I'll try to unpack it succinctly, and leave it here as a sideline opinion, for reference, so as not to derail the thread.

What is common to both principal forms of dialectics, Platonic and Hegelian, is a base in the wanting of (therefore lack of) moral direction. It's very obvious in Platonic dialectics, as Plato demonstrates that no true meaning for important moral terms like "just", "good" and "virtue" in general, can be determined. It's less obvious in Hegelian dialectics because Hegel generalizes dialectics, transforming the process to be applicable to all forms of logic, which Plato actually did in his later work after applying the method to terms like "knowledge".

So in Hegel's dialectics, we have the thesis (good), antithesis (bad), and the sublation of the two. What is shown is that there is no true correct or incorrect, just an endless process of sublation, as this procedure repeats itself. Therefore, when related to morality, the concept which supports this dialectical structure, is the idea that there is no true moral "good", as good is opposed to bad, and there is just the continuing process whereby the two opposing extremes negate each other.

Since morality deals with what is good, and the Hegelian dialectician sacrifices the value of "good" to its opposite, "bad" through the process of sublation, we can infer that the dialectician has no principles to criticize the moral direction of another; i.e. no principles to say that one person's claimed good is "better" than the opposing person's claimed good.

What I was referring to is seen in the Minkowski metric of spacetime, in which the time term is in fact a distance term c2(t1−t2)2−(x1−x2)2−(y1−y2)2−(z1−z2)2. — jgill

This I consider to be the principal defect of the current conventional conception of spacetime, that time is reduced to being spatial, rather than conceived of as being logically prior to space.

The existence of dialectics in general, i.e. the fact that dialectics is a valid philosophical tool and it is actively taught and employed, indicates that philosophers have not been capable of identifying what constitutes a "morally good life'. Dialectics is the manifestation of a lack of morals. The dialectician therefore, has no principles to criticize the morals of anyone, other than one's own lack of morals which has manifested as the dialectician's practise of dialectics.

All you are saying is the language about something, and the actual thing, are not the same. Obviously. That's basic. What of it? — Benj96

You keep insisting that the thing and what is said about the thing, are the same. Here:

I dont see incoherence in energy being a thing and that thing being what it does. — Benj96

What something does, is always what we say of the thing. It's how we interpret its relations to other things. The principle of relativity makes use of this fact, allowing that we can describe a thing's relations to others in multiple ways, none of which could be said to be the true way.

Since the thing is one, and what is said about the thing (what it does) is a multitude, they cannot be the same.

Something said about another may be correct (ie opinion in alignment with what is) or it may be incorrect (opinion not reflecting what actually is). And what of it? What's your point. — Benj96

The point is that the thing, and what is said about the thing, or, what the thing is said to do, cannot be the same. this is evident in your example. "The universe", and "is a single thing", each mean something different.

I dont see incoherence in energy being a thing and that thing being what it does. I have no issue with action being a thing. Or "doing" being an existant phenomenon (a thing that is). — Benj96

If you still don't understand the difference, then so be it. I don't see how I can explain any further. The incoherency is due to the fallacy of equivocation which I explained to you earlier. If the word "energy" refers to a thing, and it also refers to what a thing is doing, then these are two distinct meanings of the word, as it is used as a noun in the one case, and as a verb in the other. To use the word as if the two meanings are interchangeable, or the same, as you propose, is the fallacy of equivocation. It is this fallacy which renders your perspective as incoherent.

Yes. Thats how language works. I could just say "the universe is the universe" or even more extreme a case just keep chanting "oneness" repeatedly in response to everything you say. But that wouldn't be informative would it - information of course being what i use the distinctions imbedded in language to get across. — Benj96

But this is not the same as the other. To say "the universe is the universe" is to repeat the same thing, as a statement of idenity, and this says nothing about the universe.. To say as you did, "The universe as a whole is a single thing", is to say something about the universe. But then what is said about the universe is necessarily something other than the universe itself.

You pointing out that my language breaks down into little itty bitty pieces that are all separate doesnt detract from the notion - my perspective that the universe is the "whole cake" and everything distinguishable within it is a fraction of that cake. — Benj96

The point is, that when you propose that the subject (energy), and the predicate (what energy does), are one and the same thing within the category called "the universe", you leave the thing that you are talking about, the universe as unintelligible due to the incoherency which you create with this proposition.

So again, i reiterate, we can go splitting things apart and examining them in isolation like energy and matter as completely seoarate things. Or we can unify them (as einsteins equation does) and approach a singular fundamental, discussing how they are two faces of the same proverbial coin. But it depends on whether you want to accord or discord with me, that will dictate whether the conversation moves forward fluidly or remains static and fixated on particulars. (the dynamic triad i mentioned early). — Benj96

As I explained, the things are already split apart, naturally. Your attempt to describe them as unified is unsupported by any real principles, so your proposition is in discordance with reality, therefore false.

I explained why possibility is taken for granted, rather than demonstrated logically. To demonstrate it logically would make it necessary, and this would be self-contradicting, self-refuting. You might inform yourself by rereading my replies. You ask what I called the "loaded question".

Imagine, someone says "prove to me that libertarian free will is a reality". Then you attempt to make an argument which would produce the necessary conclusion. That would mean that the person that you are presenting the demonstration to would have no choice but to accept the conclusion of the reality of free will. But that instance of having no choice would be impossible if free will is the reality. Therefore, when an anti-free-willie asks a free-willie to prove the reality of free will, it's a loaded question, because if free will is the reality this is fundamentally impossible. Sure, the air is cold and thin at the top of the mountain, but enjoy the view, there is no reason to come down until some kind of need makes the decision to descend "necessary", as the means to the end. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point which you do not seem to grasp, is the relationship between possibility and free will. These two are tied necessarily by logic, such that if there is such a thing as possibility, then there is the capacity to choose, therefore free will. Asking someone to demonstrate "the possibility of...", is to ask that person to prove the reality of free will. This is impossible for the reasons explained, therefore we take possibility for granted, without proof. So your insistence, that the proposition "Free will is possible" must be demonstrated as necessarily true, is to pose the loaded question, to ask the free-willie to refute one's own position.

