Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. And it was in response to your — Banno

You just got finished describing how "extension" in possible worlds relates to abstract objects. Now you use "me" as an example of extension. No wonder you think I'm lost, you're giving me arrows pointing in two different directions. When I choose neither, you think that means I'm lost, when actually I've just decided on something reasonable.

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility — RussellA

This is correct, but it doesn't quite capture the complexity of "ontological possibility". Because things can happen, between now and that future time, which would influence the future true or falsity, and those things could be affected by human choices, it does us very little good to say that there will be a truth or falsity.

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility. — RussellA

I would not call this a "present possibility". The judgement would be based on observation, and observation is always past by the time it is judged. The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".

If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the proerpties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner” — RussellA

"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. That is why I stressed that we ought not think of the present as fixed. So, for example, a person might observe that there is a truck coming around the corner. Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. However, in the time that it takes the person to judge and make the statement, the truck could have slammed on the brakes or gone off the road.

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present. This becomes very important with fast moving things like computers, and quantum physics. Notice that the wave function of quantum physics deals with possibilities (the future side of the present), rather than factual statements about the position of a particle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. — RussellA

This is not consistent with any ordinary use I am familiar with. How does it make sense to you, that a person would say both, a truck is coming around the corner, and also it's possible that the truck is not coming around the corner?

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible. — RussellA

That time flows in one direction, and the past cannot be changed, is the most basic law of nature. Any counterfactual which proposes a different past violates this fundamental law of nature.

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up. — RussellA

It's pointless to do this with examples. I can make just as many counter examples. I wanted an apple, so I got up and looked for one. It's just a difference in the way that you and I believe animals think. I think they want something and so they go look. You think they see something, and want it.

Of course, thinking consists of both ways. But you said that correspondence was a necessary condition, and this claimed necessity would exclude the possibility of what I claim. Therefore to allow that the way of thinking which I describe is a real way of thinking, you need to relinquish your claim that all thinking is based in correspondence.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts. — RussellA

I really don't understand how you can make this claim. If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris.

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities. — RussellA

I don't think this is true at all. Thoughts are primarily guided by intention, and this is not based in correspondence. We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. That's why mistake is common and unsound arguments are abundant. To base our thoughts in correspondence requires a special type of effort, which does not come naturally to the mind of an animal.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — RussellA

You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

That is the point which I had great trouble to get through to Banno in the other thread. If you believe that the Eiffel tower is actually in Paris, you cannot also believe that it is possibly in Reno. That would be self-contradiction. Therefore you must alter your belief about the Eiffel tower being in Paris, to "the Eiffel Tower is possibly in Paris", to allow that it is possibly in Reno, without contradiction.

This is why, when designating counterfactuals as "possibilities", it is necessary to make what you believe as the actual world, merely a "possible" world. Correspondence cannot have status, or else the supposed "possible worlds" which are really just counterfactuals, would have to be rejected as false, rather than "possible". This is also why I proposed as #3 above, that counterfactuals must be rejected as a proposed form of "possibility" in order to maintain consistency between "possibility" and correspondence. The use of "possibility" to refer to a counterfactual is an incorrect and misleading use of that word.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno). — RussellA

As explained above, this is clearly incorrect. It is only by denying the fact (truth by correspondence) that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, that we can allow that it is possibly in Reno. If we accept as a (truth by correspondence) fact, that the Eiffel tower is in Paris, then we must reject the proposition that it might be in Reno. That it is in Paris makes it impossible that it is in Reno.

Modal logic makes use of extensionality within possible worlds, not the dubious notion of correspondence. — Banno

Then why did you say the following:

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

In reply to the following statement from RussellA concerning correspondence?

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

You seemed so emphatic, now you explicitly change your mind.

The experimental stage should be as important as the application itself when considering ethics here. — L'éléphant

i think this technology should only be used for learning purposes. As such, the AI's role within the biological system would be primarily observational. There is a lot which can be learned from an embedded AI. For example, scientists are very limited in their capacity to actually observe the neurological working of a complex brain. A number of implanted AIs could greatly improve observational capacity. However, experimentation generally works through interaction. We design a very controlled way to elicit a response. Therefore the best learning potential would be derived from interaction. The issue with the AI I believe, is that if we want it to do its job we need to relinquish some control because it has to work so much faster than our ability to understand what it's doing.

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Indeed. — Banno

That makes two very uneducated people participating in this threat. Not surprising.

The thread seems to have sort of come off the rails. Instead of assessing the problems which possible worlds semantics poses, as the SEP directs us, the thread has become a worship of the Platonist presuppositions which support possible worlds semantics.

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Obviously this is false. Clearly allowing that counterfactuals are "possibilities" is a violation of "truth" by correspondence. Probably the reason for so much misunderstanding about "possible worlds", which has been demonstrated by principal participants in this thread, is that they think it is possible to make counterfactuals consistent with truth by correspondence.. If correspondence was the purpose, we wouldn't be describing counterfactuals as possible worlds, as counterfactuals are clearly expressions of "worlds" which violate correspondence..

As the opening of the SEP article states, there is a limit to "the actual world", yet we wonder how things could have been different. The empirical gap between the way things are in the world, and the fictional, "different"', along with the the desire to relate these two in a rational way, is the purpose of "possible worlds semantics". Clearly correspondence cannot be the first principle, as establishing a relation between the world and fictional worlds must be the first principle.

That's is why "possible worlds" is so problematic. To establish a relation between the possible and the actual, "the actual" must be assigned the same status as the possible. Banno clearly recognizes this when he says that the actual is one of the possible, but he fails to respect this principle in his interpretations.

The SEP describes three ways in which this is done. 1. Concretism, within which each world is concrete, 2. Abstractionism, within which each world is abstract, 3. Cobinatorialism, within which each world is a combination of concrete and abstract.

Notice, correspondence is not a fundamental principle. It cannot be, or else that first principle would alter the relation between the true (by correspondence) world, and the other worlds. This would leave the other worlds as nothing but fictions. That's the point we discussed in the other thread which Banno seems incapable of comprehending. If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. Therefore, we must alter the status of the supposed "true" (by correspondence) world, to allow that the possible worlds are something other than false. In other words, to allow that the possibilities are in fact possible, which is the intent of "possible worlds", we must rid ourselves or "true" (by correspondence), and this produces a compromised representation of "the world".

The terms possibly, necessarily, ought, could, might, etc are central to understanding the meaning of ordinary language, and ordinary language is useful when it does refer to the world. “If I cross the road now, there might be a truck around the corner, and I could be knocked down” is a real world situation where modal terms are critical. — RussellA

This is why I think we need to define the different senses of "possible", each of which requires a different type of logic, and enforce those distinctions. I differentiated three significant difference earlier in the thread.

1. Ontological possibility. This is real possibility in the world which necessitates the need for decision making. Ontological possibility is in relation to propositions about the future and the important feature is that there is no truth or falsity to such propositions. By your example, "I will cross the road within the next minute" has no truth or falsity because it is undecided. Such propositions, when ontological possibility is involved, must defy either the law of non-contradiction or the law of excluded middle. Common language use has the law of excluded middle violated, we say that it is neither true nor false, the action which is undecided, and may go either way. Some ontologies however, prefer a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

2. Epistemic possibility. In this case, we assume that there is an actual truth or falsity to the situation, yet the person posing the possibility does not know which. So the possibility of "there is a truck around the corner" is a case of epistemic possibility. You, as the person deciding whether or not to cross the road, does not know if the proposition is true or false, yet you believe there is a truth or falsity to it. Unlike the decision to cross the road, in which case there will only be a truth or falsity after the appropriate time passes, the fundamental laws of logic are not violated here because ask about something which is supported by the past.

3. Counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are often called "possibilities", so I include this in the senses of "possibility", but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all. They reference the past, where there is a truth or falsity (by correspondence) so there is no ontological possibility. Also, as the name "counterfactual" indicates, the truth of the matter is assumed to be known, so there is no epistemic possibility here either. So "counterfactuals" are not possibilities in either of the two principal senses of "possibility", and to avoid confusion ought not be called that. Counterfactuals are very useful, especially in designing experiments, and aiding in predictive capacity, but they ought not be confused as "possibilities".

I propose that if we maintain the above principles, we can keep truth as correspondence, as the first principle. Notice that I produced the definitions of "possible" in a way which corresponds with our experience of "the world". The fundamental problem with possible worlds semantics is that it allows for counterfactuals which are not actually "possible" in any true (by correspondence) sense, to be considered as possibilities. Therefore "possible worlds" has at its very basic level, a violation of "truth" as correspondence.

Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world is only one among many possible worlds. — SEP

Everything which has already occurred, cannot be altered. In that sense it is necessary, and this is the foundation of truth as "correspondence". To propose that things which have already occurred, in the past, could be otherwise, as a possibility, is to violate "truth" as correspondence. Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way.

You keep making posts like this with absolutely nothing to support these very strange assertions. If it's true that I appear to you as "completely wrong" "maximally bonkers", then I can only conclude that you appear to me as highly uneducated.

The risk associated with errors. And it is even riskier with the inherited genes. — L'éléphant

I would say that it's not only riskier than inherited genes, which have a very small degree of risk due to billions of years of evolutionary execution, but it's also much riskier than GMOs. This is because the genetic modifications would be ongoing, at the discretion of the implanted AI. This is what the quoted articles calls " recursive intelligence", using biofeedback loops. From what I understand the digital implant modifies the genetics, then it modifies itself according to the effects of the changes. It appears like a trial and error process.

As trial and error, the probability of mistakes and bad outcomes is many degrees higher than the likelihood of good outcomes, so the thing must be closely monitored, caged to avoid letting loose the monster. However, since it is possible to make many many trials, the probability of discovering something good, eventually, is also quite high. The issue would be to define what "good" is in this context. Some would say, probably many would say, "we ought not interfere with God, therefore there is no possibility of good here", but that's an absolutist, exclusionary, and probably unrealistic approach. We already have GMOs.

So that Post-Human Biotechnologies article proposes "multi-layered control systems", " fail-safe genetic circuits, which activate kill-switches", and of course "human-in-the-loop-governance". But then the issue of "transparency" is brought up. And as these technologies become more popular and available, how can we expect that such principles will be observed, and enforced. And at 8.5 "The Fragility of Control in Recursive Systems". The issue being that "biology responds in unpredictable ways". This would produce effects which escape the design parameters. In other words, the implanted AI might not know how to respond. Some, perhaps the most dangerous effects, could completely escape detection. The highest danger is in the unknown.

Yep. States of affairs include change. — Banno

It doesn't matter how you define change, and states of affairs, the problem I described remains, because the difference between distinct states of affairs cannot be accounted for by reference to further states of affairs. Therefore we need to conclude that the reality of the world, any possible world, must consist of more than just states of affairs. Once we commit to using "states of affairs", we must accept that the possible worlds thus created are necessarily incomplete.

Meta has a conceptual difficulty with limits and infinitesimals, and sometimes pictures states of affairs as descriptions at an instant, disallowing change within states of affairs. Sometimes, because his view changes from post to post. Or at least it appears to - there may be some obtuse way in which he can make it coherent, but so far as I can make out, it remains unexpressed. — Banno

I'd say that you don't seem to understand what is required of the concept "limit", what a real limit must consist of.

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world .

If that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”. — RussellA

I think that this is a very important point. Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas, not any independent physical world. This is why truth by correspondence is excluded. Then a further judgement of correspondence is usually required, what the SEP calls whether the statement "obtains". The issue though is that this is not a judgement of 'truth", it is a subjective judgement made relative to the purpose of, or what is intended by, the model. That is why I claim that possible worlds semantics is fundamentally sophistry. If you don't like that word, we might try "rhetoric".

That's the argument. What's your solution? To posit that all change takes place instantaneously between states of affairs? That's absurd. — Ludwig V

Nothing is instantaneous. It would be equally absurd to say that one state of affairs instantaneously changed into another. I believe the solution is as recommended by Aristotle, we allow for an aspect of reality which defies the fundamental laws of logic. He called it "matter", "potential", and we know it as possibility, what may or may not be.

Exactly. So there is no need to insist that all change occurs between states of affairs. — Ludwig V

it's not that change necessarily exists between states of affairs. The two coexist. The absurdity of "between states of affairs" is just what occurs if you insist that all of reality can be conceived of as states of affairs. Then we'd have the situation of distinct states of affairs, and no explanation of how one state ends and one starts, or any relation between them.

So you don't seem to understand the problem. Here is another way to look at it. Suppose we propose that all of reality could be accounted for by states of affairs. I'm sure you would agree that there is a difference between distinct states of affairs. Isn't the difference between states of affairs also a part of reality? Therefore, in our account of reality we need to also account for the difference between states of affairs as well as the states of affairs.

Consider now that each possible world is a different state of affairs. The difference between each possible world is what "possibility" is. So we'll never understand the reality of what possibility is unless we recognize as real, that aspect which cannot be accounted for by states of affairs.

I like to define words so that they do not produce absurdities. — Ludwig V

Good luck with that!

So it does depend on the definition of "state of affairs". Aristotle's argument is indeed a good reason for changing that definition, to allow that states of affairs can comprise change. Problem solved! — Ludwig V

The problem is not quite solved because you haven't produced the definition. And it's not that simple. If we redefine "state of affairs" as you suggest, such that 'state of affairs" covers all of reality, then all you have done is produced a false description of reality. Redefining things to suit your purpose, instead of to provide an understanding of reality doesn't solve the problem mentioned.

Yes, I knew that was why Aristotle constructed his system. But I don't think it would be helpful to adopt it now that we have other ways of explaining it. — Ludwig V

What other ways? Do you mean to define words so that they reflect the way that you want reality to be, rather than the way that it is? That's not very good ontology.

The state of affairs is that the apple is on the table. It is, for the purposes of the Abstractionist, an abstract object. It is not a description. — Banno

So, "the apple is on the table" is an abstract object. That looks to me, like the type of abstract object which would be correctly called "a description". "Description" is defined as a spoken or written representation. Can you explain why I am wrong to call this type of abstract object a description?

Can you give me a reason for restricting the term in that way? — Ludwig V

The reason is the argument presented by Aristotle. Suppose at some time we have state of affairs A, and at a later time state of affairs B. Since these two are different we can conclude that change has occurred in the time between A and B. As philosophers we desire to know and understand this change. We might explain the change with a third, distinct state of affairs, C, which occurred between A and B, but then we have a change which occurred between A and C, and between C and B. We might posit two more states of affairs, D and E, to account for these changes, but then we have changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B, requiring more states of affairs. And so on.

As you can see, we are headed toward an infinite regress of states of affairs between A and B, without ever addressing the actual change which occurs between two states of affairs. So, what Aristotle proposed is that we recognize "change" or "becoming" as something distinct and incompatible with "states of affairs", or "being". This implies that something occurs between two successive states of affairs which cannot be accounted for with a state of affairs, and we know this as "change". This is the principal reason for Aristotle's duality of matter and form in his physics. When one state of affairs changes to another, the form or formula changes, but matter provides for the underlying continuity between the two.

