Here again is the issue of transworld identity. Kripke's answer is now the standard response. — Banno

But the issue is not whether it is the "standard" response, the point is that it is not consistent with the law of identity, not whether or not it is the standard. As you may have noticed, I argue against standard mathematical axioms as violating the law of identity. That law was introduced by Aristotle to rid us of the sophistry produced by Platonic "objects". It effectively eliminates human ideas and formulae from having an identity as an object, by stipulating that identity is something unique to the particular, or individual.

There is no immediate problem in violating or denying the law of identity, as I explained in the last post. When we place "becoming", (the potential to be an object), as prior to actually being an object, and we give identity to that possibility of an object, instead of assigning identity to the actual material object, we circumvent the law of identity. But when this happens we are vulnerable to the type of sophistry which Aristotle formulated the law of identity to combat.

I might have put my slippers on. I didn't. One way to express this is that in some possible world I put my slippers on. It is trivial that the person who, in that possible world, put on their slippers, was me. There is no issue of "the difference between an actual object and a possible object. — Banno

If you call violating the law of identity "trivial" then it is trivial. In your example, the fact is that you did not put your slippers on. If you conceive of a counterfactual in which you did put your slippers on, then the person in that possible world is not you, because you put your slippers on. It's just an imaginary Banno, the real Banno did not put slippers on. No stretch of the imagination will provide equivalence between these two. In one case we have a real existing person without slippers and in the other there is a fictional person with slippers. It's not you. That's plain, simple, and obvious. And, if we insist that the two are both the same person we violate the law of non-contradiction because we have the very same person with two contradicting properties (slippers on and slippers off) at the same time.

If instead, I didn't know whether you put your slippers on or not, and I want to consider both as real possibilities, then the issue is more difficult. I want to say that in one possible world Banno put his slippers on, and in another possible world Banno did not put his slippers on. I have no empirical observations of the real Banno, but I believe there is one, so I want to allow that this real person identified as "Banno", is represented in each of these logical possibilities. But really, these are only 'possible Bannos', one with slippers on, the other without. The real individual represented by "Banno" is somewhere else, and I only have fictional, possible Bannos. And this is where the matter gets tricky, because by the law of identity we must conclude that the real object identified as Banno is separate, distinct from these 'possible Bannos'. The 'possible Bannos' simply have no real identity. And trying to produce an identity for them will be an endless nightmare.

I think it is important to maintain this separation if we want to maintain a realist ontology. I want to say that independent of the two 'possible Bannos' there is a separate 'actual Banno', and the correct possible Banno is the one that corresponds with the actual Banno. So I say that the name "Banno" signifies a real object, the actual Banno, and in the possible worlds this name "Banno" holds a place for a possible representation of the actual Banno.

If we do not maintain this principle, that the name refers to an actual Banno, independent of the possibilities, then we allow for different sorts of non-realist ontology. Then there is no separate, actual object, only the supposed 'possible objects', and the correct possibility is decided by means other than correspondence with the real world, like in model-dependent realism.

In several posts you mistook other theorems for A=A. — Banno

Do you recognize that "A=A" is a symbolic representation of the law of identity, which is properly stated as an object is the same as itself?

But P⊃☐P is invalid, and hence it cannot be an"reformulation" of P=P. And Kripke very carefully does not treat it as such. No consistent substitution into P=P will give P⊃☐P. — Banno

I told you, the law of identity is not supposed to be valid, it is meant as a simple axiom, a self-evident truth. There is no validity to it, it is simply intuitive. So that "P⊃☐P is invalid" says nothing about whether it is a formulation of the law of identity or not.

So take the example, "if the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice". How do you validate "necessarily" here, without reference to the law of identity? You yourself say that this statement is not valid. However, the law of identity may be seen to support the use of "necessarily" here. The law of identity is a statement of necessity, an object is necessarily the same as itself. That's the way Aristotle described this law in his Metaphysics, for the very reasons explained above. When an object comes into being it is necessarily the object which it is, and not something else. That's a statement based in the nature of time, what has come to be is necessarily so. Banno is necessarily the individual who did not put his slippers on. The table is necessarily the table which it is. If it is made of wood, and not made of ice, then it is necessarily made of wood and not made of ice. The use of "necessarily" is supported by the law of identity. What has come to be is necessarily so. An object is necessarily the object which it is, i.e. the same as itself. The object which we call "the table" is necessarily the object which it is, i.e. the same as itself, therefore if it's not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice.

The very same thing may have different properties in each possible world under consideration. — Banno

That is very clearly a violation of the law of identity. In a possible world there is only possible things. So there are no things with an identity in a possible world. "The very same thing" can only refer to an actual thing. If we allow that the very same thing has different (contradicting) properties at the same time, in different possible worlds, then the law of non-contradiction is violated. The claim of "different possible worlds" does not provide an exception to the rule, because it is asserted that it is the very same thing, and clearly it cannot be the very same thing with contradicting properties at the same time. You might say it's a possible thing in a possible world, but then it has no identity and cannot be said to be the very same thing. Therefore we must adhere to the law of identity to avoid this contradiction, and maintain that there is only possibilities in possible worlds. And possible worlds are imaginary, so there are no things with an identity of their own in these statements of possibility. We ought to avoid that nightmare and quit looking for such an identity

It appears this thread is becoming a second shoutbox.
Nice work Alan1000!

. When phenomenologists claim to be transcending dualism what they mean is the splitting of the subjective aspect of experience from the objective. Their solution is to be make the subjective and the objective indissociable poles of all experience — Joshs

This works with the inside/outside relation, if we take process ontology, and make all of reality activity. Then we have no real boundaries between inside and outside, just two directions of activity or causation, inward directional and outward directional. There must be interaction between the two, reversal of direction, which could be represented with circles, or biofeedback loops, etc..

