To be lazy, Chomsky.

(Y)

You mean the reference of the event she is thinking about and the reference of her utterance? — Pierre-Normand

Say she was talking about his murder and subsequently said "his death" in a way that it was clear to her listeners that she meant his murder. I'm suggesting that the words themselves only have meaning in use, so the case could only be settled by looking to use.

Maybe you could answer this. Did Wittgenstein accept that reference can be determined? Was the point of meaning is use to show that in many cases there is no reference?

But what if somebody meant his murder by "his death?" Wouldn't the reference be the same in that case?

Well I haven't read the thread, it's progressed far to fast for me, but I think we've hit the nail on the head. "Language as use" provides us with no approach to this cool thing about speech which has to due with freedom and limitation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? Surely there is at least one interpretation of Wittgenstein that allows first person data about the experience of speaking.

Wittgensteinian "rule-following" is acting in a way which may be observed as being in accordance with some descriptive, inductive principles, which determine right and wrong, i.e., acting like the others. — Metaphysician Undercover

But don't you agree that sometimes there's value in asking if a statement is informative? To me that's a marker for ordinary language use vs unnecessary philosophical shenanigans (and sometimes other forms of bullshit.)

In the Wittgensteinian sense, it is impossible that one who is following the rule is acting wrongly, — Metaphysician Undercover

Right and wrong is just settled via success in communication, right?

Gives relatable form to the chaos of your experiences. Brings to the surface meaning that already resides in the understanding. A prompting to see what is already on some level known. — Wosret

Precipitates... like rain from a cloud. That's what poetry does. It precipitates.

So Wittgenstein leaves us with no approach to the "desire to say something meaningful". — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't trying to explain what Wittgenstein leaves us with. I was pointing out something cool about speech that has to do with freedom and limitation.

"Storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it." --H. Arendt

What does she mean by "reveals meaning?"

Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation - all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life." — StreetlightX

Cavell should suspend his terror over this considering that his knowledge of the mechanics of human language is as limited as anyone else's. It's a fruitful topic among scientists studying human origin. At this point, that science is a collection of speculations. Why on earth would Cavell imagine that he's gone further?

Yes. I appreciate that point. I spontaneously noticed this some years back: start talking with no conscious end in mind. At some point you may notice the effect of the desire to say something meaningful. That desire produces limitation that didn't appear to be there when you first started talking. The closer you get to the end of the sentence, the fewer options you have

if you want
to continue
being
meaningful
in
your
speech.

So here we aren't talking about rules. We aren't talking about the genesis of rules. We're talking about rule-following (limitation.)

Yeah, but the really important point is not only that we must observe how language is used among living human beings, but equally that meaning in language is nonetheless not tethered to these actually-existing-practises. — StreetlightX

But I don't think even logical positivists thought that. On the other hand, I think it's only by an artificial analysis that we can separate the source of normativity from the rules themselves. In practice, it's an evolving, organic whole.

Nope, I mean that conventions as such - if by this we mean already-established uses of language - are quite literally irrelevant to Wittgenstein's account of meaning. Or, as I said, what is at stake is 'conventionalizability' and not conventions — StreetlightX

I believe I understand what you're saying. Witt wanted us to observe how language is used among living humans in order to grasp how words come to have meaning.

An example would be when the Normans invaded England. The whole community began to speak in a kind of baby-talk (English as it is today is a result of that.) Thinking of that community struggling to communicate, the thing that really drives the establishment of rules comes into view. It's part of what it means to be human.

Sure, but it is vitally important that the notion of use in a language game is made categorically distinct from 'conventional use'. To conflate the two is render Wittgenstein unintelligible. — StreetlightX

If you mean he wasn't talking about any particular set of conventions, I think that's clear. Since he encouraged the philosopher to observe word usage, he appears to have been pointing directly at convention as the reason for wording choices (as opposed to ability of language to represent.)

Mm, the 'use' in 'meaning-as-use' has never referred to 'conventional use' but 'use in a language game' — StreetlightX

Unique, unconventional language use happens, but for the most part, language games utilize convention.

Secondly, the concept of language-games points at the rule-governed character of language. This does not entail strict and definite systems of rules for each and every language-game, but points to the conventional nature of this sort of human activity. — SEP Wittgenstein

I think the answer to my question is yes. The US should be irrelevant. If it's not it's because some gruesome threat is on the scene from within or without said nation.

Trump: Making America irrelevant. — Banno

Isn't that a preferable no matter who the president is?

Right. (that is, they are not numerically identical) — Fafner

If they aren't identical, then what's the difference between them?

Don't answer. I'm giving up. What we might have eventually discussed was how truth figures in a scene where sentences are the truth-bearer. It's not pretty.

