This is why the words in the proposition "should I stay or should I go" are sequential. First one asks "should I stay" and then at a later time one asks "should I go". — RussellA

Speaking is a physical act, and that requires a choice to say one or the other first, as I said. However, the fact that they cannot both be said by the person at the same time does not imply that the person cannot have both ideas within one's mind at the same time.

Clearly people multitask, so they are thinking different ideas at the same time, required to do a number of different things at the same time, even though they cannot say everything that they are doing, all at the same time. S o why can they not have contradictory ideas at the same time?

The fact that people have many different ideas in their minds at the same time (required for multitasking) demonstrates that the subject matter of your criticism is just a limitation on the physical capacity of speaking, not a limitation on the capacity of thinking. How do you account for a person having many different ideas, in one's memory, all at the same time, which one cannot all say at the same time? Not being able to say everything which one has in one's memory, all at the same time, does not imply that the person doesn't have all those ideas in one's memory, all at the same time.

If Determinism is the case, and determines all our thoughts and actions, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined. — RussellA

Sure, you can state irrelevant conditionals, just like I can say that if I was not born yet, I would not be writing this right now, but such conditionals are not relevant to reality.

The question was, how does introspection reveal to you that determinism is the case, and free will is an illusion. Your if/then statement reveals nothing more than "if I was not born yet I would not be writing this right now" reveals. How do I get from this to believing that I was not born yet? And how do you get from your if/then statement to believing that determinism is the case?

This is what you are saying: it was determined since the beginning, thus I have no control. That's false. What's true is that if it was determined since the beginning, it's probable that the acts that follow are the determined ones. — Barkon

In this form of determinism, how do you account for acts which fall outside of being probable, the acts that occur which were not probable? These would not be deterministic, and there would be a whole lot of acts which follow from each improbable act, all not determined from the beginning.

Cons-creative, itself, must have a cause, and therefore is not the first cause.

Are you positing cons_creative as the first cause? — ucarr

No, like I said, it's the cause of cons-reactive, not necessarily the first cause. This makes the rest of your post seem irrelevant

Therefore, free will only applies if I choose between picking up the cup of coffee and not picking up the cup of coffee at 1pm exactly. — RussellA

This is a faulty argument because your designated time of "1pm" is completely arbitrary, and not representative of the true nature of time. As indicated by the relativity of simultaneity a precise designation of "what time it is", is frame of reference dependent.

But this means that at 1pm I have two contradictory ideas in my mind at exactly the same time. But this is impossible, meaning that free will cannot be a valid theory.

I have seen evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas consecutively, but I have never seen any evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

As I explained in my last post, having two contradictory ideas at the same time is exactly what deliberation consists of. "Should I stay or should I go". The Clash, a fitting name.

"Critical thinking", and philosophy in general, is all about comparing contradictory ideas. A philosopher holds these contradictory ideas within one's mind, at the same time. It is the judgement, the choice to act on one or the other, consequently the physical action itself, that results from the judgement, which cannot be both. Furthermore, denying that people can hold contradictory ideas at the same time, denies the reality of much human misunderstanding.

The problem here, is that you are treating a human subject as if one is a material object, to which the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle), apply. This is a mistake of sophistry which Aristotle keenly exposed, and he demonstrated the misunderstanding which this sophistry propagates, thousands of years ago. The reality, as shown by Aristotle, is that if we adhere to the three fundamental laws of logic in cases involving human decisions, sophists can logically prove absurdities. The "sea battle tomorrow" is his famous example, of why the fundamental laws cannot be applied to subjects. In more recent times, C.S. Peirce has done considerable work on this issue.

You have described a world where things obey the laws of nature, but I don't see where you have explained why things obey the laws of nature. — RussellA

Why would I even try to do that? What I explained, is that some people use "laws of nature" to explain why things behave in a consistent way, describable by the laws of physics. This is a sort of governance, similar to the governance of "God". What's the point to even asking why matter obeys God, if you do not even believe that matter obeys God. That would be a ridiculous question to ask. You'd be asking why does Y follow X, when you do not even believe that Y does follow X. Any one who tried to answer you would be engaged in an exercise in futility.

I thought free will referred to our being free to have whatever thoughts we wanted — RussellA

Free will is the ability to choose freely.

I agree that a person can have two contradictory thoughts consecutively, but it would be impossible for a person to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously. — RussellA

Do you agree, that by the special theory of relativity, event A could be prior to event B from one frame of reference, and posterior from another frame of reference? Since a human being is composed of many different parts, moving in many different ways, many different frames of reference are available within one human body. Therefore your stipulation of "contemporaneously" is completely unwarranted, and nothing but an arbitrary, fictional condition, imposed for the sake of your argument, when it's not a truthful representation of reality in any way.

How do you know that we are free to choose?

How do you know that we don't live in a causally determined world, where our actions have been causally determined? — RussellA

I know that I am free to choose, from introspection, analysis of my own experience.

Here's a simple experiment you can try yourself, in the comfort of your own home. Hold a small, soft object in your fingers, extended at arms length, and decide that you will drop it at some random time in the near future. Hold it for a short time, and notice that you can decide to drop it at any random time, without any causal influence, just a freely willed choice to let it go.

Unlike a pool table, where, once in motion, the balls can only end up in one exact arrangement, due to the laws of physics. — Patterner

However, someone can at any moment, reach in and stop the balls from moving in that predetermined way. And this demonstrates that free will has superiority over determinism, a phenomenon known as "the hand of God", which renders "miracles" as other than impossible.

Grab them by the pussy and see if they let him force himself on them, while the peanut gallery enjoys vicariously.

No. Suppose a person has the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

On the one hand, assuming free will, a person can have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee. On the other hand, assuming there is no free will, a person can also have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Having an idea is nether evidence for or against free will. — RussellA

I don't see how this is relevant.

My point has been that I don't accept that a law of nature precedes an event and makes things act the way they do. — RussellA

Then you do not accept my explanation.

At 1pm a person has the thought to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Free will means that at 1pm that person could equally have had the thought not to reach out for the cup of coffee. — RussellA

Free will is not about the thoughts, it concerns the acts.

It is not possible to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously, both to reach out and not reach out. — RussellA

Yes it is possible, and your example demonstrates this. The person, at 1Pm, entertains both, the thought of reaching out for a coffee, and the thought of not reaching out for a coffee. That's what choice and deliberation is all about, having contradictory thoughts at the same time. From this condition, a choice is made. And because it is possible for the person to choose either of the two contradictory ways of acting, we conclude that the will is free. It is not forced by any cause, in one direction or another. There is a cause of the act, which is the will itself, but the will is not caused to choose one or the other.

It seems that if free will is equally free to act on the thought of reaching out rather than not reaching out, then it is equally free to act of the thought of not reaching out as rather than reaching out. — RussellA

Right, doesn't your own personal experience demonstrate the truth of free will to you? You are equally free to reach out for the coffee, or to not reach out for the coffee. You are free to choose.

I don't believe in particular that thoughts can cause themselves, and I don't believe in general in spontaneous self-causation.

One reason for my disbelief in spontaneous self-causation is that it is something I have never observed.

When I see a billiard ball on a billiard table start to move for no reason at all, then I may change my mind. — RussellA

Haven't you seen parts of your body start to move without being acted on by an external force? If the "reason" for movement is an immaterial "idea", then this is evidence of free will. Isn't it?

Law of nature has more than one meaning. — RussellA

I was the one who used "law of nature", and I gave you the explanation of the sense in which I was using it. It makes no sense for you to say that you want me to have been using it in a different way, because that would better support what you belief in.

One of the reasons I don't believe in free will is that it requires self-causation, where the thought one has is contemporaneous with the decision to have the thought. — RussellA

The concept of "free will" does not involve self-causation. I don't see where you get that idea from. Thoughts are the property of a being with free will, just like arms and legs are. We do not decide to have thoughts, just like we do not decide to have arms and legs, but this doesn't mean that we do not also have a free will.

When you talk about the conflict between cons_creative and cons_reactive, you invoke an implication there is something that cons distorts when one of the modes is embedded in the other mode. This distortion implies something causal to cons that cons, in its effort to perceive it, distorts. This causal something seems to be Kant's noumenal realm. — ucarr

What is distorted when cons-creative is embedded within cons-reactive, is cons-creative. This is because that embedding is a fundamental misunderstanding which requires a distortion, of cons-creative, to allow for that model. The "something causal" is cons-creative itself, and attempting to understand cons-creative as embedded within cons-reactive is a misunderstanding because it fails to recognize the priority of cons-creative, and the fact that cons-reactive is a creation of con-creative.

My main premise in our dialogue says that Russell's Paradox shows how logically there can be no unified and local totality. I infer from your argument you posit cons in the position of first cause. In the context of our dialogue, this looks like a version of panpsychism, since you think cons exists at the level of elementary particles. Although this seems to be an argument for cons as first cause, Russell's Paradox, by my argument, forestalls cons (and everything else) as first cause; it shows that logically there is no first cause. — ucarr

It only produces the conclusion of "panpsychism" through equivocation between less-restrictive definitions, and more-restrictive definitions. This problem, I pointed out earlier. That is also the base of Russel's paradox, equivocation of "set". In one sense, "set" means a collection of objects, in another sense, "set" means a defined type. The latter sense allows for an empty set, the former sense does not.

A man might imagine the problem of getting through a rough mountain pass is solved by human flight over the mountain range. This act of imagination, however, will go nowhere if it's not eventually supported by facts, science and engineering. Can you show how facts, science and engineering support free will and immaterial soul? — ucarr

I told you how free will is supported. All you did was insist that free will may be an illusion. I invited you to take a look at the support and explain how it is possible to apprehend free will as an illusion. I'm still waiting for that.

Introspection
If a person has free will, through introspection they are free to reject the idea that they have free will, and conclude that they live in a deterministic world.

If a person has no free will, during introspection, it may have been pre-determined that they accept the idea that they have free will.

Introspection is no guide as to whether free will is an illusion or not. — RussellA

The issue is not "whether free will is an illusion or not". It is whether the person believes in free will or not. If you can demonstrate to me how introspection revealed to you that free will is an illusion, and you live in a deterministic world, and how this introspective perspective inclined you to believe that free will is an illusion, I will listen to you. Perhaps I misunderstood my introspection which inclined me to believe that free will is true.

It depends what you mean by "Law of Nature", because it has two possible interpretations. — RussellA

That is why I have been very explicit in explaining to you the meaning which I intended, and I even quoted a reference.

Possible meaning two is the reason why an object at rest will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force — RussellA

This is not a possible meaning for Newton's first law. It would be a misinterpretation, a misunderstanding. No "reason why" is given for that law, it is stated as a descriptive fact, just like "the sky is blue" states a descriptive fact. And to interpret "the sky is blue" as giving a reason why the sky is blue would be a misunderstanding of what is stated, just like interpreting "an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force" as giving a reason why an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force, would be a misunderstanding of what is stated.

If this Law is external and prior to any particular object, and applies equally to all objects in space and time, then this raises the practical problem of where exactly does this Law exist?

If the Law is internal and contemporaneous within particular objects, and all objects in space and time follow the same Law, then this raises the practical problem as to why all these individual Laws, both spatially and temporally separate, are the same?

How exactly can there be a single Law of Nature that determines what happens to objects that are spatially and temporally separate? — RussellA

Yes, these are problems which could be discussed. However, I see no reason to discuss them if they are just proposed as reason to accept the illogical premise of contemporaneousness. Once you reject contemporaneousness as illogical, I'll be ready to discuss these other issues.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is lost. Though meaningless, the symbol still exists.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is known. The rule can be read and understood. The logic supporting the rule can be read and learned. Where in this sequence is something created from nothing? — ucarr

Who said anything about "something created from nothing"? I said that the rule, for using the symbol, is prior in time to the symbol's existence, as the reason for its existence.

Consider that in our dialogue, as dialogue, there is nothing prior to consciousness. Can there be something prior to consciousness? — ucarr

How does this make sense to you? You are asking me to take as a premise, that there is nothing prior to consciousness, and then asking me if there can be something prior to consciousness. That would be blatant contradiction.

If creativity means something from nothing, that's the paradox of nothingness being an existing thing. If creativity means re-arranging pre-existent things, that's equating creativity with permutation, a false equivalence. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. — ucarr

I think the problems that you have with this issue are due to the conditions which you set up for yourself. Why do yo see the need to set out conditions such as these? Just like the above example where you asked for a blatant contradiction, this makes no sense to me. Why do you insist on "something from nothing" as a condition?

Distinct and incompatible are non-equivalent. — ucarr

Sure, but I am explaining them as incompatible. And "distinct" is a form or type of "incompatible". Incompatible is the broader term, with a wider application, and "distinct" is more specific.

Reverse engineering has no problem recreating the creation of the apparatus from the opposite direction: final state →
→
initial state. — ucarr

Perhaps, but that doesn't address the point, which is to get to the reason behind the existence of the thing, what is prior to the initial state. Consider the title of the thread, "what does consciousness do". I answer that it is an act which produces "the initial state". If reverse engineering looks at "states", it does not apprehend the activity which produces the states. Therefore reverse engineering does not apprehend the activity prior to the initial state. This issue is very evident in quantum mechanics. The engineering produces "particles" (states), but it does not apprehend the activity which produces the particle (referred to as wave function, and wave function collapse).

The will to create pre-supposes a sentient. The existence of a sentient in turn pre-supposes an environment from which the sentient is emergent. — ucarr

Again, you are just employing contradictory conditions. Why do this to yourself? You impose terms upon yourself which create an impossible to solve problem.

The issue here pertains to accessing Kant's noumenal realm of things in themselves, i.e., "being" without encountering the problem of the perceptual distortion you describe. If what you say is something you know, and not merely conjecture, then it must be true that you can do this. Show me that you can. — ucarr

I never said anything about "Kant's noumenal realm". Again, you are imposing terms designed to create difficulty in understanding. Why do this to yourself?

What do you make of Russell's Paradox as it relates to the origin boundary ontology you equate with omnipresent mind?

Note - The paradox shows that, logically, a set cannot be a sub-set of itself. In order to overthrow "existence precedes essence," you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox. It's the uncontainability of the paradox that explodes establishment of an internally consistent origin of existence.

The problem is the reason for a posited material reality independent of mind. It's this originating part of the Big Bang science can't reach. — ucarr

Now, you describe things in terms of Russel's paradox, and set theory. Then you say "you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox". But why do you even refer to set theory at all. By defining "objects" in terms of "sets", all you do is impose extremely difficult conditions on yourself. These conditions are designed to place "objects" outside our capacity of understanding, by making the constituent elements of a set unintelligible, and telling us to simply take them for granted.

Again, why use terms which create difficulty for yourself, rather than looking to actually understand the issue?

I'm wondering how a zero-mass apparatus could be built by the positive-mass agency of humans. — ucarr

If you believe in free will, and the immateriality of the soul, then you would not represent the agency of human beings as "positive-mass". Therefore this would not be an issue.

See what your post demonstrates? You reject the terms and conditions (free will, immaterial, soul) which are specifically designed to make all the aspects of these problems you bring up intelligible, comprehensible, and solvable. And you insist on employing terms which create contradictions, and paradoxes, creating unsolvable problems. Since we construct and choose our premises and axioms, why not take the ones designed to solve the problems, which the other ones create?

I think it is more likely that Free Will is an illusion than an actual thing. — RussellA

Personally, I don't see too much point in discussing philosophy with someone who doesn't believe in free will. The entire discussion would then have to revolve around persuading the person that they have the power (free will) to change that belief. And this "persuading" would have to carry the force of a deterministic cause, to change that person's mind, which is contrary to the principles believed in by the person who believes in free will. This makes the task of convincing a person of the reality of free wil an exercise in futility. The only way that a person will come to believe in the reality of free will is through introspection, examination of one's own personal experiences.

The question is, is it strictly true that "descriptions of the way the world is" are posterior to events and "principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world" are prior to events? — RussellA

The answer to that question is "yes", by the reasoning I gave.

There is an overlap in Laws of Physics and Laws of Nature. — RussellA

No, there is no overlap, for the same reason that there is no overlap of the map and the territory. An overlap would require that the map is mapping itself, but that would produce an unintelligible infinite regress, like looking into a mirror with a mirror behind you.

The Laws of Physics are the map (description), and the Laws of Nature are what is supposedly described by the map, as explained in the article I referred.