If you look at combinatorialism in the SEP article, you'll see that the "particular", takes the place of matter. So we have the "universal" which serves as the descriptive (abstract) form or formula, and the "particular" which is explicitly separate from the formula which is a universal. In this way, the particular is allowed to be independent from every universal, and since identity is obtained from the universal formula. the problem of transworld identity is thereby avoid. The particles of matter, or even space-time points ("Quine (1968) and Cresswell (1972)") in this way, do not have an identity so their transworldliness does not violate the law of identity. The problem here of course, is whether the particulars, and the idea of "simples" in general, have any real substantial existence, or are they merely convenient fictions.

So how do you know it even exists, pardon my juvenile abutment. — Outlander

I know it exists through the logic which I outlined, derived from Aristotle. If we describe the temporal world as a succession of states of affairs, then we notice that change has occurred between two distinct states of affairs. This implies that something very real happened between those states, and we desire to understand what it was. The "change" cannot be described as another state of affairs because this would lead to an infinite regress of intermediary states of affairs, without ever getting to a description of the change which happens between the distinct states of affairs.

If you can refer to something, it can be described. If you have proof of something, or reasonable belief of said something, it can be referred to. Therefore, it can be described. — Outlander

It definitely can be referred to, as I've been doing, and I believe it can be described or we can devise ways to describe it. it cannot be described as states of affairs though.

"State of affairs" is simply a name for what the description is a description of. It has very little content, like the word "thing". — Ludwig V

Right, so what I am talking about is something which cannot be placed in that category. The name "state of affairs" cannot be used to refer to this.

When we have invented new kinds of description, "state of affairs" is extended to include those new kinds of description. — Ludwig V

Not in this case, that would lead to the issue describe, potential infinite regress without ever describing the thing we want to describe. The thing we want to describe is something which demonstrable cannot be described as a state of affairs.

In other words "state of affairs" is just a correlative to "description", and is no more limited than "description". — Ludwig V

No it isn't If we insist that all description must be as a state of affairs, then we deny ourselves the capacity to describe this part of reality which cannot be described as a state of affairs. that would be a mistake.

And when you contradict yourself in the one paragraph - as were you say first that "the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs" then that "when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking"... and thereby say what was previously unsayable, presumably. — Banno

Where's the contradiction?

Indeed, since the state of affairs is how things are, not a model of how things are. — Banno

Reread the section in the SEP. The state of affairs is a description, that's how possible worlds can consist of states of affairs. If the state of affairs corresponds with "how things are" in the concrete world, it is said to "obtain". Come on Banno, you are falling right back into your bad habits of that other thread. This is "abstractionism", get with the program.

You used a non sequitur, since from “it does not capture all dynamics” it does not follow that it is captures none. — Banno

You are neglecting the point I was making. The point was that the entirety of the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs. I readily admit that states of affairs capture some of reality, but there is a very significant and real portion which cannot be described this way.

You might prefer Wittgenstein's logic "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent", but I prefer to think that when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking.

When we reach the limits of what "states of affairs" can do for us, and there is still more reality to describe, we must devise a new way to speak about it.

You missed the point entirely: the example was precisely to show that a state of affairs can be temporally extended and dynamic. — Banno

I've always agreed that states of affairs are temporally extended. In fact, I insist that they must be temporally extended. That's why I object to concepts like "instantaneous velocity" which are not really instantaneous states of affairs, but just use that word, And, I do not deny that "states of affairs" are very useful to describe a significant part of the empirical world. The issue is with the rest of the observed empirical world, the part which sound logic demonstrates cannot be described with states of affairs.

In short, you mistook modelling for misdescription, and abstraction for error. — Banno

You continue with your straw man. The point is that modeling the observed empirical world as states of affairs and nothing else is an error. Above, you accept that states of affairs "does not capture all dynamics". So how does the other, the part not captured by states of affairs fit into the abstractionist's model of possible worlds? If you reject the sound logic, and simply refuse to accept that there is any part of empirical reality which cannot be describe as states of affairs, then you are in denial.

Examples of biodigital convergence should be provided.

1. pace makers
2. genetic manipulation to produce desired behavior or charateristics
3. wearable device such as timed insulin delivery
4. I would say targeted treatment for certain diseases

Are these good examples? — L'éléphant

Those are good examples as a starting point. But the technology has advanced to the point where computers can be integrating into DNA, to influence or control biological behaviour. here's a quote from the beginning of the last article I referenced in the op:

2.1 Synthetic Biology and CRISPR-Driven Integration
Synthetic biology has evolved from gene editing into full genome reprogramming, enabling scientists to design life from scratch. The advent of CRISPR-Cas9 and more recent CRISPR-3.0 systems has introduced precision tools capable of altering human DNA with algorithmic control (Doudna & Sternberg, 2022). When paired with AI-driven gene expression models, the possibility arises of dynamically editable DNA a codebase not just inherited, but upgradable. Researchers such as Venter (2023) have proposed synthetic “xenogenomes” for future human-machine interfaces, where artificial nucleotides interact with embedded processors to form hybridized bio-digital systems. This raises the possibility of DNA encoding both biological traits and computational logic. — Post-Human Biotechnologies: Toward Recursive Intelligence and Bio-Digital Identity

If you like, we can include an error: the apple accelerates at 9.8±0.1m/s². — Banno

It's still incorrect, for the reasons explained. And as a philosopher, your attempts to avoid the reality of the situation through denial are unconscionable.

I agree that on the micro scale, such as a second, I do feel that I experience a duration of time, even though intellectually I believe that there can be only one moment in time. Very mysterious. — RussellA

Very mysterious indeed, and when thoroughly analyzed, along with the ability to direct one's own actions through choice, it becomes very complicated.

The state of affairs is an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s². — Banno

Sure, that's a state of affairs meant to describe a specific situation, but it would be false in any particular case. Due to resistance from the air, friction, the apple does not actually accelerate in the way of your statement.

Put simply, states of affairs can be dynamic. — Banno

What you have done is reduced a dynamic situation to a state of affairs. But your state of affairs is false because it does not properly account for the dynamics of the situation. In reality, the rate of acceleration varies over time, due to the forces of friction from the air, and probably some other factors. As the apple accelerates, the force of friction increases and counteracts the acceleration, until a balance would be reached when there would be no more acceleration. In the true dynamics of the situation acceleration would not be constant. Therefore the state of affairs which you stated is false because it does not describe the dynamics of the situation.

You reduce a dynamic situation to a state of affairs, "an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s²", but that state of affairs is actually false because it does not adequately account for the true dynamics of the situation. You have provided a very good example of why states of affairs cannot provide an adequate representation of a dynamic world. Describing a dynamic situation as a state of affairs will always fail to capture the true dynamics of the situation.

The reason why combinatorialism is fundamentally better than the other two interpretive models, is because it maintains the appropriate separation between particular and universal. So in the example, we have "John" ("particular"), and "being 1.8 metres tall" ("universal"), and also (the "fact" of) John exemplifying that universal.

This separation between particular and individual provides a more versatile foundation than the abstractionist "state of affairs" as the base element, because the latter unites the particular with the universal, within the basic state of affairs, and this produces the need for the incoherent "transworld identity". In combinatorialism, the fundamental particular, the "simple", is simply a point of matter, and matter on its own without any properties has no identity. So the incoherence of transworld identity can be avoided in this way.

And now
This is false,
— Metaphysician Undercover

Keep dithering and vacillating and no one can touch you with anything so solid as an argument. — Banno

I always knew you have extreme difficulty understanding simple points, but have you completely lost your mind now? For the sake of argument, I allowed that your compilation of states could be considered to be a single state, just to show that this does not affect the soundness of my argument.