Again no, what is identical is not the token but the type to which they belong. — Fafner

Obviously tokens are not identical. Last try:

You utter A. (here we see your token of the type A)

I utter A. (here we see my token of the type A)

The tokens are not identical. Right?

I'm only pointing out that this is a natural use of "the same". Don't you use and understand sentences such as "me and my brother have the same hair color" (e.g. blonde) outside philosophy? I'm surprised that I even need to explain this.

And no, the point of type identity is not to refer to a particular car (as I said it is not the same as numerical identity), but to say that the relevant cars belong to the same group or types of cars (and the type is not a car itself). — Fafner

So you utter A

I utter A

If A is a type, then there must be a token aspect to the situation. Your A (your token) is different in some way from my A (my token).

What's the difference?

OK. Anyway.. you're wrong about the type/token thing. Read more Soames.

Yeah, that's exactly my point. If propositions don't have semantic content then they don't have a semantics period (because this is what "semantics" means - a theory which assigns contents to signs). — Fafner

OK. I don't know how this fits in to the conversation. Lost track, I guess.

You have to distinguish between two senses of "the same". On one sense, indeed we don't have the same car (our cars are not numerically or token identical), but on another sense we do - say if our cars are of the same brand and model (they belong to the same type). This distinction should not be very controversial unless you are some sort of extreme nominalist (are you?) — Fafner

What is a brand such that millions can own the same one? Does it have physical wheels?

Another point about propositions: propositions are usually postulated in order to explain the semantic content of sentences. However, if you treat proposition as themselves having semantic content, then the question would arise, what is their semantic content? Another proposition? — Fafner

I'm unfamiliar with propositions being spoken of as having semantic content. They are semantic content.

You could just say "content" instead of "proposition" and get along just fine.

No, I was argueing the opposite. On the type/token distinction if you say 'cats fly' and I say 'cats fly' then we have uttered the same sentence (type), which is perfectly consistent with saying that sentences are physical entities. — Fafner

I don't think so. You have a car. I have a car. We do not have the same car (type.) We have the same type of transportation.

You utter A. I utter A.
A=A
Your utterance is not equivalent to my utterance.

A sentence is not identical to the sounds or marks that are used to express that sentence.

Since nobody claims that abstract propositions have symbolic meaning then they don't have a semantics by definition (it is fine to say that they are identical with semantic content, but it is not the same as saying that they have semantic content - it's a rather pedantic point, but this is what philosophers mean by "semantics", so it is better to follow their use in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding). — Fafner

Semantics is the study of meaning. Propositions are all about meaning.

I don't know, maybe, but this wasn't his main philosophical concern when he discussed rules. — Fafner

What was his main concern when he discussed rule following?

ou are talking here about the distinction between sentence token and sentence type, and I don't see why this should contradict what I said (that they are physical entities). We can after all talk about physical entities as particulars (a cloud) or as being a type/kind to which particulars belong ("being a cloud"). If your argument were right then it would prove that physical objects don't exist... — Fafner

You utter sentence A. I utter sentence A. We uttered the same sentence.

If this was a type/token situation, then you uttered your sentence and I uttered mine. We didn't utter the same sentence. Is that what you're arguing?

What I wanted to say is that this is not the same as saying that propositions have a semantics like sentences. — Fafner

A proposition is semantic content. What do you mean they don't have semantics?

And I don't agree at all that Witt' was "laying out rules" (whatever that means). — Fafner

Witt agreed that rule-following is a prominent part of communication, didn't he?

Then what else could it be...? — Fafner

Whatever it is, it's not physical sounds or marks. You should be able to get that intuitionally by noticing that you and I can utter the same sentence. Two utterances (physical sounds or marks), one sentence.

There's an argument that buttons it up tight if your intuition fails you :) A sentence is a particular pattern of words.

Do you agree that they are abstract entities? — Fafner

Definitely. So?

Obviously yes, his whole Language of Thought theory is about syntax. — Fafner

If he's laying out rules, then he's not saying something Witt would disagree with, is he?

So we are concerned with the meaning of sentence as physical signs, — Fafner

A sentence isn't a physical sign.

since propositions (on the standard view at least of propositions as abstract entities) don't have any semantics because they are not composed of signs. — Fafner

A proposition is semantic content.

I can give plenty of examples. — Fafner

Isn't Fodor talking about rules?

whereas most philosophers would say that you need an additional rule, for example a rule which specifies for each case (when the leaves are painted, the leaves are glowing in the dark and so on) whether the sentence is true or false in advance. — Fafner

Putting aside for a moment which philosophers believe that, here you are explicitly using sentences as truth-bearers instead of propositions. Why are you making that choice?

