Chance" and "God" even mutually exclusive theories?

God created the earth in 6 days 6000 years ago and in doing so constructed it in such a way as to appear much older to our limited technology. What's in conflict with fact or reason in that account? — Pseudonym

These sort of questions are basically Solipsistic. While Solipsism is logically self-consistent, it is also an exponentially more complicated theory than Realism. "Why is the fossil record the way it is?" becomes the same question raised to the power of, "Why fake it?", "Why fake it that way?", "What's in it for the faker?", ...

We reject Solipsism and it's related theories because, if you take them seriously they reveal themselves not to be simplified world-views, but rather indefensible over-elaborations of Realism.

To the first question, I suggest you read the papers referred to - and note that the remark was about Turing machines and their extensions (Deutsche's universal model computing machine is an extension of a Turing machine). — MetaphysicsNow

Babbage's Analytic Engine is a universal computer, as are PCs. These are all finite state machines. Ignoring the fact that Turing machines do not exist, they are not finite state machines.

To the second question, is it a trick one? Turing machines (and their extensions) are abstract constructs, as such the notion of obeying a law of physics does not apply to them. — MetaphysicsNow

Right, they are abstractions obeying abstract rules, not real physical systems obeying the laws of physics.

Physical systems that obey the laws of physics may be emulated on certain other physical systems that possess the physical property of computational universality.

What has Godel got to do with any of this?

The claim made is not that computable functions cannot be computed, that would be a contradiction in terms. The claim is that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on specific types of computing machine (i.e. Turing machines and their extensions). Read the work of S.G. Akl if you are really interested in specific examples. — MetaphysicsNow

What has the Turing machine got to do with any of this, or Godel for that matter? What laws of physics do Turing machines obey?

I'm not sure why you think the first remark is funny - I didn't find anything particularly amusing about this paper — MetaphysicsNow

I think it is hilarious when people trawl the internet in desperation. Anyway, you made the amusing claim that:

Specifically they deny (in fact they claim to be able to prove) that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on any machine capable only of a finite number of operations. — MetaphysicsNow

Name me a computable function that cannot be computed. I'll wait.

Whatever Babbage's Analytic Engine was, that it was the realization of a universal computer is what the computer scientists I am talking about deny. Specifically they deny (in fact they claim to be able to prove) that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on any machine capable only of a finite number of operations. — MetaphysicsNow

That is almost funny.

That says nothing to the question whether the principle applies to human beings. — MetaphysicsNow

I see, the Deutsch-Principle applies to Reality, but not humans.

That's what Deutsche takes to be his physical version of the (unproven/unprovable) Church-Turing thesis. — MetaphysicsNow

It is proved that current known laws of physics obey the Deutsch Principle. It is conjectured that all future laws must also.

There are a handful of scientists who believe that the a universal computer cannot be realized, but that is a technical argument in computer science. — MetaphysicsNow

The earliest known design of a universal computer is Babbage's Analytic Engine.

I have no arguments against this nonsense; I'm just the dunce, for now. Just here to throw some confetti. Confetti sometimes gets deleted, but sometimes it scatters widely and adds a nice dolup of humanity to an otherwise robotic landscape of laconic lunacy. The confetti isn't for you, tom; don't worry — Noble Dust

Maybe you could do the decent thing, and stop wasting people's time?

No, we made tech that created computational universality, and then we started getting anthropomorphical about it. Evolution didn't do that; the evolution of us making tech did that. What sort of evolution is that, anyway? — Noble Dust

It is a principle of physics, as important as Conservation of Energy, that a universal computer may exactly emulate any finite physical system by finite means. It's called the Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle, but I prefer the name the Deutsch-Principle, to distinguish it from the Church-Turing Thesis.

I could spend all day citing physics and computer science papers about this, but this is the one that started it all. Please don't read it as it will only confuse you. I provide it merely to indicate where the academic industry that studies universal computers began.

https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~christos/classics/Deutsch_quantum_theory.pdf

There really is nothing beyond computational universality, we either have it or we don't.

As for the phenomenon by which certain systems, subject to incremental change, may suddenly achieve universality in their domains, Evolution has produced at least two of those in the history of our planet.

They're anthropomorphic in the sense that we made programs and hardware, and then we decided that the world is like our programs and our hardware. — Noble Dust

We did not endow our brains with computational universality, nor create the first software to be self-aware. Evolution did that.

There is nothing beyond computational universality. Either we have it or we lack it.

