I'd say more likely he's going to announce "a miracle!"

It would help if this issue is clarified. — jgill

My guess is that KK is an engineer.

The second quote you have taken out of context, and the reference link does not link to the context. Notice that I have "feels" in quotation marks, because this was not my terminology, and I was criticizing this way of describing the situation.

The same criticism is applicable here too though. If the electromagnetic field, through which radiation transmits, extends from one object to another, and there is energy which is received at the other, but not enough to cause a physical effect (i.e. not enough for the object to absorb a photon of energy by photoelectric effect), then if we are using that terminology which KK chooses to use, you might say that the object "feels" the other, without being physically affected by it. If this were really the case, then we ought to conclude that the second object exercises will power to prevent itself from being physically affected by the other, because this is the only reasonable way that we have to talk about one object being affected by another, without causing a physical change. By the precepts of physics, if one object affects another, there is necessarily a change to the other, or else we cannot say that the one affects the other, because that claim would be unsupported by empirical evidence, and physics does not accept panpsychism as providing reasonable explanatory principles.

No, I did something that has apparently never occurred to you: I got an education. — Kenosha Kid

As evident from the terminology which you use, (described in my reply to jgill above), your education was not in physics. Nor was mine, so we ought to be on par for any approach to this matter of physics.

The OP holds that the complex wavefunction is an ontic description -- or fair approximation to such -- of how particles propagate through space and time as we represent them. — Kenosha Kid

This is where you're wrong, and you ought to refer to some real physics to sort yourself out. There are many true statements one can make about "the wavefunction", but the wavefunction does not describe the propagation of particles through space and time. That is a false proposition. We can say that the wave function may be used to predict where a particle will appear, through a description of the propagation of energy (as wave motion), but we cannot conclude that it describes the propagation of particles. It really describes the propagation of waves, hence "wave" function.

It is sufficient that each particle knows where it is going. — Kenosha Kid

That's nonsense, to say that a particle knows where it's going. Are you suggesting that the particle has a mind of its own? And it's really no different from my example of saying that the hot object knows where the cold object is. All you are doing is qualifying this to say it's not really the hot object which knows where the cold object is, it's the energy within the hot object which knows where the cold object is.

It's not the case that the particle knows where it is going. What is the case, as I explained in my earlier post, is that the human conception of radiant energy is based in the absorption of energy, because it is empirically based. As I said, "we can talk about something radiating energy into empty space, into an infinite vacuum or some such thing, but this is not consistent with the concept which is based in objects receiving energy, not in objects emitting energy." It's not the case that the energy transmitted must know where it's going, what is the case is that we do not have the understanding which is required to conceptualize radiant energy in any way other than through the empirical observations of absorption. Emission is simply a logical extension of that conception. Then you find some axioms which state that emission is the reverse of absorption, and so be it, in your mind. Despite all the obvious evidence that it is not.

Even the idea that there is a particle which is transmitted is unsupported by evidence. The emitting object has a field. There are waves between the emission and the absorption. That there is a particle which is emitted cannot be empirically verified. Whatever it is which is emitted (waves I am told by physicists), cannot be directly observed without being absorbed. Therefore your logical conclusion, that there is a particle which is emitted is simply a product of your desire to represent emission as the reverse of absorption. You are begging the question. Emission is the reverse of absorption, a particle is absorbed, therefore a particle is emitted. But the evidence is contrary to this, because all that is observable between the emitting and the absorption, is wave patterns. So you have absolutely no justification for the claim of a continuously existing particle being emitted from one location, and being absorbed at another. I would stress that you appear to have a desire to represent emission as the reverse of absorption, so you theorize that there is a continuously existing particle in between, to support this theory. But the empirical evidence clearly suggests otherwise.

No, a blackbody radiator is a non-equilibrium thermodynamic system, that is: it is not in equilibrium with its environment. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, but being "non-equilibrium", means that it is based in the concept of equilibrium. Which is what I said, even if you didn't interpret it that way.

I'll give you a heads up now, since you keep making this error: very little of what I've presented in the OP is original. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, I realize that, I've come across most of what you have written here in researching my replies to you. Do you get most of your information from Wikipedia? You ought to pay more attention to respected physicists instead. Someone like Dr. Feynman for example describes energy transmission as waves, not as particles. Your idea that a particle moves from emission to absorption, though it might make interesting discussion on the internet, is not really accepted by mainstream physics. That's why the in between is represented by a wave function. I'm sure you are aware of the fact that the wave function is not meant to represent the continuous existence of a particle. It is meant to predict where a "particle" (or whatever it is which bears that name) might appear.

Fundamentally, a particle moving from one position to another is reversible for instance, e.g. things are not constrained to move in the same direction along a given axis. — Kenosha Kid

Sure, a particle moving from one place to another is reversible. But physicists tell us that electromagnetic energy moves from one place to another as waves, regardless of what pseudo-scientists on the internet are saying. So this is the difficulty you need to overcome in order to have your theory even considered. It might be considered by people who don't know fundamental principles of physics, and think that electromagnetic radiation is transmitted as particles, but physicists know that transmission is through waves.

