Truth be told, I have no interest in developing perfect pitch. It would require substantial work and would serve very little purpose to me. I would never substitute the autotuner. Maybe it might impress some (a small class of people) as a party trick, but that's not my MO. Nevertheless, I am interested in your own tales of success and failure; hopefully the former, for your sake.

But what happens if it turns into one of those things, where you invest substantial time and effort, and still find that your "absolute" is not quite perfect. After all that time and effort, quitting wouldn't seem right, especially since you're making progress. So of course, more time and effort will better your skill. But then it's still not perfect, so you're inclined to invest more time and effort. At what point do you say "my absolute best is never going to be perfect, so I ought to quit wasting my time"?

A word like “baby” doesn’t have intrinsic meaning just as a collection of four letters. It gains meaning as a communal habit of interpretation. — apokrisis

Every time that a word is used it has meaning at the time of being used, by the very fact that it was used. This means that the first time that the word "baby" was used (we can assume that there was a first time can we not?), it was not a communal habit of interpretation which gave it its meaning, because there was no communal habit of interpretation of that word at that time..

So how do you use “baby” in a sentence? Do you always have your own completely private meaning in mind? Is that a useful habit do you find? — apokrisis

Yes, I always have a very private reason for using that word, and not choosing another word like "infant" or "child". And, yes I find it very useful, having my own private reason for choosing the words that I do. This makes the words that I use very well suited to my own private intentions. Why would you think that it's not useful?

Do you think that different people must carry out precisely similar actions in order for the action of one individual to be meaningful to another? Of course this is not the case, meaning is found in difference, not in similarity. Are you familiar with what is called "the division of labour"? There you will find clear evidence that difference between the actions of individuals is the essential property of meaning, not similarity. It is the fact that your actions are different from mine which makes your actions meaningful to me, not some supposed similarity. So your idea that people must act according to some "communal habit", (which would incline them to all do the same thing), in order for their actions to have meaning, is the furthest possible thing from the truth.

The usefulness of a theory certainly is a better indicator of truthfulness than of falsity. — Pantagruel

I don't see any logic behind this. Perhaps, statistically speaking, a useful theory might be more likely to turn out to be true than to be false. But even if this is true, (and I doubt that it is), it does not give reason to accept a theory which is demonstrably false, yet useful, as true.

Oh, and just saying that you have refuted my examples, doesn't make it so. — Pantagruel

Tell me then, what is your response to the simple logic which I presented. The activities of a group of people cannot be described as the activities of a "system", until the people can be observed to be acting in a specific way. The "system" only exists after the necessary behaviour of the people has been established. Therefore it is impossible that the "system" is the cause of the people acting in the specified way, because that type of activity is necessarily prior to the existence of the system. So, if we want a thorough understanding of this specific type of behaviour, we need to look beyond the "system", because analyzing the "system", which is posterior to the behaviour, is incapable of giving us an understanding of the cause of the behaviour. The specific behaviour is the cause of existence of the "system", not vise versa.

The very idea that, just because metaphysics is 'beyond physics', it somehow implies that physics (science in general) is invalid or untrue is ludicrous and laughable. That is a patent non-sequitur. I know of no serious philosopher who ever held such a view. — Pantagruel

Clearly this does not apply to anything I've said. I've explained the reasons for, and given the logical demonstration as to why your system theory is unacceptable. It is not a matter of 'mine is metaphysics and yours is physics therefore yours is invalid', its a matter of yours has been shown to be inconsistent with the evidence, and illogical through the application of sound metaphysical principles.

A sign intrinsically refers to nothing. — apokrisis

You are showing the incoherency of your ontology here. A sign, as a sign, is created intentionally to have some reference. Without that it is not a sign. So your attempt here, to remove the essence of "sign" from the sign, and say that "a sign intrinsically refers to nothing" is self-contradicting. Removing the intentionality (source of meaning) from the sign leaves it as something other than a sign. So that you'd need to replace "sign" in this proposition with something else, "a ... intrinsically refers to nothing". From here, we can proceed to acknowledge that an act of authority is required to make something (the supposed sign) refer to something when previously it did not.

If and when you realize that your premise is self-contradicting, you'll see your system theory fall like a house of cards. The intent of the author then becomes the most important factor in meaning, validating "what is meant by", so that the premise of infinite possibility, and your assumption that it is "completely up to a community of speakers to agree as to the semantics of any utterance", is falsified.

And if you were producing the highest note your body was capable of, you wouldn't be coming up flat either.

