are you aware of how... eccentric... you view is? — Banno

It's just that i think about extremely trivial things, which is not a common trait. But the important things are already over thought so why not?

So instead of arguing "there are two names for a thing therefore there are two things", which is a red herring, you're just arguing "there are two names for a thing and there's no reason for it having a second name therefore there are two things", which is just a red herring with weasel (obviously if a thing has two names, there's a reason it has two names... it was named twice; and obviously that doesn't count... so, the weasel is in what constitutes "a reason"). Adding a weasel to a red herring is still not an argument, though I suppose the weasel would love the snack. — InPitzotl

No, I believe the two symbols have different meaning, and I've given the reasons why I believe that. You claim that the symbols refer to the same thing so I want to know the reasons why you believe this.

As indicated in the op, it is not the case that the same thing is named twice. It's very clear that "1/9X9" does not say the same thing as "1". So your claim that the same thing was named twice is false.

And the way they use it, .999...=1. The definitions therefore are matters of fact. — InPitzotl

As I've explained to fishfry already, that two things are equivalent does not mean that they are the same thing. Therefore what is on the left side of the "=" (which indicates equivalent) does not provide a definition of what is on the right side. It seems you do not know what a definition is.

If we can't agree that 1/9 of a pie is a particular quantity of pie, then we can't have the conversation you want. But it's irrelevant anyway. — InPitzotl

As I explained to Banno, it's very clear that "1/9 of a pie" does not indicate a particular quantity of pie, because pies vary in size. If your inability to accept this fact rules you out of this conversation then so be it.

But isn't one of this pie a different quantity from one of that pie? — InPitzotl

No, why would you think that? One of anything is the same quantity as one of anything else. It is one, which is a quantity. We are talking about quantity in an absolute, abstract sense now. But if we are talking about a quantity of pie, then clearly one large pie is a different quantity than one small pie.

The lesson you ought to take from this is that 1/9, as a fraction does not refer to any quantity in any sense whatsoever, because it needs to be qualified. In order to have any meaning whatsoever, we need to indicate the thing which is to be thus divided. To talk about a division without any thing divided, is to talk about a useful tool, which is doing nothing. And the tool which divides quantities is not itself a quantity.

You say 1/9 of 9 is a different quantity from 1/9 of 18; Is 1/9 of three yet another quantity? But surely you must say that ⅓ is not a quantity... — Banno

Now you've struck the heart of the problem. Some quantities cannot be divided in certain ways. It is impossible. Three cannot be divided by nine, it is impossible. Nevertheless, mathemagicians are an odd sort, very crafty, wily like the fox, devising new illusions all the time. They like to demonstrate that they can do the impossible. Some people even believe that they actually do what is impossible. That is a problem.

But this all still leaves hanging why you think 3 is a quantity but ⅓ isn't... — Banno

Let's start with this definition. A "quantity" is something which can be measured. The simple act of counting, 1,2,3,4,5,etc., when there are no objects being counted, is an act of measuring imaginary things. These imaginary things are called "numbers". So a numeral represents an imaginary quantity, which is called a number. A quantity is something which can be measured and in this case the measurement is counting. Now look at "1/3". It represents a ratio, which is a specific relationship between two distinct quantities, or numbers. A relationship between two numbers is not the same thing as a number, therefore we ought not try to represent it as a number.

The relationship between two numbers (indicating determinate measurable quantities), is not necessarily a measurable quantity itself. When it is not, there's a word for this "incommensurable". Why create the illusion that incommensurable things are actually not incommensurable, and insist that this illusion is truth.

I invited anyone to provide a better definition of "number", one which would provide for these "non-particular quantities" to be called numbers, but none has been provided. So I still believe that concepts such as "real numbers" operate without an acting definition of "number", providing for all sorts of tomfoolery.