Programs and hardware are anthropomorphic in this context. — Noble Dust

It's called science. It is proved, that according to known physics, universal computers are equivalent - they possess the same repertoire - and that there is no higher form of computation. Either the human brain is equivalent to one of these objects, or it is less capable.

There are strong arguments that the human brain must be computationally universal.

What is a computationally universal brain? — Bitter Crank

I've been through this many times.

Skipping the preliminaries, it is a brain that may instantiate arbitrary programs. Animal brains lack the hardware to do this. It is a brain that can instantiate programs that create knowledge, explanations, and qualia. Animal brains don't do that either.

Because, like, where would we be if a clam or an orangutan could become Buddha? — Bitter Crank

Maybe an orangutan could become a person, if it evolved a computationally universal brain?

1) I see the redness of the snooker ball.
2) I consciously see the redness of the snooker ball.
In what kind of circumstances could the truth of these two statements come apart?
If they are always true or false in the same circumstances, then what is added by talk of consciously seeing anything.
In both cases, it looks like what is being seen is an instances of a visible property and that instance, wherever it is, is no more inside my skull than the snooker ball itself is. — jkg20

Robots and animals can do 1).

Only humans can do 2).

Robots will also do 2) when we figure out how to build a General Purpose AI.

You haven’t actually confronted my rebuttal, only used an appeal to authority fallacy a kin to ‘the mathematitions disagree with you so you’re wrong’. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

You have no rebuttal short of "I don't understand this".

So it would appear that I understand the problem more than you do, unless of course you can demonstrate why i’m wrong, which so far you haven’t. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

So it's you versus Cantor?

Simply agreeing with authority without actually confronting the argument being made against it ad infinitum is not itself an argument. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Demonstrating your lack of comprehension does not constitute an argument.

Yes I have. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Primary school doesn't count.

Please feel free to actually deal with the argument. I’m genuinely interested to hear a counter argument, which you have failed to offer so far. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

You don't have an argument.

I understand that mathematics uses the concept of multiple infinities. I’ve been exposed to the idea before. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Do you understand though?

I’m saying that I fundementally disagree with it. What ever they are adding is more worthy of the title ‘indefinite’ than infinity. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

So, we have established that you DON'T understand it.

As I said before. If you try to have more than one infinity then you create a problem. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Repeating an error ad infinitum does not correct it.

Infinity is boundless, without limit, Etc. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

And some of those are bigger, infinitely bigger, than the others.

If you have two infinity’s, A & B, then you are saying that in order to add infinity A to infinity B that A does not contain B. Which is to say that both A and B are limited or bounded to A and only A or B and only B — Mr Phil O'Sophy

You have never studied mathematics.

This making two infinity’s then leads to the logical conclusion that it is an indefinite number; an undisclosed amount that is limited to not containing that which you wish to add to it; not an infinite quantity as the mathematitions like to insist. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Indefinite in number, you say.

Yes there is. If it is Infinity then it should already contain the 1 you’re attempting to add to it. If it doesn’t contain that 1 being added then it’s not infinity, as it is limited to not containing the 1 you are adding. This means what you are calling ‘infinity’ is not limitless at all and so not worthy of the title. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

Seriously, you can even add infinity to infinity. Plenty of cases where that happens in mathematics.

You can add 1 to any real number, so infinity isn't a real number. Infinity is a concept. — GreenPhilosophy

Nothing to prevent you from adding 1 to infinity.

How do you know that there is a problem? It makes no sense to say you know something without having a shred of evidence in favor thereof. You're simply failing to count the reasons we have to believe QM is flawed in someway as evidence. — NKBJ

What are the reasons to believe QM is flawed?

And yes, there is no evidence that there is a problem with either QM or GR. The known problems are purely theoretical.

We can mention a hypothetical computer-program. If that hypothetical program that we’re discussing hasn’t been written on paper, is it any less a computer-program? Need it be in a computer, or even on paper? …or even completely discussed? — Michael Ossipoff

The computer program for reality may be quite simple. Initial conditions, certain fundamental laws, and off you go. This idea may explain the low entropy of the early universe.

The physicist Michael Faraday, in 1844, pointed out that our experience and science’s observations are about relation. …logical and mathematical structural relation. He pointed out that there’s no particular reason to believe in the independent, objective existence of the “stuff” that those relations are about. — Michael Ossipoff

Did Faraday really say that?

Anyway, there is very good reason to accept that the mathematical structure of our theories correspond to features of reality.