The evidence is the rationality of the explanation and the function of the process. Quite a bit of explanation, and I could post a link to a lot more if preferred.Since you have not supported this with any evidence whatever — charleton
I was addressing your comment of, "Nonetheless..." which seems to insinuate; regardless of the previous reasoning.its a bit rich trying to pretend that the arguments that have been offered to you already are unreasonable. — charleton
The method of obtaining memories is irrelevant, if there is a process which causes consciousness, that involves the use of the memories -without use of the method of receiving them. Just because there is a certain process which occurs prior to another process, doesn't disprove the following process.Your suggestion is prima facie absurd since there are no memories without the sense experience to collect them in the first place. A foetus can have no memories, and can only begin to form them by the active sensation of the world in which it thrives.
Consciousness must precede memory — charleton
Is consciousness nothing more than a particular method of memory access? — Tyler
Its not really divisible into it's supposed subcomponents since it forms a unified whole... But these aren't really divided. All are constants in my awareness. I can focus, causing certain phenomena to become highlighted, but this doesn't mean that the rest isn't there. — Ying
The mind isn't just a passive operator. Directing our attention is a fundamental part of our consciousness (through figure-ground in sensory perception and through modulation of consciousness thresholds when it comes to the other phenomenological regions). As such, our own agency plays an equally important part in how we see and interact with the world. — Ying
I think I understand what you mean, that all the components are combined and constantly a part of the entire structure. But I dont think that means the parts can't be divisible, since as long as there is a constant distinguishable function, shared between certain components, they could be virtually divided in theory, by categorization. — Tyler
Is what you describe here, basically the concept of free will?
But, including guiding-triggers as part of the method, consciousness would still be: but a method of memory access, wouldn't it?
one would be describing a hypothetical as opposed to a phenomenological — Ying
Ever notice how you are constantly shifting this gaze by paying attention to different objects? Yeah, that's not just a peculiarity of your eyes. — Ying
Only if you ignore all other mental faculties present, as I stated already. — Ying
>But I was describing the phenomenological mind in the 2nd half of that paragraph, here:
"Or, if you mean psyche is not physically divisible to allow the whole to still function; I think this is not necessarily true either, since some categorized functions could be removed, and there would still be the overall whole of the psyche" — Tyler
Yes, gaze and focus shift without attentive direct, but wouldn't that be explained by triggers in the brain guiding reaction (as a result of evolution)? Just as any automatic reaction by preset triggers in animals, which we call instinct. Instinct, or subconscious (if more prevalent) reaction, as I explained, by feedback triggers.
Look. Can you spin your eyes in a circle? Congratulations, you just employed your psychological agency. Otherwise, do tell what instinct is fulfilled by eye spinning. — Ying
It's possible to make a conscious effort to bypass the visual cortex (object identification) in favor of a faster response time. — Ying
That's one of the issues I postpone judgment on since I'm not particularly interested in running around in a philosophical cul de sac.'m guessing you dont believe in determinism, since you seem to believe we have free agency? — Tyler
>But what is imagination or inference, other than combining pieces of memories?Consciousness could access all parts of mental activity and state, not just memory but also imagination, various emotions and inference for the future events too. — Corvus
So your saying the psychological agency of figure-ground is a phenomenological act, because it's an act in the mind relevant to the way we experience the world right?
And your saying determinism is irrelevant to figure-ground? — Tyler
But in the context here, of distinguishing and explaining consciousness. If the functions of the mind, including figure-ground, are worked out, that is evidence for determinism and against any unexplained agency.
Spinning eyes in a circle would be a "conscious decision", but I was referring to subconscious or instinctual action (as I specified "without attentive direct"), because I thought that is what your point was about gaze shift etc.. When you mentioned gaze shifting, was your point, that it occurs without conscious thought, or with?
>Yes, I did. Maybe I misunderstand something, but I gather bracketing is basically choosing to focus on the minds experience, not on the function of that which is bracketed.Did you read the link about bracketing? No? — Ying
>Explaining the mechanical function of the mind, implies determinism because if there is a scientific and measurable method which causes the mind to operate the way it does, then functions of the mind like choices, and decisions are predictable and determined.Figuring out how the mind operates on a phenomenological level doesn't imply ontological determinism in any way whatsoever. — Ying
>Yes, I thought that was the whole point of that part of the discussion.So, since you insist on some form of determinism, you'll have to account for said "conscious decision" as being predetermined in some way or the other or risk being inconsistent in your views — Ying
>This seems to only suggest that there is insufficient knowledge on the topic at this point, which is true, but doesn't really evidence against the evidence.Counter: We still don't know how the brain operates specifically. — Ying
>This sounds like it involves part of the concept of consciousness. Free won't would be a result of conscious thought, which is unexplained, but the point of my initial post is to attempt to explain consciousness, and likely therein explain free wont.Free won't also is predetermined by as yet to be uncovered neurological structures — Ying
Is the point of this discussion not directly related to this? as the mechanical function of the mind, choice, and consciousness.Better to postpone judgment imho. So let's just bracket the issue and move on to phenomenology instead of running around in circles. — Ying
>Yes, I did. — Tyler
do you mean figure-ground is just an experience, and we'll leave it at that?
Explaining the mechanical function of the mind, implies determinism because if there is a scientific and measurable method which causes the mind to operate the way it does, then functions of the mind like choices, and decisions are predictable and determined.
>No problem. Everything is an assumption to some degree (or so I assume).Note to self: Don't assume silly things.
Anyway, my bad. Sorry about that. — Ying
>Is the purpose of this, to focus on the ways that different aspects of phenomenology react with each other, or react with external factors? Basically taking the concepts of mind functions to a more generalized degree, since the specifics aren't proven?It's looking at phenomenological content on it's own, temporarily disregarding other issues like neurological substructures.
>But that which causes the result of picking clothes, would be dependent on determinism. And I think the implications are quite significant whether determined or not.We still have to pick our clothes in the morning, regardless of any kind of determinism. The same holds for breaking habits. You might not believe in will, but you're going to need it if you're going to quit smoking.
That sounds like an accurate label for what is currently known about it.We have what might be called "apparent choice"
I'm confused why you say there's nothing apparent about a phenomenological act?That choice is a phenomenological act, and as such, there's nothing "apparent" about it.
>That sounds similar to what I mean, as I think that would be a way of measuring and predicting results of mind activity. But I'm more concerned with the neurological function of the brain, in relation to memory storage.The field of psychometrics.
>No problem. Everything is an assumption to some degree (or so I assume). — Tyler
In it's base, it's a fundamentally different stance on the question "what is the mind"? Instead of starting at concepts, phenomenology proposes that we start at our everyday, daily experience of ourselves. You can do the same thing with the question "what is life?" Instead of focusing on concepts, you focus on the sequence of ones everyday, mundane experiences. The same holds for how it's used in gestalt psychology. Perception for instance is studied as it's own thing, with it's own phenomenological properties, as a mental function. Considerations about non phenomenological entities don't figure into such accounts. They don't need to after all, since the mind functions as a unified whole.>Is the purpose of this, to focus on the ways that different aspects of phenomenology react with each other, or react with external factors? Basically taking the concepts of mind functions to a more generalized degree, since the specifics aren't proven?
I'm confused why you say there's nothing apparent about a phenomenological act?
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