Now you crossed a line. That's unwarranted and insulting. — Pantagruel

Is the system going to punish me now?

Clearly you understand neither the meaning of pragmatism, nor scientism. — Pantagruel

I don't believe there's a system which sets the meanings to those words.

Roughly a semitone too high. — bongo fury

Two semitones too high — bongo fury

If you set your target note at the upper limit of your range you wouldn't be having this problem.

A car is in fact the worst kind of example as a car is a machine and not an organism. — apokrisis

The car was the choice of TheMadFool as an example of a fallacy of division. I explained how it was not really a fallacy of division.

So, when there's a whole car there are no parts and when there are parts there's no car? — TheMadFool

No, I went through this with you already, twice now I think. The car has parts, but as "part", they are not independent objects. Therefore you cannot speak of them as if they are independent objects, in the same context as you speak of the car as an existing object. It's the same principle as the issue with your four meter plank of wood. It cannot be a four meter plank, and also a whole bunch of short pieces in the same context. It must be one or the other to avoid contradiction.

So, when the car is being assembled piece by piece the souls of the parts conveniently vanish and the soul of the car comes into existence when the car is being disassembled, the souls of the parts magically reappear and the soul of the car vanishes? Is this what you're saying? — TheMadFool

Now you're on the right track. These are the mysteries of the soul which no one seems to be able to adequately answer. Here's another similar mystery for you. How does a single celled organism divide and go from being one soul to two souls?

If you are then everything doesn't have a soul for the simple reason that the parts are still things even when they're all assembled together into a car and, according to you, they don't have souls when they are so. — TheMadFool

This is not true though, for the reasons I've explained. When a part is united as a part of a whole, it gives up its identity as "an individual entity", for this new identity, "part of a whole". The two identities are distinct and incompatible, contradictory, such that it cannot be both at the same time.

Premise 1: Everything has a soul (panpsychism)

Premise 2: Everything about a car (its parts and the car whole) is a thing

Conclusion: The parts of a car have souls. The car, as a whole, has a (one) soul. The car has many souls (parts) and the car has one soul (the car as a whole) [CONTRADICTION!!] — TheMadFool

You seem to be missing the point. Either you are talking about the car as one unified entity, or you are not talking about a car, but a bunch of separate things, existing independently which could be used to make a car. The contradiction is in saying that there is both, at the same time, a unified car, and also a bunch of independent parts. The car cannot have one soul as "a car", and also many souls as "a bunch of independent parts", at the same time, because it cannot fulfill these two distinct descriptions at the same time. Therefore there is no problem with contradiction. There is only contradiction if you think that it is, at the same time, both a car and a bunch of independent separate things.

Take the following symbol for example: 8. Either this symbol represents one unified whole, consisting of eight parts, or it represents eight independent things. Clearly it is the former, it represents a unified group of eight. To assign to each of the eight, a separate, independent existence would be to deny their status as eight which requires that they are a unified group. We can say that the group has a "form", represented as "8". It does not have eight independent forms.

I knew you were pragmatist. Pretty much anyone who vouches for the metaphysical virtues of systems theory is pragmatist. And pragmaticism is in bed with scientism because it cedes the quest for truth in areas which are beyond the limits of science, through the compromise of accepting what science can give in those areas, useful principles.

But as I explained, systems theory is not applicable to ontology because of the false relationship between part and whole which it assumes. So it cannot give us a true understanding of the relationship between one being and another, and therefore we need to turn somewhere else, like moral philosophy for a true understanding in that field.

So, since, as per panpsychism, only things have mind/souls, a part can't have one since, after all, it isn't even a thing to begin with. — TheMadFool

Right, a part only exists in relation to a whole, and mind/soul would be attributed to the whole.

Sorry but I can't see your point. Begin from any point in an organized system - bottom-up or top-down, you're eventually going to have to make a jump from a whole to its parts and wherever, whenever, this happens, you're at risk of commiting the fallacy of composition/division. — TheMadFool

Why do I need to "jump from a whole to its parts"? We can talk about a whole and its parts all in the same context. No jump is required. You are proposing that we divide the whole up, but then you want to keep talking about the whole as if it still exists after its been divided.

Are you asking how it is possible that a thing can be divided in two, and both halves might have the same attribute that the whole had? Isn't this like asking how it is possible that a red thing might be divided, and both halves might still be red? Why not ask the more interesting question of how it is possible that a single celled organism can divide, and become two copies of the very same thing? What are the two a copy of, each other, the original, or something else?

