What else could surprising/shocking mean? Also, what do you mean by "it has nothing to do with any supposed information within the message"? How would you come by information without a message and a medium for that message? If for instance, I read about rain in the Sahara, the message is the article on what is indeed a very rare event and the medium is the paper I'm reading. :chin: — TheMadFool

The information is "it rained in the Sahara", just like in the other instance, the information is "it rained in Oxford". How is whether or not this is surprising or shocking, at all relevant to the content of the information?

Glad that you figured that out. — TheMadFool

Figured what out, that Shannon is using "information" in a way which is completely inconsistent with common usage? I said that right from the beginning. The question is have you figured that out yet?

Thanks for your patience. I do agree that Claude Shannon's theory is not the only game in town insofar as information is concerned. I remember reading about another less-popular theory that's also out there. However, in the universe of computers, the world of 1's and 0's, in which it's almost a given that one binary state (1 or 0) should correspond to 1 unit of information, Claude Shannon's conceptualization of information as a process of reducing uncertainty of which alternative is true among [idealized] equiprobable alternatives has a natural and intuitive feel to it. The least amount uncertainty happens when we have two alternatives (0 or 1) and knowing that 1 or 0 is the case reduces the uncertainty to zero (only 1 of the two alternatives remain) and this suggests that for computers at least a 1 or a 0 should count as 1 unit of information. If the uncertainty is 4 alternatives, you would need 2 units of information to bring the uncertainty down to zero, and if the uncertainty is 8 alternatives, you'd need 3 units of information to make the uncertainty = 0 and that means the information content of a message that whittles down N equiprobable alternatives to 1 = lo2(N). This is a perfect fit for what I said a few lines above - that a 1 or a 0 should count as 1 unit of information as log2(2) = 1. — TheMadFool

The issue now is the relationship between uncertainty and information. In the normal, common expression of "information", some degree of uncertainty is inherent within the information itself, as ambiguity. In the way that you describe Shannon's expression of "information", information is the process which excludes uncertainty. Do you see the difference? Now the problem with Shannon's representation is that it cannot cope with the real uncertainty which is associated with ambiguity.

By the way, this just popped into my mind. Information is, in some sense, the opposite of ignorance and ignorance can be thought of as uncertainty among given alternatives e.g. If I don't know i.e. I'm ignorant of (I have no information on) who invented the Information theory then this state of not knowing can be expressed as consisting of the following equiprobable alternatives, just as Claude Shannon theorized, Vint Cerf OR Larry Page OR Mark Zuckerberg OR Claude Shannon... — TheMadFool

Again, this is not consistent with the common usage of "information". In common usage information is what informs a person, to deliver one from ignorance, and so being informed is the opposite of ignorance, but information, as that which informs, is not itself the opposite of ignorance. So, that information is the opposite to ignorance, is a category mistake relative to the common usage of "information".

Then why is it surprising that it rained in the Sahara and not that it rained in Oxford? — TheMadFool

As I pointed out, the surprisingness is only related to external information concerning the frequency of rain in these places, it has nothing to do with any supposed information within the message.

I admit that I'm not sure what the logic behind why the shocking/surprising is treated as having more information but if I were to hazard a guess it's got to do with what people refer to as the baseline - the greater the deviation from it, the more bits (units of information) necessary to code it into a message and the shocking/surprising certainly are major excursions from the..er...baseline, right? Food for thought: why is news "news"? New, shocking, surprising, out of the ordinary,... — TheMadFool

This is evidence of what I said, the "information" as the word is used here, is not within the message, it is in how the message is related to the "baseline".

Claude Shannon's information theory assumes that we've already passed those waypoints in our quest to understand quantify, efficiently transmit, information. Shannon's information theory is,whatever else it might be, not a philosophical inquiry into information and so we best refrain ourselves from raising philosophical objections to it - that would be like trying to diagnose a uterine malady in a man. — TheMadFool

If the accepted "information theory" represents information in a way other than the way that we normally use the word "information", and cannot account for the existence of information, according to how we normally use the word, as that which is transmitted in a message, then surely we are justified in "raising philosophical objections to it".

What I am saying therefore, is that Shannon's "information theory" does not deal with "information" at all, as we commonly use the word. If we do not recognize this, and the ambiguity which arises, between the common use, and the use within the theory, we might inadvertently equivocate and think that the theory deals with "information" as what is referred to when we commonly use the word to refer to what is inherent within a message.

I believe the man was a psychological genius, but is largely ignored as such.

Long live the Commonwealth!

It rained in Oxford every day this week: not surprising, very little information

It rained in the Sahara desert: surprising, high information content

Information: Shock/surprise value — TheMadFool

I don't think this is a valid conclusion. It rained in Oxford has the same degree of information as does it rained in the Sahara. The "shock/surprise value" refers only to how the piece of information relates to other information. If you allow that information is both, what is intrinsic to the message, and also how that message relates to other messages externally, then you have ambiguity as to what "information" actually refers to.

This is very evident in your example of "Rover is a poodle dog". "Dog" is only redundant when "poodle" is related to something else such as a definition. But if each word of the message needs to be related to something else, like a definition, then there is really no meaning in the message at all because the meaning is outside of the message in the act which relates the words to the definitions. The ambiguity is avoided by realizing that there is no information in the words, the information is in the act which relates the words to something else. What the words could mean, is anything, therefore random, and there is actually no information within the message. Information would actually be in the relationships established between the message and something else.

If this is the case, then to talk about there being "information" within the message is false talk. But, if there is no information within the message itself, we deprive ourselves of the capacity for explaining how any information gets from the transmitter to the receiver. There is actually no transmission of information whatsoever, nothing within the message, because all the information is really within the coding and decoding methods. If this is the case, then no information is ever transmitted. Therefore this way of defining "information" is really inadequate. It only appears to be adequate by means of the ambiguity which creates the impression that there is both information within the message and in how the message relates to other things. In reality there is no information within the message in this description.

It doesn't seem hypocritical to use reason to point to the limits of reason. As example, it wouldn't be hypocritical to use reason to point out that say, doing reason on this forum 24 hours a day probably wouldn't be healthy. — Hippyhead

The "limits of reason" is not the issue here.

But if you think they're hypocrites, I am not upset. — Coben

I don't think they're hypocrites, that's why I objected to your representation, which appeared to represent them as hypocrites.

Honestly this all seems extremely defensive. — Coben

When someone enters a thread, like you did, with explicit instructions of how the subject of the thread ought to be approached, then it's natural that those who believe otherwise would be defensive.

But long analytical discussions would be discouraged. — Coben

We do not pretend that our participation in this forum is an act of practising Buddhism. What is at issue here is your assertion that participation in this forum is inconsistent with Buddhist principles.

