Still...can a innate predisposition, as such, be subjected to over-ruling, whether by education or otherwise? And what of a good bias? Should my innate predisposition to help the proverbial lil’ ol’ lady cross the street be educated out of me?

You made no distinction between the relative values of our individual biases, grouping them all as biases in general, the compendium of which we can be taught to overcome. To that alone, I make objection. — Mww

There is no doubt in my mind, that some innate biases can be overcome. The more pertinent question is as you say, "what of a good bias?" And of course the related question of how do we decide which are good, bad, or indifferent.

What you seem to object to is the idea that all biases ought to be overcome, even ones which might be good. The reason for this, and this takes us right to the foundation of skepticism, is that we cannot properly distinguish between good and bad biases, when we are already biased. This means we must rid ourselves of all biases, form an open mind, then reassess all those dismissed biases from this newly established position.

Skepticism instructs us to doubt everything, and this is because what appears to be knowledge appears to be knowledge, regardless of whether it is true or false knowledge. So we cannot distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge by its appearance because it all appears to be knowledge. Therefore we must subject anything which appears as knowledge, to doubt. And this is a similar principle to rejecting all biases, because from the position of holding a bias one cannot properly distinguish which biases are good, and which are bad.

I suppose that's why they say "taste" is subjective.

My take: space is personal. Not just relativistic (fixed by reference frame), but rather each thing that exists has its own personal space. Interactions and correlations are couplings between these spaces that allow us to map one space onto another, approximately at least. These mappings enable a statistical projection of all these things going on in all these spaces onto a single hypothetical space constructed by the mind (or computer). So more like an infinite net, I suppose. — Kenosha Kid

That's good. Each "thing" has space proper to it. Now how would you relate this to the concepts of chemistry and physics, within which, things move relative to each other? We cannot use an artificial coordinate system representing one "space", because this would be a false representation. Now each thing has its own space, within which it moves and changes, and that space needs to be related to the various "spaces" of every other thing. So we are left with a very complex problem. We need to determine the way that each type of thing moves within its own space, and also we need principles to relate the space of one thing to the space of another thing.

Let's take an object like a chair, or a rock for an example of a "thing". We can say that it has "a space" proper to it. We might define the boundaries of that space with reference to gravity. Now, lets proceed to a molecule, as a "thing" which conventionally is a part of that thing, identified by the example as a chair. The molecule has its own "space" defined by its gravity, and obviously the distinct "spaces" of the molecule and the chair overlap in terms of occupying the same place. What means would you propose for distinguishing the space of the molecule from the space of the chair?

I proposed that the boundaries of a thing's space be determined by a thing's gravity, but what kind of space would be proper to a thing which has no mass? This sort of problem would reveal two distinct types of space, the type of space proper to a massive object, and the type of space proper to something which has no mass. Since the space which is proper to things which have no mass seems to permeate all the spaces of massive things, maybe an understanding of this space could be used to relate all the other spaces of the massive objects to one another. In the case of massive objects, gravity is the defining feature of the space. What features should we look for to define the space of massless objects?

Doesn't "vat-grown meat" moots the question of "justification"? ↪180 Proof (re: link to article) — 180 Proof

Vat-grown meat will undoubtably be similar to hydroponically grown vegetables, in the sense of extremely deficient in taste. We already experience a big difference between grass fed beef and grain fed beef. There is something very untasteful about producing growth (quantity) for consumption, with complete disregard for the quality of life of that which is consumed. The vat-grown meat will experience the lowest quality of life possible, and most likely have the least taste as well.

In the old days, when the opponent appeared to be gaining too much power, someone would execute.

How does the use of words (casting spells and stuff like that) enter into the concept of magick? Does Donald Trump

summoning wild animals — Tobias

qualify as an example of someone who uses magick?

I suppose if the causal connection between the person's will, and the occurrence could be established, then the person is legally responsible. But doesn't "magic" imply that the causal connection remains hidden? So I think "magick" is an oxymoron. You are saying that the person is necessarily the cause, in a situation where there is no evidence to conclude that the person is necessarily the cause. And the legal issue you raise is just a sham, because you are asking if the person ought to be held responsible in a situation where the person cannot be proven to be responsible. Of course that is a non-starter.

I wasn't making an appeal to consistency, although obviously consistency is important to any rational thought; I was merely pointing out that the various domains of inquiry in modern science form a consistent whole. — Janus

The various domains of science actually do not form a consistent whole. There is significant inconsistency between principles employed from one field to the next, and the same words are not always defined consistently from one to another. There isn't even consistency as to which fields qualify as "science" and which do not. For insistence, google the phrase "is mathematics a science", and you'll see evidence of disagreement.

That doesn't mean that theories in the various domains are not tested by observation. How else do you think they could be tested? — Janus

I think theories in the domain of "science" are tested by observation. But that doesn't mean observation is the only way to test premises. In mathematics for example, axioms are tested by consistency. That's why we generally do not class mathematics as a science.

However, many people seem content to blur the boundaries of "science". This is probably because science has a very good reputation. So if you can pass something off as "science" which really isn't science, and you don't get exposed, it will make you look like you know more than you really do

So the hard vacuum does a better job cleaning the rug.

So I can assume that you wouldn't have taken a spectator's seat at the guillotine in the French Revolution. Maybe what you've learned to over-rule is the inclination to enjoy beheadings.

From Wikipedia:

Outer space, commonly shortened to space, is the expanse that exists beyond Earth and its atmosphere and between celestial bodies. Outer space is not completely empty—it is a hard vacuum containing a low density of particles, predominantly a plasma of hydrogen and helium, as well as electromagnetic radiation, magnetic fields, neutrinos, dust, and cosmic rays — jgill

What do you think is meant by "hard vacuum" here? Is that as distinguished from a "soft vacuum"?

Does my individual psychology (which has accrued various arbitrary biases based on my genes, upbringing, books I've read, etc.) limit what philosophical theories I can consider to be good/true? — clemogo

This is why proper upbringing, and education are imperative. One's way of thinking is no less of a habit than other activities which we engage in. Learning to overrule whatever biases one is inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition, is part of a proper education. How to proceed with an open mind is something which must be learned, because it is impossible that it could be hereditary. This is the concept of free will, to free your decision making from such influences which force your decision making in one way or another irrationally.

