OK, on what logical basis do you assume these things? — Pattern-chaser

> The basis for my assumption that conscious experiences are more complex;
1. Conscious experiences seem to be significantly more common with humans, than animals. The correlation for "conscious experiences" seems to be intelligence, which involves more complex brain activity. More complex brain activity = more complex process for the experience.
2. Conscious experiences seem to always involve additional memory access, relevant to the concept or experience, which is the focus of consciousness.
3. As I mentioned, "conscious experiences" seem to be scientifically explained less than simpler experiences.

Where? By whom? What are these explanations? You assert they exist, without saying where, and without saying what they are. :roll: — Pattern-chaser

> I believe simpler experiences are mostly explained by science, wherever you search. The links I posted after that statement were examples of just that, as was that an insinuated answer of, by whom, and what the explanations are.
Here's some more;
Video of how we experience hearing
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkGOGzpbrCk
Video of the science of sensation and perception
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unWnZvXJH2o&t=2s

Your third link describes our memories, but offers nothing specific to vision or seeing, that I could see. — Pattern-chaser

I liked that as 1 of the steps in the experience of sight. After the other stages, the information received by the eye needs to be saved as memories, which could be considered part of an "experience", depending on how you define it.

Of course I know very little details about any of these processes, but these are examples showing that scientific explanations of simple experiences are known and available.

Don't you think we could be more successful if we applied a different process, and retained the interconnection-information instead of throwing it away? — Pattern-chaser

>Sure. I think that's basically what I meant.
Instead of destroying the information of the connections between portions, save that data, for future reference. But still take the concept from reductionism, of analysing each portion, to determine its function, before later determining the connections between portions.

It should (be discernible), maybe. But is it? And how does this discernment work, exactly? You're offering wishful thinking in lieu of explanation. — Pattern-chaser

It "should" be, as far as any problem "should" be discernible by analyzing cause and effect. The discernment is done like any science. Hypothesis, experiment, results.

You are still saying that the Neural Activity happens and that Explains everything. It is mind boggling to me that you cannot realize the thing that is missing in your explanation. The thing that is missing is the Red experience itself and the 440Hz Tone experience itself. — SteveKlinko

>From my perspective, once the mechanical process is outlined, something is explained. I think we've gone through this cycle of disagreement before, but I get the sense you want or expect something more than an explanation of function. I believe that's all there is, and different conscious experiences just seem so extravagant and profound, that its hard for our minds to except an explanation.

First, it is not clear to me that "experiences lacking in conscious awareness" are "simpler". Do you offer any justification for this assumption? — Pattern-chaser

>I assume conscious experiences are more complex, partially based on my understanding that conscious experiences are still considered unexplained, yet experiences without consciousness are mostly explained (which I see you ask about next, so will attempt to explain my perspective there).

"if it's agreed that those simpler experiences are explainable" - again, this has not been established. You have asserted so, but offered no justification. Please explain these 'simpler' experiences, in terms of neural activity. — Pattern-chaser

>I believe simpler experiences, which don't involve conscious awareness, are currently explained (to a sufficient degree), because as far as I'm aware, all the steps involved in a simple experience, are scientifically explained. As all the steps are explained, this sequence explains the overall experience, by my understanding.

An example of the steps of a simpler experience, explained (quoted from my previous reply to steve..)

"I believe a lot of the elements involved in the experiences, are explained.
-Here's a video of how te eye measures light: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KoUyMuMVJQY
-Then here's an explanation of the next step, of transfering that information to the brain: http://discoveryeye.org/the-brain-and-the-eye/
-then the next step of storing information as memories: http://www.human-memory.net/processes_storage.html"

We just have to explain the experiences, starting from simple, as they increase in degree of conscious awareness.
— Tyler

Go on then.... — Pattern-chaser

>Starting from my previous reply, theoretically explaining a simple experience, my theory is that conscious awareness, and therein complexity, increase gradually from this more simple process, by an increase of neural activity accessing memories relative to the experience. Basically, as the neurons increase the amount of memories accessed, relative to the experience, consciousness of the experience increases.

I am confused. First you agree that reductionism cannot properly investigate something whose function is primarily related to the connections between its components:
I think I mostly understand your point, and agree that it cannot be explained by only reductionism.
— Tyler

Then you ignore this, and repeat your previous (unjustified) assertion: — Pattern-chaser

>I agreed that Reductionism on its own, would not be a sufficient explanation, then I intended to explain that after reductionism, a further step could be taken, to then allow a sufficient explanation. Explaining the overlap of portions, would be the continued step, which is not included in reductionism (to my understanding).

But how will you explain the connections when you have used a reductionist approach? Let's just remind ourselves, again, how reductionism works. Divide and conquer. The components are disconnected - and further disassembled themselves, if necessary - until the remaining fragments are simple enough to be analysed and understood in isolation. Where significant functionality lies in the connections, it is necessarily lost in the reductive dismembering!

Please explain how "the connections of the portions are explained", when those connections were ignored and destroyed by your reductionist approach. :chin: — Pattern-chaser

>After the portions are explained, it can be reviewed where those portions came from. Then, in the same way that each portion was likely understood by cause and effect, the portions can be understood by cause and effect, in their relation to each other. If 1 portion is found to have a result, it can then be compared to the original overview, in how that portion connects to the next, then it can be analysed how the result of portion 1, causes the beginning of the next portion.
After reductionism, taking the next step of placing the portions back into the original combination, it should be discernible how all the portions interact with each other, to understand the overlap, and explain the overall function.

But the mind and the brain, as problems, or subjects for investigation, are defined by their connections more than by their components. A neuron alone does nothing useful. A neuron connected to a (very) large network of other neurons can participate in the operation of a whole brain. It's the connections that define it, mostly. And, if we approach it via reductionism, the first thing we do is to (unknowingly, one assumes) discard nearly all of the relevant data (the connections), and investigate the remnants, which are the disconnected (i.e. maimed) components of the object of interest. Such an approach cannot succeed, for the brain, mind, and all similar things. I.e. things whose interconnections are a significant part of what they are, and how they function. — Pattern-chaser

> I think I mostly understand your point, and agree that it cannot be explained by only reductionism. But I think reductionism is a very effective step. I think explaining each portion is good evidence, to then take a next step, to use those portions in an explanation of the overall function of a concept. If all the portions are explained, and then further more, the connections of the portions are explained, to overlap all portions, then the overview of the entire combination of the concept can be put together like a puzzle.
So, true that the explanations of portional components of experience and neural activity doesnt explain consciousness overall. But it is evidence pointing toward the overall explanation. I believe that overall function of consciousness is explainable using those components.