A librarian can shush people, even rather loudly (at least they used to do this) and be hypocritical only in an extremely binary interpretion of what they are doing, trying to make an environment conducive the activities libraries were once meant for. Yes, they made a noise. Does that use of noise reduce the overall noise and create a better environment for study and reading. I think it might. If the teacher of Buddhism compassion kills a person for killing a bird, ok, get out the you hypocrite signs. — Coben

Do you agree that there is a difference between talking and thinking, and that intellectualizing is a form of the latter, not the former? So this is not an apt analogy, because telling people not to talk, so that others can think, is not the same as telling people not to think (intellectualize). if we are telling people not to think, the reasons for this would be completely different, perhaps even opposite, from the reasons for telling people not to talk.

There are other non-verbal ways such things are discouraged. And sure, most adherents might have a conceptual insight about intellectualizing. If they begin to minimize their intellectualizing, that's a net gain. It's pragmatic, not some absolute moral stance that intellectualizing is bad. Longer sequences of it are problematic. It's what they have discovered or at least think they have and they try to minimize it. I don't think that's hypocrisy if some abstractions come up in the process. — Coben

If the goal is to minimize intellectualizing, then this is a different goal than is the goal of minimizing discussion. The reason for this goal might be as I described, to dispense with the bad habits of thought, in order to produce new, clean ways of thinking. And if this is the goal, the bad habits of thought might be the listening to others, and formulating ideas based on what others say. This would be intellectual laziness, letting others think for you. The good habits, on the other hand, might be to think things out for yourself, and make up your own mind, your own decisions. Then it would appear like the goal is to minimize discussion, when in reality the goal is to minimize the influence which others have over you through the means of discussion.

And yeah, I still think your reactions are odd, or better put, as I said above, defensive. Or perhaps you're critical of Zen Buddhism and you want me to admit I think it is hypocritical also. I don't. My issues with Buddhism have to do with the goals and practice, not with some perceived hypocrisy. — Coben

That the reply is "defensive" should not seem odd to you, for the reason explained. I am far from a scholar of Zen Buddhism, but it appeared to me like your issues with its "goals and practice", might really stem from misunderstanding. If a practice aims to help one find true understanding from within one's own person, rather than through some external instruction, then to portray that practice in terms of a system of instruction shows a misunderstanding.

It's not reasonable to expect reasonable dialog with Streetlight. — Hippyhead

We could say the same thing about tim as well.

Boy this thread has degenerated. A true representation of its title.

As far as the rest, there are all sorts of admonishments, especially in the Zen form of Buddhism, to avoid intellectualizing issues around Zen. — Coben

The point is, that such an admonishment is an intellectualization itself. Therefore presenting this as you do, is to represent Buddhism as hypocritical.

But I am going to drop out of this thread. I actually find the amount of negative reactions to this being pointed out rather odd. — Coben

It's only "the pointing out" which you are doing which is odd, not the reaction of others to it.. You are making the conclusion that Buddhism portrays intellectualizing as necessarily wrong, but that in itself is already an intellectualized conclusion. If you would follow the example, which you yourself put up, to "fist empty your cup", then you would see that it would be impossible to proceed to the conclusion that one ought to avoid intellectualizing, because this conclusion could only be supported through intellectualizing.

So again, if Buddhism is a process of editing thought content, isn't analysis and philosophy inevitable? — Hippyhead

I think that this is correct, thinking, and philosophizing will prove to be inevitable. The point though, is as Coben points out with the example, is that you must "first empty your cup". This means that correct thinking, in the form of philosophizing, can only be carried out without prejudice, an empty cup. This means that we must learn how not to think, to get into the proper position (empty cup), before we can learn the proper way to think. Since thinking is a process subject to habit, we must break all habits, good or bad (not being able to properly distinguish one from the other), and start from scratch.

To illustrate through a contrast, let's imagine that we were to instead define the problem which is being addressed as arising primarily from the nature of thought itself. In such a case, the suggested remedy might be simply reducing the volume and frequency of thought by various mechanical methods, which wouldn't necessarily require much if any philosophy. — Hippyhead

It may not be that the problem arises from thought itself, but from the form that thought takes. Being an activity, the form is the habits of the thinker. To break one's habits of thought would require a practise of not thinking at all, to empty one's cup.

Aristotle seems to have opted for 4 and Hegel 3 in their acts of violating the law of the excluded middle but they're equivalent - different sides of the same coin - because ~(p v ~p) = p & ~p. — TheMadFool

Logic needs to be supported by ontology to be applicable to what is real. And In relation to ontology, 3 and 4 are not the same. To understand this, you need to reflect on how they each relate to the first law of logic, the law of identity. When we take Aristotle's position, #4, neither/nor, what we say is that there is a deficiency in our capacity to identify, such that our terms of description are inapplicable. In other words, the object has not been properly identified to be represented as a logical subject. There is some type of inconsistency which makes description impossible. In the position #3, it is implied that the object has been properly identified, as the logical subject, but a logical description is impossible because contradiction is inherent within the object. So #4 implies that we need to develop a better system of identity, while #3 implies that identity is impossible.

As you can see 18. ~(p v ~p) violates the law of the excluded middle, and the Buddha and Nagarjuna have set their sights on exactly that - they're the Middle-Path guys. But, in classical logic, 18. ~(p v ~p) = (p & ~p) i.e. violating the law of the excluded middle takes the form of a contradiction and this is why I think Zen and Ch'an Buddhism are all about tackling paradoxes which are, to my knowledge, contradictions. — TheMadFool

Like Wayfarer, I'm not good with symbolic logic, but what you say is not a surprise. Aristotle demonstrated very clearly with many examples, why the law of excluded middle must be violated in order to understand what we know as activity, "becoming". To adhere steadfastly to that law allows sophist to prove all sorts of absurdities. The issue is, as I've explained, how we violate it, under what conditions. To determine the proper way requires that we understand fundamentally the three laws of logic, especially the pivotal, most important, and fundamental, law of identity.

Nice article Wayfarer. It describes how what is foundational, or basic to communication is uncertainty. This is contrary to what many on this forum argue, that certainty is the basis for, as necessary for, communication. It demonstrates clearly what Wittgenstein describes in his "Philosophical Investigations", how communication is fundamentally based in uncertainty, and as a practise, it is an attempt to reduce such uncertainty to a level which limits the possibility of mistake, contrary to the common notion that communication utilizes elements of crystalline meaning, ideals of certainty, utilizing a structure built on this.

Merry Christmas!

So long as the problem is defined as residing within the content of thought (ie. incorrect understandings) isn't philosophy inevitable? — Hippyhead

Why do you describe the content of thought as "incorrect understandings". Do you think that thought is necessarily wrong?

3. In the logic we use everyday - classical logic - the "middle" in the law of the excluded "middle" is a contradiction. If you violate the law of the "excluded" middle as the Buddha is doing (described above in 2) the end result should be a contradiction. In other words, the Middle-Path of the Buddha amounts to claiming contradictions are true. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, Zen koans are either full-fledged contradictions or evolving contradictions - Madhyamaka or the Middle-Path manifests in classical logic as contradictions. — TheMadFool

In metaphysics there are two distinct customary ways (sets of conditions) for violating the law of excluded middle, one is neither is, nor is not, the terms are not applicable, and this is expressed by Aristotle, and the other being both, is and is not, and this is expressed by Hegel.