John claims that humans can run at 30mph.

Jane claims that humans cannot run at 30mph because the fastest a human can run is 25mph.

Joe demonstrates that humans can run at 27.5mph.

Has Joe demonstrated that humans can run at 30mph? No. — Michael

That humans can run at 30mph remains a possibility.

John claims that humans can make free choices.

Jane claims that humans cannot make free choices because all actions are the deterministic consequence of some prior state.

Joe demonstrates that some actions are the indeterminate consequence of some prior state.

Has Joe demonstrated that humans can make free choices? No. — Michael

Libertarian free will remains a possibility. What's your point?

The universe as a whole is a single thing. — Benj96

Even making this statement is an act of demonstrating the separation. You have the thing you are talking about, the subject, named as "the universe", and you have what you are saying about it, the predicate, "is a single thing". Therefore your statement implies necessarily, a specific type of separation within the universe which you exist. Despite your claim that we can start with the assumption of "a single thing", you have already demonstrated that you assume two things, the thing itself (named the universe), and what you have said about it (a single thing). These two do not have the same meaning therefore they necessarily refer to distinct things. Your claim therefore is self-refuting, it demonstrates itself to be false.

You cannot avoid the separation by denying it.

I speak in terms of unifying closely related relationships. — Benj96

The problem obviously is that the act of "unifying" requires a prior separation. You want to start with the premise of "a single thing", thereby denying this prior separation which is logically necessary for your claimed act of "unifying". In on other words you deny the reality of what is logically required for the act which you make.

The libertarian needs to explain what free will requires (e.g. an immaterial soul in your example) and that these requirements are possible. — Michael

Well that's not true at all. Any stated proposition has the possibility of being true. Stating requirements only limits the possibilities. So, for instance we might start by stating the requirement that the proposition cannot be self-contradictory, and this requirement would exclude some propositions as impossible (necessarily not true according to that requirement).

There is a number of ways which we can proceed toward knowledge in cases of possibility, the above mentioned way would be the process of elimination, eliminating the impossible. That something is impossible is the highest degree of certainty, or necessity, which we can obtain in cases of possibility, but it is still not perfect, or absolute, because the certainty obtained relies on the truth of the stated requirement. So by the above mentioned example, the requirement of non-contradiction, if this requirement were not itself true, it would provide a false certainty.

Another way we can proceed toward knowledge in cases of possibility is to determine probability. And just like the way that the process of elimination depends on the stated requirements, this way depends on the principles deployed in the statistical analysis.

In all cases of understanding possibility, possibility is taken for granted. It need not be demonstrated, as you claim, for the reasons I explained earlier. To demonstrate logically the reality of possibility, would render it as necessary, and that would be self-refuting. So you're assertion here, as to what the libertarian must show, is to ask the loaded question I mentioned earlier. You might argue that to take possibility for granted is to assign it a sort of necessity, and that would be self-refuting, but that is a different type of "necessity" than the logical necessity which you are asking for in your request for requirements.

If our actions are the consequence of quantum indeterminacy then they are the result of random chance, not free choice. — Michael

Chance is not properly a cause, it is simply a descriptive term. Therefore "chance" in the context of quantum indeterminacy cannot cause actions, and no actions can be said to be "the consequence of quantum indeterminacy" in that way, as if indeterminacy had caused these actions. "Chance" and "indeterminacy" are how we describe these actions, not the cause of the actions.

However, the real and natural situation, which is referred to by that phrase "quantum indeterminacy", provides a situation where the free willing agent can act in a manner which is not dictated by the laws of determinism (therefore not compatible with determinism). I described this relationship between the possible free willing "agent" and the principles of physics (laws of determinism), and how what is understood by quantum mechanics allows that the free willing "agent" is logically a real possibility, in the post above.

Yes. Because energy is (actor) and does (property). The two are united as a singular entity. It "is doing-ness". — Benj96

As I said, this is incoherent to me as a category error which result in equivocation. The subject (actor in your terms), and the predicate (what the actor "does"), refer to two distinct things. We can assign the same name to these two distinct things "energy", and this is very common in cases where a word has meaning as a noun, and meaning as a verb, but we must maintain this separation of meaning, to avoid ambiguity. And if that ambiguity is actually utilized within a logical demonstration this is the fallacy of equivocation. And that is what you are doing. Therefore you argue by equivocation and this renders your argument as incoherent to me.

Just like a coin has 2 faces, is one face any more "coin" than the other? — Benj96

The coin is the subject and it has two stated properties. face one, and face two. The coin itself is not face one, nor is it face two, or even a composition of face one and face two. It is not a composition of the two because there is an endless number of properties which can be named, the edge, the printed figures, the weight, the shape, etc., and we could never name all of them required to produce "the coin" as a whole. So if "energy" is your subject, as "coin" is, whatever properties you name, which energy is supposed to have, they are not the same as energy.

So it is correct to say, as you propose, that one face is not any more the coin than the other, but no matter how many properties you name, you do not get "the coin". Your category mistake with "energy" is that you assume "energy" as subject, and its properties, as predicates, are the same.

Then as an example, free will (according to the libertarian) is incompatible with both determinism and quantum indeterminacy. — Michael

OK, this would be acceptable. but this leads to a further problem in defining "libertarian free will". You now have two conditions stated here: #1 incompatible with determinism, #2 incompatible with quantum indeterminacy.