The first type is not detected by our senses, or is discarded during perception; the event is not experienced. The second type is experienced consciously. The third is experienced, but outside of conscious awareness, by our nonconscious minds. — Pattern-chaser

> Agreed

And this is where we diverge, I think. This has nothing to do with 'function'. Experience is not function. — Pattern-chaser

> Yes, I think this is where we disagree. Which sort of explains some of the disagreements with the previous post, regarding explanation of experience being a physical process.
I think that experience is a function of humans, and animals (if non-conscious experience is included). I believe experience is the effect, caused by the function of brain activity. I believe the mechanical, physical process of the brain, is the function of experience.

Other than sensation, there is neural activity and emotion, but what more?
— Tyler

Perception. — Pattern-chaser

> I would argue that perception is neural activity, and therefore not anything additional. I think my argument here is related to my theory of the explanation of consciousness though, so there is likely no distinct evidence that perception is only neural activity. Just conceptual theory.

:wink: My point is limited to what I have already said: that the abstract gap between neural activity and the human mind - or consciousness, if you prefer - is just too wide for us to conveniently and usefully bridge. — Pattern-chaser

> And I think this brings me back to my point that humans have experiences lacking in conscious awareness. I think this point is relevant because, if humans have those simpler experiences, and if its agreed that those simpler experiences are explainable, then the gap is not large between the explanation of those simpler experiences and more complex experiences, involving conscious awareness. The gap should not be large, because the spectrum of experiences from simple (non-conscious aware) to complex (conscious aware), should be gradual. If it is a gradual change from non-conscious to conscious (since there is varying degrees of conscious awareness relative to the experience), then it is a gradual gap. We just have to explain the experiences, starting from simple, as they increase in degree of conscious awareness.

You are ignoring the analysis, interpretation and understanding of what has been detected by our senses. Which is to say, you are ignoring perception, as we humans do it. — Pattern-chaser

> I see. this comes back again to differing understanding of: perception, as well as analysis, interpretation and understanding. I think I would consider these processes to be neural activity and memory access. I believe interpretation and analysis function by relating relevant memories. Basically, its active memory access of concepts and cause and effect of the factors involved. So attempted understanding, would involve actively accessing memories of the factors of which are being attempted to be understood. The brain accesses memories of each factor, and the relative cause and effect that that factor has in varying circumstances. The more accurate the comprehension and understanding, the more accurate each factor is analysed and compared to memory for the most accurate cause and effect of that factor.

I thought (and still think) it impossible-to-describe-adequately-and-usefully. By this I mean to be clear: adequately and usefully to a normal human being, living a real life in the real world. — Pattern-chaser

> I still dont think it would be impossible to describe clearly to the average person. If it is possible to describe the technicalities, then it should also likely be possible to describe clearly to an average person. At this point of common knowledge and understanding, it may take a lot of information, and a lot of time for the description (like maybe even a multiple year university course), but eventually an average person could understand it clearly, I think. If so, then its still possible to describe. Perhaps it cant be described quickly or easily, if described thoroughly.

Oh, and I'm not trying to describe "a physical process involving the laws of physics". Look what I said:
...will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? — Pattern-chaser

> So, do you not consider human experience to be a physical process, and involve the laws of physics?
Even though it involves the brain, I would still consider experience to be technically a physical process, involving the laws of physics. Every process involved in the brain, to create a human experience, should be a physical, material process, I think. Otherwise, its immaterial, defying the laws of physics, as we know it?

I'm suggesting that your perspective does not meet the needs of humans living their everyday lives. And so your philosophy is not useful to them, despite the benefits you see in it for other reasons. You are not wrong. That's not what I'm saying. But your approach is less than useful. That's what I'm saying. :up: — Pattern-chaser

> Is it necessary for an explanation or description to be understandable by every day people? I think a lot of science is not easily understood by most people, yet it is still useful. As long as an explanation or description of the function of a process is understood by some (relevant experts), they can interpret the relevancy of the cause and effect of the function of that concept.

I am always trying to emphasize the difference between the external Physical Phenomenon and the internal Conscious Phenomenon. When I say Conscious Sound I am referring to the internal Experience. Doesn't matter if someone is mentally focusing on it or not. — SteveKlinko

> Fair enough, if that is your intent of the term "conscious sound", but that would mean conscious sound includes the simple (compared to conscious awareness) process of hearing, which is pretty much explained by science. By that definition of conscious sound, it could include any animal receiving audio, or human hearing without even noticing they heard (often saved to subconscious). So, i think my point was, if this simple "conscious sound" is explained by science, then there is not such a big gap from that to a gradual increase of mental attentiveness to the sound, where it would become consciousness of the sound.

The sensation of Tone-ness is only in the Conscious Sound which the Brain creates as a Surrogate for the 440Hz. The Tone sensation that you hear seems so appropriate for the Physical Phenomenon because it is the only way you have ever experienced Physical Sound. That is through the Surrogate which has nothing to do with the 440Hz itself. — SteveKlinko

> I agree with most of what you said, except that the surrogate has nothing to do with the 440Hz. The surrogate does have something to do with the 440Hz, because the surrogate used a (rough) measurement of the 440Hz to create the surrogate.

But what is the Surrogate? That is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

> The surrogate is simply the mechanical function described.
I think this is similar to my previous attempted explanation of consciousness in general. I believe the mechanical function IS the explanation. I don't see what more needs to be explained.
Sound and toneness seems weird to us, when you think about it, that is only the physical process, and interpreted by our ears and brain to turn into the sound we hear. But I think the surrogate of sound only SEEMS like something more, when we use consciousness to be aware of it.

I See Places and People in my Dreams all the time that I have never Seen. Why not a Sound that I have never heard? — SteveKlinko

In your dreams, you see new combinations of images that you have seen before, but you never see an entirely new color or pixel, which you have never seen before. Dreams are just like imagination, how they only use what your senses have recorded previously, and take tiny portions (to the smallest size that your senses and memory recorded) to make new combinations, whether pixels/colors, or pitches of sound.