The Aristotelian way is to assign reality to what is referred to by the concept of "potential", allowing this term to refer to what neither is nor is not. So for example, in the case of future events, like Aristotle's classic 'sea battle tomorrow', they neither are, nor are they not. And the reality of time is therefore accounted for by the concept of "potential" which refers to what may or may not be.

The Hegelian way, demonstrated in his dialectics of Being, allows that both what is, and is not, are subsumed within the concept of Becoming. This allows that both what is, and is not, coexist within the concept of Becoming. There aren't any real principles for separation, only an implied passing of time within "Becoming", which could separate is from is not. The result is some ontologies such as dialectical materialism, and dialetheism, which allow for the validity of contradiction, depending on how one interprets the role of time within Becoming.

I prefer the Aristotelian way, which gives a clear indication of how we ought to relate to time. Future events, are devoid of "actuality" (in the sense of being logically describable in terms of what is and is not), because they exist only potentially. He insisted we adhere to the law of non-contradiction, and we do not represent these events as a violation of it. This enforces a real separation between future and past because the reality of material existence, describable in terms of what is and is not, is true of the past only, therefore there is no such material existence in the future. This is consistent with human experience, and the Buddhist perspective, which emphasizes the importance of the present, and inspires us to the revelation that the entire material world is created anew with each passing moment of time. Such a revelation, as to the extreme complexity of this reality, which is completely and absolutely hidden from us, in itself, makes a wonderful eureka moment.

At no point was I saying that Buddhism was internally contradictory or hypocritical. — Coben

You didn't say it, but you implied that.

I think Buddhism, and especially Zen, makes it clear that the kinds of analysis be carried out in this thread, in this context, by at least a number of the participants is a dead end at best and an obstacle to the goals of Buddhist practice at best. — Coben

I can't say that I know all the precepts of Buddhism, but I really do not think that it provides you with the premise to draw this conclusion. I believe that the Buddhists provide an example of how to live a good healthy life, through principles of practise, putting emphasis on certain activities as being of a higher priority, more important, than others. If certain lower level activities, such as the kinds of analysis being carried out in this thread, interfered with, or in any way prevented one from carrying out the necessary higher level activities, which one is obliged to carry out through necessity of a healthy life, then this would be viewed as an obstacle. However, I don't see that you have the premise to say that Buddhism rejects this sort of activity necessarily.

That's probably why, in the examples Wayfarer gives, the Buddha does not answer such philosophical questions. Buddhism distinguishes the necessities of life from what is unnecessary, attempting to associate itself only with the necessary, as being what is important. This leaves philosophy as unnecessary, and outside the scope of Buddhism. So if one wants to practice philosophy, this must be done in one's own mind, on one's own time, and not under the pretense of doing so under the direction of the Buddha.

Why is our attention drawn away from the vast majority of reality and towards the tiniest fraction? — Hippyhead

We are inclined toward things which have value. And it's the rare things which have high value.

I certainly could have missed it but that wasn't what I was reacting to in the thread. It seemed to be trying to find out what the wise person meant via symbols and metaphors in the story. . — Coben

You must have missed my posts then. I was trying to determine whether the person's action, of burning the book, demonstrated a valid point. First I said the successor was wrong to burn the book, because as a symbol, the book was necessary to transmit meaning, regardless of whether the meaning is directly represented by the symbol as in the case of literal language. But then I reconsidered, and concluded that this idea was just part of my western attitude, and the influence of semiotics, the notion that all instances of meaning require signs or symbols, as a language. Then I realized the vast multitude of meaningful acts, agricultural production, labour in general, and creation, which are meaningful acts, and are fulfilled without the need for signs or symbols.

I haven't presented this as a moral issue, nor, I think have the others. It seems to me a practical issue. If the goals of Buddism and this, is behavior X a good one. Buddhism itself suggests it is not effective and in fact it is counterproductive to X. Unless one is saying the Buddhism is wrong about that, it is odd to be on the one hand treating a story in a sense as scripture while at the same time ignoring what the same sources say about analyzing and abstracting and focusing on mental verbal thinking. — Coben

You cannot divorce any practical issue from morality. Any practical question involves issues of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, good or bad, and these are all ultimately grounded in morality. That's what Aristotle demonstrated. Any means itself is an end, but also, any end can be viewed as a means to a further end, until you get to the ultimate end, which he posited as happiness. Therefore, ultimately only moral principles can determine whether behaviour X is a good one. The Buddhist seems to be saying that we cannot resort to scripture or language in any form, (these being always a means to a further end), to provide such guidance. Of course, we cannot refute this by applying principles based in words, because that would be begging the question. So only by turning to the practice itself can we determine its moral character. But that's already consistent with good ethics anyway. It's what Plato insisted, judge the action, not the narrative.

No, that's not what I am saying. I think the above should make clear what I am saying. In a context where people are treating something as authority and trying to work out what it means, it seems odd to me that what they are doing goes against those same authorities without at least, at the same time saying they are not authorities to be completely trusted. They would also, it seems to me, say why they trust the wisdom of the story, but have decided the Buddhism is incorrect on other issues. It's a bit like if I find a group of people treating a teaching story of Ghandi as total authority while at the same time advocating hitting people who disagree. I would immediately want, in that situation to say, Hey, you are treating G as an authority while ignoring an even more to G idea around non-violence. It seemed to me Ghandi was saying that non-violence is not only a more moral approach but a more practical one. If you think his other story is correct and threat it like scripture, why are you ignoring his core idea. And honestly are you in a place to judge either one yet? — Coben

This is the subject matter of hypocrisy, and it is not a simple field of study. I think that you are intentionally making it even more complex in the way that you portray Buddhism. I think you represent Buddhism as intrinsically incoherent in relation to hypocrisy, as unknowingly promoting the sort of activity which they say ought to be avoided. However, if the point is to deny the authority of words, then the saying that the authority of words ought to be avoided, itself must be disqualified. So for example, the master might present you with a story in words, and tell you not to think about anything presented in words. You see the inherent hypocrisy? But since both are presented in words, the story, and the instruction not to think about the story, the student has the choice of which to reject. Or, the student can reject Buddhism altogether, as hypocritically incoherent. But that's just a feature of your representation. Anytime you use words to represent philosophical principles which advocate transmission of meaning without the use of words, hypocrisy cannot be avoided. In reality, it is more evident that what Buddhism advocates is to accept the meaningful act for what it is, a meaningful act. But since such acts are prioritized in relation to importance, we cannot necessarily hand priority to the acts which use words. But in no way does this necessitate that we ignore the meaning of acts using words, as it does not exclude them from the classification of meaningful act.