When I see an apple falling to the ground, are you saying we are able to empirically observe more than one moment in time at the same time? — RussellA

No, I am saying that we do not observe any moments in time. A "moment" is an artificial, mental construct. Strictly speaking, we do not "observe" time at all. If a person sees an apple moving one can deduce that time has passed, but we do not observe time. So "time" itself is a mental construct. And to construct that concept of time as consisting of moments, is not consistent with the empirical observation of the apple. The apple is observed to move in a continuous way without any moments in time.

To answer your question now. The question is loaded by asking about observing more that one moment at a time, when "moment" is not an acceptable term in the first place. So, what I would say is that we are always experiencing and observing a duration of time. If you research it, it is unclear as to the exact length of the human present, and perhaps some people experience a different length as their present, than others do.

It is more the case that when we empirically observe the apple hitting the ground, we have a memory of the apple leaving the tree. — RussellA

I agree, because the duration of the human present is shorter than the length of time that it takes for an apple to fall. So the apple is seen to hit the ground, and leaving the tree is already a past observation. But have you ever seen something that moves so fast that it looks like a blur? If the apple moved that fast, it would appear like a blur from the tree to the ground.

First, the idea that a ‘state’ must be unchanging is a stipulation, not a truth. A state of affairs can include change. ‘The ball rolled east at 2 m/s for five seconds’ is a perfectly ordinary state of affairs. — Banno

As I explained, there is no change in that state of affairs. The ball is rolling east for the entire time. And if that changes, it's not the same state of affairs.

You keep treating a state of affairs as a snapshot, not a way things are. — Banno

This is false, you are making a straw man. As I said, I do not accept snapshots. A state of affairs must last for a duration of time, whether long or short. In no way does the fact that a state of affairs cannot be changed without becoming a different, separate state of affairs imply that a state of affairs must be instantaneous. The ball rolling east, or any other state of affairs can persist indefinitely, but if the situation changes, a new descriptive state of affairs is required.

Second, your complaint that states of affairs don’t ‘describe the change itself’ is misleading. A description doesn’t re-enact what it describes. A trajectory doesn’t move; a sentence about change doesn’t change. That’s not a deficiency. A state of affairs specifies what’s the case, it doesn't bring it about. — Banno

The point is that the state of affairs, nor any state of affairs, can describe what brings about a state of affairs. This is because there will always be a "change" which occurs in between, intermediary between, any two successive states of affairs. Therefore no state of affairs can satisfactorily describe what brings about any specific state of affairs. That is the incompatibility between being and becoming demonstrated by Aristotle. But what brings about a state of affairs is a very real aspect of the world. Because of this, states of affairs are insufficient for describing the totality of reality.

So, the problem isn’t with states of affairs, but with a picture that insists they must be instantaneous, static, and incapable of internal temporal structure. — Banno

Why insist on this faulty straw man representation? Did you not read my last post? I very explicitly explained that I did not accept instantaneous states of affairs. I said they were fictional. But I allow for very true states of affairs, ones with temporal extension. To be true, a state of affairs must have temporal extension. However, the problem is that "states of affairs" cannot explain the totality of reality because no state of affairs can adequately describe what brings about one state of affairs from another.

Furthermore, it is not the case that I believe there is a problem with "states of affairs". As stated above, a state of affairs can provide a true representation, of what it is designed for. The problem is with the assumption that states of affairs can provide a complete representation of reality. The description which consists only of states of affairs is necessarily incomplete, and that's why abstractionism fails.

We should look at combinatorialism. It's a bit more complicated, but I think it may provide the best approach out of the three. The problem which jumps out at me, is the issue with substantiating the proposed "simples". This idea of simples is similar to the ancient atomists. That the concrete world could actually be composed of such simples as the fundamental elements, is shown by Aristotle to be problematic. In the SEP, it looks like the combinatorialist can actually assume fictitious simples, and in a way, that would solve the problem, but then we wouldn't have a distinction between real simples and fictitious simples. And since the real simples can't be substantiated, we'd have to conclude that all simples are fictitious, leaving no substance to the physical world.

I think I will not remove them until the middle of January! — javi2541997

So long as you wait until after January 6, Epiphany. And thanks for the chance at the lottery!

Your only direct and immediate knowledge of time is that of the present, the present moment in time. — RussellA

As I said, the present, as we experience it, exists as a continuous duration within which activity is occurring. The representation of the present as a "moment in time" is completely inconsistent with empirical observation, therefore a falsity.

Are you referring to concretism?("for the concretist, there is no special property of the actual world — actuality — that distinguishes it, in any absolute sense, from all of the others; it is simply the world that we inhabit.")

I agree that is a problem with concretism. — Relativist

It's not only concretism but abstractionism as well. You are referring to the world we inhabit, (which I take as the independent physical world) as "the actual world". But this is not what "the actual world" refers to in possible worlds semantics. Look at the difference between "actual" and "concrete" in the SEP's account of abstractionism. SOAs may be actual or non-actual. "Actrual" means that it has been judged to obtain in the concrete world.

Importantly, SOAs constitute a primitive ontological category for the abstractionist; they are not defined in terms of possible worlds in the manner that propositions are in §1.3. Just as some propositions are true and others are not, some SOAs are actual and others are not.[28] Note, then, that to say an SOA is non-actual is not to say that it does not actually exist. It is simply to say that it is not, in fact, a condition, or state, that the concrete world is actually in. However, because ‘____ is actual’ is often used simply to mean ‘____ exists’, there is considerable potential for confusion here. So, henceforth, to express that an SOA is actual we will usually say that it obtains.

...

Note also that, for the abstractionist, as for the concretist, the actual world is no different in kind from any other possible world; all possible worlds exist, and in precisely the same sense as the actual world. The actual world is simply the total possible SOA that, in fact, obtains. And non-actual worlds are simply those total possible SOAs that do not. — SEP

The term "state of affairs" is perhaps first found in the Tractatus, or in Russell. There is no indication in either Russell or Tractatus-Wittgenstein that a state of affairs must occur only at an instant, or that it cannot encompass temporal extension or change. The idea that states of affairs are instantaneous is your own addition. — Banno

I agree that there is nothing to indicate that a state of affairs must be a moment in time, and I think that this is a false representation of "state of affairs", like what RussellA is proposing, the present consists of moments. A state of affairs may have a long or short duration in time. I dismiss "a moment" if this implies a point with no time passage, (RussellA's apparent approach) as fictitious. I do not dismiss "state of affairs" as fictitious, only as incapable of capturing the totality of reality.

Contrary to what you say here "a state of affairs" cannot encompass "change" without self-contradiction. The stated "state" must be unchanged for the specified, or unspecified period of time. If it changes then it is not the stated state. Therefore the state of affairs cannot encompass change. That the SOA could change, and still be the same SOA would imply contradiction.

So, we might try to avoid this and allow change within the SOA, with the most general statement about change, and say that a thing is in "a state of change". But that doesn't describe anything, and would be a useless SOA. And, once we identify a specific activity, and say that the thing is in the state of having this activity ("The ball rolled east at 2m/s"), then it cannot "change" from this without moving out of the descriptive capacity of the SOA. If anything about the ball's movement changes, the SOA no longer obtains and a new SOA would be required.

We might then describe a new SOA to match the changed situation (the ball rolled northeast at 1.5m/s), but that does not describe the change itself, how it passes from one SOA to the next. That is why SOAs are insufficient for describing the reality of change. Change is what happens between SOAs, and positing another SOA as intermediary (the ball was struck by another) still leaves change as what occurs between those SOAs. Looking for further intermediary SOAs implies infinite regress without ever describing change itself.

