Yes, as I thought, you find that there is a problem with the notion (whatever it means) that 'the numeral "1" represents a basic unity. an individual. The "2" represents two of those individuals together, and "3" represents three, etc". — TonesInDeepFreeze

No, I see no problem with that in itself. The problem is when we want to say that, and also that "2" and "3" represent a type of unity.

But (aside from even trying to parse the broken phrases) I don't know who says anything along the lines of 'the numeral "1" represents a basic unity. an individual. The "2" represents two of those individuals together, and "3" represents three, etc". So I don't see why you think it is a problem that needs to be addressed. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I don't know about you, but I always use "1", "2", and "3" in that way. If you don't ever talk about 1 chair, 2 or 3, or any number of other things like that, then I guess you don't use them the same way. But if someone asks you how old you are, do you answer with a number?

I thought you meant that there is a fundamental problem with:

"The numeral "1" represents a basic unity. an individual. The "2" represents two of those individuals together, and "3" represents three, etc. But then we want "2" and "3", each to represent a distinct unity as well."

And that your supposed solution to the supposed problem is:

"[...] we have to allow that "1" represents a different type of unity than "2" does [...]" — TonesInDeepFreeze

There is no proposed solution. The issue was stated as a fundamental problem with numbers, without a solution.

Or perhaps you would make clear which parts of your passage are ones you are critiquing and which parts are ones you are claiming. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I am not critiquing anything, the whole thing is what I am claiming. I am claiming that there is a fundamental problem with numbers. If "1", "2", "3", etc. , are used to represent unities, then "2" and "3" must represent a different type of unity from "1", for the reason I explained.

Now here is a proposal for a solution. If "2" and "3" are said to represent numbers, then maybe we ought to say that "1" represents something other than a number.

Perhaps consider the most intensely rewarding experiences of human life. They are experienced as intensely significant by their very nature. — David Pearce

Let's take an example then, competition. Winning a competition is one of the most intensely rewarding experiences for some people. Even just as a spectator of a sport, having your team win provides a very rewarding experience. But we can't always win, and losing is very disappointing. How do you think it's possible to maintain that intensely rewarding experience, which comes from success, without the possibility of disappointment from failure? It seems like a large part of the rewarding feeling is dependent on the possibility of failure. We can't have everyone winning all the time because there must be losers. And there would be no rewarding experience from success, without the possibility of failure. How could there be if success was already guaranteed?

What do you need a link for? If you don't understand what I said, just show me what you do not understand, and I'll explain. If you understand but disagree, just tell me what you disagree with, and maybe we can hash it out.

I think this is a small example of a larger problem - the inability to accept reality.

Reality deniers come in many shapes & sizes: Vaccines, the Holocaust, Flat Earth, climate change, etc.

I wish I knew what causes this. I have close relatives & friends who deny at least one (and typically many) aspects of reality. My amateur psychologist analysis is that this is partly driven by fear. The way they view themselves and how they fit into the world is being challenged. And they are afraid of that change.

And the thing is - they are not stupid people. You can have intelligent conversations with them on any number of issues, you can share laughter & tears, etc. — EricH

Yes, "bad physics" threads are necessary to bring attention to the fact that even highly intelligent people, like physicists, sometimes are amongst those who cannot accept reality.

Where can I actualy read anyone explaining the concept of numbers that way? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Didn't you just read it?

I think that a stable system is not real by the second law of thermodynamics. If "positive feelings" are associated with stability, then we are fighting a losing battle, and won't have any positive feelings until we reach maximum entropy.

Wow, can you imagine the boredom of being in a spaceship flying to another galaxy? To see what? There must better reasons for wanting an extended life than this. But what are they exactly? If we remove all suffering, doesn't the extended life just turn into one long boring flight to nowhere. Might as well be an eternal brain in a vat.

No I don't. Nor should you. But we each choose our paths. You might consider joining forces with Metaphysician Undercover. His concern is the supposed equality between 2+2 and 4. :roll: — jgill

There is a fundamental problem with the concept of numbers. The numeral "1" represents a basic unity. an individual. The "2" represents two of those individuals together, and "3" represents three, etc. But then we want "2" and "3", each to represent a distinct unity as well. So we have to allow that "1" represents a different type of unity than "2" does, or else we'd have the contradiction of "2" representing both one and also two of the same type of unity.

I'm sure there a bunch of terms that physicists pull from somebody else's discipline because they keep getting punked by "reality." It's no wonder others feel free to chime in when they see the struggle using familiar terms. — James Riley

What flavour is that quark? I don't know bite it and see. Ha ha ha!