No. I'm not saying that all relations are causal. Causality is a kind of relationship. So, if you are saying that there is information in the comparison of Joe's weight with Ron's, then information is actually in all relationships. That is fine with me. I sometimes use "relationships" and "process" instead of "information" to define the fundamental layer of reality. My "Information Philosophy" is very similar to Process Philosophy. — Harry Hindu

Why "process"? Do you deny the possibility of a static relationship? Are not the relationships between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc., static?

On the other hand, it seems to me that both Joe and Ron's weight is information, and Joe being heavier than Ron is a comparison of those two bits of information that then creates more information by inference - that Joe is heavier than Ron. So could you get the information that Joe is heavier than Ron without first having the information of Joe and Ron's weight, or Joe and Ron's physical appearance? In a sense, Jon being heavier than Ron is an inference, or an effect, of comparing the information of Joe and Ron's weight or physical appearance. — Harry Hindu

How is Joe's weight, or Ron's weight causal? That's what I don't understand. If a thing's weight is the product of a measurement, then this information is caused. But how would you account for the information within the thing itself? Clearly there must be some sort of information within the thing itself which is called "Joe", to validate the measurement as true. Isn't it the case that this information is there within Joe whether or not it acts as a cause in the case of Joe being measured?

You don't get it, either by choice or by intellectual diversity. — Book273

I "don't get it" because it's so blatantly illogical, and I can't believe that you could call this logic.

I will not attempt to explain auto immune response to you any more: you have no interest in the answers. Good day to you sir. — Book273

I was naively hoping that you might be able to give me something interesting. Actually I was quite certain that you had no such capacity, so I was just goading you. My apologies, I'm sorry, I shouldn't do that.

I don't really see the type of discussion in this thread as investigating the practice. And sure, religious people can be be wrong, but implicit in most of the posts I read here is 'there is wisdom in this story, what is that wisdom?'. Well if the working assumption is that these guy have wisdom and the issue is what is the specific wisdom and at the same time these traditions recommend against precisely this sort of activity, to me it doesn't make sense. For people who are not interested in achieving Buddhist goals or who simply want to use Buddhist ideas and stories as inspriation for their philosophical thinking, then it can certainly make sense. — Coben

There is just as much necessity to determine where the wise man goes wrong, as there is a necessity to follow the direction of the wise. No one is capable of perfection in guidance. Just because the person is wise, does not mean that we ought to mimic every action of the person, or follow every word. The wise, like the geniuses, are the ones who surpass the boundaries of existing knowledge, so it is very important to determine where they are wrong and where they are right in those endeavours. If our attitude is to think, Einstein said it, he's a genius therefore it must be correct, we will all be misled.

This is how philosophy proceeds, we look at the wisdom presented by the various respected philosophers (wise man), and discern correct from incorrect within those writings. And even if we look at the actions of various religious or mystical practices, as to whether, or whether not, to engage in them, we still must discern desirable from undesirable, just like we do with philosophical writings.

It appears to me, like modern western culture has led us down a pathway where the individual person's need to develop the philosophical capacity to discern good from bad is completely ignored, or even hidden from us. It's as if we are taught that this moral capacity just comes naturally, through instinct. We can automatically discern good from bad without the need for philosophical training. It is also implied that the authorities are necessarily correct, or else they wouldn't be authorities. I hope that the presence of president Trump serves as a wakeup call, as to how deceptive this idea can be.

So if a wise man says to you "don't doubt my wisdom for it is true wisdom, therefore you ought not doubt it", and the man has proven himself to be truly wise, by amassing a multitude of followers, would you say that we ought not question that man's wisdom? Because this is what you appear to be saying.

If there are no symptoms prior to a trigger event then, logically, the triggering event was the cause of the body electing to turn on itself and begin attacking itself. — Book273

I can't believe you call that logic. Logic is supposed to rule out other possibilities, not simply ignore them. Your premises are sorely lacking. That's like saying exposure to an allergen is logically the cause of the allergy because there were no symptoms prior to that. See, you're sort of missing a premise or two, the false ones which would be required for your conclusion.

Are you saying that all relations are causal? What about something like Joe is heavier than Ron? Isn't that information which is not a matter of causality?

We have terms that have more than one definition, so I don't understand this sudden aversion to different words meaning the same thing, or words that have more than one definition. It would only matter if the definitions contradicted each other, and they don't. — Harry Hindu

You can commit the fallacy of equivocation without the definitions contradicting each other, all that is required is that the word has two distinct meanings.

Most of the histories that I have taken have the patient claiming that the symptoms were first noticed after some sort of event. — Book273

Right, the symptoms which are observed are the effect of the underlying condition, and the event is a sort of trigger. The trigger is not the cause, as I demonstrated in my example of anger. The event which triggers my anger is not the cause of my anger. The underlying condition, my disposition is the cause of my anger. When my anger is triggered, that event of anger is the effect of the underlying, internal cause, my disposition, it is not caused by the trigger. Otherwise I could not be held responsible for my actions when I get angry.

So clearly it is not a conventional representation to portray the trigger as the cause. That is a fantasy inconsistent with reality, and you are portraying the effects of the disease as if they are the causes of the disease.

No. It's not.

First, I'm not a materialist. Second, I'm not trying to escape the need for anything except unnecessarily complex assertions using terms that you don't even understand what they mean, and can't be consistently or properly be used. — Harry Hindu

So, let me give you an example of the ambiguity then.

The more complex something is, the more information there is.

If information only exists in minds and data exists everywhere else then meaning would be arbitrary and imaginary. If there are reasons some dara exists, then those reasons would be the meaning of the data. Those causal relationships are already there prior to some mind apprehending them. So information appears as data when the causal relationship is not apprehended, and it appears as information when it is apprehended. — Harry Hindu

See the ambiguity in your usage? You start out by saying information is in the complex thing. Then you end up saying that this is really "data", and it only appears to be information when apprehended by a mind. So which is it, is information in the thing as what we call "data", or is it how the data appears to the mind when apprehended? You do understand that there is a difference between these two don't you? And to switch back and forth is to equivocate.

Yes, causality is related to time, however I don't see how it follows that that would mean it is a property of a system. — Harry Hindu

I wasn't talking about "causality", I was talking about "information". Why change the subject? The second law of thermodynamics stipulates a direct relationship between entropy and time. Further, entropy is a defining feature of information theory through the concept of "uncertainty". So we have a direct relation between information and time, through the concepts of uncertainty, entropy, and the second law.

And, "entropy" is by definition the property of a system. It refers to that system's capacity to do work. Any system loses its capacity to do work, as time passes, simply as a function of time passing. That's how the possibility of a perpetual motion machine is ruled out. The system loses its capacity to do work, because energy is actually lost from the system, but there is "uncertainty" as to exactly what happens to that energy, it simply cannot be accounted for within the system. But the first law of thermodynamics stipulates that energy must be conserved, so the uncertainty as to what happens to that energy is expressed as a loss of information. If we assume a closed system, and maintain the first law, then energy which can be accounted for is information, and energy which cannot be accounted for is entropy.