This is all at the Front End of the processing. It is all Neural Correlates of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

> It may be the front end of processing, but is basically how the brain records. The next steps would be accessing memories. True they are neural correlates of consciousness, which makes them more likely to be involved in the cause of consciousness.

Then, for the Conscious Experience, it just has to be explained how the correct combination of accessing these memories, with relevant alternate memories, causes a conscious experience
— Tyler
Yes, huge Explanatory Gap is still there. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

>But it doesnt seem so huge of a gap. Simultaneous memory access of a factor, plus its relative cause and effect. There, no problem :)

OK, perhaps you can, but will it account for the human experience I have described? The feel of the water as my hand passes through it. The trees on the bank, and the rustling sound of their leaves blowing in the wind? ... In other words, the whole experience, as a human experiences it. Can you describe that adequately and usefully in terms of neural activity? I don't think that's possible, is it? — Pattern-chaser

>I think it is possible. I dont see why a physical process involving the laws of physics should be impossible to describe. How to describe it may depend on your definition of "describe".
It should be quite plausible to describe every step of the mechanical function involved with the sensory input, neural activity, and instinctual triggers of emotion. Objectively, this is "describing".
I think describing the mechanical function of these processes seems inadequate, but I think that is just a subjective perspective from humans who experience it, because it "seems" so significant.
Realistically, I think that is all that it takes to describe any human experience.

Another type of "describing" could be using vocabulary which we've made up to represent different types of different sensory experiences. This type of description is only as effective as the knowledge of the terms, and past experiences involving the relevant terms, by the people involved in the communication for description.

I am not aware of any human experience that is not a "conscious aware" experience. Perception precedes experience, as it must, but the human does not experience the experience (sorry! :wink:) until it reaches our conscious minds, and then we become aware of it. — Pattern-chaser

>Fair enough, if thats what you consider to be an experience. So does that mean you agree that humans perceive many things daily, subconsciously, which don't count as an experience, because we are not consciously aware of them? Basically, the majority of data that your senses percieve, but you are not consciously aware of.
And would you agree then, that most of what animals percieve is not an experience, if they are not consciously aware of it?

I think you're saying here that an experience that barely (or doesn't?) registers in our awareness is closer to "neural activity" than one which engages our attention thoroughly?... I refer to the whole process of human perception, followed by the thoughts and feelings that come with the experience once it enters our conscious awareness. The whole thing. — Pattern-chaser

>I'm not saying less aware experiences are closer to neural activity, but more that those experiences are more simply explained by neural activity, as I believe they mostly are explained already. So since those experiences are basically neural activity, and the gradual adjustment to more aware experiences theoretically only involves more neural activity, there seems to be no big gap between experience and neural activity.

I refer to the whole process of human perception, followed by the thoughts and feelings that come with the experience once it enters our conscious awareness. The whole thing. — Pattern-chaser

>But are thoughts anything more than neural activity, accessing memories of words which represent objects and concepts saved in memory?
And emotion, anything more than feedback triggers connected to memories, to signal "repeat this scenario" or "do not repeat"?

These bytes don't change with the screen display. They are the instructions that cause the computer to execute word processing functions. — Pattern-chaser

>But once the instructions causes word processing functions, this would then cause the screen display to change, as word functions are executed, wouldn't they?

And I contest your assertion that neuroscience is "detailed". The problem here, with the abstract distance between neural activity and human experience, is that the gap between the two is huge, and not yet understood or "detailed". — Pattern-chaser

What combination of neurons fire in these circumstances? What are the weightings that cause them to fire in this way, not another? And what is your detailed description of how the firing of these particular neurons gives rise to these experiences? — Pattern-chaser

>I didnt say that neural science is necessarily significantly detailed, but that "If the stream of bytes was measurable and detailed to the same degree". Basically, that neural activity is detailed to the degree that is sufficient to determine general functions. So detail to those extents that you mentioned, is not necessary for determining general functions, I think.
There is currently neural mapping which can record neural activity correlated with different actions and thoughts of an individual, which can then make predictions to a reasonable degree though.

How does my experience of joy, fear or grief affect my neural activity (or vice versa, if you prefer :wink:)? — Pattern-chaser

>I believe the basic connection between the 2 is generally understood, at least to the degree of function. Joy or happiness, are basically positive feedback triggers, connected to memories (and therein neural activity) of scenarios which have been triggered as positive, to cause the individual to repeat the circumstances in the future. Fear and grief are more like negative feedback, linked with memories, intended to cause the person to avoid those circumstances. Of course each emotion is more complicated than that in detail, but that is the basics.

There is much more to it than mere sensation. — Pattern-chaser

>I dont think I grasp your explanation which argues this point. Other than sensation, there is neural activity and emotion, but what more?

Yes, we could reasonably see the eye as measuring light, but it does not code "it into neurons". The optic nerve itself begins the neural processing, even before the data reaches the brain proper. — Pattern-chaser

>What is the difference in concept, between [the optic nerve beginning neural processing for data to reach the brain], and [coding into neurons]?

It is not sense - store - recall - review. It is more like sense - perceive - associate - interpret - integrate into worldview - conscious awareness. — Pattern-chaser

>But the steps of "associate - interpret - integrate into worldview" are all neural activity, of relative memories (and could be summarized as "store"), wouldnt you agree?
So how does this suggest that conscious experience is still any more than sensory perception + neural activity?

Note in particular that only at the final stage, when perception is effectively complete, is the information passed to our conscious awareness. Prior to that, there is no conscious input to the process whatever. Not even the tiniest bit. Perception is pre-conscious. And it is much more than detecting light, and storing the fact that we detected it. — Pattern-chaser

>I think I can agree that conscious awareness can be only the final stage. But how does that suggest that the process is anything more than senses and neural activity? Those middle stages are still neural activity (subconscious), to my knowledge, just not extensive and complex neural activity of the final stage of conscious awareness.
As far as I see it being more than, detecting light and storing the data, it seems to be only the additional concept of accessing corresponding memory data, connected to that similar pattern of light.