By observing many times that the sun rises in the east, by inductive reasoning, I can propose the law that "the sun rises in the east". It is true that this law is posterior to my observations. But it is equally true that this law is prior to my observing the next sun rise.

When does a law become a Law of Nature? — RussellA

OK, so take your example here. "the sun rises in the east" is the inductive, descriptive "law", which is posterior to your observations. The proposed "Laws of Nature" are what forces the earth to spin the way that it does, causing the appearance of the sun rising in the east.

If for hundreds of years hundreds of scientist have observed that F=ma, then this is sufficient for F=ma to become a Law of Nature. — RussellA

Not at all. The proposed "Laws of Nature", are whatever it is which causes bodies to act in that consistent way, the way which makes F=ma appear to be true.

Speaking in a parallel, I don't believe grammar, an organizing principle that takes words and organizes them into sentences, paragraphs, chapters and books, creates written language. No, grammar organizes written language. The organized sounds of the spoken word get organized into written signs that can be interpreted by a standardized organization, i.e., grammar. — ucarr

I think you need to look at written symbols independently from written words. Then you'll see that there is necessarily "a grammar" behind any writing of symbols. The written symbol may be essentially a memory aid, or something like that, and there is necessarily a rule, as to what the symbol represents. Without that grammar, which tells one how to read the symbol, the symbol would be useless. Likewise, in the organizing of letters to create words, there is a grammar required. Generally, in English, each letter represents a sound. You'll notice that in some languages, a written symbol often represents an idea, and hieroglyphics is taken to be a combination of these two. In an acronym each letter represents a word. These are all different "grammars".

You might wish to restrict the meaning of "grammar" to a more formal sense, so that this type of rule does not qualify as "grammar", but then we still have to account for the reality of this type of "rule", which is used to create written language.

Likewise, as I'm saying, consciousness takes partially independent material objects that, at the quantum level, exist prior to consciousness - itself a construction from parts - and organizes them into navigable environments. So, consciousness is a material phenomenon that provides a function that parallels the syntactical function of grammar. — ucarr

This analogy does not work. As demonstrated above, with the reality of written language, the parts themselves, each mark or symbol, is created according to a rule or rules. So if we wish to maintain your analogy with quantum particles, we must say that the "material objects" are not independent, they are created intentionally, according to some rules. So if you want to maintain the principle that these parts exist prior to consciousness, then we need to allow intention prior to consciousness, as what creates the parts. Then we have a formal meaning of "consciousness", as what arranges the parts, just like the formal meaning of "grammar", as what arranges the symbols, but we still need "intention" as prior to the parts, creating them, just like we need "rules" as prior to the symbols.

First, you say there are aspects of reality consciousness can work with. That's consciousness in reactive mode. — ucarr

Working with something is not the reactive mode, it is the creative mode. This is evident from the fact that we can work with completely passive things, moving them around to build something. That you interpret what I wrote, in this way, demonstrates misunderstanding.

Didn't you already say consciousness_reactive and consciousness_creative are fundamentally incompatible? Doesn't this imply that consciousness can only be one or the other, with switching between the two modes being impossible? — ucarr

No, I meant that the descriptive principles, the descriptive modes are fundamentally incompatible. If we describe consciousness as reactive, that description is fundamentally incompatible with a description of consciousness as creative. This is a feature of the rules which apply to making such descriptions. Consider the difference between describing a past event, and describing a future event for example. We use the past tense of verbs to describe the past, and future tense to describe the future.

Notice how the incompatibility between the two descriptive modes is understood as an incompatibility between two features of reality. This is a product of the reactive mode. All such "representation of reality" is the reactive mode. So adherence to the reactive mode produces the appearance that "consciousness can only be one or the other". This is because the reactive mode cannot apprehend the creative mode except by analyzing the effects of the creative mode. This is what I described as observations through the apparatus. This approach cannot understand the creative mode which built the apparatus, because it always interprets through effects, what have occurred, the past.

From the perspective of the creative mode, however, both of the two apparently incompatible features of reality can be understood, as incompatible due to the descriptive modes employed, and these are created. This means that the supposed independent reality does not necessarily consist of incompatible features, only our (created) modes of representing reality has produced this appearance. This leaves the consciousness itself as capable of understanding reality. The required separation is not between the consciousness and the independent reality, as an independent reality is only "supposed" by the consciousness, as part of its creative functions. The required separation is between the will to create, and the effects of this, the creation.

The will to create, itself, does not require the assumption of a separate independent reality, as it takes absolute freedom as its premise. And absolute freedom denies any external constraints. It is only after the act of creating, when the consciousness observes what has been created, that the constraints of the external world are observed, in their effects, that the consciousness is inclined to create the two incompatible representations, one representing the will to create, in absolute freedom, and the other representing what has been created, as having been restricted.

If I'm not mistaken, there is no continuity between incompatible things. By this reasoning, past and future must be compatible given the natural continuity between them. Clearly, the functional present, when seen relativistically as the future in relation to the past, contains overlap with the past. If there were no compatibility between the two - not to elaborate on the problem of them existing as such only in relationship to each other - it seems to me there could only be an eternal present. An eternal present is hard to make sense of when we entertain the concept of progress. — ucarr

The issue outlined here helps to demonstrate that the problem of incompatibility is a problem with the representation, not a problem with "reality" itself. The concepts of "past" and "future" are aspects of the representation. The incompatibility exists here, within this conceptualization. The "being" of consciousness, at the present, demonstrates the continuity between the two, and that the incompatibility is somehow an incorrect representation.

The problem can be seen to be the assumption of an "independent reality". Placing reality as "independent" removes the consciousness, and its creative acts, from "reality", leaving only the observed "past" as "reality". Then the consciousness's creative acts are interpreted as reactive. Modeling the consciousness's creative acts as reactive rather than creative is what produces the incompatibility. This misplaces the creative acts, as "at the present" instead of modeling them as "in the future" with an overlap of future and past, as you describe. The reality of the overlap of future and past is what allows for the incompatibility to be resolved. But this idea necessitates a breakdown of "independent reality", which is what "special relativity" accomplishes. Then we are left with the consciousness only, no assumption of "independent reality", and we must start with a primary premise which respects the reality of the consciousness itself, as the will to create.

This argument seems to contradict your prior argument: "...the past in its reality, is incompatible with the future, in its reality." — ucarr

That is what happens when we assume an "independent reality". We assume the consciousness to be at the present. The independent reality is the past and future, and all of temporal existence, as distinct from the perspective of the consciousness, which then is understood as a "point in time", which provides the grounds for temporal measurements. But the "point in time" then is distinct from the "independent reality", which is a requirement for the idea of "independent". Now, the "point in time" is an eternal principle, as distinct from temporal existence, which the consciousness can insert anywhere into the supposed independent temporal existence, to produce temporal measurements.

However, this "point in time", which is derived from that assumption of "independent reality", is really a faulty principle, as "special relativity" indicates. Now the "point in time", which is representative of the consciousness's "present", as distinct from "independent reality", must be reworked, to allow that "the present" is actually a duration of time combining both future and past. This is the way to dissolve, or resolve, the apparent incompatibility between past and future. We take the consciousness's "present" as a combination of the will to create, and the experiencing of the effects of this will to create, without the need to assume any "independent reality".

Your above statement contains an issue. Inertia can be overcome, and it is overcome too many times to count. Einstein's equation, by explaining change of momentum through mass/energy equivalence,
establishes the fact that where's there's inertia, there's also energy, and thus past and future, being consistent along the channel of mass/energy equivalence, are not incompatible. — ucarr

We do not need to discuss this, but the incompatibility is evident in the difference between invariant (inertial) mass, and variant (relativistic) mass.

I take your above statement to be a logic-based attack upon E=MC2

=


2
. As I see it, the gist of your argument says: the equation tries to make a claim based on Mode A interpreted in the context of Mode B, but this must be a faulty claim because Mode A and Mode B are incompatible. — ucarr

Yes, the problems of E=MC2, as demonstrated by the difference between invariant mass and variant mass, demonstrate the incompatibility between the Newtonian (mass) perspective, and the Einsteinian (energy) perspective.

Can you show how inertia examples determinism? — ucarr

The inertia perspective, is derived from Newtonian laws of motion, which state as the first law, that a body will continue to move in a regular way, as it has in the past, indefinitely into the future, unless forced to change. That is the determinist perspective, that a cause of change is required. Notice that the way I stated it, as "indefinitely into the future" the determinist infinite regress of efficient causation is signified.

Are you assuming the human individual can exist untethered from mass/energy? — ucarr

I don't understand the question. These are temporal concepts, "mass", "energy". We do not need to employ them. In theory we could completely annihilate them, and build a different conceptual structure.

We know that consciousness sees and understands the many events that populate the history of the world. This is consciousness reacting to its environment.

Is consciousness only reactive?

What about the possibility of consciousness acting in the role of a transitive agent impacting and changing the objects under its influence?

I claim that consciousness performs a variety of functions that affect the boundaries of material objects in various ways:

• Time dissolves boundaries

• Space platforms boundaries

• Spacetime extends boundaries

• Consciousness oversees these three boundary negotiations — ucarr

There are two very distinct ways of looking at this. You describe consciousness as reactive here, the other way is to describe consciousness as creative. The two are fundamentally incompatible, because the former assumes a world already made, which is irking the consciousness, while the latter assumes that the consciousness is producing "the world", in its creativity. Then you attempt to describe the consciousness as constructive (creative) within the incompatible premise that the consciousness is reactive.

To deal with this incompatibility, lets assume two distinct aspects of reality, those which the consciousness can work with to create, and those which the consciousness does not have the ability to alter, so that it can only be reactive to these. Basic experience defines these two categories as past and future. We look at the future as having the possibilities to create, and the past as what we do not have the ability to alter. I believe that this is the most productive way to frame that fundamental incompatibility, the past in its reality, is incompatible with the future, in its reality.

Now the human being is fundamentally an intentional being, so its primary perspective is toward the future of possibilities, and it observes, notes, and remembers the past in relation to the primary perspective, which is the creative perspective, looking toward the future. Therefore, I ask you to reverse your perspective, and place the consciousness as fundamentally creative rather than reactive. The consciousness is always moving forward in time, creating, constructing, and the means by which it "reacts" is through the structures it has already created. So all of its "reactions" are already conditioned by its creations, the creations being prior to the reactions, as required for "a reaction". This is demonstrated by the scientific method, we test hypotheses with experiments, build an apparatus, and see how it reacts. Notice that the "reaction" is fundamentally conditioned by the apparatus built. And it is required that there is an apparatus to produce a reaction.

As described by Einstein's equation: E=MC2

=


2
we're navigating our way around a reality populated by the mass/energy binary. Mass is the particle form of energy and energy is the waveform of mass. Under this scheme, consciousness, like your word-processing program, organizes raw data. — ucarr

Notice how the past/ future categorical separation is represented by the mass/energy binary". The "mass" perspective is a conceptual creation expressed in Newton's laws of motion. We describe past existence with "mass" which has inertia as a fundamental property, and this is "resistance to change". Resistance to change is what is basic to "what we do not have the ability to alter", and this is mass. "Energy", on the other hand is "the capacity to do work", and this is an expression of the view toward the future, "the possibilities to create". What we have then, with this expression of mass/energy equivalence, E=MC2, is a principle designed to convert "what we do not have the ability to alter", the inertia of mass, into the malleable energy, "possibilities to create".

However, we need to respect the basic incompatibility between the past and future, which defines these two categories. Because of this basic incompatibility, we can know that this supposed mass/energy equivalence is defective It is an attempt at doing what is impossible, taking the determinist principles of inertia, "what we do not have the ability to alter", and expressing it in the free will perspective of "the possibilities to create".

The problem is that we need to assign priority to one over the other, and fit the other within that perspective. And, as I explained above, the primary perspective of the human being is intentional, the view toward the future, so this must have priority. However, the entire sense apparatus of the human being has bee constructed through evolution as reactive, the view toward the past, and sense observation is what is used to validate "science". This means that science is critically disadvantaged as a tool to guide us in this endeavour. What this implies is that we need to create an observational capacity, an apparatus, which is not reliant on mass/inertia principles. In other words we need an apparatus which is entirely created of possibility without matter or mass. We cannot call this use of pure possibilities "energy", due to the faulty mass/energy equivalence.

I observe a hundred times that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud then lightning occurs. I can ask why.

I can conclude that there is a Law of Nature such that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud lightning occurs. — RussellA

Notice that I distinguished between a law of physics, and a law of nature. What you describe is an inductive principle, like a law of physics. That is a descriptive principle. In the way I used the term, the law of nature is what the law of physics is supposed to represent, it is what is supposedly described by these inductive principles. Check the "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" for reference.

Within metaphysics, there are two competing theories of Laws of Nature. On one account, the Regularity Theory, Laws of Nature are statements of the uniformities or regularities in the world; they are mere descriptions of the way the world is. On the other account, the Necessitarian Theory, Laws of Nature are the “principles” which govern the natural phenomena of the world. That is, the natural world “obeys” the Laws of Nature. This seemingly innocuous difference marks one of the most profound gulfs within contemporary philosophy, and has quite unexpected, and wide-ranging, implications. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/

My usage was the latter sense of "laws of nature".

My question is, is it in fact the case that a Law of Nature precedes the event it describes, or is the Law of Nature contemporaneous with the event it describes. My belief is the latter. — RussellA

A "law of nature" in this sense necessarily precedes the event, because the laws of nature are what makes things act the way that they do. So they are the cause of an event occurring the way that it does, a way that is describable by laws of physics. Notice in the quote, that things "obey" the laws of nature, so the laws must be prior to an events, as the events will necessarily obey the laws.

Some argue that Free Will is an illusion. — RussellA

Yes, they have the freedom to do this. I don't believe that, do you?

There is a particular lightning strike, and being a particualr instance is a token. Several lightning strikes would create a class of events, The Lightning Strike, which would be a type. — RussellA

Yes, this is the issue which Plato addressed. When a lightening strike occurs, there has already been many events of the same type (lightening strikes). This implies that there is a form ("formula" if you like), which preexists the particular event, and determines what it will be.

In modern days we understand this as inductive reasoning, cause and effect, and laws of physics. This inclines us to think that these formulae are abstractions, the product of human minds, existing as ideas in human minds. And this is correct, but this way of thinking detracts from the need to consider some sort of "form" which preexists such events, and determines their nature.

A common way of representing the difference between the two types of "form" are as the laws of physics (human abstractions), and the laws of nature (what the laws of physics are supposed to represent, which causes things to behave the way that they do). Aristotle provided much guidance for separating the two senses of "form", the causal as prior to events, and the human abstractions as posterior to events.

In practice, can anyone give any explanation, other than in the mind of God, where a Lightning Strike could exist prior to a lightning strike? — RussellA

This is why "God" and "angels", are the most common explanation for the immaterial Forms which are necessarily prior to material existence, as cause of the orderly existence we observe. The prior Forms (laws of nature), are "idea-like", but they are prior to material existence rather than posterior to it (as abstractions are), being what causes whatever we determine as the fundamental elements of material existence to be, in the way that they are. Since the prior forms are "idea-like" as immaterial, and the cause of things being the way that they are, in much the same way that human ideas cause artificial things to be the way that they are, through freely willed activities, we posit a divine mind, "God".

Therefore, the form of the lightning strike must have existed at the beginning of existence. Similarly the form of every event must have existed at the beginning of existence.

In other words, according to Aristotle, the form of this post, which has a form unique to itself, must have been determined at the beginning of existence, 13.7 billion years ago, which is a scary thought. — RussellA

The issue is not so simple, because you are applying determinist principles here. When we account for the reality of freely willed events, the entire way that we understand "time" needs to be altered. Then we do not get this infinite regress to "the beginning of time". Free will allows a new, undetermined event to enter into the chain of causation determined by the past, at any moment in time.

The chain of causation is an abstraction, inductive principles derived from the observation of continuity in time. A thing, object with mass, will continue to be as it has been, in the past, unless caused to change. This is the basis for Newton's first law, and the "cause" of change here, was traditionally understood as another massive object (f=ma). The freely willed cause, however, as an immaterial cause known as "final cause", is free from that determinist causal chain. The freely willed cause must even escape the concept of "energy", because of the relativistic equivalence between mass and energy which renders "energy" as inertially deterministic.

Simply put, when we allow for the reality of freely willed events, we allow as a fundamental principle, a break in the continuity of being, between past and future, a break at the present. This is the lack of necessity between cause and effect, and in inductive reasoning, pointed to by Hume. Things do not necessarily continue as they have. This implies that the entire world of being, all that exists relative to our observational capacities, must be created anew at each passing moment of time.