But let's turn the question around. An atom in the oven emits a photon and later another atom absorbs it and re-emits it (more like A below). How does the first atom know to emit a photon such that an even number of its wavelengths will fit in the box? How does either the atom or the photon know how big the box is? Photon emission is just the de-excitation of an atom from one energy level to a lesser one, and the energy of the oven is given by its temperature, which could be anything. — Kenosha Kid

Do you think that a hot object knows that the cooler object is cooler when it radiates heat? Of course you do not, because you know that thermodynamic equilibrium, which determines whether emission occurs or not, is a feature of the object's relationship with its environment. And I'm sure you know that the definition of "black-body" is based in thermodynamic equilibrium. Since this idea which you have (I should call it an "ideal") that emission/absorption is reversible, is dependent on black-body conditions, it's practical significance is very limited.

Let's see if I can determine its significance. Emission/absorption is only reversible when an object is at thermodynamic equilibrium, which is when emission will not occur. When emission does occur, the object is not at thermodynamic equilibrium. Therefore emission/absorption is never reversible. However, we do have a slight issue, which is "black body emission". Of course this anomaly indicates that the ideal is faulty.

The question becomes less mysterious when we treat time and space equally: the emitted photon doesn't just have a spatial endpoint, but a temporal one, i.e. the photon can only be emitted when it "knows" where and when it will be absorbed. But how could this be? — Kenosha Kid

All radiation, other than black body radiation (which is an anomaly produced by misconception), is a feature of the relationship between the emitting body and its environment. There is no need to employ this type of imagery, such as the emitting body "knows" its environment.

Run that movie backwards and you have exactly the same thing... — Kenosha Kid

Clearly you cannot "run the movie backward". The idea that you can take an object's radiation of energy to its surroundings, and turn it around such that you can represent it as it's environment radiating the energy to the object, is completely unjustified, and obviously wrong.

The Copenhagen description, though, is irreversible: wavefunction collapse is a loss of information that is not retrieved by simulating the reverse process. — Kenosha Kid

Have you ever heard of "mechanical efficiency"? Mechanical efficiency is always less than 1, because a mechanical system always loses energy to its environment, friction for example. Clearly, we cannot have a reversal process, because energy is lost. We all know that perpetual motion is nonsense. It's covered by the second law of thermodynamics. Therefore you ought to know that your proposal of reversal is ridiculous.

In answer to the question, "can a deterministic world support a deterministic language ?", I don't believe so, as it seems that linguistic meaning is always indeterminate. The problem remains that language is part of the mind, and the mind is part of the world, not separate to it. Ultimately, bearing in mind Russell's paradox about sets being members of themselves, something can never know itself, meaning that language can never be determinate — RussellA

OK, so the question is, if language is an indeterminate part of the mind, and the mind is a part of the world, why do you believe that the world is determinate. Isn't at least part of the world indeterminate?

In Plato's terms, language may be included with justice, truth, equality, beauty as being derived by reasoning from the Form of the Good, where the Good is a perfect, eternal and changeless Form, existing outside space and time and superior to every material instantiation of it. The perfect Form - a deterministic language - may be strived for, but never achieved. This raises a problem with Plato's Theory of Forms in that if the Form is outside of time and space and superior to every material instantiation of it, how can Plato argue for the existence of something that he has already argued is beyond his ability to discover. — RussellA

I think you need to recognize that Plato was exploring the deficiencies in this theory of eternal Ideas, which was coming from Pythagoreanism. We tend to approach Plato's work with the idea that Plato put forward this grand theory of eternal Ideas, and this is what we call Platonism. In reality, Socrates and Plato were more like skeptics, so they did what they could to elucidate the principles which supported this Idealism,(which was quite vague at the time) so that it could be judged. Aristotle then went on to refute this form of Idealism, using what Plato had taught him.

As for how a philosopher like Plato can approach something which is outside of space and time, the answer is with logic. What logic demonstrates to us, in its usage, is that it is not restricted by spatial-temporal reality, it can very easily go beyond, and think about things which have no spatial temporal existence. The real question then, the point of difficulty, is how do we maintain truth in this realm of logic, which goes beyond spatial-temporal existence. This is where "the good" becomes significant. We can apprehend as reality, that logic is not grounded in spatial-temporal existence, it is grounded in "the good". The good is what Aristotle called "the end", the goal, or objective, what is wanted.

Wittgenstein's contribution consists in his pointing out that this particular jigsaw does not have corners, nor edges. There are always bits that are outside any frame we might set up. And further, we don't really need corners and edges anyway. We can start anywhere and work in any direction. We can work on disjointed parts, perhaps bringing them together, perhaps not. We can even make new pieces as we go. — Banno

More precisely, Wittgenstein pointed out that what we think is a jigsaw puzzle is not really a jigsaw puzzle. So we shouldn't call it a jigsaw puzzle, maybe call it a game instead. And all those philosophers who think they are doing a jigsaw puzzle, and are looking for pieces to fit together are self-deceived and will never get anywhere, because they think they're doing a jigsaw puzzle when they're not.

But then we could say the same thing about the game. Philosophers who think philosophy is a game are self-deceived. And so on, we could go, with any analogy as to what philosophy is. And what this indicates is that analogies do not work for describing what something is, they're only an attempt to tell you what the thing is like, as someone will always come along and show you how the thing is different from the other thing, therefore the other thing doesn't provide you with what the thing is, only some form of similarity, from the perspective of the person who makes the analogy.