I believe that free will is incompatible with determinism, which is consistent with condition #1. I also believe that free will is compatible with quantum indeterminacy and this is inconsistent with condition #2. So now we have two conceptions of "free will" which are both incompatible with determinism. I always thought that my conception of "free will" is compatible with so-called "libertarian free-will", but according to your stated conditions, it is not.

Are you able to help me to expose the difference between these two conceptions of "free will" which are both incompatible with determinism? Can you explain to me what are the features of the libertarian conception which make it incompatible with quantum indeterminacy, and in exchange I will explain why my conception avoids this incompatibility?

Free will requires that there is some third mechanism (e.g. agent-causation) for action, and the libertarian's task is to make sense of such a thing and show that such a thing is possible. — Michael

Agent causation is not a problem for my conception of free will, and it ought not be sufficient to impose condition #2 on the libertarian conception, but maybe you can demonstrate otherwise. The "agent" involved is an immaterial act, as described by classical dualist metaphysics, and commonly known as the soul.

Material existence occurs at the present as time is passing. It is what "is", implying "now" which is commonly known as the present. The immaterial cause is always prior to, i.e. in the future of the present "now", so it is never observable to us. It is known only by its effects which manifest at the present. As time passes, the immaterial cause may act as "agent" to influence what unfolds as observable material existence, at the present.

For further explanation, consider this. The principles of quantum physics apprehend a shortest possible period of time, which is represented as the Planck length. Now suppose two material, or physical states which are supposed to be separated by a Planck length duration of time. These are the describable situation at T1, and the situation at T2. These two situations are not the same, so something must happen in that short duration of time to "cause" a difference between the the situations.. But whatever happens in that time between T1 and T2, it cannot be referred to as a material, or physical occurrence, because it occurs during a period of time which the principles of quantum physics dictate that a material or physical change is impossible. Therefore, the change which happens between T1 and T2 is an immaterial, or nonphysical change. This is where the immaterial, or nonphysical "soul" may be active, as an agent, and influence what becomes at T2, from what was at T1.

I described the immaterial soul s acting "in the future of the present moment" because we measure time as it passes, so all measured time is in the past. Therefore, as we attempt in our experimental endeavours to produce a shorter and shorter period of time, what we are really doing is reducing the amount of past time, within the measured duration, to get a more and more accurate pinpoint positioning on "the present moment". The pinpoint positioning appears to be impossible, hence the limitation of the Planck length, and so the Planck length substitutes for the pinpoint position of the present, as "the infinitesimal". However, there is necessarily change which occurs during this time period (the infinitesimal) which serves by substitution as "the present moment", as demonstrated logically above. This is the change which occurs between T1 and T2, as these are different situations. This activity must be apprehended as occurring prior to the present, outside (as prior to) the boundaries of "measured time", which is past time. So any agent which acts to cause change within this infinitesimal time period, must be acting in the future of the present moment.

For me change is a property of potential. — Benj96

Not true from my personal perspective/rationalisation. The changing thing is changing. The constant it abides by in doing so - change - is permanent in its phenomenonology.

In this case your statement would be a conflation of the actor (change) with the acted upon (the changed) - they are a dichotomy. — Benj96

You are making a category mistake. You state that change is a property. but then you make change the thing, the actor. At one point change is the predicate (property), and at another time it is the subject (actor). That's equivocation. Then what you say afterward is incoherent to me because of this equivocation.

I hope i am articulating the concept well. Forgive me if it isn't unclear I'm happy to further elaborate if need be. It's a tricky subject one I've been thinking about for years now — Benj96

You'll have to clear up that issue, stated above, before we can proceed any further toward a mutual understanding.

It might be that free will is impossible if either determinism or some other X is true. — Michael

This is a misleading statement, because if it "might be", means it is still possible. So "it might be impossible" means that it is possible. To say that it is "impossible" rather than that it is possible that it is impossible, would require another demonstration to show the required necessity. if determinism is shown to be necessarily false, how would you proceed with that demonstration, when the only other premise we have is that determinism is inconsistent with free will? Since these are the only two premises, the appropriate conclusion is that free will is possible.

A demonstration that determinism is false isn’t a demonstration that this other X is false, and so not a demonstration that free will is possible. — Michael

We have two premises. One is that determinism and free will are incompatible, the other is that determinism is false. From these two we conclude that free will is possible. There is no "other X", so your premise concerning "other x" is irrelevant. If there is something else, "other x", which forces the necessity that free will is impossible, this would be a completely different argument. And until that "other X" is identified and shown logically to make free will impossible, the conclusion from the other two premises, that free will is possible, stands. From the premises stated we can conclude that free will is possible, and "other X' has not been shown to be relevant.

It is not sufficient that determinism be false for free will to be possible according to libertarians. — Pierre-Normand

Why not? I think that if free will is inconsistent with determinism, then the demonstration that determinism is false is exactly what is required to demonstrate that free will is possible. A and B cannot both be true. A is false therefore B is possible. I know that this does not necessitate free will, but you're talking about the possibility of free will here. The problem is that free will is fundamentally inconsistent with necessity. So free will can only be accurately related to possibility, not necessity. it would be self-contradictory to say that free will is necessary.

Imagine, someone says "prove to me that libertarian free will is a reality". Then you attempt to make an argument which would produce the necessary conclusion. That would mean that the person that you are presenting the demonstration to would have no choice but to accept the conclusion of the reality of free will. But that instance of having no choice would be impossible if free will is the reality. Therefore, when an anti-free-willie asks a free-willie to prove the reality of free will, it's a loaded question, because if free will is the reality this is fundamentally impossible. Sure, the air is cold and thin at the top of the mountain, but enjoy the view, there is no reason to come down until some kind of need makes the decision to descend "necessary", as the means to the end.

Ok, let's suppose Hume is wrong. Then try to solve the following problem: A billiard ball rolls toward a second billiard ball. Try to figure out (before they meet) what will happen when the two balls meet and state what method you used to do it.