Again, here you are using the word, "time" inappropriately. What is, "time"? Isnt time just another word for change? Is change fundamental, or is the substance that changes fundamental? Can you assert that one is more fundamental than the other? Does it even make sense to separate one from the other? — Harry Hindu

I don't see how any of this is relevant. I used "time" in the way that it is used in the second law of thermodynamics. Any other way that "time" might be used is irrelevant and a distraction.

That's better. I wondered what had happened to the old MU with all this "I'm sure the experts know best" malarkey. — Isaac

That's the malarkey right here. When have I ever said anything even remotely like what you quote me as saying? It doesn't even sound like anything I would think of. So how is that the old MU, "I'm sure the experts know best"? The only position I have taken in this particular discussion is a stand against the notion that there is a direct relationship between taking vaccines and developing an autoimmune disease.

This is much more like it - startlingly egotistical pronouncements of certainty on topics you clearly have absolutely no training or understanding of...the world's back to normal again. — Isaac

Well, are you ready to show me the evidence then? Where has it been demonstrated that the introduction of one type of molecule into a living human system could cause an autoimmune disease? Or at least clarify as to why you think my statement to the contrary is a startlingly egotistical pronouncement of ignorance. It seems like a statement of what is common everyday knowledge to me.

Bold request since no one really understands auto immune diseases. — Book273

Exactly, that's the point I've been trying to impress upon Isaac here. Autoimmune diseases are extremely complex. Isaac seems to think that they are extremely simple, like a matter of injecting a particular molecule into a body, and boom, there you have it, an autoimmune disease has been caused.

We theorize that auto-immune diseases are triggered by an event.. — Book273

I thought the prevailing intelligence was that they are most likely genetic. If this is the case than portraying them as being triggered by "an event" is completely inaccurate. For example, suppose I have a disposition towards anger. Even though it is a true representation to portray any particular instance of anger as being triggered by an event, It's completely inaccurate to portray my disposition toward anger as being triggered by an event. It is a reversal of cause and effect. So your phrase, "triggered by an event" demonstrates that you are trying to portray an effect as the cause.

Little known detail outside of the healthcare world: most of our hospitals run at 95-115% capacity as an operating normal. — Book273

This is exactly why the governments enforce lockdown measures, they haven't the capacity for any type of surge. If the hospitals were sitting empty, and the healthcare staff were idle with no cash flow, we might see them lobby the government to encourage more people to get sick.

My own authentic view is that the matter is not black and white at all. A lot of the psychiatrists are so quick to want to medicate at the slightest trace of an unusual idea or belief. The nurses can also be very quick to condemn anything which seems out of the norm, and this included religious and non religious staff. Often, at work I used to say things which they looked a bit puzzled about. I think if I was working in mental health care at the moment and told some of the discussions I am having on this site they would query my sanity. — Jack Cummins

I believe our society has a tendency to streamline normalcy more than what might be necessary. So students are funneled through a narrow passageway. The problem with not giving them a wider berth is that once they are outside the straight and narrow they are labeled and then there is no incentive for the individual to go back into the confines of normalcy. This might be like being shunned, and then they will just drift further away. So we have illnesses like ADHT for example, and it's difficult to grasp how pointing out to a child that they have a mental illness like this, will affect the child, and also difficult to know if medication is good for this child in the long run.

I see a real difficulty in defining "the norm". And even once "the norm" is defined, isn't it still expected as "normal", that some people will fall outside these boundaries? Is it right to use medications in an attempt to bring people back within the boundaries? Of course if a person is violent and a threat to others, medication to calm the person is required. But in a case like ADHT isn't it more like the medication is just being used in an attempt to keep the person within the stipulated boundaries of normalcy?

I am inclined to think that a lot of what is manifesting in mental illness in our times is related to deep levels of suffering and conflict in the mass psyche of humanity. I really don't think that there are any easy solutions.I am not against psychiatric medicine but think that a deeper level of healing wisdom is also needed on many levels. — Jack Cummins

I tend to think that we take "the mass psyche of humanity" for granted. We take it for granted that there is a united humanity, that there is a normal human being, and such things, when in reality these things are only created through moral effort. So when we take it for granted, we do not put in the effort required to keep the psyche healthy and together. And this is when things start to fall apart.

It is amusing that you cannot see what you mean when you say morality is a matter of cause and effect when for me it is as obvious as night and day. How can that be? How can we both be so sure of what we know and disagree?

Everything must be pleasing to mother nature because when we go against her, things go wrong. This does not make the earth quake or volcanos spew smoke and lava, but if we pollute and land and water we harm life. If we cause the extermination of animal, insect, and plant species, we unset the balance of nature. We may be destroying our planet. Moral, this behavior needs to change. — Athena

I still don't see what you mean by morality being a matter of cause and effect. To me, morality is foreseeing a bad thing before it occurs and preventing it, or foreseeing a good thing, and encouraging it. I suppose you could call this cause and effect, in a way. But we cannot look at bad things which have already happened, and say that this must change, because it's too late, those bad things have already happened, and cannot be changed. All we can do is look ahead toward the future and try to do what we think is right, and avoid doing what we think is wrong.

Here's an unorthodox way of looking at intuition. Intuition is like an inner voice, which inspires one to act in any particular way; the actions might even be sort of random. Some people might even argue that this inner voice comes from God, or aliens, or whatever type of being which acts to inspire one through the internal mechanisms of the human being, rather than externally.

As soon as we are born into the world, we are taught to quell this internal force to act, and listen only to the external voices. The external voices are the voices of reason, and the internal voice must be subdued in order that we can be rational beings. "Normal" childhood development consists of suppressing the internal voice with the conscious mind receiving its information externally, and developing the alternative, the voice of reason. Before the child can even get a glimpse of what is going on, the internal voice is suppressed to the extent that the conscious, reasonable, "normal" mind does not even remember the existence of the internal voice. Consequentially "normal" people are not very intuitive. However, in some cases the internal voice is not so suppressed as it is in other cases and this allows for idiosyncrasies.

Often these are of a negative nature for the person, but in some instances it is possible that the person can be seeing aspects of wisdom which others cannot see. — Jack Cummins

This is a key point which I made earlier in the thread. You say "these are of a negative nature", referring to these thoughts, or "voices". But we need to put "negative" into some context, some form of scale providing standards of better or worse, in order to validate that judgement. Commonly we would use social conventions, the norms of our culture, as the standard for such a judgement. Then "outside the norms of our culture" might stand as the basis for a judgement of "negative". However, we see as a fact, evidenced by empirical experience, the existence of genius for example, that the scale which allows for "outside the norms of our culture" extends both ways outside, to the negative and to the positive. Therefore if we judge a certain type of thinking as "outside the norms of our culture", we need to devise some other principle whereby we can distinguish negative from positive.