The problem with this type of metaphysics is that it really has nothing solid, no substance to account for the reality of homoeostasis, balanced activity, being. Then the speculators get a hold of this process ontology and make proposals like symmetries to account for balance, but these are just ideals produced from the mathematical axioms, which are not supported by real evidence.

So this perspective really does nothing to bridge the gap between the two incompatible descriptive formats of "being" and "becoming". The scientific (empirical) approach leads us toward the conclusion that all is "becoming", while philosophy and logic require a substantial "being". Plato and Aristotle demonstrated that the two are fundamentally incompatible. So when science describes everything as processes, becoming, and it cannot account for the reality of "being", mathematicians simply produce the required axioms and being appears, in the form of mathematical equilibriums.

But an individual object is general for Husserl not because a particular car belongs to a general category of cats, but because the unity of an object is an intentional achievement produced by a synthetic act uniting memory , anticipation and actual presence. The self-same object is an objectivating idealization concocted out of a changing flow of senses , and thus a generalization. — Joshs

This is exactly what happens with such an ontology, there is no such thing as an object, therefore no such thing as being, or beings. However, in practise the existence of objects is very real, so the appearance of them (though it's only an appearance from this ontology) needs to be accounted for. This requires positing principles of balance, homoeostasis, symmetry. So a mathematics of equilibrium is produced. But the reality, and cause of such balance cannot really be accounted for, it's just represented by this math.

Simply put, the result here is that the classical boundaries of an object (separating the supposed internal from external of the empirical object) are replaced with a balance of activity, and this balance becomes the new representation of the object. The problem though is that this balance of activity is commonly represented by systems theory which requires boundaries distinguishing the inside from the outside of the system. So the science minded people who take hold of this philosophy and speculate, bring us right back to the old standard, boundaries between inside and outside. Therefore this philosophy has not really gotten us away from internal/external boundaries. it just allows more freedom to arbitrarily place such boundaries, and employ vague or undefined boundaries which are simply assumed to be somewhere. This renders objects, beings, and being in general, as unintelligible.

The result of making the subjective and objective into two extremes of one scale, rather than keeping them separate by dualist principles, is that the subjective principles are now allowed to corrupt the objective science. This is due to the one-way directional nature of time, causation, and necessity. If we look from the inside outward, the way of philosophy, we look from the realm of possibility, potential, so there is no necessary boundaries. Boundaries are something to be created for one's purposes. But if we look from the outside inward, we only see parts, and these have necessary boundaries. Without the boundaries the parts would not be seen.

So when the science of observation, looking from the outside inward, takes principles from the philosophical observations of looking from the inside outward, it is corrupted by those principles. From the inside looking outward it appears like there are no real boundaries, just potential boundaries to be produced at will. But looking from the outside inward, in the way of science, the boundaries are very real and necessary, because if they were not there, the internal parts could not be seen. To allow the scientist looking inward to place the boundaries arbitrarily, in the way that the philosopher does looking outward, allows the scientist to disregard the empirical data, therefore corrupting the scientific enterprise.

In practise, confidence is required because time flies, and there is no chance to question things. In theory it's better to question everything. So, life is a balance.

I think you misinterpret the law of identity. It says something about things, not something about the way we talk. It says that a thing is the same as itself. So if it says something about the way we talk, it is prescriptive, saying something about how we should talk. It is saying that we ought to talk about things as if they are the same as themselves. To use your bishop analogy, it's like whoever made up the game, making up the rules, saying we ought to have a piece which only moves diagonally, and this we will be called the bishop.

The law of identity is widely accepted, and that is because it is very intuitive. Logically though, we can deny it like Hegel does. We can argue for example, that in the act of becoming, which is the transition between not being and being what a thing is, the thing must exist as something because it's not not being, but it is also not the thing which it is when it is the thing which it is (by the law of identity). Hence the thing must be something, but something other than the thing which it is, in this mode of becoming.

So when we give priority to "becoming" as Hegel does in his dialectics, we can override the law of identity, asserting that the thing is something in this prior state, when it is becoming the thing that it will be, but is not yet that thing, and by Aristotelian principles it is only the potential to be that thing, which it will be by the law of identity. Then we say that the potential to be something is something. But since potential consists of many different possibilities, then the thing which that potential is, is like many different things at the same time. This violates the law of identity yet it is also very intuitive, if we allow that the possible thing is in some way a thing, because possibility is the potential for many different things. So we must violate that law when we say that the possibility for a thing is a thing.

Hence, it is not that "Kripke seems to want to prove something like the law of identity".

I think he takes it as given. — Banno

I find it quite clear that he does not take it as a given. From what he writes, he obviously knows the law, and its meaning. But then he questions it, and so he has to find a way to state it which suits his purpose, 'If the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice' for example. This is just a reformulation of the law, a thing is necessarily the thing which it is. But he has qualified it with the empirical judgement of what the thing is, a wooden table, and restates it as a conditional. Notice he could state the conditional any way "if it's made of wood..." "if its made of rock..." etc.. So what he states has been derived from the law of identity but is a completely different form, being expressed as a specific conditional, rather than the general law.

Furthermore his "rigid designators" demonstrate that he actually has no respect for the law of identity at all. In each possible world, the thing denoted by the rigid designator is different from what it is in other possible worlds, having different properties. Yet he says that these different things are the same thing. Therefore "a thing is the same as itself" is very clearly violated.

What is difficult to maintain, after understanding Kripke's arguments, is that objects are constituted by essential properties. — Banno

We can do this simply with the law of identity. It implies that each object is unique, whereas essential properties are what things of the same type have in common. Therefore an object must consist of more than just essential properties, by the law of identity. In Aristotelian terms, an object has accidendal properties as well as essential properties.