As you have indicated, H2O and water are very different concepts.

If you use "properties" in that way, referring to the function of a thing, then you must respect that functions which the object does not currently have, though the object has the capacity to be used that way if approached by the right mind, are not actually properties of the thing, because it is not being used that way. Otherwise the thing has all sorts of different properties at the very same time, in violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Waves might be substrate-less. That is, they may not be like the waves in the water, which is the substrate for the waves. They are only waves. — spirit-salamander

When you start into basic physics in high school, they'll teach you about waves, and do demonstrations of waves in wave tanks, and you'll learn about sound waves and such. You learn the physical structure of waves. It is nonsense, completely illogical, and fundamentally contrary to good science, for anyone to say that "waves might be substrate-less", regardless of your appeal to authority.

stick can be used to bash over the head, or it can be used as a lever to roll a giant rock down a hill. Or it can be used to scratch symbols in the sand. The same basic physical form can have radically different functionalities. Therefore radically different abilities. So even if beings have the same physical form, they can have radically different 'shapes' with respect to their environments. And hence different properties as reflections of their 'shapes.' Which are different abilities.

If as a result of a purely mental operation otherwise identical physical things can acquire different properties, then these properties are instantiations of the mental. And if these properties enhance survival then they result in progressive physical modifications. So the 'shape' of the mind in the world is a product of its own mental operations (in a physical context) and not merely a physical product. — Pantagruel

I think it is misleading, and therefore incorrect to call this immaterial property "shape". What you describe is that the same physical object can be used for a multitude of purposes. Hence the same "shape", the shape which the object has, can have different functions. "Function" is determined by purpose which is dependent on a goal. So "function" is determined in relation to the goal. It is incorrect to say that the function of a thing is a property of the thing, because it is really a feature of the thing's relation to the goal. So we cannot correctly call it a property or "shape" of the thing.

pecifically, I like the notion of mental shape because shapes have specific properties, and our properties or abilities 'fit' with what I've described as environmental gradients. — Pantagruel

The problem with this perspective is that our capacities always extend beyond our properties. This you describe in the op when you say that the same physical object can be used in multiple ways. "Property", if could by applied to usage, would refer to the current usage, and cannot go beyond that, as it is incorrect to say that something has a property which is not currently existing. But if a creature produces a new intention, has a new goal, then the same physical object might be be used in a new way, and this may become a new property (if property could be applied to usage). But as I explained above, the capacity of the object to be used in all sorts of different ways is not a property of the object itself, because it does not exist within the object, as it is dependent on the mind which views the object with intent toward a goal.

First, it is unlikely that there are exactly two types of stuff, particles and waves, absolutely differentiated. The reality must undoubtedly be so much more complex that duality ceases to have descriptive relevance. Second, all matter thus far experienced has evolved from common antecedents, so it is most likely that if particles ride a more foundational wave substance, the particles evolved out of it. Its not conceptually impossible for eternally distinct particle and "wave" substance to exist, nor is anything else, but the most probable explanation due to their pervasive interactiveness is that they have a common origin with impulsion towards combinatory states. As a fanciful example, if particles ride dark matter waves their behavior is probably mutualized enough with dark matter for whatever reason that this amounts to a synthetic substance in some degree. — Enrique

The existence of waves necessitates the conclusion that there is a substance (commonly referred to as the ether) within which the waves are active. One might deny the reality of the ether, but this leaves the relationship between the waves and the particles as unintelligible. The Michelson-Morley experiments indicate that the ether is not a separate substance, i.e. it is not distinct from physical objects. This implies that particles must be conceived of as a feature of the wave substance (ether), not as something distinct from it, "riding" it.

Hmmm. Excuse my error, then. — Banno

OK, you are excused, but you really do need to pay more attention to subtle differences, something very important in philosophy. Notice the difference between saying "language is a game", and "language is something within which there are numerous games". In the first case we might consider a composite whole, united by one consistent set of rules. In the second, we have numerous distinct sets of rules without any identified source of unity, yet we assume a whole and call it by one name "language". In the latter case we must inquire further to identify the source of unity which enables us to apply one name, assuming one whole, because there is not one complete set of unifying rules to make one game.

This difference, as the difference between a system, and a multitude of systems, is what I spent much time attempting to explain, already in this thread. To which you replied "I do find you verging on the incomprehensible." So, in case you are interested, I'll provide you with a review. Please remember, and adhere to the fundamental idea that there is a difference between a system, and a multitude of distinct systems, and perhaps what I said will be more comprehensible to you.