Is that your contention? — Banno

No that's not my contention. One is a quantity, two is a quantity, three is a quantity and so is four, etc.. 1/9 is not a quantity because it is a fraction, and for it to refer to a particular quantity it must be specified what it is a fraction of. 1/9 of 9 is a different quantity from 1/9 of 18, which is a different quantity from 1/9 of 27, etc.. So 1/9 on its own does not refer to any particular quantity.

We do talk of half a pie as being a quantity of pie. — Banno

I'm not denying that people talk that way, just like they say .999... is a number. I'm saying these people are wrong. Half of this pie is a different quantity from half of that pie. So half a pie is not a particular quantity at all. Even though people might talk as if it is a particular quantity of pie, we'd be fools to believe them. If you bought half a small pizza would you complain because you expected to get the same quantity as half a large?

It might be a normal way of speaking, so long as the meaning is understood. And the meaning is that the circumference of the cone is smaller at one end than the other. So let's transpose this to the mountain analogy, the circumference of the mountain is bigger at the bottom than it is at the top. The mountain itself is not bigger at the bottom than it is at the top, because "mountain" refers to the entire thing, just like "cone" refers to the entire thing.

Right, that's why one is called a number, it's a value representing a particular quantity (as per the definition I offered), the quantity of 1. On the other hand, 1/9 does not represent any particular quantity unless it is qualified with 1/9 of 9, or 1/9 of 90, etc..

One is a particular quantity, and therefore a number; 1/9 is not. This is because a fraction must be a fraction of something in order that it signify a particular quantity, 1/9 of this, or 1/9 of that. But 1/9 on its own does not signify any particular quantity.

A ninth of that particular pie is a particular quantity. A ninth, or 1/9, is not a particular quantity. Are you capable of understanding this?

Would you not say that a cone is smaller at the point than at the open end? — Pfhorrest

No, a cone is the whole thing, not just one end or the other. One cone is smaller than another cone, but it makes no sense to say that a cone is smaller than itself at one end or the other. Are you lacking in English skills? It might make sense to say that the circumference of the cone is smaller at one end than the other, but it makes no sense to say that the cone itself is smaller, because "cone" refers to the entirety of the shape.

Is that really such a weird way to speak to you? — Pfhorrest

Yes, it's a very primitive and misleading way to speak, to say that because the circumference of the cone is smaller at one end than the other, then the cone is smaller than itself at one end or the other. If you really think that this is an acceptable way to speak, then ask yourself, if "the cone is smaller", then what is it smaller than. You will see that there is nothing else referred to but itself, and you are saying that the cone is smaller than itself. Truly a very weird way to speak.

I'd point out that 2 + 2 = 4, but we've previously determined that you don't even believe that. — fishfry

Seems you have a short memory. What we previously determined is that I do not believe that 2+2 is the same thing as 4. Remember? You argued that 2+2 is identical to 4, ignoring the difference between equivalent and identical.

What do you mean "If that's the case, then"? There seems to be an implicit assumption that every thing should have exactly one name. — InPitzotl

The question was why does the same thing have two names. There was no implicit assumption that the same thing ought not have the same name, but an implicit assumption that if the same thing does have two distinct names, there is a reason for it having two distinct names.

I don't believe that ".999..." and "1" refer to the exact same thing. So I'm asking you, who apparently does believe this, why does mathematics, as a single unified discipline, have these two distinct symbols to refer to the exact same thing. If you could answer this for me, then you might help me to believe what you believe. Until then, I'll believe what seems very evident to me at this time, that these two have distinctly different meanings.

You might argue as others have, that it is a difference which does not make a difference. But in acknowledging that it is a difference you accept the fact that they do not refer to the exact same thing. So I warn you that this would be a self-refuting argument.

So 1/9 is a number, even for Meta, but 0.111... is not? And this despite their being equal?

Is this Meta's claim? — Banno

Did I say that I agree that 1/9 is a number? Check my definition of number, "particular quantity". How could 1/9 ever be construed as a particular quantity? A fraction is not a number.

