That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time. — Janus

OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already.

If coming into, and going out of ,the conscious mind, is what constitutes the beginning and ending of an instance of sensation, then why do I say that I have the same toothache when I wake up in the morning, as when I went to sleep? In reality, we do not judge a sensation as "the same", based on a judgement of "an instance", we judge it as "the same" based on a description of type.

The issue is even more pronounced and significant when we consider other types of inner experiences like memories and ideas. We designate it "the same memory", and "the same number two", no matter how many different times it comes in and out of the conscious mind. So why is there a double standard with respect to what constitutes "the same" inner experience? In the case of "a sensation", one might say that it is "the same" sensation for the length of its continuous duration in the conscious mind, whereas in the case of "a memory", or "an idea", we say that it is "the same" memory, or idea, no matter how many different times it come in and out of the conscious mind.

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

Well, you'd have to demonstrate that, if you really think it's true, because I think the evidence demonstrates that this is clearly false. That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain".

I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". — Luke

You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type" then I suggest we need something other than types and tokens, to account for all the times when we are talking about type-like things (like sensations for example), which are not "types" according to what you say types are, as agreed upon definitions or use.

he word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. — Luke

No it doesn't, because "sensation" has many different meanings or definitions. What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. Now, when you say that pain is a sensation, you conflate the object of the sensation with the act of sensing, to say that the act of sensing, "the sensation" (the pain) is itself the object of sensation. So you have no separation between the object being sensed, (which might be pain or something completely different), and the act of sensing which produces the sensation. Therefore you use "pain" to refer to a complexity which is both the object sensed, and the act of sensing it. This conflation which unites a passive object with an act, is just a confusion, a misunderstanding, which cannot have a token.

I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic: — Luke

Uh, I beg to differ. Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. And that's the issue at 258, the problem he alluded to at 244, what does it mean to name a sensation. If sensations like pain exist as tokens, we ought to be able to name them, like applying a proper noun "S" for example, such that we might be able to distinguish one sensation from another, like we would distinguish one chair from another. Of course, the problem becomes evident, that sensations do not exists as things, (or tokens), which we can name with a proper noun.

.

He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S". — Luke

There is no problem with the words "sensation" and "pain", because they refer to what you call types. The problem is in the attempt to name a particular instance of sensation (what you call a token), with a proper name like "S". Then there is an issue of distinguishing the supposed particular sensation, which is to be named with "S", from all other sensation. Since sensation is something inner, "private", there is no criterion for this naming process, because a criterion, or rule, by Wittgenstein's definition is necessarily public.

So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state, it is with the assumption of a private object, thing, (what you call a token), which is supposedly named with that sign "S". The issue is not a problem with private symbols, or words. There is no problem there, someone could make up private symbols for things, and not tell anyone else, that's simple. The problem is with the supposed thing named by the symbols, being something private, "inner experience", "sensation". The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified.

That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning? — Luke

The problem is with your misreading, and misunderstanding. You refuse to acknowledge that when Wittgenstein talks about "a sensation", and "the sensation", he is proposing a particular thing (a token) to be named with the name "S" as a proper noun. The public use of "sensation" is to refer to a type-like thing, whereas "S" is proposed as referring to a token-like thing. What reason do we have for saying that "S" refers to a token of that type, "sensation"?

If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word. — Luke

Right, Wittgenstein is trying to draw our attention to this type of usage, which he has said is an illness which needs philosophical treatment (254-255). People like you insist on taking the so-called PLA out of its proper context, to propose that its purpose is something else. What Wittgenstein is demonstrating is the reality of the situation, what you describe with: "there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type". That is the reality. But this reality is completely different from, even contradictory to, how we commonly use words. This is an illness which requires philosophical treatment. We cannot change the reality, only our usage of words.

Why should religious/spiritual people hold the philosophical community as authoritative over the religious/spiritual community? — baker

I was talking about something philosophical, understanding the existence of a cause which is unobservable, through observation of its effects, with the application of logic. You came and tried to change the subject, by describing the unobservable cause as something spiritual, implying that it could not be understood through the means that I presented.

Now you are trying to equate "religious" with "spiritual" in an attempt to exclude the philosophical aspects of religion, from religion, and claim that philosophy has no place in religion. Obviously you are wrong though and I have no need to present an argument for that, because it's so obvious to anyone who knows anything about religion. Your writing just appears as absurd, and undeserving of a response.

Do you feel the need to demonstrate to the religious/spiritual people that you are right? — baker

No, you changed the subject on me because you were unhappy with what I was talking about. I suppose you felt threatened by the truth. I would like to get back to the subject I was discussing, but since you refuse to go there, I'm content to simply point out where you are wrong.

A) The One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the cause of everything else.
(B) There are only two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause.
(C) There is a material principle called the “Great and Small” and an essence or formal principle called “the One”.
(D) The “Great and Small” or “Dyad” is traditionally identified with what is elsewhere called the “Unlimited and Limit” and with the One.
(E) Therefore the One is the ultimate cause of everything.

The mainstream Platonic position is that: (1) there is a first principle of all and (2) Plato reduces sensibles to Forms and Forms to a first principle called “the Good” or “the One”. — Apollodorus

According to Aristotle, at your quoted passage, Plato differentiated between three categories, sensible things, Forms, and numbers. Numbers come from participation in "the One". But Forms are prior to Number, as Number is the medium between Forms and sensible things.

You have the order reversed, putting One, and therefore Number first, as prior to the Forms. But that's the way Aristotle describes the Pythagoreans, as saying that all things are Number. But he distinctly says that Plato differs from the Pythagoreans in this respect, placing Forms as prior, (being based in definition). The One, and Numbers, follow from the Forms, and finally sensible things.

[quote} Further, beside sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position...
..
...by participation in the One come the numbers"

I understand that "the One" in Plato, refers to a type of Form which is responsible for the existence of numbers. But "the One" is not necessarily the first principle, or first Form. For that position we must look to "the Good".

So, to begin with, I think it is reasonable to regard the Creator-God as a form of Intelligence. And since he creates the Cosmos from the Same, Other, and Being, and according to certain eternal patterns such as Goodness, Order, and Beauty, it stands to reason that these patterns or Forms are within this very Intelligence itself. — Apollodorus

I agree that from Plato's metaphysics we'd have to go this way. But I was saying that this does not make sense to me, for the reasons explained, so I would not follow Plato at this point.

(A) The Creator-God is above the Cosmos.
(B) The One/the Good is above the Creator-God.
(C) The One is the first principle and cause of all.
(D) Therefore the Creator-God is a manifestation of the One. — Apollodorus

Placing the One as the first principle is inconsistent with the passage from Aristotle. Aristotle describes Plato as positing the One as the first principle of Number, but Number is in a place intermediate between the Forms and sensible things. So the Forms are prior to the One, and Number.

Of course, it is arguable that the One being ineffable, unfathomable, and above Being, the designation “the Good” is, strictly speaking, inappropriate for it and that the One becomes “the Good” only in relation to Being and Becoming. In this sense, the Good may logically be said to be subordinate to the One. Ultimately, however, the two are one and the same thing. — Apollodorus

The One, is a Form. And it is the cause of Number. But the good is not itself a Form. It transcends the Forms, as described in The Republic. The good is what makes the intelligible objects intelligible, as the light which shines on them. Therefore the good is prior to all Forms.

Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. — Luke

That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible.

You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category. — Luke

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms.

