So your saying the psychological agency of figure-ground is a phenomenological act, because it's an act in the mind relevant to the way we experience the world right?
And your saying determinism is irrelevant to figure-ground?
But in the context here, of distinguishing and explaining consciousness. If the functions of the mind, including figure-ground, are worked out, that is evidence for determinism and against any unexplained agency.
Determinism seems pretty relevant to consciousness, if there is a functional explanation for it.

By Vivid Image I'm talking about the immediate present moment when you are looking at something.. I'm not talking about trying to remember the Image of something after the fact. — SteveKlinko

>Yes, I realize you mean the present moment, but I'm questioning what function in the mind defines your intended meaning of vividness.
Hence my mention: "Or, if by "perceive" and "vivid image", you mean simply storing the image as a memory, then that seems like an overly simple method for consciousness, as even computers perform this function."

We can certainly see new Objects we have never seen before in our Physical Reality so there is no reason to think that we would not be able to see the Objects injected by a Virtual Reality no matter how strange they might be. — SteveKlinko

I don't doubt we could see new things, I doubt the mental vividness of new things if we have 0 comprehension of what we are seeing. If you mean visually vivid, then perhaps it would still be vivid with no comprehension, as long as you have clear vision. But it seems quite likely that conscious vividness of viewing, involves more than just visual sensory input and data storage (as memory) of an image.

Look. Can you spin your eyes in a circle? Congratulations, you just employed your psychological agency. Otherwise, do tell what instinct is fulfilled by eye spinning. — Ying

>Spinning eyes in a circle would be a "conscious decision", but I was referring to subconscious or instinctual action (as I specified "without attentive direct"), because I thought that is what your point was about gaze shift etc.. When you mentioned gaze shifting, was your point, that it occurs without conscious thought, or with?

If non-conscious gaze shift; objects would grab attention according to relevance, based on instinct and subconscious order of priority of what is important to notice.
If conscious viewing (such as rolling eyes); that's when the quantity and diversity of causes becomes very in depth and complex. But if you believe in determinism, then all conscious choices such as spinning your eyes, do have a rational calculable cause, even if its so complex, that we cant pin point it.

A basic (thought maybe incomplete) answer to your question might be: the instinct that is being fulfilled by spinning my eyes in that context, would be task accomplishment. The instinct of task accomplishment and motivation, was likely developed through evolution for individuals to attempt to accomplish something within a complex environment, therein causing them to be more likely to survive.

I'm guessing you dont believe in determinism, since you seem to believe we have free agency?
Earlier today, I happen to have watched this 10 min video about such concepts, which I'd recommend: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCGtkDzELAI&list=PLMdCqdiXqqRxnFCY4AuUCiPRBwChmYFmV&index=7&t=2s

It's possible to make a conscious effort to bypass the visual cortex (object identification) in favor of a faster response time. — Ying

>This is interesting. So, basically we consciously choose to bypass conscious activity...

Just by saying that Something is perceiving the Image, to me, means that the Something is Conscious of the Image. — SteveKlinko

>But what do you mean by perceiving? I think this is coming back to my same question of what you mean by a vivid image. These both relate to the basic question; what is the required function to be conscious of something?
If by "perceive" and "vivid image", you mean mentally comprehend the scenario involved, then the required function would be that mental comprehension. This is basically my theory, that mental comprehension (and therein memories of concepts) is required for consciousness. This is the mechanical function.

Or, if by "perceive" and "vivid image", you mean simply storing the image as a memory, then that seems like an overly simple method for consciousness, as even computers perform this function.

But directing Attention to a Conscious Object in your Visual Image is different than Knowledge and Memories about that Object. — SteveKlinko

>I think I would argue just the contrary, that they are not different, but the same, and that knowledge and memories of an object, are the mechanical function of directing conscious attention.

I think you can have Vivid Images without any Knowledge or Memories of an Object. — SteveKlinko

>But if you had no knowledge of the object or its setting or environment (so you had no comprehension of any aspect of an image you were seeing (for eg. woke up in a virtual reality world, where nothing that you sense is familiar)), then would you have a consciously vivid image or perception of any object within the environment?
Also, would the image be visually vivid before your brain stores the new sensory input as memories, then begins to theoretically, actively access those memories, at the same time that you continue to view the image?

one would be describing a hypothetical as opposed to a phenomenological — Ying

>But I was describing the phenomenological mind in the 2nd half of that paragraph, here:
"Or, if you mean psyche is not physically divisible to allow the whole to still function; I think this is not necessarily true either, since some categorized functions could be removed, and there would still be the overall whole of the psyche"

Ever notice how you are constantly shifting this gaze by paying attention to different objects? Yeah, that's not just a peculiarity of your eyes. — Ying

>Yes, gaze and focus shift without attentive direct, but wouldn't that be explained by triggers in the brain guiding reaction (as a result of evolution)? Just as any automatic reaction by preset triggers in animals, which we call instinct. Instinct, or subconscious (if more prevalent) reaction, as I explained, by feedback triggers.