I understand the concern. I think it's not just that they cannot be observed, it is my understanding that they can not exist independently. From the point of view of Gnomon's point, I'm not sure that it matters. — T Clark

The point is mainly directed at Janus, and anyone else, who argues that the theories employed in modern science have been "tested", or proven by observation. What constitutes 'proof by observation' seems to have lost all credibility in modern science.

Take the famous Michelson-Morley type experiments for example. What these experiments prove is that certain postulated relations between mass and the proposed ether of light transmission, are incorrect. What is commonly cited as "proven" by these experiments, is that there is no ether. You ought to be able to see that logically, the inability to properly represent the existence of something in hypotheses, is not proof that the thing is not real. In this case, what is demonstrated is that "ether" has not been adequately described (defined).

This is the big problem with the metaphysics of 'observation is the foundation of knowledge'. It doesn't account for the fact that in knowledge observation, as proof, is posterior to hypothesis. Therefore the usefulness of observation as a means of proving hypotheses, is limited by the formulation of the hypothesis.

To really understand the nature of knowledge therefore, we need to grasp the method by which hypotheses are produced. Focusing on observation as the source of knowledge, is to account for the a posteriori while remaining ignorant of the a priori. And to deny the reality of the a priori simply demonstrates this ignorance.

Only premises that are descriptions of physical things or the behavior of observable things can be tested, though — Janus

That's not true, logic is tested by consistency. That 4+5 equals 9 is tested by 9-5=4, etc..

The premise that the truth of premises can be tested only by observation is itself based on observation of how we test premises. — Janus

Obviously you don't actually know how premises are tested, so your premise is false. It's like you saw 20 black squirrels, and no other squirrels, so you claim as a true premise, "all squirrels are black".

You have actually given a very good example of how "observation" itself is very deceptive as the basis for validating premises. Without very good (immaterial) rules as to how one might derive a valid premise from observations, observations very often mislead us.

Moral premises are judged against standards of compassion, social harmony and against how we feel about things — Janus

Your missing the point. No amount of observations of compassion, social harmony, and such things, will justify the claim that we ought to support such things. Moral premises concern what ought, and ought not, be done. That people act in a specific way, and they say "this is good", does not justify the claim that what they say is good, is what ought to be done.

But quantum theory and particle physics is consistent with chemical theory, and chemical theory is consistent with geology, cosmology and biology. I see them as just being different domains or levels of description and explanation. — Janus

What happened to "premises can be tested only by observation"? The example of "quarks" described earlier, is clear evidence that the Standard Model is not supported by observation. So now you make appeals to consistency? That a quantity of energy moves from one place to another, in the form of a wave, and also in the form of a particle, is an example of inconsistency. So quantum theory is supported neither by observation nor consistency. It is supported only by its capacity to predict.

I don't associated the idea of the 'world soul' with Aristotle in particular, but definitely with the idea of 'animating principle'. — Wayfarer

The point (derived from Plato) which Aristotle demonstrates very well, is why the soul is necessarily prior to the material living body. Any living body is organized. Such a body is necessarily organized from the very first moment of its existence. Organization requires a cause. Therefore the thing which causes the living body to be organized (the soul) is necessarily prior to the body.

Then, in his metaphysics, Aristotle carries this principle further, to all physical existence in general. Since the very essence of physical existence, is to be in some way organized, then all physical existence must be organized from the very first moment of its existence. And since organization requires a cause, that cause must be prior to physical existence.

The modern trend in metaphysics is to posit some initial condition of absolute disorganization, from which organization emerged. This idea is what is demonstrated by Aristotle's cosmological argument to incoherent and unintelligible. But it has reemerged in modern metaphysics as a result of physicalist bias impairing the cognitive capacity of human beings.

Quarks have mass. I do remember reading that the mass of the quarks making up larger subatomic particles; i.e. protons, neutrons, and mesons; add up to less than the mass of the particle itself. — T Clark

I agree that quarks have some mass, but it's relatively small. The majority of the mass in a proton or neutron is accounted for by the energy of the gluons which are supposed to hold the quarks together. The problem is that individual, separated quarks, cannot actually be observed.

Logic, though, doesn't tell us anything about an inference other than whether it is consistent with its premises (validity); it cannot tell us whether the premises are true.

The only way to test the truth of any premise is by empirical evidence. — Janus

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. Whether empirical evidence, or knowledge about the immaterial, provides a more sound judgement is another question. Plato was insistent on the latter.

Science is based on a method of testing the truth or falsity of immaterial principles (hypotheses) through reference to empirical evidence. What science does not provide for us is any real principles for testing the validity of empirical evidence. Sure there are guidelines as to what constitutes an "observation\", and principles as to how experiments ought to proceed in a way to produce objective observations, but these are all based in "ought", so they can only be supported by strong metaphysics. Weak metaphysics produces inconsistency between one field of science and another, as to what constitutes a valid observation.

Most of the mass=energy of a proton is from the gluons. — PoeticUniverse

Yes, gluons have no mass in themselves, but they are responsible for, as carriers of, the strong force. The strong force, which binds quarks into massive objects, is mathematically equivalent to mass. So if quarks are separated there is a freeing of energy which exists in the hadron (massive object) as gluons.

The problem is that the strong interaction force is not well understood. It is "observed" to be unrestricted by distance, and because of this, quarks cannot actually be separated in experimental practise. No matter how far apart they are supposedly separated, the strong force still acts to hold them together, and no real separation can be observed.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons [N], no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — Wikipedia

I think that the Higgs mechanism only accounts for a very small percentage of mass that is known to us.

It is worth noting that the Higgs field does not "create" mass out of nothing (which would violate the law of conservation of energy), nor is the Higgs field responsible for the mass of all particles. For example, approximately 99% of the mass of baryons (composite particles such as the proton and neutron), is due instead to quantum chromodynamic binding energy, which is the sum of the kinetic energies of quarks and the energies of the massless gluons mediating the strong interaction inside the baryons.[28] In Higgs-based theories, the property of "mass" is a manifestation of potential energy transferred to fundamental particles when they interact ("couple") with the Higgs field, which had contained that mass in the form of energy.[29] — Wikipedia

A Quark is invisible and un-measurable, so in scientific terms it exists only as a theory in a mind. — Gnomon

Yet quarks are supposed to be the constituent parts of massive objects. Where does all that mass actually come from?