The problem is that the law of identity is just an assumption based in intuition, it really cannot be proven. Some might say it's self-evident, some might say it's a priori, but these things really don't stand to be proven. That's why some philosophers (like Hegel) will dismiss the law of identity. So Kripke seems to want to prove something like the law of identity. But he uses faulty premises and his argument is unsound, so he does nothing toward helping us to understand the issues, he only obfuscates them behind a cloud of confusion.

It's most likely the case that what Kripke is trying to prove really cannot be proven, so the only way for his argument to be successful is if he can use enough smoke and mirrors to hide the faults in his premises.

However, there is much more at stake here than what meets the eye. There is the issue of the difference between an actual object (supposed to have independent existence in the world), and a possible object, (one signified with a name or description, but not necessarily assumed to have independent existence). Kripke's mode of argument effectively dissolves this difference, and this I believe is a serious ontological problem.

Using Kripkean principles, how are we to distinguish between a named or described object which may or may not exist in the physical world, and a named or described object which is supposed to have real existence in the physical world? This is why I stated that if we do not accept that the real object is the Platonic idea, we are forced into anti-realism because there is no other option for a real object.

Imagine you are good at art - you can, if you so wish, produce beautiful paintings - but you decide not to. Have you done wrong? — Bartricks

Art is complex, as is the judgement of beauty, and your example makes it appear simple. To begin with, you need to distinguish between what the artist knows as "beautiful", and what the audience wants as "beautiful".

So, for example, the artist might produce what oneself knows to be beautiful, yet it is not respected as such by others, so the artist is not paid, and must take a real job. Then the artist might quit producing art for the reason of having no time for it. In another case, the artist might get paid for one's work, and be inspired to produce more, but the work might be known by the artist to be not beautiful, and only being produced for money.

Those are two possible reasons why the artist might give up on producing beautiful work. One, because there is no pay for it, and the artist does not have the time, and the other, that the artist gets good pay to produce things which the artist believes to be not beautiful.

There are two keys required for unravelling the issue. One is to understand what qualifies as "beautiful". And the other is to understand the importance of money in the artist's life. Since money is a necessity for living, and there is no necessary relation between beauty and compensation, the artist has no obligation toward beauty. We cannot remove the importance of money, and simply assume that the artist's necessities are supplied, because that kills the will to do anything.

No. I take a picture of with an x-ray that I can look at and see what is inside the person. How is that different from taking a picture of that person and seeing what their outside looks like. — T Clark

An x-ray does not allow you to see the inside of a person. It allows you to see the outside of specific internal parts. The fact that the x-ray goes right through some parts and not others indicates that it is not really showing us the inside of a person. It simply makes some parts appear transparent. Seeing through some parts for the purpose of looking at other parts is not a matter seeing the inside of anything, because some parts are unseen and other parts are seen from the outside.

You are clearly not understanding what I am saying. Do you think that when you see a fish in a body of water, you are seeing the inside of the water? And it is the same thing for the fiber-camera, it as well, shows the outside of some internal parts, by passing around others.

I think you're being pedantic. If I want to see the structure of the inside of a stone or a piece of wood I can break it open to reveal it. I could also use xray or some other imaging technology to "see inside" the object if it isn't practical to break it open. — Janus

Making oneself appear as a pedant is what is required if one is trying to understand the intricacies of nature. Have you read how Plato portrays Socrates? Being pedantic is a requirement of good logical process. As they say, "the devil is in the details". When our theories fail in accounting for the details, the theories are flawed. That's plain, simple, and obvious. Why deny the existence of flaws, just because they appear to be minor?

The fact is very clear, that these methods you propose do not adequately show us the inside of any physical objects. And this is because we have no proper theory which distinguishes the inside of an object from the outside, therefore any proposed definition is ambiguous or arbitrary. This is the biggest problem with systems theory, it assumes objects called "systems", but employs arbitrary principles to distinguish inside the system from outside the system. Until we have real ontological principles whereby we can make a justified distinction between inside and outside, knowledge produced by such theories will be fraught with unreliability.

You are making an artificial, unsupportable distinction in an effort to hold your argument together. — T Clark

Actually, I am just stating what is very obvious, the obvious deficiencies of the modern scientific method. Scientists proceed as if there is no real difference between the inside and the outside of physical objects, so if such boundaries are employed they can be placed wherever they want. (This is what the examples of you and Janus show, an arbitrary "inside".) Yet conscious experience gives clear evidence that there is a very substantial difference between the inside and the outside. You, being a proponent of scientism, simply deny that reality, and dismiss the evidence with the prejudiced claim of "unsupportable", implying that you already presume that there cannot be any evidence. Or, in the case of Janus, there is a dismissal of people who try to point such details out, as being pedantic.

We can't see the inside of objects unless we break them open, then we can. — Janus

No, that's the problem, breaking an object in two allows us to see the outsides of two objects, not the inside of one. Every time we take something apart, we remove the parts from their proper place as a part of a whole, such that they are no longer parts of a whole, but are each a separate object, a whole.

Therefore we have two distinct perspectives. A part receives its function, and its being, its very nature as a "part" by existing as a part of a unity. Therefore there is a relation of necessity between the part and the whole, the part has no being without the whole. But a whole is not necessarily a part of anything. So the necessity is a one way street. Because of this, every time we take apart an object to look inside it, and look at a part of it as if it is an object itself, a whole itself, we do not see the relation of necessity which the part had with the whole, prior to being dismantled, because the newly formed object (whole), now has no necessary relation as part of a larger unity. So we don't see it properly as a part, we see it as a whole. And something is missing from what we see, that is what makes the whole greater than the sum of the parts. This inclines us to misunderstand the order of necessity, and the nature of causation in general. On the other hand, when we look inward at the first-person experience we see the causation more correctly, by the cause of our own actions as an outward process towards an external necessity.

