The size of the string determines how tight it must be tensioned to produce a desired pitch, but it is the pitch and not the size of the string that determines whether or not the lyre is in tune. Those pitches are not determined by the lyre. — Fooloso4

As I said, you do not at all understand the tuning of a stringed instrument. It is not necessarily tuned to any specific pitch. The notes which the instrument makes must be in tune relative to each other, not relative to any specific pitch. So the base note could be 180 hertz, 160, 175, !90, whatever. The particular pitch does not matter. So long as all the strings are properly tensioned in relation to each other the instrument will produce harmony, and can be said to be in tune. Not only that, but stringed instruments have a wide range of possible tunings. This is why your interpretation of "attunement", or "the tuning of a lyre" as a standard which needs to be adhered to when tuning a lyre, is simply incorrect. There would have been many different ways to tune a lyre in Plato\s time, and nothing specific as "the way".

Anyway you've gone off on a tangent and refuse to address Plato's argument, insisting that "attunement" is something other than the way that Plato described it. Maybe you are correct, and the true description of "attunement" is as you say, and not as Plato said. However, this is irrelevant because Socrates' arguments are directed against "the soul is an attunement", by the description of "attunement" presented in the text, not the one presented by you.

So your dismissal of the arguments seems to be based on a claim that Plato does not properly present what "attunement" is. You think that Plato does not actually refute the Pythagorean theory that the soul is a type of harmony because he makes a strawman of "harmony", and refutes that instead. I believe it is you who has made the strawman, by not following the conventional translation of "harmony", which has a clear meaning consistent with Plato's description, and opting for the more ambiguous "attunement" instead. The ambiguity allows you to produce the strawman.

This is very simple. Either you believe there is a first cause or you do not believe there is a first cause. It's a matter of belief, not reasoning. Sounds like theology to me. — jgill

I disagree with this. I think it is a matter of reasoning. Aristotle's so-called "cosmological argument" begins from the reality of change, and contingent being, which we experience at the present time, and proceeds to demonstrate logically the need to conclude the reality of what people call "a first cause". Because of this, I think that belief in the first cause is really, at its base, a matter of reasoned metaphysics, rather than religion.

The theologists have taken "the first cause" from the theoretical discipline of metaphysics, named it "God", and put it to work herding human beings in the practical field of religion. But theologists use many different tools in their practise, some even unethical, so this has created much dislike for religion. The backlash turns against "God" and ultimately the metaphysics which supports that conception. The problem is that the backlash against the metaphysics is generally irrational, being motivated by practises other than teaching the logical necessity of "the first cause", yet being directed at "the first cause"..

These consequences do not follow if one does not assert that the soul exists before in enters the body. Simmias' argument is a refutation of this assertion, but poor Simmias has become as confused as you are. — Fooloso4

Sorry I don't see the relevance. What I pointed to was Socrates' description of "harmony", to show you that it is inconsistent with your description of "attunement". By Socrates' description, "harmony" is the last composed and first destroyed. You had said attunement is prior to any particular instrument.

I was not talking about any "consequences", only showing the discrepancy between Socrates' description of "harmony, or "attunement", and your interpretation.

The tuning of a lyre, that is the frequencies to which a lyre is tuned, and the process of tuning a lyre are not the same. A particular lyre is tuned to those frequency ratios which exist prior to it. A lyre is well tuned when it comes close to matching those frequencies and poorly tuned the more it deviates. — Fooloso4

If you were familiar with string instruments you would know that this is not true. An instrument is not necessarily tuned to any specific frequencies. There are ratios between the different parts of the instrument which must be upheld to produce harmony, but there is no necessity for specific frequencies. Furthermore, any string instrument can be tuned in a multitude of different ways. The ratios of the different tunings may be said to be understood, and preexist, but these are principles of music theory, they are clearly not "the tuning of a lyre". We might call it some sort of instructions for tuning a lyre, but "the tuning of a lyre" is the act of actually putting the instrument in tune.

The relation is between attunement and a lyre. A relation of the one to the other. The tuned lyre is one in which the proper ratio of frequencies is achieved. — Fooloso4

No, this is not the case. The tuned lyre has properly tensioned strings according to the size of the strings. The tuned lyre has the required relationship between its parts to qualify as being in tune.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You're still not getting the point, or else simply denying it. A poorly tuned instrument does not have "harmony", or "attunement". If the soul is "harmony", the body cannot be poorly tuned and still be a soul. "Harmony" or "attunement" is a good tuning, not a poor tuning. The soul is defined as having a good tuning "harmony" or what you call "attunement". If the body is not properly tuned (poorly tuned) there is not harmony nor attunement, therefore there would be no soul. But this is inconsistent with the evidence. We see that some people are evil, and some are good, yet they all have a soul, while "harmony" or "attunement" is only proper to a good tuning.

Here's an example which may help you. Let's take the concepts of "understanding" and "misunderstanding", and compare them to harmony and dissonance. Suppose a person understands, and this is like a harmony in the person. However, it's also possible that the person misunderstands, yet believes oneself to understand. If we say that understanding is a descriptive property of the person's soul, we must also allow that misunderstanding might also be a property of the person's soul. Understanding is the good, and misunderstanding is the bad. Likewise, harmony is the good, and dissonance is the bad. We cannot restrict "the soul" simply to the good property, harmony, because this is inconsistent with observed reality, the soul also has the bad property, dissonance, just like it has both understanding and misunderstanding.

To improve would be to lessen dissonance. Again, it is a matter of degree not either or. — Fooloso4

But the soul is a matter of either/or. That's why there is an incompatibility between "soul" and "harmony". To make "harmony" compatible with "soul" we have to make it a matter of either/or, because that's the way soul is, either a body has a soul or it does not. Now, either the instrument has harmony or it does not, to be consistent with a body either having a soul or not. But then dissonance is excluded from soul, if soul is harmony, and this is inconsistent with the evidence. The evidence indicates that the soul has both the contraries, bad and good, not just the good, harmony.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

Exactly! That's why "soul" is inconsistent with "harmony". A poorly tuned instrument does not have harmony, yet a "poorly tuned soul is still a soul".

It is not a set of principles, it is a ratio of parts. In the case of a lyre it is the ratio of frequencies of the vibrating strings. Those ratios exist prior to the lyre. They are mathematical relations and can be heard. It is this ability to hear them that allows someone to tune a lyre. — Fooloso4

This makes no sense. You do not hear "a ratio of parts", nor do you hear "mathematical relations". You hear sounds, harmony and dissonance.

The fact is, an instrument can be more or less harmonized, more or less in tune. — Fooloso4

An instrument can be more or less harmonized, but a body does not have more or less a soul. That's why the theory "soul is a harmony" fails. A body might have more or less of whatever quality you define, but this is not the case with "soul". That's why soul cannot be a property of a body, like "attunement", or "harmony".

I am not equivocating. What is confusing you is that you are conflating the process of tuning with the standard by which the instrument is tuned. The tuning of a lyre is that set of frequencies that determine that some particular lyre is in tune. The lyre is tuned, the strings tightened and loosened, in order to come into accord with those established frequencies, that is, the tuning of a lyre. — Fooloso4

You can define "the tuning of a lyre" however you want. The problem is that the way you describe it is not consistent with the way that Plato does, as "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". So whatever arguments you make, based on your definition, are irrelevant to what Plato wrote. Plato is using "the tuning of a lyre in a completely different way, the common way, the act of tuning a lyre. As such. it is the aspect of the instrument "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". And if you insist that your argument, which uses a different definition, is relevant, that is equivocation.

The question cannot be addressed without establishing on the one side what an attunement is and on the other the body it is said to be an attunement of. — Fooloso4

As I said, you can define what "an attunement" is however you want, but if it is not consistent with what Plato has presented your definition is not relevant.

I want to clarify that when I mentioned "context-specific" regarding the term "identity" in logic, I was referring to its nuanced use within logical frameworks. In logic, the concept of identity is defined in a specific context and does not necessarily imply absolute identity in every conceivable sense, as stated in the law of identity.

While there might be some variability in how the term is used in different contexts, it doesn't necessarily mean that it is inconsistent or incompatible with the law of identity. The distinction between "equality" and "identity" in logic is often made to accommodate the need for precision in different logical systems and mathematical structures. — ChatGPT

ChatGPT has become evasive, saying nothing of any value here. What it says is that the use of "identity" in logic is "nuanced" and variable, and this doesn't necessarily mean that it is inconsistent with the law of identity. Since there is a well stated principle called "the law of identity", which defines "identity", I would conclude that any nuanced or variable use which is contrary to this principle is inconsistent with it.