That means that "the form of the world", consequently "the form of each event", as time passes, is produced (by what was referred to as the mind of God above), at each passing moment of time. This is the basis for the idea of divine "Providence", and the idea that God must act continually, at each moment to maintain His creation. The laws of physics, like Newton's first law, depend on "God's Will", as it is required that God actively recreates the world at each passing moment, and God having a free will, could recreate the world at any moment, in a way which is not consistent with determinist cause/effect.

es. That's the problem.

But every word in language refers to a concept, in that "fundamental" is a concept, "particle" is a concept, "and" is a concept, etc.

It can also be argued that every word in language should be taken as a figure of speech rather than literally. For example, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote the book Metaphors We Live By 1980. In science, Andrew May in Science 2000 argued that even Newton's second law, F = ma is a metaphor. — RussellA

When you recognize the requirement for "idea-like" Forms, as explained above, which exist independently from human minds, this so-called problem is turned on its head. There is ideas internal to human minds, and ideas external to human minds. And, there is a supposed "material world" as a medium between these two. The material world, as it appears to us, is a representation of the consistency (temporal continuity) within the independent Forms. The key point is that this consistency is not necessary as the determinists represent it. It simply appears to us in this way, as the aspects of the independent Forms which appear to our senses as "the material world", are the parts which demonstrate such consistency. Consequently this constitutes the features of the material world which appear intelligible to us.

But concepts don't exist outside the mind.

Therefore, the problem is that language is using concepts which only exist in the mind to describe a world that exists outside the mind, where such concepts don't exist.

I agree that I am using the concept of "force", which exists in my mind, to describe something in the world, even though the concept "force" doesn't exist in the world.

And this is true for every word in language.

Language as a whole is using concepts, including the colour red and number, to describe a world where those concepts don't exist. — RussellA

So, try this. All words refer to concepts in human minds, as you say. And, outside of human minds there is another sort of "concepts", in another sort of mind (God's). These are the Forms. In the same way that words appear to you within the material medium, as alterations in its consistency which you can interpret as the representations of ideas in other human minds, allowing you to extract meaning, the consistency of physical objects, and the entire physical world, exists as representations of the ideas which exist in that other sort of mind.

Imagine that the other sort of mind is speaking an entirely different language, a language which utilizes consistency of the medium whereas human languages utilize the inconsistency of the medium. Being a sort of inverse language, in relation to our type of languages, it is very difficult to interpret these ideas. However, there is a key to interpretation, a principle, which if adhered to, it will guide the way. The key is the way that time passes, and the fact that everything which occurs at the present, the passage of every material event, has an immaterial (unobservable) Form prior to it in time, as the cause of that event. So, for example, when someone speaks, there is an immaterial cause of those words, within the mind of the speaker, and the material world is just the medium of passing time, which displays the communicative features. The human mind which makes that statement exploits a deficiency in the consistency of the medium, which provides free will the capacity to state that message, while the consistency itself is representative of the other sort of ideas.

Or, maybe "force/s" in that context means 'cause of motion' ? — Kizzy

What could be the cause of motion other than the passing of time? Time passing is what causes things to move. Is "force" the passing of time?

My premise is that ideas only exist in the mind. This would lead to the paradox that if I am able to successfully communicate my ideas using language, then it follows that, as language exists outside the mind, these ideas now exist outside the mind, thereby negating my original premise. — RussellA

Here's another related problem, which was given much consideration by the ancient Greeks, like Plato and Aristotle. Plato thought that since things exist as types, then the form, or type, idea, must be prior to the thing itself, to cause it to be the type of thing that it is. Aristotle showed that since a particular thing has a form unique to itself, which must be prior in time to the thing itself to account for it being the thing that it is and not something else, forms must be prior to material things. This indicates that there must be something similar to ideas, forms, which are prior in time to material existence, therefore outside of human minds.

I believe a world outside the mind exists, but not a world of objects, whether chairs or wavelengths, but rather a world of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time. — RussellA

Isn't "force" just a concept?

When I observe a postbox, I know that the colour red exists in my mind, and science tells me that a wavelength of 700nm exists in the world. — RussellA

How could a wavelength of 700nm exist in the world? Wavelength is a measurement, or a complex idea which serves as a standard for measurement. As such, any statement of wavelength is an expression of an idea. Measurements are just a matter of projecting your subjective experience of numbers onto the world.

A measurement has the appearance of being "objective" because we apply "standards", "rules", "conventions", or "norms", which produce what some call "intersubjectivity", and others call "objectivity". Whichever of the two terms one chooses, it's generally employed as a means for taking the agreement which supports the "existence" of the standards, for granted.

It appears like neither one of us is understanding anything which the other is saying at this point.
Break time.

I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. — Dan

As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you?

It's becoming very clear why you and I have completely different ideas about what it means to "understand one's choice". For you, to "understand one's choice" simply requires a description, what you like to think of as an "objectively true" description. For me, to "understand one's choice" requires the choice be given a position within one's wants, needs, desires and goals, the person's subjective value structure. The former, your sense of "understanding" is a description of what the choice is. The latter, my sense of "understanding" is to know why the choice was made.

In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about. — Dan

That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged.

There is no "property of wrongness". How would we sense that property? And if we do not sense it, how would we decide whether or not a thing had that property, except by a judgement? And if the decision of "wrong" is made by judgement, without any wrongness being evident through sensation, wrongness only being present to the mind that judges, how could the wrongness be anything other than the judgement itself?

We can go further, however, and ask about the judgement. This would be to ask about the wrongness which was determined. This requires a definition of "wrong" and an explanation of how the act fulfills the criteria of that definition.

I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. — Dan

You have provided a conditional proposition. And, the "conditional proposition" provides a rule for logical procedure. In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true".

Your sophistry is to introduce another sense of "true" which is hidden within your usage as "something that is true". This would be a sense of "true" which is independent of the logical procedure, and judgement of the conditional. In other words, the conditional proposition lays rules for a judgement of "true", while you also speak of "something that is true", independent of that judgement. Your statement conflates the two distinct meanings of "true" in an invitation to equivocate.

The invitation to equivocate is the sophistry. The conditional should be properly stated as "if we know that something is true, then we are not mistaken". The way you state it " if we know something that is true", is incoherent if analyzed. This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true.

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability.


This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective?

Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch. — Dan

You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes.

Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference?

You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me.

Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple.

I suppose one's attitude toward migrants depends, somewhat, on the attitude of the migrants. If the migrants arrive with the attitude of conquer and rule... Then again, the attitude of the migrants may depend, somewhat on the attitude of the occupants. If the attitude of the occupants is Keep off!...

What has been revealed now, is why there is such a huge difference between you and I as to what it means to "understand" one's choice. I believe that making a decision often involves having contradictory inclinations, and decision making involves resolving those contradictions. You have asserted that there is an "objective truth" concerning what one desires. This makes the way that I understand decision making unintelligible to you. And, the way that you understand decision making is unintelligible to me.

This doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction at all. This is exactly the kind of situation I am saying is fine and not in the least contradictory (in the sense of having mutually exclusive properties). It's not a matter of words. People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations, these aren't contradictory properties since one does not imply the lack of the other. — Dan

The point is that if we treat "inclinations" as objective properties, like you proposed we do with "desires", then there is a violation of the law of noncontradiction. A person cannot have, as objective properties, both the inclination to eat cake, and the inclination to not eat cake, at the same time without violating the law of noncontradiction.

You can insist, as I do, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations... " but then you ought to recognize that people are not objects, they are subjects, and what we can validly say about subjects is different from what we can validly say about objects. Objects cannot have contrary properties at the same time. Subjects can have contradictory properties at the same time,, as you yourself say, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations". Therefore we must maintain the division between objective facts and subjective facts. So what we say about the inclinations of people cannot be said to be objective fact, because we do not allow contradiction within "objective facts".

This seems fairly clearly not to be true. We can want two things but want one more than the other. — Dan

Sure, and of course, there is a reason why one has a higher value than the other, that is what I referred to as the "higher goal". The higher goal gives the higher value. And this is why one thing is wanted more than another.

In the case of objects, it makes no sense to say that an object has a specific property more than the contradictory property. We don't say that an object has the property of being red more than the property of not being red, allowing some of each. This would just be seen as an instance of attempting violate the law of excluded middle, by saying that the object is "to some degree" both red and not red.

This is more evidence as to why we need to maintain a distinction between "subjective" (of the subject), and objective.

Again, it's not a matter of using a different word. I'm not engaging in any sophistry here, I'm just pointing out that it isn't in violation of the law of noncontradiction to want two things which conflict with one another. — Dan

When we treat a subject as something with properties to be judged according to the fundamental laws of logic, then "what a person wants", would clearly violate the law of noncontradiction. This indicates that we cannot treat "what a person wants" as an objective property, because it would be a property which violates the law of noncontradiction, and this would make the supposed "objective" independent world unintelligible, if we allow for such violations in the "objective" world. . This is why I keep telling you that there is no "objective truth" to what a person desires. "What a person desires" exists relative to subjective value structures, of which a person has more than one, and which are constantly changing.

Again, you are confusing the judgement with the thing the judgement is made about. — Dan

No, it's you who is conflating the judgement with the thing that the judgement is about. The judgement is "true" or "false", and the thing judged is a statement, proposition, idea, belief, or something like that. In the other case the judgement is "right" or "wrong", and the thing judged is a human action. Whether it's "true", "false", "right", or "wrong", this is the judgement, not the thing being judged.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can't know all of the truth, so we can't know any of it? Because that is fairly obviously a fallacy. — Dan

I don't understand why this is so difficult for you. What I say is that none of our knowledge is truth as you describe "truth". You describe "truth" such that "a truth: is something in which the possibility of a mistake is excluded. Human beings are fallible, imperfect in their knowledge, so there is always a possibility of mistake within any human knowledge. All of our knowledge is imperfect. There is always the possibility of mistake. Therefore none of our knowledge obtains to the level of "truth" as you describe it, as requiring that there is no possibility of mistake.

When you judge that you are running along a safe path but the truth of the matter involves a pitfall trap and a hungry tiger, then the truth has pretty significant bearing. — Dan

The only relevant "truth" to this matter is a subjective truth. "Safe path" is a subjective judgement, relative to the values of a subject. The subject may misjudge, and make a mistake. The assumption of an "objective truth" to this matter is completely, and absolutely irrelevant. So why make it.

The truth of those beliefs is (or isn't) in the world itself. — Dan

You said that truth is "the way that the world is". That is clearly not "in the world itself", but something which corresponds with the world.

To make this clear to yourself, consider where falsity is. Clearly falsity is not "in the world itself", but it must be somewhere mustn't it? But the difference between truth and falsity is that one is the way that the world is, and the other is the way that the world isn't. That does not put truth into the world itself, it just shows that the designated "way" of truth is different from the "way" of falsity. Where might these different "ways" of the world exist? I assume there must be an infinity of them, because of all the possible wrong ways. These "ways" are not in the world, where are they? And what separates the true way from the false ways?

I didn't include any claim about need here to avoid you trying to weasel out of the core point in exactly the way you are doing here, but you seem to have ignored that and done it anyway. — Dan

This doesn't help, what you wrote still makes no sense. A belief about myself dying if I don't eat, is a belief relating to a subject, therefore it is subjective. What definition of "subjective" allows this belief to be anything other than subjective?

Also, an objective fact isn't a fact "about objects" nor is a subjective fact a fact "about subjects". Neither in the grammatical sense nor in the everyday use of that sense. That is not an appropriate definition. — Dan

"Subjective" means "of the person", which we know as "the subject". "Objective" means not of the subject, what is other than the subject, which we know as the objects.

here are very often reasons for and against a proposal, but the desire to eat cake and the desire to lose weight are not contradictory in the sense of being contradictory properties. People can definitely have both of them. One might count against an action (such as eating a cake) and one might count for it. None of this is a problem. — Dan

You are changing the description to suit your purpose. I am talking about deliberation, the desire to eat cake versus the desire to not eat cake. There may be numerous reasons to eat cake, and numerous reasons to not eat cake (of which the desire to lose weight may be one). I am not talking about any specific reasons, I am talking about deliberation, in general, which considers various reasons for and against a proposition, or idea. So your straw man is not relevant.

Now, once you get beyond the straw man, you will see that people "can definitely have both" of contradictory desires. If, a person is weighing factors against, and for, a specific action, and this is not a case of having contradictory desires, then we need to answer which is properly called "the desire", and which is called "reasons against the desire"? Since "desire" is commonly associated with base emotions, we would say that "to eat cake" is the desire, and the other is "against the desire". In this way we might avoid the contradiction. That, I tell you is the sophistry designed to make the problem appear like an illusion.

So let's replace "desire" with "goal", "intention", or "end", to see the situation more clearly, free from that deceptive sophistry . Suppose I have two distinct goals. Goal #1 requires that I perform action A, and goal #2 requires that I do not perform action A. For example, I want to complete my Christmas shopping today, and this requires that I take the afternoon off from work, but I also want a clean absentee record at work, and this requires that I do not take the afternoon off. The subject of deliberation here is "I take the afternoon off from work". It is apprehended as a necessary means to the end which is goal #1. The exact contrary of this is recognized as the means to the end which is goal #2. Since I hold both goals at the very same time, I have an inclination (I excluded the word "desire" above) toward choosing contradictory propositions. The "inclination" which I have, as a describable property of a subject, "my attitude", violates the law of noncontradiction. I have, as a property of myself, contradictory inclinations.

This is very relevant to what I said about "understanding one's choice" in the case of buying the shirt. In the example, there was contradictory inclinations, and the example did not provide a reasonable understanding of the contradictory inclinations, therefore I conclude that the choice was not understood.

The driving inclination, the primary goal as stated in the example, goal#1 was "only buy cotton", and this is produced from an inclination toward cotton as the only desirable material. The secondary goal, goal #2, "buy a shirt" is produced from a different inclination, I need a shirt, or something like that. At the store, the attitude, or inclination, toward the particular object in question, a particular shirt, is contradictory, due to the difference between the two goals. Goal#2 produces the attitude of "buy", and goal#1 produces the attitude of "do not buy". Since the example does not provide reasons why goal#2 was prioritized over goal#1, in the decision, I concluded that the decision was not understood. When two goals collide, we need to refer to a higher goal in order to reasonably choose one over the other.

I have consistently been using words to describe conflicting desires that do not create the appearance of them being contradictory, because they are in fact, not contradictory (in the sense of being contradictory properties in violation of the law of noncontradiction). This is not sophistry, this is talking about things sensibly as they are. — Dan

As explained above, conflicting goals, intentions, or ends, produce contradictory inclinations or attitudes. Describing the contradictory inclinations in different ways, to make them appear like they are not actually contradictory, does not resolve the issue. And yes, that is sophistry, as it does not provide adequate principles for moral philosophy. We need good principles which help us to understand the problem of contradictory inclinations, and methods for resolving them. If we simply create the illusion that they are not contradictory, and insist that they are not actually contradictory, then we will be inclined to allow them to continue to coexist, and we will always be debilitated by a condition of indecision, or else we will continually make decisions which we do not properly understand, like the shirt example.

Again, subjective opinions cannot be wrong, as there is no fact of the matter. — Dan

What kind of bull shit is this? "Wrong", and "right" are judgements. And, it is subjective opinions which we judge as wrong or right. Your assumed "fact of the matter" is completely irrelevant.

I don't know what this means. Are you allowing for an objective reality that has features/properties that we can be right or wrong about? — Dan

No, I've already explained why this is not what I am saying. The supposed independent "reality" which I assume, is continually changing. We make "objective" judgements (judgements concerning supposed independent objects), based on certain logical principles, which are inconsistent with the reality of continual change. Therefore "objective reality" is incoherent as self-contradictory.

No, we can absolutely use the word "truth" because we can aim at truth even if we cannot know for sure we have got it. — Dan

The problem I described though, is that we can know for sure that we will never have "truth" as you use the word, due to the fact that we know for sure that human beings are not perfect in their knowledge. This makes "truth" as a goal, out of reach to human beings, an impossible goal for human beings. Having an impossible goal is counterproductive because when we come to realize (through demonstrations like mine), that the goal is impossible, it becomes very discouraging, as there is then a hole, where there should be a realistic (potentially obtainable) goal.