We learn about things by looking inside them all the time. — T Clark

But what you describe is not "looking inside" things. It is looking at the outside of things and making inferences about what is happening on the inside through theories and logical inference. We see effects on the outside and make inferences about the internal causes. So you claim that we look inside objects, and you give examples, but your examples obviously do not support your claim.

I'm not sure if this is what you're getting at, but it is my understanding that the expansion of the universe leads to galaxies moving apart, but features within galaxies, e.g. stars, are not. — T Clark

This is how spatial expansion is commonly modeled, but it's very problematic. How could we create a boundary, even in principle, between the space which is inside a galaxy and not expanding, and the space which is between galaxies and is expanding. There would have to be two different types of space, the space with massive objects in it, which doesn't expand, and the space without massive objects in it which does expand, along with an obvious boundary between the two. But that's really just a poor representation, and what is really the case is that physicists do not at all understand the relationship between space and massive objects. I think that's what the famous Michelson-Morley experiments demonstrated to us.

Meta's posts, as always, serve only to confuse. — Banno

To put that more correctly, Meta's posts, as usual, serve to show that the subject is confused.

I agree with this, but I don't see why it is a problem. Science is looking in from the outside. That's how it works. If we can look at every other phenomenon in the universe with science, why would we not be able to look at consciousness that way? — T Clark

It's a problem because we can never truly see the inside of an object. So sense observations of an object are always observations of the outside of things. No matter how we divide the object into parts, or peer at those parts through Xray or MIR, we are always looking at the parts as objects themselves, and we are looking at them from the outside. However, with subjective first-person experience, we actually get real observations of the inside of an object, oneself. Therefore, unlike the usual scientific observations which cannot observe the inside of an object, first-person conscious experience gives us real observational information from the inside of an object.

So, sure we can look at any phenomenon in the universe with the scientific method, but we cannot see the inside of any object that we look at with the scientific method. However, we can directly experience the inside of an object through subjective first-person experience, so this is the route we need to take toward understanding the inside of things. And, as I mentioned, with the discovery of phenomena like spatial expansion it becomes very clear that we need to understand the inside in order to get a grip on reality.

I think it's right, although I hadn't considered it from the perspective you suggest regarding the expansion of space — Wayfarer

The expansion of space is a difficult issue to wrap one's head around. I think it calls for a two dimensional time. But consider that if space expands, it must expand from every point outward. This means that there must be a multitude of such points with an expansion around each. And since the structures we know exist in the expanded space, the points must be connected somehow through the inside, in order to support coherent structures in the outwardly expanded space.

You mean inside and outside the body, no? My experience of anything internal to the body is not accessible to others. to be sure, so there is no possibility of identifying common objects of "inner" experience, as we would do with "external" objects. Is that what you mean? — Janus

The point was that the only way to observe the inside of an object is through the first-person conscious experience. The methods of science cannot observe the inside of objects. Then I gave the reason why I think it is important to develop an understanding of the inside of objects, in our quest for understanding reality

The argument is about the first-person nature of experience - 'what it is like' is an awkward way of describing simply the nature of 'being'. Chalmers is pointing out that 'experience' or 'state of being' must always elude third-person description, because it's third person. — Wayfarer

I approach the "first-person nature of experience" from the perspective of the difference between "inner and outer". If we allow the fundamental empirical principle that some things are experienced to come from inside oneself, and others from outside oneself, we can understand that the third-person perspective cannot give us any observation of the inside.

So in the sciences for example, we are always breaking physical objects down into parts, analyzing, and using instruments like microscopes, Xray, CT-scans, MRI, and spectrometers, in an attempt to get a glimpse at the inside of physical objects. However, no matter how far we break down these objects in analysis, and whatever we do with these instruments we are always looking from the outside inward. That is unavoidable, as the nature of what is called scientific 'objective' observation.

Now the first-person 'subjective experience' gives us the capacity for a true glimpse at the inside of an object, thereby providing us with true observations of the inside of an object (human being in this case). Therefore, when it comes to observing the inside of an object, first-person observations, rather than third-person observations must be considered as the true observations, therefore the basis for any real science of the inside of objects.

Why is the inside/outside differentiation important? The importance is demonstrated to us by developments in modern cosmology which reveal a process called spatial expansion. The cosmological evidence is very strong, such that spatial expansion cannot be ignored in any credible ontology. The reality of spatial expansion demonstrates to us that there is necessarily a real difference between the inside and outside of space itself, which manifests as time passes.

Therefore it is very important to differentiate between the inside perspective, and the outside perspective, and work with true observations from each of these, comparing the two, if we intend to get a true understanding of the active nature of space itself.

The problem though, is that if heat is defined as the motion of molecules, this doesn't account for all the forms of heat in the external reality, because a principal form of heat is radiant heat, and this is clearly not a movement of molecules. However, we do feel heat as the movement of molecules within our bodies, even radiant heat is felt that way. So by restricting "heat" by this definition, "motion of molecules", we restrict it to the sensation of heat, and so our understanding of "heat" under this definition is contingent on experience.

So we can't proceed from this definition of "heat" to show that heat is anything other than contingent on experience. And Kripke's stories about how it could be otherwise are not relevant, because he portrays heat as necessarily the movement of molecules, when "heat" is supposed to refer something external to the sensing body, and this is incorrect because much heat is radiant. So if we want to portray, or define "heat" in a way such that there can be a necessary relation between the word and the definition, we need an idea closer to "energy", which encompasses all forms of heat which are believed to exist. This would be the ideal conception of "heat", the one which includes all forms, and the external thing which that name refers to would be the Form of heat (Platonism).