By what reasoning do you find out whether the balls will attract each other, whether they will bounce off each other and in what direction, whether they will penetrate each other, or disintegrate, or explode, or ... or ...? — Jacques

If I'd never played pool before, I could read some books, and learn how the balls ought to behave through geometrical principles, and physics, then apply deductive reasoning to say that the balls on my table will move that way. Those principles I would study would have been developed from inductive reasoning. Or someone could tell me these principles. If I've played pool before, and learned from experience rather than being taught principles, I'd use inductive reasoning more directly.

Broadly, we may say that the doctrine of determinism entails that all the facts about the past together with the laws of nature uniquely determine the future. — Pierre-Normand

It doesn't but quantum indeterminacies often are seen to provide no help to libertarians. — Pierre-Normand

I don't see any consistency between these two statements. If, following the laws of nature is a requirement for determinism, and "stochastic" refers to actions describable by probability rather than law, then it would definitely be true that the stochasticity of quantum indeterminacies supports the rejection of determinism.

And his thesis is that one cannot derive an effect from a cause by thinking alone. This is only possible by observation. — Jacques

Well sure one cannot derive causation from thinking alone. That would be rather nonsensical because something has to stand in, within the thinking, as the cause and as the effect. That is known as the content of thought, and most of the content is derived from observation.

But that is not the issue here. The issue is whether the concept is derived from thinking, (better stated as "reasoning") or some other living process like a simple propensity to associate one thing (the cause) with another thing (the effect). Hume's claim is that our capacity to predict, through the use of the concept of causation, i.e. to say that a certain outcome (effect) would be necessitated by a certain action (cause), is not based in reason, but in some sort of propensity toward seeing things in this way.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

This is the heart of Hume's mistake. He misunderstands how we sense and observe things. We actually observe things as continuous in time, not as distinct events. there are no natural divisions observed between events or motions, as motion is observed as continuous. It is the mind which separates, or individuates distinct events, or distinct motions, within the flow of time. So we observe a multitude of billiard balls rolling and bouncing off each other as one event. This is very evident with the opening shot which breaks the pack, and the balls are rapidly moving around bouncing off each other. It is the mind which separates the action of one ball from the action of another ball, and the mind numbers these individuated events as motion #1, and motion #2, in a temporal order, assigning cause to the motion of one, and effect to the motions of the other.

This is evident in all such activities which are divided in this way to assign cause to the earlier part of the event, and effect to the later part. For example, a rock flying through the air hits the window and the glass breaks. That is sensed as one continuous event. But the mind of the observer separates the flying rock, as cause, and the breaking glass as effect.

So Hume's thesis is incorrect, by starting from a false premise. He assumes that we must somehow associate cause with effect, and so inquires as to the means by which we establish a relation between these two. in reality though, the temporal process which constitutes cause and effect is perceived by us as continuous, without natural divisions, and we separate cause from effect. So the proper inquiry should have been to inquiry how the mind separates cause from effect, rather than how we relate cause to effect..

What Hume meant to say is this: when you observe an unknown process for the first time in your life, say the encounter between two unknown creatures from the deep sea, you cannot predict by any reasoning what will happen. The only way to find out is to observe what happens. — Jacques

And that's relevant?

Consider this. The fact that reasoning cannot provide us with an absolutely perfect and omniscient capacity of prediction, does not imply that our capacity of prediction is not based in reason. That conclusion would require the premise that reasoning provides us with absolutely perfect and omniscient knowledge.

This is why the Stanford article you quoted says about Hume's argument, "what he calls 'reasoning'''. Hume consistently mischaracterized, poorly described, or incorrectly defined (if we can call descriptions definitions), the capacities of human beings.

I have no doubt that some kinds of animals have a capacity to reason, and I don't believe that reasoning is necessarily carried out, even by humans, in the form of "explicit thoughts". — Janus

I tend toward believing that many animals perform some sort of processes which are very similar to "reasoning", if not actually reasoning. The issue here is in how one would define "reasoning". If we limit "reasoning" only to those formal processes like deduction and mathematics, which produce a high degree of certainty, in the way that Hume wanted, then I think we decisively exclude the mental processes employed by other animals from the category of "reasoning". I don't know Hume well enough to say this for certain, but this may have been his intention, to produce a clear separation between the mental capacities of human beings, and the mental capacities of other creatures.

I like to think of "reasoning" as being defined by the use of symbols in the thinking process. And, there are formal ways of using symbols in thinking, being defined by convention, and also informal ways of using symbols in thinking, and these could be called private ways. We need to allow for the reality of private ways of thinking, in order to account for creativity; the reality of growth and expansion, evolution in the thinking process. Private ways may be taught, and adapted by others, becoming new conventional ways.

If, as I propose above, we use the use of symbols as the defining feature of reasoning, we might in some sense exclude other animals from the category of "reasoning", but this depends on how one would define "symbol", and exactly what type of mental images other types of creatures employ. In many ways, an aural or visual imagine can qualify as a "symbol", so the exclusion of other animals is not so simple.

This problem of definition is very common when analyzing the capacities of living creatures, and it is the principal reason why deductive reasoning does not provide us with the high degree of certainty which many people believe it does. The results of deduction are only as sound as the premises employed, and definitions constitute a large part of the premises. Each definition creates a sort of internal boundary as to what is essential, necessarily inhering within, the defined term. And this is known as logical priority. So, in the example above, I define "using symbols" as necessarily inhering within "reasoning", such that using symbols is an essential aspect of reasoning, and therefore logically prior to reasoning. Then "using symbols" is the broader category and may include other activities which are not properly "reasoning".