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to. — Luke

No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. A type is not a token. "Mustang", as a type of car is not a token of the type, "car", it's a subtype. A particular Mustang, or any particular car is a token of the type "car". But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. So it cannot have an identity as a particular, because there can be no correctness in identifying it.. Therefore "a sensation" cannot correctly be used to refer to a token. If you insist on that type/token dichotomy, then it must always refers to a type.

If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has
something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens.

Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer? — Janus

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment.

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token". — Luke

Sorry Luke, I can't demonstrate to you, the way that you are using a word. If you can't remember, reread the posts.

There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". — Luke

No, there are many different types of pain.

Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang". — Luke

There are many different types of Ford Mustangs.

We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain". — Luke

That's obviously not true. The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding.

In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". — Luke

Again this is obviously false, as a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. "Pain" is described in many different ways, sharp, ache, throb, etc., each referring to a different type of pain. That we have different types of pain does not imply that one type is not "pain", this is like suggesting that if we had different different "types", one could not be called a type. But that denies the whole point of having different types, which is to allow that a class can be divided into subclasses.

Moreover, you cannot have a type. — Luke

This is what is nonsense. If I can't have a type, then neither can you. And if no one can have a type, then where are all the types? Are they existing in a Platonic realm of eternal Forms?

Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language. — Luke

Right, now maybe you're catching on. When I apply "pain" to refer to an inner experience, what we've been calling a "sensation", I might follow some sort of criterion. Use of the criterion ensures the appropriate classification as to the appropriate "type.". However, nothing indicates that whatever it is which I "have", is a token. I might simply have a type, which I class as a subtype, by placing it into the proper category, through reference to the criterion.

Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. We further divide to another type, the one specified by the diarist as "S". Each division produces a new type, and at no point is a token produced. Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. Whenever criteria is applied we simply divide the established type into a further type, coming up with a new type, but never defining "a token".

There is no need to explicitly mention the One everywhere. The point is to follow the logical process suggested in the dialogues. Once a principle of inquiry has been established that reduces everything to a first principle, then we must logically arrive at an irreducible One. Of course, we are under no obligation to do so. It is a matter of personal choice. — Apollodorus

OK, so you define "the One" with "first principle", so that passages which are translated with the use of "first principle", you interpret as "the One".

A beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre are beautiful by reason of their co-having, having a share, or participating in the Beautiful (or Beauty) itself (Hipp. Maj. 287e-289d).

The girl, horse, and lyre are things that participate; beauty is the property or attribute they participate in; Beauty itself is the unparticipated, transcendent Form to which the property or attribute properly belongs. — Apollodorus

Why do you first say here, that they are participating in Beauty itself, then you say Beauty itself is the unparticipated?

Plato distinguishes between a property, e.g. Beauty, “itself” (auto to kalon), and beauty in beautiful things or in us (en hemin kalon) (Phaedo 102d). Beauty itself is perfect, eternal, transcendent and “unparticipated”. It cannot be co-had. What is co-had is an imperfect, transient, immanent and “participated” or “shared in” version or likeness (homoiotes) of Beauty, also referred to as “enmattered form” (enulon eidos). — Apollodorus

I disagree with this. I think it's very clear in The Symposium that the Idea of Beauty, which is Beauty itself, is participated in. And I can't find your reference in Phaedo. In any case, this discrepancy points to the problems of the theory of participation which I described earlier.

Personally, I see the One as not comparable to a particular sensible object. To begin with, it is not an instance of a universal. So it is not a particular. :smile: — Apollodorus

A particular is not necessarily an instance of a universal. That is the conclusion of a judgement

Don't worry, you'll know where it is as soon as I start smashing your hand with that hammer. — Olivier5

All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there.

I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens". — Luke

That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token.

That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it. — Luke

We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". There is consistency between my usage and your usage due to our outward expressions, as Wittgenstein explains, how we all justify our use of "pain". There is absolutely no need to assume the existence of tokens of pain.

The consistency in our usage is not produced from tokens, examples of the pain itself, it is produced from our outward expressions which are not themselves tokens of the type, but they represent the type in a way other than the way that a token represents the type. So the type is recognized and understood through means other than tokens (examples). And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. To be a token of pain would require that the sensation conform to some criterion of correctness. Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain..

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself? — Luke

I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token".

Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying: — Luke

I am not discussing Wittgenstein's expressed point of view on this matter, we are discussing whether sensations can be considered to be tokens. And I often doubt whether some of my sensations ought to be called "pain" or not. That's a common experience for me.

Also, I don't see how the comments at 250 are relevant to the argument I made . You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. I don't see how the question of whether a dog could perform such a pretense is relevant.

Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? — Luke

Why would I think that? How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? Are you simply writing this as an intentional distraction? You can use the dog as a token of a dog, but how do you use a dog as a token of pain?

I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist? — Luke

I can't understand this contradictory mess. You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private.

Wittgenstein clearly indicates at 253, in what sense you and I can be said to have the "same" pain. Read it again, before you continue to insist on what Wittgenstein is saying. If your pain and my pain are distinct, as two distinct chairs are, but are of the same type (to use your word "type", not Wittgenstein's who says "exactly the same as"), then in this sense of "same", you and I might have the "same" pain.

But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. And if we want to talk about distinct pains as if they are distinct tokens, then we need to produce these tokens, lay them out on the table, or some such thing, so that we can compare them, to see if they truly are "exactly the same". If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? You are simply talking about imaginary tokens, as if they are real.

Just saying, if you want a token of pain, just give me your hand and a hammer. I can easily combine those two things in a manner that will produce a token of pain for you. — Olivier5

i don't see how you could produce a token of pain with a token of hammer and a token of hand. You could create a token of 'damaged hand', or 'injured hand', but where's the token of pain?

And you have not read the Catechism of the RCC, I presume?

And look, even in the passage you quote, it is said first: "Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us."

Aquinas assumes the existence of God can be self-evident to us. Making inferences based on His effects is only a secondary epistemic method. — baker

Aquinas might have thought that the existence of God "can be "self-evident", but he explicitly said, "in so far as it is not".

I think you misunderstood me baker. I did not deny that a person could have a personal relation with God, I denied that this could be called "knowledge" of God, because knowledge requires justification. That you claim "the existence of God is self-evident" does not make it self-evident.

You keep insisting on approaching the topic of knowing God on your own terms that are extraneous to monotheism (and you interpret standard monotheistic references to suit this agenda of yours). — baker

It's not strictly "my terms". It's what's accepted in the philosophical community, as specified by epistemology. Knowledge requires justification. You can't just say "I know God because I talk to Him every night". Such a use of "know" is unacceptable by epistemological standards. So in reality, it's you who is relying on idiosyncratic use of words. Your use of "know" is not consistent with philosophical standards.

I'm just trying to get you to see the disjoint between the way you think and the way others think. And simply insisting that your way is right doesn't get you anywhere because you need to demonstrate that you are right. Of course, if what you are insisting on is that you do not need to demonstrate what you are insisting on, then you have a problem.

Correct. “Intellect” means the Divine Intellect. The Divine Intellect contains the Forms, the human intellect thinks or philosophizes about the Forms (until it has elevated itself to a level from where it can directly grasp or “see” them). The Forms are independent of human intellects but dependent on the Divine Intellect of which they are a part. The Creator-God who creates the Cosmos is the Divine Intellect. — Apollodorus

Here's the problem I have with these principles. The "intellect" which we know about is the human intellect. And this intellect is a property, or attribute of the soul. The human intellect is deficient in its capacities because of the soul's union with the material body, as explained by Aquinas. But there is also a need to account for the reality of the independent Forms, as we've discussed.