How could a non-physical explanation ever be tested? — Janus

Non-physical explanations are tested logically. That's what logic gives us, non-physical explanations. Are you familiar with mathematics for example? Some people however, still do not trust logic, they have no faith in the non-physical, and so they must fall back onto the comfort and illusory security provided by their senses.

I think scientifically educated people will find it very difficult to honestly believe in things for which there can be no definitive evidence. — Janus

The problem with this statement is that you define "definitive evidence" as physical evidence. If you would allow that logic provides evidence which is just as "definitive", or even more so, than your senses, you would allow for "non-physical evidence".

If the explanation you are considering is a physical one then there is nothing wrong with it, — Janus

What kind of bias is that? If we are seeking the cause of physical existence, obviously the answer cannot be something physical.

That kind of question is not answerable in any verifiable or falsifiable manner in principle.. — Janus

I don't see how you would justify this claim.

As I already said the idea of "pure chance" is incoherent. If there is an explanation of the origin of life it will be in lawlike terms. To say something arose by "pure chance" is no more an explanation than to say it arose on account of "necessary being, also known as the unconditioned, unmade, uncreated and so on". — Janus

Since explanations concerning the cause of material being have always been incomplete, what is wrong with pursuing an explanation which would likely require a further explanation? I don't see the merit in your rejection of such a "rabbit hole".

It may have possible poetic value, but what explanatory value could it have, since it posits something about which nothing can be said, other than what it isn't? — Janus

The value it gives, is to tell us that to proceed in the direction of pure chance is to go in the wrong direction.

As I already said, any explanation you give will then require a further explanation as to why it is as it is; if you were able to go down that rabbit hole there would be no end to it. — Janus

To go down the road of "there is an explanation", even if that explanation may require a further explanation, and a further one after that, is a much more reasonable route than "there is no explanation".

There is a big difference between saying "if you go that way you'll never get to the end of the road", and saying "that is the wrong way to go". The way of "it is chance, it is unintelligible and will never be understood", is clearly the wrong way to go. But if someone says "your understanding will never be complete", this should not deter anyone.

I dare not say I am an intellectual; but, have been noticing in myself a desire to be consistent with who I read and adopt into my mental landscape of ideas and thoughts. I can give an example with Plato who I hold in high regards, and Wittgenstein who I also think is conducive towards clearer thought. There are clear inconsistencies with both theories of thought in many regards. — Shawn

I would say that in as much as people desire to be understood, they desire to be consistent. Plato, I think it is clear, had a desire to be understood, though he lived in a society full of inconsistencies which he sought to expose. Exposing the inconsistencies of others is a function of not being able to understand others. Wittgenstein, on the other hand received criticism for his early work, so he may have actually given up on the possibility of being understood by the time of his later work, which appear to me as demonstrations of the reality of inconsistency.

There are others, like Peirce, who assign inconsistency to the natural world, assuming the natural world to be fundamentally unintelligible.

We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases. — Bartricks

This really does not address the issue. Your claim that you can sense change through a single sensation without the requirement of comparing a number of sensations, is not justified by your assertion "that there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change".

Try looking at it this way. When we sense something, we can describe the feeling, as "a sensation", by distinguishing it from other sensations within the same category of type of sensation. So for example, in the category of taste, sweet can be distinguished from sour, in the category of hearing, loud from quiet, hard from soft in tactile sensation, red from green in vision, etc.. All these descriptions require a comparison

Now, what category of sensation would you put "change" into, such that we can consider it to be a type of sensation which can be apprehended and described without comparison to another sensation?

Yes there is. I suspect that, like most people here, you don't know an argument from your elbow. Here is the argument:

1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks

I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. But if we find that there cannot be "a sensation" of change, and that it requires a number of sensations to perceive change, then your entire approach must be rejected.

Where does it say at 258 that he does not or cannot know what "S" refers to? What is it that "S" refers to that he does not or cannot know? — Luke

He doesn't explicitly say he cannot "know", but if you think 'whatever seems right to me is right', is a description of knowing what "S" refers to. then I suppose that the "private language" described at 243, where the person knows what the words refer to, appears coherent to you. Notice I use the word "appears" here.

Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands — Luke

This is clearly wrong. When a person believes oneself to understand something, the person will proceed to act under the assumption that the thing is understood. This means the person will act in a way which appears like he understands when he does not understand.

Now, when we take into account the context, that we are talking about a private language, there cannot be a third person judgement as to whether the person actually understands or not. Your statement assumes such a judgement. The person is thinking himself to understand, and acts accordingly, and is judged to be misunderstanding, according to your statement. But because no one else knows the meaning of the words such a judgement cannot be made.

"In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand'' might be called a "private language".

Notice here, "no one else understands". This indicates that he cannot be judged to be misunderstanding, as you assume in your statement. He appears to understand because he acts as if the words have meaning to him, but he cannot be judged as to whether he actually understands or not.

You claim that 'thinking he understands' means acting as if he does understand, but at 269 Wittgenstein distinguishes between the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' and for 'understanding the word correctly'. It is only the latter where the man shows that he understands.

Wittgenstein tells us that the man does not understand because he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. That is, he misunderstands the meaning of the word. Here we might speak of a "subjective understanding", but Wittgenstein distinguishes this from the criteria in a man's behaviour for understanding the word correctly (i.e. right). — Luke

There are three possibilities outlined 1) does not understand at all, 2) misunderstands, 3) understands the word right. The second lends itself to the private language. However, in the case of the private language, no one knows the meaning of the words, so the person misunderstands but cannot be judged as misunderstanding. Therefore the person thinks he understands, and he acts as if he understands (a sort of pretense because he doesn't really understand), and so he "appears" to understand. However, he cannot be judged to be acting according to 2) (acting as if he misunderstands), because no one knows the meaning of the words which he "appears" to be understanding. Therefore "thinking he understands", in the case of the private language cannot be judged as misunderstanding, it can only be judged as "appears to understand".

If he understood the meaning of the word, then the criteria in his behaviour would be that he attaches the right meaning to the word and understands the word correctly. Alas, he does not. — Luke

You are neglecting the conditions of the context, the "private language". No one knows the meaning of the words. Therefore no one can judge whether his actions indicate that he attaches the right meaning or not. All we can say is that his actions are consistent with 'understanding the words', because he acts as if he attaches some meaning to the words, but we cannot judge whether it is "the right meaning". Therefore all we can say is that he appears to understand, he acts as if he understands.