I still view Randomness as a necessary source of novelty, which supplies open possibilities, for Selection to choose from. — Gnomon

The source of novelty need not be randomness, it only needs to be possibility. Possibility means that there are options, but possibilities might exist without a being which can choose between them. And, a being like the human being might not adequately understand the extent of the possibilities, such that they could appear as if they were based in randomness. But all possibilities are really limited in extent, possibilities are restricted. Therefore the underlying mechanism which allows for the reality of possibility cannot actually be randomness, because randomness cannot account for the reality of whatever it is which restricts possibility.

That's where we differ. "Chance" also means Opportunity. Choice may have its reasons, but Chance supplies the substance to be rationalized --- the objects to be ordered. — Gnomon

OK, I see how you are using "chance" now. You use it as somewhat synonymous with possibility. If there is a possibility of a certain event occurring, there is a chance of that event. I look at this as the human perspective on possibility, we judge possibilities in this way, as chances, or probabilities. But only when we look at possibilities as having real ontological status, then the possibility, (what you'd call the chance of something), becomes an opportunity. We can make that possibility actually occur by proceeding with the required actions. I find that "possibility" is a better word to use here than "chance", because chance will often imply randomness in a common interpretation, but as I described above, there is no need to associate randomness with possibility or opportunity. If a person apprehends opportunity, as provided by possibility, then as I explained above, there is no need to conceive of this possibility as being provided for by randomness. If I offer you a choice of this or that, there is no need to assume that these possibilities are provided for by randomness.

Ideas about the nature of radiation that are different to quantum mechanics may well be fascinating, but not relevant. — Kenosha Kid

Your false claim that emission/absorption is reversible is obviously what is inconsistent with quantum physics.

And your refusal to accept the empirical evidence of a multitude of real examples of radiant energy, demonstrates that you are simply obsessed with some pet theory which is not supported by empirical evidence.

I see, avoid the issue you claim to be addressing by asserting that the OP has already addressed it. I call that lying.

You propose a complete misrepresentation of the human conceptualization of radiant energy. Notice that a cooler object will not radiate heat to a warmer object, therefore contrary to your claim, emission/absorption is not a reversible process. Your claim that spontaneous emission is deterministic is dependent on this false premise.

It seems that linguistic meaning is ultimately indeterminate for several reasons, including the problem of definition, the Russell paradox about sets not being members of themselves and Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

Perhaps, as it is therefore beyond the ability of current language to fully explain the reality of the world we live in, then another movement with the same goals as the Logical Positivists of the 1920's and 30's would be beneficial, ie, to create a new language whose meaning was determinate. — RussellA

Since you believe that linguistic meaning is "ultimately indeterminate", then don't you find the idea of a new language whose meaning is determinate, contradictory to what you believe? Wouldn't this make the new language something other than language as we know it? How could it be possible for language to change so drastically? Wouldn't any attempt to create a language with determinate meaning just produce another indeterminate language due to the nature of the human mind and human understanding?

As an aside, I intuitively believe that we live in a deterministic world, even allowing for apparent free-will, chaotic systems (still deterministic yet making predictions difficult) and quantum indeterminacy (not ruling out the possibility of a deeper determinism underneath quantum mechanics). — RussellA

So I assume that this ideal, deterministic world, which you believe yourself to be in, despite all the evidence otherwise, would support this ideal, deterministic language which you believe in. Can I ask why you intuitively believe in such ideals?

Obviously, this is a location of the highest quality, making it extremely desirable. And, they love you fdrake, desiring more and more of your authoritarian ways.

I dedicated quite a portion of the OP to spontaneous emission — Kenosha Kid

Yes you described emission as the reversal of radiation. And I explained how this is an unjustified assumption. Your reply was "Oh crikey!". And then you went on to assert "the concept of emission is pretty uncontroversial in quantum mechanics." Now you refer back to the OP as if you think that the answer to my question is there. But all that is there is the following faulty assumption:

Photon emission/absorption is another example of a reversible process. — Kenosha Kid

You seem to be ignoring the fundamental facts of radiant energy. The ejection of an electron which is caused by the absorption of radiation, according to the photoelectric effect, or some other mechanism, what you call scattering, is not a simple reversal of the emission of radiation. The former has a determinate cause, the latter may be spontaneous. The fact that you can treat the two mathematically as one reversible process does not justify your claim that the two are one reversible process.

Do Alice and Bob have the "same idea" when looking at this object. — RussellA

Welcome to my nightmare
I think you're gonna like it
I think you're gonna feel like you belong

This must be judged from within a quantum theory, with additions and subtractions of course, so I will focus on the parts of your response that fall within that scope. — Kenosha Kid

There is a problem with this approach, and that is that you have outlined specific problems with quantum theory itself, and how these problems lead toward an appearance of indeterminism in some interpretations. To dispose of the appearance of indeterminism, the problems which are being interpreted need to be addressed themselves. Since the problems of quantum theory are a manifestation of the conceptualizations employed (as I described above), then we have to step outside quantum theory to get a handle on these problems.

That is why my Zeno analogy is relevant. What you are asking is analogous to saying let's adhere strictly to Zeno's descriptions, and try to solve Zeno's paradoxes from within that box. It cannot be done, because it is Zeno's descriptions themselves, the conceptualizations employed which are faulty, so we must step outside of those conceptualizations to locate their faults. How could we possibly judge the Copenhagen interpretation without stepping outside the descriptions and conceptualizations which are employed to produce it?