The problem is that the thing which inheres within, that which is "logically prior", as essential to the defined thing, is always the broader and less well-known category, therefore receiving a less clear and concise definition. So the effort to produce certainty in our deductive reasoning requires that we go further and further inward in our quest to understand and define the prerequisite terms employed, and as we proceed in this way, the terms are less and less well defined, decreasing the desired certainty accordingly. And since this is how defining works, uncertainty inheres within conception.

That is the principal reason why "systems theory" is not at all suited for the understanding of "living systems". Systems theory relies on the use of boundaries, and the boundaries define the external limits of the proposed system. But a living system is defined as "open" and this implies that the boundary is not a true boundary. The reason why the boundary is not a true boundary is because it does not provide a good definitional base for distinguishing the status of some things as to 'part of the system' or 'not part of the system'. And the issue, or deficiency, is that the model puts the boundary around the outside of the system, while the true opening, or weakness (which is really a weakness of definition) is to the inside of the system. Therefore the opening in the boundary of an "open system", a living system, ought to be represented as on the inside.

Let me make an analogy. Let's suppose a model of thinking which is a neurological representation, is presented as a system. As wayfarer states above, this "brain-mind identity theory" is defective. The neurological system model puts a boundary on the system which is an external limit to the system. Things which have a causal effect on the system as a whole, which cause change to the system, must come from outside the system and pass through the external boundary in order to be apprehended as having an effect. However, as I demonstrated above, the mental process of thinking and reasoning employs symbols with defining boundaries to the inside. In this process, the weakness of the whole, the location where things are not clearly defined and therefore may be either part of, or not part of, the whole, thereby having causal influence on the whole, is to the inside of the whole, not the outside. Systems theory, since it is based in empirical observations from the outside of the system provides no means for apprehending the cause of changes which pass through the principal weakness of the whole, the internal opening.

If two or more parties agree by experience that it is currently hot then that is truth.

How do you get conspiracy out of that? — invicta

What if what these two agree to, is contrary to what everyone else is claiming? For example, if two parties conclude by their own experience that the earth is flat, or that the sun revolves around the earth, while most other people are telling them otherwise, does that make it true? Sounds like the beginnings of a conspiracy theory to me, because then those two would have to explain why everyone else is conspiring against them.

Finally I understand that you are not criticizing my interpretation of Hume, but Hume himself. I am so relieved because I am sure he does not need my help. — Jacques

I'm criticizing both, your interpretation, and Hume himself. Your interpretation is bad because you interpret Hume's argument to be demonstrating that the conception of causation is not based in reason, when he clearly shows that it is based in reason. The reason for your bad interpretation though, is that Hume's argument is incoherent, so you can blame Hume if you will. Notice that the quote from Stanford which you provided says that Hume concludes that the relation between cause and effect has "no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'". The authors at Stanford notice that Hume is working with an unconventional idea of "reasoning".

You do not seem to have noticed this, and that's why I am criticizing your interpretation. What you're not noticing is that Hume describes this relation between cause and effect as being based in reason, when "reason" is understood in the conventional way. But, he proposes that we restrict our use of "reason" according to a private definition which he is outlining, so that the type of reasoning by which we commonly relate cause to effect, does not qualify as "reasoning" under this private definition. The issue here is that faulty or invalid reasoning is still reasoning.

The further point I made, is that by Hume's own argument, his conclusions concerning the relation between cause and effect cannot be "reasoned" conclusions, so his conclusions are fundamentally unjustified. Therefore Hume undermines his own argument, so his argument is self-defeating. The same premises by which he argues that the concept of causation is not derived from reason, ensure that his own conclusion is not derived from reason. That you do not apprehend this is a further indication that your interpretation is poor.

And as the truthfulness of such a statement depends on mutual agreement between two or more subjects then it’s no longer subjective (context dependent) but objective (context independent) for certain statements only which are subject to change such as current heat level. — invicta

Hmm, agreement between two or more subjects produces truth and objectivity? That sounds like a conspiracy theory to me.

Hume concludes that this inference [from cause to effect] has no foundation in the understanding - that is no foundation in what he calls 'reasoning'. — Graciela De Pierris, Michael Friedman

I explained quite clearly already, why such a conclusion is self-defeating. Notice that even this statement is self-contradicting. The word "inference" implies reasoning. An inference is what is derived from reasoning. So if a supposed "inference" has no foundation in reasoning, it cannot be called an "inference" because that would be contradictory. Yet it is called an "inference", because it is recognized that it actually is founded in reason, and Hume's attempt to portray it as not founded in reason is just incoherent hypocrisy.

Hume attempts to limit the meaning of "reasoning" to exclude inductive reasoning from the category of "reasoning", because of the deficiencies found to inhere within this form of reasoning. However, that leaves Hume's own conclusion, that the relation between cause and effect is not founded in reason, as itself not founded in reason. Therefore unjustified. That's why Hume's conclusion is self-defeating.

I do not find that it is an inductive inference, because it is not an inference from particular cases to the general case. It is more likely to be a case of analytical reasoning. — Jacques

An inference from the particular to the general is exactly what the quoted conclusion is. Look:

"The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination.

Hume gives many examples of particular instances of why the mind cannot find the effect to be implied by the cause. These examples of particulars are supposed to be representative of what observations of the "most accurate scrutiny and examination" could provide for us. Then he states the general (inductive) conclusion "the mind can never possibly find...".

Analytical reasoning involves judgements concerning relationships of meaning. Hume could not produce that conclusion of impossibility, "the mind can never possibly..." through analytical reasoning because there is no premise or axiom to support that inference of impossibility, only Hume's observations of what the mind can and can't do. Then the general principle "the mind can never possibly...", is produced; clearly inductive reasoning.