How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258? — Luke

Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to.

Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
These are not the same. — Luke

I don't agree with these distinctions. Not all senses of "pretend" require intentional deception, And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use.

What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word? — Luke

Are you serious? Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand.

If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right. — Luke

Again this makes no sense to me. As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. How can you not understand this? When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right", meaning something other than right. How can you not understand this? When right is excluded, what we are left with is necessarily not right.

How we portray "not right" in this context is another matter. Wittgenstein portrays the 'not right understanding' as "subjective understanding", "thinking one understands". This is clearly not the opposite of being "right". I'd say it is categorically different from being "right". So what he has done is to place subjective understanding, which is the type of understanding associated with the private language, into a different category from "right" understanding, which is to be consistent with the common language.

f Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived. — Sam26

I believe there is a very real problem with Wittgenstein's perspective on subjective understanding. In all writing and speaking there are elements of private meaning, idiosyncrasies which are unique to the individual, and these are the elements of subjective understanding. Now, when we go to interpret a piece of oration, or writing, it is the common opinion that we ought to try to determine what was meant by the author. This means that we must delve into, and make our best attempts to understand the private elements, to reach the "true" meaning, as the one intended by the author. However, Wittgenstein dismisses this "true" meaning, as not the "right" meaning, because it strays from the rule-based social conventions. Therefore "the right meaning", which is a strictly rule based interpretation, is not necessarily in tune with "the true meaning", which is what the author meant, including all of one's idiosyncrasies, which are the private aspects of the person's speech. It is often an individual's use of particular idiosyncrasies which makes one into a great orator.

What's your argument for this? — Luke

I went through this. At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. So at 269, it is suggested that we could call it a "private language" when the speaker has a "subjective understanding" of the words; when one attaches meaning to the words, but not the right meaning, and therefore appears to know the meaning of the words when no one else does.

How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent? — Luke

Well, I don't see any incoherency demonstrated by Wittgenstein for what he is calling a "private language", at 269. I suppose that if you think it's incoherent you ought to be able to demonstrate that. Do you not believe that attaching meaning which is not the right meaning, and having that 'meaning'. private to oneself, is a coherent concept?

The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:

(1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.

(2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".

You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language. — Luke

Yes, you've demonstrated to me very clearly that you enjoy removing statements from their context, to give them your own 'private meaning'. That, despite your appeals to authority, you have shown me consistently in this discussion. Why would you remove the final sentence of a paragraph, from the context of that paragraph, and place it into a different context? In some schools of formal writing we are taught to use the final sentence as a sort of summary of the paragraph.

I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand.

When you apprehend that this sort of "subjective understanding" as a very real situation, (not necessarily in the context of 'private language', but in general) as for instance, your attitude toward Wittgenstein's use of "private language", then we can extrapolate and relate this type of 'understanding' to the possibility of a "private language". A person could have a "private language" which no one knows the meaning of the words, including the user of that language, but the person 'appears', or pretends to understand. "Pretends" is a good word here because it underscores the pretentiousness associated with that false attitude of certitude, when someone pretends to know what no one else knows.

We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). — Luke

What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here? We say that something "appears" to be a certain way, when we want to distinguish this from the way it really is, this is fundamental in German philosophy, from Kant. The person 'appears to understand', is a distinction from 'actually understanding'. In the context, that's very clear and ought not even be a point to be discussed.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish.

Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations: — Luke

Luke, I told you the way I feel about secondary sources. They are an invalid form of appealing to authority, because the only true authority is the author.

You continue to ignore the facts of what has been written in the text. What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. These two are incompatible as logically inconsistent with each other.

Now, just like you said to me, there is no point in proceeding with the discussion until I fully understand what Wittgenstein says at 243, I can now say that there is no point in proceeding until you come to respect the difference between 243 and 269.

I think we can look at two possible reasons for Wittgenstein's 'change of mind' We might decide that he is intentionally being ambiguous. As I explained earlier, if this is the case there would be no such thing as "what Wittgenstein means by a private language". Another possibility, and I believe this is what the evidence indicates, is that he changed his mind as to what would constitute a "private language". The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. So he proceeded to offer another proposal, a more realistic proposition as to what constitutes a "private language". This is actually a common practise in philosophical writing, initiated by Plato. It's called Platonic dialectics. And Wittgenstein is known to have read some Plato. You'll see in the Theaetetus for example, that the participants in the dialogue move through a number of proposed definitions of "knowledge", demonstrating each to be unacceptable, for one reason or another.

Therefore I think you ought to recognize that it would not be at all unusual for a writer of philosophy, like Wittgenstein, to propose a definition of "private language", demonstrate the definition to be unacceptable, then proceed to offer another definition. If, in the end, an acceptable definition is not found, as in the Theaetetus an acceptable definition of knowledge is not found, this does not that there is no such thing as what is meant by the words. It means that we do not properly understand the meaning of the words. It is only if the ambiguity is created intentionally that it is actually the case that there is no such thing as what the words mean.

.

The private language described at 243 is one where the word/symbol refers to what can only be known by the speaker. This is not merely “a sensation” or just any old sensation. It is a “certain sensation” or a “particular sensation”, the nature of which is private and known only to the speaker (one’s “immediate private sensations”). The word/symbol does not simply refer to any general sensation, or to the common meaning of the word “sensation”, as you suggest. And “my blood pressure rising” is not private in principle, because it can be verified by others. — Luke

Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot be verified.

Regarding 269, I view it as Wittgenstein’s view of the only possible thing that we might actually call a private language, which is where some individual behaves as though they actually understand sounds or words that nobody else understands. We are not told what the words or sounds of this language refer to, and I don’t see how such an individual understanding would be possible, but it is Wittgenstein’s concession regarding the possibility of a private language. — Luke

So, do you think that what is said at 270 relates to the "private language" described at 243, or to the one described at 258 and 269?

Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.” — Sam26

Actually adding the word "know" to "I'm in pain", to say instead "I know I am in pain" does a lot more than what Wittgenstein admits here. "I am in pain" states a simple opinion which the audience ought to allow as possibly true or false. "I know I am in pain" implies that I know what pain is, and what I experience has been judged to fulfill the criteria of "pain".