And there you have it folks. MU is a genuine, triple-barreled whackdoodle. — tim wood

"Triple-barreled" now. Looks like I'm moving up in the world.

We ordinarily talk quite readily of motion or change with respect to a dimension other than time as we usually experience it. Hence the mountain that gets smaller with altitude even though it stays the same size with time; the pipe along its side that gains altitude as it moves westward, even though it’s not moving with respect to time; the abstract line that moves in a y-ward direction over the x-ward direction, even though it too doesn’t move with respect to time. — Pfhorrest

Sorry to have to inform you of this, but this talk makes no sense to me. And I've never heard anyone talk like this prior to seeing it on this thread. So I think you guys are just making it up. The mountain gets smaller with altitude? What could that even mean? It's the same mountain. If you're at a lower spot on the mountain than someone else, this does not make the mountain any smaller. Nor does walking down the mountain from top to bottom make it any smaller. That's nonsense to say that the mountain is smaller or larger according to one's altitudinal position.

...and there's Meta's problem.

Family Resemblance. — Banno

Sorry Banno, but in logic definitions are prerequisite. Family resemblance might suffice as a description of meaning in common vernacular, but mathematics is logic.

This is a language barrier. In the language spoken by the mathematics community, .999... represents the same particular quantity that 1 does. — InPitzotl

If that's the case, then why have two distinct representations for one and the same thing?

Just for the heck of it, what are they, then? — tim wood

I believe shenanigans is an apt word for a description of "real numbers". Modern mathematics contains a lot of sophistry, of which some is used for deception. Mathematics is loaded with tricks which the mathemgjicians have designed for the purpose of hiding contradictions.

The diagonal of a square, for example, measured in the units that the sides are measured in, is how long? Is that length not a number? Or did something magic happen? — tim wood

A true square does not admit to a diagonal, the two sides are incommensurable, making the square an irrational figure, just like the circle. There is no such thing as the diagonal of a square, because there is no such thing as a square, just like there's no such thing as a circle. These items were designed as ideals, but the irrationality of the ratios demonstrates that this effort was a failure. Space cannot be represented as distinct dimensions, as the irrationality of these two dimensional figures demonstrates. One dimension is incommensurable with another, whether you represent the relationship between them as a curved line or as a right angle.

I think the system of real numbers allows that "number" remain undefined, indefinite, and this is why "the real numbers" is not a fixed system. Rigorous defining of "number" has been withdrawn for the sake of producing the real numbers.

Eternalists don't think that the universe is motionless. — Pfhorrest

To support this thought, they define "motion" in very strange ways, as Kenosha has demonstrated. This makes the thing described as "motion" something completely different from what we commonly refer to as motion.

There is something that turns the cup at t into the cup at t'. — Kenosha Kid

Now your catching on. Motion is that thing in between, which is not represented.

Motion still falls out: dx/dt = (dx/dc) x (dc/dt) — Kenosha Kid

The problem is that this is not what motion is. It is not the difference between two states, it is the act of moving.

So as long as x, c, and t are continuous, i.e. so long as objects don't disappear then later reappear, motion is still possible. — Kenosha Kid

What separates me from Luke, is that I think motion is possible in an eternalist framework, if we provide the appropriate additional premises, such as those used in religion, or Luke's spot light theory. However, Luke insists that adding such additional premises makes it no longer eternalism.

What a silly thing to say. .999, eighteen, XVI, and .999... all represent numbers. — InPitzotl

I take my definition of "number" from OED: "an arithmetical value representing a particular quantity and used in counting and making calculations". Notice specifically the criteria "particular quantity". This rules out the possibility that .999... is a number.

Show me a definition of "number" which allows that .999... is a number.

As a numeral, it's nothing in itself but a sign of something. But a sign of what? Well, the people who define these things have told us. — tim wood

A numeral is a special type of sign. To know whether .999... qualifies as a numeral would require a definition which dictates the criteria for being a numeral.