This is worth treating. In 1900, things were thought to be either particles or waves. The blackbody radiation spectrum and quantised atomic orbitals turned that on its head: waves were behaving like particles; particles were behaving like waves. It was surprising, hence the "wave-particle duality paradox'.

There is no paradox. There is no preferred basis set for describing waves except for that of the operator a particular measurement device is described by. At one extreme, plane waves -- Eigenstates of the momentum operator -- have well defined momentum and no defined position, but occupy all of space. At the other, Eigenstates of the position operator have well-defined position but no defined momentum. Everything else lies in between. — Kenosha Kid

This describes exactly what I explained. There are two distinct and incompatible conceptions of space. The wavefunction attempts to reconcile the two, but because they are incompatible it cannot. So the two defining parameters (boundaries if you like) of motion, 1)"well defined momentum and no defined position", and 2)"well defined position but no defined momentum", are each in themselves, incomprehensible if they are meant to describe an actual motion. The former describes the limits to the "wave in space" conception of space, and the latter describes the limits of the "particle in space" conception of space. The two conceptions are incompatible, so when attempts are made meld them together as the wave function, the result is uncertainty with respect to one or the other.

The double-slit experiment begins with an electron with a well-defined position and, after measurement, ends with an electron with a well-defined position. These need not be precise, though they are typically treated as such. In between, the electron spreads out as a wave, but eventually must reduce, either deterministically or spontaneously, to something more localised. — Kenosha Kid

Here again we have a demonstration of the two distinct, and incompatible spatial conceptions. You describe an electron as a particle with a well defined spatial position, at the beginning and at the end of the process. This represents the one spatial conception, "objects in space". In the meantime, the "in between", you say that the electron spreads out as a wave. This is a completely different conception of space, one in which there are "waves in space", and this conception of space is incompatible with the "objects in space" conception, as demonstrated by the Michelson-Morley experiments.

As I stressed in the last post, your claim that there is a particle, called an electron, which exists during the in between period, and "spreads out as a wave", is completely unsupported by the conceptualization of "energy". In fact, the concept of energy denies the possibility that there is such a particle. So your stated "beginning" is really the end of an electron, and your stated "end" is really the beginning of another electron, and what exists in between the two, providing for temporal continuity, is wave energy which is based in a conception of space that is incompatible with the conception of a particle as an object at a location in space.

It really makes no sense to attempt at a validation of a temporal continuity of a single electron by introducing different forms of the electron , like "stroboscopic wave-packet", when the real issue is that there are two distinct conceptions of space, one supporting the existence of particles like electrons, and the other supporting the existence of wave energy. Putting the two conceptions, wave-like and particle-like on equal footing is not a good idea because each of the two involves a conception of space which is incompatible with the other. Therefore the intelligent solution is to determine which of the two conceptions is superior to the other, and figure out what needs to be done to make things which are understood by the other, consistent. Pretending that the two can be made to appear consistent by putting them on an equal footing, is not a real solution.

The concept of emission is pretty uncontroversial in quantum mechanics. — Kenosha Kid

As your op describes, there are problems with quantum mechanics in general. Therefore we must question all principles, even those uncontroversial things which are taken for granted. The idea that emission can be described as spontaneous and random indicates that it is not well understood.

The end-game being an attempt to put to bed the 'quantum equals non-determinism' myth. — Kenosha Kid

OK, if that's what you want to discuss, then perhaps you can describe how spontaneous emission and random fluctuations are consistent with determinism.

PPS__ I may have answered my own question in the next post. — Gnomon

Yes, I think you have answered the question in the next post. Chance is not actually a cause at all, in evolution, natural selection is the cause.

Yet, combined with Selection, Chance can be creative. — Gnomon

It appears to me, like you are still making the same mistake. "Chance" is the word that we use to describe the situation when we apprehend no particular reason for one outcome or another. So the word refers to how we, as human beings, apprehend or describe the situation, it doesn't refer to something active in the world.

Take a coin toss for example. A human hand takes the coin, tosses it, and allows it to land. That is a description of the activity involved. The hand is the cause of the coin toss. However, we can say that there is a 50/50 chance of heads or tails. That "chance" is the way that we describe the possible outcome of the potential toss. If the action is initiated, there is a chance that the outcome will be one thing, and a chance that the outcome will be something else. So "chance" is a word that describes the effects of an action, not the cause of the action.

Even when a person is considering what action to take, and the person decides to "take a chance", "chance" relates to the potential outcome of the possible action. The person is not sure what the outcome will be, and so takes a chance. Chance is not the cause of the action, because the person intentionally chooses the action, but the word "chance" refers to the person not being sure what the outcome will be.

Imagine your example of evolution. One might say, that there is a chance mutation of the being. This does not mean that the mutation is caused by chance, it means that whether the mutation might make the being more or less capable, is a matter of chance, just like flipping the coin creates a chance of heads or tails. Natural selection is the end result, what validates the effect as better or worse. So "chance" is something created by an action, like flipping a coin, or throwing the dice, and the word refers to the fact that the outcome (effect) is indeterminate. But chance is not a creative power in itself, it's how we describe the effect of a creative act when there is more than one possible outcome of the creative act.