Science does not acknowledge or detect (using the red snooker ball example) the wealth of meaning contained within the human concepts of "red" "snooker" and "ball", — Pattern-chaser

>I think I disagree. Science does acknowledge and detect the meaning, as science acknowledges the concept that those terms are meaningful based on alternate memories of similar objects or concepts. I see no more meaning to the terms than, memories of the concepts, + comprehension of the interaction of the objects (ie memories of outcomes of the concepts interacting with variables). I think science acknowledges that (or at least is should ha ha)

It's a complicated subject, of which we know only the most basic details, as yet. — Pattern-chaser

>I believe for a lot of concepts, all that is necessary to comprehend the function, is basic details. Basic details provide patterns of cause and effect (which I think is also the basic cause of conscious comprehension :)), which provides the answer of function.

But current knowledge definitely indicates that you underestimate or misunderstand what human perception involves. — Pattern-chaser

>Perhaps I do underestimate or misunderstand, but then I must also misunderstand your reasoning which suggests this. Maybe it is regarding those middle steps of "associate - interpret - integrate into worldview -" which I suppose you believe involve more than neural activity, but I believe are simply neural activity of linked relative memories.

the abstract distance between neural activity and experience is just too big to span. — Pattern-chaser

>I disagree, and think the distance is not big. By "experience" do you mean specifically the more conscious aware experience, or any experience?
If you consider different experiences in different degrees of conscious vividness, then an experience with very minimal or no conscious vividness, should have basically no figurative distance to span, from neural activity to experience.

It's like trying to appreciate Microsoft's word processor as a stream of bytes. It is a stream of bytes, but this does not help us to understand it as a word processor. — Pattern-chaser

>If the stream of bytes was measurable and detailed to the same degree that neuroscience is, then by testing the comparison of reaction between the bytes and the alterations on the screen, I think it would be helpful to understand it as a word processor.

Human experience is mostly composed of stuff that science discards, or does not detect/acknowledge in the first place. — Pattern-chaser

>like what for example?
If science explains the functional processes of the neurology involved with an experience (such as the eye measuring light, coding it into neurons, then accessing those neurons), then what more is there that science does not detect?

When we talk about the Bell we are talking about the Conscious experience of Sound. — SteveKlinko

>This depends on how you define conscious experience. I assumed by the context, conscious experience refers to requiring the additional mental focus and attent. Without the mental focus, simply hearing a bell, would not be the conscious experience of the sound.

The point is that the Physical Sound has the 44Hz Property. The Conscious Sound experience has no 440Hz Property. — SteveKlinko

>I agree the conscious sound experience would not involve the specific accuracy of 440Hz, but the conscious experience likely involves a rough measurement of that 440Hz, which could be considered a property of it. There would be no need for hearing to develop to an accurate degree of measurement (including distinguishing the oscillation), so a rough measurement would make sense, by natural selection.

The Conscious Sound is a Surrogate for the Physical Sound. — SteveKlinko

>I agree. Once the rough measurement is taken, the brain must translate it into code, to then save as memories. The overall interpretation of the coding would be the surrogate.

You can hear the Standard A Sound without any Physical Standard A Sound in your dreams. — SteveKlinko

>This would be accessing memories, as it is coded and saved in the brain. Since dreaming is neural activity accessing memories, we could not dream of an entirely new pitch of sound, which has not been recorded by memory.
Same as coded memories of recordings of Red, then accessed in a dream.

The experience of Red or the Standard A Pitch are completely unexplained by Science at this point in time. — SteveKlinko

>I think that may be an over-exaggeration. I believe a lot of the elements involved in the experiences, are explained.
-Here's a video of how te eye measures light: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KoUyMuMVJQY
-Then here's an explanation of the next step, of transfering that information to the brain: http://discoveryeye.org/the-brain-and-the-eye/
-then the next step of storing information as memories: http://www.human-memory.net/processes_storage.html

That is for the more simple function of experiencing the sight of red. Then, for the Conscious Experience, it just has to be explained how the correct combination of accessing these memories, with relevant alternate memories, causes a conscious experience.

If indeed consciousness is caused by neural activity then one must ask what is the instigation of this "neural activity'. — Marcus de Brun

>If you mean on terms of each instance, then stimulus instigates the neural activity. Usually sensory input stimulus would trigger the neural activity, which then causes consciousness (with the effective quantity and combination of neural activity).
-If you mean, in terms of development of the concept of neural activity, then the instigator to cause it to develop would be natural selection, in general. neural activity likely developed through natural selection, within an environment which benefited memory use, as a more accurate determinant, compared to instinct.

and merely requires us to consider consciousness as a valid ex-homino exogenous entity/force with ex-homino activity that is observable in the context of physics and or quantum mechanics. — Marcus de Brun

This doesn't sound mere. Since there is no observable evidence to suggest consciousness is caused externally, it seems unlikely that this is the case. The concept that consciousness is caused by something externally, of which we have not observed any connection of cause and effect, makes it much less probable to be the circumstances. Compared to neural activity being the cause, of which we have suggestive evidence. This is probably the logical reasoning that it is a more common belief.

And yet Steve's point remains unanswered: scientists do not have a method for studying the Experience or the Experiencer. — Pattern-chaser

If the experience etc. is simply neural activity, then I believe we do have a method for studying it, as we have studied lots of neural activity.

Science is the (valuable and useful) perspective you get when you reduce humans to impartial observers. The study of experience and experiencers requires that humans be considered as active participants. — Pattern-chaser

But, in order to have an impartial observer, dont we only need a different human? The only active participant for experience, is the specific human which is being tested for experience. The other humans who are observing the tests, are not an active participant in the experience, therefore are impartial observers.

To investigate experience and experiencers, a tool other than science is needed. — Pattern-chaser

I disagree. Science should be capable, since alternate humans from the experience, can be impartial. It should be comparable to using AI or an alien as the observer. They would not be human, but would still use science, and would you agree, be an impartial observer?

that followed another was necessarily a consequence of the first event, is the post hoc ergo propter hoc — wikipedia

I believe I am not arguing the same concept which you are citing the contradiction of. I am not arguing this point: (quote from the Wiki article) "That "correlation proves causation," is considered a questionable cause logical fallacy "
I totally agree that correlation does not prove causation. I am arguing that correlation logically suggests a higher probability of causation, than lack of correlation. Simply put; if you take 2 variables with a correlation, it is more likely that there is causation between them, than between 1 of those variables and a random other variable (without a correlation).

