You continue assuming that brain and mind are like two effects, that can "correlate" such as the increasing of educative and economical level. If you identify the two thing, we have not hard problem, only psychological problem. If you differentiate them, so conscience is "to know if you brain is or not lying you", that is, to differentiate reality from fiction, then the hard problem is the "transcendental" deduction problem. That is, following to Kant, we are conscience bears, but to be conscious and to know conscience are two different things. We can say that conscience is a condition of possibility of knowledge, in the sense that this requires a subject and its conscience to be produced. Then, we can not study conscience empirically because we presuppose it when try to know it. — Belter

So If I just say the Mind is the Brain that explains it all. Sorry it doesn't work for me. Even if Mind truly is the Brain then I would still need to know what the Conscious experience of Red is. What is the Red? Saying that the Red is Neurons is a Dodge with no explanation. The Red has to be explained.

I would still need to know what the Conscious experience of Red is. What is the Red? — SteveKlinko

I think that you are in a kind of conceptual vortex. "Red" is a color...

I think that you are in a kind of conceptual vortex. "Red" is a color... — Belter

You say "Red is a Color" dismissively as if saying that explains anything. Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind. We experience the Red and recognize it as a Category of Experience that we call Color. I want to know how we See the Red as well as all the other Colors. It is the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind. — SteveKlinko

I will try another way. How do you know that 1) "Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" is true; but 2) "a Conscious experience that exist in the Physical world" and "a Physical experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" are false?

We experience the Red and recognize it as a Category of Experience that we call Color — SteveKlinko

There are several problems with Hard Problem. Another more is that we do not experience the Red as red (the Redness) but something as red. An object (real or fictional) can have the property of being viewed as red; in the same way that it has the property of being eaten by a black hole. The difference between another properties is that these kind of them needs another object to be corroborated empirically (an observer and a black hole respectively).
We call color to a property of objects, but not mental states. The properties of mental states could be "conscious", "vivid", etc., which would be a kind of "categories of experience".

So, you can say "What is that I am viewing?" "A red tomato"; "How are you viewed it?" "Very vividly". "With that are you viewing it?" "With my visual system (eyes->visual cortex)", and so.

I will try another way. How do you know that 1) "Red is a Conscious experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" is true; but 2) "a Conscious experience that exist in the Physical world" and "a Physical experience that exists in the Conscious Mind" are false? — Belter

If Red is a Physical World thing then what is it made out of? Is it made out of Energy? Is it made out of Matter? Is it some aspect of Space? Science does not know what it is. But we do know It exists as a Conscious experience. You can not explain it to anybody using Physical World language. It exists as a thing in itself that must be Explained. Nobody can answer question 2 because nobody knows what Consciousness is. We only know that it Exists.

There are several problems with Hard Problem. Another more is that we do not experience the Red as red (the Redness) but something as red. An object (real or fictional) can have the property of being viewed as red; in the same way that it has the property of being eaten by a black hole. The difference between another properties is that these kind of them needs another object to be corroborated empirically (an observer and a black hole respectively).
We call color to a property of objects, but not mental states. The properties of mental states could be "conscious", "vivid", etc., which would be a kind of "categories of experience". — Belter

Don't think about Objects think about the Red itself apart from any Object. Think about the Red experience. Objects are not Red. Objects can reflect Red Physical Light. But the Physical Red Light does not even have the property of Redness. The Redness is a conversion that the Brain does to let you Detect the Red Physical Light. What we See is the Conscious Surrogate for the Physical Red Light. We never actually See Physical Red Light. Physical Red Light doesn't look like anything. Physical Red light has the Property of Wavelength. Conscious Red Light has the Property of Redness.

So, you can say "What is that I am viewing?" "A red tomato"; "How are you viewed it?" "Very vividly". "With that are you viewing it?" "With my visual system (eyes->visual cortex)", and so. — Belter

See previous post.

Physical Red light has the Property of Wavelength. Conscious Red Light has the Property of Redness. — SteveKlinko

The property of redness is said to all that we call "red", both if it is real or fictional light. I follow the semantic rule of predicating a property of the thing that has it.