The issue is with the example which he has chosen. Since we take it for granted that everyone knows what "pain" means, then when someone says "I am in pain", unless we have reason to believe the person is lying, we take it as synonymous with "I know I am in pain" because everyone knows the criterion for "pain" as unpleasantness.

If we take as examples, more complex medical or psychological conditions, the difference starts to becomes evident. If someone says for example. "I have ..." a specified disorder, we might ask "have you been diagnosed?" But if the person says instead, "I know I have..." the specified disorder, we would tend to think that there's been a diagnosis.

Thread still open?

Aristotle says that Plato posits Forms for qualities, but not for artifacts.

He says that Plato at Phaedo (100d) affirms that a beautiful thing exists in virtue of its dependence on the Form of Beauty.

Aristotle’s point is that (man-made) objects like house or ring of which Plato and the Platonists hold that there are no Forms are nevertheless generated. And if objects like house and ring are generated without Forms, then other things might also be so generated. — Apollodorus

I don't think we can make this conclusion about Platonic Forms, because Forms account not only for the existence of qualities, but also of types. So the Form of Animal is the reason why anything which is an animal is an animal. We could say the same thing for Ring, and House. But I agree that there are many simple little things which Socrates would say we can't assume a Form of this, and a Form of that, until there is a different Form for every distinct individual.

This is a deficiency in Platonic metaphysics which I think Aristotle greatly improved on. Aristotle assumed that every particular thing has a Form proper to, and unique to, itself. And this becomes the principle which his law of identity is based in. He says that the fundamental question of Being, or metaphysics, is not 'why is there something rather than nothing?', but 'why is each thing the exact thing that it is, rather than something else?'.

However, Aristotle does not apply to his own comments the same logic that he applies to those he attacks. For, if no Forms are necessary for humans to build houses and make rings, it does not follow that this must apply to naturally occurring things, or to all things. — Apollodorus

But Aristotle's argument in his Metaphysics is that it is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. If it were not the thing that it is, then it would be something other than it is, and this is impossible, (forming the law of identity). Further, since things are generated (come into being), then in order for a thing to come into being as the thing which it is, the form of the thing must be prior to the material thing itself, as the cause of it being the thing which it is. If the form of a thing is not prior to the material existence of that thing, then the thing could come into being as anything, therefore not necessarily the thing which it is, violating the law of identity, by allowing that a thing could be anything.

So Aristotle's argument is that it is necessary to assume that each and every thing has a unique Form which is prior in existence to the material thing, as the cause of the thing which it is. So Plato is seen as not going far enough, by not allowing that every existing thing has a form unique to itself.

Aristotle knows this, but he must reject it because in his own system there is no Creator-God. — Apollodorus

There is a 'Creator-God' responsible for material existence in Aristotle, it's the Divine Mind, described I believe in Bk 12 Metaphysics. In his Metaphysics, I believe it's around Bk 6, he describes how the form of an artificial thing comes from the soul of the craftsperson, and is given to the matter in the act of creation. The matter accounts for the "accidentals", and why the thing created is not exactly the same as the form coming from the soul of the artist. He implies that natural things are created in the very same way, but from the Divine Mind.

The problem which Aristotle sees with Platonic metaphysics is that Forms are only universals, yet material things are particulars. But Plato wanted Forms to somehow be the cause of material things, by causing material things to be the type of thing that each is. However, Plato does not close the gap between universal and particular, to show how one universal Form can cause the existence of many particulars, when each particular is distinct and unique. Aristotle moves to close the gap with the concept of "matter", allowing that matter accounts for the accidentals, and the uniqueness of each individual.

This is why, as already explained, Socrates’ “Form of Bed” is a purely hypothetical Form that he uses exclusively for the sake of the Painter and Poet Analogy and should not be taken to mean that he (and even less Plato) is committed to Forms of artifacts. Had Plato believed in Forms of artifacts, he would have made this clear. But nowhere does he do so. — Apollodorus

So this is why Aristotle portrayed Plato's Forms as conceptually deficient.

In contrast, Christians like Aquinas who lived about a millennium later in the West, were cut off from the Platonic tradition. Their knowledge of Greek philosophy was largely limited to Latin translations of Aristotle and the works of Aristotelians like Averroes and Maimonides, who were anti-Platonists. — Apollodorus

I believe that this is factually incorrect. The early Christian metaphysicians, St Augustine for example were well versed in Neo-Platonism. So Christian theology was based in Neo-Platonism. The fall of the Alexandria library made the work of Aristotle less and less available to the early Christians, though they had access to Neo-Platonist teaching. The Muslims maintained access to Aristotle through other sources, and Averroes and other Muslims worked to introduce the more scientifically inclined Aristotelian metaphysics into the more mystical Neo-Platonist metaphysics which the Christians held. You can see in Aquinas' writings that he was working to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist principles already held by the Church, and the newly introduced Aristotelian principles. This brought scholasticism to an end, and also came the end of the middle ages

The quest for the One (on different levels) is a recurrent theme in the dialogues. — Apollodorus

Metaphysically, this "quest for the One" is lagging far behind Aristotle, who found "the One", as the particular, the individual, and defined it with the law of identity. The introduction of Aristotle into Christian schools marked a revolution in thinking for the Christians.

In case you've forgotten, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibility of a private language. Moreover, he is investigating the possibility of a private language in principle. That you might choose to be uncooperative or to keep a secret are beside the point, These have nothing to do with the privacy of language, in principle. — Luke

Obviously, choice is a significant factor if we consider "private language" in any real way. The "private language" at 243 is fundamentally incoherent, so choice does not become a factor in this proposed private language. The "private language" at 269 is proposed as a real private language, existing in the context of real common language. Here, choice is relevant because the person must choose to maintain the "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than opting for "the right" understanding, which is given by integrating the private language into the common language. This is done when the speaker recognizes that "S" (private) is a "sensation" (common), rather than "S" (private) means "my blood pressure is rising" (private).

A private language has no criterion of correctness. Having no criterion of correctness implies having no criterion of incorrectness. If I think that the connection between the sign "S" and this particular sensation defines the sign correctly, this implies that I think that the connections between the sign "S" and other sensations define the sign incorrectly. By implication, whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct and whatever is going to seem incorrect to me is incorrect. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'correct' or 'incorrect'. — Luke

That's your interpretation, but it's obviously not what Wittgenstein actually wrote. He said "here we can't talk about 'correct'. He said nothing about 'incorrect'. It is very clear to me (but incomprehensible to you), that if we have a situation with no possibility of being correct, the possibility of being correct is excluded, then we can say that everything in this situation is incorrect.