Since most scientists deny the necessity for a First Cause of the subsequent sequence of natural events, they put the emphasis on Randomness as the creative power behind the upward arc of Evolution. But that doesn't make sense to me. — Gnomon

You demonstrate a logical intuition, to say that this does not make sense to you. Randomness is just like chance, it describes a created situation, like tossing the dice, it does not describe a creative power. We create randomness, like a random number generator, or tossing the dice, but randomness cannot create anything itself. If there was such a thing as pure randomness, it would just continue on as pure randomness forever and ever, without creating anything. If it actually did create something, then by that very fact it would falsify the designation of randomness, and we'd have to say that it really wasn't random.

I believe that most of the problems which you point to here, are a product of the means of conceptualization. I will try not to be offensive or insulting, because we are all only human after all, but I can say that the concepts employed here are deficient, showing a lack of understanding of the concepts. This leads to odd problems much like the conceptualizations employed by Zeno led to Zeno's paradoxes. We can see with Zeno's paradoxes, that the problem is the result of the means of description, the conceptualizations employed, and how they are employed. Things are described in a way which produces the appearance of paradox. Such is the case in your description above.

So let me start with this idea that the electron (or whatever proposed particle) takes a path, a "trajectory". It is actually impossible that the particle takes a path, and this fact is imposed by the concept of "energy". Energy, in its conceptual formulation is a wave feature. A person might think that a massive object, or a particle, moves from A to B, and brings with it "energy" which is transferred to another object at point B. But the energy according to conventional principles is understood as being transferred from one body to another through wave principles. A moving body has velocity, mass, and momentum according to Newtonian principles, but it does not have "energy". Energy is a feature of the body's relation to something else, and according to conventional principles (Einsteinian), the "something else" is light, or electro-magnetism. Since electro-magnetism is understood and represented by wave principles, the concept of "energy" dictates that energy transmission from one place to another is in the form of a wave. Therefore it makes no sense at all, to say that energy moves from A to B as a particle, because the very concept of "energy" dictates that energy can only be transmitted as a wave. The further discussion as to which trajectory the particle takes therefore, is completely moot, having no significance whatsoever, because whatever it is which transmits from A to B is conceptualized as energy, and energy transmits as a wave, not a particle. There is no particle which moves from A to B, only energy, and by conventional principles energy is transmitted as a wave. The possibility of a particle with a trajectory is excluded by the conceptualization employed.

This idea of the absolute square is important. It is how we get from the non-physical wavefunction to a real thing, even as abstract as probability. Why is the wavefunction non-physical? Because it has real and imaginary components: u = Re{u} + i*Im{u}, and nothing observed in nature has this feature. The absolute square of the wavefunction is real, and is obtained by multiplying the wavefunction by its complex conjugate u* = Re{u} - i*Im{u} (note the minus sign). Remembering that i*i = -1, you can see for yourself this is real. We'll come back to this. — Kenosha Kid

I believe the wave function, as you mention here, is artificial. It has been created in an attempt to establish consistency between the two incompatible representations of space, 1) massive bodies moving through empty space, and 2) energy moving as waves in space.

Notice, what you say later, that what makes the wave function "real" is the capacity for reversal. This is another feature of conventional conceptualization. We understand radiant energy, such as radiant heat, through its absorption, not through an understanding of the process of radiation. So this is a necessary condition of radiant energy, that it is absorbed. The concept of radiant energy is based in the absorption of energy into a body. Sure we can talk about something radiating energy into empty space, into an infinite vacuum or some such thing, but this is not consistent with the concept which is based in objects receiving energy, not in objects emitting energy.

This is a fundamental feature of our means of understanding, which is observation. The observer is always on the receiving end of the radiation, so our understanding of radiation is based in its reception. It doesn't really make sense to talk about observing radio wave emissions because the act of observing is itself a reception. And, though we can observe changes to the body which emits the radiation, this is not a true observation of emission itself. So, to facilitate mathematical calculations we simply assume that emission is an inversion of reception, and voila, the wavefunction is claimed to be real, but really there is a hole in the understanding here.

The back screen is a macroscopic object that cannot be treated precisely with quantum mechanics. — Kenosha Kid

I believe the macroscopic/microscopic division is not an adequate representation of the real divide. The real divide is the division between two incompatible conceptions of "space". One understanding of space is as a medium full of waves, and the other is as an empty vacuum with massive bodies moving around. You can see how the two conceptualizations are incompatible, and where the two conceptualizations meet, radiation is absorbed or emitted from a massive body, and there is confusion due to the incompatibility of the two. That the issue is not macroscopic/microscopic is evident from the fact that macroscopic things can be represented by the wave model. That the wave model representation of macroscopic objects is inaccurate is due to that hole in the understanding.

The back screen is a high-entropy object compared with the electron. That is, at any time, it may occupy one of hundreds of thousands or millions of microstates: particular configurations that are energetically equivalent to one another. At one instant t', a position on the screen r' may not admit an electron because it already has one there. At a subsequent instance t'', it might admit an electron at r'. The screen will explore these microstates in a thermodynamic way. i,e, in the same way that a box of gas will have different but energetically equivalent configurations of gas molecules one instant to the next. — Kenosha Kid

This is a good example of the incompatibility. You are describing the screen as an area of space within which there are subdivisions, some of which will allow for the existence of a particle. But the incoming radiation, to be absorbed into that space is being received as waves within this empty space. So it is necessary to have a transformation principle whereby space (as a medium) with energy moving as waves, is compatible with the conception of empty space with moving particles. Conventional wisdom tells us that the wave formulation is far more advanced, providing a much higher degree of understanding of the reality of the situation, so we ought to dispense this conception of empty space with bodies or particles moving around, and replace it with a consistent wave model. The whole idea described here, that the screen consists of an area with subareas which might or might not provide for the existence of a particle is the wrong approach. The entire area (screen, or macroscopic object) needs to be represented as an interaction of waves to be able to properly understand how the incoming waves of radiant energy will react. However, as I described above, the relationship between emission and reception of radiation is not well understood, and we cannot simply assume an inversion.