But is it meaningful to consider the structure of inorganic matter in terms of ‘information’? Science has long since come to understand the atomic weight of the elements in the periodic table, which constitutes information about the nature of the elements. But is it meaningful to represent the elements as being actually ‘composed of information?’ Even if everything about the elements could be represented mathematically - and mathematical physics has many gaps in its accounts - is it true to say that this mathematical information is the substance from which the elements are constituted? That’s what I am dubious about. — Wayfarer

"Information" Is an ambiguous term which allows the modern materialist, or physicalist, through the use of illusion, to escape the need for God in metaphysics. It is directly related to time in the second law of thermodynamics, and this allows the premise that if there is time, there is information. The problem though is that under this definition "information" is necessarily the property of a system, as entropy is defined as the property of a system. If the metaphysician ignores this fundamental requirement of "information", one can also ignore the fact that a "system" is an artificial thing with definite boundaries. The boundaries of "the system" in this modern form of metaphysics will be the beginning and ending of time. But as you can see this is a sort of logical incoherency, an epistemological trick, because the proposal is to assume that something with unknown boundaries must have actual boundaries. The illusory assumption therefore, is that we can start from the premise that the boundaries are known, as is necessary to describe this "system", and proceed using the "system" which we describe from this premise.

That's exactly the point of the Enformationism thesis. Generic (general, universal, creative) Information is Meta-physical. But it has the power to transform into Physical things, including living things --- just like Energy --- and like Plato's Forms. — Gnomon

This is a very good example of how the ambiguity of "information" allows a metaphysician to avoid the need for God. Since the second law of thermodynamics describes entropy as increasing while time passes, the beginning of time is described as the most highly informed, or organized state. This allows that the information can pass into any other possible highly organized states as time passes and the system entropizes. The premise that the system starts from the highest possible state of organization allows that the system transforms itself into other highly organized states through random changes of entropization. But we ought to see through this smoke and mirrors illusion, to realize that this is only possible because the most highly organized state possible is premised as the beginning state. And of course such a beginning state could only be created by an omniscient Being. So the premise that information is fundamental, implies that God is even more fundamental. But this implication is simply ignored or denied by the informationist.

Trump supporters will either will decide they are lying or decide — FreeEmotion

Oh yeah, after the thousands of lies that Trump has made while in office never lost him any support, what's going to change now?

I just presumed that you'd have no reason to disbelieve me. I can cite a dozen trial results, but if you've already decided that I'm making stuff up I'm sure you'd just sweep them away somehow too. There's little point in continuing along those lines. — Isaac

The fact that some people are worried that a vaccine might cause an autoimmune disease, does not constitute a logical relationship between vaccines and autoimmune diseases. Worry does not imply logical.

Absolute nonsense. Pharmaceutical trials are not public relations exercises. — Isaac

Tell me another one Isaac, LOL! The product must be accepted by, then sold to the public, as the goal is to make money. Don't you agree? So, how could these trials be anything other than public relations exercises? The goal of the trial is to make the product appear acceptable to the public, so that it will be bought.

How does it being complex prevent it from being triggered by some molecule. And if not triggered by some molecule, then what is it triggered by? Something from another realm? — Isaac

If the injection of one type of molecule could cause the disease, then it has a simple cause, and is therefore not a complex disease. I'm quite confident that if the cause of any particular autoimmune disease was the presence of one type of molecule, that cause would have been found by now.

I think it was common for humanity to fear an angry god. It is not always the fault of humans if a god/goddess is angry but just the same we better do what we can to make the god/goddess happy because bad things happen when a god/goddess is upset. But I don't think jealousy was a common trait of gods and goddesses. Oh my goodness, the more I think on this the more interesting the subject becomes! I don't think Zeus was a jealous god but his wife Hera sure was! Another point of interest here is Hera did terrible things to female humans who Zeus was interested in, but she did not punish the whole of humanity. — Athena

The god of the Old Testament is definitely described as jealous on a number of occasions. That's why we wants Abraham's people, the Hebrews, to worship no other god than him. The point though, was the question of why they would portray God as having human characteristics like anger and jealousy which are not seen as really good traits. Is it the case that these were seen as good traits back then? More likely it is the case that they wanted to portray God in a way that would make people fear and obey Him.

But then with the New Testament and Christianity, God is portrayed as loving and caring, supremely good. I think that this demonstrates an evolution in the way that human beings view morality and ethics. At first it was thought that the way to make people behave is to threaten them with punishment, and strike fear into their hearts. Then it was learned that the better way is to forgive, love, and care for people. And we can see that they went from the ten commandments of "thou shalt not..." to the single golden rule of what to do, love your neighbour. I think it's far more effective to encourage cooperation and morality through kindness than it is to try and force morality through threats of punishment.

Would you be interested in a more focused discussion of the gods and the evolution of this kind of thinking? — Athena

What did you have in mind, a new thread? If so, I'd participate.

I claim a moral is a matter of cause and effect and that makes good moral judgment a matter of logic. — Athena

i really cannot see what you mean when you say morality is a matter of cause and effect.

But if we think God is in control and what is happening is His plan, then this planet will loose most of the life on it. — Athena

This is an example of fate, determinism, which is not an example of believing in God, rather it's the contrary. A religious person cannot look at the effects of the actions of atheists as God's plan.

I really like your last sentence! :cheer: what a yummy thing to contemplate! What is the spirit of the Christian who ignores knowledge, and the spirit of the pagan who thinks that knowledge is vitally important? Also, what is the source of spirit? When I felt my mother had betrayed me by lying to me about Santa Claus, she lovingly explained Santa Claus is the spirit of Christmas. The spirit of Christmas is clearly manifested by thoughts and actions.

Morale is that high spirited feeling we have when we believe we are doing the right thing. The American spirit is that high morale, and a high mortality is essential to our liberty and democracy. So what would you say is the source of spirit? — Athena

Really, I think spirit is inherent within all living things as the source of living action, vitality. But it needs to be cultured, directed, otherwise it will go in any random way. I believe there are two features to guidance. One is to stop the inclination toward action, and this is will power. In conscious human actions It goes against the spirit, preventing rashness and ill-tempered actions, encouraging prudence. The other is knowledge and this allows that the spirit which has been brought under control through will power might be pointed in the right direction.

I went through the article quickly to get the gist of it, and I find it a good comparison. But I don't accept Hegel's dialectics of sublation. I don't agree with the process in principle because of the way that it fails to deal with the potential for contradiction. So when the article gets to the discussion of the infinite, I find that the classifications made, external/internal, subjective/objective, are not well supported.

Zen places a lot of emphasis on 'subitism' which is a sudden and radical transformation or conversion. — Wayfarer

Subitism is an excellent topic for a thread of its own. It figures prominently into Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" but remains unexplained, as hidden. Here there is basically a gap which develops between learning through repetition, and the sudden grasp of the eureka moment. The gap manifests from a description of the mechanics of learning. Wittgenstein describes the repetition feature as a machine, directly observable in instances like learning mathematical procedures and reading. But it is implied that even in such repetitive type learning, there is a moment of sudden apprehension when the person moves from simply memorizing the motions of the procedure, to actually understanding what is going on. So it appears like the two aspects, repetition of practice and sudden enlightenment, are features of all learning.