The question is, why would we assume an "intellect" to account for the independent Forms? The "intellect" as we know it is something which follows from the soul's union with the material body, it's posterior to that union, and dependent on it, but here we are talking about "Forms" which are prior to the soul's union with a material body. So why would we think that this is a type of "intellect"? When we look back in time this way, we see the soul as prior to the intellect, and we see that the soul somehow takes part in the independent Forms. To move further, and look to see what supports the independent Forms, why would we turn back around, to look toward an "intellect", when "intellect" refers to something posterior to the soul, not prior to it?

Individual human souls are each endowed with an intellect (nous) of its own that contains something of the Divine Intellect within it. — Apollodorus

So this doesn't really make sense to me. The human soul has an intellect as an attribute. And the human soul has a connection to something Divine, the independent Forms. We might even say that the soul uses the intellect as a means toward understanding the Forms. But the connection is between the soul and the Forms, not the intellect and the Forms, and this is why the Forms are so hard for the intellect to understand. Furthermore, the intellect creates its own forms, which are categorically different from the independent Forms, and since they both have the same name "forms", this confuses the matter. So as much as the human soul has a direct connection to, or relation with, something Divine, which we call "Forms", I don't think it's correct to call this Divine reality an "intellect".

If we look at some of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s teachings, it can immediately be seen that they make no sense. — Apollodorus

I wouldn't say this. I would say that it takes a lot of work to understand Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, but once the effort has been made they make a lot of sense. For me, it required a lot of reading of Thomas Aquinas, someone who made that effort. Then I had to return to Aristotle to reread and confirm that Aquinas' interpretations actually were consistent with Aristotle's words in context, and in some instances right back to Plato.

The problem is that the idea of independent Forms was a new idea at Plato's time, so it was very confused and not well worked out. Prior to Plato there was an idea of an independent soul, which was supposed to be immortal. But the immortal soul needed logical support (substance), and this was proposed with eternal "Forms". But the issue was very confused by the fact that human ideas, "forms" are not eternal. So now there was two distinct types of ideas, human ideas, dependent on human minds, and independent ideas which are supposed to be eternal. This is what Aristotle describes in the passage from 1033 which you refer to. Independent forms are the forms of particulars, and if independent "Forms" are supposed to be something other than particulars, these "Forms" cannot account for the reality of particular things.

And Plato is not particularly interested in particulars. What counts in the Platonic project is the Absolute or the One. — Apollodorus

Don't you see this as a contradiction? The "One" by the fact that it is one, is a particular. So to say that Plato was interested in the One, but had no interest in particulars cannot be true.

This is entirely possible. There is some evidence to suggest that under Arcesilaus and others the Academy took a turn in the direction of skepticism. This does not necessarily mean that Plato himself was a skeptic, though. Only that his school went through a period of skepticism. — Apollodorus

The character in Plato's dialogues named Socrates, was definitely a skeptic.

For obvious reasons, Plato cannot be expected to give a detailed account of the One, and he tends to refer to it indirectly, using the language of analogy and myth. His intention is not to provide his readers with an exact description of the One, but to point them in its direction. Still, I believe that he provides sufficient information for us to form a fairly clear idea of what he is talking about. — Apollodorus

There are two very distinct meanings of "one", as the first in an order or hierarchy, and as a unit, particular, a whole, or individual.

1. The One is the First Principle which is “beyond being” and “beyond essence”.
The One cannot be many (Parm. 137c).
The One is without parts, without beginning or end, unlimited, formless, etc. (Parm. 137d-e). — Apollodorus

Here, the two are conflated, and called the One.

2. The Good is One over many Forms (Analogy of the Sun) and beyond being. Therefore it must be fully real and creative (Rep. 509b).
The Forms are good in virtue of the Form of the Good.
Plato predicates “good” and “one” of all the Forms.
Therefore the Good is the One. — Apollodorus

Plato does not equate "the good" with "the One" at this point in The Republic. There is no mention of "the One". That's a blatant misrepresentation.

This is entirely consistent with the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysical system. Plato says that whenever inquiring into intelligible things (e.g., Forms), the philosopher must always rise to the first principle (arche) and apprehend everything in conjunction with that. He reduces the Forms to the transcendent first principle of the One and then deduces all things from that (Rep. 511b-d). — Apollodorus

Nor is there any mention of "the One" here.

You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it.


Yeah, I'm masochist and Luke readily submits to my desires. But Luke only submits because he thinks I'm feeling pain, when I'm really feeling pleasure.

I claim to be in pain. Yet the question remains, either I have pain or I don't. Where do you think the token is? My claim is not the token.

I guess this is all you have left to say. — Luke

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain which you seem to believe is so real.

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"? — Luke

Yes, my pains are not instances nor examples.

Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. — Luke

Perhaps I am lying. How would you know?

And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false. — Luke

This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token..

But in my example, you would have sympathy (feel sorry) for these "animals", not because they are a dumb flock, but because they are unaware of their fate. So it's that particular aspect of their "dumbness", that something is going to happen to them, which they are unaware of, but you know about, which makes you feel sorry for them.

Sure. But I’m not saying that Forms are “at rest”. On the contrary, Forms seem to be nothing more than a particular function of intelligence (in which case they are not separable from the Intellect within which they have their existence). And, personally, I find the idea of “motionless intelligence” hard to imagine, a bit like “dead soul”, really.

At the same time, as I pointed out earlier, something that is outside the spacio-temporal realm cannot be susceptible to either rest or motion in a conventional sense. Presumably, there is some form of "activity", but it wouldn’t be what we normally understand by that term.

In any case, Forms and Intellect seem to stand in a relation of cognitive identity to one another. At the end of the day, Forms are not ultimate realities and they depend on an ultimate principle. They have no separate existence. — Apollodorus

For the sake of argument, I'll assume that forms are dependent on an intellect for their existence, and cannot be separate. You know that's problematic, because each individual person has one's own intellect, therefore one's own forms, which are proper to one's own understanding of things, and so we have no "Forms", the capitalization signifying something independent from individuals, and proper to humanity as a whole.

From this principle you propose, we have no unified human "body of knowledge", only the knowledge which each individual has. Furthermore, the communication of ideas becomes a very difficult problem, because we cannot say that one idea is shared between us through the means of communication. So to be consistent with what you propose, we need to deny the reality of what is represented by our common way of speaking, that we share ideas, we all have the same idea of "two", the same idea of "square", etc..

This proposal of yours, may or may not be consistent with Plato, depending on how you account for the reality of independent Forms. Plato was concerned with independent Forms, and the difficulty he approached was the effort required to bring your perspective, that forms are properly dependent on an intellect, to be compatible with the idea of independent Forms. As much as Plato elucidated this problem, and pointed the direction toward resolution, I tend to believe as Fooloso4 has said, that Plato exposed the problem, but did not resolve it.

This is why, following Plato, we have a division, the direction taken by Aristotle, and the direction taken by Platonists and finally that of Neo-Platonists. Aristotle assumed to have a solution, which involved two distinct definitions of "form". We have "form" in the sense of formula, and this is dependent on the human intellect as you say, but he also proposes that every particular thing has a "form" which is proper to the thing itself. The latter sense signifies a form which is independent from the human mind, so we could capitalize "Form" and we can conclude that if these independent Forms are dependent on an intellect.it is a divine intellect.