They are simply based on a systems-aware perspective. — Pantagruel

A person can claim a "system" to exist anywhere, and assert that evidence supports the reality of this system, but the evidence needs to be judged. I've made that judgement. A system has boundaries, and the boundaries of these supposed systems are not identified, nor are they evident. That is the basis of my judgement. I have nothing against a "systems-aware perspective", as I've said, a living being is an open system. The boundaries of that system are evident, yet thing pass through the boundaries. I object to claims of "a system" where evidence of a system is inconclusive, therefore the claims are not justified.

The only difference is, the systems-centric perspective tends to solve problems rather than generate aporias. — Pantagruel

Also, I've already explained to you how usefulness of a theory does not indicate truthfulness. That is a fundamental feature of mathematics, it is very useful, but it does not necessarily reveal truth. Truth depends on the soundness of the premises employed in the application. So arguing the pragmatically effectiveness of applying systems theories all over the place does nothing to indicate that these theories might reveal truth.

There is no "misinterpretation," just an alternate interpretation. One which can be meaningfully applied across many, many different domains. And that meaningful applicability is itself the best gauge of the power of a theory. — Pantagruel

That's your opinion. My opinion is that it is a misinterpretation because it veils the truth of the matter for a principle of pragmaticism. And so I stand by my judgement, that the truth of a theory is a better gauge of the theory than "meaningful applicability" is.

So yes, in a cooked up, abstract sort of way your notion of ontological singularity makes sense. In a much more robust and edifying way, the notion of systemic entities makes better sense, facilitating, as it does, a practical and universally inclusive model of reality. — Pantagruel

I'm afraid you've got that backward. Truth is a much more robust principle than applicability.

A thing is just a thing, anything, and there are no necessary relationships in being a thing. Ergo, a part is just as much a thing as a whole is a thing. I agree with you so far. — TheMadFool

This is not what I said. What I said is that a part is not a thing. If "thing" is defined as having no necessary relations, and "part" is defined as having necessary relations, then to be both at the same time would be contradictory.

So, once I talk about things I can't talk about parts. How come then that you talk about the car having a soul then? After all, the car is, essentially, the whole consisting of parts and you said, in your own words, "....to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated" (in the second paragraph of your post) and this is exactly what you've done when you made the claim that "...not only do the parts of the car (if each can exist as an individual), have a soul/mind..." — TheMadFool

The soul is not a thing.

To make things easier, let's continue with the example of a car. At one point, you're saying that the parts of a car are things and ergo have souls/minds (accepted) and that you can't view them as parts to do that (accepted). Then you go on to say the car is also a thing and so has a soul/mind but the problem is you can't talk of a car anymore because when you took the parts of the car as individual things, you, by your own admission, believe that"...the whole (the car) needs to be divided. When the whole (the car) is divided, it (the car) is annihilated". — TheMadFool

Again, the soul is not a thing. You seem to be proposing that the soul is a part, and also a thing, and insisting that this is contrary to what I said. But we do not apprehend the soul as a thing and therefore you are proposing a false premise.

The question is, does a 4 meter long wooden plank have one soul or an infinite number of souls (assuming halving ad infinitum)? — TheMadFool

Again, you are making the same mistake I pointed out already. The four meter plank is one thing, it has not been divided. You cannot speak about it as if it were a large number of things, just because you have the capacity to divide it. It has not been divided. If it were divided you could not call the pieces a 4 meter plank. To talk about the plank as if it is both divided and not divided at the same time is simple contradiction.

Thanks for the reference Pantagruel. I have read through the article, only skipping over some of the closing notes about directions for future research. I really do not see how the evidence presented supports what you are arguing better than it supports what I am arguing.

As I said, the human individual as an agent utilizes external and internal things during cognitive activities. What this indicates is that the individual thinking being is an open system, as described by von Bertalanffy, and as I said, language is utilized on both side of the boundary of that system.

There is nothing in the article to indicate that any aspects of the activity of remembering, or the activity of cognition, occurs externally to the boundary demarcating the individual agent, except of course the activity occurring internally to another agent. The authors of this type of theory which you propose seem to observe an agent's use of external objects in the activities of remembering, and falsely conclude that some aspect of the memory activity occurs externally to the agent. The conclusion is false because the external objects are passive in relation to the act of remembering, and they only enter into that act according to the will of the agent who might make an association, representation, or utilize the external object in some other way.