Well, it's all reducible to energy. And since the conservation of energy is universal, it would be the same in all possible worlds which are equipped with Einsteinian principles. Since "energy" is more universal, why not set it as the rigid designator instead?

Beginning with this lectern, this lectern is made of wood. If it had not been made of wood it would have been a different object, so this lectern is necessarily made of wood. This sounds reasonable. — RussellA

This is the law of identity in a nutshell, as composed in Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing that it is, because if it were not, it would be something else.

This raises the question as to whether objects such as this lectern exist over and above their properties, in that if all the properties of the lectern were removed, would this lectern remain. — RussellA

The issue of whether or not a thing necessarily has properties is resolved by the implications of the law of identity. It is properties which make one thing distinct from another, so the law of identity implies that a "thing" necessarily has properties in order to be a unique particular.

Time is a thief" is a metaphor in that time is not the same as a thief. "Object A is object B" is a metaphor in that object A may be similar to object B, but object A can never be the same as object B. — RussellA

You only have this issue if you do not distinguish between the subject and the predicate, or object and property. In your quote, "time" is the subject, and "is a thief" is the predication. But predication is not the same as saying object A is object B. However, if through Platonism we represent properties as objects, then we might create that problem.

So "heat is the motion of molecules" fits the form, and thereby are objects in terms of the logic. — Moliere

Just out of curiosity, how could we account for radiant heat with this type of definition? Radiant heat is a real form of heat which we feel. Yet in that case, heat moves from object A to object B without the medium of molecules in between. So how would that heat get from A to B without moving through molecules in between?

I believe that in quantum physics what supports the temporal extension of a massive particle is called the strong interactive force. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to Wikipedia, this is the "gluon field". It is actually eight different fields, one for each "colour charge". Each of the eight fields has a "timelike" component and three "spacelike" components. The existence of the proposed fields is supported by gauge theory which employs a principle of invariance resulting in symmetries.

I know The Red Sox will win their next game, I know The Eiffel Tower is in Paris and I know that I am looking at the colour red. The word "know" is being metaphorically, in that it has degrees of certainty, because language is inherently metaphorical

Similarly, the word "same" is being used metaphorically having varying degrees of certainty. — RussellA

I would say, that your example shows the existence of ambiguity rather than metaphor. Although metaphor often makes use of ambiguity, the two are not the same. And in logic, we ought to make an attempt to reduce ambiguity, as this will increase the degree of certainty. We can reduce ambiguity and increase certainty by employing axioms which leave no room for ambiguity.

There are varying attitudes with which we can approach the production of logical axioms in relation to ordinary language use. At one extreme we try to adapt axioms to match the habits of ordinary language use. At the other extreme we attempt to curb the habits of language use, conforming them, and even producing new habits, to match contrived and artificially created axioms.

Language use is an habitual activity. Habits may be judged as good or bad. So the question of whether an existing habit of usage ought to be incorporated into a logical system requires a judgement as to whether it is a good or bad habit. And, the question of whether a new habit ought to be encourage or produced, as the result of introducing a new axiom, requires a judgement as to whether it would be a good or bad habit.

I don't debate MU, and I don't debate you, for pretty much the same reason. — frank

So Banno and MU on the same thread are double trouble?

I would think that a theory such as morphic resonance would require some sort of hierarchy of fields. Massive particles, protons, and neutrons for example, by the law of inertia, have a lot stronger 'staying power', for temporal continuity of existence, than a particle with very little mass like an electron, or a photon with no mass. Therefore the massive particle should have a substantially stronger resonance, with its specific vibration much more deeply ingrained into its own being, as well as into the fiber of the universe. This would be required to support the continued unity of that massive particle in its temporal extension. I believe that in quantum physics what supports the temporal extension of a massive particle is called the strong interactive force. It is an unusual force because it cannot be observed to be limited by distance.

Kripke's proposition that "identity statements are necessary" is true
1) Objects are observed in the sky. By observation, as "Phosphorus" has a diameter of 12,103km, and as "Hesperus" has a diameter of 12,103km, "Phosphorus" is identical in diameter to "Hesperus". Therefore, the identity statement "Phosphorus is identical in diameter to Hesperus" is true. — RussellA

This is a similar issue which I went over with Banno already, concerning Kripke's premise that if the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice. That premise is a priori. And in your example, we need a similar a priori principle which states that one measurement of 12,103km is necessarily the same as another measurement of 12,103km. Kripke easily sidesteps this issue by implying that we can simply assume that 12,103km has the same meaning in each instance.

But this is not how meaning is in reality, each particular instance of usage has peculiarities unique to that context of usage. So in your example, the measurements might have been done in different ways for example, under different circumstances. These features, peculiarities which are unique to the particular circumstances, are known as accidentals. Therefore we remove, ignore, or make exceptions for the accidentals, and when two measurements are the same with respect to the apprehended essentials, we might say that the measurements are the same.

Of course two distinct measurements, even of the same object are never truly identical. Each act of measurement is unique, due to the difference in circumstances. Therefore we need to rely on an a priori principle to say that one measurement of 12,103km is the same as another measurement of 12,103km. Consequently, we compromise and say that the two measurements are "equal". And "equal" becomes a compromised sense of "the same", as it ignores the accidentals and applies only to what is determined as essential, depending on the purpose.

That which is willed — bert1

This is "good" as a noun, "the good", the thing desired, or the objective. Taking "good" from being an adjective, or even adverb, and making it a noun, as you've done here, is what makes "good" intelligible.