The following article attempts to place the two into the terms of Hegelian teleology, "means and ends". Consider that the Zen way of 'transmission outside words and letters', is portrayed as a removal of the means to the end, to achieve the end without use of the means. The article implies that this is impossible, but the Hegelian method is to consider each individual means as an end in itself, and so the gradual way becomes a succession of individual moments of enlightenment. But the subitists seem to warn us that this cannot be the true representation of enlightenment because it becomes an infinite procedure with no true finality.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/267922692.pdf

I think the God of Abraham religions are the most threatening because of the notion of a god having favorite people, which is connected to a notion that this god wants us to engage in wars that include us in His "power and glory". — Athena

That ancient God is a bit weird, "jealous" for example, and angry such that He might smite you. In those times I think they were assigning to God human emotions, which it was later realized that a well-tempered person ought to control. This might be an indication of how human attitude toward different emotions evolves. Jealousy seemed like it might be considered a good trait back then, but now it is not considered to be a good emotion. In any case, human emotions were attributed to God. You might notice that Jesus rebelled against the misrepresentation of the relationship between people and God. In Christianity most the human characteristics of God are removed, except love, but we're still left with a weird relationship between Jesus and God.

Being virtuous requires knowledge of virtues so I would not agree with Socrates and his student, Plato, on this point. — Athena

Being virtuous does require knowledge, this is not what is disputed by Plato. What is disputed is the idea that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. Knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient. We will sometimes go ahead and engage in activity which we know is wrong.

"Logically" we can not know the right thing and do the wrong thing. It is illogical to do what will bring harm to ourselves and others. — Athena

Since we very clearly can go ahead and act in ways that are illogical, doing something which we know is illogical (maybe buying a lottery ticket as a simple example), I think we might find that virtue is not based in logic. Plato introduced a tripartite person. To the body/mind division he added spirit or passion as a medium between the two. Spirit, or passion, is responsible for action, later becoming known as will, and in Plato's theory the spirit can ally with the mind, to ensure that we act rationally, but also the spirit might ally with the body which would influence us to act irrationally. So in the instances when we know the right thing but do the wrong thing, the spirit, which is the cause of action, is aligned with the body rather than the mind.

Your argument is like ordering a glass of water and then complaining that it is not what you want when it is served warm. In 1958 we stopped transmitting the culture that we had put in place for a highly moral society that can enjoy liberty without authority above the people and without social problems, and we left moral training to the church. This was a huge mistake! — Athena

This might be argued as a "huge mistake", but someone else might argue that separating church from state was an even bigger mistake. Looking back in time and pointing to what you apprehend as a mistake is probably not very productive because I think it's better to look at history as a natural progression, an evolution. Whether the process is a corruption, and the species is headed toward extinction, or the process is a generation, and the species is evolving toward something better, would be an extremely complicated and difficult judgement.

Science can just as easily be tied to morality. Research on poverty and human problems such as schizophrenia, or prejudice, etc. is tying science and morality together. A moral is a matter of cause and effect and that is why science is very important! — Athena

I don't see this at all. Morality is not a matter of cause and effect, it is a matter of determining good from bad, proper judgement of goals. Before we can determine the required means (cause), we need sound judgement that the desired end is actually good, not just appearing to be good. How could science actually determine what is good, rather than just being the pragmatist's means for obtaining what has already been determined as good, through the use of some other principles?

The OP is basically asking how opposites interact. Well MU, how do opposites interact? — Harry Hindu

Have you seen a battery? There's a negative pole and a positive. You put a wire across, and if the battery is strong enough you'll see sparks. That's how opposites interact.

Which is the same as saying that pattern and the substance are one and the same as you can never have one without the other - ontologically. The distinction you are talking about only exists in your mind as language concepts. — Harry Hindu

The pattern, and the substance, are not the same, because the pattern is a mental construct, an abstraction, and the substance is what is independent. We observe the activity and replicate it as "a pattern". But the pattern of waves on water is applicable to other substances, therefore the pattern and the substance are not one and the same. It's the same principle as any property. The property and the substance are not one and the same, because the property is the creation of our sense perception. We see an object as red, but many other objects will be seen as red also. Therefore the property and the substance are not one and the same. The property is a feature of our perception.

However, if we want to allow that the property, or abstraction which is within our mindshas real existence, we need to provide it with a designation of "substance" because substance is what supports the reality of existence. The substance which supports mental things must be different from the substance which supports independent things or else we would have no way to distinguish fact from fiction, as fictions have real (substantial) existence within the mind, but not independent from the mind.

I am now wondering if part of the problem is that dualists seem to think that they see the world as it is (naive realists), and how it appears is different than how it is thought about - hence dualism. You think that the duality exists ontologically, and are unwilling to ponder the possibility that the way it appears in the mind may be different than how it actually is (but that isn't necessarily saying that we can never know about how it actually is). — Harry Hindu

The fact that how the thing appears to the mind is different from how it is independent from the mind is evidence of the reality of dualism. This is because we must account for the existence of both, the appearance, and the independent object. Existence is supported by substance. There is a difference between the independent object and the appearance. The difference cannot be a difference of form because the form of the object is what we come to know, and this would mean we could not know the object because the two forms would be different.. Therefore the difference must be a difference of what underlies, or supports the form, and this is substance.

Pay attention to the bolded part: This can be said about earth, water, fire and air, so why dualism? Your focus on mind and body being special and fundamental would simply be a personal fetish with the two. — Harry Hindu

It's a matter of reduction. There is only a need for two substances to account for the existence of minds and the medium between minds. Being a monist, you have no prerogative for that objection. You want to reduce all to one. The dualist simply points out to the monist, that there needs to be two fundamentally distinct substances, to account for the reality of separation between minds. If you can pull yourself away from your monist assumptions and accept the reality of the need for dual substances, then we can apply the dualist principles and see if a need for other substances arises. So far it has not. But you, insisting on monism are in no place to talk about a possible need for a further multitude of fundamental substances.

You're assuming that there can't be different kinds of one "substance" (again, you haven't even explained what you mean by the word, or what qualifies as a "substance", so until you do, I'm assuming that you don't know what you're actually talking about when you use that word). Just as we have all the different elements that are just different configurations of atoms, we can have different configurations of one "substance". There are different configurations of the same "substance" between the configurations that are our minds. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I agree that there are different configurations of the same substance between our minds. However, within our minds must be a different substance or else there would be no real separation (no real boundary) between our minds. Our minds would interact directly. Hence the need for two distinct substances and no more than two. And if we assume that it is the case that only the different configurations are what have boundaries, then we still need a distinct substance which constitutes those boundaries. Again, we have a need for two distinct substances and no more than two. The need for two distinct substances is unavoidable.