So to me, the whole article describes a misinterpretation of evidence. The empirical fact that I use external objects as memory aids, I take notes in a lecture for example, is not evidence that part of the act of remembering occurs externally to the individual. Nor is the fact that I use a calculator to sum figures evidence that part of the act of cognition occurs externally. Yet proponents of these types of theories use examples like these to support their theories, without explaining how the factual evidence is actually supposed to support the theory. So what it comes down to is a matter of interpretation of the evidence, and its what I would call misinterpretation.

The section on the metaphysics of group memory provides a good example of this type of misinterpretation. They describe a phenomenon they call "alignment", in which two individuals interacting will behave similarly. Instead of proceeding toward understanding what is going on within each of the individuals, to produce this form of compatibility, the theorists present us with a supposed "alignment system" which exists externally to the individuals, and this is supposed to be what causes the alignment.

You ought to be able to see how this is clearly a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation of the observed evidence. The cause of alignment is the willingness of the two distinct individuals, not an external system. The proof of this is the fact that the alignment, and therefore the proposed "alignment system" does not exist until after alignment has occurred. Therefore the alignment system cannot be the cause of alignment. This problem is endemic to the "systems" perspective on part/whole relations. They assume that the cause of part to part relations, which creates a whole, is a property of the whole itself. But it's quite clear that the whole has no existence until the part to part relations are established, and therefore it cannot be the cause of these relations. The part to part relations must come into existence before there is a whole. So it is illogical propose that the cause of the parts acting in cooperation to form a whole, comes from the whole itself. We must assume that the cause of such cooperation comes either from within the parts themselves, or from something else, completely independent.

It seems as if the authors of the article respect the fact that these theories which you are proposing are just a matter of creative interpretation of evidence. Here is one of the closing statements:

On the other hand, Clowes (though he argues that HEC may prove more useful than HEMC in investigating the effects of our increasing reliance on novel forms of external memory) points out that, given a case of putatively extended cognition, a theorist committed to one or another alternative view can always redescribe it so that it is consistent with his view. Thus it is at this point unclear whether empirical evidence can help to resolve the debate among the varieties of distributed theory.

It seems to be, that these theories are dependent on a creative interpretation of empirical evidence in the first place. So they all rely on making up fictitious relations between the actual evidence and the proposed theory. Therefore one theory cannot be singled out as the true theory, because they are all false. They all propose an illogical part/whole relationship which ought to be rejected.

Transmission is emission + absorption. — Kenosha Kid

Don't you think that this is a sort of odd way of looking at things? We think of emission as occurring at a point in space and time, at the cathode, and absorption occurs at a point in space and time at the screen. However, there is a spatial-temporal separation between these points, and the concept of transmission accounts for that spatial-temporal extension. This would imply two distinct acts, emission and absorption, with a spatial-temporal separation between them.

To make emission/absorption into one single activity you need to dissolve the spatial-temporal separation between them. The cathode and screen must directly interact. Traditionally, the radio tower emits the information, the radio receives it, and the spatial-temporal separation between them is covered as transmission in the form of waves. Now, you could say that the wave field is a property of the transmitter, and this wave field interacts with the wave field of the receiver, and then you would have the premise for a direct interaction between transmitter and receiver, making your statement (above) true. The radio tower interacts directly with the radio, through the means of their wave properties, making emission and absorption one and the same act This would be like saying that the sun warms the earth by touching the earth, the electromagnetic field properly being a part of the sun which is in contact with the earth. This would negate the premise of space between the object and the eye; when seeing an object it actually touches the eye through field interaction. Also the idea that two distinct objects cannot occupy the same space would be faulty by this premise. This would allow an object to be understood in its entirety rather than just as it appears to our senses. We already know that objects really overlap each other, by the effects of gravity which is a property of objects.

Distributed cognition has been studied extensively and experimentally. Hence it can be said to have empirical evidence. — Pantagruel

Well, maybe you could show me the empirical evidence of "distributed cognition", and explain how these instances of evidence are not better described as distinct cognitive beings involved in distinct acts of cognition, who are communicating with each other through language, rather than your assumption that these instances are a single act of cognition. Do you recognize the role of intention within cognition, and the fact that different people have different intentions?

Anyway, yes, distributed cognition, environmental and social, is very much a real thing. — Pantagruel

Until you can either disassociate cognition from intention, or somehow show that my intention is exactly the same as yours, I think It should be very obvious to anyone with the capacity for individual thinking, that your goal of "distributed cognition" is just a pipe dream.