Regardless, the "private language" described at 269, as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one", is very clearly consistent with both, yours and my interpretations. If there is neither correct nor incorrect in this situation, it is still consistent to say "not the right one", because 'neither correct nor incorrect' rules out the possibility of being correct. In the situation described at 258, if there is neither right nor wrong, we can say that whatever the diarist is thinking, is not right, because the possibility of being right has been excluded. And that is exactly what is said about the private language at 269, attaching a meaning but not the right one.

What makes you think that the diarist does not use "S" to refer to a sensation, or that they do not understand that they are using "S" to refer to a sensation? — Luke

If 258 is supposed to be an example of a "private language", (I deny that it's a valid example as per 243, but accept that it is a valid example as per 269), then the user of that language does not understand "S" as referring to a "sensation", because "sensation" is a word of common language. If the diarist understood "S" as referring to a sensation, this would mean that the person understands "S" in the right way (consistent with, and part of, the common language), therefore the "subjective understanding" described at 269 would be ruled out, and it could not be a private language.

Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. — Sam26

How many months has it taken Luke and I to work through the chaff, and get to the topic of the thread? I think that either Luke and I are very dim, or Wittgenstein is very difficult to understand. Or both.

Anybody else with a manometer could also measure his blood pressure. That's what makes it publicly verifiable whether or not his blood pressure is rising. — Luke

Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verification described. And, if such a verification were proposed, the person who is "I" could decline it. Therefore a "public verification" is not even implied.

He says this in relation to misidentifying the sensation, not in relation to being wrong about his blood pressure rising. We can verify whether or not his blood pressure is rising and whether he is right or wrong about that. What we cannot verify is whether he has correctly identified the sensation that he associates with his rising blood pressure. If he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, then it makes no difference whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not.

When he identifies the sensation correctly, he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, so the association between the sensation and his blood pressure holds true. But when he does not identify the sensation correctly, then he still marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is still measured as rising. In other words, he was correct about his blood pressure rising even though he misidentified the sensation. Therefore. it makes no difference to the correct use of "S" whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not. (This explains the 'mere ornament in the machine' metaphor.)

But, of course, it does make a difference to the use of "S" whether his blood pressure is measured as rising or falling, because then we have a criterion of correctness and can say whether or not his use of "S" was correct.

This might now lead you to question whether "S" actually refers to a sensation at all. Wittgenstein is well aware of this and invites the question: — Luke

None of this is at all relevant to the text. It's all your imagination, based on your assumption of a public verification, which is so obviously not what is described at 270. What is described is that the person can say 'my blood pressure is rising' "without using any apparatus". There is no comparison between the person saying "my blood pressure is rising" and the readings of the machine described. What is described is that the person says "my blood pressure is rising' without any machine.

This is inconsistent with the scenario at 270 where he discovers from experience that whenever he has a particular sensation, a manometer shows that his blood pressure is rising. How can he discover this association from experience if he can't know the particular sensation called "S"? — Luke

We've been through this already, you're not paying attention.

At 258 he says that whatever is going to seem right to the private linguist is right. This means that we public linguists cannot talk about either "right" or "wrong" here (in the public sense of these words). — Luke

That's not what is written. He said "here we can't talk about 'right'". He does not say neither right nor wrong. Then, at 269, he provides a description of a "private language" which has the person " attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one." This "private language" at 269 is completely consistent with what is described at 258. At 269, the person attaches a meaning to the words, but a meaning other than 'the right meaning', because there is no such thing as "the right" meaning here, as explained at 258.

Almost all of your post consists of you persistently insisting that Wittgenstein wrote something different than he did.

At 269 we can talk about "wrong" and "right", because Wittgenstein is using these words in the public sense. A person attaches a meaning to a word, "but not the right one". The judgment that the person attaches the wrong meaning to the word is based on their publicly observable behaviour. Wittgenstein tells us that "one might speak of a subjective understanding" in this case. And what might be called a "private language" are "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’". — Luke

Right, now do you agree that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243.

Further, do you see that the "private language" referred to at 269 is completely consistent with the example at 258, while the "private language" referred to at 243 is not consistent with the example at 258?

That the person knows when their blood pressure is rising is not ruled out as impossible at 270. In fact, it's how the meaning of "S" was supposedly established in the first place. Once again: — Luke

The "correct" meaning of "S" is not established by the manometer, that's what Wittgenstein is explaining. That "S" means "my blood pressure is rising", is the "subjective understanding". The person thinks that they understand the meaning of "S", with reference to the manometer, but they really do not. The person has found a use, and therefore meaning, but it is not "the right meaning". It is the subjective understanding which is described at 269, as a "private language". The person appears to understand, having associated S with a meaning, but the meaning is not the right meaning.

The right meaning is that "S" is the name of "a sensation". As described at the end of 270, "S" is associated with a particular "sensation". And "sensation" is a public term, so the person must turn to the public language, justify that the thing referred to with "S" is actually "a sensation", as described (260-261), in order to understand the "right" meaning of "S"


I agree with you on that point, Wittgenstein is rejecting that subjective sense of "know", in favour of a criterion based, epistemological standard for "know". This is why the "private language" described at 243 has the speaker of the language knowing what the words refer to. And when this "private language" is shown to be incoherent at 258, because the speaker is lacking the required criterion for knowing, he proposes a different sort of "private language", at 269, one in which the speaker of the language has a "subjective understanding" of the words, rather than knowing them.

But I think of espousing more as trying to force your views on others in a way that is unreasonable. — apokrisis

Espousal does not require unreasonableness. But if the view espoused is unreasonable, that's another matter.

The only use "S" has at 270 is public. — Luke

This is such a blatant misreading, I think it must be intentional. "I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus" is very clearly a private purpose. Whether he has a public audience when he says "my blood pressure is rising", is completely irrelevant to this use. And, as he describes, if there was a public audience, they would have no way of knowing if he was getting it wrong (which would always be the case, as per269, because he doesn't "know"), and it would be as if the machine (being replaced by him now) is just for show, not even turned on. This is an example of the "subjective understanding" described at 269, he would appear like he knew when his pressure was rising, but he really didn't, because he really can't know the sensation called "S", as described at 258.