This is the direction Christian theology took, following Thomas Aquinas. There are two types of forms. The forms of the human intellect are deficient, because the human mind is dependent on the soul's union with the material body. This dependency on the material existence of the body inhibits our capacity to know the true form of the particular, the individual, the whole, the one. On the other hand, the separate or independent Form, which is the form of the particular, one or individual, is dependent on a divine mind of an angel, or God Himself, for its existence.

And I can see no evidence that Plato’s views on the Forms have been conclusively refuted by anyone. — Apollodorus

I don't think it is possible to conclusively refute Plato's views on Forms. This is for the reasons that Fooloso4 points to, Plato does not propose a coherent theory of Forms. He exposes problems with the theories which were current at his time, pointing to incoherencies and incompatibility with the scientific knowledge of his time, but does not propose a solution. This is why Aristotle claims to refute Pythagorean idealism, and what he calls "some Platonists". What is taken to be "Platonism", at that time, has already become divided, dependent on interpretation, and this is prior to the problem we have today with translation, which only increases the divide. One might argue that the true followers of Plato (Platonists) adopted a position of skepticism, and because of this we cannot claim that they have a "view on the Forms" to refute.

But what Plato is really saying is that the ultimate cause (aition) of the Cosmos or Universe is the One in its aspect as Creative Intelligence, but that for a more precise human understanding several causes (aitiai) are introduced. — Apollodorus

As far as I can tell, you have still not demonstrated to me, where you derive this idea from Plato, that "the One", is the creative force of the Cosmos. He refers to a divine mind, and a creator, but I don't see that it is consistently called "the One".

That is correct. I am only saying that the Forms cannot properly be said to create - in any case not on their own - as it is the Creative Intelligence which creates by means of Forms. — Apollodorus

OK, but the point that I was making was that the theory of participation proved to be inadequate because it represented the Forms as passively participated in, when in reality they are active in causation. This is relevant to what Fooloso4 was saying about Forms being eternally at rest. When Forms are understood as being passively participated in, they appear as something eternally at rest. But when they are understood as active in causation, it is impossible that they are at rest.

One way of looking at it is that Forms exist within the Intellect in which case they are inseparable from it and if they act at all, they do so in conjunction with Intellect. — Apollodorus

It is doubtful that Forms are inseparable from the intellect, in an absolute way. In the act of creation, the form which exists in the intellect comes to exist in the material object. So for example, the form which a building has, is in some way "the form", which was in the architect's vision. But here we have to be careful about the use of "same", as I explained to fooloso4. Even so, a material object has a "form" proper to itself, as stipulated by the law of identity, and it appears like that form, being the effect of the Creator's act of creation, rather than a cause in the act of creation, is independent from the Creator's intellect.

Plato mentions various types of causes, among which the primary are always associate with Intelligence: — Apollodorus

That's a very relevant passage. Notice how he says the causes which most men consider as primary (the efficient causes dealt with in science), are really secondary causes. They are secondary because they do not act with reason, like Soul does, so Soul employs these as auxiliary causes. The first causes belong to the Intelligent Nature, causing what is good, whereas accidents are attributed to the secondary type of causes

That's my interpretation, applied to the person who claims to have some knowledge of the true reality, but refuses to justify it (teach others). What Plato says is too extensive to be quoted here, but the most significant part is 519-520.

Those who have obtained the highest levels of education (ascent to the good), but do not partake in educating others (refuse to come back down to the cave), are portrayed as lazy, growing freely like a weed within a society. In such a situation these people are not inclined by any sense of duty or responsibility to teach others. If we allow those who have obtained the highest level of education into the state which we are creating, we have the right to compel them to care for, and educate the others.

Personally my sympathy has always been with those who stay in the cave. They seem content despite their chains. — Tom Storm

"Sympathy" is an odd choice of words here. "Sympathy" implies feely sorry for, as one might have sympathy for the cattle in the barnyard, who are content despite being slated for slaughter.



I conclude that you are not familiar with Christian theology then, and especially have not read Thomas Aquinas. He explicitly states (Summa Theologica, Q.2, Art.2) "Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us."

God is supposed to be known directly. — baker

Monotheists frequently demonstrate their knowledge of God with other monotheists; they form an epistemic community. — baker

These two statements directly contradict each other. Suppose I approach you, and insist "God can only be known directly". Then I say, "let me demonstrate my knowledge of God to you." Or, in the inverse order?

Plato's cave allegory. It's the part from 518-522.

No, I'm talking about divine revelation, not that "which one obtains from within", "intuition", or "mystical union". Divine revelation as in, holy scriptures. The "inner" part of all this is just the personal affirmation one feels inside that the holy scriptures are in fact the word of God. — baker

Then I think we were talking about different things, and what you said was not relevant to the point that I was making, which you replied to.

I was talking about knowing a cause (God for example), through its effects (the physical world He created). We have no capacity to directly observe the cause, but we can observe the effects, and infer the necessity of the cause. If you cannot relate to this way of knowing God, I could switch it for an example from quantum physics. Physicists assume that there is something real represented by the wave function, and they know about it from it's effects, which are observed and expressed as the existence of particles.

How can you possibly know it's pretense? — baker

Because "knowledge" in the epistemological sense is justified, and "justified" implies demonstrated, which means shared with others. So if an individual claims to know something, but what is known cannot be demonstrated, or shared with others, it is not "knowledge" in epistemology, which is where the accepted definition of "knowledge": is derived from, and it is therefore just a person claiming to have knowledge, which is not real knowledge, but a pretense.

Remember, in Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher, having seen beyond the reflections, toward understand the true reality, is compelled to return to the cave to teach the others. Without doing this educating, the person would just be someone assuming I am right about reality, and they are all wrong about reality, and such a person would not be a philosopher at all, but a poser.

I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. — Luke

I answered this. No. My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token.

You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token. — Luke

Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words..

I am not avoiding the question. I have answered it. No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance".

If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word. — Luke

Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. . — Metaphysician Undercover

The way I see it, it is not the Forms that create the material things. According to Plato, the Cosmos was created by the Creator-God by means of Forms. If the Forms were to create anything then there would be a multitude of creators and this is not what Plato is saying. — Apollodorus

To say that the Creator-God creates by means of Forms, is not to deny that the Forms are themselves active causes. In fact, the tools, in this case the Forms, must be themselves causes, or else they would have no role in the creative process. The human being creates through the means of machinery and all sorts of tools, but that does not mean that the tools are not active causes. And, if there is a multitude of tools being used, as distinct causes, this does not imply that there is more than one person using those tools.

Plato's concept of participation (metoche) is particularly enlightening. Sensible objects exist by participation in a Form's property. On this subject, Proclus distinguishes between (1) that which participates, (2) that which is participated in, and (3) that which is unparticipated.

The Form's being a Form is its being a paradeigma whose property or properties are participated in by sensible objects. In other words, a Form is the eternal paradigmatic cause of the things that are eternally constituted according to nature: — Apollodorus

This is where Neo-Platonism can become inconsistent with Aristotle. Aristotle's description necessitates that forms, and therefore Forms. are actual. And actual as active is distinct from potential, which is passive. In the theory of participation, material objects (actively) participate in the Forms, which (passively) are participated in. This problem is evident in Plotinus' description of the One. He describes the One as pure, or absolute potential, but he also says that everything else follows from the One as the cause of everything. But in Aristotle's metaphysics, pure absolute potential cannot have any actuality, and therefore cannot be the first cause (cosmological argument), a cause necessarily being active..

This is the problem with the theory of participation, as addressed in the Timaeus. Forms, as prior to the material things which follow from them in creation, must be actively involved in the act of creation, as causes. Therefore we cannot accurately describe the Forms as passively being participated in, they must be described as actively creating the material things.