For example, if a person said that "=" in mathematical equations, is a symbol of identity, this would be inconsistent with the law of identity. Two different things, what is represented by the right side of an equation, and what is represented by the left side, are said to be equal. But by the law of identity a thing's identity is unique to itself. Two different things cannot have the same "identity". Therefore the "=" symbol in mathematical equations cannot be said to be a symbol of identity without violating the law of identity. Remember the following?

So, while 1 = 1 in the sense that the individual "1"s are considered equal, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are combining two equal values to get a sum of 2, without suggesting that the individual "1"s are the same in an identity sense. It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity — ChatGPT

Thanks Banno, it appears like CGPT has a lot of respect for me. It concludes that "Identity" in logic is "context-specific", therefore not consistent, and not at all representative of the law of identity.

Thanks Banno, for providing a reply not chock full of confirmation bias. Unfortunately for you, and others who take the position you have, the unbiased machine appears to support my position very well.

For instance, in first-order logic, you can have variables that represent specific individuals, and statements like "a = b" assert that the individuals denoted by "a" and "b" are identical.
...
When we say "a = b" in logic, it usually implies identity. If "a" and "b" are interchangeable, it means they are the same in the relevant sense. Your example of chairs ("a" and "b") is correct in illustrating this concept. If everything predicated of "a" is the same as what is predicated of "b," then "a = b" holds in the logical context. — ChatGPT

We have two distinct statements here. 1) "a=b" indicates that a and b "are identical", and 2) "a=b" indicates that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense". To avoid equivocation with "=", it is necessary to conclude from these two statements, that "identical" means "the same in the relevant sense". That is exactly what equal means, therefore we have an indication of the concept of equality.

However, "the same" by the law of identity means the same absolutely, and this is quite different from "the same in the relevant sense". Therefore we can conclude that logic uses "identity" in a way which is inconsistent with the law of identity.

In summary, while logic does deal with individuals and identity, the equality symbol in logic typically denotes identity, not just equality in a quantitative or qualitative sense. Your explanation captures the nuances well, but it's important to recognize that in logic, "a = b" usually means that "a" and "b" are the same individual or object. — ChatGPT

So, we have a problem here. If "a=b' means that a and b are the same object, and it also means that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense", then we must conclude that "the same object" really means "the same in the relevant sense" in logic. This is not consistent with the law of identity which indicates that an object is the same as itself in every sense. Therefore the claim that logic deals with individuals or objects is false if what it means to be an "individual" or "object" is provided by the law of identity.

In summary, while logic does deal with individuals and identity, the equality symbol in logic typically denotes identity, not just equality in a quantitative or qualitative sense. Your explanation captures the nuances well, but it's important to recognize that in logic, "a = b" usually means that "a" and "b" are the same individual or object. — ChatGPT

Conclusion: since "identical" is shown to mean "the same in the relevant sense" in logic, and "a=b" usually is taken to mean that the two are identical in logic, logicians who take this position are in violation of the law of identity.

Your clarification aligns with this distinction, and it's important to be aware of the context in which terms like "equal" and "identical" are used, as they can carry different meanings in different discussions. — ChatGPT

Yes, these "different meanings" facilitate equivocation, and we must be wary of equivocation when judging soundness. Since many logicians use a meaning for "Identical" which is inconsistent with "identity" as stated by the law of identity, we need to be careful to recognize this difference to avoid equivocation. When a logician talks about "identity" this might really mean "equality", which is distinctly different from "identity" by the law of identity.

So, while 1 = 1 in the sense that the individual "1"s are considered equal, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are combining two equal values to get a sum of 2, without suggesting that the individual "1"s are the same in an identity sense. It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity.[/chat] — ChatGPT

It appears like ChatGPT has vindicated me. It recognizes the difference between "equality" and "identity", such that the mathematical notation of "=" is recognized as representing equality not identity. The difference between the two is shown to be necessary for the application of mathematics, by my example, and ChatGPT recognizes this necessity. So, if one would insist "equal" means "identical" in mathematics, they would simply be wrong. As shown by my simple example, arithmetic would not be sound if "=" meant identical. It really means "the same in the relevant sense", and the relevant sense here is quantitative value.

Do you mean probability approaching 1? — jgill

I suppose, I'm not familiar with the terminology of probabilities, I don't bet.

=" is the sense we were using, the one used in mathematics and logic, which is a predicate ranging over individuals. "a=b" will be true if and only if a and b are the very same individual. — Banno

In logic, "a=b" might indicate that a is the same subject as b, definitely not "the very same individual". Logic does not deal with individuals, it deals with subjects. Whether or not "a=b" is a true statement is irrelevant to logic, requiring a different type of judgement. That's why there is a difference between "valid" and "sound".

So for example, we can have two distinct chairs, and name one as subject "a", and the other as subject "b". So long as everything we predicate of a is the same as what we predicate of b, then we can say that a=b within our logical proceedings. I believe this allows for substitution, as the two are interchangeable within that logical system. By some people, they are said to be "the same" even though this is simply "equal", and they're obviously not the same. We know that the objects which were given those symbols are not "the same" by a rigourous definition of "the same", but within the logical system they are considered to be equal, and this facilitates the use of logic.

What you are referring to in the quote is a different case. You and I are not the very same individual. — Banno

Right, you and I are not the same individual, we are equal, and this allows that we are actually two, not one.

"Banno is human and Meta is human" is not a case of "=". To suppose so would again be to confuse the "is" of equality with the "is" of predication. — Banno

I'm afraid it's you who is confused. There is no such thing as "the 'is' of equality". That's just a misconception.

Here is a grade school exercise for you, to get you back on the right track. Suppose we represent you as 1, and we also represent me as 1. Now we put us both together and we have two, so we represent this with 1+1=2. I'd say that we're pretty smart to figure that one out. But I also think that both the 1's must be equal or else we could not give them both the same value of 1. So we can say 1=1. But if this "=" means that both the 1's are the same, then it's impossible that 1+1=2 because both 1's are the very same thing, so there is only one, not two. Understand?

Attunement is how Horan translates it. It is how Sedley and Long translate it. It is how Brann translates it. It is how many others translate it as well. The Greek term is ἁρμονία (harmonia) and is transliterated as harmony. — Fooloso4

The particular word used is not relevant. What is relevant is how Plato describes what is being talked about. We have the passage from Simmias which I quoted, "a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal". Replace the word translated as "harmony" with "attunement" if you will, but that does not change the description presented.

Then we have Socrates' description at 92c, "...the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed." Go ahead, replace "harmony" with "attunement". This does not change the thrust of the argument because the context provides the meaning.

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

This is nonsense. Yes, it is true that the principles by which a lyre is tuned exists apart from any particular lyre. But "the tuning of a lyre" is the tuning of a lyre, and that means that a particular lyre is being tuned. This is your sophistry. When Plato talks about a particular lyre, a bodily composite of elements, wood, pegs, and strings, which is tuned to produce a "harmony" or "attunement", you claim that he is talking about the general principles by which a lyre is tuned.

The context clearly indicates that you are wrong in your interpretation. First, in Simmias' statement, the harmony or attunement is something which exists "in the attuned lyre", it is not a separate principle by which the lyre is tuned. Then in the context of Socrates' statement, "the harmony is composed last of all". Obviously this "harmony" or "attunement" is not the principles by which the lyre is tuned, because that would be prior to the attunement, and not "last of all".

These statements in Plato's Phaedo are very explicit, and completely contrary to your interpretation above.

The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. If we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But it cannot be recollected if it had not at some time first been learned. — Fooloso4

Yes "recollection" is fraught with problems, as it leads to eternal objects of knowledge, commonly known as "Platonism". But the problem of preexisting knowledge, knowledge which preexists the individual, which shows up within the individual, as instinctual know-how, and the capacity to learn, which the theory of recollection was designed to resolve, still exists if we deny the theory of recollection.

To improve does not mean to bring into existence. One cannot improve something that does not exist. — Fooloso4

Put this into context though. To improve would be to bring harmony from dissonance. This very clearly indicates bringing harmony into existence.

Your final statement, "One cannot improve something that does not exist" represents the exact point of Plato's argument. To improve an evil person is not to bring harmony to dissonance, because that would imply that the evil person, being dissonant, does not even have a soul. Being dissonant means the harmony does not exist, and therefore neither would the soul.

But that is not the case in reality, the evil person does have a soul, and so do all sorts of other living things. Therefore improving on the attributes or properties of the soul, may be described as bringing harmony to something dissonant, but the soul cannot be the harmony because it exists even when there is dissonance, prior to the harmony.

Right, it is not the soul which is tuned. The soul is the attunement, the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body, not what is tuned. — Fooloso4

Now you are being ambiguous with your use of "attunement". Each body, or musical instrument, has parts and an arrangement which are particular to that body or instrument. You've said already that the "attunement" in your peculiar interpretation exists prior to the instrument, as the set of principles by which the instrument might be tuned. Now, you cannot turn around and say that the attunement is "the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body", and pretend to be consistent. That arrangement and tension is particular to the individual body, and is therefore posterior to the existence of the body.