It's not my public verification; it's the manometer's. — Luke

There is no discussion of a "public verification" at 270, there is the exact opposite. After the diarist discovers, for himself (privately), with the use of a manometer, that the sensation coincides with a rise in blood pressure, he starts to say "my blood pressure is rising" instead of "S". He does this without the use of the machine. So there is no public verification. Now, his use of "my blood pressure is rising" is equivalent to his use of "S" at 258, and there is equally no such thing as "right" here. So he is just pretending to know when his blood pressure is rising, as described at 270, and this is an example of "subjective understanding" (269), what Wittgenstein describes as "...'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word but not the right one.".

If the use described at 270 were purely private, then there could be no possibility of error. As 258 tells us, a private language has no criterion of correctness and whatever seems right to the private linguist is right. — Luke

Again this is a blatant, apparently intentional, misreading, to support a completely wrong interpretation. What Wittgenstein concludes at 258 is not as you claim, "there could be no possibility of error", it is "And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'."

Your conclusion "no possibility of error" implies 'always right', which is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's conclusion "here we can't talk about 'right'", which implies 'always wrong".

That the use of "S" is always wrong is the basis for the description of "subjective understanding" at 269, "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". It is only by this conclusion of "always wrong", that Wittgenstein can say that the user of the "private language" (as per the description at 269), associates a meaning which is "not the right one".

I must have missed it. Could you explain it? — Luke

There, I explained it above, ruminate on that for a while. You clearly do not understand 270 because you think that the manometer serves as a public verification, when it does not. it just provides a private use. or a meaning for the private language user. The meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising". But as described, it is a subjective understanding, and therefore "not the right" meaning.

How can the private linguist misidentify their sensation? What criterion of correctness is there? Whatever is going to seem right is right. — Luke

It is what is concluded at 258, "here we can't talk about right". When "right" is ruled out, we're left with necessarily wrong. And that's the basis of the second option at 269 "thinking he understands", which "might be called a 'private language'"

If the person doesn't really know what they are doing, then - contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario - are they not really able to say that their blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus? — Luke

It's not "contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario, it is the exact scenario. The person clearly does not know when their blood pressure is rising, it's all just a show, a pretense. It appears as if the person knows when his blood pressure is rising but he does not, as 269 explains. The possibility that he "make a mistake" is excluded because he's not even doing what he appears, or pretends to be doing (determining when his blood pressure is rising) to begin with. It's a completely mistaken scenario, as if the machine is not even turned on. The machine cannot make a mistake if it's not even turned on. But pretending that it is turned on when it is not creates what is necessarily wrong, as in, 'we can't talk about the machine being right here'.

And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have
recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly
identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews
that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were
turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part
of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the
mechanism at all.)

Now, let's get to the real issue, of disagreement between us. Do you apprehend that "private language" at 269 refers to something completely different from "private language" at 243?

The person does not "develop a use for "S"". Wittgenstein asks us to imagine this development, but upon closer inspection, this development cannot get off the ground. — Luke

Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use.

At 258, he notes that "S" cannot be defined. However, he tries to give himself a "kind of ostensive definition" by "concentrating [his] attention on the sensation" while he writes the sign down. But this is problematic: — Luke

The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between us here. That's why the demonstration at 258 does not qualify as a "private language" as described at 243. However, it does qualify as a "private language" as described at 269, where it is not required that the meaning is known. It is only required that the word has a use, as developed at 270.

Where we seem to disagree is whether "S" can have a use when its meaning is not known. You do not seem to be able to grasp this fact of language, that people sometimes use words when they do not know the meaning of them.

Wittgenstein tells us at 258 that he cannot commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation because there is no criterion of correctness here. If he cannot commit the connection to memory, then no use for "S" can be developed. Therefore. "S" cannot refer to anything. — Luke

You are distorting what Wittgenstein wrote with your habitual misreading. He did not say that "S" cannot refer to anything, nor did he demonstrate that, and it is an invalid conclusion on your part. Every time he writes "S" in the book, it refers to something. That it might refer to something different every time he uses it does not negate the fact that it refers to something each time. He said "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".

We have now uncovered a second sense of ambiguity, distinct from the other sense we discussed. What we discussed was using a word once, to imply possible different meanings, like your example of "bank". Now we have using a word numerous times "S" in the example at 258, each time potentially referring to something different.

This is what has happened with Wittgenstein's use of "private language". At 243 it refers to one thing, then at 269 it refers to something different.

You are still presupposing that the symbols can refer. You are missing the fact that a use for "S" cannot be developed. — Luke

This is simply incorrect. And that's very obvious. The symbol "S" does refer, and a use is developed, despite the fact that the use is described as "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".

I quoted the SEP article regarding 269 and 270 the other day, if you'd care to read it. — Luke

Sorry, I'm not interested in secondary sources, and appeals to authority. The only authority here is Wittgenstein's writing itself.

S" is said to signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Whether one's blood pressure is actually rising (or has actually risen) is something that can be publicly verified with a manometer.
...

Either way, "S" cannot be a private sign. — Luke

Regardless of what you got from SEP, the use described at 270 is purely private. "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." That's a private use, he is describing, regardless of how you depict as "something that can be publicly verified". It cannot necesaarily be publicly verified because the public, just like the private language user has no criterion as to whether he has the "correct" sensation. The manometer will say whether the blood pressure rises, but the private language user could say whatever he wants, refusing to cooperate with your proposed public verification. Therefore the use described at 270 is purely private.

Do you accept that "private language" as described at 269, is completely different from "private language" as described at 243?

What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it? — Luke

Obviously, that's what is explained at 270. Something like the manometer would serve that purpose. "Subjective understanding" is use for a purpose. "Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. " For the person using "S" there is purpose and use, for the public it is pure show, it appears like the person knows what he is doing. Neither of these justify "the person knows what he is doing".

As a member of the Academy, Aristotle was in a position to know what the general view, including Plato’s own, was, and he clearly agrees with Plato that there are Forms of natural objects but not of artifacts: — Apollodorus

Aristotle makes a separation between "Platonists", and "Plato". I even saw at one point where he referred to. "some Platonists". Your quotes are quite questionable. Perhaps you could find the place in Phaedo which Aristotle refers to? My footnote says 100d, but I didn't find it.