Now let's position the "system of believe" relative to the true doubt. The doubting person cannot be "within" the system of believe because that would mean that the system is already accepted by that person. The doubt must be aimed at the system as a whole, because as "a system" we must assume that there is consistency between the parts (individual beliefs) of the system, and one cannot reasonably doubt one part of a consistent system. So true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole.

Would you agree with that? If we say doubt can only occur from within a system of belief, that system of belief must be other than the system being doubted. The two systems may not even be remotely related. So the assumption "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", is really an irrelevant point, because that system of belief must be other than the one which contains the belief being doubted.. And if we take the game analogy, true doubt can only come from the person who refuses to play the game, because to play the game is to consent to the rules, and to consent to the rules is to forfeit your right to doubt them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's how what I stated above is relevant to this thread. If we assume that any specific language-game is a representation of a system of beliefs (consistency being a necessary requirement of "system"), then true doubt can only be directed at any specific language game from outside that particular game. I.e. the person who refuses to play. I'll call that person the skeptic, is the only one who may cast true doubt. If we assert that the skeptic must pose one's doubt from a position of being within a language-game, within a system of beliefs, then that system providing the skeptic's approach, must be other than the one doubted, and there cannot be consistency between these distinct language-games, or else true doubt would be impossible. This implies that language in general, as a whole, cannot be represented as a single language-game, because of the inconsistency between distinct language-games which makes true doubt a real thing.

The other course we could take, is to allow inconsistency within any specific language-game, and system of belief, thereby allowing for doubt within the system. If there is inconsistency within the game, or system, then doubt from within would be true justified doubt. But that ought to be seen as epistemologically unsound, to allow inconsistency to inhere within a system. It produces a faulty definition of "game" or "system", one in which the rules of the "game" contradict each other, or the "system" has parts which oppose each other, or are not conducive to its function.

So the logical course is to maintain that a language-game, or a system of beliefs, is necessarily consistent, and true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole, from outside that system. This is also the most practical solution, because if inconsistency appears to inhere within a system of beliefs, it is extremely difficult to isolate the defective parts, with the goal of doubting just those parts. So the entire system must be doubted as a whole. This implies that refusal to play the game is required, and we're at the point of doubting the entire system anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

I explained very clearly why doubting the entire belief system is the only reasonable form of skepticism. Beliefs within a system are necessarily logically consistent and interrelated. That's what makes it a "system". To doubt one belief within a system requires doubting the beliefs it is dependent upon, and it is implied that the beliefs dependent upon the doubted belief are doubted as well. So it's unreasonable to doubt one belief without doubting the entire system within which it is integrated,

This is why the idea that there are hinge propositions which are somehow indubitable is unacceptable epistemology. If the entire system is intrinsically consistent, and valid, which it must be to be a "system", then no part of the system can be doubted without doubting the whole. And this would require doubting the supposed hinge propositions as well.

The preceding result, is the logical conclusion of assuming that beliefs exist as part of a "system". If we remove that premise, and allow that beliefs have individuality, free from the influence of an overall system, then it is reasonable to doubt individual beliefs. But then the whole game analogy, and the idea of hinge propositions is completely inapplicable. . — Metaphysician Undercover

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. This is like taking a deductive argument, and saying that the logic is valid, the conclusion is dubious, but the premises are beyond doubt. If the logic is valid, we cannot doubt the conclusion without doubting the premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

But then it is incorrect to call this a "system", that's the whole point. If we move away from the "system" representation, to the "big, baggy monster of ways that people do things" representation, then the idea of hinge propositions makes no sense at all, because there is no system for them to be supporting. If there are systems, then the systems themselves must be coherent, so to doubt any aspect of the system implies a doubt of the entire system, including any supposed hinge propositions. Either way, the notion of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is fundamentally incorrect. That's why Kuhnian paradigm shifts are a reality, the entire system along with its foundations must be dismissed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh.

What necessity forces you to use language? People can choose not to use language as freely as they can choose not to play chess. — Luke

Hahaha. I assume that's meant as a joke. If not, I feel sorry for you. The need to get what I want, the mother of all necessities.

Can you give us an example of language without grammar? — Fooloso4

This question is not relevant because "grammar" does not necessarily imply "rules", depending on how one defines the terms. So I have no desire to go around in the same circle which Luke leads me around, with you, except with the word "grammar" instead of "rule".

So now you are saying that those rules for language, the ones it doesn't have, also vary from one language to another. — Banno

Obviously, I never said language does not have rules. Read if you're going to comment. I've argued that rules are not prerequisite for language, they emerge from language use.