When the instrument is in tune the strings are in harmony to each other. — Fooloso4

Again, you are playing your equivocation.

The more harmonized the soul the less its dissonance. A soul that is in poor health, a soul with a great deal of dissonance, is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You are not getting the point. The soul is harmony, attunement. That is the theory. It cannot be more or less harmonized, or in any way dissonant or else it would not be a soul. That is the precept of the theory, the soul is harmony. Therefore, by the precept of the theory a soul cannot have "a great deal of dissonance", because this is contrary to harmony, and by the theory the soul is harmony. The proposed "great deal of dissonance" would indicate a supposed soul with a great deal of non-soul, but that is contradictory.

A soul that is well attuned, a soul that is in harmony and balance, rules well. One that is in discord does not. Harmonized means that there is not one element of the attunement that rules. — Fooloso4

If the soul is a harmony, or attunement, then every soul, necessarily, is well tuned, by definition. By this theory, "the soul is a harmony", there can be no such thing as a discordant soul. That would be contradiction.

The attunement is the condition of the instrument. Your being in good or bad health is not something distinct from you, but you are not the condition you are in. — Fooloso4

Again, you are equivocating with "attunement". By what you said at the beginning of the post, "The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre", the attunement is not "the condition of the instrument". It is something separate from any particular instrument, as the principles by which an instrument might be tuned.

Your equivocation allows you to blatantly contradict yourself. First, the attunement is apart from and prior to any particular instrument, and now it is "not something distinct", it is "the condition of the instrument".

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul? — Fooloso4

Read "The Republic" please.

What I claim is that the attunement is not apart from the body, not that it is a part of the body. It is not some part in addition to the parts. — Fooloso4

Hmm, the final part of the post directly contradicts the beginning of your post. This is due to the equivocation I pointed to. Do you proof read? That could help you to avoid embarrassment. Look, this is the top of your post:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune — Fooloso4

By your new statement "the attunement is not apart from the body", do you agree with what Plato has Socrates say, that the attunement is posterior to, as dependent on the body? It is last to be produced, and first lost at corruption of the body And do you agree that an attunement is not random, but according to some principles which constitute "harmony". So if the soul is supposed to be a harmony, or attunement, the tensions of the bodily elements must exist in this specific way in order for that body to be endowed with "a soul"? That is the position which Plato is arguing against. And I suggest it is much the same as modern physicalism

He claims it problematic that '"equal" means "the same as"'. — Banno

This appears quite contrary for someone who tends to assert that meaning is use.

As human beings, you and I are equal. We are the same kind. This means that each one of us is of the same kind, human being. Despite being the same in kind, the fact that we are not the same in a complete way, provides for the reality that we are two distinct individuals. And, that we are of the same kind, allows us to say that there are two of that kind. If we were the same, we would only be one.

If you do not understand the difference between being equal and being the same, I'll do what I can to help you. If you are ready, let's begin. First, do you accept that you and I are equal yet not the same?

His otherwise innocent confusion is most troublesome for someone with pretensions to doing metaphysics, showing itself in many of his excursions into the area. He has for example variously also asserted that there is no such thing as instantaneous velocity, that... — Banno

I will say however, if you do not yet understand the difference between being equal and being the same, please get some schooling before you attempt the difficulties of metaphysics. Otherwise you will be lost in what is an extremely complex discipline. And, I will also tell you that your epistemology will suffer greatly if you do not respect this difference between being equal and being the same.

And don't forget the other end of causal chains - do they terminate in the future, or peter out into nothingness. — jgill

It is a basic ontological mistake to extend a causal chain into the future, that's the issue pointed out by Hume. Beyond the present, the events are possible, contingent. So in that sense future events are understood as probable, and predicted through statistics. Some future events, especially those which are more immediate, would have a probability approaching an infinite value, but still the present must be understood as making a boundary, a limit, which disables certainty, as Hume explained.

Also, lets be wary of non-constructive interpretations of Hyperreals, for otherwise one ends up having infinitesimals by fiat that do not denote anything tangible. — sime

None of this shit is "tangible". "Infinite" is not tangible. That's the issue, because it's not tangible, mathematicians are free to create all sorts of axioms which do not relate to anything physical. But when the mathematics gets applied there is a very real issue of the intangible aspects of reality. And if the axioms which deal with the intangible in mathematics do not properly represent the real intangible, the product is "the unintelligible".

This is what happens when we approach the issue of "the first cause". The calculus turns the first cause into a limit on tangible causation, rather than treating the first cause as an actual cause. But if there is an actual intangible first cause then the mathematical representation renders that first cause as unintelligible, being outside the limit of causation, according to the conventions for applying the mathematics.

Thank you for illuminating this issue for the fifth graders on the forum. — jgill

That's what I do, take everything to the most base level, and lay it out plain and simple. But the simple confuses many because at the most simple level things are complex.



Your referenced page makes the exact mistake I explained above. This mistake is to assume that things which are equal are exactly the same. The fact that someone else makes the same mistake as you does not correct your mistake.

This number is equal to 1. In other words, "0.999..." is not "almost exactly" or "very, very nearly but not quite" 1  –  rather, "0.999..." and "1" represent exactly the same number.

There are many ways of showing this equality... — Wikipedia

It appears Wiki could use some editing. Notice toward the bottom of the referenced page, the mention of "hyperreal numbers." That might help you to understand that valuing .999... as equal to 1 is just a matter of convention.

All such interpretations of "0.999..." are infinitely close to 1. Ian Stewart characterizes this interpretation as an "entirely reasonable" way to rigorously justify the intuition that "there's a little bit missing" from 1 in 0.999....[55] Along with Katz & Katz, Robert Ely also questions the assumption that students' ideas about 0.999... < 1 are erroneous intuitions about the real numbers, interpreting them rather as nonstandard intuitions that could be valuable in the learning of calculus. — Wikipedia

Here, check the following, like the guy says, even his "early-school math teachers knew that fact":

https://medium.com/@kenahlstrom/proof-that-99999-is-not-equal-to-1-5672e7dd58ce

First, it is important to understand that hyperreal numbers are an extension of real numbers … meaning that the restriction of disproving .99999… = 1 using only real numbers remains valid with hyperreal numbers.

The important function of hyperreal numbers in this case is that they create a method by which infinitesimal values can be represented within our imperfect decimal notation system.

Now, we can mathematically represent what we all know to be true. We all know that .99999… is not actually equal to 1, but that the difference between the two numbers is so infinitesimally small that it “doesn’t really matter”. Well, the true notation of equality between 1 and .99999… is 1 -h = .99999… and that is not an actual equality between the two numbers. Further, remember that problem of 1/3 not actually being equal to .33333…? Well, that can also be accurately expressed by hyperreal numbers as: 1/3 -h = .33333…

Conclusion
.99999… was never exactly equal to 1. Instead, a limitation in notation of decimal numbers created the illusion that the two numbers are equal and an academic desire to keep everything neat and tidy lead to confirmation bias and the statement that, at some limit, the actual difference was essentially akin to 0. With the inclusion of hyperreal numbers ( introduced algebraically in 1948 ), we can provide an actually accurate representation of the numbers being represented by using the infinitesimal representation h.

The lesson learned here? Question everything and everyone, even the experts. If something feels wrong and it’s ‘proofs’ seem insufficient, do more research … because you just might be on to something.

This seems to be the principal issue of this thread, the difference between a limit imposed by convention, and the reality of the thing which the limit is imposed on. According to the axioms of the mathematics, the difference appears to be infinitely small, therefore insignificant. But since the limit may be applied arbitrarily, in practise, the difference may actually be very significant. This means that because the difference is there, and very real, the practise of using calculus must adhere to very rigourous rules of application, to make sure that the chosen limit adequately matches what is real, to ensure that the difference does not become significant. Rules for applying calculus vary according to the field, or discipline of study.

Your entire argument seems to be centered around a misinterpretation of the theory, "the soul is a harmony". Clearly, the "harmony", or what you are calling "attunement" is something distinct from the material instrument itself. That is very clearly expressed by Simmias in the passage I quoted.

Simmias says, 85e-86d:
One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed...
— Plato, Phaedo — Metaphysician Undercover

You might continue to insist that the "attunement" is not something distinct from the instrument, but clearly Plato's arguments are directed against the idea of a "harmony" as such. And, the harmony exists as something separate from the instrument, as produced from the instrument. This is clearly the idea that Plato argues against, and is more consistent with modern physicalism. Your use of "attunement" only creates ambiguity between "attunement" as the general principles by which an instrument is tuned, and "attunement" as a specific condition of a particular instrument.