Hence it is sentences that are "context driven"; not truth. — Banno

What could this possibly mean? Are use suggesting that context "drives" the sentence like a person would "drive" a car, a team of horses, or a herd of cattle? What exactly is context doing here which qualifies your use of "driven", to say that the sentence is driven by context?

it seems to me, that it would be more appropriate to propose that it is what the sentence says (it's meaning) which is true or false, and this, "meaning", is dependent on the context. Doesn't that make more sense to you?

(Note that Plaque Flag is taking one of his regular breaks from Forum participation.) — Wayfarer

We ought to take that time to get this thread back on track.

The hiddenness of nothing is what allows movement and interaction. Thus the more one fills the emptiness of awareness with the images of self, the less emptiness remains for the world to unfold itself in.

We join spokes together in a wheel,
but it is the center hole
that makes the wagon move.

We shape clay into a pot,
but it is the emptiness inside
that holds whatever we want.

We hammer wood for a house,
but it is the inner space
that makes it livable.

We work with being,
but non-being is what we use.
— Lao Tzu — unenlightened

I like this proposal, there is something which is hidden, and that is what we call "nothing". This place where nothing is real, and possibilities for movement and interaction emerge from, is the future. Possibilities are "what we use", and they are derived from the nothingness which has reality as the future.

So "possibility", sometimes called "potential", is how we view the medium between the emptiness of the future, and the fulfillment of the past. Respect for this medium provides us with the capacity for "use". But if, in the imaginary world within our minds, we allow the nothingness of the future to become filled by self-confidence, or if we allow that nothingness to seep into the fulfillment of the past, as is the case with regret, then confusion reigns in this imaginary world.

The issue here is that animals also seem to have inductive expectations. So maybe what we think of as inductive reasoning consists in rationalising our instinctive expectations. — Janus

I remember once, you described to me what you thought qualified as inductive reasoning carried out by other animals, and it did not appear to be anything like the way that I understand "inductive reasoning". And I think it's clear that this would not qualify as a concept of causation, like Hume was talking about. I do not think that things like Pavlov's conditioning qualify as analogous with the predictive capacity of the human concept of causation. I mean, there may be some underlying base capacity which is common to both, but the latter qualifies as prediction based on inductive reasoning, while salivating at the sound of a bell does not, it is just a basic form of association.

Another line of thought is that the idea of causation derives from our direct experience of ourselves as both causal agents and as being subjected to the effects of other things like the sun, wind and rain and so on. I can push, pull, cut and smash things and in doing so feel the force I am exerting. — Janus

I agree with this to an extent, and it is why, as I explained already, the concept of "necessity" which we associate with causation is based in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed, as the means to an end. This is why it is misdirected to attempt to ground the "necessity" of the relation between cause and effect, in some sort of logical necessity which is supposed to be grounded in certainty. Instead, logical necessity, which is supposed to produce certainty is grounded in "necessary' in the sense of the means to an end. So the "necessity" which we assume for the sake of logical proceeding is the means (as necessary for) the end which is understanding, or knowing. Therefore "logical necessity" is grounded in "necessary" in the sense of what is needed for an end, hence the archaic phrase for logical necessity "must needs be", as signifying "necessary for".

...but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

Without the explicit thoughts, we cannot classify this as "inductive reasoning". So, we must look for some other form of process similar to rational thinking, but not rational thinking, which rational thinking may be based in, as a manifestation or growth from this process, but is completely different from rational thinking, as we think of cause as being distinct from effect.

I agree, but I don't think inductive reasoning involves any deductive certainty, or necessity. — Janus

That's right, but inductive reasoning is still a form of reasoning, so we cannot deny, as Jacques does, that causation is based in reason. We just have to respect the fact that this type of reasoning, which currently provides us with our understanding of causation, cannot provide that high degree of certainty which deductive reasoning does.

However, the problem which arises, which Jacques exposes with the skillfully selected quote above, is that Hume makes an inductive conclusion about causation which expresses the exact form of certainty which he insists that inductive reasoning cannot provide, i.e. "the mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause".

It is this faulty conclusion of Hume's which leads us toward the the equally faulty assumption that there is no such necessary relation between cause and effect, rather than the more appropriate conclusion that the human mind's application of induction, does not provide the capacity required, to properly understand the necessary relation between cause and effect. In other words, it is the deficiencies of inductive reasoning which make it so that we cannot find necessity here, as is the case with inductive reasoning in general. But this does not mean that necessity is not there hidden within the concept of causation, such that we can conclude with certainty, as Hume does, that the mind can never possibly find that necessity.

I am sorry to say that I cannot see any connection between Hume's thesis on causality and your post. — Jacques

Yes, it has become very evident that your understanding of Hume is quite sorrowful.

I mean you provided the clinching quote from Hume himself, and you still don't understand the predicament which Hume put himself into.

The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination — David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

If that is not an inductive conclusion which asserts the exact form of certainty, (with "never possibly find..."), which Hume insists that inductive conclusions cannot provide, then how do you explain it?

Another thing to recognize here is the difference between "custom" and "habit". What I explained in the other post is that we can take actions which are directly contrary to custom. Such an action was represented as "pretense". It is the fact that such acts are contrary to custom which makes the various forms of deception and misleading possible. In the case of intentional misleading or deceiving there is a conscious effort to be contrary to what is customary. This is what is required for that type of action to be successful.

These acts which are contrary to custom may even become habitualized, so that we have instances of habitual liars for example. That some habits may be according to custom, and some might be contrary to custom indicates that "habit" is the wider category, and that "custom" in its relation to "habit" only refers to a specific type of habits.

This means that we cannot understand habits by referring to custom, but we can get some understanding of customs by referring to habit. Therefore we must proceed to principles completely independent from custom if we want to understand habits, and this would be necessary if we want to understand customs in their relation to habit.

Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work according to Hume. — Janus

Yes, and this is why Jacques' claim is a strawman representation of "Hume's argument" when he describes Hume's view of causality as "based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Hume's view is that causation is based in inductive reasoning.