But as I said, that issue is just a distraction. What matters to the present discussion is that .999... does not represent a number. Nor does .111... represent a number, and that's the problem with the op. Whether or not these could still be numerals, which do not represent numbers, is a matter of one's interpretation of "numeral", and this is not relevant.

The rest of your post doesn't seem to make any sense.

.999... is obviously not a number. It is a numeral. 1, 2, 3, ..., are obviously not numbers. They are numerals. It's a difference that makes a difference. I'm surprised you need to have that pointed out to you. — tim wood

Whether or not .999...qualifies as a numeral is a matter of interpretation. What I meant, as you seem to have difficulty in understanding, is that it does not signify a number. Whether or not .999... is a numeral is a semantic issue involving the meaning or definition of "numeral" being applied, and is irrelevant to the point that I was making, that .999... does not signify a number. If you'd like to discuss this point, please do not just create a distraction like that.

Try this: .999... is not a number because it has a indefinite extension. A number is an object and an object cannot have an indefinite extension. So discussing the status of .999... under the presumption that it is a number, is misleading oneself by starting with a false premise.

If a person wanted to say "1" they would say 1. If a person wanted to say ".999..." they would say .999.... The two symbols have a distinct meaning and it is not a case of using different symbols to refer to the same thing. The one refers to an object, the other something indefinite. Why try to argue that they each refer to the same thing? Since it is so obvious that the two symbols have a different meaning, it requires accepting that false premise just to start the discussion. Then as soon as you accept the false premise there is nothing to discuss anymore, because the falsity has been validated.

It's not my definition, blame Galileo! — Kenosha Kid

Your wrong, it's not Galileo's definition of motion. It's yours.

An effect of the motion of the teacup is that it is now on the floor. — Kenosha Kid

Right, that's exactly what you claimed motion is:

my everyday experience of motion: the thing is not where it once was. — Kenosha Kid

See what I mean? You are taking an effect of motion, "the thing is not where it once was" (the teacup is now on the floor), and claiming that this is motion.

If that's your level of argumentation, we cannot trust that each other are trying their best to explain what seems true to them. Further discussion would be pointless. I'm not having a go; you've described exactly how I feel about everything you have said. I just would have persevered and tried to reconcile our different experiences of motion, or perhaps got a consensus on another thread. — Kenosha Kid

You obviously haven't a clue of what you are talking about. Good luck in your attempts at discussion!

I don't see the need myself, but I would like you to explain it some more so that I can understand what you are getting at.
Also, as I said initially the mysticism of the creation and maintaining of the physical world is complex with some deep mysteries and spiritual cosmology which will probably be difficult to correlate with metaphysics. It would be better to stick to the more obvious correlations around being and what Mystics are actually concerned with, as the physical world is regarded merely as a tool for the development of the expression of being.
If you insist on delving into the creation of physical matter and it's attendant time we can go there, but I expect we will quite rapidly hit an impasse. However provided when the impasse is reached we can get back to the topic in hand then that's ok with me. — Punshhh

Maybe this is evidence of that difference between metaphysics and mysticism which you have been describing. Metaphysics, in the tradition of philosophy involves the desire to know. As I explained in the prior post, the reason for separating space from time is to bring the eternal, or what you called eternity, into the realm of intelligible. What separates the forms which we know and sense, from the Forms of eternity, is matter. So we have to get through matter in one way or another if we want to properly understand the existence of the divine, immaterial Forms.

Perhaps the mystic is satisfied with simply coming into contact with the divine, and does not feel the need to understand this realm. In metaphysics there has been proposed a division between aesthetics and ethics. This division is consistent with the division of passive and active. One might passively enjoy the beauty of the natural world, up to and including the divine reality, without any desire to act. But the nature of the human being, as I described earlier is to be inclined to act. So one can only enjoy the aesthetic beauty for so long without feeling the need to act. When we go to act, we want to understand what we are doing, and why we are doing it, and this makes us consider purpose and therefore ethics. We need to bridge that gap between the passive enjoyment of the divine beauty (aesthetics), and the ethical principles which guide us in our actions. This means that we need to understand what it means to act, and this includes all forms of activity, including that divine activity which is prior to material existence (the eternal). And since space is a concept based in observations of material existence, we must allow a conception of time which is free from space, in order to understand this activity, which is necessary for an inclusive ethics..