You started by claiming that language had no rules, but when this was shown to be silly, you have slid to claiming they are an emergent feature. — Banno

Well I don't think so. I seem to remember joining into this thread talking about the rules in a system of beliefs, and the rules of logical systems. That's not exactly a claim that language has no rules. Nine days ago:

I don't deny that there are rules in language, that's what formal logic is all about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you haven't been paying attention. You've been making some exceedingly absurd statements about what you think I believe. Now, I've been arguing this point with Luke for a long time, on numerous threads, the relationship between rules and language. As far as I know I've maintained a very similar position, as has Luke. That's why we go around in circles, Luke refuses to adopt a position which would allow us to proceed toward a better understanding of language.

General Relativity is about curved space-time... — Banno

Right, and special relativity is about curved space-time too ... not. Yet they're still both "relativity". I think you're missing something there Banno. General relativity is how the principles of special relativity are adapted to account for gravity.

You are inhabited by some strange mind which thinks it knows what it obviously does not. So you haven't the foggiest clue how to explain anything.

Seems far more likely that you haven't quite grasped relativistic physics. — Banno

What is the case is that separation caused by spatial expansion, is not considered to be properly called spatial "motion". Very large objects like galaxies get further apart without actually moving at all, because spatial expansion does not qualify as "motion". Since this activity of separating from each other, due to spatial expansion, is not a form of "motion", material things can separate at rates which are much faster than the speed of light, without violating principles of relativity, because within the confines of that theoretical structure, this does not qualify as "motion".

You ought to be able to see, that in the effort to maintain general relativity as the applicable theory for motions in the universe, we have now developed a whole new category of motion which does not qualify as "motion", because "motion" is defined by that theory. In other words, if we want all the types of motion which we have observational evidence for in the universe, to be measurable within one consistent theory of motion, we need a different theory. General relativity does not allow that this type of motion which is the result of spatial expansion is "motion".

Luke is doing a fine job of pointing out the mess that Meta has made for himself. — Banno

If you cannot see how Luke's adherence to the game analogy has lead him into a dreadful misunderstanding of the nature of language, as outlined in my last post, then perhaps you'd like to address that issue, which is the inversion of the relation between freedom and necessity, that is evident in the comparison between chess and language.

Does language have no rules or does it have "competing rules"? What "competing rules" does language have? — Luke

I have stated that language does not require rules, that they emerge as a feature of language. So there is obviously rules within language. The point being that there is language outside of rules. The differences in rules are varied. What is legal in some countries is illegal in others. Some philosophies promote violation of the law of excluded middle, some promote violation of the law of noncontradiction. Different languages have developed different grammatical structures.

How is this different to the game of chess? It is not as though people are forced to play chess against their will by the deterministic laws of nature, or that they are physically unable to make illegal moves. Chess is also "shaped...by freely chosen activities of free willing beings", yet it is still a game for all that, and has rules too. — Luke

Right, some never play chess, because they choose not to. But we really do not have such a choice in the case of language, due to the necessities of nature. Do you see how playing chess has an inverted relation to the forces of nature and free will, from that of languages usage? This is the difference between the two.

We freely choose whether or not we want to play chess, and if one decides to play, one must adhere to the rules when making moves. However, in the case of language usage, we are forced by necessity into using language, yet we are free to choose whatever moves we want. The relation between freedom and necessity is inverted between the two. In one case participation is freely chosen while the moves are determined by necessity, while in the other case participation is necessary while the moves are freely chosen.

As I believe in reductive physicalism, in that I believe that the mind and body are ontologically indiscernible, for me, the mind cannot be prior to spatial existence — RussellA

Well, I wouldn't agree with reductive physicalism, because I don't think it gives us an ontology which is capable of making the existence of abstractions, ideas, and conceptions, which are immaterial, intelligible. When we recognize these properties of the mind as immaterial, we apprehend them as having a non-spatial existence. We cannot measure them in any spatial way, such as size, shape, or any dimensional forms.

Yet these immaterial things do seem to have a temporality. This provides us with the premise to give mind, in its relation with time, priority to spatial presence. In Kant we see time as the internal intuition, and space as the external intuition. Strictly speaking, in terms of absolute, the external is not necessary, yet the internal is, or else there is nothing. (We cannot move to an external absolute because the mind cannot go, where by definition, there is no mind.) With the internal as the only acceptable absolute, spatial existence is not necessary, and follows only as contingent on material being.