Hume actually supports what I described, that all forms of causality are reducible to forms of necessity by reason. Hume then goes even further in the analysis (or reduction), to represent reason as habits of thinking which are formed through custom.

But instead of going further in this analysis, to describe "habit" in the Aristotelian terms of potential and actual, as was customary in prior philosophies, Hume suggests, as indicated by Jacques' quoted passage ("By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity."), that there is no further to go in such an analysis. See, Hume is claiming that the idea that we can proceed further in the reduction, toward an understanding of things like "habit" and "custom" through application of the Aristotelian ontological structure, is just a pretense. This I would call a sort of intellectual laziness.

I believe this is representative of a very important bifurcation in the understanding of biology, which was developing at that time. Lamarckian evolutionary theory placed great importance on "habit" as formative, i.e. having a causal role in the process of evolution. And Lamarck's evolutionary theory became widely accepted in the east of Europe, being well-suited to Marxist materialism. The idealism, and scientism of the west however, had no place for this idea, that the activities of the living organism could actually be causal in shaping the form of the material body.

So we, in the west, became immersed in the custom of thinking that the cause of change in evolution was random chance mutations. This custom, the idea of "chance" as a cause, remains paramount in the concept of abiogenesis, though mainstream biology is now moving more and more toward removing chance as the reason (cause) for the genetic mutations deemed necessary for evolutionary change. In general, when "chance" is stated as a cause, it is just a stop-gap (God of the gaps), which serves as a placeholder until a better understanding is developed. Those who adhere to this idea of 'chance as a cause', refusing to acknowledge that it is just the stop-gap that it is, resist and deny the need to look further for the true cause, and this incapacitates the philosophical will to know. This is very evident in the concept of "spontaneous generation" which was widely accepted by the unphilosophical right up until the nineteenth century and the work of Louis Pasteur.

In my understanding, "can never" is a negation and is equivalent to "can not". How you can interpret "can never" as an affirmation is a mystery to me — Jacques

If you place a quote like this, in the context of what Hume says overall, the bigger picture, which is represented by Janus' quote above, "Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work", you will see why I assert that Hume's position is self-defeating, as self-contradicting and inconsistent.

He clearly argues that causation reduces to reason as Janus indicates, it is a matter of inductive reasoning. But then, as you show, the problem of inductive reasoning, which Hume exposes, forces the conclusion that there is no "real" necessity here. The "necessity" is an inductive necessity which does not provide any absolute certainty, therefore not the requirements of a true objective necessity. This opens the door to "chance" as the filler of that gap, when we deny the "Will of God" as the filler of the gap.

The reason why this move by Hume is self-defeating, and contradictory due to inconsistency, is that it starts by attributing causation to reason. The reasoning involved is inductive, as Janus presents. Then, the deficiencies of inductive reasoning are exposed, and from this Hume concludes what you present, "the mind can never possibly...". But this itself is an inductive conclusion, and the form of the conclusion "can never possibly..." is exactly what is denied by Hume's exposé concerning the problems of inductive reasoning.

So Hume's conclusion exactly contradicts his premise. And it is this inconsistent move which opens the door to "chance" as having a real place in causation. Instead of accepting what he has exposed, a deficiency in human reasoning, which might be improved upon in the future, to close this gap in certainty caused by the problem of induction, he wrongly concludes that this deficiency cannot ever be rectified.

Then, from this false necessity which he has produced ("the mind can never possibly..."), we can go on to assume that the gap in certainty is a feature created (caused) by the independent material world, rather than a feature created (caused) by deficiencies in the habits of the human mind. But this is to proceed on the foundation of that very false premise of necessity. And when we apprehend this gap in certainty as a feature of the independent world, rather than as a deficiency in the habits of the human mind, we are wrongfully convinced in our belief that this gap cannot ever be closed. From this misdirected position, we tend to attribute to "chance" these features of the world which we incorrectly believe cannot ever be understood. And of course, we assume that we cannot ever understand them because they are chance, in this extremely vicious circle which circumvents the philosophical desire to know.

Hume does not say that custom or habit is the cause of something but rather he is saying that our knowledge of the relation between cause and effect is ...

... founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past.
— David Hume (EHU 4.21)

But demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question,

... since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. — Jacques

OK, but "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past" is a principle derived from inductive reason. Therefore Hume is saying that causation is founded on reason. So why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". Clearly, "that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform..." is an inductive principle, so causality is based on reason according to Hume.

I am sorry to say that by speaking of "hypocrisy in Hume's words" you show that you have not understood his argument at all. — Jacques

Judging by the problem stated above, I think it might be you who does not understand Hume very well. It appears like you have created an argument which is not consistent with what Hume actually said, and you have presented it as Hume's argument.

I disagree. I tend to follow Hume's view that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit (as stated in his "Enquiry on Human Understanding"): — Jacques

To say that custom or habit is the cause of something, is just to avoid the question of what is the the real cause of that thing. "Real cause" here referring to what a proper analysis and understanding of the situation would uncover. These words are just used to facilitate communication, when a deeper philosophical understanding of the situation is not required. So if we say X did such and such out of "Custom" or "Habit", we are really saying that we do not properly understand why X did that, but there is some reason there, for the action, which we do not properly understand. So "Custom" and "Habit" here are terms that stand for something which is not well understood, but understanding those things is not necessary to the conversation, so the use of them allows use to breeze over those not-understood aspects of reality. We use many words like this.

Hume alludes to this in the quoted passage with the statement "By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity". But of course this really is not a pretense, and the quoted passages gives us no reason why we should assume that it is a pretense, just an assertion that we should think of some actions as the custom of pretense.