As the Timaeus shows, the Form is perfect, the sensible objects fashioned after it are not so. The Form itself is the perfect paradigmatic original which is "unparticipated" and therefore transcendent. Its image, on the other hand, is an imperfect version of the perfect paradeigma or model, is "participated" and therefore immanent. — Apollodorus

This is why Christian theology has adopted a distinction, based on Aristotelian principles, between perfect independent Forms, and the forms, or ideas, created by the human mind. The latter are imperfect, being derived from, and therefore dependent on, the material existence of the human being.

I do not understand the Stranger to be saying that "proceeding by the method of division, we would take the kind, "beautiful things", and divide it into further types, bodies, souls, institutions, etc."
I realize just now that I failed to type in the full quote from the Stranger. My apologies. Let me try again: — Valentinus

As I said already, I find that passage in The Sophist to be very ambiguous and confusing, subject to many different translations. I don't think it's a good indication of what Plato says about ideas, that's why i gave what I thought was a better one, from The Symposium. I think that passage in The Sophist represents what the stranger (who is a sophistic philosopher) is saying about forms, intentionally creating ambiguity to make it look like Forms are the same thing as kinds.

So there is a limit to proper division and designating what combines into wholes. That relates to the Hippias passage of how a whole relates to the parts it unifies. Socrates distinguishes a difference between the whole and its parts. Hippias says Socrates is needlessly dividing things to say that. — Valentinus

But Socrates' point here is valid and very important. There is a fundamental difference between a part and a whole, involving dependence and independence, such that parts cannot be treated as wholes, and wholes cannot be treated as parts. This important difference is almost completely ignored in modern scientific enquiry, as atoms, electrons, protons, etc., which are fundamentally parts, get treated as wholes. But a part, by the definition of "part" is necessarily dependent on the whole which it is a part of, while a whole, by the definition of "whole", is in itself complete and independent, and cannot be a part of something else.

So in Socrates' example, if each person is "one", then they are described as independent individuals which are not part of any further whole, but are themselves, in themselves, whole.. But if two people are described as "two", then each of the two are necessarily parts of a whole. Then each , therefore, is not an independent whole, but a part. And, we cannot call each of them "one", because we'd have to call each of them "half" or something like that.

The Forms are said to be eternal and at rest. The category things that are eternal and at rest consists of Forms. — Fooloso4

This is the problem I address above, in this post. Forms are described by Plato in the Timaeus as causally active in creation. Therefore to say that Forms as conceived of By Plato, are eternal and at rest is a mistaken proposition. We must account for the reason why a thing comes into being as the very thing which it is, and not something else. The Form must be prior to the material thing and play an active, causal, role in making the thing be what it is. Therefore Forms cannot be in the category of "at rest". Forms are active causes.

Further, eternal things must be actual and therefore cannot be passive . This is what is exposed by Aristotle's cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual (Bk9,Ch8, 1050b). So Aristotle straightens out all this confusion caused by the deficiencies of the theory of participation, by placing forms in the category of active, or actual. This inclines the Christian Theologians to posit active independent Forms, like God and the angels.

First, according to your argument no two things are the same. No two dogs are the same dog, but all dogs are the same in so far as they are dogs. It is this sameness that is fundamental to Forms. To be the same does not mean to be identical. — Fooloso4

By the law of identity, "same" refers to the very same, particular thing. A thing is the same as itself. That's what "same" means by the law of identity, one and the same, no two distinct things are the same.

No two dogs are the same dog, but all dogs are the same in so far as they are dogs. It is this sameness that is fundamental to Forms. — Fooloso4

Again, I really think that this is a mistaken proposition. Any particular thing has a form unique to itself. This is what Aristotle describes with the law of identity, This form which a particular material thing has, is complete with accidentals (what the human description, using kinds, or "forms" in that sense does not include". This means there are two distinct meanings of "form", the form which a particular has, and the form which a human being attributes to the thing in description. The latter being a description of kinds. What the latter does not include is what we call accidentals. So the latter sense of "form" does not involve "sameness", it involves similarity. And "similar" indicates a type of difference, not sameness, which by the law of identity is a things relation to itself.. So "sameness" in the philosophically disciplined sense, is reserved for the former sense of "form", what an individual has unique to oneself.

You are confusing the Forms 'Rest' and 'Change' with things that are at rest or change. — Fooloso4

This is a typical example of Parmenidean sophistry. Next you will say that 'Change" is at rest, because change is some eternal unchanging form, and argue some absurdity from this contradiction.

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction. — Luke

You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language.

However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. — Luke

As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens.

I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache". — Luke

You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain.

Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind.

Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then? — Luke

You really do not understand what a token is. Suppose you name a type, "beetle", and I say, yes, I have one of those at home. The thing I have at home does not serve as an example of a type, and therefore cannot be called a "token", until it is displayed as such.. Since a token, by definition, is an example, used to demonstrate a type, anything which does not serve that purpose cannot be called a token.

This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type. So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token".

You seem to misunderstand. An expression, such as "I have a headache", is not a token of the type "pain". It is an expression, which you (mistakenly) take to represent a token. It does not represent a token, it explicitly states I have a sensation which is of the type, "headache". This is what Banno attempted to do earlier, remove the separation between the expression, and what the expression indicates, to say that the expression is the pain. But this proved to be nonsensical.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. .

I think this issue demonstrates the area where language does not serve us well, at the fringes of our knowledge. The reason for this is obvious, what we do not know, we cannot talk about. However, philosophy is the desire to know, and this desire inspires us to expand what is known, beyond the currently existing boundaries, thus expanding the evolving body knowledge.

Our knowledge of Forms is such a thing. Some participants in this thread seem to think that a Form is a kind, and I have been saying that "kinds" are the way that we divide things, and I put Forms into a different category, as something other than a group of things. Now there is a clear need to distinguish between a group of things, divided by kind, and the principle itself, which supports the division of groups of things. Without this distinction here is much ambiguity and confusion in philosophical discussions.

The issue is well exemplified, and exposed in discussions of set theory in the philosophy of mathematics, particularly in reference to "the empty set". If there is such a thing as an empty set, then "set" cannot refer to a group of things, because it's incoherent to say that there's a group of things which consists of no things. This means that in the case of the empty set, "set" must refer to the defining principle, which allows that we might define a 'type", a "kind", and talk about that that "kind", as if it is itself, some sort of "thing", independently from any members which are supposed to be of that kind. This is the only way that we can have an empty set, if the thing referred to as "the set" is something completely independent from the members which compose the set. However, we find in the philosophy of mathematics, some people will assert that "set" refers to the group of things itself, but also assert that there is such a thing as an empty set. This is incoherent.

In relation to understanding "Forms" now, if "Form" refers to the defining principle of a group of things, then we must allow that the Form is independent from the group of things, as evidenced by "the empty set". Someone might propose "a kind" which has no members of the group This makes the Form itself something which needs to be understood as something independent from the group of things which serve to exemplify it. Therefore no degree of analysis of different groups of things can give us an adequate understanding of Forms themselves. To understand Forms, we need to separate the Form from the group of things, and grasp its independent existence. If we deny that a Form is something independent from the group of things, we will never understand how it is that there could be an empty set.

No, because a token is an object which serves as an instantiation of a type. Pain is not an object, so if we use the type/token distinction it can never be other than a type. Think about it, all descriptions of pain are descriptions of a type, tooth-ache, sore toe, etc.. Even if I think about the pain I have right now in my..., it's always a type.