Because the electron's birth and death are the true boundary conditions of its wavefunction! — Kenosha Kid

This is the principal misleading, or misguided principle right here. If the radiant energy travels as waves, as necessitated by the concept "energy", the death of the electron is the moment that the energy is emitted. Its birth is when the energy is received. There is no continuity of the particle during transmission. The particle only exists as a part of a massive object. So this is where you need to turn your model around. You cannot represent a photon or electron as being emitted. The photon, as a particle only exists as a part of an object. If energy is emitted by that object, it is emitted as waves, and this constitutes the end of the photon or electron, not its beginning. Conversely, the beginning of the photon or electron, is when radiation is absorbed into an object. We must maintain these principles because the spatial conception which represents energy traveling from here to there, does not allow that energy travels as a particle, it necessitates waves. The particle only exists within the other spatial conception of objects existing in empty space. Remember, "boundary conditions" are applied as deemed required, so if you want your boundary conditions of the electron or photon to be true, you need to represent the true existence of the particle, as allowed for by the conceptions employed. If the conceptions deny the possibility of a particle transmitting energy from one object to another, you cannot employ boundary conditions of the particles, which allow that the particle exists while the energy is being transmitted as waves.

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Randomness is matter completely free. — Gregory

This is contradiction, plain and simple.

We are all trying to figure this stuff out — Gregory

There's no point in trying to figure out contradictions. Give it up! It's simply wrong.

I'm not arguing that it's deterministic. Nor am I arguing that it is not random. I'm arguing that chance cannot be a cause. If there is such a thing as a random occurrence, then the occurrence is uncaused. If we say that it happened by chance, in no way does this mean that chance is the cause of the occurrence.

Hi Kenosha Kid,
I appreciate the well thought out, explicit and thorough description of your thesis. I will reread this a couple times and perhaps make a comment if I see something questionable.

Clearly each ticket has an equal chance to win. It doesn't cause one to win rather than another, because each has the same chance. What causes one to win rather than another, is the draw.

Intentional acts are deterministic & teleological, while Accidental events are random & probabilistic, caused by Chance. — Gnomon

Again, I think you are conflating categories, making category errors. Let's make two categories, as you propose, artificial (intentional), and natural (chance). We cannot say, as you do, that intentional acts are deterministic, because the evidence is that we have freedom of choice. Likewise, as I already explained, we cannot say that natural occurrences are caused by chance. In fact, it makes no sense at all, as I told you already, to say that chance is a cause. To say that something happened by chance is to say that it is uncaused.

But, for the purposes of Science, Chance is the causal power of Nature, not some spooky fickle force like Fate. — Gnomon

This is not true at all.

Well I do think that chance can be a cause — Gregory

Perhaps you can explain these thoughts? Let's say for example, that I'm in a shopping mall and happen to meet an old friend I haven't seen in many years. That's a chance meeting. How do you think that chance caused me to meet this person? Or suppose a person wins a lottery. How does chance cause that person, rather than another person, to win?

Such decisions are made by God, as master, and human attempts to understand these decisions using conceptions like fairness and equity are fruitless, because God does not apply human mathematics in judging good.

You must have in mind a different definition of "Intentional". The antonym of Intentional (planned, willed) is given as Accidental or Un-intentional or Un-planned.or Un-willed. Are these definitions not oppositions? Perhaps "Accidental" is not a physical Thing, but as a concept it is the negation of "Intentional", is it not? Or are all actions Intentional in some sense? — Gnomon

I see your definition, but as I explained, philosophically it doesn't refer to anything real. Intention is a cause, and chance is not a cause. So chance and intention are two distinct categories, not opposites. When we say an action is intentional, we mean that it was caused by intention. When we say that an act was by chance, we do not mean that the cause of it was chance, nor do we mean that the act was not caused. We generally mean that we do not know the cause of it. If we assume that a chance event has no cause this is an unintelligible idea, as I explained.

So we allow a category of physical activities which are not caused by intention, and are also not by chance, and are therefore not accidental (in that sense). The sun shines and evaporates the puddle of water for example. This is not an intentional act, nor is it by chance, so it is not accidental in that sense. It is a different category, or type of activity, a type of activity where the designations of intentional/unintentional, are not relevant. In the other category, the type of activities which are human activities, the intentional/unintentional designation is relevant, and within this category the two are opposed, as "what I intended", and "not what I intended". But here, an accident, "not what I intended", is actually an off shoot of an intentional act, the unintended consequences of an intentional act. And that is because it doesn't make sense to talk about a human act which is not an intentional act, but a chance act.