Only if you ignore all other mental faculties present, as I stated already. — Ying

>Are you referring to your 1st paragraph? If so, I thought that paragraph was describing the "phyche"? Which I think you described as being the larger whole, therein including those extra aspects of mental faculties.
Whereas you specified consciousness "as the acting agent in the center", so potentially not including extra mental faculty.

If all extra mental components are to be considered part of consciousness, it seems unlikely they are a minimum basic requirement. Since, similar to my earlier argument, the whole can exist with those components removed.

Its not really divisible into it's supposed subcomponents since it forms a unified whole... But these aren't really divided. All are constants in my awareness. I can focus, causing certain phenomena to become highlighted, but this doesn't mean that the rest isn't there. — Ying

> I think I understand what you mean, that all the components are combined and constantly a part of the entire structure. But I dont think that means the parts can't be divisible, since as long as there is a constant distinguishable function, shared between certain components, they could be virtually divided in theory, by categorization. Or, if you mean psyche is not physically divisible to allow the whole to still function; I think this is not necessarily true either, since some categorized functions could be removed, and there would still be the overall whole of the psyche (unless your definition of psyche includes every single component). For eg, someone with a dysfunction, that does not have 1 specific component (perhaps sense of smell), would likely still be considered to have their psyche.

-Interesting categorization of memories

The mind isn't just a passive operator. Directing our attention is a fundamental part of our consciousness (through figure-ground in sensory perception and through modulation of consciousness thresholds when it comes to the other phenomenological regions). As such, our own agency plays an equally important part in how we see and interact with the world. — Ying

> Is what you describe here, basically the concept of free will?
So do you believe there is a part of the psyche which is unexplained (and phenomenal as you mentioned), which guides the direction of memories which are being accessed during consciousness?
I would suggest that this concept is a bit of an illusion (kind of like consciousness as a whole). As far as I can understand, the driver of attention within consciousness is similar, if not the same as the driver of subconscious action (such that animals act on). Basically just emotions, which are feedback triggers linked to memories (episodic?) to determine which action to take, or which alternate memory to access.
The difference with human consciousness, would be that we can access much more memories, and more specific aspects of memories, making that which is triggered, less distinct and predicatable.
If this is correct, then granted, feedback triggers are likely a required variable for the sum of consciousness.
But, including guiding-triggers as part of the method, consciousness would still be: but a method of memory access, wouldn't it?

If it is still a Vivid Image then I think you are Conscious of it. I think we can have Vivid Images of all kinds of things that we have never seen before. We would never be able to be Conscious of new things with that theory. I think the Conscious experience and the Comprehension are two different and separate things. — SteveKlinko

> If an image is photographically vivid, you think that means whatever is perceiving that image, is conscious of it?
Or if it's mentally vivid, then yeah, I'd agree that the individual is conscious of it, by definition...
But in order for an image to be mentally vivid, the individual should need comprehension of the scenario involved with the image. If no comprehension of scenario, than I would think it would not be mentally vivid. As humans, we can see images throughout the day, but if you're not paying attention, then you're not comprehending the scenario, and the image is not mentally vivid. You dont even notice what you saw...
The only way we would never be conscious of new things, is if we had no comprehension of the new image.

I don't see that there is an explanation for the Vivid Image that you Experience for the Squirrel. If you lost all your memories about Squirrels you would still see the Squirrel just as Vividly. — SteveKlinko

>By "Vivid Image", do you mean just the photographic picture of the squirrel, or comprehended overall image of the conceptual idea of the existence of the squirrel?
If all memories of squirrels and concepts relative to to squirrels were lost, I think you would still see the physical picture of the squirrel (vividity of this just, depends on eyesight and resolution), but it would mean nothing to you conceptually. I think it would be like a current day computer receiving a video of the squirrel. It could save the images in memory, but there would be no consciousness of the squirrel, with a lack of comprehension.

If someone defines it that way then ok. But we really only Detect Physical >Light we never really See it. We always only See our internal CL. — SteveKlinko

Fair enough.