But the judgement that it is true is not itself the truth. The judgement can be wrong. What makes that judgement wrong is that it doesn't match up with the truth. — Dan

This is the unnecessary, and completely useless assumption you make, that there is something beyond the judgement "it is true", which is "itself the truth". All we have, beyond an individual judgement, is further judgements, personal reflection, and judgements from others. What produces the further judgement, that the initial judgement of "true" was a "wrong" judgement, is a change of mind, generally created by a difference of information, applied in personal reflection. Also, one person can judge another's judgement of "true" as "wrong" based on a similar difference of information. This other assumed thing, which you say is "itself the truth", is completely irrelevant, having absolutely no bearing on any of these judgements.

Putting the cogito aside, you're rather missing the point here. Truth isn't the same as certainty. Just because something exists in the world doesn't mean we can know about it, and even if we do, we aren't likely to have complete certainty of it. — Dan

But "truth" as you represent it, is absolute certainty. It is "the way the world is" without any possibility of error. Notice "the way the world is", is something distinct from "the world itself", as that which corresponds with "the world itself", in "truth". And as you insist, this correspondence must be without error. Therefore "truth" as you represent it, is a correspondence of absolute certainty.

This is very much nit-picking and avoiding the core point. If you don't think there is an objective fact to whether you not eating or breathing will lead to your death and that this is just subjective, then presumably you think that if you believe that failing to eat or breathe will not lead to your death, then it won't. — Dan

What? This makes no sense. The need to eat and breathe is not an objective fact, because it is not a fact about objects, it is a fact about subjects. That makes it a subjective fact. And, as I've explained, facts about subjects are completely different from facts about objects. In the case of the former we must allow violation to the fundamental laws of logic, in the case of the latter, we do not (try Charles Peirce for information on this). We must allow violation to those laws of logic for the reasons I explained, the facts about subjects (subjective facts) exist in relation to value structures, which are often conflicting. The fact that a person needs to eat and breathe exists as a fact, in relation to life, as the valued goal. If a person is suicidal, and values death, the need to eat and breathe is no longer given priority, and is therefore no longer a fact. That is the nature of "subjective facts" (facts about subjects), they shift, and change, depending on what the subject values. And since a single subject often has conflicting values, subjective facts are often contradictory. That produces the need for deliberation, and principles to resolve the reality of contradictory facts.

"We ought to do good" is a normative statement, not a descriptive one. You can tell because it's about what one ought to do — Dan

This really depends on how one would interpret the statement. If you interpret it as a value judgement, then it is making a subjective normative statement, indicating that the author believes that the type of action which one ought to do, is the good type. Then it might be interpreted as a normative statement, telling you that there is a type of act, called a good act, which is what you ought. Of course you can see how useless such a statement, as a normative statement, would be, as it gives no indicatinon as to how to identify an act as a good one. That's why I say it really is not a normative statement, because it says nothing about what type of acts one should make, only naming them as good acts.

But if you interpret it as an objectively true proposition, then it is a descriptive statement indicating that acts which are referred to with "ought" are only those describable as "good". In this case, the statement is interpreted as intended to demonstration (through a sort of description), the meaning of "ought". This is analogous to "all bachelors are unmarried men". It can be interpreted as a normative (subjective value) statement, meaning you ought only use "bachelor" to refer to a married man, or you can interpret it as a demonstrative, descriptive (objectively true) proposition, meaning that if it is called "bachelor" it is an unmarried man.

As a demonstrative, descriptive statement, is a more meaningful interpretation of "we ought to do good". Then if we are told "you ought to do X", we know that X is good, or desirable, from this descriptive interpretation. "We ought to do good" demonstrates the meaning of "ought", through that description, just like "all bachelors are unmarried men" demonstrates the meaning of "bachelor" through that description.

Clearly, these two modes of interpretation are completely different from each other, and this constitutes a form of ambiguity. To mix them up, and conflate the two is a form of equivocation which was common to classical sophistry, as demonstrated by Plato.

This is the type of sophistry which you are currently engaged in Dan. You interpret the statement true by definition, and you assume that this provides "objective truth" to the normative interpretation. So, you also take the inverted, normative (subjective value) interpretation of that statement, and you conflate the two. The conflation of two distinct, and incompatible interpretations provides you with the fallacious conclusion of a normative statement with objective truth.

They aren't contradictory properties. One doesn't imply the lack of the other. — Dan

If you say the desire to eat cake, and the desire to not eat cake, are not contradictory properties, then this is simple denial. And to stretch for other words to describe the desire to not eat cake, (the desire to lose weight or something like that), just demonstrates your refusal to acknowledge what "deliberation" really consists of, weighing the reasons for and against accepting a proposal.

I have conflicting desires all the time. — Dan

OK, now please accept the implications of this admission. If you are the subject, and you have contrary desires, then this means that if we are to predicate desires of that subject, you, in the same way that we predicate properties concerning an object with an identity, we must allow for violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Will you accept that, or are you going to go back to describing the "conflicting desires" with words that create the appearance that such desires are not really contradictory, in the way of sophistry?

That is true, but Kant's categorical imperative is very much a normative claim. — Dan

As indicated above, it can be interpreted in two very distinct ways. If you interpret the categorical imperative as "normative", then it is a subjective value statement. If you interpret it as a proposition with "objective truth", then it is a descriptive principle.

The biggest clue that it is a claim about what one ought to do might be the word "ought". — Dan

As explained above, the word "ought" does not necessarily imply that the statement indicates what one ought to do. To make that assumption would cause equivocation, when the statement was demonstrative, demonstrating or describing the meaning of "ought".

Here, let me formulate the statement in a slightly different way to demonstrate. "The acts which a person ought to do, are acts which are good." See how the statement is descriptive, and demonstrating the meaning of "ought", by describing what we ought to do, as good acts. This makes the same descriptive statement as "we ought to do what is good".

No, not a subjective opinion, but a belief regarding objective fact based on reason. — Dan

How is "belief regarding objective fact based on reason" anything other than a subjective opinion to you?
I'll refer you back to your claims about understanding one's own choice, to show you that having reasons for what one believes, does not negate the subjectivity of the belief.

No it isn't. It would be a composition fallacy if I were to suggest that anything true of the planet we live on would be true of the whole of objective reality. — Dan

That's exactly what you did do. You said that a belief about the planet is a belief about objective reality.

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. It is only with this assumption, that we can be wrong, that we can determine what beliefs can or cannot be justified. — Dan

I do not deny reality beyond what we believe. I deny that there is truth beyond what we believe, unless one assumes God or some other divinity.

No, I allowed for things to be true subjectively and showed that this leads to absurdity. Things being true "subjectively" is what allows for contradictory premises, although exactly what you mean by being true subjectively has been difficult to pin down as you seem to make claims that you seem to be making about objective facts. — Dan

Contradictory premises are common, so we have to accept that as part of reality. And, as explained above, it is necessary to allow predications of contradictory desires of the same subject at the same time. Therefore it is necessary to understand the reality of contradiction as a very important, and significant aspect of the subjective reality. Denying subjectivity because it allows for the reality of contradiction, is the mistaken approach, because deliberation, where contrary premises coexist, is very real, and we need to account for it as a significant part of reality.

So when a person deliberates on contrary beliefs, e.g. "the world is flat", and "the world is round" then we allow for violation of the law of excluded middle, the person believes neither. Or, if we represent this deliberation in the form of desires "the person wants to believe that the world is flat", and "the person wants to believe that the world is round", both at the same time, then the desires violate the law of noncontradiction, as explained above.

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. — Dan

I've told you already there is clearly very much beyond what people believe. I've just argued that its incoherent to say there is truth there, beyond what people believe, unless we attribute that truth to God.

But the truth isn't the judgement. The fact isn't the belief. Again, people can be wrong. — Dan

This indicates the problem about your perspective which I pointed out already. If, as is indicated here, "truth", and "fact" signify an exclusion of the possibility of error, then it is irrelevant to this world of human beliefs which we are talking about. If this is what you want from "truth", that the possibility of error is completely excluded, then we cannot use the word at all in talking about human affairs, because human beings are fallible, and cannot exclude the possibility of error. If this is what you desire from "truth" then we can never truthfully call a human belief "true", and the word becomes useless to us.

Therefore we need to respect the reality that "truth" actually is a judgement. We judge propositions as true, we judge beliefs as true. And if we use "truth" in this other way, which you propose, as an independent, objective form of "truth", we need to respect the difference lest we equivocate. But this other sense of "truth" which you propose is completely irrelevant, so we do not need to use it at all. So we have to accept "truth" as a type of human judgement Of course the sophists will equivocate though, and say that some human judgements of "truth" are objective truths.

And no, I do not suggest we have access to the objective truth of all matters (perhaps we do for some things, like the cogito, but not much) but we do our best to figure out what the world is like by considering the evidence we have available to us. If we instead assume that whatever we believe is correct, then there is no need for any of this surely. — Dan

Human beings are fallible. No judgement of truth or fact, made by a human being can exclude the possibility of mistake. Therefore human beings cannot have "objective truth" in any matters.

Yeah, I think you are assuming I'm doing something here that I'm just not. I'm not suggesting for a second that we can tell that we need to eat and breathe because the truth is objective. What I am suggesting is that if you don't think there is an objective fact about whether we need to eat and breathe (which requires there to be such a thing as objective facts/objective truth) then you must accept that if you believed otherwise, you wouldn't need to breathe or eat. — Dan

We do not need to eat and breathe, as an "objective fact", that's the point. If we do not eat and breathe we simply die. So, we only need to eat and breathe if we want to stay alive. This makes "we need to eat and breathe" a subjective value statement. We only need to eat and breathe for the sake of that specific subjective end, to stay alive.

It isn't produced by the logical conclusion. We must assume there is objective truth in order to come to any conclusions about what we must do in any sense. — Dan

You are sorely mistaken. All we "need", to make conclusions about what we must do, is desires, goals or intentions, as well as some experience. The desires tell us what we want, and the experience tells us the successful method of getting it. From this we can make a conclusion about "what we must do". If a person is lacking in experience, then they proceed through trial and error, but this type of choice is not of what we "must" do, it's a choice with less imperative.

Your claim "We must assume there is objective truth" makes no sense at all. How does the assumption of "objective truth" even have any bearing on our conclusions about what we must do? We cannot assume to know the objective truth. So the idea of objective truth becomes completely irrelevant, and we make our conclusions about what we must do relative to what we desire, and our experience, as I explained.

Granted, they have some utility... — BC

Pizza and beer delivery to your backyard pool party?

Migrants might fare better fixing their own countries. — NOS4A2

I don't think this addresses the problems I mentioned. Things like war and climate change result in loss of housing, and loss of inhabitable land in some areas of the world, conditions which are impossible for the people to fix. An eight hour wait at the emergency room, instead of getting immediate medical attention after leaving the comfort of your home, is nothing compared to not having a place to call home.

I just assumed "treat migrants with care" is a principle we all take for granted. Since the capacity to do this requires that we give up a handful of precious cash, then it might be a problem if the billionaires of the world frown on this principle.

Analysis: Recent Immigration Surge Has Been Largest in U.S. History — NOS4A2

Migration has many causes, overpopulation, war, even bad weather. As climate change ramps up, so does the surge of migrants. The US will need to accept even more. Canada has so much wide open space, it can take even more than the US.

Universal rules do apply to every particular circumstance. That's what makes them universal. — Dan

I believe you are conflating "descriptive rules" with "prescriptive rules". A universal, descriptive rule, such as "we ought to do what is good", does not apply as a prescriptive rule. It is categorically distinct, as stating what is the case (description) rather than stating something we ought to do (prescription). What causes the confusion, is that it is a descriptive statement about what is valued, or as I say, what is desired.

The descriptive rule does not tell us how to act, it tells us "what is the case". A prescriptive rule, such as "you ought to save an abandoned baby", tells a person how to act, by projecting what is valued or desired into the individual. Descriptive value-based rules, such as "abandoned babies should be saved", and even "people should save abandoned babies", do not tell anyone how to act. Notice, that once the universal "people" is used, the statement becomes a descriptive "is" statement, as compared to the prescriptive which is directed at the individual named as "you".

Kant's so-called categorical imperative is a descriptive value-based rule. It tells us what is the case, that there is a prescriptive rule for every situation. As a descriptive rule, it does not tell us how to act. Prescriptive rules tell us how to act.

Are you perhaps using "truth" in some non-standard way? — Dan

I am using "truth" in a different standard way. If you check a dictionary you will notice two basic ways to use that word.

A much easier way to go would be to recognize that having conflicting desires is not in violation of the law of noncontradiction since having the property of "wanting to eat cake" and the property of "wanting to be thin" or whatever conflicting desires you like, aren't mutually exclusive and one does not imply the lack of the other. — Dan

All you do here is use sophistry to hide what you truly understand as contradictory. The properties of "wanting to eat cake", and "wanting not to eat cake", which make it difficult to decide whether or not to eat cake, are truly contradictory.

This way that you have, of refusing to accept what you know to be true, because it is inconsistent with the principles you espouse, is a sort of dishonesty, self-deception which interferes with good philosophical discourse. That is what led to the impasse in our discussion of "understanding". When it comes down to looking at these conditions which are internal to us, subjective features, you make statements which are completely inconsistent with my personal experience. This is the case now with your attempt to make "desire" objective. I cannot agree with such statements, and you refuse to consider the possibility that your statements may be inconsistent with your own experience. The impasse is imposed.

I'm not really sure what you mean by this. Morality tells us how we should act, but you still make the decision of whether to do so yourself. It doesn't make you act in some way. But perhaps you mean instead that there are multiple maxims one might act in accordance with that may all be acceptable according to the categorical imperative? That's also not problematic, as morality telling you what to do doesn't require it to tell you that only one thing is permissible. There may be multiple actions that are morally permissible. That doesn't make the moral theory in question not action-guiding. — Dan

The point is that a universal descriptive statement, by the fact that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive,, does not tell a person how to act. That is the point of the is/ought divide. The universal, descriptive statement, is a statement of what is the case, which may or may not have been produced from good inductive reasoning. So, "one ought to do good" is a descriptive value-based statement of what "is" the case, which may or may not be a good inductive conclusion. It does not, in any way, tell a person how to act. Notice there is no actions described. This is the same category mistake you repeat over and over. Because it is a value-based descriptive statement it uses the word "ought". By using the word "ought" in the phrase, it appears like the phrase is a prescriptive statement, telling a person what act one ought to make, but it's clearly not. In a similar way, "the world is changing" doesn't tell us anything about the way that the world "is".

So the issue (problem) is the gap between the universal, descriptive statement, and how one should act in any particular situation, consequently what one "ought" to do. In any particular situation, an individual must decide, which universal statements are applicable, and how to apply them toward what is desired or valued personally, by the individual. This will include universal value-based statements, which influence what the person desires, or values. It is this act of choice, by the individual, in the particular situation, which determines which universal statements are relevant, in relation to the individual's personal desires and values, which "tells a person how to act". Notice, it is an act of choice which tells the person how to act, not any specific universal statement, or set of universal statements. It is clearly not the universal statements which tell the person how to act, because the person must establish a relation between these statements and what is personally desired.

I have given good reasons to believe in what I have presented. — Dan

Your so-called "good reasons" to believe in objective truth, is that it is the only thing which makes sense to you. That is nothing other than a subjective opinion. So a true, honest understanding of your "objective truth" reveals it to be subjective.

And when you apply your premise of objective truth toward trying to understand "subjective truth", you create a contradiction which makes subjective truth appear to be absurd. These absurdities created by your begging the question constitutes your "good reasons".

The planet that we live on is very much a part of objective reality. Claims about what shape it is absolutely are claims about objective reality. — Dan

That's a composition fallacy.

And no, I am not assigning moral value to it, rather I am suggesting that it already has moral value as an objective fact. What "value" could mean in this context is that its presence determines the morality of actions (that's not an entire or formal definition of moral value of course, but rather an example of what it can mean for something to have moral value). — Dan

This merely demonstrates the incoherency of "has moral value as an objective fact". You are proposing, as a personal (subjective) opinion, your choice of "value", as a principle which "determines the morality of actions". You support this principle with reasons, an attempt at justification. Your reasons are "it is an objective fact".

Obviously, it is not an objective fact. It is your subjective opinion, an idea which you are proposing. And if you are capable of supporting this principle, it is a justified idea. But no amount of justification can turn it into an "objective fact" as you desire this to mean, independent from human values. Therefore "it is an objective fact" is incapable of justifying your opinion.