But surely the prior state is external to (separate from) the physical universe we are discussing. So it can have its own separate space? Remember I said the physical world we find ourselves in is a construct. So the prior actual, genuinely real state then constructed an artificial world which isn't real in the same, actual, way, which is the our physical world*. — Punshhh

If there is space in this eternal realm, we have no reason to believe that it is in any way even similar to the space we are familiar with. The logic which has been used by the metaphysicians before us has directed us toward the actuality or activity of that eternal realm. And "act" is a temporal term. As an example, consider the ancient distinction between locomotion (change of place), and simple change (when a thing changes due to differences within. Change of place requires a conception of space to understand it. But change within a thing only requires the capacity to describe a thing's properties or qualities.

As you describe, the external world, which is our physical world, isn't real or genuine. But our conceptions of space are validated by observations of this artificial world. This makes our conceptions of space inadequate in the first place. Furthermore, our conceptions of time are derived from, and dependent on these conceptions of space. But we see that the internal is much closer to the real, so the internal activity, internal changes, are the activities which the concept of time ought to be based in, not conceptions of space. The internal time is based in the distinction between past and future, not in spatial relations.

For me all is material, but this is not the material known to science, or philosophy, but rather a constellation of subtle bodies. The only physical material in this schema is on the physical plane. So if by immaterial, we can agree on some kind of subtle body, immaterial in terms of any material we are aware of, then that's fine. I can also go along with immaterial too, but at some point I would ask the nature of these immaterial forms and how they become expressed in worlds of material. — Punshhh

It seems like I need to ask what you mean by a "plane". I take "plane" as a spatial term, it signifies two dimensions. Two dimensions puts us somewhere in between non-dimensional, and the classic three dimensional space. No body, no matter, can exist on a plane, being just two dimensional.. This is one of the difficulties with spatial concepts. We construct spatial concepts through the addition of multiple dimensions. But in reality, when a body, a material object, comes into existence, it must partake in all three spatial dimensions. Further, there is a certain incompatibility between different dimensions, as demonstrated by the irrational nature of the diagonal of a square, and pi. So it seems to me that to say that this type of body is on this plane, and another type on another plane, would create a certain incommensurability between these different types of bodies.

I can also go along with immaterial too, but at some point I would ask the nature of these immaterial forms and how they become expressed in worlds of material. — Punshhh

This is the opposite of what I described, and is the key principle of Plato's cave allegory. In reality, the material world is an expression of the immaterial Forms.

Yes, for me these forms are subtle bodies, there are numerous kinds of subtle bodies, or ethers (ethereal bodies). — Punshhh

So the question then is are these kinds of bodies separated by planes of existence such that there would be no commensurability between them? In other words, would these different types of bodies each need to be measured by different principles. If so, do you think that an adequate conception of time could establish a relation between them?

The second ridiculous thing applying this straw man to: "My tea cup is sitting on the table right now, and it used to be on the counter" to imply that it did not move. — Kenosha Kid

I agree that to have changed position implies that something has moved. But motion is defined as. and the word is used to refer to, the activity of moving, not the effects of moving. That's the problem with your kinematic definition, kinematics deals with the effects of motion, not motion itself.

My everyday experience of something moving now is based on recent and current sense data on the positions of the thing. — Kenosha Kid

You seem to have a sense apparatus which is completely different from mine. When I see a thing moving, such as a car going past me on the road, I see it as moving. I do not see it as having been in one position, and now in another position. But I don't believe that you really experience motion in this way. So I think you are either lying about how you experience motion, for the sake of supporting some metaphysical position, or you haven't ever really thought about how you experience motion, and so you are just fabricating this claim.