Scientific American has an article about the resonance theory of consciousness which came up in my search, titled "The Hippies Were Right: It's All about Vibrations, Man!

That objects placed near each other tend to synchronize their vibrations is a well known scientific fact, observed with pendulums for hundreds of years. The following article references a number of relatively recent experiments and describes the discovery of what is called "chimera states":
https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-discover-exotic-patterns-of-synchronization-20190404/

Would you agree that how Kripke should have defined "rigid designator" is as the same subject (logical subject) in all possible worlds? So we could say X is a rigid designator, and X is the same subject in all possible worlds.

This puts X into the realm of possibility, and leaves X as possibly referring to an object, and possible not. This is where X needs to be if it is going to be the same in every possible world. That puts the judgement as to whether X corresponds to an actual object, and the important judgement as to which possible world corresponds with a presumed actual world, into a completely different category, i.e. a completely different type of judgement.

Under Kripke's plan, whereby X, as a rigid designator, represents the same object in every possible world, we have no real principles whereby we can separate the correct possible world (the one which best corresponds with the real world), and all the other possible worlds, because the real (actual) object is designated as within the possibility. This is because he does not allow for a separate real object, which we might compare the possible worlds to. The object is always as it is described in its possible world, but at the same time, the same object is in all possible worlds. This leaves no room for the real object, in a real separate world because the real object is designated as being within all possible worlds.

Those premises result in a dichotomy of Platonic realism, and anti-realism. It gives us the choice of those two ontologies. Either the real object is the very same thing as the logical subject (Platonism), having real existence in all possible worlds, or else we deny the reality of Kripke's "object", and say that the rigid designator does not reference a real object, only a possible object, but then we are left with anti-realism.

In other words, Kripke hands us the metaphorical "have you quit beating your wife?". If we affirm his premises, and accept the "object" indicated by the rigid designator, we are plunged necessarily into Platonism. If we deny the premise, saying that this is not a true object, we proceed into anti-realism, because there are no principles provided for any real object, and we are denying the reality Kripke's proposed "object". Therefore the correct response is to reject his premises altogether, as some sort of trickery, or at best, as simply incoherent.

A quick search tells me that one of the recurring themes in the various vibration theories, is that things such as living beings somehow adjust their vibrational field to maintain harmony with their environment.

This field of study (pun intended) is very problematic. Physicists understand the transmission of energy in electromagnetic fields as waves. They also know that a wave is the movement of a substance. This produced the idea that there was an aether, as a medium, within which the electromagnetic waves are active.

The current attitude in the scientific community is to deny the reality of the medium, and produce models, or representations of the wave action which do not include the medium, space-time being a separate somewhat static background. This renders the true nature of the wave action which is involved here impossible to understand. You can see that a true understanding would require that either we stop representing electromagnetic energy as a wave action, or else we include within the representations, the substance (aether) which is active. Of course the former is unrealistic, and that leaves us with the task of trying to determine the true nature of medium which is the substance within which, those waves exist. Denying the reality of this substance, and continuing with the current enterprise of faulty models is not the answer.

I'm interested in any sources for these kinds of ideas — Wayfarer

There is a large volume of speculative information on the web, which begins from the assumption that all physical existence is vibrations of the underlying medium (the medium here being roughly equivalent to what scientists call space-time). That the entire Cosmos is a collection of vibrations is a very ancient idea, extending back through the Pythagoreans and beyond. You'll find it very evident in Plato, The Phaedo for example, where the idea that the soul is a harmony which creates the unity of the material body is discussed. If you start searching through "vibration" theories on the web, it's a very daunting task to separate the tidbits of valuable information from the masses of propaganda, as is the case with much religious material.

Perhaps you might prepare yourself by listening to one of the greatest pop songs ever written: "Good Vibrations"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apBWI6xrbLY

Temperature is a physical phenomena; in a gas it's directly related to the RMS average velocity of the molecules involved (contra ↪Metaphysician Undercover ). — Banno

Not contra MU, you mean exactly as I said. We "relate numbers to the physical world", and come up with what you say here, "average velocity". Temperature is a measurement, the result of applying a scale, it is not the thing measured.

What I asked is how you support your claim that the value of 100℃ is fixed to something called "the temperature", without invoking Platonism. That we move on, from fixing "100℃" to the boiling point of water, to fixing it to some other physical activity like the average velocity of molecules in some substance, does not support your claim that 100℃ is fixed to "the temperature".

So yes, it is necessarily the case that temperature equates to molecular kinetic energy. — Banno

So you continue with a misrepresentation, in the attempt to reify "temperature". Temperature is the number assigned, based on a scale of measurement, it is not the activity itself, which is more properly called heat. So we cannot say that one is equivalent to the other. That would be a category error, like saying two chairs are equivalent to the number two.

Molecular motion is an example of heat, as is infrared radiation, but neither can be said to be equivalent to temperature, because the temperature scale must be capable of measuring all forms of heat. The temperature of something is a number produced by measurement, the application of a scale. And "temperature" in general may refer to that scale, but it does not refer to the property which is measured, heat and lack of it (cold).

This is a good place for the analogy of the map and the terrain. When we take the temperature of something and say that it has a temperature of 100℃, it might be the activity of molecules which is being measured, but the temperature,100℃, is the measurement. One is the terrain, the other the representation (map). To interpret the representation "100℃" we must refer to some rules, just like we have to refer to the legend when interpreting the map.

Thanks Banno, but that doesn't really solve the problems.

The way I see it, Kripke has no respect for the difference between a logical subject and a physical object. The former can exist in many possible worlds, the latter, by the law of identity cannot. So a rigid designator (designating the same thing in every possible world) could refer to a logical subject, but it cannot refer to a physical object. Treating the logical subject as if it were an object is Platonism. And once Platonist principles are employed, failing to distinguish between the material object and the immaterial object results in ontological confusion, as well as a compromised epistemology.