I have demonstrated that it is the only justified option. — Dan

No, you really haven't. You begged the question, assuming objective truth as a primary premise, then from this premise you show how the secondary premise of "subjective truth" produces absurdities. Duh! Obviously when you assume contradictory premises, the result is absurd.

There are potentially other reasons to think so, but the fact that it is the only option where we can consider whether beliefs are justified (since it is possible for them to be wrong) or have any kind of meaningful discussion about anything, provides good enough reason in this case. — Dan

Why do you think that the premise of objective truth provides the only means for justification? I already explained to you how application of beliefs in actual pratise is what justifies them. Further, I explained how we employ principles such as the law of noncontradiction in our judgements of justification.

It is your assumption of "objective truth", which is absolutely useless for any form of justification. What are we supposed to do, compare a belief with "the objective truth" to judge that belief in justification? Where would we find that "objective truth" to make the comparison, when all that appears to us is beliefs?

My point is that your view that anything you believe is true is nonsense. — Dan

Actually, if you had taken just a tiny bit of your precious ten years, to think about this, you would easily have recognized that the idea of "being true" as independent from "being believed to be true", is what is nonsense. There is absolutely nothing to the judgement "X is true" other than a belief that X is true.

I agree that we must breathe, eat, etc, but that is because there is an objective fact of the matter. — Dan

You have clearly reversed the logical priority here. Because we observe the necessity in the following, "we must breathe, eat, etc,", then we infer the logical conclusion, "there is an objective fact of the matter". Do you understand the difference? Please take some time to consider this because it is very important.

We cannot proceed logically from the premise "there is an objective fact of the matter", to the conclusion "we must breathe, eat, etc.", as you do when you say "that is because there is an objective fact of the matter". This is because these things, the need to breathe, eat, etc.. do not necessarily follow from a supposed "objective world". The premise "objective world" does not necessitate logically the need to eat, breathe, etc., so we cannot say that the need for these things is because there is an objective fact of the matter. This is the issue with free will as well. Freely chosen acts are not necessitated by "objective fact", that is the gap between what is, and what we choose, (and what we ought to choose), which cannot be bridged with logic, due to that lack of necessity.

However. we can proceed in the other direction, the inverse way, logically. We can look at the evidence, "we must breathe", "we must eat", etc., and the necessity provided by "must", produces what is required to make a logical conclusion about the "objective world" within which the subject lives. Notice though, that "must" (the form of necessity specified here), is as means to the end, which is "to live". If we assign "value" to life, then we can say things like "we ought to breathe", "we ought to eat", and these "oughts" are supported by the value assigned to living, as the end.

Notice that "the obective world" is produced as a logical conclusion from our observations, induced by our observations of "necessity". The very same type of observations of what is natural to us, as living beings, produces inductive conclusions about what is valued. Then, we can make logical conclusions about what is "necessary" in this other sense, as required to achieve those ends. But starting with "there is an objective fact about the matter" gives us nothing to base any logic in, because the is/ought gap cannot be bridged in this direction.

So, chairs exists and numbers subsist? Is that a common understanding? — Art48

I think that the important point here is that we notice the difference between these two types of "things". Notice that by categorizing them with the same name "things", I tend to negate that difference which I am trying to emphasize. So when we categorize them in ways like this, by calling them both "objects", it's counterproductive toward understanding the difference between them.

The law of identity (a thing is the same as itself) was intended as a means of recognizing, and upholding the difference between these two. A physical object, a chair, as an individual particular, has an identity within itself, which is independent from anything which we say about it. We can point to it, or sense it, and assume it's independent existence. This assumed independent existence supports the concept of "thing-in-itself", and it also supports the idea that what we say about a thing might be incorrect, false. A "number" does not have this type of identity, because if we remove everything which we say about it, there is nothing left to point to. The number's existence is necessarily within the context of a conceptual structure, and is therefore better known as "a subject", in the sense of a topic, or theme, to be studied or discussed.

So your use of "subsist" to describe numbers is problematic. "Subsist", especially in the sense of "self-subsistence" implies existence independent from the environment or context. But this is exactly what makes a physical thing different from an idea, the chair has independent existence, "self-subsistence" while the number is dependent on the conceptual structure, so it does not have self-subsistence.

There is a type of Platonism, derived from Pythagorean idealism, which assigns "self-subsistence" to numbers. Aristotle analyzed this type of ontology in his "Metaphysics" and found it to be problematic. The issue is, that if an idea, such as "the good" has self-subsistence, then the idea, and its essence are necessarily one and the same. This would be the same for all ideas, they would be one and the same as their essence. Accordingly, it would be impossible for us to understand any ideas, because understanding requires logical relations such as prior and posterior.

So for example, if it's stipulated that the number two has self-subsistence, then its essence, (which is the means by which we understand it), must be within the number two itself. This would make its relations to other ideas "one", "three", "the first even prime greater than 100", etc., accidental rather than essential. If that was the case, ideas would be impossible for us to understand.

Therefore, it is very important in our ontology, to maintain the proper principles of separation between assumed independent objects, which are assumed to have separate existence by the law of identity, and ideas, which are dependent on their environment, context, for their existence. The latter we can know with a high degree of certainty, that it is impossible for them to have a truly independent existence.

Consider the implications of what you are saying here. Do you meant to imply that a doctor is not responsible for the death of a patient when proscribing a medicine that is lethal to a patient who has a specific condition. It seems like you are implying that doctors need not check for potential risk factors at all. I imagine you don't mean to imply this. — Dan

You are not getting it Dan. The subject matter here, the issue which the example exposes, is the relevance of particular circumstances. The nature of particular circumstances is that they are features unique to the individual situation and therefore are outside the applicability of general, universal principles. In Aristotelian logic, these particular circumstances, which escape the formal rules, are known as accidents.

What you have done in reply here, is instead of respecting the reality of, and the nature of, particular circumstances, as features which fall outside the applicability of the universal rules, you have produced a universal rule to include that particular set of circumstances. This just indicates that you misunderstand the nature of particular circumstances. If it was feasible to produce a universal rule for every particular set of circumstances, then the applicability of universal rules would be negated, by the requirement of a different rule for every particular set of circumstances.

Sorry, are you suggesting something is objective? — Dan

That's right, I do not deny the relevance of "objectivity". What I am arguing is that "truth" and "right", as concepts produced by human subjects, are wrongly represented as "objective". To argue that "truth" and "right" are wrongly classed as "objective" does not imply that there is nothing which can be classed as "objective".

As for how they can be the same thing, that's easy, not things that are objective are the same thing. — Dan

Huh?

That just isn't so. Even if we take objective to imply that it is observable to someone other than the subject, which I don't agree with, something being observable doesn't make it immutable. We might imagine a mind reader who can tell what you desire, but you might nevertheless be able to overcome that desire or not act in accordance with it. — Dan

The point though, is that to consider opposing desires, as we do in deliberation, it is required that contrary desires are predicable of the same subject, at the same time, in violation of the law of noncontradiction. The three fundamental laws of logic dictate how we understand objects. Objects have identity as an object, and what we say about "the object" must obey the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

If we make the subject the object, as you propose in saying that the subject's desires are objective, there is an incompatibility with the law of noncontradiction when the object has contrary predicates (desires) at the same time, as is evident in deliberation.

I see a few possible solutions.

The first, most obvious possibility is to allow for a general violation of the law of noncontradiction. However, this has far reaching ramifications for our capacity to understand "the object", and further ramifications on the nature of "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects) in general.

The next possibility which I see, is to alter the law of identity, design a form of "identity", which allows that the identity of a subject, as an identifiable object, is a different kind of object (allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction) from other types of objects (not allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction). However, this is very confusing because now we have two distinct types of objects, those which obey the law of noncontradiction, and those which do not. Further, this would produce a bifurcation in "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects), according to that same division. Since the same words are used, "object", "objective", etc., equivocation and very significant, and important, misunderstanding, is inevitable.

What I propose therefore, is to maintain the separation between subject and object. This allows distinct words, "subject" and "object", so that we do not confuse things which are "subjective" (of the subject) with things which are "objective" (of the object). In this way, we are not inclined to call things which are property of the subject, like desires, "objective", because we maintain a proper separation between the categories, subject and object. That this categorical separation is required is demonstrated by the fact that understanding of "the object" is facilitated by adhering to the three fundamental laws of logic. However, understanding of "the subject" is facilitated by allowing for violation of those laws. This is because the fundamental, or essential nature of the object (describable by determinist principles), is incompatible with the fundamental, or essential nature of the subject (describable by the principles of free will).

It does tell you how to act. It tells you what you should and shouldn't do, specifically, tells you which maxims you should and shouldn't act in accordance with. — Dan

No it really doesn't tell you this, because you still have to make the decision for yourself, rather than having the categorical imperative state it for you.

Also, it is your position that claims one cannot be wrong. My position is there is a right answer, and I am attempting to find it. Yours appears to be that whatever one thinks, they're right. — Dan

You seem to be forgetting what I am arguing. Being right is not simply a matter of truth, there is also the issue of justification.

This is exactly the problem with your approach, You state all these things about obective truth and objective right, which you seem to honestly believe, therefore they are true for you, but you haven't been able to justify any of it. Your attempts demonstrate incoherency in your beliefs.

They really aren't. One of them can be incorrect. If I like chocolate ice cream and you prefer strawberry, one of us isn't wrong. If you think the world is flat and I think it's round(ish) one of us is wrong. — Dan

This example is not applicable. Claims about the world being flat, or round, are not claims about objective reality, they are claims about the world. You continue to demonstrate that you just do not understand predication at all.

The Euthyphro dilemma shows that suggesting that the good/pious is determined by god/the gods leads one to either the good/pious being arbitrary or nor actually being determined by god/the gods after all. But this does not mean that there is no objective good/right. Good/right in the moral sense need not be 'determined' by anyone. — Dan

You're right that the arguments themselves do not produce that conclusion. However, as I said, we are meant to infer, from the context of the dialogue, in relation to the human court trials of impiety, that pious/impious is determined by human beings. That is the way that Platonic arguments work. Plato demonstrates the unsound deductive arguments of others, unsound due to faulty premises. Then he provides information which is evidence for the probable correct premise. So the conclusion (the correct premise) is more like an inductive conclusion, based in evidence and probability, rather than a deductive proof.

Look at the conclusions more critically. Pious/good is not determined by the gods or God. Pious/good might be arbitrary. But obviously it is not arbitrary, because there are human trials going on which determine pious/good. That's the evidence. The conclusion we ought to draw, is obvious, human beings determine pious/good, in a non-arbitrary way.

I am not 'assigning' value to it, I am suggesting that it might be morally valuable. Valuable as such. Valuable whether or not anyone values it. What one should do (or how one should be, or what one should pursue etc) regardless of what one wants. A categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one. — Dan

This makes no sense. If you say that it is morally valuable, then you are assigning value to it, moral value. What could "valuable, but not valued by anyone" possibly mean? What would justify the claim that it is valuable? And if you say "it's just a belief", then as I explained, a belief must be justifiable through application, or it's worthless. Therefore it's a belief with no value, and self-contradicting.

It is not my subjective opinion. It is my belief on an objective matter. — Dan

Unless it is justifiable, it is just a subjective opinion. I think I've adequately demonstrated that your supposed concept of "objective truth" is unjustifiable. Therefore it is a subjective opinion.

I don't know how you can consistently say that someone can say what they believe and be wrong. I don't know how your beliefs allow for honest mistakes. — Dan

I think you are continuing to judge "subjective truth" from your premise that truth must be objective. Of course this is the instance of' begging the question' which I explained earlier. It makes "subjective truth" appear self-contradictory to you. Therefore you make all sorts of absurd conclusions about subjective truth. The problem, obviously, is that you are not letting go of your premise that truth must be objective, before considering the concept of "subjective truth".

Why do you think that life requires action or we die? Just believe something different and it won't anymore according to your position. — Dan

I don't see your point. We must breathe, eat, etc.. If you believe that you can live without these go ahead and try. I will then judge whether you've justified those beliefs or not.

The rare condition in this case causes drug X to be lethal, so the doctor's actions did kill them, which from an actual-value consequentialism perspective, does make them wrong inasmuch as the doctor could have acted differently and their action caused worse consequences than had they done so. — Dan

I don't think so. As you state, the rare condition "causes drug X to be lethal". The act of administering the drug is not a lethal act, as indicated by all the other instances. Therefore the rare condition is the cause of death, not the doctor's action, which you mistakenly judge as wrong.

You have just asserted that if there was an objective truth about the matter, this would make free will impossible, but there is no reason to think this. You are asserting that it can't be the case that it is objectively true that I desire ice cream but I am not seeking it, but there is no reason to think this is the case. — Dan

I explained the reasons. It seems you didn't pay attention, maybe you didn't understand, or just ignored.

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Desires are indeed different from the actions one takes in pursuit of them. — Dan

Sure they are different, when the desire is understood as subjective, and the action is understood as objective. But the issue is how could both the action and the desire be objective without them being one and the same. "Objective" implies observable by someone other than the subject. No part of the desire is observable except the actions associated with it. Therefore the proposed "objective desire" and the action which demonstrates it, would be one and

And the reason why objectivity of desire is incompatible with free will is that if there was objective fact about what I desired, then I, the subject could not use my will power to overcome that desire. In other words, I could not choose to desire something contrary to what I objectively desired, because a person could not deliberate, i.e. having incompatible desires. Take your shirt buying example as proof that desires cannot be objective. The stated desire is to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, yet somehow an incompatible desire caused the act. How could two incompatible desires both be objectively true at the same time? Yet two incompatible desires coexist when we deliberate.

I mean, it says rather a lot more than "act according to maxims". It specifically says what kind of maxims it is rational (according to Kant) and therefor moral (according to Kant) to act in accordance with. It is very much telling you how to act. — Dan

The categorical imperative says what kind of maxims tell one how to act. It does not "tell you how to act". It tells you what kind of maxims tell you how to act. This is another good example of the same type of category mistake you make when you say "the world is changing" says something about the way that the world is. In this case, since there is one maxim which says that there are many maxims required to tell you how to act, you conclude that there is one maxim which tells you how to act. In the other case, "the world is changing" tells you that there are many ways which "the world is" and you conclude that it states that there is one way that the world is.

I mean, I would say Kant does propose multiple rules for action, rather than just one, though he would surely disagree. — Dan

This is the problem. What Kant did, is not the same as what he said he did. What he said he was doing (his goal or intention) doesn't pan out in what he did. This is because what he was trying to do, base moral philosophy in one objective principle was impossible, so his endeavour was doomed to failure. So when we state what he did, he would disagree and say that's not what I was doing.

This is what happens when you seek to base moral philosophy in some fictional, fantasy "objective truth". You produce an unobtainable goal for your moral philosophy, an ideal (sort of perfection) which is unrealistic, such that the philosophy itself, which is intended to support that goal cannot do what you need it to do.

That isn't what Kant or I do. Morality isn't subjective. People all believing different things about morality is a result of some (or all) of them being wrong. — Dan

OK, and what do you base your claim that they are wrong on, other than insisting that your morality is right? These statements of yours are useless.

No idea who "we" is in this context as I'm fairly sure that moral objectivism is the majority view, but even if it weren't, we have good reason to think it is the correct view. Although, if I am right that objectivism is the majority view, this also means that objective theories are more likely to be accepted. — Dan

Ha ha, that's funny. You have good reason to think that objectivism is the correct view, because objectivism states its position to be objective, therefore impossible to be wrong. Oh, that's actually begging the question, and truly a very bad reason. "I hold the correct view, because I assert that it is impossible for me to be wrong."

And then you make a meaningless, unsupported assertion about objectivism being the majority view, when such a thing would be completely irrelevant to objectivism.

No it isn't. When we hold beliefs about objective reality, those are not the same as subjective opinions about, for example, matters of taste. — Dan

Beliefs about "objective reality" are metaphysical speculations which are subjective opinions, "matters of taste". This is one's attitude toward reality, what you prefer to believe, just like your attitude toward ice cream flavours.

Sorry, why do you think that Christianity is based on Plato? — Dan

To start with, I've read Plato, and I've also read St Augustine, a Church Father. Augustine claimed to base many of his ideas in Plato, and I've corroborated that claim through my own comparison. I've also read other Christian theologians, and have seen how they were influenced by reading Plato. We could discuss this, but you already demonstrated a strong aversion to theology.