I disagree. I think I am fully experiencing the Conscious Light that makes up the scene I am looking at. This is true if I am Awake or Dreaming. — SteveKlinko

>I think I get what you mean, that the light in your mind seems the same. But I think the difference between dreaming and awake remembering, is not in how the CL (though, I would call it NL) appears, but the additional processes in mind which are occurring. Just that you are more aware of the whole concept (of seeing CL) which is occurring, while awake, than while dreaming (I think this lack of additional mind process, is why people mostly cannot remember dreams).
Would you agree that you are more "conscious" of something that you're remembering while awake, than while dreaming of it?
Similar to the previous eg of a human consciously experiencing something, compared to an animal.

Yes that happens but how does all the Neural Activity produce the end product of a Conscious experience?"
-"I still don't understand how any kind Neural Activity can create the Experience of Red. You are saying: Neural Activity happens and obviously a Conscious experience happens. It isn't obvious to me how the Conscious experience happens. — SteveKlinko

>The neural activity produces conscious experience because the neural activity causes memories to simultaneously come to the mind of the person.
So, that which is being remembered all at once, by the person, is; [the object or concept, that the person is being conscious of] + [aspects of how that object or concept interact with its environment (or in this world)].

I'll try making into an equation:
CE = MA (FA + IF)
CE = Conscious Experience
MA = Memory Access
FA = Factor
IF = Interactions of Factor

For eg. Bob is conscious of a squirrel on his lawn.
FA = squirrel,
IF = concepts saved in memory of how that squirrel relates to this world.
CE (in Bobs mind) = MA (FA [the squirrel itself] + IF [Many concepts which are relative to the squirrel, including: being an animal, living on Earth, being alive, having a mind, the lawn which it is on, its behavior, its motivations, its senses, the weather elements affecting it, etc.]

This actually just made it more graspable for myself...
When Bob has memories of all those relative concepts, in his mind, at the same time, this combination of memories creates the Conscious Experience.
Does that sound like it makes sense?

Seeing CL does not require the eyes to be involved. The CL we See while dreaming certainly has nothing to do with Physical Light or eye function. — SteveKlinko

That is likely true, if your definition of "seeing" the light includes that which occurs while dreaming. I'd consider dreaming to be a process of memory (just like remembering seeing light, while awake), so I think its debatable whether or not to consider the process of remembering light, as "seeing" light. I think my point remains, if someone defines "seeing" PL, as light hitting the eyeball, then by definition, we do see light. That's seeing light, in general, but I would agree, if you specify "Conscious light", then it is not the PL hitting the eye, it is a process in the mind

I never say it is a certainty. I only propose that there could be a separate CSp that the CM exists in. — SteveKlinko

I "see" (ha ha). That's fair, as a possibility. Just a technical misunderstanding, as you stated "but it is certainly a different realm or reality".

but the functionality of the Inter Mind must then be discovered to exist in Neural Activity and it must be explained as to how this happens. — SteveKlinko

True. And, I believe I have an explanation, as I had posted separately, called "Consciousness as Memory Access". Summed up, basically conscious experience is created by; neurons accessing memories of any given thing, at the same time as neurons accessing memories of concepts of the interaction (cause and effect) of that same thing. I just dont really know what more to do with my theory, ha ha.

But you are still experiencing CL aren't you? — SteveKlinko

I would think no, while dreaming, but yes, while awake and remembering it. Because you mentioned that your definition of the "conscious" part of CL, is being aware. I would say someone is not consciously aware of anything while dreaming (except to some degree perhaps, in the rare case of lucid dreams), so therefore not experiencing conscious light.

Don't you think an Animal that has color vision can experience the Color Red just like we do? I think that they do. I think they have Conscious Minds just like we do. They're just not as smart. I'll do a diversion here to talk about Pain. Animals seem to feel the full and total Agony of the Pain just like we do. Pain is a Conscious experience. If an Animal feels Pain then why not the experience of Red? — SteveKlinko

I think an animal does experience red just as a human, if the human is not consciously thinking about the red. Based on my theory, if a human accesses memories of the interaction of red, then they are being conscious of the red. I believe animals (mostly) do not execute this function of accessing memories of the interaction of red, and therefore do not experience red to the same degree, as humans.
I think animals have a minimally conscious (sub-conscious) mind, compared to humans. I think this is why they are not nearly as smart as humans. I think conscious memory access of cause and effect of any given thing, is what causes humans to be so much smarter. I think there is a direct correlation between degree of intelligence and consciousness.
Pain is virtually the same concept as red. I would not consider an animal to be consciously aware of pain while they experience it. Humans can consciously experience pain, if they consciously think about the occurrence of the pain. Consider this, if you ignore, or become distracted from pain, it is not nearly as bad as if you pay attention to it. Because you are not being conscious of it, by not firing neurons to parts of the brain relative to pain.