The very same is also true of physical objects, we describe them in words which typify them. The only reason why a physical object can be a token is because we can point to it, without describing it in words in which case the words describe a type. Then, when it's pointed to, we can see it as an example of a type. The internal sensation we cannot see, nor point to, so it cannot serve as a token of a type. Therefore if we class it by type/token distinction, it must be a type.

It is not difference that makes things similar. Things that are similar are in some way or ways the same and in others different. — Fooloso4

Each thing is different. The "way" that it is similar can be said to be "the same way", but there is no need for "same" here, there is simply a way in which they are similar. And the "way" is artificial, as what is said about the things. Therefore sameness is not part of the things themselves, but only what is said about the things which are said to be similar, in a way. However, to say that they are similar, is to say that they are different, and this is to say that they are not the same, so this is a false form of sameness, which you propose, as property of the judgement rather than property of the things, which are said to be in some way, similar. Aristotle's law of identity, on the other hand attributes true sameness to the thing itself, by saying that a thing is the same as itself. But this means that no two things are "the same", and "the same way" is a completely different meaning of "same", because a way is not a thing. It's a superfluous use of "same", which serves no meaning.,

Rather than show it is mistake to assume sameness and difference as both necessary for intelligibility, your example shows why they are necessary. — Fooloso4

No, it just demonstrates that by some corrupt and undisciplined meaning of "same" , which allows that any two things are "the same" in some way (even if just by the fact of being things), and they are therefore similar, then any two things can be said to be the same kind. This sort of ambiguity is a feature of unintelligibility rather than intelligibility.

Things can be classified according to those that are at rest and those that change. — Fooloso4

This is very obviously another feature of the unintelligible metaphysics you are promoting. Any thing can change from being at rest to being in motion at any moment. So any thing which might be classified as a thing at rest will also be classified as a thing which can change, unless that rest is eternal. Since "rest", to be distinguished from "change" requires that change is impossible, your classifications would be better stated as "eternal" and "temproal". But the classification of the eternal cannot be said to consist of "things" because no things are eternal. Therefore the category of "eternal", or "rest" cannot consist of things at rest, and the eternal cannot be a "kind", as "kinds are how we classify things. Nor can "at rest" be a kind of thing. Of course you just need to look at relativity theory to see that there is no kind of thing which is at rest.

I will have to think more about your charge of a 'category mistake' in this context. The method of division is used throughout the dialogues. Socrates has been charged numerous times for being sophistical on account of it. See the Greater Hippias at 301 for a particularly exquisite example of the style. — Valentinus

The mentioned argument in Greater Hippias is not that type of argument at all. Hippias had said that if the same thing is true of each of us, then it is true of the both of us. But Socrates demonstrates that this is not the case, because it is true that each of us is one, but also true that both of us is two.

The category error I referred to, can be understood better through the premise of The Symposium. Remember when Socrates tells about his teacher, in love, Diotima? Diotima teaches him to see beauty in all sorts of different things. First, the beauty in bodies, then the beauty in souls, then in activities, customs, laws and institutions, and finally the beauty in knowledge and wisdom.

Now, if we were proceeding by the method of division, we would take the kind, "beautiful things", and divide it into further types, bodies, souls, institutions, etc.. And of course, each of these could be divided again. The problem is that with this method we are always dealing with things, dividing them into kinds, and we do not ever approach, or apprehend the idea of beauty, or form of Beauty itself.

So the method of Diotima differs because it goes in the opposite direction from dividing, Diotima proceeds in what is called the upward direction. Instead of dividing, Socrates is taught to see that in all these different classes of things, there is one thing in common, which unites them all. This is Beauty itself. Then the "Idea", or "Form" of beauty is apprehended as what all beautiful things partake of.

This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to leraning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful — Symposium 211c

That, in itself, is a beautiful description of the method of Platonic dialectics. Dialectics, in the Platonic sense, is not a matter of dividing things into types, in a downward direction, as if we might find the Forms in that way. It is a matter of starting with particular individuals, following what they have in common, in an upward direction, until one grasps the reality of the Form itself, which accounts for the reason why they have such in common.

Understanding of the Idea itself is derived from observations of the things which partake in that Idea, but the Idea is not a thing which can be divided, like a class, or a kind is said to be divided. Socrates explains this in The Parmenides, but I don't have the reference off hand. The Idea is like the day. No matter how many different places are taking part in the day, it is never more or less than what it is, i..e. the day. Likewise, the divisions which we make of kinds, are not divisions of the Idea itself, they are divisions of the things which partake in the Idea. To say that the Idea itself is what is divided is a category mistake, the groups of things are divided.

Well, the way the world is going today, it won't be long before there's a wiki for vilified sources, (if it's not already out there). The alternative wiki, for those who don't accept the mainstream "facts".

You proposed that the Sophist was written specifically as a refutation of Parmenides. — Valentinus

No, I said that the arguments purportedly made by Parmenides, as expressed in Plato's "Parmenides", are deficient, i.e., contain category mistakes. This is consistent with what you say here:

Plato is not content with Parmenides' position either. — Valentinus

Both sameness and difference are necessary for intelligibility. — Fooloso4

It is a mistake to put sameness and difference in the same category. "Similar" is a type of difference, but "same" is fundamentally different from similar. So it is a mistake to assume sameness and difference as both necessary for intelligibility. Sameness, when analyzed, is not a part of intelligibility. Just ask yourself what does "not different " mean, and you'll see that "same" is unintelligible. "Difference" is defined by change, and so is intelligible as such. "Same" is defined by lack of change, so same defines the category of "eternal", which we cannot relate to because we have no experience of it. So "same" is some mystical unintelligible category of "eternal", which people claim to have knowledge of, when this is not really knowledge at all. It's like "God", purported to be the most highly intelligible, but also completely unknowable.

Is the coupon cutter a hunter? Is a fisherman a hunter? Treating them as if they are the same or similar leads to some comical images. Fish and game requires separate fishing and hunting licenses, but no shopping licence for bargain hunters. — Fooloso4

They all have things in common, and there is nothing comical here. It only becomes comical if we try to say that they are "the same". But that's because "the same" is unintelligible.

The text refers to the use of Kind and Form in the following way: — Valentinus

Yes, this is the stranger's way of talking, to equate forms with types. Now proceed to his examples "rest" and "change". In no way does "rest" or "change" refer to a kind. A "kind" is a class of things, as Appollodorus has been pointing out, and neither "rest" nor "change" refers to a class of things. We can still say that "rest" and "change" signify forms though, as intelligible ideas, but neither signifies a class of things (a kind). Therefore there is a difference between "kinds" and "forms".

Now the stranger starts the discussion by referring to kinds of things, and dividing them, hunters, fishers, etc.. Then he (falsely) proposes an equality between "kind" and "form", as you've quoted, and proceeds to talk about some forms, "rest", "change", "being", "different", "same", as if they are kinds. But these words do not refer to kinds, the stranger has made a category mistake, and so the argument is faulty.

By the way, Valentinus, you seem to be very adept at pulling up the most highly relevant and significant passages from Plato. How do you do this? What supports that skill?

The passage you quoted above is completely different in my translation, Nicholas White, and there is a footnote proposing an alternative translation, which is completely different from yours as well. In any case, we do not need that passage, where the stranger explicitly attempts to equate "forms" with "kinds", (but is so highly ambiguous that translation consensus cannot be obtained) to see that he makes a category mistake when he proceeds to talk about the forms which follow from this point onward, as if they are kinds,

As I said, change occurs between time 1 and time 2. If change occurs then there is difference. That's what sensation is, the perception of change.