The important, and significant thing to notice is that "possibility" is a feature of the change itself, not the SOA. So if we want to understand the mode of "possibility" we need to look at what is intermediary to SOAs, and attribute "possibility" to that, rather than to SOAs. That's what the concept of energy does. As "the capacity to do work", "the energy" of a thing, or system, refers to the possibility that thing or system has, to effect change to an SOA.

Again, I'll state the relevant point. Some, especially Banno prefer denial, so I'll make it clear.

Motion, change, becoming, or activity, cannot be understood with the terminology of "states". This is because change is what occurs between states, therefore does not get described by "a state". To describe the change which happens between states, with another state, produces the need to describe what happened between those states, causing the appearance of an infinite regress, without ever addressing the issue of what "change" is, change being when one state ends and the next begins.

So, even if we take Banno's example "The ball rolled east at 2m/s", and consider this to be "a state", the next "state" might be "the ball rolled northeast at 1.5m/s. Notice, that what happens in between is not described. We can posit an intermediate state, "the ball was hit by a ball moving north". This still does not provide a description of the change. We could posit many more intermediary states, indentation of the ball, elasticity, difference in molecular activity, electrons, whatever, and all those intermediary states will never produce an understanding of the "change" which occurred between one state and another. So, the simple solution is to employ the concept of "force". There was an exchange of "force". But "force" is not a state of affairs, nor can it be understood as a part of a state of affairs, because it describes something about the relation between distinct states of affairs.

Now Banno will have you believe that a compilation of "states", such as "The ball rolled east at 2m/s'", since it is a compilation of distinct states, could have "force" included within that compilation. The rolling ball had a specific force. But of course, apprehending a compilation of states as "a state", is an ontological misunderstanding.

And Merry Christmas to all!

maybe take care here, too. Why shouldn't a state of affairs list the positions some object occupies over time? As, 'The ball rolled east at 2m/s'?

Meta would have to disagree with this, because he can't make sense of instantaneous velocity, or of calculus or any sort of limit or infinitesimal in general. See the Christmas Cracker above, where Meta treats change as a series of static instances rather than as dynamic, and as a result discovers that motion is impossible. :wink:

Change cannot be reduced to a sequence of instantaneous states - but no one is claiming that. — Banno

In your twisted mind, what does "state" mean?

The reason why "a state of affairs" cannot list "the positions" some object occupies over time, is because this is explicitly a compilation of a multitude of states. Therefore it is not "a state". Do you recognize the fundamental distinction between one and many? If not, you could read Plato's Parmenides, where he examines this distinction in his arguments against sophistry. This is why "one" was not considered to be a number by ancient Greeks. And, even now "one" is excluded from the primes because inclusion would render a meaningful definition of "prime number" as impossible.

And Merry Christmas to you Cracker Jack!

I am not saying that time does not exist, but even if time does exist, there is only one actual moment in time.

Suppose a train enters a station at t1 and leaves the station at t2.

What does “we see things moving” mean? — RussellA

I am asserting the very opposite of what you are saying. There is no "actual moment in time". Time is continuous duration, or flow, without any moments. You see the train enter the station, stop, passengers come and go, then the time leaves the station. Your proposals of t1 and t2 are just mental products, useful fictions, which are not at all representative of the real independent world.

What does “we see things moving” mean?

At t2 we see the train leaving the station and at t2 we have the memory of the train entering the station at t1.

It cannot mean that at t2 we see the train leaving the station and then nip back in time to see the train entering the station at t1. Time travel is not possible.

It means that at t2 we see the train leaving the station and at t2 we have the memory of the train entering the station at t1. — RussellA

It means that the use of "t1" and "t2" do not provide the grounds for a true representation of the real world.

What can actually happen is what already happened with Iran. The US makes a strike against Venezuela basically destroying it's Air Defences and then Trump declares a victory! And anybody in the US government who even thinks to doubt this let alone comment about it publicly will be fired. — ssu

I'd say the situation is a lot more complicated than that.

And I think that this is the brainfart that Trump is now following. He just assumes that if he blows up boats and seizes oil tankers that Maduro will cave in and flee to Cuba (or something similar). — ssu

How does killing low level drug runners have any effect on Maduro at all, other than pissing him off? Does Trump believe that if Maduro gets thoroughly pissed off, that might influence him to make a fatal mistake?

It is the reality that we perceive with our senses. You could say that we are stipulating this reality exists (=solipsism is false), but I suggest that we innately believe we are perceiving an external world. So this "stipulation" just reflects an abstraction of our innate world-view. — Relativist

In the modal model there is a world stipulated as the actual world. It is obviously not the external world which we perceive. The reasons for the stipulation are fundamentally subjective. It may be intended that the stipulated actual world is a representation of the external world we perceive, but even so, that representation may be false in the sense of correspondence, because of mistake.

Same "stipulation": we are perceiving aspects of reality apart from oneself. We have perceptions of color, and of that cold, powdery stuff. We perceive these even without naming them, but by naming them we can reflect on them abstractly. — Relativist

When someone says "It is true THAT snow is white IFF snow is white", perceptions are completely irrelevant. Notice, it does not say "iff snow is perceived as white", and there is nothing to indicate that "white" refers to a perception.

We have named the perceived color of the cold powdery stuff, "snow" a stipulation in English, but the reference is the same for Germans, who have similar perceptions, but stipulate it to be "schnee". Again, this is grounded in our innate trust in the mental image of the world that our minds present to us. — Relativist

That would require a further definition. "White" would need to be defined as a specific type of perception. But that is not what is intended, as the intention is to avoid intension. So "white" is simply a predicate, and the predication "snow is white" is true if it is a fact that snow is white. We can thereby stipulate that snow is white (this is a feature of the actual world), then "snow is white" is made to be true, by the means of that stipulation.

I have given you a grounding for "actual world" that no fictional world can have: our direct interaction with it. — Relativist

But that's not the grounding of possible worlds semantics, it is your personal choice, your grounding for "actual world". Other people could use other groundings because the stipulation of "actual world" is subjective.

However, the world only exists at one moment in time, which is the present. — RussellA

That is not consistent with empirical observations. We see activities, things moving. Therefore what we perceive as "the existing world", is a world in which time is passing, things are changing, and this is inconsistent with your statement "the world only exists at one moment in time".

I agree that a State of Affairs can only capture one moment in time, but as the world can only exist at one moment in time, a State of Affairs is able to describe the world. — RussellA

That the world exists at a moment in time, as a State of Affairs, is a faulty assumption. It is faulty because it is inconsistent with empirical observations, which indicate to us that time is always passing, and change is always occurring. That is why there is an uncertainty principle in physics.

The italics phrase reflects a proposition; the bold phrase represents an element of actual reality. — Relativist

But there is nothing which you are calling "actual reality" in the modal model, that's the problem. "Actual" reality is simply stipulated, even Banno accepts this, as indicated below. So in the case of "It is true THAT snow is white IFF snow is white", the latter "snow is white" is simply stipulated. So the meaning of "It is true THAT snow is white IFF snow is white", is that "snow is white is true" if we stipulate that snow is white. "True" is already used, so it would be meaningless to say "It is true THAT snow is white IFF it is true that snow is white". So the latter "snow is white" is stipulated based on arbitrary or subjective principles according to whether you want "snow is white" to be true or not.

See how the single line you quote is part two of four of the antecedent of a mooted definition of true-in-M that is being true in any arbitrarily selected world. The conclusion is the opposite of what you suggest: any world might have been chosen to take on the place of the actual world, with the same result. — Banno

That's exactly the point I am making. The truth condition stated as " its designated 'actual world' is in fact the actual world" is never met, because "any world might have been chosen to take on the place of the actual world,". So the modal "actual world" is never "in fact the actual world", and the conditions for truth are never met.