I think Aristotle says something on this issue in The Physics, after a discussion of the four common senses of "cause". He asks whether chance and luck ought to also be considered causes. I think what he determined was that chance on its own cannot be considered a cause. But when chance occurrences are taken in relation to final cause, the result may be fortune (luck). So in relation to final cause, chance has an effect therefore it must be in some sense causal. For example, a man goes to the market and by chance meets someone who owes him a debt, and he collects the debt. Chance is a cause of his good fortune.

From this we can infer that if we consider "luck" to be something real, then it must have a real cause, and this is "chance".

Well, that made me laugh. — Banno

Maybe it's off topic for this thread, but how would you say that "100℃" refers to a thing called "the temperature" if not by invoking Platonism?

A description may be used to pick out some individual in order to give it a name. But thereafter, the name can be, and Kripke claims, is, used to pick out that individual without using the description. — Banno

In your interpretation of Kripke does the thing referred to with "100℃" qualify as an individual? If not, then how does "100℃" become a rigid designator for you, naming the very same thing in all possible worlds?

The problem obviously, is that "100℃" is a description, and only by Platonist ontology does this descriptive term refer to an object. Likewise, only by Platonist ontology can we say that the descriptive term "2" refers to a thing called a number.

We go past the boiling of the water and fix 100℃ to the temperature. — Banno

This is where Platonic idealism misleads us into nonsense. Temperature scales relate numbers to the physical world. That there are numerous different temperature scales based in different principles for making such a relationship demonstrates that this is the case. The idea that we "fix 100℃ to the temperature" implies that there is something independent from the scale and its relationship to the physical world, an independent "ideal" called "the temperature", which "100℃" actually refers to.

Clearly this is false because there is nothing independent of physical things designated to be 100℃ that we could point at and say this is what "100℃" refers to. So to say that there is a thing called "a temperature" which "100℃" refers to is just a creative fiction, produced to facilitate communication.

This is the reason why Platonic idealism misleads us so easily, because it is so effective at facilitating communication. For example, instead of having to demonstrate what the numeral "2" means in each instance of usage, we assume an independent ideal, "a number" as a named thing which that numeral refers to, and this makes the use of "2" much easier.

The assumption of real ideals, as real objects which exist independently of the context of actual usage of the symbols, presents an ontological problem. This problem truly exposes itself when we try to determine what type of existence these supposedly named things, ideals, actually have. That problem was well demonstrated by Plato.

If we set "100℃" as another term for "the boiling point of water", if they equal the very same thing in the way 2+2 equals 4, then in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃. And since that's our definition, then Mww would be correct that the boiling point of water is, a priori, that is, from the nature of the very terms used, 100℃. — Banno

So, this issue is not as simple as you make it out to be. As discussed in another thread, the boiling point of water is equally a function of pressure, as it is temperature. Therefore we cannot correctly claim that "in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃". This mode of speaking is just facilitated by your Platonic idealism, which assumes an independent object called "the temperature". This makes temperature an object rather than a property, which is a category mistake.

Then we still have the further ontological mistake made by Kripke, which is the proposition that an object designated by a "rigid designator" could be the same object in a multitude of possible worlds, despite having different properties. Kripke's work is just riddled with ontological mistakes, one after the other, and it is highly questionable as to what his intent actually was..

It isn't. It is invalid, so it can't be a priori. If it is true, it is true a posteriori, as Kripke uses it. — Banno

It is an a priori principle called "the law of identity". The law of identity implies that a thing is necessarily what it is, and not something else. It is used by Kripke in the first premise "If the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice". That is an a priori principle. Whether it is true, false, valid, or invalid, is not what is at issue. What is relevant is that it is an a priori principle necessary for the conclusion produced "It is necessary that the table not be made of ice".

Notice he states "and this conclusion is known a posteriori, since one of the premises on which it is based is a posteriori". That mentioned a posteriori premise is what is derived from empirical investigation. It is stated as "The table is not made of ice". The other required premise, "if the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice", is a priori.

Therefore his claim, "this conclusion is known a posteriori" is not justified by his argument.

It seems to me that the use of the word necessary is redundant between objects, in that what does "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact necessarily one and the same" add to "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same"

Necessity between an object and its properties - between a lectern and its property wood
As regards the lectern, necessity is being used between an object and its properties, where he writes "So we have to say that though we cannot know a priori whether this table was made of ice or not, given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — RussellA

Read my last two posts. That the lectern is made of wood, and not made of ice is given empirically. But the empirical observations do not provide the necessity required to say that it is necessary that the lectern is made of wood and not of ice. The necessity is derived from the a priori law of identity, which implies that it is necessary that a thing is what it is, and not something else.

So, the fact that the lectern is made of wood, and not made of ice, is supported by the empirical observations. But empirical observations do not make it necessary that the lectern is made of wood and not ice. The necessity, (that it is necessary that the lectern is wooden and not made of ice), is derived from the a priori law of identity, which states that a thing cannot be other than it is.

P⊃□PP⊃◻P

is invalid. It is certainly not a priori.

It seems you have not understood the argument, the whole point of which is that P⊃☐P in the case of the lectern is known a posteriori. — Banno

Like I explained, there are two premises stated by Kripke, #1 "given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice", and #2, through "empirical investigation" we know it is not made of ice. From these two premises he makes his conclusion that it is known a posteriori "that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice". Premise #1 is a priori, and premise #2 is "given" through empirical observation, therefore a posterior.