Doesn't this presuppose knowledge of consciousness that we do not currently have? :chin:
...and exactly what are these "elements" that are measurable and evident, and have they actually been measured, and found to be evident? :chin: Just asking. :wink: — Pattern-chaser

We have knowledge of consciousness to a vague degree, at least. We have knowledge that consciousness (by definition (which yes, is not very concrete in itself (as a result of lack of explanation))) involves; life, a brain, thought, wakefulness, awareness.
So these are the elements which I believe are measurable and evident. I believe the last 3 are measurable by specifically neural activity, which is the correlation to consciousness, which I think suggests it is more probable (than any other random variables) to also have a link of causation.

Indeed there is a correlation between both neural activity and consciousness. It is very easy then to join the herd in the assumption that consciousness is the 'effect' and private neural activity is the 'cause'. — Marcus de Brun

It seems you presume that I only believe consciousness is caused by neural activity, because of a bias that it's common belief. That's could be fair enough, but I argued that the reason I believe it is logical, regardless of most common belief. It could be argued just as easily that your position might be just as biased (but to the contrary), toward assuming that the common belief is incorrect. Or you could have a bias aligned with another common perspective, that consciousness is mysterious and seems magical, so cannot be explained by current science.

I have already pointed out that this view is homocentric and does not address the reality that neural activity and the identification of such activity is both contained and consequential to, consciousness. — Marcus de Brun

It seems to me that the view of [consciousness is caused by neural activity] does directly address the concept that "neural activity and the identification of such activity is both contained and consequential to, consciousness." Why do you believe it does not address that concept? The concept that neural activity is consequential to consciousness, is just the logical reasoning to assume that the neural activity is the cause.

we can then consider the fundamental question pertaining to its creation of the experience of material reality. — Marcus de Brun

That is exactly what I'm doing isn't it? Questioning the creation of the experience of consciousness.

principally because we do not venture into assumptions that result in the need for further false assumptions. — Marcus de Brun

What false assumptions are needed, for the assumption that neural activity causes consciousness?

Consciousness as an entity outside of or uncaused by neural activity, becomes relieved of temporality — Marcus de Brun

What is wrong with temporality?

It also satisfies the empirical nature of determinism — Marcus de Brun

So you believe that neural activity causing consciousness does not satisfy determinism? I see no conflict between the 2

Wilful adherence to the old but persistent paradigm does not advance the agreed correlation between consciousness and neural activity, it merely reasserts the current paradigm. — Marcus de Brun

I believe I'm not adhering strictly to the old paradigm, if I apply a concept which was not part of it, and theoretically solves the problem. The concept I apply is: a complex combination resulting in a construct greater than the sum of is parts. This advances the correlation.
.

Sorry to all for my delayed responses btw. I've been too distracted in the summer...

I'm not quite sure what is simpler when it comes to Sensory inputs but I suppose a Bell and a Flashing — SteveKlinko

I think I meant that the bell would theoretically be simpler than the Red Experience, since The Red E. specifically involves the conscious aspect.

But to me Red is a very simple basic Experience. — SteveKlinko

I agree that red itself is basic, but The Red E. is specifically more complex since it requires conscious focus regarding red. Without the conscious focus and attention, I think red does become simple (similar to hearing a bell), but without the conscious aspect, there is no Red Experience, and no problem with explanation. Without conscious focus, red is just a light wave-length measurement I believe.

There's nothing more to it than Explaining how the Experience and Experiencer are Neural Activity. — SteveKlinko

Right, and it has been explained by science, how the simple experiences (without conscious focus involved) are neural activity, has it not?
So if simple experiences are explained, then complex experiences involving conscious focus, can be explained by complex combinations of those simple experiences (by my theory)

correlation between brain activity and consciousness, but this in no way implies the euphemistic application of correlation with the notion 'cause' — Marcus de Brun

> I'd argue that correlation does imply cause. It doesn't prove cause, but correlation implies a higher probability that it is also a cause.

yet there is no evidence to suggest that it is caused. — Marcus de Brun

> There may be no conclusive evidence at this time, but I believe there is still supportive evidence that consciousness is caused by neural activity. The supportive evidence would be similar to what I mentioned of currently known neuroscience. There is evidence that neural activity does cause simpler specified processes of thought. and since consciousness is correlated with thought processes, this is supportive evidence of the high probability that neural activity causes consciousness as well. This is why I believe consciousness is just a more complex combination of neural activity, than the specific thought processes (which are caused by neural activity).

I might just as easily assert that brain activity is in fact caused by consciousness — Marcus de Brun

> Since elements involved with conscious experiences, are measurable and evident to occur regardless of consciousness, this suggests that those elements are the cause of consciousness, rather than consciousness being the cause of those elements.

If its agreed that consciousness is directly linked with sensory experiences, then it is evident that the original cause of those sensory experiences occurs regardless of consciousness, and therefore the cause is not consciousness. For eg. a tree falls in the forest with nobody to witness. The tree falling is measurable and evident to occur, regardless of sensory experience witness (brain activity). This suggests that in an alternate case of brain activity witnessing a tree falling, the cause of the sensory experience was the tree actually falling. If the cause of the sensory experience was consciousness, then the tree falling would not occur without the cause of consciousness.

but how can any kind of Neural Activity result in that Experience? — SteveKlinko

> Do you mean, how it can result in specifically the Red experience, or generally any experience?
Do you agree that simpler neural activity, results in simpler experiences?
eg. audio sensory input, results in the experience of simply hearing a bell

Scientists have no idea how Neural Activity causes or results in the Red experience. — SteveKlinko

> If its agreed that simpler sensory input causes simpler experiences, then I believe (just as with consciousness) the Red is caused in a similar process, just involving multiple simultaneous experiences.

Scientists do not yet have a method for studying the Experience or the Experiencer. — SteveKlinko

> If the experience is caused by neural activity, then the experience and the experiencer are simply neural activity. There may be nothing more to it.