So the dispute is about whether you can describe language algorithmically, such that the meaning of every expression would completely determine in advance what you should say on each occasion. — Fafner

That's contrary to common sense, so the philosophers who adhere to that view have some explaining to do. You wouldn't say the majority of philosophers have made this blunder would you?

No he doesn't, he just says that rules are not enough for meaning, or better - that applying a rule is always a matter of exercising a special sort of capacity which is not itself determined by antecedent rules (which I think is also Wittgenstein's point). — Fafner

Then Travis is like most philosophers who

believe that whenever the meaning of a sentence seems to be context dependent, then that sentence must contain some semantic 'parameter' that fixes in advance how any context of utterance can and cannot contribute to its meaning. — Fafner

The parameter in question is simply that the sentence follows the rules (leeway given for creativity).

So the question is: why should we think of Wittgenstein's views as extraordinary?

most philosophers believe that whenever the meaning of a sentence seem to be context dependent, then that sentence must contain some semantic 'parameter' that fixes in advance how any context of utterance can and cannot contribute to its meaning. — Fafner

Does Travis deny that rule-following is an aspect of communication?

The example you've given would be a good way to explain what a proposition is. It doesn't really prove semantic externalism, though (not a hard version of it anyway.) But maybe you didn't intend it that way.

I don't think the traditional view is that we never have to look to context to understand what's meant.

I'd say the main thing is always explanatory power: does the theory make sense of our collective intuitions? does it clarify murky cases? does it include what it should and exclude what it should? The opposites of those (and whatever else goes in there) are bad. — Srap Tasmaner

That's cool. Could you give an example of the type of thing you want to explain?

I'm not usually too impressed by explanatory power. Explanations come and go. Each has some power, I suppose. I'm more drawn to a geometric approach. Pretend I'm an eliminative materialist. What would I have to conclude about the presuppositions of communication? What would I say about content?

What's the opposite of being eliminative? What would I see if I stood in that position? To make a square out of it, what view partakes of both of the above opposites (there should be two of them to make a square)?

In regard to those questions, it's common to be interested in building an argument up to the answer dictated by one's ontology. You said you don't have any ontology. So how do you want to answer the questions: logically? By observing people from afar? By observing the events of your own mind?

That's right on top of intensional definition. Two utterances have the same extension, but the extension alone is not adequate to convey the thought.

Also Soames presents an awesome argument for why we can't dispense with propositions (a sort of netherworld object) without denying that there is such a thing as agreement. It's in Understanding Truth.

"Mind-independent" is not a phrase I have any use for, I think. — Srap Tasmaner

OK. "Mental object" is what math people call the "idea" Frege speaks of. That's as opposed to "abstract object" which I suppose is his "sense."

I was just discussing the meaning of enlightened with another poster. It's a case where we can go back and forth between a and the sense. There are a lot of different kinds of Buddhism with wildly different doctrines. Among a particular community, we could identify the sense agreed upon. Yet that sense is a sense among many that are out there (and over time.)

If you say that's how people use the word in your language community, I'll just have to trust that. In that case, I'd guess there's never been a reasonable claim of enlightenment among your crowd. So... does anybody actually use that word in your community?

In my community, enlightened means something like, having gained wisdom or knowledge, light being an obvious metaphor (I see!). "They had an unenlightened approach to healthcare." They obviously didn't know that.

As you probably know, in religious terminology, "enlightened" is a word from Christian mysticism, used to translate a Buddhist concept. My understanding is that the real Buddhist word literally translates to "awakened." So it makes sense that they would have picked "enlightened." The Chinese likewise used Taoist words to translate Buddhism.

Notice the same paradox surrounds the handle of the previous poster.

The opposite of enlightened is something like deluded

What does it mean if a person claims to be deluded? 'Course if I say I'm not deluded... that's just the type of thing you'd expect a deluded person to say.

If by "third-person" you mean public, then I think yes. — Srap Tasmaner

Or maybe you meant mind-independent. The reflection of the moon in the mirror is there whether anybody's looking or not.

There are various ways of formulating contextualism and some of them conflict with compositionality. I can't imagine giving up compositionality. I don't even know what the alternative would be. — Srap Tasmaner

I think I was arguing against compositionality. The parts, to the extent that they have meaning, gain that meaning from their place in the whole.

I'm not sure what this means. — Srap Tasmaner

I meant how some form of platonism fits with your overall ontology. Dualist? Monist? Both?

It's not the object referred to but still objective. — Srap Tasmaner

Objective? Third-person data as opposed to first-person data?

That would be a version of Frege's context principle. It can get a little weird. — Srap Tasmaner

Weird how?

but there's something there that has to be taken seriously. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know if you've really taken it seriously unless you've pondered how it fits into the bigger picture.