Another way of accounting conscience is the following: conscience is the vividness or "resolution" of mental states. It would be a property of mental states, different to redness, which is of objects. When I finish a summary of hard problem I will post here. Thank you for your responses.

because my brain is dying yet my self remains far more intact than most people assume — MiloL

> How do you know your "self" remains intact, compared to your brain?

I suggest that this position is a consequence of a; pleasing, tempting, fashionable, contemporary and entirely materialist bias. — Marcus de Brun

> This could be true, but it is also the most logical position, as I explained. So thinking that consciousness is not brain activity, may be just as bias toward an alternate explanation.

All you just said is that it is Complicated and involves Memory and some kind of Interpretations. Maybe this is all true but there is no explanation in what you say. — SteveKlinko

> I tried to give a general explanation that it is complicated, but the key is that its a combination of relevant parts. The explanation of function was in earlier posts, with more specific details, but you still ask "how", and I'm not sure what else there is to explain.
As much as I think about the Redness of Red, I still think it is explained by a combination of memory access.
So I guess we're at a stand-still anyway...

I suggest that this position is a consequence of a; pleasing, tempting, fashionable, contemporary and entirely materialist bias.
— Marcus de Brun
> This could be true, but it is also the most logical position, as I explained. So thinking that consciousness is not brain activity, may be just as bias toward an alternate explanation. — Tyler

If we consider that 'bias' is the process of adopting a view that is outside of or in contradiction of the evidence presented, and that bias can generally be considered to be a view that serves an ulterior motive outside of the facts; my position cannot be construed as containing a bias as my view strictly accords with the agreed facts (ie there is no material evidence for the endogenous manufacture of human thought/consciousness). My position is also your position, unless you have some evidence to contradict my view, you can only contract that view upon the basis of an assumption, or negation of fact (BIAS)

My view does not contain any assumptions of fact other than the given truth that thought itself exists (this has not been refuted) . To suggest that this thought is contingent upon material process is THE contention that contains bias as it adds to the existent fact that 'thought exists' with the additional entirely unproven assumption that thought is emergent from or contingent upon material processes. All of this amounts to nothing more than self serving assumption and lies outside of the facts.

Why the passion for self serving delusion?

To assert that my refutation of the agreed position that there is as yet no evidence for the silly presumption of an emergent or contingent basis for thought is not bias, it is an assertion of an agreed fact. Bias lies only in the negation of fact in favor of unfounded or unproven assumption. To assert that one is bias because one identifies bias and disagrees with the presumptive nature of that bias borders upon the ridiculous.

The property of redness is said to all that we call "red", both if it is real or fictional light. I follow the semantic rule of predicating a property of the thing that has it. — Belter

Then you will agree that Physical Red Light does not in fact have a Property of Redness. It is the Conscious Light in the Mind that has Redness as a Property. The Thing that has Redness is not the Physical Red Light Thing it is only the Conscious Thing.

Another way of accounting conscience is the following: conscience is the vividness or "resolution" of mental states. It would be a property of mental states, different to redness, which is of objects. When I finish a summary of hard problem I will post here. Thank you for your responses — Belter

I think I understand what you are saying, I'll look for your summary. I also thank you for the discussion.

> I tried to give a general explanation that it is complicated, but the key is that its a combination of relevant parts. The explanation of function was in earlier posts, with more specific details, but you still ask "how", and I'm not sure what else there is to explain.
As much as I think about the Redness of Red, I still think it is explained by a combination of memory access.
So I guess we're at a stand-still anyway... — Tyler

But how can something like the experience of Red come from Memory Access? Memory Access is Neural Activity and other chemical changes in the Neurons. The experience of Red is a whole other Category of Phenomenon. I have given it my best shot and I agree that we are at a stand-still.