Euthyphro shows nothing of the sort. — Dan

With the dilemma illustrated in Euthyphro, it is shown that it is neither the case that the pious is called "pious" because it refers to what is loved by the gods or God, nor is it the case that the gods, or God loving the pious is what causes it to be called "pious". And in the context of the discussion, court trials about impiety, it is demonstrate that in our world of existence, "pious" is what human beings determine it to be. So the idea of one common, independent "good", validated by divinity, is demonstrated as false, and "good" is what human beings determine.

Because it is morally valuable. It is coherent because moral value and being valued by someone aren't the same thing. — Dan

You have not demonstrated how something which is not valued by anyone could be valuable. If you are the one assigning "value" to it, then it is valuable to you. But that is clearly subjective.

Objective truth is not a fiction or a fantasy. It is in fact quite the opposite. — Dan

Thanks for letting me in on your subjective opinion. Not that it does you any good.

Because people can be wrong. — Dan

Right, now you're catching on. When someone says "tell the truth", and you tell the truth, you do actually tell the truth, even if you are wrong. That is the nature of human fallibility. Even when we tell the truth there is a possibility that "the truth" which is told, might still be wrong. That is what constitutes "an honest mistake".

If you insist that "the truth" must exclude the possibility of being wrong, you place 'truth" right outside the world of human existence, and human activity. This is the interaction problem of Platonic realism. Your proposed "objective truth" is a fantasy, a product of your imagination which has no bearing on the existence, and actions of human beings, unless these human beings are willing to accept this ideal (imaginary perfection), and allow it into their lives. Then it becomes a divinity, like God, something we accept, believe in, and have faith in.

Usefulness in what sense? I don't know how any laws of logic or rules of theory selection in, for example, science can be useful if you think that whatever you believe is true. There's no fail-state, so there's no need for any of these rules. You can just believe any old nonsense and hold that it's true, no need to evaluate your beliefs for consistency or consider whether they match reality at all. — Dan

Believing and doing are distinct things. If a person could sit in meditation, without doing anything, they could believe "any old nonsense, and believe it's true" as you say. However, life requires action or we die. When we move to act, our beliefs are tested for usefulness. Ones which do not produce success are forgotten, and no longer is it possible that a person believes any old nonsense. Beliefs of "any old nonsense" die with those who hold them. And "rules" which prove to be useful prevail over our activities.

That also isn't what is happening in my hypothetical. The situation I presented was that of a patient in a time-sensitive situation where spending time investigating rare conditions may result in their death, drug X is the most effective drug for the condition and has the least general risk associated with it, and the patients does not present any signs in either their behaviour, symptoms, or available medical history that would suggest they have the rare condition that would make the proscribing of drug X the wrong choice. — Dan

There is nothing in this example to indicate that the wrong choice was made. There is only indication that the right choice was made. Therefore we ought to conclude that the right choice was made. Furthermore, if a patient does dies from that "rare condition", it is the rare condition which causes the patient's death, not the doctor's actions, and we still cannot conclude that the doctor's actions were wrong.

It is presumably objectively true that I want some ice cream. That doesn't mean I have to seek ice cream. — Dan

You are speaking nonsense again. If it is objectively true that you desire ice cream then it is objectively true that your are seeking it. How could it possibly be an objective truth that you desire ice cream unless you were seeking it? What produces the objective conclusion is the fact that you are seeking it. If you say "I feel like I want ice cream, but I am not seeking it", then you refer to subjective feelings, and it's not an objective truth, it's subjective. You, the subject are interpreting your own feelings as a desire for ice cream, and this means it's a subjective conclusion.

The reason I suggest that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter is that presumably we can be wrong about what we desire. We can think we desire one thing, but in fact we don't (this is different from desiring something and then, once we get it, we decide we don't really like it after all). — Dan

Right, and that's one example of why there is no such thing as objective truth about such feelings. They are what defines "subjective", feelings of the subject. You propose "that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", but as I've explained to you, this would exclude the possibility of free will. If there was objective truth in the matter, desires, and the actions which we say are caused by desires, would be one and the same. That is what is required to make the desire objectifiable. Conventionally we hold the desire as separate as separate from the action, because the causal connection is not necessary (free choice being intermediary), and the desire is of the subject, not observed, therefore subjective.

What I've been telling you, your presumption, "presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", is nothing but a fiction, a fantasy of your imagination, which is demonstrably incoherent. You presume this because it provides some support to your consequentialist morals. In reality though, if what you presume was true, it would deny the possibility of free will, and all types of moral philosophy. Therefore if you keep supporting your so-called moral philosophy on such presumptions, you render what you propose as something other than moral philosophy. I've been calling it "immoral", but I now see it's better called "amoral", because your principles put what you propose right outside the field of moral philosophy, so that it cannot be judged by the principles of moral philosophy to be immoral. What you propose is simply not relevant to moral philosophy, therefore amoral.

You are badly mistaken. Kant's categorical imperative absolutely does say how people should act. Specifically, that they must always act according to maxims... — Dan

You don't seem to understand the meaning of what you are saying here. If the imperative states "act according to maxims", that imperative is not telling anyone "how to act". It is telling them that there is a maxim which will tell them how to act. Then there needs to be a different maxim for every different situation to tell a person how to act in that situation. This proposed categorical imperative tells everyone that they must act according to a maxim which is applicable to each particular situation one finds oneself in, but that says nothing about how one should act in any situation.

Therefore it truly says nothing about how one should act. It just states a general principle of what one should consider before acting. And if we say that deciding how to act is itself an action, and this is the action which that categorical imperative refers to, then the imperative becomes incoherent. The imperative "how to act" must be understood before it can be followed in an act. If, "act" also refers to understanding it is impossible that one could apply the imperative to the act of understanding the imperative.

Your claim demonstrates the same type of category mistake you make when you say that "the world is changing" makes a statement about the way that the world is. "Changing" signifies something mutually exclusive from what "what is" signifies. The two were demonstrated by Aristotle to be incompatible. So when you predicate "is changing" of "the world" you create the illusion that "changing" is compatible with "what is". That is a sophistic trick exposed by Socrates and Plato thousands of years ago. You employ another version of the same type of sophistic trick when you claim that "one imperative which states that you must act according to many imperatives", means that there is one imperative which tells you how to act. Really, what this means is that there is one imperative which tells you that there are many imperatives which tell you how to act.

For another, the classical utilitarian would say the way you should act is in the way that maximizes utility (usually understood as happiness - unhappiness). — Dan

Again, all this says is that there is a different way to act for every different situation, which is the best way according to the situation. It is not one rule which tells you how to act in all situations.

It isn't inconsistent with free will in the least. That being said, many moral philosophers seem to think free will is not necessary for moral theory (especially not of the strong, incompatibilist sort). I disagree with them on this point, but again, you appear to be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the landscape of moral philosophy. — Dan

Yes, this is really the issue we have now. Since it is very clear that moral theory is inherently subjective, moral philosophers can produce all sorts of different moral theories. That is evident from the abundance and variety of moral theories which avail us. Some are quite absurd. However, some, like Platonic moral theory for example, get accepted, conventionalized, and become quite influential, through a sort of intersubjectivity.

On the other hand, there are some people who do not like the idea that moral theory is inherently subjective. They believe that the reality of a multitude of moral theories which is enabled by free will, freedom of choice in thinking, and the inherent subjectivity of moral theory, is for some reason a defect to moral theory, which ought to be corrected. So these people, like Kant, like yourself, and many others, ignore the lessons of history which teach us the reality about moral theories, and they produce further subjective theories, which propose objective principles as the foundation for their subjective theories.

Of course we can reject these as being inherently self-defeating, untrue in the sense of dishonesty, subjective theories which claim to be objective. Further, since their basic principles miss the true essence of a moral theory, a subjective theory which is agreeable, and likely to be accepted, and conventionalized in an intersubjective way, we can dismiss these proposals as outside the category of what constitutes a "moral theory".

He doesn't start with a subjective opinion, but a believe about the objective. — Dan

Any "belief about the objective" very clearly is a subjective opinion. If you understood metaphysics and ontology, you'd see this very clearly. Our beliefs about "the objective" are all subjective opinions.

Also, whether or not Kant succeeds does not demonstrate that the goal he is aiming at is doomed to failure. — Dan

The problems which he encounters which I explained, but you didn't understand demonstrates that his goal is doomed to failure. Maybe you'll understand better from what I said in this post, concerning the "one imperative", which dictates that a vast multitude of imperatives tells us what to do. Making an imperative which dictates that many imperatives are required, does not constitute demonstrating that one imperative will suffice. It actually demonstrates that the opposite is probable.

Kant is one of the most influential moral philosophers of all times. — Dan

I don't think so. Christianity is based in Platonist moral theory. It held sway in the western world for many hundreds of years. Kant pales in comparison. In fact Kant as a moralist, is more often than not, criticized and rejected, as insufficient. Where is the supposed "influence"?

I think you'll find that the Christians are definitely aiming at objectivity. — Dan

This demonstrates the same misunderstanding of the Platonic/Christian tradition you showed earlier. If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that each individual person has one's own place within the state, with ones own desires and goals. "The good" refers to what is desired by the individual, as the motivation for activity, and this is not one common, objective goal which we all seek. The idea of one common goal, validated by the divinity, is the idea which is shown to be incoherent in The Euthyphro.

On a different note, being accepted and convential is not the same as being true. — Dan

The goal of moral philosophy is not to be "true" in the "objective" way that you understand this word. That shows your attempt to conflate is and ought. The goal is to be "true to oneself", honest. And when an individual moral philosopher is honest in this way, the principles will be espoused by others. "Truth" in the way you use that word is irrelevant and outside of moral philosophy.

Also, why should we assume that what we value and what is morally valuable are the same? — Dan

How would you get anyone to accept your moral philosophy if you put forth a system where what is proposed as "valuable" is not actually valued by anyone? How is that coherent?

Also, you appear to be committing a naturalistic fallacy towards the end there, suggesting that what is natural is moral etc. — Dan

No, I'm not suggesting any such equivalence. I am suggesting that moral philosophy must be based in something real, and what we have as "real" in relation to the acts of beings, is what is natural. That doesn't say that what is natural and what is moral are equivalent. Basing moral philosophy in some fictional fantasy of what is "objectively" true or right, provides no traction.

When you say something is true, do you just mean that you believe it? — Dan

Yes, when I say "X is true", it means that I honestly believe X. You know, like when someone says "tell the truth", and in court when they say "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", it means what you honestly believe. How could there be anything more to "is true" than this?

Okay, but why do we need to abide by the law of noncontradiction if it is not true? What if you don't believe in the law of noncontradiction? — Dan

The law of noncontradiction is a rule I believe in because of its usefulness. Depending on one's attitude toward the law of identity, the applicability of the law of noncontradiction may be accepted or rejected. Hegel rejected the law of identity as a useless tautology. But then some who follow him, like dialetheists and dialectical materialists, also reject the law of noncontradiction, as inapplicable in cases where identity is inapplicable. They do not believe in the law of noncontradiction.

No, in this case we don't want doctors to be doing that because not proscribing drug X will kill more people than it saves. — Dan

I disagree, we always want doctors to be aware of possible negative effects of any drugs they prescribe. Telling doctors this drug usually saves lives when a person has such and such symptoms, therefore always prescribe it when a person has those symptoms, is wrong, and not he way doctors are actually trained. They are trained to be aware of, and look for possible complications

Intuition, of the reliable kind that might present in this kind of context, is more about unconsciously noticing circumstances that your experience and training have prepared you to notice. Eg, a firefighter "just knowing" that a building is about to collapse, because they have unconsciously noticed signs that correspond to things they have seen in buildings on the verge of collapse in the past. In this case, no such signs are present in the patients who will die from drug X. — Dan

Right, that's what I am talking about. Training is not simply about teaching general rules (prescribe X drug when a patient has such and such symptoms), it's also about culturing good intuition, which is reading the peculiarities of the unique circumstances. Doctors need this just as much as firefighters do.

You are wrong to say no such sign is present in this case. If I remember the example correctly, the sign is explicit, and tattooed right on the foot of the patient. The doctor might be aware of a trend to make such a tattoo, or some other factor learned might subconsciously incline the doctor to check the foot. And in real life cases there are often indications that a doctor might look for, just like a firefighter. Intuition is a factor which gives the expert an edge over others.

First, there presumably is an objective truth to what a person desires. — Dan

You might presume this, but if it were true, it would deny the possibility of free will. As I explained if it was an objective truth that a person desires X, then the person would have to seek X and would not be free to do otherwise.

No, moral facts are facts about the way that persons ought to be or act. — Dan

This is nonsense. No moral philosophy claims to state objective facts about the way people ought to act. We might make a general statement like "a person ought to do what is good", but since "good" is such a general term, this sort of statement says noting about any specific "way" that a person ought to be. Even Kant's presumed categorical imperative doesn't state a way that people should live.

Again, no, morality (at least, of the sort I am interested in) is not about human judgements, but about the way all persons, actual and merely possible, ought to be or act. Of course, both are the subject of moral philosophy, as what morality is and what the goal of morality is is a question of metaethics. — Dan

You are wrong. As I demonstrated already, "the sort" you are interested in, is not a sort of morality at all. You pretty much accepted this already when you told me that you didn't agree with any traditional moral principles. So it's just like my example. If a person came up with a bunch of axioms which are completely inconsistent with traditional mathematics, and said "this is the sort of mathematics I'm interested in", we'd have to say that is not mathematic at all. And to take the analogy further, if someone proposed "a sort" of logic which was completely inconsistent with traditional logic, we'd designate it as illogical. Likewise, your "sort" is immoral.

I think that objectivism is the only viable metaethical option at this level, and that leaves us with either moral realism (paired with objectivism) or moral error theory as our potential plausible views of morality, of which I think moral realism is the better view to take. — Dan

I'm starting to see that your form of "objectivism" is actually inconsistent with free will. This makes it inconsistent with moral theory, therefore immoral.

This is very much not an idea that is common in moral philosophy. — Dan

You are demonstrating a very low level degree of education in moral philosophy.

I mean, Kant aboslutely would say that there is one universal imperative, though he would claim there are different "formulations" of it. — Dan

Different "formulations" is the key thing here. The problem for Kant is that there are two distinct universals to deal with, every situation, and every human being. Due to the incompatibility between these two universals, there cannot be one law for both, every human being in every situation. Kant thought there ought to be one overarching categorical imperative so he tried to determine it.

However, his attempt breaks down, such that we can either have distinct laws for each situation, which apply to all people, or we can have distinct laws for each person which apply in all situations. Either way ends up with a multitude of categorical imperatives, either a distinct imperative for each situation, or a distinct imperative for each person, and there cannot be one categorical imperative which determines them all because there are two distinct types.

So on one reading of this, you're very badly wrong. Moral philosophy as a discipline doesn't start with an assumption of subjectivity and then proceed from there. If you'd like, I can point you at some moral philosophy textbooks if you like so you can get a better grasp of this. — Dan

Take Kant's for example. He starts from the personal believe, a subjective opinion, that there ought to be one categorical imperative. That is a subjective opinion. No matter how you look at it, you cannot get away from the subjectivity of moral philosophy.

You like to think that moral philosophy can start in objectivity, but that's your subjective opinion, and as Kant's effort demonstrates the quest for objectivity is doomed to failure. Therefore every successful (i.e. influential) moral philosophy in the past, begins with the subject. You can show me as many proposals for moral philosophy, as you like, which begin in objectivity, and I will show you how each fails. And, since they are all inconsistent with true, accepted, conventional, and influential moral philosophy, it's best to describe them as immoral.

It is not an arbitrary assertion, it is abductively reasoning towards the best candidate for moral value under the assumption that something has such value. — Dan

Unless you can provide the reasons, there is no abductive reasoning here at all, and your claim of what provides the best candidate for moral value is arbitrary.

I've provided good reason why "desire" grounds "value" in what is desirable. This is because desire is what shapes and guides our decisions. We choose things which we desire, and that is a natural fact. So we ground "value" in how it is naturally grounded. Notice, this is not proposed as "objective fact", it is a natural inclination. Since free will allows us to create structures of value not grounded in natural inclinations, such as what you propose, we cannot say that it is an objective fact that value must be grounded this way. It is a choice to be made, ground value in the natural way or not, just like the choice to be moral or immoral. We cannot say that it is an objective fact that we must behave morally, because that would be denying our freedom of choice to act immorally.. Such proposals, being inconsistent with what is natural, ought to be rejected as immoral, but I cannot say it's an objective fact that they must be rejected..