But how can something like the experience of Red come from Memory Access? — SteveKlinko

> Basically, the same way that emotions, or dreams, or mindful images/ sounds can come from memory access. The experience of Red is just perhaps a more complex combination of such memory access.

my position cannot be construed as containing a bias as my view strictly accords with the agreed facts (ie there is no material evidence for the endogenous manufacture of human thought/consciousness). My position is also your position, unless you have some evidence to contradict my view — Marcus de Brun

> Do you mean agreed facts are that there's no evidence that consciousness is related to brain activity?
If so, I don't agree to that, as I believe there is lots of evidence that thought processes correlate with brain activity. I did provide suggestive evidence of this, which you didnt seem to refute.
Here is what I stated on page 4:
["Assuming by "consciousness", we mean the awareness and comprehensive perception, the evidence is that brain activity has proven to be directly correlated with being awake, thinking, remembering, and interpreting sensory input. Consciousness involves these concepts as well."]

All of this amounts to nothing more than self serving assumption and lies outside of the facts. — Marcus de Brun

> How does the assumption that consciousness is caused by brain activity, serve oneself?
The amount of evidence of the relation between thought processes and brain activity seems quite significant. I find it hard to see your perspective, that there is no evidence. Basically all of neuroscience is supporting evidence that thought is directly correlated with brain activity.

because my brain is dying yet my self remains far more intact than most people assume — MiloL

> How do you know your "self" remains intact, compared to your brain?

I suggest that this position is a consequence of a; pleasing, tempting, fashionable, contemporary and entirely materialist bias. — Marcus de Brun

> This could be true, but it is also the most logical position, as I explained. So thinking that consciousness is not brain activity, may be just as bias toward an alternate explanation.

All you just said is that it is Complicated and involves Memory and some kind of Interpretations. Maybe this is all true but there is no explanation in what you say. — SteveKlinko

> I tried to give a general explanation that it is complicated, but the key is that its a combination of relevant parts. The explanation of function was in earlier posts, with more specific details, but you still ask "how", and I'm not sure what else there is to explain.
As much as I think about the Redness of Red, I still think it is explained by a combination of memory access.
So I guess we're at a stand-still anyway...

consider your position on this topic with a certainty that the self remains regardless of the condition of the machine. Once the Machine is damaged beyond repair and function the self moves on but that topic has enough threads no doubt. — MiloL

> I see no reason to believe that the self remains regardless of the condition of the machine, or that it moves on after damage.
If "self" consists of the machine and computer, and functions by means of processing data of the environment, why would you assume (and be certain) that self exists without that which it is made of, and without that which is its function?

How does 1 produce 2?

Think about the Redness of a Red experience. Think about Neurons firing. How on Earth do think that these are not two different categories of Phenomenon? — SteveKlinko

> 1 produces 2 by a complex but coordinated combination producing an intricate outcome.
I think they are the same category because it seems logical that the 1 process (of neural activity) is the functional explanation of the other (Redness of Red).

By my theory, I might say, I use consciousness to access memories of the concepts relative to the explanation, simultaneously to accessing new memories of incoming sensory input of the image of red.
When I look at and think about red, I also think about the function of my eye measuring the light wave-lengths of red, and my neural activity coding it and saving it as a memory. So the appearance of red, is just the interpretation of the coding of wave-length measurements.

What is the evidence that suggests that consciousness involves brain activity? — Marcus de Brun

> Assuming by "consciousness", we mean the awareness and comprehensive perception, the evidence is that brain activity has proven to be directly correlated with being awake, thinking, remembering, and interpreting sensory input. Consciousness involves these concepts as well.

I would suggest that consciousness has been more thoroughly investigated by Philosophy than brain activity has been explained by Science — Marcus de Brun

> This very well may be true, and the lack of explanation of brain activity by science, is what leaves the open potential for brain activity to still be the explanation of consciousness. Since there is that unexplored potential, it seems most logical to assume that with further investigation of brain activity, using science, we will then discover the explanation of consciousness.

Consciousness in Philosophical parlance would appear to cause and or contain brain activity, in the same manner that it may contain our perception of 'objective' reality. — Marcus de Brun

Yes, and wouldnt you consider "perception of 'objective' reality" to be the basic concept of "consciousness"?

It clearly, is NOT there. Lets get over it! — Marcus de Brun

Evidence suggests that consciousness involves brain activity. We have not thoroughly tested and understood all aspects of brain activity.
So it seems more likely that we have not discovered the aspects of brain activity to cause consciousness, than that it comes from somewhere else which has no evidence.

But even when you get to the point of having all the pieces and you know these pieces cause the Conscious experience, the question still screams out as to how the Conscious experience happens from these pieces. — SteveKlinko

> I don't think I see the difference.
If we have a causal explanation of the mechanical function of something, that is the answer of how. If we explain it with neural activity, then it seems to me that the question is answered, of how the Conscious Experience happens from the pieces. What is left to be answered?

As with your eg of the Red Experience, hypothetically with the understood neural function, it does explain how.
What more is there to explain? Asking how, asks what function causes a result. Hypothetically, that would explain just that: the function which causes the result.

There is a Categorical difference between any kind of Neural Activity that you can talk about and the Experience of something like Red. — SteveKlinko

> The only categorical difference that I see, is degree of specificity. Neural activity is a more specific category involving details, where as experience is more general, involving less detail of the scientific process. This doesn't mean that the details of neural activity cannot explain the more general overall experiences.

I realize those are all types of neural activity. I'm not saying those, in themselves, explain consciousness. I'm saying those are some of the "puzzle pieces", and when fit together in the right combination, it is a decent potential explanation for consciousness.
Those common experiences are more like supporting evidence of the overall explanation of consciousness.

My overall explanation is not that finding more neural activity will magically explain consciousness. My explanation of consciousness, is that all the known neural activity can create consciousness, when in the correct combination. Which is why I refer to it as a puzzle. All the pieces are there, and known (at least sufficiently), they just have to be arranged correctly.

As for explaining how, a 1 line summary of my explanation (similar to what I think I've mentioned a few times), would be; memory access of a factor, simultaneously to memory access of the interaction (including relevant concepts) of that factor causes a conscious experience of that factor.

But that is a very basic, minimum requirement description. Here is a link (if this site allows links...) to a 1 page description, for more detail (which is still just a summary of much more detail)
http://livedlogic.blogspot.ca/2018/03/conscious-summarization.html

Sorry, I was unclear. I meant that common experience effects are additional "puzzle pieces", not really added to neural activity. Common experiences that involve neural activity, but the function of which, aren't necessarily completely understood or proven by neural activity.

Experiences such as memories triggering other memories, or compounds of memories creating memories of concepts, or categories of memories, or analyzing cause and effect, etc.