I believe that happiness is a stable, balanced state of existence which is consistent with true well-being derived from an inner source of contentment. Joy seems to be more euphoric, requiring external stimulus, and therefore unsustainable in the long term. So I see the difference in temporal terms, whereas happiness is a long term passive well-being which is conducive to consistency in actions, joy is a short term, more of a manic type of thing, which may produce extreme good, but being less balanced it could slip the other way.

These are different "standards" to those in the context of norms and normativity. — Luke

There was no equivocation. The first line in the Wikipedia entry on "Normative": "Normative generally means relating to an evaluative standard." Isn't that just what I said about how I used "standard"?

The problem which you seem to have, is accepting that there is a difference between a publicly stated "rule", and a principle which an individual applies in one's mind when making a decision or judgement. In order to have a proper understanding of language use, we need to maintain this distinction. The reality of this difference is what allows one to know the rule, yet act in a way which is inconsistent with the rule. When I explained this reality to you, you insisted that it's contradiction. But that's only because you do not heed the distinction, rather dissolving it and creating confused ambiguity.

How does the analogy fail? Moving pieces wherever you want, irrespective of the rules of the game, is not playing the game. — Luke

Right, in playing a game we must adhere to the rules with all moves. But in language we see competing rules which makes such a thing impossible, so we ought to drop the analogy right there. Instead, a multitude of games is proposed. However, a closer look at language use would reveal that it is shaped not by rules, but by freely chosen activities of free willing beings. Hence, what is basic or fundamental to the form which language takes, is not a rule governed structure, but the very opposite of this, activities which are free from rules. Therefore, if we adhere to the game analogy when trying to describe, or represent language use, our models will be completely backward. The game analogy represents language use evolving from fundamental rules (hinge propositions or whatever), building more and more rules on top of foundational rules, instead of modeling the reality of language, as a fundamentally free and lawless activity, free from foundational rules, from which rule structured activities may emerge.

How we employ an analogy, as a tool, is that we apply it until the point where it fails. Its failure, and how it fails, tells us something new, which we didn't already know, about the thing that it is applied to. We take a well known thing, and compare it to a lesser known thing, something we are trying to understand. Of course the two things will not be exactly the same. So when we get to the point where the comparison fails, and it can be carried no further, we have exposed the aspects of the lesser known thing which we do not understand. Now we can proceed toward understanding these mysterious aspects. But at this point we can no longer apply the analogy, so we must apply other principles.

There is no such "standard"; it is merely your own personal opinion. You don't set the standards or norms all on your own. — Luke

You ought to recognize, that in my context of usage, a "standard" is an example or model used for judgement, like a criterion. That any specific standard is the one which ought to be applied is a matter of judgement and therefore opinion. However, there may be a rule which states which standard or criterion is applicable in a specific type of situation. Such rules can greatly assist in one's application of standards. So standards are things which you hold on your own, as opinions, and they may or may not be consistent with the rules. But if I used an unacceptable word here, that's my mistake and I apologize if it was taken as an offence .

Otherwise, where can I find this standard of behaviour? Where is it written? By your own reckoning, a rule cannot exist unless it is explicitly stated, so where is it explicitly stated that a rule must be explicitly stated? — Luke

Since when is "standard" necessarily exchangeable with "rule"? The reason why a language has many different words is to provide us with the capacity to say many different things. If you make all the different words mean the same thing, how could you ever say anything meaningful? Obviously, judging by the context, I do not use "standard" to mean the same thing as "rule". That would mean I was intentionally contradicting myself. So your behaviour of exchanging "standard" for 'rule" so that you might ridicule me, is not only unsupported with any logic, but is downright mean.

You cannot use that word however you want if you want to be coherent. Your argument is analogous to saying: I can move any chess piece to wherever I like on the board because it's physically possible, therefore chess has no rules. But you can't move the pieces just anywhere if you want to play the game, or if you want to make moves in the game that are permissible/coherent/understood. You seem to think you're making an interesting point about the freedom to make any moves whatsoever, but all we're really interested in are possible moves within the game. This is where the line is drawn between coherent and incoherent. But this line cannot be drawn by you alone. Who told you that? — Luke

You are just providing evidence here that the "game" analogy fails. Instead of looking at the reality of language use, and seeing that the "game" analogy is incapable of capturing all the aspects of language, you argue against the truth about language, by applying the game analogy. This is a very important point to understand about the use of things like analogies, similes, metaphors, hyperboles, parables, and allegories. These tools are only capable of bringing us a limited understanding, and if we adhere to every aspect of them, as if they are a literal description, they will surely mislead us, ending up with misunderstanding rather than understanding.