Notice the inherent contradiction, or hypocrisy in Hume's words. It is our custom to believe that we do not give the complete reason when we say that custom is the cause. But if custom really is the cause, then we would have to accept that custom is the cause of us believing this. Therefore he could not truthfully say that this is a pretense, he must say it is a custom. Pretense is a cause other than custom, because it runs contrary to custom by causing one to express the opposite of what that person would customarily express, in order to "pretend". To be customary is to be consistent with the acts of others, but to pretend is to make your act (which is consistent with others) inconsistent with your mind. So it's self-refuting for Hume to say that we pretend otherwise, when he says that custom or habit is the real cause, because pretense implies a cause which is inconsistent with custom. If custom was the real cause it would be impossible for us to pretend anything, because to pretend is to do something contrary to what custom inclines us to do.

I did not equate the two kinds of causation, because I do not attach any reality to the "causation by reasons". Causation by reasons belongs to a metaphorical way of speaking, which has nothing to do with reality. Indeed, we often give the wrong reasons for our decisions and actions because we are often mistaken about the real reasons. — Jacques

I think, as explained in my post, that you have this backward Jacques. All causation is causation by reason, and any other form of "causation" is fundamentally wrong, for the reasons explained.

The wheel was invented by someone who found dragging stuff a drag. — unenlightened

I cannot disagree with that portrayal. Physical laziness inspired mental ambition. So that person, if it was just one, found oneself some mental purpose, even though that ambition was inspired by physical laziness. But if that person happened to get run over by pulling that first wheel laden with heavy stuff downhill, the difference between goodness and danger wasn't well respected in that lazily inspired ambition. The physical laziness may have seeped into the mental ambition resulting in a mental laziness.

Sub specie aeternitatus ... Deus, sive natura ... ~Spinoza

People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion. ~Einstein — 180 Proof

That does not address the issue of prediction, possibilities, and probabilities, which I described. An issue which is very real to science, regardless of what those who put their faith in physics believe.

for my own part, I have long felt i was here on holiday, and the real work will begin post mortem. — unenlightened

That's called 'leaving the work for someone else" better known as laziness.

Average has already confessed to being very ambitious. The problem I find with pure ambition is that it needs to be directed. Properly directed ambition is what is commonly called "goodness", and wrongly directed ambition can produce all different sorts of evil, so I'll just say in simplification, that it's dangerous.

It appears like Average is very ambitious, and also has an innate will, or inclination to avoid the dangerous side of things, assuming "a purpose", yet does not know "the purpose" which will ensure proper direction.

The world is all that is the case — plaque flag

How would someone who takes this proposition as a true premise, understand future possibilities as a real part of the world? We know that future possibilities are grounded in reality somehow, because some are acknowledged as highly probable and some are highly improbable. Therefore the art of prediction, in the world of future possibilities, may be supported by the science of "all that is the case", yet prediction deals with what will probably be the case rather than what is the case.

Nothing is hidden, — plaque flag

The next question therefore, is how can anyone hold this premise as true and also accept the reality of future possibilities? How is it possible to conceive of the reality of the future as not hidden, when we talk about it in terms of what is possible rather than what is the case?

This touches upon a point I've been debating ever since joining forums - of reason understood as 'the relations of ideas'. The tendency of reductionism is to conflate the two kinds of causation, physical and logical: which is what we do when we say that 'the brain' acts in a particular way, and so 'produces' thought, because of physical causation. The 'because' of reasons - the 'space of reasons', it has been called - can't be explained in those terms, because it belongs to a different level of explanation. — Wayfarer

A careful analysis of the two principle forms of causation reveals that the necessity of "because of physical law" is reducible to a form of the necessity of "because of reason". Simply put, the laws of physics are principles of reason, and the necessity which supports them is a logical necessity, inductive and deductive reasoning.

So, Newton's first law for example, does not describe any real necessity in the physical world, it states something which we employ as necessary for our understanding of the physical world. The "necessity" here is supported by inductive reason which itself suffers from "the problem of induction". When we understand the necessity of the first law, in this way, we see that the temporal continuity described by the concept of "inertia", would not really be necessary in a truly independent (from the human mind) physical world. That this "necessity" is just made up, created by the human minds which attempt to understand the physical world, and does not obtain to a true independent necessity as demonstrated by that stated problem, is the reason why Newton said that the truth of his first law is dependent on the Will of God.

There is an even more fundamental way of looking at the two principal senses of "necessity", which reveals this reduction even better. The two senses would be "logical necessity", because of logic (this includes physical causation), and, "what is needed", or necessary for an end. The former, logical necessity, is reducible to a form of the latter, necessary as the means to an end. Logical necessity can be seen as what is necessary, or needed, as the means toward the goal of understanding. So logical necessity describes what is needed for understanding, just like food is needed for subsistence. The relation between these two senses can be understood in translations of the old Latin expression for logical necessity "must needs be".

In this way, logical necessity, along with the necessity of the laws of physics and other scientific laws which are derived from logical necessity, are subsumed under the category of necessary for the sake of a goal, needed as means to an end. This greatly simplifies one's understanding of causation and necessity, allowing these to be tools of the mind and ultimately subservient to the free will.

However, the physicalist trend, to make the reduction in the inverted way, a way which it is impossible to make because it is incorrect, is a misunderstanding which casts all sorts of confusion onto the issue. But for anyone who has an adequate understanding of the nature of scientific laws in their relation to human thought, and the reality of the physical world, that misunderstanding ought to be obvious.

If change was not a stable or constant property then change would stop. — Benj96

I really do not think that change can be said to be a property, because change is the process whereby something loses or gains a property. So, you must have a different idea of "change" than I.

But for the sake of argument, suppose "change" is a property which is stable and constant, then we would have to say that the changing thing is unchanging. That's directly contradictory, the same thing has the property of changing, and unchanging at the same time. Your way of speaking Benj96, is incoherent and unintelligible.

Btw, I think Nicko got banned.