I've come to reconsider what I said yesterday. I no longer believe that the physical object as a symbol (spoken word, written word, book, gift, or whatever) is a necessary requirement for a meaningful action. I now think that a meaningful action does not require the use of symbols or signs. This is contrary to the Western way of looking at meaning in general, as an aspect of language, and more specifically contrary to semiotics which attempts to reduce all meaningful activity to a usage of signs.

Even in Christian religions strong importance is placed on love, and love is judged by its actions. These actions are very meaningful but they do not necessarily employ the use of symbols. And if we look to what is considered to be the supreme act of love, the creative act of God, we find that there are physical objects involved, the creation, but the objects are not meant to be signs or symbols. Therefore we have very good examples of meaningful acts which do not necessarily involve the use of symbols, so the assumption that meaning requires the use of symbols or signs is unwarranted.

Furthermore, if we classify some meaningful acts as requiring the use of symbols, we will find that in a hierarchy of importance, these acts of using symbols are the lower levels of meaning. The meaningful acts of true love and creation which do not necessarily require the use of symbols are of a higher importance.

So look at Hui Neng's poem. He first dismisses symbolism as not fundamental. He then takes us to the nothingness which precedes creation, and all such symbolism, implying that the fundamental acts of creation are of greater importance than the acts which use symbols. Notice, that he was an illiterate farmer. Being nevertheless very wise, he probably recognized that the activity which creates agricultural produce, is of greater importance and therefore fundamentally more meaningful than the activity which uses words. And through his legendary actions we can find a demonstration that meaning is based in a form of activity which is other than a usage of symbols or signs.

Guillain-Barré syndrome, multiple sclerosis, type 1 diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, Bell’s palsy, paraesthesia, and inflammatory bowel disease are all routinely checked during trials for new vaccines or new adjuvants. Autoimmune issues are a significant concern. What's been debunked is the idea that any existing vaccines cause such issues (in significant enough quantity to out weigh their advantages). This hasn't just magically made all future vaccines safe, what a ridiculous notion. You'd be arguing that it is impossible for any injected molecule of any sort to cause autoimmune conditions. — Isaac

You haven't presented any logical relationship between any vaccination and any autoimmune disease. The fact that it is checked for in trials does not demonstrate a logical relationship. What it demonstrates is that some people are afraid that a vaccine might cause an autoimmune problem so it is checked for in trials, in order to demonstrate to these people that it does not.

And, I think it is actually highly unlikely that an injected molecule of any sort could cause a chronic autoimmune condition. These conditions are extremely complex with unknown causes. So, if it were the case that the injection of a molecule into the body could cause such an illness, I think it would not be the case that these conditions are extremely complex with unknown causes.

What's ironic is that this is coming from someone who thinks every mathematician in the world has made an error, but you can't even conceive of the idea that pharmaceutical researchers might have done. Just goes to show the quasi-religious hold these people have over the population. Fear of death...come to think of it, it's not so different from religion afterall. — Isaac

I don't deny that there are huge evils within the pharmaceutical industry. But I think that connecting vaccines with autoimmune diseases is a case of barking up the wrong tree. Most businesses involve themselves in some goods, along with some evils. If the pharmaceutical industry has some goods along with their evils, why attack the goods as if they are evils?

What scientific theory says that waves are immaterial? — Harry Hindu

Have you studied any physics. Science holds that waves are patterns of motion within a material substance composed of parts. They are a change in the relations between the parts of the material substance. As such, the substance is material and the wave is immaterial.

The wave-particle duality is an epistemological distinction, not an ontological one. — Harry Hindu

What are you talking about Harry? Wave-particle duality is a description supposed to be concerning the reality of what is, therefore it is ontological. It refers to two distinct aspects of the same situation being described, the wavefunction, and the particle. It is not two distinct descriptions of the very same thing, therefore not an epistemological distinction. Failure to recognize that the "wavefunction" and "the particle" refer to two distinct things assuming that they both refer to the very same thing, would create many contradictions. Epistemology does not allow contradiction therefore we must maintain that the distinction is ontological.

You are making an unwarranted assertion that the medium between minds is different than the medium of your mind... — Harry Hindu

It's clearly not unwarranted. Something must constitute the separation between minds. If what was between your mind and my mind was the same thing as what's in my mind, and the same as what's in your mind, there would be no separation between our minds. However, we experience separation. We cannot posit a real boundary between one thing and another, unless there is a different sort of substance which constitutes the boundary. A boundary is only real (substantial) if there is a difference of substance. If it is all water, within my mind, and yours, and everywhere between us, then there is no separation between us. If it is evident that there is a separation, as it is, then we need to posit another substance which forms the boundary.

Thanks for the explanation Wayfarer, it's appreciated. I think we all need to apprehend that there is so much meaning in actions which are not a use of words; words are just an accessory of convenience. If we fail to grasp this we do not understand the first thing about meaning.

I believe ↪Book273 explained, just not in great length. Perhaps its brevity is insufficient for you, but it is still an explanation. But seriously, you haven't heard about the correlation between vaccines and autoimmune diseases? — Merkwurdichliebe

I thought the idea that vaccines actually cause autoimmune diseases was debunked a long time ago. Is that baseless hypothesis still floating around? Your quote only says that several ways that vaccines might cause autoimmune diseases have been proposed. Since they are proposing "several" ways which vaccines "might" cause such a thing , I conclude that there is no evidence of any single one way, and the author is clutching at straws.

Book273's "explanation", if you want to call it that, was sorely lacking. Do you think you can do better? And please don't give me several ways that this might happen. I want an explanation of how it does happen.

If someone believed in the existence of God then they had a Truth to their life. Otherwise why would you believe it? If and when someone begins to doubt the existence of God and eventually repudiates that existence with what do they replace that Truth they had? — Brett

Wouldn't there necessarily be a reason for the person to doubt and then reject "God"? Wouldn't this reason be the person's new Truth? However, the person might just become extremely doubtful and skeptical of Truth altogether. Some people argue that this type of doubt constitutes the person's new Truth, "there is no Truth". But I do not see it that way. I think it's a very naive way of viewing this situation. In reality, to have faith in Truth, and to be skeptical are two very distinct attitudes, and one cannot be reduced to a form of the other.

Therefore I would describe your example as a change in attitude, one type of attitude is replaced with another. The change might go the opposite way as well. Also, I firmly believe that a person cannot go directly from having faith in one Truth, to having faith in an incompatible Truth without going through a transition period of skepticism, having no faith. If this is true, it means that we must firmly reject one faith, by switching to an attitude of skepticism, before we are capable of accepting a new faith.

This I think, is the reason why many arguments in this forum are fruitless. Instead of sowing the seed of skepticism in the mind of a person with an opposing faith, whereby the person would be induced to doubt what one currently believes, most posters in this forum simply try to convince others that their view is the correct one. Arguing one's own perspective is ineffective toward changing the attitude of another. What is required is to change the person's attitude, to instill doubt, releasing the person from the binds of certitude toward what one believes. This is to produce an open mind on the subject.