You could create an analogy that a computer is just like a car, they both are mass produced artificially, and have electronics. And anytime I tried to show you that there are no wheels on the computer, so the analogy fails at this point, you keep denying the reality of what I am showing to you, by referring to the analogy and insisting that there must be wheels on the computer, because it's just like a car.

So referring to the game analogy, intending to disprove the facts about language which I am showing you, when I am showing you this for the sake of demonstrating the failings of the analogy, really doesn't help your case.

It is your belief or opinion that a rule must be explicitly stated. What's normative about that? — Luke

It's my opinion and belief. It's my opinion that if it hasn't been stated in some form it cannot be a rule, and I believe this. This "must" in your statement, "must be explicitly stated" is normative, because it's a standard of behaviour that I believe in. For example, suppose you think of something which you believe is a rule, but it has never been explicitly stated. Then I break this so-called "rule" and you accuse me of breaking the rule. I would argue that I didn't break any rule because what you thought was a rule was never stated and therefore it did not exist as a rule.

The problem, as I have pointed out, is that you contradict yourself with your pair of beliefs that "you can use "rule" however you please", and that "you use "rule" in an incoherent way." — Luke

I don't see how this is contradictory. People use words in incoherent ways quite often. This is just a matter of describing reality. I believe the word "rule" ought to be used in a way which avoids contradiction, but I know, and respect the fact that freely choosing human beings such as yourself, can use words however you want. It's no different from saying that I believe people ought to act morally, but they freely choose to act in immoral ways. It's my opinion, and I firmly believe that one ought to do what is right (use "rule" in a logically rigorously defined way), yet I have respect for the reality that people are free to do what I believe is wrong. Furthermore, I might even do what I believe is wrong in some instances.

Either I can use "rule" however I please or I cannot. Which is it? — Luke

I've told you many times, you are free to use that word however you want. However, I will not necessarily agree with the way that you use it. There is no contradiction here. Until we have a rigorous definition (a rule dictating how we must use "rule"), I cannot accuse you of breaking any rules. I can however say that your use appears incoherent (inconsistent) to me. This was the case the last time we discussed this, I believe you were equivocal in your use.

The obvious implication here is that if you want to use the word "rule" in a coherent way, then you cannot use the word "rule" however you please. — Luke

What we want, and what we are actually free to do, are two distinct things. That's reality. And that I am free to do something which I do not want to do, does not amount to contradiction. Even when I end up doing something which I didn't want to to, this is generally a mistake, it is not a contradiction. But when I say I will not do something, yet I do it intentionally rather than by mistake, this is lying or hypocrisy.

I can imagine zero dimension, but not no dimensions
I can imagine a cube of 1cm sides. I can imagine a cube of 1mm sides. I can imagine a cube having sides of zero dimension. But I can only imagine this cube of zero dimensions within my ordinary everyday space of tables, chairs, etc. For the mind to be able to imagine no space would be as if the mind could imagine not existing, as the concept of space is a fundamental building block from which the mind is constructed. — RussellA

I don't understand any of this. How is it possible to imagine a zero dimension cube? Why is it impossible for the mind to imagine spacelessness, or non- spatial existence? If we imagine that the mind might have temporality only, and is prior to spatial existence, then spatial presence becomes unlimited. That is to say, if space is conceived of as coming into existence from no space, as time passes, and the mind itself is prior to spatial existence, then the mind is free to appear in many different spatial points at the same time. Isn't this how free willing locomotion works? The mind has freedom to determine spatial location.

As I said, it's not my argument, so those questions I'll ignore. I was just pointing out some issues I had with what you were saying. Those questions you propose are irrelevant to the points I made.

A review of the videos will persuade anyone that the whole matter is just plain not that simple. For example, what exactly is the speed of light? What does it mean? How and by whom measured, under what circumstances and contexts. — tim wood

I think that's exactly the point of the op, designating "the speed of light" as a constant has been proven to be a mistake.

Yep. And this is where I walk away. — Banno

Wise move. Educate yourself on the law of identity, and prepare yourself with some principles before you attempt to argue that identity is a relation. I think such an argument only demonstrates a lack of understanding of the difference between what a relation is, and what an absolute is.

I will refer you back to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", 253-256. If you understand these passages you will apprehend the need for an explicit criterion of identity. Without that law of identity we might use "same" in the ordinary, customary way, such as to say that this chair is the same as that chair, or even my sensation is the same as your sensation.