How does that Memory (It's just Neural Activity) produce the experience of the Red? How does coded information in the Brain lead to an experience of Red? That is the Explanatory Gap of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko

The conscious experience of red (or anything) is by means of a combination of simultaneous memories being accessed. The specialty of humans, is being able to dissect memories, and access all the individual components of memories, required to understand the interaction or cause and effect of something. If a person accesses the different components (saved as memory code) which are relative to "red" or "pain" or perhaps "self-existence", then they obtain a conscious experience of that thing or concept.


.

We have never seen the PL only the CL that is correlated to the NL — SteveKlinko

I think that argument depends heavily or the definition of "see". If the definition of "seeing" includes the eyeballs receiving the physical light, then we do see light.

In talking about CSp it is assumed that it is not a space like our physical three dimensional world but it is certainly a different realm or reality. — SteveKlinko

How do you come to the conclusion that this is a certainty?
I think it is more simple than the model you have shown. I think the PM and CM are the same, and the physical occurrence in the brain of neurons firing is the CM.
I think there is no need for the IM. In order for the NL to cause CL, the CM just needs to send neurons to alternate memories which are relative to the NL. The CL is created using the NL in combination with related memories of light. The correct combination of neurons firing to memories, is what creates a conscious experience of anything.

You could say that Dreams are made out of CL. If it's not CL then what is it? — SteveKlinko

I think you're nearly correct that dreams are made of CL, although it depends on your definition of "conscious" within the term "CL". I think it may be more accurately NL, since there is no conscious comprehension (if that is included in the definition of the C within CL) required of the light, for the NL to be saved as a memory, then stimulated later during sleep.

But how does the NL in the PM get converted to CL that the CM can use? — SteveKlinko

Now that I think about it, a lot of this may depend on your definition of the (C)onscious part of these terms. Do you mean conscious as in; mentally aware of (which we assume mostly only humans accomplish)? or as in; awake (which any animal accomplishes)?
If you mean simply awake, then I would think the NL just needs to be saved as a memory. Then the mind can access that memory later.

how does Neural Activity produce the Conscious Red experience? — SteveKlinko

By memory. As the PL hits the eye and the information is coded into NL, the PM stores that coded information. Then later, the conscious red experience is produced by accessing that coded information again. Since, as you mentioned, the light is never physically in the mind, the initial experience of light is received only as the coded information. So accessing that same information (which is stored in the PM) later as a memory, should be nearly the same as experiencing it in the first place. Both occurrences are just coded information in the brain.

In other words you have no evidence. — charleton

With a lack of rational comprehension by the one interpreting it, then no evidence.

How convenient for you!!! LOL — charleton

Yes, proving you wrong is convenient, thanks.

Since you have not supported this with any evidence whatever — charleton

The evidence is the rationality of the explanation and the function of the process. Quite a bit of explanation, and I could post a link to a lot more if preferred.

its a bit rich trying to pretend that the arguments that have been offered to you already are unreasonable. — charleton

I was addressing your comment of, "Nonetheless..." which seems to insinuate; regardless of the previous reasoning.
But, if including your previous argument, I wouldn't necessarily say it is unreasonable, but I gave reasoning why it would rationally not be a valid argument. As I mentioned, amnesia patients wouldn't be reason against consciousness being a function of memory access. It seems pretty logical that any amnesia patient would have to have some memories to be able to operate as a conscious human. If they are truly void of any memories, they would have no ability to comprehend anything whatsoever, which would fall well short of the definition of consciousness.

Your suggestion is prima facie absurd since there are no memories without the sense experience to collect them in the first place. A foetus can have no memories, and can only begin to form them by the active sensation of the world in which it thrives.
Consciousness must precede memory — charleton

The method of obtaining memories is irrelevant, if there is a process which causes consciousness, that involves the use of the memories -without use of the method of receiving them. Just because there is a certain process which occurs prior to another process, doesn't disprove the following process.
True, sensory input seems to be the only method humans obtain memories, but that doesn't mean that particular function of obtaining memories, is required for consciousness. It is possible that input function is required for consciousness, but an alternate possibility doesn't disprove the other.