Outgrowing this individual-centric (selfish) paradigm will be key to the future of our society I believe. — Pantagruel

You're showing your scientism again, assuming that science can go beyond is limits. This is consistent with your false claims of empirical evidence for distributed cognition. You take the evidence, draw a false conclusion from it, then claim that the false conclusion is empirical evidence from which your supposed "science" can proceed.

You are free to explore these or not. It seems these domains of study are not familiar to you. — Pantagruel

These studies are familiar enough to me, familiar enough for me to reject them with sound argumentation, as I have in this thread. If it is your desire to continue in this misdirected study, that's your prerogative. I am only trying to show you how this direction is inconsistent with the facts of life, and therefore wrong.

Another tack on this issue is the theory of embedded or distributed cognition:
Cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group.
Cognitive processes may be distributed in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves coordination between internal and external (material or environmental) structure. — Pantagruel

You appear to be introducing ideas here which have no support in evidence. My cognitive process is proper to myself, and there is no evidence to indicate that my thinking is shared with you. When your theory requires the concoction of unsupported magic, like ESP, to support it, then you ought to just admit that the theory has a problem.

Sure, we share cognitive tasks, and an individual's cognitive system requires external factors, but true understanding of the reality which is the cognitive system, requires a proper distinction between what is internal to the system and what is external to it. A "system" needs an accredited boundary.. We can place the boundary at the individual, according to the evidence which we have, that my cognitive activity is separate and distinct from your cognitive activity, or we can ignore this evidence as you are inclined to do, and seek some other principles to support a boundary. Where would you place this boundary? The members of a family, a community, a state, or country, the species as a whole, animals as a whole, everything as a whole? Now that you have denied the real boundary, the one which we have clear evidence for, the individual, you no longer have anything real to support a boundary, and now the boundary, which supports your supposed system is arbitrary. This will not produce an accurate understanding because the truth as to what is internal and external to the system will be veiled.

If you take a step back, and see the real true boundary, the one which we have an abundance of evidence for, the one which formulates the individual as distinct from other individuals, then you can grasp language as crossing the boundary of the system. Language is employed both internally, within the individual's cognition, and externally, as a communicative device. This is essential to the nature of language. And, I believe it is extremely important to the understanding of language, meaning, and the nature of the use of signs and symbols, to represent the system which employs the signs as an open system, which allows language to cross the boundary of the system. Otherwise you cannot account for the ambiguity which is inherent within language use. If it were the case, that language use occurred completely within a system (human species being the system). there would be no reason why the same word would be used in completely different ways within the very same system.

Cultural artefacts for me are exactly the sedimentation of human actions and concepts. I do take sociology to be an empirical science, as do sociologists. It sounds to me as though you believe you live in a nominalist-idealist world. Charming, but really not reflective of the total gamut of modern understanding. — Pantagruel

Artefacts, like any works of art, are works of individuals. That many artefacts are a collaboration of individual efforts is testimony to the value of cooperation. But in my mind it is a big mistake to take human cooperation for granted. Cooperation is a product of moral effort. If "modern understanding" takes human cooperation for granted, then I think that's a misnomer and we ought to be saying "modern misunderstanding".

I think we should be careful in assuming that we know what Trump is up to. Trump himself may not know. He's a very instinctive and spontaneous player. And using that method he succeeded in defeating the entire political establishment at their own game, until very recently. — Hippyhead

Rather than "instinctive and spontaneous", I'd use the word "puppet".

Now, take the panpsychist assertion that everything has a soul/mind in the context of a car. The car has parts. Every part is a thing and since everything has a soul/mind, every part must have a soul/mind but to draw the conclusion that the car itself, the whole, has a soul/mind is the fallacy of composition. — TheMadFool

If the assertion is that everything has a soul/mind, then not only do the parts of the car, (if each can exist as an individual thing), have a soul/mind, but also the car itself, as a thing has a soul/mind. There is no fallacy of composition here.

The issue of the part/whole relationship which is more relevant here, is the question of whether parts can be said to be things, in the same context in which the whole is a thing. The nature of a "part" is that it necessarily exists in specific relations to other parts which collectively make up the whole. In this context, the whole is the thing, and the part is a part of that thing. Notice the necessity in the part's relationship with others, as essential to the word "part". There is no such necessary relationship in the concept of "thing", or "object". An object is an independent entity having relations with others, but not having any specific necessary relations.