Again, there Might be a point Meta could be making, but his utter inability to understand and use the formal logic here incapacitates his expressing his view. Meta might be gesturing at a familiar philosophical concern, namely that the appeal to an “intended model” smuggles metaphysics into what is advertised as a purely semantic account. To make that objection, Meta would have to distinguish object-language truth conditions from metasemantic stipulations, recognise the difference between fixing a model and evaluating formulas within it, and understand how conditional definitions work in formal semantics. There may be a point Meta could be making, but his inability to understand and use the formal logic prevents him from expressing it. — Banno

Obviously the problem cannot be expressed in formal logic, because the nature of the problem is that it renders the formal logic as fundamentally unsound. To try and express it as formal logic would be a self-defeating exercise, because accepting it's rules is implied by using it. Instead, to demonstrate the problems of formal logic, we must show that the absurd conclusions it produces are because the logic is faulty.

But if you know about the problems of possible worlds semantics, as you claim here, then accept it, and reject possible worlds semantics for what it is, misleading sophistry.

For the Abstractionsists:
There is the actual world, an actual world, a State of Affairs that exists and obtains.
There are possible worlds, non-actual worlds, States of Affairs that exist but fail to obtain. — RussellA

The glaring problem I see with abstractionism is that the entirety of the observed, empirical world, cannot be captured by "states of affairs". This is due to the reality of change, activity, and motion. If we assume that the world could be captured as states of affairs, we end up with Zeno paradoxes. So, as Aristotle demonstrated, "being" (states of affairs) is fundamentally incompatible with "becoming" (change and activity). The changes, motion and activity which we observe in the world, cannot be described by states of affairs.

The demonstration is like this. If the world is describable as state A, and then it becomes state B, we can conclude that change occurred between A and B, We could then assume a state C as the intermediary between A and B and describe the change as state C, but this would imply that change occurred between A and C, and also between C and B. We could posit state D between A and C, and state E between C and B, but we would still have the same problem again. As you can see, this indicates an infinite regress, and we never get to the point of understanding what change, activity, or motion, really is. Activity, change, motion, is what occurs between states of affairs, when one becomes the other.

Because of this, Aristotle determined that we must allow that the nature of "possibility" is such that the fundamental laws of logic are violated by it. If at one moment, t1, an object has property X, and at the next moment, t2, it does not have property X, indicating change or motion, then to accurately understand what change or motion is, we must allow that either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle is violated in the meantime, between t1 and t2. Either the object both has and does not have the property during this activity, or it neither has nor does not have the property during this change. Aristotle stipulated that we must not violate the law of noncontradiction, and opted for a violation of the law of excluded middle. This forms the basis for our current, common understanding of "possibility". The thing which is said to be "possible" is understood to to have a status of being neither what is the case nor what is not the case. As such, "possibility" cannot be understood through the application of states of affairs.

Nuh. I reject your arguments because they are muddled. — Banno

You are still looking for epistemic truth in a semantic system. — Banno

Your ability to amuse me with your ridiculous straw manning never ceases to amaze me. Again, you take your own error "muddled" arguments (here represented as "epistemic truth in a semantic system"), and you pretend that your error is mine. For example, defining an infinite set as "complete" only creates a muddled mess of contradiction.

These sets are not "incomplete" - you trade on an ambiguity here. M is not the actual world, as you think, but an interpretation of a modal system. — Banno

You still completely ignore, and disrespect the second truth condition stated by the SEP. The one I've quoted three or four times now. The actual world of the modal system must "in fact" be the actual world. Here is the complete package of conditions:

Say that M is the “intended” interpretation of ℒ if (i) its set W of “possible worlds” is in fact the set of all possible worlds, (ii) its designated “actual world” is in fact the actual world, (iii) its set D of “possible individuals” is in fact the set of all possible individuals, and (iv) the referents assigned to the names of ℒ and the intensions assigned to the predicates of ℒ are the ones they in fact have. — SEP

@Banno, until you accept the real necessity of "(ii) its designated “actual world” is in fact the actual world", you will never understand the real epistemological problems of modal logic, and why there is so many distinct interpretations. Look:

For abstractionists, however, actuality is a special property that distinguishes exactly one possible world from all others — the actual world is the only world that happens to obtain; it is the one and only way things could be that is the way things as a whole, in fact, are. However, for most abstractionists, the distinctiveness of the actual world does not lie simply in its actuality but in its ontological comprehensiveness: the actual world encompasses all that there is. In a word: most abstractionists are actualists. — SEP 2.2.3

The reason for so many different interpretations, is because it is impossible to make "possibility" as we understand it, consistent with "the truth about the actual world of empirical observation", as we understand that. These two are fundamentally incompatible as Aristotle decisively, and irrefutably demonstrated thousands of years ago. In modern times this incompatibility is known as the uncertainty principle. A fundamental particle cannot have a true, actual location (this implies not moving), and also have the possibility of moving, at the same time.

The multitude of interpretations arise from the attempt to establish compatibility between two incompatible ideas. Human beings are very creative, and industrious, so they will keep trying more and more different ways, never succeeding. They will not succeed because the two are incompatible, and the only way to understand the both of them properly is to model them separately, in a dualist way, with a form of mediation between them.

You haven't followed what is going on in the SEP articles. — Banno

I think I've followed very well. I see section 2 as proposing three distinct interpretations of possible worlds semantics, each of these being insufficient, due to the problem described above. You seem to want to focus on one, the abstractionist interpretation, as if it is the only acceptable interpretation, not allowing for the possibility that it is just as faulty as the other two.

Again, it seems to me that what you are doing is attempting to critique modal theory, which is based on semantic theories of truth, by replacing that basis with a correspondence theory. It's no surprise that this doesn't work. — Banno

Sure, replace correspondence with some other theory of truth. That is just a move of ignorance, denial of the problem, which is the fact that the mode of "possibility" is inconsistent with "the truth about the actual world of empirical observation". Remove yourself from the relevance of the truth about the actual world of empirical observation if you like, but then what good will your logic serve? I mean, you might argue that predictive capacity is far more useful than truth about the physical world, but then why not go to a probabilistic semantics of modal logic. That makes far more sense. Instead, you want "possible worlds", which pretend to assume some sort actual world of fact, yet not respecting that as the basis for "truth". What kind of muddled nonsense is this?

Tarski's semantic theory of truth provides a rigorous, mathematical framework for understanding what makes sentences true. His famous T-schema—"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white—captures a correspondence intuition: a sentence is true when it corresponds to how things actually are.
However, there are some important nuances: — Relativist

The problem, as I indicate above, is that it is a pretense to correspondence. That is the problem I mentioned earlier, of replacing intension with extension. Correspondence becomes simply a stipulation, instead of criteria for judgement. The actual world of the modal model "is" the actual world of fact, because this is stipulated as a necessity for truth.

So, "snow is white " is true if and only if snow is white. Yes, now we stipulate "snow is white" (or in the case of possible worlds, the actual world of the modal model is stipulated as in fact the true actual world), and voila, "snow is white" is true by stipulated correspondence, and the actual world of the modal model is true, by stipulated correspondence. But of course, we can all see that this is just a pretense of correspondence.

Banno seems to be trying to deny the pretense of correspondence, to claim some other basis for "truth" in possible worlds semantics. Clearly this is just denial, as reference to "in fact the actual world", in the truth conditions, indicates that truth is based in correspondence. Correspondence by stipulation ("snow is white" is true because snow is white) becomes very problematic, so Banno wants to deny that it's even a part of the modal semantics of possible worlds.