I dont mean; common or existing knowledge, which is regarding the overall function of consciousness. The theory is regarding overall consciousness yes, but the common knowledge I was referring to was more like basic concepts. The theory takes those basic concepts like puzzle pieces, and explains how they fit together.

I attempt to arrange the puzzle pieces of neural activity (+ common experience effects) to fill the explanatory gap. With the finished puzzle, the correlation & cause/ effect between neural activity and consciousness, is portrayed.

You say that if they really are both the same category in the first place then the problem is solved. Ok, but you offer no reason to think that they are the same category. You only just say they are. What's the reasoning? I still recognize two separate categories.. — SteveKlinko

>I said that they could be considered the same category. I don't mean that this statement proves the problem is solved. Actually, I would argue that category is not that relevant. The concept of a Category is vague, and I dont think really proves much. Lots of things can be considered in the same category, it just depends on the degree of specificity of the category label you use.

Science can explain the steps about how molecules in an egg become a baby. But you have not explained how more Neural Activity becomes a Conscious experience. You only say that it could. You offer no explanation of how it does. It seems more like a wish or a hope. — SteveKlinko

>I cant explain the precise molecular function of how neural activity creates a conscious experience, as I'm not a scientist. But can explain the more generalized logical logical process.
I believe I offered plenty of explanation of how neural activity creates conscious expeirence (and could link or paste more that I have tried to explain the overall concept).
Evidence supporting it, is common knowledge concepts, and the theory explains how the cause and effects of those concepts interacting with each other.

I dont claim it scientifically proven. I claim it's a theory, which should be considered, and tested for flaws and to see if it can be disproven, and potentially become scientifically proven. After a while now with this theory, I have yet to receive much of any reasoning at all suggesting it is incorrect.

Both the Red Experience and Neural Activity could be considered the same category of Memory Access. I suppose you could argue the red experience isn't necessarily memory access, but considering it's an "experience", it could also be argued that any experience is memory.

If my explanation is true, then the difference between the 2 categories, is that 1 is the cause, and 1 is the effect. Neural activity is the cause, and the Red Experience is the effect.

The visual screen embodied in front of your face, that you mention, is memory. Similar to taking a photo, then later accessing that photo. Its a coded recording of the image. Human memory just isn't nearly as precise as a computer, at accessing a particular memory.

An additional quantity of one category of thing, results in a different category, by cause and effect, since the extra quantity surpasses a point, which causes a new effect.

eg 1. a small quantity of water on the ground is moisture, but an additional quantity surpasses the point where the category becomes a puddle.
eg 2. a small quantity of various molecules in an egg + additional quantity = baby

Just because all these Neural things are happening does not even begin to explain the actual Experience of Red. — SteveKlinko

Why do you say that? Why shouldnt a complex combination of simultaneous memory access explain the experience?
I don't really see any reason to assume that the experience must be more than that.

The "experiencer" is the additional quantity of neural activity. The inter-workings of a complex combination of many smaller elements, creates something greater and more significant than the sum of the parts.

I think that concept is observed to occur in other situations in this universe, as combinations of smaller parts (potentially the way that virtually everything is constructed by smaller parts),
so why can't consciousness be the same?

That sounds like it all makes sense, and is a good comparison from computer to brain
.
My estimate of how the conscious Red experience is created by the neural patterns, is the relevant combination of neural patterns. This goes back to what I was trying to explain before I think; that it requires the neural function combination of accessing memories relative to Red.

For eg. When focusing on the Redness, you are likely mentally trying to comprehend the Redness. While attempting to comprehend it, you are accessing memories of concepts related to Red. You access memories or concepts such as: existence, significance, reason, cause and effect. These are all generalized conceptual terminology, saved as a memory. The concepts are based on memories of the meaning and function of them, which is based on memories of how the concepts can be applied to alternate variables.
When memories of these concepts, plus similar scenarios are accessed simultaneously, as a combination, this creates the conscious experience of Red.

You are also likely accessing memories of seeing the color and similar shades in past instances. These neural patterns of memories of red, match current incoming neural patterns of visual input (when you are actively looking at red).

If someone programmed a computer to access its memories in a similar combination, I would suspect it would be just as conscious of the Red Experience. (it would require quite a bit of relative memory data though)

the Conscious Experience of Red) has Redness as a Property, but Conscious Red Light does not have Wavelength as a Property. — SteveKlinko

So, if by definition, the property of "Redness" is only in the conscious experience, doesn't that mean, the property of Redness is just the neurological process? (assuming conscious experience is a neurological process).

The difference between Wavelength and Redness, is Redness is in the brain as an interpretation of the wavelength.
So, basically I would think Redness is just the coded version of the measurement of the Wavelength.

where does this Surrogate come from and how do we Experience it?

>Assuming the eyeball measures the wavelength and translates that measurement into information (as you mentioned, it's a surrogate), then the brain would send and store that information as neurological activity.
So Redness would be the coded information of the measurements of wavelengths.

Computers code information, save it, and access it later. I'm guessing the brain does a similar concept, but with a more efficient coding and saving process (and the additional function of accessing many bits of information simultaneously).

It is a little bizarre to think that everything we ever experience, is probably only information of measurements, which is coded and saved with neurons...

So I have a hunch that many animals on earth are conscious to some degree, it got me pondering how different it would feel to be one of those animals. — Dendu

>I dont think animals' "consciousness" is all that mysterious, since I think humans experience the same degree of consciousness every day. Humans also experience the higher level, as we often consider to be "consciousness", but throughout the day there's times when a person is not in that deeper degree. Any time you're not paying active mental attention, and you're not using working memory, then you are likely using subconscious reaction, just like animals do all day long.
Dreams are another state of subconsciousness, but with no sensory input to act on as stimulus, the brain goes to odd, less distinct, more abstract memories. But I think the experience of mental awareness is nearly the same in a dream, as animals while awake.

do you think its reasonable to think that consciousness also has a storage and that it too is passed on during reproduction? — Dendu

>I think consciousness functions by method of memory access, and I dont think memories can be passed on through reproduction. I think just instincts are passed on, which are generally constant persistent reactions, not adaptive reactions, such as subconscious or consciousness.

I think I understand what the question is asking. But my answer is still the same; it's just memory. Even when I concentrate on it, and it seems indescribable, I still comprehend the scientific reasoning behind that.