My apologies for the continued derailment, but since MU is insistent and refuses to move this to another thread I will respond here.

The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that the argument that begins:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.
(92a)

and goes on to ask:

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.
(92c)

provides the foundation for "a very good refutation". — Fooloso4

OK, so you dismiss the first of the three arguments, because you do not believe in the theory of recollection. This theory is meant to account for the reality of the innate knowledge which a person is born with, the capacity to learn, intuition, and instinct.

Are you saying that this type of know-how does not qualify as "knowledge", or does not even exist? Or what is the basis of your rejection of the knowledge that a person is born with, knowledge which a person has, which precedes the existence of one's body, so that the person is born with it?

An attunement does not lead or follow the elements. The attunement is the condition of those elements. For the lyre this means the proper tension of the strings. For a person this means being healthy. The limits of the analogy are obvious, a lyre cannot tune itself. But we can act to maintain or improve our mental and physical health. — Fooloso4

Clearly, the lyre exists prior to being tuned, therefore the attunement follows the elements of the physical composition. And' the harmony follows from the attunement. The very fact which you cite, that a person can act to improve one's health, or improve the attunement, demonstrates that the attunement is posterior to the physical body. That the attunement of the instrument, and therefore the harmony, is most readily changed is the reason why it is last coming into being in generation of the instrument, and the first thing lost in the corruption of the instrument.

The theory, "the soul is a harmony", as expressed by Simmias, very explicitly states that the harmony is something distinct from the physical instrument, strings and wood. And, the harmony, as something distinct, is produced from the instrument.

Socrates then resorts to a bit of sophistry:

“Now does this also apply to the soul so that, however slightly, one soul is more what it is than another? Is it more and to a greater extent, or less and to a lesser extent, a soul?”
(93b)

A lesser attunement is still an attunement. One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul.

“Now, what will any of those who assert that the soul is an attunement say that these things, virtue and the vice, in our souls are?
(93c)

They are like health and sickness, well tuned or poorly tuned, and in harmony or out of harmony.

And, being neither more nor less an attunement, it is neither more nor less attuned. Is this the case?
(93d)

No, that is not the case. It is well tuned or poorly tuned, and this allows for degrees. — Fooloso4

Plato's argument is not sophistry, it is just complex and difficult to grasp. You demonstrate a misunderstanding of it, and that's why you call it sophistry. Your dismissal of it is what is really sophistry. Look.

First, do you recognize that it is the bodily instrument which is either well tuned or poorly tuned? Therefore you cannot say "both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul" to be consistent with the argument, because the body is analogous to the instrument, and is what is tuned; it is not the soul which is tuned. That is your bit of sophistry. In the theory "the soul is a harmony", the soul follows from the body, like harmony follows from the instrument according to the attunement. This is just like in modern physicalism, mind follows from body, and concepts follow from the mind. Remember the statement by Simmias which expresses the theory that the soul, is a harmony. The harmony itself is invisible, without body.

Next, do you agree that if the instrument is not well tuned there will be some degree of dissonance, and that dissonance is inconsistent with harmony? And, since there is a multitude of strings, some may be in harmony and others dissonant. Therefore the same instrument may produce some harmony and also some dissonance at the same time, depending on the tuning. But "soul" by the theory, can only be harmony, it cannot be dissonance.

Now, the problem which Plato elucidates. The same soul can have degrees of both goodness and evilness at the same time due to the various elements within, just like the tuned instrument can have harmony and dissonance at the same time. However, according to the theory, the soul can only be harmony. Dissonance is contrary to harmony which is, "soul", and the soul cannot consist of aspects of 'nonsoul'. Therefore the theory must be wrong, the soul is not like a harmony, it also has dissonance as well.

This is deliberately misleading. On the premise that the soul is an attunement then it is not one element of the attunement that rules, but rather the relation between those elements, the ratio and harmony of those elements that rules. When the person is well tuned, balanced and in harmony, he or she will rule themselves well, and if not then poorly. — Fooloso4

You seem to misunderstand this argument too. The premise "the soul rules" is proposed as a true proposition, validated by the evidence explained. And, it is specifically proposed as inconsistent with "the soul is a harmony". There is nothing deliberately misleading here.

So you point out the inconsistency between the two ("the soul rules" and "the soul is a harmony"). However, since "the soul rules" is demonstrated to be a true premise by the evidence given, then logically we must reject the inconsistent premise "the soul is a harmony", which is proposed as an hypothesis rather than supported by evidence.

This begs the question. Socrates treats the soul and body as two separate and different things, the very thing the attunement argument denies. — Fooloso4

This is not true, it's clearly misinterpretation. The "harmony", or what you call the "attunement", is explicitly stated as something distinct from the instrument. Refer to the passage quoted above, what is stated by Simmias.

The passage from Homer is about Odysseus controlling his anger. Where is anger located within this separation? Is it an affection of the body or the soul? According to the division set in the Republic the source is the spirited part of the soul not the body.
If Odysseus is his soul then the example is not about being led by the affections of the body. — Fooloso4

The "spirited part" is the third part, the medium between body and mind. It is not the source of anything, only the medium between, which may act with one or the other. Either the the source is the mind, if the soul is healthy, or the body is the source if the mind is ill. So "anger" is good and healthy when the mind is exercising control over the body, and "anger" is bad and unhealthy when the body has affected the mind. Therefore your objection here has no relevance.

Certainly, when one goes through the arguments sufficiently, it becomes clear why we should not accept them. — Fooloso4

It has become very clear why you reject the arguments. You straw man them. You do not represent "harmony" as something invisible without body, which follows form the attuned instrument, as clearly stated in the text. Instead, you claim that the "attunement" is a part of the body of the instrument.

If we were discussing the "attunement", then we'd have to consider the intentions involved in the act of tuning, which produces the attunement. This would involve the complete design and manufacture of the instrument to ensure proper tuning. All that intention involved is prior to the manufacture of the instrument, and the tuning of it. If we were to represent "the soul" as the creator of the instrument, in this way, then the argument would be completely different. However, it is very clear that Plato is arguing against "the soul" as hypothesized to be something which follows from the body, as "the harmony" follows from the instrument.

Interestingly, your many mathematical expressions contain only a finite number of elements, yet set out infinite sequences. A simple expression such as 0.9˙=1
0.
9
˙
=
1
includes infinity - the dot says we "carry on in the same fashion", writing more 9's...

We don't expect to be able to write all the 9's down. But we do, in a finite time, understand what is going on, and can follow subsequent arguments and discussions without getting trapped in our inability to actually write an infinite number of 9's...

Well, some of us can. — Banno

:"Some of us" get lost in self-deception. The question is which are the ones who are lost. The two expressions, the 1 and the 0.9˙ are said to be equal. And as you say, we can readily understand what's going on without getting trapped. The two do not actually have the same meaning, it's a form of "rounding off", with the convention allowing the use of "equal". When rounding off we assign a different meaning, which better serves the purpose, and we allow that the rounded is equal to the pre-rounded.

I would assume that those who do not understand that this is a form of rounding off, and claim that the two expressions are actually the same, despite the glaring difference in meaning between them, are lost in self-deception. They have fallen into the trap of saying that two different things are the same, just because the convention allows us to say that they are equal. It seems common at TPF for mathematicians to fall into the trap of saying that "equal" means "the same as".

I thought that a pretty cool response, but then, it was also telling me what I wanted to hear (although, how did it know that :chin: ) — Wayfarer

I think that this is a very interesting question, and goes to the heart of what current AI processes actually are. It's more a topic for the philosophy of language, than mind, but the two are closely related, language being a reflection of mind.

The Ai is formulated to look at the exact words which you use, and the exact way that you use them, compare this with others, and thereby categorize you, produce a very specific "type" constructed just for you, the individual. You are a type. But it isn't really "you" that it is representing with that specialized type, it is simply what you want, as represented by that one specific instance of language use. And, as you note, it is very adept at giving you what you ask for. Beside the fact that it has all sort of language use available at its fingertips to analyze, it is very impressive because it is designed with that one intent, to represent what you want, without the interference of having its own desires, which happens with human to human interaction. The machine has the capacity to determine what you want without being influenced by what it wants, if the only thing it wants is to give you what you want.

Of course, misuse is extremely likely. To begin with, ulterior motives are probably already cooked into the machine, intent other than to simply provide a representation of what you want, such as data collection and other forms of classification for you, for advertising or whatever.

Imagine if an AI were to stalk you. It can already produce a very good representation of what you want, from one simple instance of language use. Do you think that if it followed a whole lot of your language use, it could produce a very clear model of "you", or would it get totally confused by all sorts of conflicting wants, and see you as a completely unintelligible being?