Therefore it is inherently contradictory to say that a part is itself an object, or thing, in the same context in which it is a part. The "part" is constrained by the necessity which makes it a part, and an object has no such constraint. Therefore to be both is contradiction. This logic of part/whole relations reflects the fact that in order to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated. So it is impossible that the part exists as an individual object at the same time while it is a part. And we should never apprehend a part as an object because this is a logical incoherency.

more conservative out in the middle of nowhere. — TiredThinker

They're anti-social.

I guess I was looking for a walk through that logic (if you have time). — frank

People tout emergence from all different angles, each requiring a different logical refutation. Show me the premises which would lead you to believe in emergence, and I'll show you how they are logically incoherent.

Monistic idealists have been known to suggest that matter is an emergent property if mind, so perhaps this is again a mistake of logic? — frank

No, I think that this is an opposite type of mistake. Rather than being a mistake of logic it is a denial of empirical evidence. If matter is just a human concept, then it is an emergent property of mind. But this idea would deny the evidence that "matter" refers to something independent from minds.

Why do you say emergence is illogical? — frank

There are many ways to show this, depending on the exact premises of emergence which are presented. The most simple and straight forward way, is something like what wayfarer presents. It's not logical that something experiential could emerge from something non-experiential.

It seems to me that his argument is concerned with creating a conceptual space for 'experience' (I would use the term 'being') in the objective domain - to say that, because he can't doubt the reality of experience, and because he's committed to the view that every real phenomenon is physical, then the physical must also be experiential. 'That is what I believe: experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena... Assuming, then, that there is a plurality of physical ultimates, some of them at least must be intrinsically experiential, intrinsically experience-involving....Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an ‘inference to the best explanation’. — Wayfarer

If concepts arose as the result of the interaction of individuals A and B, then the concepts are a function of those two organic beings. Since concepts arose as a result of the cumulative interaction of all organic beings (people) then the concepts are a function of the interaction of all those organic beings, aka...the collection known as...the species! It isn't something that has to be proven, it is simply an empirical fact. — Pantagruel

This would only be the case, if a concept was something which existed independently of the human mind which creates it. And, this is how we often speak of concepts, as independent things. The usual method of supporting these independent Ideas ontologically, is through the premise of Platonic realism. But Platonic realism denies the notion that human minds create concepts, because of the very assumption that concepts are independent from human minds.

So, when we reject Platonism in favour of the idea that human minds create concepts, then we lose the premise which allows concepts to be independent from human minds. Now the concept is right in the human mind, distinct and unique to the individual mind which holds it. My concept of "language" or of "meaning", or of "2", or "4", is created by my mind, and particular in its form as being unique to my mind, having been created by my mind through the education process which was specific to me, due to my personal circumstances.

The point is, that to say concepts are created by human minds, and also that concepts are things which exist independently from individual human minds, is to conflate two incompatible premises. To make a statement about the existence of concepts, and claim it as "an empirical fact" is nonsensical because the existence of concepts is not even supported empirically.

So while we may not seem to differ that much on this, I do think you are clutching at something more illusory, since you seem to believe that the individual has some kind of privileged, context-free status. Language is one giant set of inter-relations, where the meaning of anything is conditioned by its context, both present and historical. It's central to hermeneutics. And the same is true of people, qua language users. I don't necessarily ascribe an emergent-ontological status to the collective; however nor do I see any particular reason to deny it. — Pantagruel

The individual clearly does have a privileged perspective, because concepts are known to exist in minds and minds are the property of individuals. If your intent is to remove the concept from the mind, and say that it is something independent from human minds, then I think we'll have to move to some sort of Platonism to support the ontological status of the concepts. Otherwise where would you assume that a concept exists?

.

In other words, it's an easy way out of the problem, which avoids dealing with emergence. — Olivier5

Well no, emergence doesn't have to be dealt with, it just needs to be rejected as illogical. That's very simple, and it doesn't really require any substitute or anything like that unless the person is inspired to seek reality. But when people reject emergence it's usually because they are inspired to seek reality, then an alternative to emergence is required.

I would say that dualism, though it is more complicated, is the only true solution.

The appearance of conspiracy has a very limited representation in relation to what is real. As I said above, it represents something epistemic. What it represents is our inability to actually understand the true nature of emission and absorption. The one, absorption, is dependent on the other, emission, in its real existence, yet emission is not understood, and is represented as a mirror image of absorption, which has a dependence on emission, which is not understood. Therefore it is simply a vicious circle of misunderstanding, manifesting as the appearance of conspiracy.