The brain is accessing the neurons which have saved the information about the wavelengths of light which reached the eyeball, when Red was recorded. It probably "feels" like something special and unique when you focus on it, because you are accessing memories of concepts relative to red, simultaneously to memories of the visual of red (wavelength information). This would also explain why Red does not seem significant, when it is seen or remembered, but not consciously thought about (no memory concepts accessed).

I think that is basically the only mystery about it. Same as all sensory data saved as memories.

How could you know that it exists only in the conscious mind though? It could potentially exist in a computer program (unless you would consider that a conscious mind). I dont believe it would with current day technology, but I suspect future general AI with perceive similar conscious states, including the experience of red

I don't know how the neural activity functions mechanically, if that's what you're asking. All I know is somehow neurons store memories as information, and when that neuron is accessed, the info of that memory is recalled.
But as far as I can theorize, based on these concepts, this process of accessing the recorded information, is all it takes to produce a conscious experience of anything (including Red), as long as it's the appropriate info and neurons which are being accessed simultaneously.
I don't see why there should be anything more to it.

>I mean it is the coordinated combination, that creates the experience.
If the neural activity of a memory is on its own, the memory doesn't do much for experience.
Or if the combination of neural activity is uncoordinated, and random or irrelevant, then the experience would be nonsense.
But when it's a coordinated combination of parts, the sum of those parts is a coordinated assembly.
The coordinated assembly, is the experience of Red.

1) Neural Activity for Red happens.
2) A Conscious Experience of Red happens.

How does 1 happening result in 2 happening? — SteveKlinko

> I think my explanation would still be basically the same, The neural activity for Red, causes a conscious experience, because of the combination of neural activity, which accesses memories relative to Red. This fills the Explanatory Gap, and would be the function causing the illusion of consciousness.
I'm trying to figure out, what doesn't work with this simple explanation?

Note to self: Don't assume silly things.
Anyway, my bad. Sorry about that. — Ying

>No problem. Everything is an assumption to some degree (or so I assume).

It's looking at phenomenological content on it's own, temporarily disregarding other issues like neurological substructures.

>Is the purpose of this, to focus on the ways that different aspects of phenomenology react with each other, or react with external factors? Basically taking the concepts of mind functions to a more generalized degree, since the specifics aren't proven?

We still have to pick our clothes in the morning, regardless of any kind of determinism. The same holds for breaking habits. You might not believe in will, but you're going to need it if you're going to quit smoking.

>But that which causes the result of picking clothes, would be dependent on determinism. And I think the implications are quite significant whether determined or not.
If determined the choice of clothes is based on:
Subconscious influences (positive or negative influences of memories related to the clothes being chosen),
+ Conscious consideration (working memory analyzing more detailed effects of the result of clothing chosen)
+ State of Mind (current emotions/mood influencing decision, and amount of each type of neural activity used)
=predetermined and predictable (if vast quantity of affecting variables were known)

Or if free will:
some factor is involved in the brain, causing the outcome of decision to be incalculable. This factor must be unknown to current math and science, and I would think would be an amazing discovery.

Basically, same concept for quitting smoking.

We have what might be called "apparent choice"

That sounds like an accurate label for what is currently known about it.

That choice is a phenomenological act, and as such, there's nothing "apparent" about it.

I'm confused why you say there's nothing apparent about a phenomenological act?
Isn't the idea behind phenomenology, to leave things unspecified, and so would indeed be "apparent", or seems to be a way but is uncertain?
It seems like from a phenomenological perspective, "choice" would be left to that specificity, of "apparent", whereas from a deterministic perspective, "choice" would be analysed for the scientific mechanical cause and effect.

The field of psychometrics.

>That sounds similar to what I mean, as I think that would be a way of measuring and predicting results of mind activity. But I'm more concerned with the neurological function of the brain, in relation to memory storage.

Did you read the link about bracketing? No? — Ying

>Yes, I did. Maybe I misunderstand something, but I gather bracketing is basically choosing to focus on the minds experience, not on the function of that which is bracketed.
So related to your statement: "Figure-ground is a phenomenological act, and that's all it needs to be, since the rest is "bracketed" out.",
do you mean figure-ground is just an experience, and we'll leave it at that?
If so, this is why I then mentioned: "But in the context here, of distinguishing and explaining consciousness...",
because I think the point, is to work out the function of the minds processes.

Figuring out how the mind operates on a phenomenological level doesn't imply ontological determinism in any way whatsoever. — Ying

>Explaining the mechanical function of the mind, implies determinism because if there is a scientific and measurable method which causes the mind to operate the way it does, then functions of the mind like choices, and decisions are predictable and determined.

So, since you insist on some form of determinism, you'll have to account for said "conscious decision" as being predetermined in some way or the other or risk being inconsistent in your views — Ying

>Yes, I thought that was the whole point of that part of the discussion.
Which is why I did theorize an account for the conscious decision, with the follow-up of that paragraph as here;
"If conscious viewing (such as rolling eyes); that's when the quantity and diversity of causes becomes very in depth and complex. But if you believe in determinism, then all conscious choices such as spinning your eyes, do have a rational calculable cause, even if its so complex, that we cant pin point it.

A basic (thought maybe incomplete) answer to your question might be: the instinct that is being fulfilled by spinning my eyes in that context, would be task accomplishment. The instinct of task accomplishment and motivation, was likely developed through evolution for individuals to attempt to accomplish something within a complex environment, therein causing them to be more likely to survive."

Counter: We still don't know how the brain operates specifically. — Ying

>This seems to only suggest that there is insufficient knowledge on the topic at this point, which is true, but doesn't really evidence against the evidence.

Free won't also is predetermined by as yet to be uncovered neurological structures — Ying

>This sounds like it involves part of the concept of consciousness. Free won't would be a result of conscious thought, which is unexplained, but the point of my initial post is to attempt to explain consciousness, and likely therein explain free wont.

Better to postpone judgment imho. So let's just bracket the issue and move on to phenomenology instead of running around in circles. — Ying

Is the point of this discussion not directly related to this? as the mechanical function of the mind, choice, and consciousness.

Consciousness could access all parts of mental activity and state, not just memory but also imagination, various emotions and inference for the future events too. — Corvus

>But what is imagination or inference, other than combining pieces of memories?
And what are emotions, other than triggers for memories?