You pretend your already repudiated arguments were adequate. — Banno

As usual. you reject my arguments because they are inconsistent with what you believe, without even addressing the the truth or falsity of the premises, or the validity of the argument. Look:

Say that M is the “intended” interpretation of ℒ if (i) its set W of “possible worlds” is in fact the set of all possible worlds, — SEP

Possibilities are infinite, so we cannot have "the set of all possible worlds", as required for the truth conditions. That is impossible because any proposed set will be incomplete. We will never have the true actual world (M), therefore the stated truth conditions for possible worlds semantics are necessarily violated, truth cannot be obtained.

It's easier than that. Existence is not a predicate. — Ludwig V

But you used it as a predicate, when you said that one could imagine that something exists. otherwise its a verb, but that becomes even more difficult, to explain the activity which is referred to as "exists".

Whatever has been imagined would then count as a possible object, and so existent in another world, not this one. Yes? — Ludwig V

Yes, but concretism would have the other world exist as well. That's when it becomes problematic. The only place the other (possible) world exists is in the mind, because it is a fabrication, a mentally produced possibility. But now we have to say that this mental fabrication has actual concrete existence.

This statement needs unpacking.

The first part of the statement, “The place signified "Chicago" is not an imaginary thing” is from a mind-independent viewpoint.

The second part of the statement, “it is understood as real, actual” is from the viewpoint of a mind.

The first part of the statement linguistically clashes with the second part of the statement, making it difficult to answer. — RussellA

I don't see you complaint. Both parts are "from the viewpoint of a mind". In the first part the mind is using the word "Chicago" to refer to something believed to be independent from that mind. The second part describes that independence as "real, actual".

For Lewis’ Concretism, the statement is true from our viewpoint, in that from our viewpoint, these worlds are imaginary worlds, not real or actual.

But the statement is not true from the viewpoint of those people living on these worlds, in that from their viewpoint, these worlds are not imaginary worlds, are real and actual. — RussellA

I really don't see the problem you are alluding to. A statement is made from the perspective of the one who makes it, unless the person signifies that this is supposed to represent a different perspective. Then it would be an imaginary perspective. We could make a statement about the perspective of a person in a different imaginary world, but that would still be a statement made from the perspective of the person making the statement, and that person would be stating an imaginary perspective.

So it's still an imaginary perspective. We can't get to the point of having a real perspective from an imaginary world. If a person in the imaginary world could talk to you, and describe the perspective, that would just be your imagination describing the perspective. And if a person in the actual world describes a different perspective to you, that is a perspective from the actual world, not the imaginary world. So there is no way that we can get to the conclusion that the people in an imaginary world have a real and actual perspective.

For example, if you plan on a holiday to somewhere you have never been before, you presuppose that where you are going is an actual and concrete place. — RussellA

The place signified "Chicago" is not an imaginary thing, it is understood as real, actual. In the case of possible worlds, they are imaginary things, not real or actual, but possible. The analogy is incorrect.

No, we don't have to assign existence to it. All we have to do is to imagine or suppose that it exists. — Ludwig V

That would be very interesting if you could explain a reasonable difference between these two. The former would be an actual predication, the latter would be an imaginary predication. Is that what you're saying?

Yes, the mind is central.

There is a causal, spatial and temporal connection to the fictional world of Middle Earth, through books, films, etc.

But there is no causal, spatial or temporal connection to an actual world of Middle Earth, as we have no knowledge about it having any mind-independent existence. — RussellA

That, I believe is why concretism is unacceptable. We produce a fictional idea, a possibility, then to make it fit within the possible worlds semantics, we assign concrete existence to it. This is unacceptable, to arbitrarily, or for that stated purpose, assign concrete existence to something completely imaginary. It demonstrates quite clearly the deficiency of possible worlds semantics. To conform we must accept what is unacceptable.

Was he asking to be banned, in a round about way? That’s what I thought. Otherwise he was pushing, or testing the boundaries repeatedly while saying I might be banned for this. — Punshhh

That's what I think. Bob kept pushing and pushing that way. He wanted to go as far as he could, and he would not stop until banned. The banning would determine how far he could go. It's a sort of challenge. So he slowly kept taking one step further and further and further. The only way to stop him was to ban him. It reminds me of a number of others who have slipped in that way. Good people get caught up in the wrong cause, and cannot recognize that it's a bad cause.

Kripke showed how give truth conditions for modal claims using Tarski's semantics. — Banno

The concrete approach is one interpretation among many. — Banno

Ambiguity is not evidence of truth, therefore I think the conclusion you make about kripke is false.

Kripke produced what appears to some people, as truth conditions for modal claims. But when philosophers have tried to substantiate this supposed truth, they've had to interpret it in many different ways, none of those ways produces anything acceptable. Clearly that's because Kripke did not do what you claim that he did.

As I've shown, it is impossible to do what you claim that Kripke has done. Possibility and truth are fundamentally incompatible. And that's why the mathematically based semantics which uses probability rather than truth is proving to be a much more effective tool for modeling modal statements.

You are not describing this other concrete world, you are describing what this other world could be like as a concrete world. — RussellA

Not according to concretism as described by the SEP. The possible world is as described, and each possible world is concrete. Therefore the description is of what the concrete possible world is like, not of what it could be like.

Call this the concretist intuition, as possible worlds are understood to be concrete physical situations of a special sort. — SEP

Notice, the physical situation is concrete. It's not a possible situation in a concrete world.

In the same way that between the fictional world of Middle Earth there is no causal, spatial or temporal connection to our world other than in our mind. — RussellA

That's a very significant connection. Don't you think so?

And yet, here it is. — Banno

We already read through the truth conditions in the SEP article. And, I showed how the stated conditions of truth are impossible to completely fulfil. There is a big difference between being able to state truth conditions, and being able to fulfil the stated conditions. But whenever fulfilment is close, the correct result is probable, and we can pretend to have satisfied the conditions.

Truth as described in possible worlds semantics is actually impossible, and there ought not be any pretense to it. So topological semantics, and probability theory (instead of truth and falsity) are proving to be much more productive in applications like AI.

So, it's kind of clear that you aren't reading along. Can you remedy that? — frank

What's with the nonsense frank? Honestly, your posts directed at me are ridiculous. If you think I'm off topic of the thread and a distraction, then please report me to the mods, and have me removed. Thank you.

For Lewis’ Concretism, these possible worlds are concrete worlds. — RussellA

Yes, the possible worlds are concrete worlds, that's what the SEP calls concretism, but how are they absolutely separate? If a person like me, in this concrete world can describe another concrete world, then I must have some access to it, and it cannot be absolutely separate.

On the other hand, I can imagine a possible world that is as concrete as ours, where the Hobbits, Trolls and Orcs that inhabit this world believe themselves as real as we believe ourselves.

But we also know that there is no causal, spatial or temporal connection between this possible concrete world of Middle Earth and our actual concrete world. — RussellA

The words you use to describe that imaginary world have meaning derived from your experiences in your concrete world. This implies that things within the two worlds have some similarity. How can there be that type of similarity without some sort of spatial temporal consistency, or continuity, between the two? The spatial temporal conditions of one must be similar to the spatial temporal conditions of the other, implying that there is a connection between them.

For Lewis, possible worlds are absolutely separate, causally, temporally and spatially.

No individual in one possible world has any kind of access to any individual in a different possible world. — RussellA

This cannot be correct. If each possible world is separate from every other, in an absolute sense, then there would be no point to considering them, as they'd be completely irrelevant.

Might not be a bad idea to go over the terms being used, since it seems there is some confusion.