You can believe that or you can believe that a rule must be explicitly stated. You can't have both. — Luke

"Must" is normative here, it does not imply logical necessity, so your argument is not logical, it is fallacious by equivocation. And I believe that people are free to act contrary to the norms. So I see no problem with believing that you use "rule" differently from me, and also believing that a rule must be explicitly stated to qualify as being a "rule". You are doing what I think you ought not do, and this type of thing is a common occurrence. So I believe that you use "rule" in an incoherent way which renders logical procedure impossible. I believe that to proceed logically we need to distinguish between what is stated and what is not stated, and only what is stated qualifies as a rule.

But you believe that there could be premises (rules governing the use of a word) which are not stated, and this foils logical procedures by enabling equivocation. I've tried to persuade you to see things my way, so we could proceed together logically, but to no avail . Since I have no inclination to join you in your incoherency, and you appear to have no desire to proceed logically, discussing this issue is fruitless..

Sorry, I don't see the relevance, but you can make that conclusion if you want, I will not.

That's right, you can use "rule" however you please.

I think what makes a rule a rule, is to be explicitly stated.
— Metaphysician Undercover

There is no rule (used my way) for the use of "rule".
— Metaphysician Undercover

Which is it, MU? — Luke

Both it is. What makes a rule a rule is to be explicitly stated (my opinion, notice "I think"). But there is no rule which states that "rule" must be used in this way.

It sounds profound to talk of the Law of Identity; we need to keep in mind that what we are talking about is just a=a. — Banno

No, I'm not talking about a=a. What I'm talking about is the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself. Look it up if you don't already know it. If you represent the law of identity as "a=a", then we must respect the fact that you are using a=a to express "a thing is the same as itself.", that is the defined meaning of a=a.

As it stands it is impossible to confirm its validity, let alone that it is cogent. It mixes terms - mind, necessity, dependency - that need considerable work to be understood. — Banno

I know that the validity of the law of identity cannot be proven, and that's irrelevant. You can accept it or not, but I think like any other fundamental proposition, it's best to understand it before rejecting it. And understanding it requires recognizing that a thing and its identity are one and the same. Therefore to be a thing is to have an identity, and to have an identity is to be thing. Clearly there is no stipulated dependence on a mind required for a thing to be a thing, and no reason to think that a mind is required, therefore a thing is mind independent.

It is also clear that a=a is a relationship, contrary to what you claim; all you have done is stipulate that relationships are between different individuals. — Banno

This is equivocation on the meaning of "a=a", and so you've provided a fallacious argument. As indicated above "a=a" must represent "a thing is the same as itself" to represent the law of identity. And, being one and the same as, is not a relation. "Relation" indicates what one has to do with another, and that's something completely different from being the same thing.

We are faced with the insolvable problem of how the mind can know things that exist independently of the existence of the mind. — RussellA

It is not really insolvable, because we do this with logic. That is what logic does for us, it allows us to extend our knowledge beyond the limits of our immediate experience. The problem is that there are limits to what we can do with logic, and there are judgements as to validity and soundness which must be made. So, depending on how you define "knowledge", and the degree of infallibility which you require as the criteria for "knowledge", our knowledge of such things is limited.

Kant may have expressed it as his opinion that we cannot know things which exist independently of the mind, but Plato allowed that the mind has direct contact with independent Forms. With such direct contact we can understand independent Forms (things) through the use of logic, without relying on the medium of sense perception. Perhaps Kant would disqualify such fundamental ontological principles as not fulfilling the criteria of "knowledge", but Plato places this as the highest form of knowledge, just like Aristotle positions intuition as the highest form of knowledge.

Ethically, I think our most urgent biological-genetic focus should be ending suffering: — David Pearce

Well, I think the principal issue is that "suffering" is a very broad, general term, encompassing many types. So the questions of what types of suffering ought to be eliminated, and would eliminating some types increase others, or even create new unforeseen and possibly extremely severe types, is very pertinent.

Sorry tim, but your references don't seem to address the issue, and I see no basis for your accusation of "colossal stupidity". But It's not my argument, so I'll leave it at that.

OK, I'll recant, and say that the law of identity implies necessarily, that things are independent of the mind. So let me explain this, in a way which you might be able to understand.. In fact, I'll present it in two slightly different ways.

The law of identity stipulates that the identity of a thing is the thing itself. A thing is the same as itself. Since it does not say that a mind is necessary for a thing to be the thing that it is, yet it is necessary that a thing is the thing that it is, we can conclude that to be the thing that it is, does not require a mind. Simplified: "things are independent of the mind".