I summarize as I understand the relations between brain, mind a conscience. We start with brain, which is an object of nature (the phenomena to explain, like “specie” for example in the theory of evolution). You can open a head and you will find a brain, which is not questionable. How is that brain exists? Now is when the concept of mind appears. Brain appeared as a biological response to the advantage that thinking has. You can elude predators, moving to food, light, etc. So from an evolutionary (biological) account, mind explains why some organisms have a brain. Moreover, in our model of mind, we differentiate conscious and unconscious mind states. I think, following to Llinás (I of the vortex) that brain could solve the problem of mind by the space (some areas are specialized in certain mental functions, such as emotions, memory, reasoning, etc.) and the consciousness problem by time. That is, when different areas are firing we have mind, but if also they are firing simultaneously, we have a conscious mind state. A higher frequency fits more "vivid" mind states, such as some drugs cause. Also if many areas are synchronized, the experience is more "detailed" o "complex". This is in my view the picture of a scientific philosophy of mind.

Seems like a logical view. But I still need to know what Red is.

Red is how individuals see certain objects when they are lighted. This is a psychological fact. You are which must prove that the scientific view of colors is wrong. The Chalmers' argument in my view only proves that fantasy is very persuasive.

Red is how individuals see certain objects when they are lighted. This is a psychological fact. You are which must prove that the scientific view of colors is wrong. The Chalmers' argument in my view only proves that fantasy is very persuasive. — Belter

I can See Red while dreaming. No objects are being lighted there.

In previous responses I said that you can see objective and subjective red objects. You seem to want misunderstanding me.
Anyway, even when you imagine a red tomato, you need to see it with "imagined" light. Are you able to imagine a red thing in a dark scenario? You are only questioning "What is red?", "What is Red"? like a colorblind. Sorry, but it is not interesting for me.

In previous responses I said that you can see objective and subjective red objects. You seem to want misunderstanding me.
Anyway, even when you imagine a red tomato, you need to see it with "imagined" light. Are you able to imagine a red thing in a dark scenario? You are only questioning "What is red?", "What is Red"? like a colorblind. Sorry, but it is not interesting for me. — Belter

Unfortunate that you can not appreciate the question: What is Red? To me it is a pivotal question. It is not the only question but you have to start somewhere. I like to stick with trying to understand what seems like a simple thing (Redness) but when you consider it long enough you see the mystery of it. If we could understand what Red is we would understand an aspect of Consciousness itself. Remember that Red only exists in the Conscious Mind.

my position cannot be construed as containing a bias as my view strictly accords with the agreed facts (ie there is no material evidence for the endogenous manufacture of human thought/consciousness). My position is also your position, unless you have some evidence to contradict my view — Marcus de Brun

> Do you mean agreed facts are that there's no evidence that consciousness is related to brain activity?
If so, I don't agree to that, as I believe there is lots of evidence that thought processes correlate with brain activity. I did provide suggestive evidence of this, which you didnt seem to refute.
Here is what I stated on page 4:
["Assuming by "consciousness", we mean the awareness and comprehensive perception, the evidence is that brain activity has proven to be directly correlated with being awake, thinking, remembering, and interpreting sensory input. Consciousness involves these concepts as well."]

All of this amounts to nothing more than self serving assumption and lies outside of the facts. — Marcus de Brun

> How does the assumption that consciousness is caused by brain activity, serve oneself?
The amount of evidence of the relation between thought processes and brain activity seems quite significant. I find it hard to see your perspective, that there is no evidence. Basically all of neuroscience is supporting evidence that thought is directly correlated with brain activity.

But how can something like the experience of Red come from Memory Access? — SteveKlinko

> Basically, the same way that emotions, or dreams, or mindful images/ sounds can come from memory access. The experience of Red is just perhaps a more complex combination of such memory access.

But how can something like the experience of Red come from Memory Access? — SteveKlinko> Basically, the same way that emotions, or dreams, or mindful images/ sounds can come from memory access. The experience of Red is just perhaps a more complex combination of such memory access. — Tyler

No doubt that Neural Activity seems to happen when a Red Experience happens, but how can any kind of Neural Activity result in that Experience? Memory Access is just a type of Neural Activity. Scientists have known that there was a Correlation between Neural Activity and Conscious experience for a hundred years. The knowledge that certain types of Neural Activity happen when the Red experience happens is the Easy Problem of Consciousness.