The only way I see that your example could prove consciousness precedes memory, is if a fetus has consciousness, before it acquires memories. Considering consciousness is a state of awareness and comprehension, it seems quite unlikely that a fetus has consciousness.

Nonetheless, pretending that consciousness is nothing more than memory access is absurd. — charleton

Ok, but why? Part of the point I posted this, is to get feedback of reasoning or supporting evidence that I'm incorrect, as I haven't come up with much for counter-evidence so far. I explained reasoning that it could make sense, so you can say its absurd, but by what reasoning is it absurd?

consciousness would likely still arise, though it would remain completely empty. When awake, I think there would be some sort of awareness of existence, kind of like the state of 'empty mind' one achieves when meditating — CasKev

I would not consider that state, to fit the common meaning of the term consciousness. True, it would have the capability of having consciousness, but without information for the brain, there's nothing to be aware of. Perhaps similar to a state of meditation and empty-mindedness (though, I think there would still be subconscious brain activity), or in a deep dreamless sleep, I think I would not consider those states to be conscious states.


What is experience, other than memories?

You have no warrant to conclude this. — charleton

That (plus the rest of the sentence) is only a theoretical conclusion warranted by rational interpretation of observations, stated for the potential of counter-evidence.

Since and existence with no sensation is impossible, sensory input is an indelible part of consciousness. — charleton

How is this counter evidence to what you quoted ("to be conscious of any given factor, the memory system just needs to access memory of the factor")? Are you saying that, since sensory input is required for consciousness, then sensory input must also be part of the definition of being conscious?
If so, I disagree, since only the information involved should be required to be conscious. Yes, humans use the method of sensory input to receive the information, but that doesn't mean senses are the only possible method for gaining information. Information could potentially be directly downloaded (such as with a computer).

It is, however possible to live with a complete lack of any memory. In rare cases of profound amnesia, consciousness persists with no reference to memories — charleton

Interesting, and this would be counter-evidence to consciousness being memory access, but I doubt the amnesia is a complete lack of memories. I suspect they still have long term memories from before the amnesia started, which allows all the requirements of memory data. If they did not have memories of language -they could not speak, or if no memories of what any object (clothing, door, utensils etc.) is -they would not know how to use it. If they had a complete lack of any memory, they would be in a continuous infant-like mental state.

Imagine a child born without any sensation. What would they be conscious or? Nothing. — charleton

I think I agree that a child born with no senses, would not be conscious. So sensory input is required at some point, to provide information for the brain to be conscious of. But, my point was that, "continuous" input is not required. It may be difficult to prove, but based on the prospect that we can be conscious by function of mental processes, using only memories which were created by senses that we do not have active input from at the time of being conscious.

We have proprioperception, hunger, and a range of other senses way beyond the classical Big Five. — charleton

True, but it seems likely those additional senses don't play a role in causing the person to be consciously aware in their mind, of their existence relative to the world. Someone in sensory deprivation could still access -to some degree- many memories which were recorded by the main senses, which are at the time deprived. Therefore, they are using past sensory input to be conscious, without current or continuous sensory input.

What do you mean.? — charleton

By "factor", I mean basically any information, whether 1 unit, or a constructed compound of information. Basically a very generalized term for anything which a person or computer can have saved as memory.
By "interaction of that factor", I mean the relative cause and effect of that factor.
This is how I describe the most basic form of the concept of being "conscious".
So, to be conscious of any given factor, the memory system just needs to access memory of the factor, simultaneously to accessing memory of the cause and effect of that factor. This, I believe computers do not do typically.

Thanks, glad to have found this.
Interesting that infants don't identify as a separate entity, but I would think that is because they are incapable of identifying or perceiving anything at all, with a lack brain function to comprehend concepts as complex as that. I would think that the differentiation as an individual, is not so much the means to self-consciousness, but more a requirement of the definition. I would think the means are whatever causes the perceived differentiation of self and other.

Are other creatures capable of learning conscious in the same way then? Or is there something more to humans that allow us to have that capability — Sydasis

I believe the difference between animals and humans is basically the ease of access of memories. Animals using subconscious reaction, access much fewer memories based on sensory input. With humans ability to access memories easier, we can then access memories of cause and effect of any given factor. So basically, whatever function (quantity of neorons or synapse connection?) in the brain causes our ease of increased memory access, is what I believe makes the difference.