Perhaps Aristotle is referring to the fact that Plato posited Forms for qualities, like Beauty and Just, not for particular things like a house or a ring. That of course was the big issue for Aristotle, particular things have substance, yet Platonists claimed Forms (as universals) were the the cause of substance. So there is a gap to bridge here.

This presupposes that the words have an established (private) use — Luke

No it doesn't presuppose any such thing, it is the example at 258, where the person is establishing a use for the sign "S". The person privately develops a use for "S" without knowing what "S" refers to.

This is no different for the purported "other" private language at 269. — Luke

Right, they are the very same thing. But "private language" as described at 243 requires that the person knows what the symbols refer to (that's one of the conditions). So the example at 258 does not qualify as a private language because the person doesn't know what the symbol "S" refers to. Yet the description at 269, which is not different from the example at 258, is called a "private language". That's because Wittgenstein offers two distinct meanings for "private language", one at 243, the other at 269.

"S" cannot have a usage because there is no criterion of correctness. — Luke

But usage is not excluded from "S". That's what Wittgenstein demonstrates(270). Even when the person does not know what the symbol "S" refers to, there may still be a use for "S". After he dismisses the requirement that the person "knows" what "S" refers to, in order for "S" to be useful, the "private language", under the new description, is a reality.

Does "subjective understanding" qualify as understanding? Because you are claiming that a person can have a private language which they do not understand. — Luke

No, "subjective understanding", as Wittgenstein uses it does not qualify as understanding, it might make the person "appear to understand" though. He describes it as "attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one". A good example of "subjective understanding" is your supposed "understanding" of Wittgenstein's "private language".

ed.: Just so that you don't take this as an insult, there is no "correct" understanding of Wittgenstein's "private language". Because of the two descriptions, it is ambiguous, so there is no "correct understanding".

How is it "fully coherent" that there can be a speaker of a private language who does not understand, know, or speak his own private language? — Luke

Of course the person speaks the private language, he just does not understand or "know" it. That's what's exemplified at 258. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'". See, the person has a use for "S", and uses "S", but it cannot be the "correct" use of "S", because there is no such thing as the correct use of "S". So the diarist has a "subjective understanding" of what "S" refers to, meaning that he might appear like he understands the meaning of "S", but what he is thinking is the meaning cannot be "the right" meaning, so he really doesn't understand.

What Wittgenstein calls a language-game includes "the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven". As I said, you cannot have a language-game without a language. — Luke

That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts which make up the whole, go by the same name (language-game).

How does this "condition" make it incoherent? — Luke

We went through this already. As demonstrated at 258, there is no criterion of correctness, no "right" here, so the condition, that what the words refer to is "known" by the speaker, is necessarily violated. It is logically impossible, by the principles employed by Wittgenstein, that the speaker knows what the words refer to. This makes the "private language", as described at 243, incoherent.

Appearances can be deceiving. What is it that he appears to understand? Wittgenstein tells us at 269 that the alleged private linguist is "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". Doesn't this imply that he does not understand the meaning of the word? To paraphrase 246, if we are using the word “understand” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then this person does not understand the meaning of the word. It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke

Yes, all of this I agree with. Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258 that the diarist does not know or understand one's own usage of the symbol "S". That is what is intended with "I have no criterion of correctness".

Remember the example I gave, when I see someone with the same hat as me. I judge it as "the same" the moment I apprehend it, without applying any criteria. At that moment when I see it and judge it as 'the same" I cannot say that "I know" the hat is the same as mine, nor can I say that "I understand" why I judge it as the same as mine, it simply appears to me to be the same, so I judge it as the same.

It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke

Now, what makes the private language described at 243 incoherent, is the condition that the speaker must know what the words refer to. So, if you take this sentence and remove "or to know" as a requirement, then we can also remove "not" from in front of "coherent". So we are left with "It is coherent for a person to have a private language which they do not understand.

That, "the private language which they do not understand", I tell you, is the "private language" presented at 269. This is a fully coherent "private language" (if we overlook Wittgenstein's problematic definition of "language" referred to above, which is really not relevant at this point)), in which the speaker might "appear to understand" the use of the words, through some form of "subjective understanding", which does not qualify as "knowing".

Do you consider there to be a difference between having and knowing a language? — Luke

Of course there is a difference between having and knowing a language. There is a huge difference between having a capacity, and knowing the capacity which you have. But of course there are many different definitions of "know", and one might make "knowing" synonymous with "having", in the case of language. And this would not be the sense of "knowing" which Wittgenstein employs because each time a person who has, (and "knows", if it is supposed to be synonymous with having) a language, yet incorrectly uses a word, we'd have the contradiction of the person both knowing and not knowing the same language at the same time. You might see that this also could be a feature of the incoherent definition of "language" that you insist on above, which produces a fallacy of composition.

Nah, he's talking about the same private language throughout. — Luke

How can you not see the inconsistency of "private language" between 243 and 269? At 243, what the words refer to, is "known" to the speaker of the language. At 269 the speaker of the private language has a "subjective understanding", which causes him to "appear to understand" what the words refer to. Surely you will not insist that these two are "the same".

Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts. — Luke

Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what the words refer to. If we remove that condition, as Wittgenstein does at 269, and replace it with the condition that the speaker has a "subjective understanding", or might merely "appear to understand" what the words refer to in a private language, then "private language" is no longer incoherent.

In this latter case, "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”." But that does not mean that it is a private language (or any language). — Luke

What kind of nonsense is this? Of course it is not a "private language" as described at 243, but now Wittgenstein has decided to call something else a "private language". Do you remember or discussion about ambiguity? If "private language" is intentionally used ambiguously, then its meaning is ambiguous. We cannot say that either the first or the second "private language: is "the private language" intended by Wittgenstein, the meaning is left ambiguous.

(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".

How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)? — Luke

You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way.

Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language. — Luke

Where's your proof of this? If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language.

It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation." — Luke

It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example.

The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language? — Luke

Have you read 269 yet. I keep referring to it, and you refuse to acknowledge it, insisting that we must understand what "private language" at 243 means first. But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. The definition at 243 has been demonstrated as incoherent because the person cannot "know" what the words refer to. So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243.

You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist. — Luke

Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist.

So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for? — Luke

Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you.

There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation. — Luke

Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"?