And what constitutes a single instance/token of the sensation? — Luke

There is no such thing as a "token of sensation". That's why I objected to your application of the type/token distinction here. And it's the point Banno was making weeks ago. We ought not talk about inner experiences as if they consist of things. That way of speaking is the illness which Wittgenstein referred to, requiring philosophical treatment (254-255). The reply I made to Banno though, was that we can equally apply the same principles to external "things", as process philosophy does, and Heraclitus, did; there are no things, internal nor external, all is flux.

You refuse to consider metaphysics as relevant though..

If you know this stuff, have a go. — Banno

If I wrote anything it wouldn't even last an hour.

Why would the diarist mark "S" if they thought it was incorrect to do so? — Luke

I think that the diarist would do that, because I see that people do that all the time. The sensation isn't exactly like the other one, but it's close enough, so I'll mark it as S. The person knows it is not the same, but marks it as the same anyway. I think that this type of behaviour is very common.

What criterion is there by which the sensation could be different? — Luke

Change is the criterion of difference. A person senses change and concludes difference. Change is sensible.

There’s is mystical union, theosis, which is said to be non inferential. — Wayfarer

This "cause" which I spoke of, is a part of the person, so the union is there, clearly it is logically as necessary.

That's natural and happens to everybody. — TheMadFool

Every self-respecting Christian has a personal relationship with God. — baker

The question is how is this, what I described as a "cause", and "the fundamental capacity to anticipate the future", known to us. As explained, it cannot be observed in any way. We can call it a "mystical union" like Wayfarer did, but that does not validate it as a form of knowledge. All it is is a statement of fact, what is common to us all.

This is probably the same issue which Wittgenstein grapples with in the private language argument. What is known directly to a person, through the inner source, might actually be the highest form of knowledge; Aristotle classed intuition as the highest form of knowledge; but when it comes to validating this form of knowledge to others, through public language (justification), it does not even class as "knowledge".

Again, no, not in the case of God and people who believe in God (and whose knowledge of themselves proceeds from their knowledge of God).
Because these people's knowledge is not derived from the observational, empirical knowledge, but is a (directly) received revelation from God. — baker

The problem is, that even this sort of "knowledge" (I'll call it that, though it does not qualify as knowledge by epistemological standards) which one obtains from within, "intuition", or "mystical union", must be expressed in some sort of words, if one is to proceed in a logical manner from principles derived here. So. if this "knowledge" is to form the basis for premises by which one might proceed toward understanding one's inner self, it must be expressed in language which is suited to, or conformed around observational knowledge. That is the reality of our language. So there is an inherent problem in describing inner experience with language shaped toward describing external observations.

Therefore, a person can proceed toward a "knowledge of themselves" which is completely based in their "knowledge of God", as you say, but they cannot get anywhere in this procedure. It's a dead end right off the bat because that sort of "knowledge" is not at all consistent with the language that we use to make premises for a logical proceeding. So the very first step, must be to justify , through the use of words, that inner experience. Otherwise, any sense that the person has, and is claiming, that their "knowledge of themselves proceeds from their knowledge of God", is just imaginary, an illusion. It's not real knowledge because the person is incapable of making any statements concerning what is pretended to be known. It's simply pretense.

It's immaterial whether you agree with this epistemic method. The point is that it avoids all the usual problems related to knowledge that is derived from observation, empiry. — baker

Sure, it avoids all the epistemological problems, but that's just because it isn't real knowledge, it's pretense. The epistemological problems are involved with real knowledge, not pretend knowledge.

Are you going to address the point or not? Clearly Wittgenstein is not talking about what seems to be wrong, rather, what seems to be right. And "right" cannot simply be exchanged with "wrong", because the two are completely different, so you have made no point.

I see from another of your responses that you reject 'kinds'. You seem unaware that Forms are Kinds. — Fooloso4

I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms.

We have not identified the philosopher. In your opinion the philosopher would not divide things into kinds. In your opinion then Socrates was not a philosopher, for he asks "What is the just?" and rejects all examples of justice as an adequate answer. He is asking about the kind of thing it is that makes all those examples examples of the just. He is asking in what way they are all the same and come under the same name. — Fooloso4

I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created.

To ask in what way are all the things which are called by the same name similar, is a completely different process than to divide things into kinds. Do you see this difference? Take the strangers example of "the hunter". The stranger says, lets divide "hunters" in to type A and type B. Then we can take type B and divide that into B1 and B2, and further we can divide B2, etc.. The Socratic method is to look at all the different examples of people who are called "hunters", to see what they all have in common, so that we can glean an idea of what it means to be a hunter.

The usual modern view is that the forms of inference we rely on, or should rely on, are merely truth-preserving, so an argument yields truth only by being founded upon truth. If you make a proper inference from what purports to be truth but is not, or if, in an informal argument, you rely on true premises that you have stated and untrue premises that you have not, you are abusing or misusing inference. — Srap Tasmaner

The type of argument I am talking about here is the type which attempts to prove the truth or falsity of a premise. This is the issue, how do we determine whether premises are true or false. So, for example, in the dialogue The Sophist, there is a premise that the sophist, the philosopher, and the statesman, are three distinct types. But then in the course of the dialogue, it is demonstrated that this premise is not true. Therefore the stranger, who was introduced as a true philosopher, might also be a sophist, because the premise that the philosopher is a distinct type from the sophist has been shown to be false.

In the Theaetetus, Socrates rips the Heraclitean thesis that "all things change" to shreds — Valentinus

That Heraclitus is wrong does not mean that Parmenides is right. That would make a terrible argument. You are wrong, therefore anyone who says something different from you, must be right.

Here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’, either. — Luke

Yes we can, that's the point. In fact, "wrong" is necessary, and that's why we cannot talk about "right". The only reason we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person knows oneself to be wrong. If we so much as allow the possibility of being right, then we can talk about "right". And one can only exclude the possibility of being right if the person knows oneself to be wrong. Therefore the only reason we cannot talk about "right" , is because "wrong" is necessary.

So, we can apply this to Wittgenstein's example, the sensation of pain. Every moment that I have pain, I know that it is different, and not the same as the moment before. So every time I mark "S" to name the pain as the same pain as before, I know that I am wrong, it is not really the same pain. Since this knowing that it is not the same (because there is no criterion by which it could be the same), necessitates that I am wrong in naming it as the same, therefore there is no possibility of me being right, we cannot talk about being "right" in this context.

The passage connects to both the distinguishing between kinds and the use of 'same and different' being discussed in the dialogue. — Valentinus

The visitor's use of "kinds" is the chief indicator that he practices sophistry. We might call this the theme of The Sophist. That mode of argumentation, which is to divide things into kinds, is extremely defective, and is actually just sophistry. This is because the division of a kind into further kinds may be extremely subjective, arbitrary, or done solely for the purpose of bringing about a particular desired conclusion.

The evidence that this is sophistry is thus. Socrates asks the stranger if he recognizes philosophers, sophists, and statesmen, as three distinct kinds. The stranger says yes, these are three distinct kinds. However, throughout the stranger's discourse, we see that each of the three shares characteristics of each of the other. So such a division of kinds is really just random, or proposed for a purpose, of producing a desired conclusion.