It may be worth considering what assumptions you are making and ensure one of them is not that everyone else is making the same ones. — Dan

I explained to you how this idea is very faulty. So it's definitely not an assumption I am making.

How I get from one to the other is that, presumably, if truth is subjective, then each of our beliefs are true "for us". I agree it is only true if truth is subjective, but if you think truth is subjective, then presumably you must accept that if I think truth is objective, I am also right, thus the contradiction. — Dan

I don't see the contradiction. You simply demonstrate your lack of understanding of predication.
P1 predicates of the subject MU, the belief that truth is subjective.
P2 predicates of the subject Dan, the belief that truth is objective.
There is nothing more than this, and no incompatibility nor contradiction, different beliefs are predicated of different subjects.

It is only if you add a further premise, P3 "truth is subjective", that the appearance of contradiction arises. However, the appearance of contradiction is due to the way "truth is subjective" is interpreted by you. You interpret "truth is subjective" as an objective truth. And of course, if you interpret the proposition "truth is subjective": as an objective truth, contradiction is implicit within your interpretation, and so absurdity appears.

The issue therefore, is that since you believe truth is objective (P2), then if you judge P3 "truth is subjective" as true you create a contradiction. Therefore to judge P3 as true you need to be a different person than the Dan mentioned. Then you will not judge P3 "truth is subjective" through an interpretation of this as an objective truth, you will judge it as true in the only way that it could truly be judged as true, a subjective truth (you simply believe it), and then there is no contradiction and no absurdities.

So you're saying that if we accept the premise "truth is subjective", then my beliefs about whether truth is subjective or not can be wrong? Which is to say, there is an objective truth to whether truth is subjective? I mentioned this earlier, but you tried to dodge it by allowing the subjectivity of truth to itself be subjective, which gives rise to exactly the problem I pointed out here. — Dan

No, I didn't imply any objective truth. I said that if two premises contradict each other, and we accept one as correct, then we must reject the other as wrong. There is no implied "objective truth" just adherence to the law of noncontradiction.

No, the wrong action is being praised in order to promote the right ones. — Dan

To justify this would require demonstrating a causal relation between the proposed cause, praising the wrong, and the effect, future right ones.

I have not equvocated so much as clarified since you seemed to be stuck on the term "same act". I have absolutely given you an example of this that used neither of these terms in the case of "proscribing drug X to a patient who has a specific medical history, set of symptoms, etc". In that case, praising the wrong action (from the perspective of actual-value consequentialism) of proscribing drug X to that patient is done because you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X. — Dan

In the example, administering drug X caused the death of the patient, that's why it was judged as wrong. If you praise administering drugs which cause death to patients, how do you think that this promotes future right acts.

As I've been trying to tell you, without analyzing the act, and separating the right from the wrong, you cannot conclude that promoting the act will have the best consequences. This is because separating the actions of the acter, which you wish to praise, from the particular circumstances, which are responsible for the judgement of wrong, will have better consequences than simply praising the act which was wrong. The consequences will be better because analysis will enable the students to better "understand" the role of circumstances in relation to the consequences of their actions.

So, " you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X." But this is clearly not the best approach. We want doctors to do more than just consider "the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc,", we want doctors to also be aware of unique and peculiar circumstances. "Etc." here might indicate other situations in which the patient would die. This is a special sort of keenness which is sometimes associated with intuition, but it can be identified and cultivated by educators. It is a heightened sense of awareness of the risks and dangers in a given situation, and the capacity to rapidly assess and judge the potential impact of the circumstances.

This capacity separates someone with excellent capacities (expert), from someone who is merely good at what they do. If we want "the best consequences" we need to promote such excellence, rather than your average "goodness", and this means having the highest understanding of how the peculiarities and uniqueness of each particular situation may have an effect on the consequences. This is known as "good intuition", and excellence requires not only good education, but also good intuition. And that is why we do not judge "expertise" solely on a person's theoretical education, but also on one's practise, because how an individual applies one's theory to the vast variety of situations which a person finds oneself in, is what really determines how "good" the person is.

I think there may be a clash of underlying assumptions here. I am assuming that things that any moral facts that exist are objectively true, in fact I would go as far as to say necessary truths. It seems as though you are treating moral values as something we invent? Is that fair to say? I think this might be the source of this disagreement. — Dan

You are missing the point, let me try again.

If we name any specific thing, as that which a person desires, this would be as you say, a contingent truth, not a necessary truth. This is due to the nature of the human being, and free will. We have desires, and particular things are sometimes desired, but no particular thing desired, is necessarily desired, and this constitutes our freedom of choice. If certain things appeared to us as "necessary" in any absolute sense. we would have no freedom of choice, because of the necessity of those particular things.

Because of this, there is no "objective truth" to "what a person desires". If there was objective truth to "what a person desires", this would implicitly negate freedom of choice, by contradiction and incompatibility. So, moral philosophy takes this as a fundamental principle, not necessarily an "objective truth", though some may say that God supports this as an objective truth. I take it as an axiom, a self-evident principle, since it is evident that we have free will, it is a necessary conclusion that nothing desired is desired as necessary.

What I was telling you, is that this principle provides the basis for moral philosophy, because it allows for the reality of differences between us. So for example, we do not need to fight over the same thing. It is not necessary that we each have the very same thing, we can each have something similar. Furthermore, by cultivating the differences between us, we have different people suitable for different positions, different jobs, etc..

So, your idea " any moral facts that exist are objectively true" is actually counter productive to moral philosophy. "Moral facts" are statements about human subjectivity, what we value, and desire. And, it is essential to recognize and promote the "moral fact" that we may value and desire different things. This is necessary to avoid fighting over the same thing. Further, allowing for these differences allows us to cooperate toward common goals or ends, by each person playing a different role.

The difficult part to understand, and accept, is that "moral facts" themselves cannot be objectively true. This is what I've been trying to tell you concerning the nature of a predication, as a judgement. Judgements are made by subjects, and as such they are guided by one's desires and intentions, so they are inherently subjective. If we assume facts which are "objectively true" these fall outside the realm of human judgement, therefore outside the realm of "moral facts", which consists of human judgements. Then the only time they can become relevant is if we attempt to determine what these divine judgements might look like, but that is a completely different subject, not moral philosophy, but ontology or metaphysics. Plato outlined that separation in The Euthyphro.

I'm struggling with this one, because a lot of what you've said is dead wrong, down to the bones wrong. — Dan

That's consistent with your usual response. You insist that I am "dead wrong", but you offer nothing to back that up. You clearly have a misunderstanding of "moral philosophy", believing that it consists of some universal, objective statements about "the thing we all desire" when I've explained how this is dead wrong. Moral philosophy must be based in assumptions that we desire different things.

But, on the other hand, I would agree that moral philosophy should allow us maximum freedom (over our own choices) in a way which doesn't interfere with others' (possessive apostrophe added as I obviously mean others' freedom over their own choices). — Dan

So you really do share ideas with traditional moral philosophy. That is why I still think it is worthwhile discussing these things with you. We don't throw out the baby with the bath water. Your idea to maximize freedom is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. you just do not seem to have the same understanding of "freedom", and so you have a different approach.

Having to live our lives "the same way" is not the same as all being subject to the same categorical imperative(s).

When I discuss "morality" I am referring to objective, universal, indeed necessary, morality. Those truths, if indeed they exist, are the ones I am after. I think that is what people say when they say "morality." If it isn't, then so much the worse for them, and I will accept the asterisk next to the word and continue on regardless, as those are the kind of moral truths that are worth pursuing.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that. — Dan

I think you misunderstand Kant's concept of categorical imperative. Notice, there is not one universal "imperative", but a better interpretation would reveal a different imperative for each different situation. That renders Kant's idea as useless.

Moral philosophy is intended to help guide us through the difficulties of the uniqueness of situations, where universal objective principles do not well apply. So if you seek such universal, objective principles, as a basis for moral philosophy, you are proceeding in the wrong direction. What you ought to look at is how such universal principles fail us in the uniqueness of particular circumstances. That's what moral philosophy is all about, guiding us in dealing with the unique and peculiar circumstances which we find ourselves in every day. I think that is the lesson of the doctor example. The doctor follows "the universal rule" but still ends up making what could be judged as "the wrong choice". Moral philosophy guides us to hone our intuitions enabling us to rapidly assess the peculiarities of the circumstances, and how these peculiarities may effect any attempts to apply universal rules.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that. — Dan

That's right, there is absolutely no place for objectivism in moral philosophy, which deals with the decision making of subjects. The subject of moral philosophy is the decisions of the subject, so objectivity is irrelevant. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear on moral philosophy assume a compromised (false) sense of objectivity, often called intersubjectivity, which is nothing more than convention, agreement between subjects. Objectivism is relegated to a place outside moral philosophy, i.e. ontology or metaphysics. From there it can bear on epistemology, and even moral philosophy, but only in the way that it affects an individual subject's attitude toward these fields.

I would say instead that the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them is the best candidate we have for moral value (for all the reasons mentioned in my primer and the referenced works). So, assuming anything has moral value, we should assume it is this. Abductive reasoning, not deductive. — Dan

But you do not say why freedom of persons over their choices has "value". Because of this, it is just an arbitrary assertion. You assert something like "the ability to make one's own choice freely is the most valuable thing". But someone could say "the ability to eat is the most valuable thing", or "the ability to breathe", "the ability to move", or "the ability to see", or "hear", etc.. Unless you support your claim with reasons, it is just arbitrary like all these others, and many more.

To support or justify your position you need a definition of "value" which is consistent with your claim. The common definition associates "value" with what is desirable, but this does not work for you. And when we associate "value" with freedom in a more general sense, it is incompatible with general universal "objective" moral principles. So you need to give up one or the other. Either give up associating "value" with freedom. or give up associating "value" with objective moral principles, because the two produce incompatible definitions of "value". What I have proposed is to associate value with freedom, but then moral principles are taken as subjective.

I agree that I don't think truth is subjective, but presumably you think I am wrong? Presumably you could state P1, and then state P2 (as Dan thinks etc etc), and thus end up with the conclusion that truth isn't subjective. — Dan

No, it doesn't work that way. If I state P1 as "I think truth is subjective", and P2 as "Dan thinks truth is objective", then it is recognized as the beliefs of two different subjects. How do you get from this to "truth isn't subjective"? That would require the same sort of misunderstanding of predication which you demonstrated with "that expert is a person". See, "objective truth" is predicated to what "Dan thinks". It is not stated as "there is objective truth and Dan believes this", it is stated as Dan's belief, so it is only true if truth is subjective. Therefore we cannot conclude that truth is not subjective, because without the further premise "truth is subjective" none of the premises can be taken as truth. And with that premise, it just means that Dan's belief is inconsistent with that premise (i.e. wrong if we accept that premise).

I've already explained how it could lead to the best consequences: by promoting people acting in similar ways in situations that appear similar to them as the wrong action did to the actor in question but which are in fact different and will lead to good consequences rather than bad ones. — Dan

Obviously then, you are not praising the "same act" which was judged as wrong, you are praising, and promoting, what you clearly describe as "similar" acts.

That just isn't so. If praising a bad, incorrect act will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism recommends we do. — Dan

I'm still waiting for a logical explanation of how you believe that praising a bad, incorrect, act could lead to the best consequences. You've switched from your equivocation of "the same" to acknowledge that you are praising and promoting "similar acts". But now there is no principle whereby you would praise the bad act itself, you only praise and promote similar acts. The difference however, is that one is bad, and the others good. I suggest to you, that since bad and good are opposing predications, they aren't really "similar" at all, you just illogically claim this for argument sake.

Is it often assumed that what people value has moral value, certainly by the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists, but this is not a required assumption, and not one that I think we ought to make. — Dan

OK, I'll see if I can follow you with this assumption. I would say that moral value is based in "what people value". We proceed logically from determinations about what people value, to make conclusions about moral value.

You think that is not something we ought to do, you think it's a bad approach.. So now I want you to justify this claim that it is a bad approach.

Again, it just isn't. It's often assumed that what we value is moral valuably, but I am not making that assumption as a) I don't think we do all necessarily want the same thing, b) even if we, as humans did, that is no reason to think that all persons do, and c) even if they do, as a matter of fact, that would merely be a contingent fact about them, rather than a necessary one. Instead, I would say that I begin with simpler assumptions, which I detailed in the initial primer, and then from there try to determine what is the best candidate for moral value. — Dan

None of this justifies your claim.

a0 It is not necessary that we all want the same thing, to base moral value in what people value. In fact, it is in wanting different (though many are similar) things rather than the same thing which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If we all valued the same thing we would just fight over it, and we couldn't get anywhere with moral values. But since we may value different things, we can structure moral values in a way which allows us all to have what we need.

b) This is Irrelevant, because "moral value", as derived from what people value, does not assume that we all value the same thing. In fact, the opposite is the case.

c) The fact of the matter is as you say, when people value "the same thing", this is only contingently true, not a necessity. Because of this we can base moral principles in a system which allows people to value different things, and each have the different things that they value, without fighting over the same thing. So it actually is this "contingent fact" about "what people value", that they do not necessarily all value the same thing, which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If it was a necessary fact that we all valued the very same thing, we'd all fight over it and we could have no moral system based in what people value. Since what people value is contingent, we can all value different things and not fight over the same thing.

So your claim is not justified by your statements, it simply shows a lack of understanding of what it means to base moral value in what people value.

Again, nope. Moral philosophy, as I understand it, is about how we ought to live our lives, where ought is understood in a universal, objective sense. — Dan

Wow, you really do have a lack of understanding of moral philosophy. Do you really believe that moral philosophy dictates that we ought to all live our lives in the same way, according to some "universal, objective" sense of "ought". This is exactly the opposite of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is designed to allow us maximum freedom, for each person to seek after their own goals, in a way which doesn't interfere with others. We might employ universal principles, like love thy neighbour, but these are not employed in an objective sense, they are employed as a tool, the means toward allowing people to live their lives in the way they want, seeking the goals they want to seek, while allowing others the same capacity.

First, you haven't demonstrated any such thing. Second, I am not presenting the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them as desired by people. I am presenting it as valuable whether or not it is desired. — Dan

But you need to ground "value". By common definition "valuable" is defined as what is desirable, therefore value is grounded in what is desired. When you deny this relation, this grounding of "value" , you need to replace it with something else, otherwise you just make an arbitrary assertion, "X is valuable" without any reason as to why anyone might value it.

So, if "the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them" does not have value because it is desirable, then what makes it valuable. If you cannot say what makes it valuable then it's just an arbitrary random assertion. And, arbitrary random assertions do not produce moral philosophy.

Again, consequentialism isn't really a "means to an end". — Dan

You stated that consequentialism is the method. As method, it is the means.

That is not what I said. Since the view that truth is subjective allows for contradictory propostions to both (or all) be true, I demonstrated how this leads to problems using an argument that included contradictory premises to demonstrate why this position is not acceptable. — Dan

The view that truth is subjective does not allow that P1 and P2 are both true, as I explained. If you believe P1, therefore P1 is true by the subjective perspective, then P2 must be false. A person who thinks that truth is subjective cannot also think that truth is objective. And if you start with P2, "I think truth is objective", you cannot truthfully state P1, truth is subjective. No matter how you look at it, from the "truth is subjective" perspective you have sated two contradictory premises. It is only from the perspective of "truth is objective" that the two contradictory premises appear to be coherent, and that demonstrates the faultiness of that perspective. It makes two contradictory premises appear to make a coherent argument.

Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise. — Dan

OK, you and I have different ideas about what constitutes "expertise". That's not surprising.

No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter. — Dan

So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert.

I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. — Dan

You give "several" definitions for the same word, or phrase. You gave at least two for "their own choice", a choice concerning one's own mind body and property, and, a choice which does not restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.

Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion.

I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. — Dan

Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation.

Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend. — Dan

I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. To me, doing this would only produce the conclusion that your judgement of "wrong" is faulty. Well, I might agree then, "the best consequences" are denial of "actual value" moral principles. Is that what "the best consequences" are in this case, recognition that the principles by which you judged the praiseworthy act as wrong, are faulty principles?

I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. — Dan

As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts.

This is like your judgement of "expertise", but inverted. We can praise a person as "an expert", and you say that even when the so-called expert makes mistakes, we continue to praise the person as "an expert". What we do, is remove the person from the context of those mistakes. We do not praise the person for the mistakes.