Another way to consider this is that identity in modern terms is sometimes said to be the relationship which a thing has with itself. It can be argued that it requires a mind to draw a relation between two distinct things. But the relationship between a thing and itself is not actually a relationship at all, the thing and itself are one and the same thing, and this is absolute, not relative. Hence, no mind is required for a thing to be the thing that it is, because being the thing that it is is not a relationship.
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This is a principle which Aristotle made a great effort to explain, requiring many pages, even multiple books, in his "Metaphysics". It is the reason why most philosophers will argue that Aristotle was not idealist, even though he clearly placed form as prior to matter in his metaphysics. It is a principle which is mostly unlearnt in modern society, as not even philosophy graduates are required to understand Aristotelian metaphysics.

Meaning is based in intent, and the intent of that statement, "a thing is the same as itself", the law of identity, is to say that a thing does not require a mind to have an identity as a thing, i.e. to be the thing that it is. The intent of this statement is derived from the context, Aristotle's "Metaphysics", understanding of which is required to determine the meaning Due to the tendency of human beings to believe that identity is something we assign to things, the idea that a thing has an identity, and is therefore a thing, independent of us assigning an identity to it, is not easy to dispel.

Simply stating that things exist independently from the mind does not suffice to put down skepticism, as it 's just a bald assertion. So the law of identity is formulated from the necessity that a thing must be the thing that it is (it has an unique identity); and it cannot be other than it is or else it would be something else, two distinct things at the same time. If we accept this proposition, and it seems reasonable to me, then the thing's identity is within the thing itself, not the identity we assign to it, because assigned identity is not a necessary relation. Then the thing's existence as a thing is necessarily independent from the mind.

It looks like we're pretty much on the same page here, except where you see a difficult task, I see an impossibility which ought not even be attempted. It's a waste of time and resources, and of course there is the risk factor, of creating extreme division within the human community which I've already mentioned. This is because living beings tend to have very strong feelings concerning the well-being of their offspring, feelings which are not necessarily rational. So to put it bluntly, if you think this process "would be unlikely to pass an ethics committee", why are you discussing it as if it is a viable option? Isn't conspiracy toward something unethical itself unethical?

Variety is a very important aspect of life, I'd argue it's the essence of life. And it is the foundation of evolution. The close relationship between variety and life is probably why we find beauty in variety. Beauty is closely related to good, and the pleasure we derive from beauty has much capacity to quell suffering. This is why there is a custom of giving people who are suffering flowers.

But on the other side of that spectrum, suffering is just as much varied as life is. So the goal of ending suffering through bioengineering is not feasible. This is because such bioengineering endeavours always create uniformity, and the goal of creating difference would produce random monsters. To end all the different sources of suffering would require that all people be the same. I don't think that a thing which has been designed not to suffer could even be called alive.

The law of identity: A thing is the same as itself. What does this mean to you? Do you see any mention of a mind needing to apprehend that thing?

I think Gary explained it to you quite well. If I understood correctly, what he said was that for the (material) parts of the universe to get to where they are right now, from the big bang, they must have traveled faster than the speed of light. I did not check his math, but I think this is what he was saying anyway. Does it not make sense to you?

1 - the size of the universe, which on current estimates is more than 98bn light years across - and therefore more than 4 times the widest spread that could be achieved by an exploding singularity at the speed of light. — Gary Enfield

The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole. — RussellA

The law of identity stipulates that there are things independent of the mind, and these things have an identity proper to themselves. The true identity of the things might be completely different form how we conceptualize things. The thing itself is what Kant called noumenon. Of course, that there are independent things, and that they have an identity, are simply assumptions. And Berkeley makes very valid points, that we know things as forms, and a thing's identity is its form, therefore there is no need to assume the existence of matter at all. But when we deny the reality of matter then we need a mind to support the existence of the forms. So the recourse to Berkeley's arguments is to deny that there are any forms, things with identity, in the independent world, and assume that all is matter. Now we have your position, "that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind". There is matter outside the mind, but no things.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated. — RussellA

I agree, the question of existence of a "whole", as a form, or a thing with identity, is the issue here. We can assume that there are such things in the world, wholes which have an identity as a thing, but this is just an assumption which remains unproven. Furthermore, wholes are by their very nature organized structures, and it appears evident that only minds have the capacity to organize disorganized parts into a whole. So the question of a true whole, with organized parts, existing independently of all minds is very difficult.

Where you and I seem to disagree is on this issue of spatial separation in the independent world. I believe that if parts are united as a whole, there cannot be spatial separation between the parts. Space is what is external to a whole, and within the whole there cannot be "space" in the same sense of the word, because that is where the whole is. So whatever it is which unites the parts into a whole, it is existing in this area which is the internal of the whole, such that we cannot say that there is spatial separation between those parts.