This fact is further demonstrated by our discussion here, some of us say that the visitor is a sophist, and some of us say that the stranger is a philosopher, and neither of us is truly correct, because such a division of kind is not a true division. We say he is a sophist (he is of that kind) for the sake of discrediting his argumentation. Fooloso4 says he is a philosopher, for the sake of claiming that Plato is supporting the metaphysics he professes. In reality though, Plato is demonstrating that this form of argumentation, to divide things into "kinds", the various kinds being created solely for the purpose of the argument, is a very defective form of argumentation.

Any close examination of the proposed "kinds" will show that the divisions are defective. As demonstrated by the dialogue, the division between sophist, philosopher, and statesman, is an untenable division. And if we look at some of the other divisions which the stranger proposes, hunting, angling, trading, etc., we'll see the very same problem. Many instances cross the proposed boundaries, and the divisions are just created for the sake of producing the desired conclusion. Close examination, and understanding of the proposed kinds, and boundaries is required to expose the deficiencies. those deficiencies are what we've come to know through the existence of category mistakes.

This form of argumentation is what supports the stranger's metaphysics. The deficiencies of it are exposed more clearly in The Parmenides. But the proposed kinds, boundaries, and consequent category mistakes, expressed by Parmenides are extremely difficult to following, requiring great attention to detail. It is evident therefore, that Plato is rejecting this metaphysics, as based in faulty arguments, rather than supporting it.

I can reflect on myself, I can think about what I think, but this problem of reflexivity remains, because, as I said, the subject who thinks is not an object, except for by inference. — Wayfarer

I think that this is a temporal issue. To reflect on yourself is always to look backward in time at what has occurred, the past. This is an observational act, and it is the issue with the empirical sciences in general, what is observed is always what has happened, and is therefore in the past.

There is another aspect of human existence, and living being in general, and this is the way that we relate to, and anticipate the future. We can access this to a small extend, through introspection (which is somewhat different from reflection) , but the problem is that introspection is still an observational position. Because of this, the knowledge that we get through introspection, concerning the way that we anticipate the future, is always through the lens of how this fundamental capacity to anticipate the future, affects us (alluding to human affections), as living physical bodies, rather than being able to see this capacity as a cause

So even in introspection we are always looking at the effects of that fundamental capacity to anticipate the future, and we cannot see its true nature as a cause. This is the very same issue we have with God. We know God through His effects, the reality of physical existence, but we cannot see Him directly as the cause, His existence is inferred. Therefore when we proceed toward understanding this form of causation, it is through logic alone, and the logic is only as reliable as the premises employed. Since our premises are derived from the observational, empirical knowledge, they are in a sense tainted, as backward looking, toward the past, so that they need to be inverted to be fully logical. This is why the physicalist who sees everything from the perspective of empirical knowledge, without inverting that knowledge to make it fully logical, i.e. consistent with the rational mind, will think that the idealist, or dualist has everything backward.

Then we are all, including the philosopher, sophists. Five apples are five whether they are red or green or yellow. Unless we want a particular color apple we treat that difference as the same. — Fooloso4

No we don't necessarily treat them as the same. "Five" to me, implies five distinct and different objects. They cannot all be the same or else there would not be five but only one. It's only if you think of "five" as implying five of the same, "ones", that you treat the different as the same. But that way involves contradiction, because there cannot be five of the same thing.

Which of the pre-Socratic philosophers make the good the focus of their philosophy? — Fooloso4

Many of the ancient myths which Plato refers to are concerned with the good. The difference between good and evil has been an issue for thousands of years.

It is the context in which it is being used in the dialogue that is at issue. The way the Stranger uses it. — Fooloso4

I know, that's the point, the stranger switches meaning, equivocates, because the stranger is a sophist.

In this context, the role of the Sophist as a whole dialogue can be sought after. In what way does it impart the art of the philosopher? — Valentinus

I don't think The Sophist as a Platonic dialogue was intended by Plato to "impart the art of the philosopher", I think it was meant to expose the Eleatics as sophists rather than honest philosophers. That's what I've been arguing. The stranger is an anonymous person from that school, who is portrayed as behaving in a way which is consistent with his description of how a sophist would behave. So what is imparted is a lesson, by way of example. Imagine if there was a dialogue where a person described what it was to be racist, and in the process of that description demonstrated themself to be just like the description.

The "art of the philosopher" would be to see through the stranger's disguise, and see him as the sophist which he is. So the lesson to be learned from Plato here, is that the sophist is well disguised, and the logical arguments of sophistry may appear infallible, but the sophist is best revealed as a hypocrite, behaving in a way which he would say is not a good way to behave.

I'd say the reason for this difference is that cars typically last for about 10 or 15 years, while feelings typically don't last as long. However, feelings can last for more than a day, as I noted earlier. You might tell the doctor that you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years. — Luke

What Wittgenstein is saying at 258 is that the person has no criterion by which to judge the pain as the same from one moment of occurrence to the next, therefore there is no such thing as correctness in this situation.

However, I believe we ought to consider this principle much more closely. This is derived from Wittgenstein's definition of what it means to follow a rule, and the assertion that to think that I am following a rule does not necessarily mean I am following a rule. This results in the problem above, that the person has no criterion by which to assign the symbol "S", and there is no correctness.

But there's a principle pointed out by Plato, which is that a person can knowingly act contrarily to a rule. This is to knowingly break a rule. And this is a strong argument which Socrates used against the sophists who claimed that virtue is knowledge. Knowing what is good and correct, virtuous, does not ensure that one will act in this way. A person can knowingly break a rule. So if there is some truth to "I know that I am acting in a way which is contrary to the rule, therefore I am breaking the rule, there must also be some truth to "I know the rule, and I am obeying it, therefore I am following the rule".

Applied in this case, we can see that a person might continuously have a tooth-ache, and refer to it as one thing, the same thing. This might be for the sake of convenience in the public communication. But in the privacy of one's own mind, the person would see that it is not the same pain from one moment to the next, it goes through many different phases of intensity, etc.. So the person would know that it is incorrect to call it by the same name, "S". Yet in Wittgenstein's example, the person proceeds to do what is known to be incorrect.

This demonstrates a peculiar use of words by Wittgenstein. He says "whatever is going to seem right
to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." What is really the case, is that there is no such thing as "right" here, and we cannot talk about 'right', because the person always knows oneself to be wrong. So the only reason why we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person has excluded the possibility of being right, by knowing oneself to be wrong.

This implies that a person can know oneself to be wrong, without reference to any rules.

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator. — Fooloso4

But the stranger appears to be a philosopher, he doesn't appear as a sophist. The question is whether he really is a philosopher, or a sophist.

The Stranger's method abstracts from value, it treats such differences as the same. — Fooloso4

To treat differences as the same is sophistry to me. It is contradiction.

His concern is not Socrates' concern for the good. But this does not mean he should simply be dismissed as a sophist. If the search for the good is the mark of philosophy then Socrates would be the first philosopher. He was not. — Fooloso4

It is very clear from Plato, that he believes that the search for the good is the mark of philosophy. Also, it is clear that Plato did not believe that Socrates was the first person ever to have concern for the good.

It does. The Stranger is identified as a member of that circle. (216a) How do we reconcile Parmenides' denial of not-being with the Stranger's affirmation? The solution is in the dyad 'same and different' or 'same and other'. In this case, what is and is not being. — Fooloso4

Being concerned with "that which is not" is the mark of a sophist (254).

If you maintain the distinction between being and becoming then you maintain the distinction between being and not-being. As you say, becoming is not being. — Fooloso4

In the context I was using it, "not-being" was a shortened form of "that which is not". Here, you use "not being" to indicate something which is other than being. "Becoming is not being". Equivocation is a tool of the sophist.