Since you did not answer the question, I take it you agree with me then. The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.

Short answer begins here

A more adequate long answer here

It is clear from that thread that you disagree with my interpretation. If you wish to pursue this further please reopen that thread or begin a new one. — Fooloso4

Your quoted passages in the "short answer" are all before 92 in the text, which is where the argument against 'the soul is a harmony begins'. The issue I am addressing here is not whether Socrates provides a good argument for the immortality of the soul, as presented in the The Phaedo. Neither is the issue whether Plato believes that he or Socrates has provided a good argument for the immortality of the soul. The issue discussed here is whether or not Socrates provides a good argument against the theory 'the soul is a harmony'.

This position, 'the soul is a harmony' is very much similar to the modern physicalist position which apprehends ideas, concepts, mind and consciousness in general, as something distinct from the physical body (as the harmony is distinct from the lyre), but insists that these are dependent on the physical body as properties of it, or emergent from it, like the harmony is dependent on the lyre.

I believe Plato provides a very good refutation of this theory 'the soul is a harmony'. Regardless of what you think abut Socrates' arguments for the immortality of the soul, do you agree with me that the refutation of this theory is a sound one? If not, why not?

The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter. — Fooloso4

A lyre that is not in tune cannot play a tune in tune. The harmony is not what is played on the lyre it is the condition of the lyre, the proper tension of the strings in ratio to each other that allow it to play in harmony. A body that is not in tune cannot function properly. When it is far enough out of tune it cannot function at all. — Fooloso4

Simmias says, 85e-86d:

One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed... — Plato, Phaedo

Socrates' refutation of 'the soul is a harmony' (92-94) consists of three distinct arguments. Each one argues a slightly different principle. Each argument is aimed against the idea that the soul is a composite thing, it is composed from the elements of the body coexisting in a specific tension, resulting in a "harmony". From the elements of the body, the harmony is composed last, and first destroyed in corruption of the instrument. In modern terms we might consider this "harmony" to be a balanced state of existence, or equilibrium, of the composite material parts.

The first and third argument attack the fact that the harmony is posterior to the bodily composition which produces it, yet common understanding of "the soul" puts the soul as prior to the bodily composition. These are simple arguments but rely on the common notion of "the soul" for their effectiveness. That is what Foolos4 rejects with "The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter." But this dismissal is unacceptable because proposing that the soul is a harmony, already in itself, as a primary proposition, assumes this body/soul separation, as "the harmony" is expressed as something distinct from the material body which produces it (described by Simmias above). So this rejection would only be acceptable if we remove the primary proposition 'the soul is a harmony', but then there is nothing to argue. The point to argue might then be 'there is no soul'. But Socrates' argument is against the Pythagorean position that 'the soul is a harmony'. So it is the Pythagoreans who have already framed the argument in this way.

The second argument is more complex and difficult, involving the difference between "equilibrium" (as the harmonized state), and "equality", as what all equilibriums might have in common. The argument seems to be that a harmony is an equilibrium, and all physically existing equilibriums partake of varying degrees of equality. That would dictate their stability. The soul on the other hand is more like "equality" itself, that which all equilibriums have in common, as an order state of being.

So in the first argument, Socrates appeals to another principle, 'knowledge is recollection' and shows how this is inconsistent with 'the soul is a harmony'. Knowledge is a property of the soul, so if the knowledge which an individual will have, pre-exists the person's bodily existence, then so does the soul. This is inconsistent with the soul being a harmony which arises from the well-tuned elements of the body. In modern terms we can think of the preexisting knowledge as innate knowledge, intuition and instinct, knowledge which is supported by genetics and DNA. If this is a type of knowledge which an individual has, and knowledge is the property of a person's soul, then the person's soul must precede the person's body.


The second argument concerns the various degrees of tuning which are possible. We can say that an instrument is better tuned or worse tuned depending on the amount of dissonance inherent within the harmony produced. Each bit of dissonance which exists within the harmony is a degree of unharmony. Since a harmony is never absolutely perfect, there is always various degrees of dissonance within the occurring harmony itself, and this is a case of the opposite of the thing, occurring, or inherent within, the named thing, Due to a lack of perfection, there is always some degree of 'not-harmony' within the harmony. As analogy we could consider instances of "hot". Each hot thing still has some degree of cold inherent within it, unless it is the absolute hottest possible thing.

If the soul was like this, admitting to various degrees of "soulness", harmony and dissonance, then we'd have to say that an evil person has less of a soul than a good person. But this is not the case, we say that all souls are equal, as souls, and the evil person has no less of a soul than the good person. Furthermore, all the living creatures are equal in the sense of having "a soul", and despite the vast variety of difference that we notice amongst the living creatures, one is not more in tune than the other, as is the case with the difference between harmonies, one having more dissonance than another. All the souls of living creatures are equal, as souls.

The third point is that the soul is said to rule the various part of the body, making them do, at times, what is contrary to their very nature. If a man is hot and thirsty yet the water is known to be bad, the soul prevents the man from drinking. Likewise with food. If the soul was a harmony, it could do nothing but follow the plucking of the strings, the soul would be directed by the affections of the body, following them, never being in opposition. But this is not the case, we see that men, with the power of will, are capable of inflicting all sorts of punishments on their bodies in many different ways, directing the parts in ways very contrary to the nature of the part. It is impossible that a harmony could do this, directing the activities of the composite parts of the lyre, as this would alter the tuning, corrupting the harmony which is "the harmony"'s very existence.

In order not to get too far off topic I will only say that Plato also gives us reason to doubt the argument provided. — Fooloso4

Can you show me the reasons given by Plato, to doubt the arguments presented by Socrates, as paraphrased above.

Well, kind of, but the meaning of the general category of 'object' is still abundantly obvious. — Wayfarer

How can you say this in light of what I presented? If "object" is supposed to have the same meaning when referring to a physical thing which we can sense, pick up, move around, etc., and also when referring to a subject of discussion, like 'the weather' or 'American politics', which you metaphorically call an "object of discussion", then how would "object" be defined, in an abundantly obvious way?

Suppose we say an "object" is something apprehensible, either through the means of sensation, or directly to the intellect. This could formulate the general category "object". But you know as well as I know, that there is a huge separation between these two types of objects, outlined in Plato's Republic by the categories of the divided line. Now Kant came along and said that one of these two types of objects is not even apprehensible to the mind anyway. So the proposed definition, "something apprehensible" is rendered unacceptable by Kant's metaphysics, and what was supposed to be abundantly obvious is now very confusing and unintelligible.

The tendency is to ignore Kant's metaphysics, and assume that an "object" is apprehensible. But this places the two distinct types of objects together in the same category. The problem is that some objects are inherently unknowable, while others are inherently knowable, and we've denied, or ignored the metaphysical principle which would distinguish between these two. This produces a significant epistemological problem. Mistakes inhere within our knowledge due to the fact that some objects are inherently unknowable. But the knowable and unknowable have been so thoroughly mixed to together through the use of this "general category of 'object", that the skeptic must doubt all supposed "objects of knowledge" to expose where the elements of unintelligibility are hidden.

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. — Wayfarer

There is more than one such distinction, between object and subject, because these words have multiple meanings. Consider the following:

What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. — Wayfarer

The use of the phrase "object of discussion" is strictly speaking, incorrect, because what you are saying is really "subject of discussion". This type of sloppy usage is what leads to the problem you speak of, where consciousness is considered to be an "object", because it is taken to be an object of discussion rather than a subject of discussion.

This problem is actually pervasive with many modern logicians who prefer to ignore this subject/object distinction. In a common predication there is a subject and a predicate. The subject cannot be taken to be an object without category mistake. Some people will say that the word names an object, and so the proposition concerns the object. But this is false, because the word itself is the subject in this case, and there is a further correlation between the word and the object named. The reality of this separation must be maintained to maintain the possibility of mistaken identity.

Strong emergence would show the analogy is simply wrong, as Plato is arguing, although it would be wrong in a different way. With strong emergence, we would have a new, fundemental and irreducible force in play. Such a force would seem to be causally efficacious, and so it shouldn't be a problem to say the mind causes the body to do things in the way that it appears to be a problem for a harmony to "cause" changes in the instrument that generates it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this "fundamental and irreducible force" 'the soul', as defined by Aristotle, 'the first actuality of a body having life potentially within it'?

But conceptually, I would argue this doesn't appear to make sense. The analogy breaks down because a lyre/harmony relation seems like a reducible one. That it is conceptually hard to see how this could ever work is sort of the point. Strong emergence isn't at all intuitive and this would seem to suggest that either something is fundementally wrong with the concept, or the concepts it is built on top of (substance/superveniance), or that there is something wrong with our intuition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

By this "strong emergence", is it the case that the material body is actually emergent, from that "force"? This would be consistent with the immaterial soul being prior to the material body, as the force from which the body emerges. Therefore it must be immaterial.