Intentional means colloquially "by intent". As opposed to a river running down a mountain — Gregory

Right, these are two distinct categories, or types of activities, which Gnomon conflates into one category, to say that the act of a river running is the opposite of the act of a human running, one is intentional and the other is the opposite, unintentional. Then Gnomon applies the definition of "accidental" which is normally applied to an accident in an intentional type of act (not what I intended, therefore chance occurrence), to the other category, the unintentional act of the river running, and tries to argue that actions like the river running are accidental, or chance acts.

Despite what its often called, it's not science, it's art.

I'd like to know how you decide what is legal and what is illegal in this context.

Do you think the American government should use the intelligence apparatus to spy on opposing political campaigns? — NOS4A2

There's a couple things wrong with this question. First, the government agency has no allegiance to one party or another, so it's wrong to say that it is investigating, "spying", or whatever you want to call it, an "opposing" campaign. The agency does not have a side, regardless of who produces information against whom. Remember, Clinton was investigated concerning the emails, so the agency goes both ways. Second, if the agency has reason to believe a crime was committed, an investigation is in order, regardless of the political affiliation.

Please explain how. I'm much interested — Gregory

I'll start with a bit of an outline. Traditional idealism has a deficiency which becomes evident when the theory of participation, which supports it, is analyzed, as Plato did. He noticed that individual things must participate in the ideas which describe those things. For example, a thing of beauty must participate in the Idea of beauty if there is any truth to its beauty. But this representation makes the thing participating active, while the Idea which is partaken of, is passive. And so this representation cannot explain how the Idea of beauty imparts beauty to the beautiful thing, because it does not allow that the Idea is active. Notice that the Idea of beauty needs to be active, as the cause of beauty, if the Idea is to account for the existence of beauty within the thing.

This is why Plato turns to "the good" in The Republic. The good is said to be what makes the intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible, by lighting them. So the good provides the principle of activity, inspiring human beings to act, and also allowing them to grasp the intelligible objects.

This produces a separation between the intelligible object as apprehended by the human mind, and the intelligible object as independent from the human mind, just like the separation between the visible object as lit by the sun, and the visible object as perceived by the seer. In Plato's system, "the good" is the medium between the intelligible object and the apprehension of it, just like the sun is the medium between the visible object and the image of it.

Plato explored the separation between divine ideas and human ideas in The Republic. He describes a double layer of representation. The carpenter has an idea of a bed, and produces a material bed which is a representation of this idea. But the carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the divine Idea, which is the best, or ultimate bed. So the carpenter attempts to make the best possible bed, but that carpenter's mind, with its idea of a bed does not really grasp the Ideal, and the bed is made to the best of the carpenter's ability to conceive of the ideal bed.

This refutes the Pythagorean idealism by demonstrating the necessity of a separation between the human ideas and the divine ideas. That type of idealism does not provide for such a separation, as the mathematical objects which are grasped by the human mind are said to be one and the same as the eternal Ideas. After this wedge is driven between the Ideals, and the human ideas, Aristotle attacks the human ideas, demonstrating that their existence can only be in potentia prior to being discovered by the human mind, and he demonstrates with the cosmological argument that no potential can be eternal.

I see matter as res extensa and still regard it as a mystery — Gregory

Either way, the point was that if it refers to a mystery, "matter" can't be anything more than an idea.

No. In this context, "accidental" is the opposite of "intentional". In modern terms, an Accident is caused by random forces, and does not involve the property of Teleology. Aristotle contrasted Accidental change with Substantial change. But that is not what I was talking about. — Gnomon

I don't see how there is such a thing as the opposite of "intentional". But for the sake of argument, I'll assume that there is such a thing, and I'll call it "non-intentional". And we'll say that this would be a random force. But such a force makes no sense whatsoever. It would have to spring from nowhere, as uncaused, to be truly random, and a force just springing from nowhere, uncaused, doesn't make any sense.

Let's put this in context: it's neither as amazing or alarming as a giant sky lord judging me for masturbating. — Kenosha Kid

I don't see how your masturbation is relevant.

The most peculiar part is the sense in which no time passes for, and no space is traversed by, light: a feature of SR that has always amazed and alarmed me. — Kenosha Kid

Good reason to be skeptical.

So you can leave out the bit that deduces stuff from a basis of certainty, and proceed instead from the common sense of the stuff around us. — Banno

Yes, follow Banno's advice KK, use your common sense and be skeptical.

It's fine to question anything, but absurd to question everything.

There are things in which we needs must be confident in order to participate in doubt. — Banno

No it isn't absurd to question everything. That's how certainty is produced by questioning things. It's impractical to question everything, because this takes time, but the time it takes to question something, and resolve that doubt with a solution is not infinite. So the person who questions everything is slower (and much more annoying) than someone else, but that person is not incapacitated by such questioning.

There is no infinite regress of questioning unless you assume a relationship between one question and another. But if you question one thing, answer it and proceed, there is no infinite regress. In reality, this idea which you, and so many others profess, that a person "must be confident in order to participate in doubt", is what is absurd. It's just based in a straw man of what "doubt" is. Use your common sense, and recognize that certainty is only produced from questioning things, and therefore could not be necessary for it.

There have been attempts to refute the Forms by saying there cannot be a perfect Form of mathematics. But like Hegel, Plato seemed to have an implicit dislike for mathematics, perhaps because he wasn't great at it. Plato thought math was outside the Forms and earthly because 4 is greater than 2 but smaller than six. So 4 seems to be big and small at the same time, an imperfection in Plato's eyes — Gregory

Some people, myself included, claim that Plato himself refuted Pythagorean idealism, before Aristotle. The modern representation of Platonic realism is Pythagorean idealism, and is not a true representation of what Plato exposed.