Last I heard, it takes 40 hours of supercompute cycles to simulate a minute of brain activity. — Sydasis

Wow, pretty intense. I would assume that is equivalent to a human brain which has average activity while conscious. But, I wonder if a much smaller portion of human brain activity could be replicated, such as an instant freeze frame of someones brain activity. Or a single memory, though i'd assume we dont know the human brain well enough to calculate which parts of the brain relate to which memories.

I get my own semantics on this issue confused at times. Self awareness, consciousness, and the ability for active thought. — Sydasis

I can understand that. Considering consciousness is ill explained or commonly understood, this makes the definition very vague, causing a much higher degree of variation of anyone's perspective of what the term means.

If I put my hand on the stove, my hand is moved quickly, perhaps even before I realize it has moved — Sydasis

Interesting, but wouldnt that be a result of instinct bypassing consciousness? I imagine instinct as preset triggers built in to the individual, which cause X reaction to Y sensory input. In the eg of touching something hot, X= move hand away to Y= pain, which is preset triggers built in to virtually any human. I suspect this is what causes the latency, since instinct would react faster than consciousness (being the slowest brain activity). So, I think preset reaction triggers bypassing consciousness might be the only way that latency would occur.

also continuous sensory input too, not just internal access of brain states. — charleton

Why do you assume continuous sensory input is required? I think any human could still be conscious for some time (even if minimal), with complete sensory deprival. As long as they are still accessing memories of concepts involved in their own existence relative to their surrounding.

This, however, is not a full explanation since a computer can also have inputs and also access memory. — charleton

I think the difference is that computers do not access memories of factors simultaneously to the interaction of that factor. I guess my theory is that it would be relatively easy to make a computer conscious of any given factor. But to be generally conscious of its own relative existence, would be a bit more complex...

Information doesn't comprehend. Mind comprehends information and uses it — Rich

Yes, I agree the mind comprehends info, and I think that's how I have it worded, as in this sentence: "virtually any information can be comprehended", it is implied that the mind is that which comprehends the info.

The arrangement of these neurons can be represented with just data — Sydasis

I think that makes sense, that it could all be represented by data. Do you think that would mean the data could be generated in a computer to simulate consciousness, without imitating the infrastructure of a brain? Perhaps a mimic of consciousness could be computed with only code. Though I suspect it would take a lot of code.

It is a meshed loop of outputs feeding into inputs — Sydasis

Would that be basically the method of function for one memory to trigger another related memory, and at times circle back and trigger the same memory?

As the components of each system flow from cluster of neurons to cluster or neurons, perhaps simultaneously at times, the illusion of a singular time line and singular consciousness is established — Sydasis

That sounds like nearly the function of consciousness as I believe it. If the neurons in the clusters are accessing memories relative and relevant to each other, including memories of concepts and the function of factors within the concepts, then the mind perceives consciousness of those concepts.

what happens when you take away the inputs to such a system and replace it with something unnaturally void? — Sydasis

You get dreams, perhaps. Sleeping is a lack of sensory and memory input, and without active stimulation for memories, the brain defaults to memories which have most recently been accessed. Although, I suppose by "system", you may have been referring to conscious data system? Where dreams are subconscious, but then again, your neural networks you mentioned, are quite likely also not conscious. Maybe the weird results you've found, are similar in some way to dreams?

This term, consciousness, represents an idea we claim to have, but an idea does not mean we are truly conscious. Having an idea does not imply consciousness, does it? My cat has lots of clever ideas, like the idea of pissing on my pillow when I went on vacation for a week. — Sydasis

I disagree. I think the idea which is represented by the term "consciousness" does in fact imply consciousness. Since the only definition and intended meaning by the term "consciousness", is that idea. The only thing that the term really refers to is that idea, which we have of what it means.
Your cat may be a clever one for pissing on your pillow, ha ha, but the idea of a cat, functions differently or to a significantly differing degree, than the idea we have of consciousness.

even run part of it from the moon and the other part here, and yet we will still perceive things as singular — Sydasis

very interesting point. Reminds me of something I have been wondering; what is the degree of connection required, between the differing data units which are being accessed, for the system to remain 1 overall memory system? would the minimum required connection be an electrical current perhaps?

Cutting away at this digital brain, how much is needed before we then qualify the system as no longer conscious? — Sydasis

I would say, once you cut away enough that the system can no longer simultaneously access memory data of any unit of the data, and memory of the reaction of that datum (in any circumstances). Though, that is my most basic estimate of parameters required to be conscious of only 1 piece of information. The more generalized term of being conscious, requires memory access to specific concepts, of the existence of the memory system itself, I think.