For me, this is tough because I think the analogy is probably in some ways a good one, although "melody" would work better. But I would tend to want to locate the problem back at basic ontological distinction between things and processes being basic (putting Heraclitus over Parmenides). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that the simultaneity of the parts of the "harmony" is an important aspect, which ought not be replaced by "melody". It is very important to the concept of the material body of the living being, that the various parts exist in a unity of simultaneity, and this gives us the intuition of being "present". Being "present" is a very difficult but real aspect of being, and the difficulty manifests as the uncertainty principle in the Fourier transform when we try to break a harmony into its constituent parts at the present moment. The way that different notes coexist at the present moment is very perplexing, each requiring a different length of time to perceive due to differing wavelengths, and this is indicative of the difficulty in understanding the reality of passing time.

And Socrates certainly seems to use the term like it refers to a (specific) "tuning," rather than just a any harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Actually, I admit that Plato is ambiguous with this term, translated as "harmony", and uses it in different ways in that text, depending on the translation, which is also very critical. Probably in his time, "tuning" was the more common usage for that word. However at the point when Socrates dismisses or refutes the idea that the soul is a harmony, it is very obvious that he uses "harmony" in the way which is more common to us, the way I defined. Obviously, that's what makes the argument work.

@Fooloso4 is very quick with quotes, so I'll wait for some reference then I'll show the ambiguity in Plato.

The problem I see is that it seems possible that Plato is having Socrates use the term in a very limited and argumentatively weak way on purpose. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion, Plato is having Socrates demonstrate the ambiguity of the term. People in that time would have claimed that the soul is like a harmony (I believe that's a Pythagorean principle). For those individuals who would believe that the soul is a prior "force" (like you describe in strong emergence) causing the unity of the body, as a sort of tuning, then this interpretation is apt. However, the physicalists/materialists of the time would have argued that a harmony is something produced from the "tuned" body, in the way I defined "harmony" above. So the principle, 'the soul is a harmony' is lost to ambiguity. It is a meaningless principle, because some would believe that this means that the soul is prior to the body as that "force" which produces the parts co-existing in harmony, while others would interpret "harmony" as what is produced by the tuned body. Therefore the stated principle supports two opposing perspectives, and requires analysis of the ambiguity in order to produce an adequate understanding.

Given the advice that comes before, I think we are supposed to pick up, examine, and discard each of the first two (arguably three) reasons he gives for discarding the analogy, until we get to the last argument that parallels the problems of strong emergence. Likewise, Plato seems to save his best overall argument for the immortality of the soul for even later in the dialogue. I don't think this argument works, but figuring out why it fails required innovations in logic that weren't around for a very long time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've read the passages a number of times, but my memory fails me now. If I remember correctly, Plato builds up to the argument with numerous mentions of "tuning". Then at the point of dismissing the position he argues against "harmony" (in our common usage as simultaneous notes produced by the instrument). This really leaves the aforementioned "tuning" unaddressed.

I guess it depends on what you take the goal of science to be, usefulness or truthfulness. Traditionally, in "the scientific method", the ability to predict was taken as an indication of the correctness of an hypothesis. Now, it appears like many people believe that the capacity to predict is the goal.

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Yes, i think there definitely is a "survivorship bias". Consider that only the best really got preserved. Most ancient Greek principles, from the Ionians, the Eleatics, the atomists etc., were preserved only through the criticism of it, in Plato and Aristotle. So really, what was preserved was the dismissal of the ancient ideas, the refutations found in Plato and Aristotle which demonstrated the faults. Then skepticism, as demonstrated by Socrates, became very important because it was necessary to rid the mind of the ancient foundations which were being demonstrated as faulty. We ought not downplay the importance of this movement, to rid the mind of ancient ideas which were being refuted (the downfall of Alexandria for example).

Faulty assumption. It could be that the physics is bad. Usefulness does not necessarily imply truthfulness.

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite see how you think that "strong emergence" gets around Plato\s trap. Can you explain what you mean here?

That's a good point. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Foolos4 simply equivocates with "harmony". The primary definition of "harmony", the one Plato deals with is "the simultaneously sounded musical notes to produce chords and chord progressions, esp. as having a pleasing effect".

But Fool implies a "harmony" could exist without the instrument which plays the notes, by referring to "harmony" as if it meant a general principle of "tuning". This allows Fool to say that the "harmony" as the general principle by which the lyre is tuned, precedes the playing of the lyre. But this is a different meaning for "harmony" from the one that Plato is using, which is the common definition of "harmony", the simultaneously sounded musical notes having a pleasing effect. "Harmony" in this sense requires that the lyre be tuned already, and Plato is arguing against the soul as harmony, not as a principle of tuning.

If we were to clone two human beings, they wouldn't feel like two different persons anymore because their thoughts wouldn't be unique anymore? — Skalidris

I disagree. Identical twins, very similar to clones, obviously feel like two different people. And research on animals shows that clones have different thoughts from each other, and would think of themselves as unique individuals.

Which "I" are you referring to? The notion we have when we are completely awake and conscious? The cloudy version of "I" we sometimes have in dreams? What about people with mental illness, their notion of "I" is completely different, imagine people with split personality, or people with schizophrenia who hear voices. Which "I" are they? I don't think you realize how complex this "I" is, we feel like ourselves when we can access our memory, our feelings, things that we normally access to when we're conscious and awake. I mentioned waking up from fainting in my thread, and the first images and sounds were really different from reality, yet I didn't experience any feelings of weirdness or fear. If I had the same notion of "I" as I do when I'm conscious, I would have felt disoriented and scared. — Skalidris

Didn't I say "the 'I' is the complete package"? That means complexities and all.

How do we know that the notion of "I" is related to consciousness?
...
It's the most intuitive one, for sure — Skalidris

Question answered, by yourself. My point was that coming up with a fictitious scenario, your so-called thought experiment, does nothing to deconstruct that intuition.

If we choose not to trust our intuitions, what rational arguments do we have to say that consciousness is always related to this "I" notion? — Skalidris

If you choose not to trust any intuitions, you cannot make any rational arguments. Rational arguments require premises, and judgement of the premises is based in intuition. If you dismiss all intuitions, then anything might be taken as true or false, and whatever argument you produce would be meaningless, lacking in soundness.

I believe the issue here is the force of habit. "Habit" was first described by Aristotle, as a sort of property (in Latin, "to have") of an active being. When a being has the propensity to act in a specific way, we say that it has a habit. And the habit is a way of avoiding the need for conscious decision making, and employment of the will, for every little act which the being makes.

Aquinas analyzed "habit" quite extensively, questioning amongst other things, where does the habit reside. He determined that the habit must be a property of the potential to act, not the act itself, therefore it is proper to the material or bodily aspect of the being. This is a difficult principle to understand because properties are generally formal, actual, so to assign a property to potential is to say that the potential already has inherent within it, some sort of form, which is not evident as "formal" in the description of the act. I conclude that this is why the habitual act is often contrary to what is "reasonable" as decided by the agent who acts.

The difficulty becomes more apparent when Aquinas considers habits of the intellect. We observe that the activities of the intellect follow patterns of habit, so we need to assume a material aspect to account for the residence of these habits. This results in a very complex Thomistic structure of appetites. The lower appetites (of the senses) are divided in two, concupiscible and irascible, meaning roughly inclined toward and inclined away from an apprehended particular. The intellect however, specifically the will, being inclined toward the general notion of "good", cannot be divided into concupiscible and irascible in that way. However, in the way that the will directs us toward "good" in the general sense, and it exercises will power over the concupiscible and irascible appetites of the senses, there is still a resemblance of that division within the intellectual appetite (will).

A thorough reading of Aquinas' exposé is recommended because it is very well thought out, and revealing of the underlying complexities in the activities of living creatures. Modern, science based descriptions, tend to be deterministically modeled, and these models ignore the role of the free will in the creation, evolution, and destruction of habits. We tend to think of the being as having in-grown, internal inclinations and avoidances consisting of structures like defense mechanisms and control structures. These are understood to interact with the environment in a deterministic (scientific) way, effecting change on both sides. However, this type of modeling, by removing the role of choice by the agent, is an over-simplification which ignores a hugely important, and greatly complicating aspect of the activities of life. It takes the pre-existence of the internal mechanisms for granted, and neglects the role of choice, selection by the being as agent, in the interaction between internal structure and external conditions.