Now, in the inverted sense, we have the mistaken act itself, as wrong, incorrect. You want to praise the act itself, which has already been judged as mistaken. In your previous explanation, you removed the act from its context, to say that the act in "most circumstances" would not be wrong. This would put the blame on the circumstances, for the mistake, not on the person. But then it is not a case of saying "THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF" is praiseworthy, it is a case of saying that the circumstances were wrong, and the act itself was actually correct, therefore praiseworthy.

So, the "actual value" principle by which you judge the act as wrong is faulty because it puts the blame on the acter, saying that the act (as property of the acter) was "wrong", when in reality the mistake was caused by the circumstances, not the choices of the acter. It wrongfully blames the acter with a "wrong" act, and you recognize that this judgement of "wrong act" is wrong (you recognize the actual value judgement as faulty), therefore you proceed to praise the acter, knowing that the act was not really wrong, the mistake is properly attributable to the "accidents" of the circumstances, not the act itself.

Therefore, in the inverted context, the context of the judgement of "expertise", the person is judged as an expert, and praised as an expert. Yet, the person demonstrates "misunderstanding" by making a mistake. In order that we maintain the judgement of "expert" we attribute the mistakes to the circumstances, not to the field of expertise. The expert continues to display an impeccable understanding of one's area of expertise, yet fails in understanding specific circumstances, "accidentals", and this produces mistakes. The mistakes cannot be judged as "wrong acts" of the acter, because that would negate the praiseworthiness of the the person called an expert, so the mistakes are attributed to a misunderstanding of the circumstances, and "circumstances", or "accidentals" are something external to, not part of, the area of expertise.

It is not logically impossible. — Dan

OK, I grant to you, that by strict deductive logic, it is not "logically impossible". This is due to the is/ought gap. The is/ought separation makes it impossible to demonstrate logically that it is incoherent to say that we "ought to praise an act which is wrong". This is because judgements of "ought", and judgements of "is" are categorically distinct, and no logic can bridge that gap. Instead, we bridge the gap with rules of moral philosophy, ethics. These rules are definitional, like axioms of mathematics.

So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles.

What i say now, is that your system may not be "logically impossible", but since it negates and denies the conventions of moral philosophy, we cannot call what you are proposing "moral philosophy". What is "logically impossible" is for your proposed system to be called "moral philosophy". That what you propose is incompatible with conventional moral philosophy, and that you present it as "moral philosophy" is what produces incoherency, and this makes your enterprise "logically impossible". It is logically impossible that what you present is moral philosophy. It's like for example, if someone proposed new axioms which are completely inconsistent with accepted axioms of mathematics, and presented them as "mathematics". It would be logically impossible that what the person presented is mathematics. Therefore, to avoid the judgement of "logically impossible" you need to quit representing what you are doing as moral philosophy.

II understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation. — Dan

You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood.

First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. — Dan

You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy.

Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake. — Dan

This furthers the evidence that what you propose is not "moral philosophy". You have separated "value" from "what is desired", and assume some form of consequentialist valuation. However, consequentialist principles are still based in the determination of a "good" outcome. And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not?

You posit "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the ground. But this becomes circular when the definition becomes self-referential. When are the consequences judged as "good"? When that ability is enabled. But why is this principle the measurement of "good". I suggest to you, that it is because it is consistent with the "type of freedom" which you personally desire. Now your moral philosophy is grounded in desire, what you desire, and as a oral philosophy it becomes logically incoherent.

With this proposition, "the ability to make their own choices is the measure of 'good' which you desire", I bring your proposal into the system of conventional moral philosophy to judge your desire as incompatible with moral philosophy. You claim to overrule my subjective judgement with an appeal to "objectivity". You insist that your system is not grounded in what you personally desire, it is grounded in an objective understanding of "freedom". But that's false, you define "freedom" as you please.

Now you propose a so-called "moral philosophy" which does not ground "value" in something fundamentally subjective, what is desired, but you ground it in something you propose as objective, "freedom". And we're back to the start, this is not "moral philosophy" at all.

The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. — Dan

The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all.

Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan

Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them".

Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false. — Dan

That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good.

I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. — Dan

I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:

So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. — Dan

I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect.

This was the significant sticking point between us, which made agreement on what it means "to understand one's choice" impossible. I wanted this to mean applying one's rationality prior to making the choice, and put the possibilities to be selected from into the context of what is desired by the person, but you want simply "able to apply their rationality to the choice", which signifies the ability to rationalize the choice after the fact.

Actually, I don't think you even understand this difference, and the failure to agree, between us, because you deny that the nature of time is important.

It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value". — Dan

Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means.

I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here. — Dan

OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong.

No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. — Dan

This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate.

I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town. — Dan

As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good.

No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. — Dan

As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.

Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement.

Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made. — Dan

If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it?

By actual-value consequentialist principles we cannot approve the act, because it is judged as wrong. What principles, what value system do you apply when you judge the act as praiseworthy? Whatever principles (value system) you apply, to judge the act as praiseworthy, clearly it is incompatible with actual-value consequentialism, which forced the judgement of wrong.

I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. — Dan

Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind.

I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented. — Dan

And here, by "intersubective" you mean agreement amongst a number of individuals don't you? So if there is such a "standard" which you refer to, it would be a rule of criteria by which we would judge whether a person is an expert. This way, if we all followed that specific rule, there would be significant agreement about whether a person is an expert or not. I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity".

Now, what do you think is the "standard" for expertise? Is it not, as I suggested earlier, the highest possible level of understanding? To me, this means that the person can carry out actions within one's field of expertise, for an extended period of time, without showing any mistakes. I still allow the possibility of mistake at some time, but such a mistake would not be conducive to the judgement of "expert", and it would carry with it the need to reevaluate an earlier judgement of "expert".

Of course, we really don't have any such "standard". We don't say that the person must be mistake free for a year, or six months or anything like that. This is because there is a whole lot of other factors which we take into account, the person's education, the type of mistake, degree of severity, and all of this even varies significantly from one area of expertise to another.

Therefore, it ought to be very clear to you, that there is no such thing as "objective expertise". Such objectivity requires "a standard" and clearly in the case of "expertise" we have no such standard. This is why you and I have no agreement about what constitutes an "expert". Just like you say, I want way too much from the word "understand", you also think that I want way too much from the word "expert". On the other hand, I accuse you of a "sloppy" use of words.

You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy.

I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times. — Dan

I know you can "say" this, you do a lot of that. You assert many things which I show to you to be incoherent, through logical demonstration. That is known as justification. I support my claim that you are incoherent with justification. You simply assert, 'you are wrong, and I am right', and when I ask you to justify, you either continue with your assertions or attempt to justify your position through a sloppy use of words which amounts to equivocation.

So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation.

The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. — Dan

You need to support this claim. The actual, individual act, was judged as "wrong" because it led to bad consequences. It is impossible that the very same act would "likely lead to good consequences" because by the law of identity, the same act is the act itself, and that act has those consequences which are judged as bad.

If the "actual-value consequentialist" removes "the act" from the circumstances, through abstraction, then that person is no longer talking about "the same act", one is making a generalization, and talking about a type of act. And if the person proceeds to argue that this "type of act" would likely have good consequences, that would produce the problems exposed by Hume, the problem of induction, and the is/ought gap.

As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them. — Dan

I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character.

That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist. — Dan

What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.

Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism.

The problem is that the means (method of evaluating) is not consistent with the end (the stated "measure" of value). In other words the means will not produce the end. Justification of this claim is as follows. The method of measurement evaluates (measures) according to the moral restrictions of the principles of consequentialism. "Freedom" as the measure of value is a lack of restriction. Therefore the stated "method" is not a means to the end at all, being inconsistent with the stated end. The proposed method measures value relative to specific restrictions, while the stated "measure", "freedom" is a lack of restrictions.

Therefore the proposed "method" must be apprehended as a distinct end, it is not conducive to the stated end, therefore it is distinct in its assignment of value. This means that you have two distinct ends, two measures of value, therefore two evaluation systems, one which has "freedom" as the measure of value, and the other has "consequentialism" as the measure of value.

I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". — Dan

No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean.

I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions. — Dan

Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice".

This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all. — Dan

Well then what is the "measure of value"? You state above, "freedom is the measure of value". This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices".

I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. — Dan

I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments.

I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect. — Dan

I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you?

I think at this stage I would be entirely justified in saying "please, stop, for your own sake".
I literally said it is not Dan's problem. — AmadeusD

You stated, and I quote you: "That's not Dan's problem."
So I asked you, quote: "Well then what is Dan's problem?"
Do you have an answer for me?

If you could, perhaps, not entirely change the subject to attempt a further pointless and badly-worded impugning of Dan's work... That would be nice. But, it speaks to exactly what i"m saying - that's not his problem. It's yours. /quote]

It's you Amadeus, who's changing the subject. We were talking about, and this thread is about "Dan's problem". You are attempting to change the subject into "MU\s problem". I know it's The Lounge, and any sort of BS is permitted, but Dan and I are staying on topic, why do you want to butt in and change the subject. It makes no sense for you to act this way.
— AmadeusD

He's being a gentleman even giving you the time of day — AmadeusD

That is blatantly wrong. Dan is refusing to give me the time of day. As you did already, Dan refuses to consider the nature of time, thinking that this is irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Dan wants to make "freedom" a fundamental principle, then refuses to consider what makes freedom possible. If a person makes statements similar to "freedom is valuable" and "we ought to have freedom", then that person needs to be prepared to consider the means by which freedom is enabled. Otherwise it's a case of "talking through one's hat". If you, Dan, or anyone else, fails to see that human actions are a type of action, and all actions require "time", making "time" logically prior to human actions, this would seriously impair your moral philosophy.

That this has gone on months baffles me, as it probably does both of you - but for me, its his patience and your density that's baffling. — AmadeusD

Why should a few months of this baffle you? Dan claims to have already spent the better part of a decade pursuing this "problem". I'm working to demonstrate that the reason why his pursuit appears to go on endlessly is that he has a faulty approach. Let me tell you something AmadeusD. A man who's been on a specific quest for ten years, is not going to be convinced by a couple months of discussion, that his quest has been fruitless. The longer one remains on a mission the harder it is for that person to accept that it is impossible, because the amount of time wasted mounts. A few days wasted... "oops that was a mistake, glad I caught it". A few years wasted.. "after all this time I must be close to a solution by now".

So please, quit with your attempts to twist Dan's problem into being my problem. Clearly, after all these years, it's Dan's "density" which is the point of discussion, and I am the one showing patience in letting him persist with his zealous defense of his "impossible dream".

The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all. — Dan

Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement.

You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place.

The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely. — Dan

Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information.

Your ideas of "objective truth", and "objective right", are obviously misleading you now. You seem to think that since you can bring this into the example, "there is an objective truth as to whether the person is an expert or not", (your imaginary idea that there is such a thing as "being an expert", which is beyond simply being judged to be an expert), that it has some bearing in real life situations. It does not! We look at the information we have about the person and make the judgement. Whether or not the person is an expert is a matter of judgement alone. There is no "...being an expert", nor is there any "they are an expert until...", there is only "being judged to be an expert", and "they are judged as an expert until...".

How do you support your claim of "a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about"? All that the person making the judgement has to go on, is that the one in question acts like they know a lot. You assert "a big difference", because you assume some kind of "objective truth" to the matter, but this is all just imaginary. The "big difference" is in your imagination, because you are imagining an "objective truth" in the matter.

In reality, there is absolutely no difference to the people judging whether one is an expert or not, between "acting like you know a lot", and "actually knowing a lot". This is because the people making the judgment have nothing but the individual's actions to go on. So your claim of "a big difference", is only based in your imaginary "objective truth". Accordingly, you ought to conclude what this demonstration clearly reveals, your idea of "objective truth" is severely misleading you.

Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action. — Dan

Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged. You say "in most circumstances" it would not be wrong, but that's to remove the act from the circumstances and treat it as a type of act. You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action". Therefore, what you state here, that you would "not generalize this to the type of action", is inconsistent with what you actually do in the example which is to generalize.

You generalize to say that the type of action the doctor made (a similar action in different circumstances) is praiseworthy, even though the identified "individual action" is judged as wrong because of the circumstances. The one judgement judges the type of action, "right", while the other judgement judges the individual action, "wrong". The mistake you make, which I pointed out, is that the category of judgement, the principle of predication is "moral value". And, since the individual act is predicated as "wrong", it cannot be predicated as "right" in that same category of moral value, because that would be contradiction. This means that if you adhere to those principles which judge the individual action as "wrong", you must recognize the differences which make it wrong, and not predicable with that property "right". Therefore you need to recognize it as not only a distinct individual act, but also different with respect to that property, "moral value". Therefore the (individual) act which is judged as wrong is not the same as the (individual) act which is judged as praiseworthy. That I tell you is what reveals the problem with your enterprise.

I've seen MU be a bit less than becoming of his intellect in stating Dan has "Wasted 10 years". Perhaps he means such in the truest earnest form of communication. Perhaps he's just frustrated. Perhaps a bit of both? — Outlander

Look at the situation, Outlander. Dan asks in the op, if anyone can "solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on". I replied right after reading the op with "Therefore the 'freedom' perspective and the 'consequentialist' perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible.' So it was very clear to me, right away that Dan was tying to do something which is impossible, and I mean in the truest most earnest form of communication, that Dan has wasted that time.

We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'.

So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? — Outlander

If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear) — Dan

This I would say is quite a good summation. The issue is clearly not that you misunderstand me, it is simply that we have different beliefs. The question might be, why do you adhere so strongly to your beliefs, and I adhere so strongly to my beliefs, yet they are very different. On top of that, we might also add that these beliefs which are so different, concern a very important subject, moral philosophy.

Suppose you and I were both asked to judge a particular philosopher, to say whether that person was a good moral philosopher. I'm sure we would not agree. Since whether or not a person is an "expert" is a similar judgement, why do you think there is such a thing as "being an expert", rather than simply judgements made by people as to whether a person is an expert or not. If you think that there is such a thing as a good moral philosopher, independent of judgements made by people, how do you think we would ever know whether or not a person was this, so we could ensure that our judgements would correspond with this reality.

I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter. — Dan

This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject.

A "habit" is by definition not ultimately restrictive. — Outlander

For reference, the point I made is that a habit restricts one's freedom by inclining one to act without considering other available possibilities. Not looking at information limits the possibilities which are present to the person's mind, therefore restricting the person's freedom to choose (specifically the possibilities not present to the mind). There was some question about what constitutes "available" information. If the person has to seek the information does this qualify as "available"? And in the most simple case, if the person has to search through one's own memory, does this qualify as "available"?

When you consider this problem, of what qualifies as "available" information, the power of habit to restrict our freedom becomes even more evident. Since even searching one's own memory requires a directed "seeking" of information, the issue is not the availability of information, the issue is the inspiration or ambition to seek the information. Habit robs us of this inspiration, or ambition, by inclining us to act directly and immediately without seeking any further information to guide us, which might instill the desire to act in another way.

Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom — Dan

More precisely, the point I make is that valuing freedom is inconsistent with valuing consequentialist moral principles. This ought to be quite obvious, in principle, so I can't understand why it's so difficult for you. Freedom is the capacity to choose and make any action. Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. — Outlander

This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts.

P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective — Dan

All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict.

I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach.

As i said earlier, we have a significant difference as to the meaning of "understanding", which makes discussion extremely difficult. I should never have come back to this subject.

I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert. — Dan

Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism

Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not? — Dan

Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you?

This distinction is very relevant to your example of the doctor. However, for some reason, you appear to have a mental block, or an attitude of denial, which seems to make you incapable of considering this very important distinction.

When a person makes a judgement, one is limited, restricted in one's freedom of choice, by the restrictions which are imposed as the limitations we express as "available information". Increase in information increases one's freedom of choice, by revealing more options.

Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information.

This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person.

Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details). — Dan

"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same".

Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical. — Dan

You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation.

Look, the predication is made relative to moral quality, and this is a judgement of two distinct types of act, "good", and "bad". The two predications of "type of moral act", bad and good, are opposed to each other, such that "good" is necessarily a different type of moral act from "bad". If an act at one time is judged as "bad", and an act at another time is judged as "good", these two distinct acts cannot be judged as "the same type" in relation to moral evaluation.

What you propose is that there is a type of act, which is sometimes good, and sometimes bad. The problem is, that moral standards of evaluation set "bad" and "good" as opposing, contradictory, and incompatible types of actions. Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction to say that the same type of act, in relation to moral judgement could be sometimes bad and sometimes good. Your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge them this way, indicates that your judgement "they are the same type of act" must be a faulty judgement.

However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act.