Emergence is logically incoherent at a fundamental level. Rejection of emergence seems to leave two basic approaches, dualism and panpsychism. Dualism has been seriously beaten down in modern times, so it is rejected out of prejudice, and this leaves panpsychism as the favourable option.

I see analogues of musical concepts in all manner of time-based phenomena, and I think the first hypothesis about predictability was on the right track. — Pfhorrest

I agree with this, rhythm is basically a repetition, and without rhythm there would not be music. The average piece of music takes a fundamental rhythm and experiments with variations. When you hear music played the variations create emotion and interest. But the artist must stay within a range of acceptability with the variations employed, or else the piece will be rejected by the potential audience as incoherent.

Sound is all about patterns of changes over time (pitch is just frequency), and all kinds of musical concepts are further refinements upon that (harmony is when multiple frequencies share certain relationships, rhythm and tempo are also all about frequency of notes). Musical ups and downs, breaks and shifts, all all about establishing and then changing patterns over time. — Pfhorrest

We could think of frequency as a very fast rhythm, perceptible only subconsciously, and apply the same principle stated above. The average piece of music takes a fundamental frequency (key) and experiments with variations, harmonies. The artist must stay within an accepted range of experimentation or else the audience will dismiss the piece as dissonance.

I think we’re wired to have emotional responses to patterns like that more generally, to get bored of repetition but also to fear unpredictable change, to get intrigued by noticing patterns and the relationships between patterns, etc, and music just directly pushes all those emotional buttons in the most straightforward way divorced from any broader real-world context. — Pfhorrest

Notice, that in my description above, the audience's response to frequency is fundamentally subconscious, while the response to rhythm is more conscious. The subconscious does not "understand" things in the way that the conscious mind does, so it does not enforce the same strict rules or principles of predictability which the conscious mind enforces. Consequently the artist is allowed a lot more freedom of experimentation within a piece, with frequencies than with rhythm.

I believe that emotion arises from the interaction between the subconscious and the conscious, and it often involves agreement and disagreement between the two with respect to what is acceptable in relation to predictability. It may be the case that the subconscious does not require predictability, being incapable of understanding it. But more likely, the subconscious really has extremely rigid rules of acceptability, as evidenced by songbirds singing almost the exact same thing. The subconscious would apprehend predictability only in precise repetition. So it's quite possible that the conscious mind must override the rigidity of the subconscious, allowing the subconscious wide open freedom, as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of music. This would make the emotions involved with listening to music somewhat trained, or controlled at a fundamental level because the conscious mind would then have influence over the development of the subconscious, in this artificial freedom.

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How they weigh it?

That is not a false premise, but an established scientific fact. Aggregates of human behaviours have been proven to be amenable to systems theoretical analysis. That is good science.

Rather, what you are doing is attempting to utilize the gloss of scientism to foster your own metaphysical agenda, which is bad philosophy, since it is pure prejudice. — Pantagruel

Prejudice is not an issue in my position, because I am simply showing how yours is wrong. I don't have a strong belief, or position on the exact nature of language or meaning, but I do know that when there is a group of individuals, it is wrong to assign a higher degree of reality to the group than to the individual. That's pretty obvious, for the reasons I've stated, which you seem to have ignored. It's clear that individuals can stray from the herd at any time, and this does not diminish the reality of their existence. There is all sorts of evidence which proves your position wrong, especially the nature of evolution, as I've explained. So the rejection of your position is based in evidence to the contrary, not in prejudice.

The premise that concepts arose through interaction is pretty fundamental. Think of the genealogy of the mind. Individuals did not evolve in a vacuum, create a set of concepts, then proceed to try them out on each other. All of our concepts, including the concept of the individual self, obviously evolved through the normal, pragmatic, day-to-day interactions through which (the individuals of) our species survived and developed. If we are speculating, that speculation certainly makes more sense than the opposite (that we create our own concepts in vacuo, as it were). — Pantagruel

Surely I agree that concepts arose through the interaction of individuals, that's what I've been arguing. What I've been denying is that there is an individual thing called "the species", and that concepts arose as an activity of this thing, the species. So what I am saying is that if we want to speculate about the nature of concepts, meaning, and language, we need to focus on the activities of individual human beings, not some illusory thing called "the species", and its supposed activities.

It's fun watching him lose the election every day. — Michael

Hopefully it will continue every day until some point around Epiphany, at which point he'll be moved to start packing his bags.

That is a complete mischaracterization. Scientism claims that scientific certainty is exclusively authoritative, even in domains that are beyond that of its inquiry.