In light of this need, the need to include the role of choice by the being, as agent, on the effects of internal mechanisms, principles of Lamarckian theory become a requirement for a better understanding of the process of evolution. As Aquinas explained, habits must have a real material base. And the habit comes into existence as than effect of choice. And choice may also be active in the maintenance or removal of the habit. Therefore choice of the being as agent, must have a real effect on the evolving material bodies. And of course this is very evident in the role of choice by the being, in reproduction, within Darwinian evolutionary theory.

The relevant point now is that something more than simple "guidance" is required to lead individual human beings toward the good. It becomes obvious that the person to be guided must possess the will to be guided. We can call this inspiration, passion, spirit, ambition, or something like that. Therefore the first step to "guidance" is not an act of guidance at all, but kind of an inversion of this. It is to instill this special quality within the person to be guided, the inspiration required, as the wealthy man did for the children with the offer of toys in your parable. And that is to empower the individual as a real "self", a spirited and ambitious person who will make the break from one's past in order to better the future. This is to make the person a leader rather than a follower. As it turns out, to guide a person in this sense, is not to show them the way, but to inspire them to find the way.

Conceptions of divine command theory obviously go back to the ancient world, but they weren't popular until the Reformation, and they became popular precisely because of modern redefinitions or morality (and were more popular in Protestantism in any event). The more common formulation is that God has authority precisely because God is good, and what goodness is entails this sort of authority. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is exactly the problem I was talking about. It's nothing but a vicious circle. There is nothing there to provide any principles for judgement as to what is good or bad in human actions. God has authority because God is good, and what goodness is, is that God has authority. Anytime someone says "God wants X and God is the authority therefore we must do X", this is just a human judgement, not a judgement from God, and we have no way of knowing what God really thinks about X.

There is a disconnect, a gap, between the human judgement of "good", and any true divine judgement of "good" which cannot be bridged because we appear to have no way to ask God. Therefore it is a mistake to base "good" in the authority of God because this denies us of the capacity to determine what is "good".

The mistake is to assume that, if mankind has any sort of telos, it must be defined by divine command, or that it can float free of the communities in which men live. In the ancient world, the community is prior to the individual.

Consider Timothy Chappelle's formulation of Platonic virtue ethics: "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see how you bring in "the community" as a source of telos. We know that individuals have their own very distinct intentions, and God is often assumed to have intention in a similar way. But what justifies a claim that a community has any sort of intention or telos. A community is a group of individuals who work together on agreement toward common goals which have been stipulated by various individuals, and are sometimes voted on. The source of the goals is the individuals, not the community. It is true that goals are adopted and passed on from generation to generation through the form of "the community", but the goals are passed from individual to individual, in the same way that a father might pass a goal to a son. "The community" is never a source of goals, nor can any telos be said to be proper to the community, they are the goals of the members of the community..

The quote "Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good." does not imply a community at all. It implies an individual in contemplation of "Good".

In more modern views (e.g. Kant), we might think in terms "rules" that "any rational agent," can agree too (and indeed, recent ethics threads on the board assume this indeed must be what morality is). — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is simply one proposal, and I do not see any reason to accept it as "what morality is". Remember Plato's Republic, and the cave allegory in particular. Only the philosopher gets a glimpse at "the good", while the vast majority suffer from the mistake of thinking that the shadows on the wall are real things. This majority consists of "rational agents" but the philosopher is unable to convince the majority of them, upon return to the cave, because they are victims of that habit. In fact, Plato often implied that "the good" is not what the majority would agree to. The vast majority of men are like children who want candy, totally ignorant of what is truly good for them. We cannot say that these men are not rational agents, but they would never agree on "the good" like you or Kant would suggest. Their ideas and thoughts are directed toward supporting their childish wants, and the term we use for this is "to rationalize". They are still rational agents, but are hopeless in the sense of agreeing to the good.

The perfection of virtue doesn't sit outside the sphere of intersubjectivity and history. It does involve the contemplation of a good that transcends these, but can't be reduced to it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where you and I seem to disagree, the role of "intersubjectivity". If it is the individual who engages in the contemplation of good, then it must be the individual who determines what is good. Therefore the individual leads the community in demonstrating what is good, not vise versa. If the average person is unable to understand the complexities of "the good", as indicated in Plato\s Republic, and only the philosopher who contemplates good, can even get a glimpse of understanding, then this person who contemplates good needs some power of authority over the community, as having the rightful capacity to lead it. Where could this person turn, to obtain that authority other than to God?

I stand corrected then. Dialectical pride is like the tip of the iceberg. The real issue is not the dialectic exclusion which is evident as the symptom, but rather an underlying ethnic discrimination.

You've lost me again. Free will is given to us. Through the use of free will we give ourselves something which was not given to us, we create for ourselves. There is something here prior, and something posterior. The reasons for our existence are prior to our existence, and the cause of us having free will. But our own reasons, as created by our free will, are posterior.

I meant the latter, the author of that language.

It doesn't matter that your dialect is not one of the excluded ones. Your attitude towards the exclusion indicates an underlying instance of what you have termed "dialectical pride". Otherwise the exclusion would not have significance to you. In other words the exclusion only becomes significant in relation to an attitude of dialectical pride, and, the exclusion is significant to you.

f everything one is, is given to one from someone else, does that not also give one the right to claim any of that as oneself?

Genetically you are half of your father and half of your mother (plus a little mutation), yet you are yourself. — mentos987

By free will we give to ourselves something other than what was given to us.

We could all be puppets playing out a role given to us. But while we live in a world of puppets, we all remain real to each other, and so do our motivations, our "reason". — mentos987

In that case, "one's own reasons" would not actually be one's own reasons, but simply the reasons of the puppet master, as in my explanation.

It seems to me that in many ancient and medieval ethical systems it would be both. There is on the one hand man's telos, which is internal to man (plural), but determined prior to any individual man. On the other hand, there is free man's own reasons for doing what he does, being who he is etc. The whole reason ethics is difficult is that these two can vary from one another in practice. Man can fail to fulfill his telos and fail to flourish, through his own choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and I think that this is why the concept of "free will" was developed, as you describe, to fulfill the need produced by that gap between the prior telos and the individual's telos. The concept of free will allows that the individual's telos is in some way free from the prior telos.

The ideal situation is where man's free choice synchs up to mankind's telos. But there is a wrinkle here in that these thinkers were generally not free will libertarians. However, neither were they modern fatalists. Rather, they embrace a certain sort of "classical fatalism." "Character is destiny," Heraclitus says. They embrace the concepts of "fate" and "divine providence," and elucidate the ways in which man is a slave to circumstance, desire, and instinct, and yet allow that man, both individually and as a society, can manage to become more or less free / self-determining. Part of fulfilling man's telos is precisely becoming more self-determining and more "one's self," rather than being a mere effect of external causes. (Modern existentialism recapitulates part of this, while missing crucial elements) — Count Timothy von Icarus

This might appear to be the "ideal", but it would require having some access to, or some principles relating to, that prior telos, what you call "mankind's telos". But we have no access to that telos, so it's just a pie in the sky "what God wants". Then there is no way of knowing what constitutes "synching up", and individual human beings (following their own telos) will try to make their own determinations as to what constitutes the prior telos, making affirmations about whether or not a particular telos is in synch with the prior, based on nothing real.

Because the supposed "ideal" is left impotent in this way, it cannot be the true ideal. It's a fiction which cannot be obtained, and furthermore, we have no way of even knowing if we are coming close, or even headed in the right direction. Therefore this proposition cannot be accepted as a true representation of "the ideal".

This is why an overflowing love is important in Plato and the Patristics. To hate something to be controlled by it. To be indifferent to something is still to be defined by what one is not. Only love, the identification of the self in the other, allows one to avoid being determined by what is external to personal identity. This translates into a "love of fate," that must accompany the entity that will not be mere effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Based on what I said above, I would not accept this conclusion. Plato recognized the problem with this supposed "ideal", and exposed it in The Euthyphro. So Plato's designation of "love" as important is based on something other than an appeal to the prior telos, "mankind's telos", just like his designation of "just", "good", et.. Plato makes an extensive analysis of human emotions, feelings, terms described as virtues and vices, good and bad, and their relations with pleasure and pain, and makes suggestions based on this analysis of human beings within the context of human society. So he provides guidance for the telos of the individual from an analysis of the human being, within the condition of human society, and he does not pretend to access that prior telos which you call "mankind's telos".

I think the social view moves towards a climax in Eusebius, who has a proto-Hegelian view of how history can act as an engine spurring man on towards the greater fulfillment of human purpose at the world-historical scale. With the medievals, you also start to see the acknowledgement that, while human telos has certain unchanging elements, it is also shaped by the social-historical conditions man finds himself in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This idea, (that of an Ideal telos), what you call "mankind's telos" was propagated by the Church as God's intention, what is wanted by God. But this was a pretense developed by the Church in an effort to keep the subjects in line, and it strayed from the earlier teachings derived from Plato, which promoted the free will to decide as the highest faculty. Fundamental to the development of Christianity is the freedom of the individual to willfully join the movement. The turn around which involved telling people that they must conform to the will of God, was the beginning of the decline. St Thomas in particular obscured this principle by describing the will as subject to the intellect, but ultimately he had to admit that the free will is higher in the absolute sense. However, varying interpretations will lead some to believe that the will must be subject to the intellect.