Scientists can only say there is a Correlation between Neural Activity and the Red experience. Scientists have no idea how Neural Activity causes or results in the Red experience. Scientists don't actually even know what the Experience of Red is. They also don't even know what the Experiencer is, that is having the Experience. Scientist do not know what they themselves are. Scientists do not yet have a method for studying the Experience or the Experiencer. Scientists understandably then mostly ignore the Experience and the Experiencer. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

It is periodically a good thing to refresh what this thread is about. See http://TheInterMind.com for the full presentation of the Inter Mind Model.

Just by saying that Something is perceiving the Image, to me, means that the Something is Conscious of the Image. With all Conscious Sensory experience there is an implied Observer. Understanding what the Observer is, of course, is the Hardest part of the Hard problem of Consciousness. Ironic since we are the Observers. — SteveKlinko

When visual input enters the brain, it goes from the eyes, to the thalamus, which is the most wired part of the brain. The thalamus is located in the center of the brain and is the brain's main CPU and switching unit. The signal crosses in the thalamus and then goes to the visual cortex in the back of the brain.

Besides this forward current, a secondary current is induced that goes in the opposite direction; Thalamus-cortical loops. These go from the thalamus, toward the front of the brain, into the frontal lobe. Seeing generates two connected currents. The forward flow allows us to see the object, the counter current flow triggers memory and imagination for context.

If we saw something that was brand new the dual current is still in affect. However, there may not be a direct memory context for what I see. However, since we have others memories in storage, the counter loop will attempt to create context using that memory.

When westerners first saw the platypus, it was described in the context of other animals we know. It was not originally described in terms of it own unique look. This comes with time. The thalamus will assemble something. The inner self is connected to the thalamus.

The inner self is connected to the thalamus. — wellwisher

We speculate that the Conscious Mind is connected to the Physical Mind (the Brain) in some way. If the inner Self is connected to the Thalamus then the real question is how? There must be some other Mind component or mechanism that provides this connection. This is what I call the Inter Mind.

Scientists have no idea how Neural Activity causes or results in the Red experience. Scientists don't actually even know what the Experience of Red is. They also don't even know what the Experiencer is, that is having the Experience. Scientist do not know what they themselves are. Scientists do not yet have a method for studying the Experience or the Experiencer. Scientists understandably then mostly ignore the Experience and the Experiencer. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

It is? It looks to me like the Hard Problem of (misapplied) science. For good reasons (that we don't really want to investigate here), science reduces humans to impartial observers, or ignores them altogether. This makes it difficult or impossible to come up with a scientific way of studying humans as active participants (in the world), instead of impartial observers. The success of science is (for me) beyond challenge, but it is not a tool that fits every problem, and this is one of the ones it doesn't fit.

These matters can be investigated, but it looks to me like we need to use considered, structured, thought to do it. No theories, no falsifiable hypotheses (and so forth), just careful consideration. It's what we have. We must use it, or we have nothing.

> Do you mean agreed facts are that there's no evidence that consciousness is related to brain activity?
If so, I don't agree to that, as I believe there is lots of evidence that thought processes correlate with brain activity. I did provide suggestive evidence of this, which you didnt seem to refute. — Tyler

The issue at hand is your presumption that brain activity is the cause and consciousness the effect.

There are two flaws with this logic both of which serve the contemporary bias of 'self' construction. This is a bias that we have yet to evolve out of, and indeed it takes a degree of courage to do so and this courage is not commonplace. The first flaw is the extension that is applied to the word 'correlation' as you use it. Indeed there may well be a correlation between brain activity and consciousness, but this in no way implies the euphemistic application of correlation with the notion 'cause'. The contemporary paradigm would have us believe that consciousness is indeed correlated with brain activity, yet there is no evidence to suggest that it is caused. All attempts to apply causation of consciousness to brain activity have failed. Yet the paradigm persists out of a rather homocentric if not egocentric love for the delusion of self.

I might just as easily assert that brain activity is in fact caused by consciousness, and indeed despite the unpalatable nature of the assertion, it resolves the paradox with greater ease than might its self serving inverse.

The second flaw is in the very notion of cause and effect itself, this relationship has already been sufficiently undermined by Hume.