Science obviously provides an accurate understanding of the phenomena it examines, that is the whole point of science. — Pantagruel

That says it all. Scientism attempts to extend "science" beyond its domain of enquiry, through the use of false premises, such as the one you describe above, that the human species is an entity which can be treated as a system. And so you assert that some sort of authoritative "scientific certainty" has been produced through the application of a false premise.

In reality, human intention, which is the driving force behind the creation and use of language, and meaning in general, is outside the domain of science, being the domain of moral philosophy. But your false premise, that language can be defined as an attribute of a species, rather than as intentional actions between individuals, creates the illusion that it can be understood scientifically. That is a case of attempting to extend science beyond its domain. And you, insisting that the application of this false premise provides you with some sort of authority, (arising from the deceptive belief of "scientific certainty") over those who respect the true reality of the situation in this field, which is truly outside the domain of science for the reason stated, are demonstrating scientism.

(Unless holes and/or emission events conspire to construct the distribution that we expect to see.) — SophistiCat

Sure they would appear to "conspire", because the fields associated with the emitting device would overlap and interact with the fields associated with the absorbing device. Fundamentally, the emitter cannot be separated from, to be considered as independent from, the absorber.

Are you implying that science is the same thing as scientism? If so, you are operating under a massive misconception and a prejudice. — Pantagruel

No, obviously I didn't say that science is the same thing as scientism. But assuming that a scientific theory provides us with a true understanding of the events which it predicts, because it has a proven track record in its predictions, is a mistake of scientism.

Systems theoretic analysis has a proven track record across a broad range of empirical fields, including sociological ones. — Pantagruel

This is the folly of scientism, the belief that the capacity to predict implies a true understanding of the phenomenon. Pragmaticism provides us with no guidance toward ontological truth.

I've spent the last six months reading material which entirely contradicts your position. Mead, Parsons, Habermas. Of course, you are entitled to your opinion. Just be aware, there is an opposing viewpoint, and it is cogent and coherent. Viewing collectives of biological entities as complex systems in their own right perhaps is just too "modern" a perspective for you. — Pantagruel

I'm fully aware that there are opposing viewpoints, but I see a large number of very real problems with viewing collectives of biological entities as complex systems. First and foremost, I see a problem in viewing such a collective as an entity itself, which is required by the term "system". And the assertion that the existence of the collective, as an entity is more real than the existence of the individuals which make up the collective, and the claim that the individual is just a reflection of the system, is fundamentally incoherent. It is incoherent because it contradicts the defining premise, which names the multitude of individual entities as the defining feature of the collective. To then name the collective as a system which is more real than the individuals required to produce the collective is incomprehensible. This is like saying that 5 is defined as five 1s, but 5, as an entity, is more real than 1.

Furthermore, I believe it is a mistake to describe the human species as "a system", for a number of reasons. First there is no common function, as required by the term "system", and second, there are not definable boundaries as required by the term. So the proposition that the human species is a system, is simply false. Sometimes, especially in metaphysics I find, more modern does not mean better.

If you compose, you will see that the possibilities for composition are significantly influenced by the relationship between the key chosen, and the physical constraints of the instrument (or instruments) employed. In this case the instrument is the human vocal cords.

It may indeed be a scientific term, nevertheless, the species is also the sum total of its organic constituent entities on the planet. And we are not in a science class, nor are we using the term for classificatory purposes. — Pantagruel

To say that "the sum total of...entities" is itself an entity is a mistake. There is nothing, no principle which makes a collection of entities into an entity itself. A collection is a constructed "set". And to say that the set has a more real existence as an entity than the individuals which make up the set is just a category mistake.

If you really think that the term "species" has no organic extension then that would be an end of fruitful discussion I fear. — Pantagruel

In no way is a species an organism. If you want to use "species" to refer to "a group of living organisms", I'm fine with that, so long as you respect that this is a group of individuals being referred to. And if we are to refer to the group itself as an individual, we ought to recognize that this group is an artificially constructed individual (as groupings are). Then we can proceed to discuss the interactions between the members of such groups. In this way we can avoid the mistake of taking the interactions for granted, which might be the case if we assumed that the group itself was a natural individual.

Sorry to have to insist on something so simple Pantagruel, but "species" is a scientific term, with a rigorous definition, and it refers to a system of classification. To use it otherwise is simply an undisciplined use of the word. Your reference to "expression of cumulative genetics" does nothing to justify your claim, because any individual is an expression of cumulative genetics, yet we are all different.