What you describe as human beings recognizing the prior telos, "mankind's telos" as changing, evolving with the evolution of human society, is simply a recognition that this "ideal telos", the intent of God is faulty as a principle for the telos of individual human beings. The supposed "ideal telos" changes with changes in the societal context, and is therefore a reflection of the society, posterior, rather than the true prior telos.

So individual man's reasons are not identical with the the global telos of man. This is precisely because man is not free, and being enslaved to desire, ignorance, and circumstance , man lacks the knowledge and means of fulfilling his purpose. Even modern existentialists seem to recognize the need for some level of self-determination to make life meaningful, although they deny the global telos.

The shift to emotivism is important here. For the existenialist, moral freedom can't be the crowing achievement of man because moral freedom is simply reducible to desire. Due to their focus on the individual, they often lack the same focus on social freedom as well, but not always. Without these, the idea of a telos for mankind does indeed become incoherent and reduce to a single "internal" purpose defined only by the
individual. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The confusion represented in your conclusion here, is just a reflection of the fault in your premise. The fault is in trying to base the telos of the individual in some sort of "ideal" prior telos. The prior telos cannot be accessed by us, even if it is real, so we must base all the principles for the telos of the individual in the real needs of the real individual, here and now, and this is what must shape society. That's what Marx pointed to.

Subjectively they would be your own. From the viewpoint of fellow humans, they would be your own. — mentos987

I don't see that. Can you explain?

Nice try, — 180 Proof

I don't know about "soundly" but, if we have an external "reason" then it may have been "programed" into us and take the form of our own "reasons". — mentos987

That's a good point, but you need to be careful with semantics. If the reasons are external, and preprogrammed, it would be incorrect to call them "one's own" reasons. I think that the "reasons" in the form in which they are attributed to the individual, would be distinctly different from the "reasons" which were prior to the individual, so we could not say that these are "the same reasons" in a different form. They would be distinctly different reasons. And if they are by any means "the same reasons", then we cannot attribute them to the individual.

It's soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no "reason for the existence of mankind" but mankind's reasons.

Is there a reason for my existence?
Likewise, it's also soundly reasonable to conclude that there is no reason for "your existence" but your reasons. — 180 Proof

How could it be "soundly reasonable" that the reason for your existence is your reasons? The intent for a thing is prior in time to the existence of the thing, and in general the cause of a thing is prior in time to the existence of that thing. Therefore the reason for the existence of a thing, as the cause of existence of the thing, is prior in time to the existence of the thing. One's own reasons are an attribute of the individual, therefore dependent on the individual and not prior in time to the individual. It is impossible that your reasons are the reasons for your existence.

Now the supposedly "soundly reasonable" proposition is even more soundly refuted. And the preceding proposition which is also supposedly "soundly reasonable" suffers the same problem.

An initial state did not "begin to exist" within a state of affairs in which it previously did not exist. An initial state simply implies there is no prior state of affairs. — Relativist

In other words, "initial state" is a fictitious ideal.

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Replying to your comment, the "ball of energy" would not be disoriented because it would only carry the energy to "light up" some neural network, to give rise to this "conscious experience". It wouldn't carry the content of the thoughts. It could be like electricity: if you change the charger of your computer, or the battery, the data and programs in the computer stay the same. — Skalidris

Well I don't see the point then. Consciousness is defined by the thinking activity of the being. If each person continues to have one's own individual thoughts, then you do not avoid the individual nature of consciousness in this way. Having a different ball of energy which charges up the consciousness everyday, does not take away from the individuality of the consciousness. In fact, that is what is the case already, we eat different food every day, constituting a different ball of energy to charge up the consciousness.

If we didn't have the notion of individual, this would indeed happen. But if the notion of individual is simply a structure that the ball of energy "reads", this wouldn't happen. — Skalidris

It's not just the notion of individual which matters here, but the fact that each person has distinct and unique thoughts. Having distinct and unique thoughts is what produces the idea of individuality. The supposed "I" which reads these thoughts is already the same for everyone. "I am a human being". When we separated the I from the thoughts, it's called abstraction, and we come up with something general rather than the particular. But that's not how we conceive of an individual, as having a a separate "I", the "I" being something general. The "I" is the complete package of the individual. So you propose a separation of the "I", but it's unrealistic.

But this is just a thought experiment to challenge this notion of "individual" and show that it could be separated from consciousness. It's to emphasize that this sense of individual could just be a concept in our brain, just like time, numbers,... From the point of view of the thought experiment, there's no reason to think that whenever there's a flow of electron through a circuit, there must be a specific electronic circuit coding for the concept of individual. For living beings, it makes a lot of sense to have this notion and it's hard to imagine that a living being would function without it, but that doesn't make it part of the flow of energy, it doesn't make it necessary for the "conscious experience", they're independent. — Skalidris

What's the point then? You propose a thought experiment to show that we could conceive of things as being otherwise, but the otherwise which you propose is unrealistic. Sure, the notion of "individual" is just a concept in one's brain, but we want the true concept, not a fictitious one. To propose a fictitious one is to say that things could be otherwise, but since the notion of individual is the true concept what purpose does the fictitious one serve?

The attitudes towards Nynorsk and Bokmål are quite separate from this, however. Nynorsk/bokmål are not competing with the dialects; the Norwegian dialects have no standardizes written form, and Nynorsk and Bokmål have no standardized spoken form. Nynorsk is the language that fits my dialect the best, so if dialectical pride played a part, I would prefer Nynorsk. Yet, I prefer Bokmål, because at least its construction was not as stupid as that of Nynorsk. — Ø implies everything

The main reason you gave for dislike of Nynorsk was the way that the author treated certain dialects. So I still believe there is an issue of "dialectical pride" here, though complex and perhaps disguised. If there was no dialectical pride involved you would not concern yourself with the way the author preferred some dialects over others.

In the sentence "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" , the sun is the frame of reference in which the relation "further" operates. It takes a mind to formulate any proposition; in this one, the Sun is marked as a frame of reference, without which "further" would be meaningless. But does the proposition hold independently of minds, or not? — hypericin

I'm not as forgiving as Wayfarer on this issue. The simple answer is no. No proposition cannot be said to "hold" independently of minds. Each proposition needs to be interpreted for meaning, and a judgement made concerning the truth or falsity of what is meant, in order to determine whether or not it holds.

It appears to me, like you have made that judgement concerning the stated proposition, and you conclude that the proposition is true. You also appear to believe that the proposition will continue to be true into the future, indefinitely, if at some time in the future there would be no minds to interpret it. I see two distinct epistemological problems here.

First, there is the matter of your judgement that the proposition is true. How can we know the correctness of this judgement? Even if all currently living human minds agree with you, a new way of understanding the reality of the solar system might demonstrate that this judgement of the proposition as true, was based in a form of misunderstanding. This is what happened when the geocentric model was replaced by the heliocentric. We really have no idea of how our understanding of spatial-temporal relations may change in the future. And, problems like quantum uncertainty, entanglement, wave-particle duality, wave-function collapse, and spatial expansion, demonstrate very clearly that change to this understanding is inevitable. Remember what happened to Pluto, it was a planet and now it's not.

The second problem is the issue of the indefinite continuation of sameness into the future, as time passes. This problem Hume elucidated in his discussion of causation and inductive reasoning. Things have continued through time, in the past, to exist in a very specific way, and this supports the supposed continuation of the truth of your proposition, into the future. However, we do not know or understand the true nature of passing time, so we cannot make the proposition required to support the claim that your proposition "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" will continue to be true indefinitely into the future, even if it is true now. What we know is that the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend an extremely small portion of the magnitude of that possibility. Because the future is full of possibility and we only apprehend a very small portion of it, we ought not expect that true or false can be attributed to any statements about future conditions. This was covered by Aristotle when he discussed the conditions under which the law of excluded middle must be forfeited.

I don't see how. It takes a mind to mark something as a frame of reference. — hypericin

A frame of reference is clearly an artificial creation. From Wikipedia: "In physics and astronomy, a frame of reference (or reference frame) is an abstract coordinate system whose origin, orientation, and scale are specified by a set of reference points―geometric points whose position is identified both mathematically (with numerical coordinate values) and physically (signaled by conventional markers).[1]"

How do you think that something other than a mind could mark a frame of reference?