#1 is stated as a premise, not as a conclusion, so whether or not it is valid is not in question. We might investigate its soundness though. It is derived from the law of identity, that a thing is what it is, and cannot not be what it is. It is an a priori principle based in intuition, and it is not meant to be a valid conclusion From this Kripke derives the necessity required for the first premise "given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice".

And from that necessity stated in that first premise, the a priori premise, he derives the necessity of the conclusion ""that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice". His mistake is that he characterizes this as an a posteriori principle, when the necessity stated in the conclusion is derived from the a priori premise, rather than from the a posteriori premise.

It's clear from the examples given that statements of the form x=y can be discovered empirically, and hence at least some are not discovered a priori. — Banno

This is incorrect, and is the result of Kripke's mistaken conclusion that the "necessity" of identity is a posteriori. That's wrong, as described above. The necessity of such statements is derived from the law of identity, that a thing is necessarily the same as itself, and cannot be other than itself, which is a priori, and not discovered empirically. Premise #2 above, that the thing is what it is named to be (wood and not ice), is a posteriori. But there is no necessity in that premise. Therefore the necessity of statements like "x=y" cannot be accounted for by empirical discovery. Empirical discovery does not provide the required necessity, which is only provided by the a priori principle of identity.

That this table is not made of ice is known a posteriori - by examining the table. Yet that this table is not made of ice is a necessary fact about this table - if it were made of ice, it would not be this table.

We cannot know a priori if the table is made of ice or of wood. But given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — Banno

The first premise expressed at 180 ("given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice") is a priori. It is directly derived from the law of identity, and a priori principles of "being" as described by Aristotle. When a thing comes into being, it is necessarily the thing which it is, rather than something else, as indicated by the law of identity. This a priori principle, along with the (empirically) given fact that a thing displays an order, is what leads us to conclude that the Form of the object necessarily preexists the material object.

The second premise, which supports the asserted "given", that the table is not made of ice, is a posteriori. The "given" that the table is not made of ice, is provided by empirical observation, therefore a posteriori.

The mistake which Kripke makes is to attribute to the conclusion the character of only one of the premises. One premise is a priori and the other is a posteriori, but he says the conclusion "it is necessary that the table not be made of ice", is a posteriori. Since the conclusion is stated as a necessity ("it is necessary that...") we must enquiry as to what validates this claim of necessity.

Kripke's conclusion is a mistake, because the necessity of the conclusion "it is necessary that..." is derived from the first premise which is a priori, "given that the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice". It is only the "given" aspect which is a posteriori, and the "given" is not at all necessary, and cannot provide the necessity required for the conclusion.. So it is very clear that the conclusion "it is necessary that..." is a priori, because the "given", or what is taken for granted (which is the a posteriori aspect of the argument), could be replaced with absolutely anything, Any possibility whatsoever, provided by empirical observation could replace "not made of ice", and the necessity of the conclusion would not be altered. We could still conclude "it is necessary that... (with the replacement empirical fact). Kripke simply employs smoke and mirrors sophistry, to make it appear like the conclusion "it is necessary that..." might be a posteriori.

What's an identity statement? — frank

As used in that post, any statement which claims to reference the identity of an object. Our only access to an object's identity is through the object itself, so we reference the object itself, and we might do this with a name. If we claim to reference the object's identity, and then proceed to make statements about the object's identity as if it were something separate from the object, we enter the fantasy world of sophistry. There really is no such thing, so if we insist that there is, it could be absolutely anything, so sophistry runs amuck.

Here's an example of such a sophistic reference intended to create an independent, or separate identity:

The suposition here is that an identity that we discover cannot be a necessary identity, and so there must be something amiss with the derivation (1-4). — Banno

See what happens? At the first attempt to create such an independent identity, immediately it is evident that something is "amiss". That's because the thing itself with its true identity is understood as independent, so it appears like it's identity must be "discovered", but whenever we try to talk about a separate identity, this must be something created by us.

If we allow the "discovered" identity, we allow Platonism, as separate, independent Forms which are discovered. If we allow a created identity, then we reject the true identity within the thing, as inconsistent with the created identity, and we have a type of anti-realism. The only solution is to deny a separate identity altogether, to establish a ground free from such sophistry.

Realizing that the logical proofs for the existence of God fail isn't bigotry. It's just true.

I saw them as a helpful way to learn the basic structure of syllogisms and to locate errors within them during my introductory philosophy classes, but if you walked away from that thinking God had been proven (or disproven) by the sheer force of logic alone, I think you missed something. — Hanover

The real issue is where exactly does the failure lie. Is the failure in the deductive logic, or in the induction? So, the cosmological argument for example, all material things have a cause, a cause is prior in time to the effect, therefore the first material thing has a prior cause which cannot be a material thing, and this we call "God".

The only real failure here is in the inductive premises concerning the causation of material objects. But when inductive premises are seen to be deprived of certainty in this way, it casts doubt on all scientific knowledge.

Solution: place this thread into a blocked category and quickly forget about it.

So it's very clear now, each mathematician lives in one's own private multiverse.

If your identity is a description or definition, then it makes no sense to say you could have become a plumber. — frank

By the law of identity, a thing's identity is the thing itself. To say that a thing's identity is a description, definition, or even a name, is to make the category mistake of saying that the thing's identity is what someone says about the thing, rather than the thing itself. The name of a thing is a representation of the thing's identity, not its identity.

If you allow this category mistake into your thinking, then you allow for all sorts of sophistry to invade your mind, such as the questions about Hesperus and Phosphorus, and the ship of Theseus. Instead, we ought to be content in knowing that we simply cannot make any true identity statements, and that's just a basic feature of human knowledge.

Good advise. So you'll always find me where they want me to be. But the happy thoughts...?