Exists
A thing exists if it is in the domain of a world. That is, if it can be used in an existential quantification. Existence is what the existential quantifier expresses. Things can exist in one world and not in another. One point of difference between Lewis and Kripke is that for Lewis things exist only within a world, while for Kripke the very same thing can exist in multiple worlds.

A thing that exists is also possible.

In Kripke a thing can exist and not be actual or concrete.
In Lewis if a thing exists then it is concrete, and actual in some world.

Possible
It's possible if it's “true in at least one accessible world”.

Something might be possible and yet not exist - by not existing in w₀ but in some other possible world

Simialrly, a sentence is possible if it is true in some accessible world.

Actual
Actual is indexical. It works like here, or like now. We designate a world as the actual world, w₀, and then the things that exist in that world are actual.

In modal logic being actual is a label. In metaphysics being actual is usually a special ontological state. Lewis rejects this, since everything is actual in some world.

Contingent
A modal variability across worlds, something is contingent if it exists in some, but not all, possible worlds. And similarly, sentences are contingent if ◇P ^ ◇~P. If it exists in all possible worlds it is necessary. If it doesn't exist in any world, it is impossible.

Contingency is assessed modally, not temporally. So an event can occur and still modally contingent.
The fact that it happened does not make it necessary.

Concrete
This one is less clear. If something is physical, spatiotemporal, or causal it might be considered concrete.

In Lewis' system everything is concrete, in a world that is spatiotemporally separate and distinct from every other possible world.

In actualist accounts, only the things in the actual world are concrete. The other stuff is abstract.


Real
A claim of Metaphysical status. In Lewis something is real if it exists. In actualist accounts it is real if it both exists and is actual. — Banno

It appears like Banno is trying to hijack the thread to enforce his own brand of modal sophistry when the SEP clear indicates three distinct types:

2. Three Philosophical Conceptions of Possible Worlds — SEP

The three are:

Concretism: possible worlds are understood as concrete worlds with internal spatial temporal relations.
Abstractionism: possible worlds are understood as abstract "states of affairs", or similar terms like sets of circumstances, etc..
Combinatorialism: a world consists of particulars, relations between them, and also "facts", which are a representation of the particulars and their relations.

Possible-worlds semantics gives precise truth-conditions for modal claims, compositional rules for complex sentences, and a mathematically explicit structure (models, accessibility relations, evaluation clauses). — Banno

You demonstrate the problem with possible world semantics very well, right there. The nature of possibility is such that it is impossible to give "precise truth-conditions for modal claims". That's the fundamental reality of what is referred to by "possibility", it violates the basic truth conditions of the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle. This was demonstrated by Aristotle with examples like the possible sea battle.

So possible world semantics attempts to do the impossible, give "precise truth-conditions for modal claims". It's far better that we respect reality, and deal with possibility with strategies like "probability", than to proceed under the sophistic illusion of "precise truth conditions" which is created by possible world semantics.

For us, we live in the actual world. For us, other worlds are possible worlds, but for anyone living in such a possible world, they would also consider their world to be the actual world.

A possible rewording would be “But Lewis' interpretation appears to be that each possible world "is" an actual world for the inhabitants of that world” — RussellA

I don't know Lewis; principles too well. Do you think that it's possible for the different individuals referred to by "us", live in different possible worlds? How would we be able to communicate, and make sense of the things around us, when contradictory things would be true for each of us? Without the unity produced by agreement, could there be an "us"?

Lewis does believe that all possible worlds are actual worlds, but that's not a common view. Lots of philosophers disagree about that, but still use possible world semantics to discuss counterfactuals. Whether or not those counterfactual worlds are possible is debatable - but "possible" can apply to past, present, and future. — Relativist

Yes, I thought that's what we were talking about, Lewis' interpretation where all possible worlds are actual.

In everyday discourse it's ambiguous, but it appears to me that among philosophers, there's no ambiguity about what it means. There are controversies, but not about the basic definition. — Relativist

Not at all, like all the terms of modal logic, there is a big difference between ontological meaning and modal logic meaning. That is the ongoing discussion I've had with Banno over the meaniong of "the actual world".

What this shows is that Meta's way of talking is incompatible with the formal account. — Banno

Obviously.

He's not offering an alternative theory. — Banno

I offered an alternative theory. It involves a real ontology of time, and a separation between ontological possibility, statements of epistemological possibility, and counterfactual statements which are not possibilities at all, being statement so things which are actually impossible. That's three distinct categories.

For the rest of us, some proposal is contingent if and only if it is true in some, but not all, possible worlds. — Banno

Relaitivist and I were talking about "contingent things", not "contingent proposals". @Relativist, see what I mean about the ambiguity?

It is as if you were arguing that "over there" is meaningless, because it can be made to refer to any place at all. — Banno

You're ignoring the other half of the conditions. The meaninglessness was dependent on referring to everything as actual, and also without a definition for "actual". That's the situation Relativist and I were discussing concerning Lewis' interpretation of possible worlds. Every possible world is an actual world, and Relativist added that the world we perceive is an actual world, therefore everything is "actual", and I said that if everything is actual, then without a definition, "actual" is meaningless.

This shows very clearly and precisely, in a nutshell, the significant and substantial problem with your understanding of possible world semantics. In standard modal logic, the term “actual world” is an indexical label applied to one world in the model—it does not make any ontological claim about that world being the only real or “ontologically actual” world. It is a convenient reference point for evaluating modal statements, just as “here” or “now” is in ordinary language. — Banno

Banno, did you not read the SEP on truth conditions? The actual world of the modal model must "in fact" be the actual world. This means it must be the ontological actual world. This will be the third or fourth time I've produced this quote. Are you blind, or just unable to understand English?

(ii) its designated “actual world” is in fact the actual world, — SEP

How do you interpret "is in fact the actual world", in any way other than 'is the ontologically actual world'? That is an ontological statement. It does not state as the truth condition that the designated actual world must be the designated actual world, it states that the designated actual world "is in fact the actual world". Do you see that, and understand what it means? That is why Lewis proceeds to propose that each possible world is a concrete world, just like the one we designate as "the actual world", because we know "the actual world" ontologically as a concrete world, and the truth condition requires that the actual world in the modal model must "in fact", be the actual world. Therefore he concludes that all the possible worlds must be concrete worlds, just like the one we know.

You confusion comes from thinking that the world given the title w₀ in a modal interpretation must be our world - the confusion of the modal and the metaphysical. Think I've mentioned that before. — Banno

According to the SEP, the modal "actual world", must in fact, be the actual world. If you maintain that there is another "actual world", what you call the "metaphysically actual world", then to accept the modalism, you must reject the truth of the metaphysically actual world. It must be an illusion, because the modal actual world is "in fact", the actual world, and the metaphysical world is different, as you assert, so the metaphysical "actual world" must be fictional.

Yes, cheers - understood. I find it easier to answer these odd little objections than to move on with the harder stuff of the article, so I find myself somewhat distracted. There's a chance that the explanations I'm giving will help folk see the direction the article is taking. It's already very clear that Meta - for whom you started this thread - is for whatever reason incapable of following the discussion. But others may be coming along. — Banno

You think that this is the easier stuff, but you seem completely incapable of understanding it. Look at the meaning of "is in fact the actual world", for example. Why ignore the "is in fact" part, as it is a critical truth condition? Accept what the article says, and get on with the Idealism of modal logic. Instead, you keep insisting that there is another "actual world", the metaphysically actual world. But the "metaphysically actual world" is ruled out, as a fiction, when it is stipulated that the modal actual world is "in fact" the actual world. So, the easy part puts us into the idealist framework. Now, having gotten beyond the easy part, we must now proceed within that idealist framework, otherwise our interpretations are bound to be badly mistaken.