But this is all in a materialist sense. The most I am willing to reduce matter to is energy. Information? No. Something spiritual? Nop. When Schopenhauer says matter is incorpereal, I take that to mean energy. Every thing else is fairy wand imagination. The world is vibration — Gregory

The issue is in one's understanding of what the word "matter" means. If we understand the term to refer to an aspect of reality which is not understood by humanity, then matter is necessarily just an idea. This is because there can be nothing specific which is known as "matter", there's just a vague unknown which bears that name..

But the First Cause must be activated either by Accident or by Intention. — Gnomon

I don't know what you would mean by "Accident" here. Isn't an accident a property of an intentional act? So the so-called First Cause would be an intentional act whether or not the outcome is the intended outcome or an accidental outcome.

I'm not sure what you meant by "the reality is given by measurement". — Gnomon

Your analogy spoke of "virtual particles", "that are not real, but only potential, until their unreal state is collapsed into reality by a measurement or observation." So in this case, as you describe it, it is the act of measurement which gives reality. This cannot be a perspective from outside the world, because the description is of an interaction with the world.

The strictest form of determinism would be a mechanical determinism, where the state of the system at any given time can be exactly known if the state at one specific time is known. That would mean events are "mechanically" connected, so that each event has fixed connection to each other event. — Echarmion

Your use of the word "system" in this post is somewhat misleading. "System" implies boundaries which distinguish internal from external, but the boundaries are positioned according to the judgement of the modeler. Therefore the distinction between the features which are internal to the system and the features which are external to the system is subjective, dependent of the intentions of the modeler.

Is it conceivable that there is a world where events have connections, but the connections are not mechanical? That is, for a given state at T0, more than one future state of the system is possible? — Echarmion

Here, you seem to be referring to a system with no causes external to the system, external causation not being allowed for by your description of possible events within the system. But such a system, which is closed in an absolute way, is not a realistic proposition.

He's found the cure, he's going to give it to everyone for free. — Punshhh

And China's going to pay for it!

Why not let him make up his own mind? — Gregory

What kind of nonsense is this? Isn't the point to posting and participating here, to get other people's ideas? Try chewing on that.

I wasn't making a judgement about whether the cosmological argument is true or not, so whether that's debatable is beside the point. That's why I didn't reply to your post.

The issue was whether Eternal Potential is consistent with Aristotle and Aquinas, as Gnomon claimed. It is not. The idea of Eternal Potential is what the cosmological argument claims to refute.

For many people, these new fear associations are so strong they can even be triggered when the threat isn’t imminent. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I really believe that most people are not actually in fear of covid-19. They practise physical distancing measures as a moral responsibility to protect those within our society who might be negatively affected by the disease. The odds are quite low that I will be one of those who die from the disease, so I do not fear the disease whatsoever. This attitude is expressed in your examples of risk taking. People take risks without fear.

However, statistics show that some people have died, and will die from the virus. So I feel morally responsible to take these relatively simple measures, distancing and mask wearing, to do my part to help those unknown people who inevitably will be negatively affected. This is quite simply a matter of will power. Are you capable of preventing yourself from doing what comes naturally from instinct, and long standing habits and desires, for the sake of protecting others?

Therefore I think your portrayal of "fear conditioning" is a misrepresentation. We learned thousands of years ago, that moral responsibility is not based in fear. That idea was left behind in the Old Testament, the fear of God. The New Testament displays the new learned reality, that moral responsibility is based in love for others.

But in general most beliefs seem to favor a paradise. — TiredThinker

Purgatory and hell are paradise?

Boy I can't wait until the next debate. It will be like the last one except literally on steroids. — Mr Bee

I recommend drug tests.

I don't know what Aristotle's opinion was on the concept of "Eternal Potential". But his ontology assumed a necessary Non-Contingent Cause. Which I would interpret as a non-physical, non-temporal, eternal potential. — Gnomon

The point is that a potential cannot be a cause, only something actual can cause anything.

Ideality :
In Plato’s theory of Forms, he argues that non-physical forms (or ideas) represent the most accurate or perfect reality. Those Forms are not physical things, but merely definitions or recipes of possible things. What we call Reality consists of a few actualized potentials drawn from a realm of infinite possibilities.
1. Materialists deny the existence of such immaterial ideals, but recent developments in Quantum theory have forced them to accept the concept of “virtual” particles in a mathematical “field”, that are not real, but only potential, until their unreal state is collapsed into reality by a measurement or observation. To measure is to extract meaning into a mind. [Measure, from L. Mensura, to know; from mens-, mind]
2. Some modern idealists find that scenario to be intriguingly similar to Plato’s notion that ideal Forms can be realized, i.e. meaning extracted, by knowing minds. For the purposes of this blog, “Ideality” refers to an infinite pool of potential (equivalent to a quantum field), of which physical Reality is a small part. A formal name for that fertile field is G*D. — Gnomon

Notice that in your descriptive example, there are supposedly infinite possibilities which collapse into one reality, the reality given by measurement. But that measurement is an act, and the possibilities are not really infinite, it's just a misunderstanding attributable to the mind that measures.