I didn't say it was, but their not contradictory. Unless knowledge stalled millennia ago. — Kenosha Kid

To have a position means to have a particular, and determinable spatial location. To be in motion means to be actively moving from one spatial location to another. So yes, the two are contradictory. And if this implies that knowledge stalled out millennia ago, then so be it. It's people like you make quantum uncertainty into acceptable physics. The particle was there, and now it's here, but who cares what happened in between. We know that it moved, and for us that's what constitutes "motion" Big problem, that's not really what constitutes motion, you are deceiving yourself, and you really haven't a clue what motion is.

no clue there? — Kenosha Kid

.It's becoming very clear, you really haven't got a clue as to what motion is.

It is not to kinematics, which accords with my everyday experience of motion: the thing is not where it once was. — Kenosha Kid

I think that's ridiculous. My tea cup is sitting on the table right now, and it used to be on the counter. So you say my cup is in motion because it's not where it used to be. That's ridiculous the cup was in motion, and that's why it moved from one position to another, but being in a new position, it is no longer in motion. My OED defines motion as the act or process of changing position. To say that motion is being in a new position, is nonsense. Nobody uses "motion" like that. Nor is it consistent with anyone's experience of motion.

If you define motion to be impossible, then I agree it is impossible. — Kenosha Kid

I don't define motion to be impossible. But I think it is ridiculous to define motion as being in a different position, because no one in conventional English usage uses the word that way. To be in a position is not to be in motion, the two are contradictory. To be in motion is to be changing position. Do you not understand what it means to be active?

It cannot do that if it only knows where the fly is now, and not where it is going. — Kenosha Kid

Sure it can, because it's bigger than the fly. A big thing doesn't need to know where the small thing is going, to get in the small thing's way.

Even a stoopid frog can figure out where a fly will be such that it can fire its tongue out and catch it. — Kenosha Kid

If it is moving, there is no place where it is.. That's contradictory, to say that it is moving, and that it is at a place. The frog intercepts the fly with another motion it does not figure out where the fly will be. Being bigger than the fly, that's an easy thing for the stoopid frog, it merely has to get in the fly's way.

Yes, but changes with time, i.e. has different positions at different times. I recall that the Moon was there. Now it is there. It has moved. — Kenosha Kid

No, motion is not having different positions at different times, that's having different positions at different times. Motion is what happens in between the different positions, how a thing gets from one position to the other. It is to be moving, which is very clearly not to have a position.

The way I view it is that divine beings came up with a system of generating a realm of manifestation, a place of extension, of extension of space and time, spacetime. As this extends the space inflates along with the window of time, like blowing bubbles. Or as the Hindu's describe it spun from the tips of Ishvara's fingers like silk, creating the fabric of our world. — Punshhh

For the reasons alluded to in my last post, and mentioned earlier in the thread, I really think it is necessary to separate space and time conceptually. Space is the primary concept by which we measure material things, sensible things. Principally, this is geometry. The problem described in the last post is that there is an actuality which is prior to the existence of material things. Since space is a concept used for measuring material things, and this activity does not involve material things, being prior to them, we have no reason to believe that space is an applicable concept when we are speaking about this activity which is prior to material existence. Time is the primary concept by which we measure activity. So we must unchain the concept of time from the material world, such that we can apply it to the activity of the eternal, which for now is outside of time because the currently applied concept of time is tied to the spatial activity of material things.

Remember the principle we agreed upon earlier, that the entire material world must be created anew at each passing moment. So if there is a bubble which is blown at each moment (to use your analogy), each of these bubbles must expand from nothing, or near nothing, to extremely big, in a time period which is so short that we do not even notice it. This would be space itself expanding at an extremely fast rate, at each moment, in order to present us with what we see as spatial distance. Our conceptions of space do not allow for anything like this, having been derived from the illusion of continuity of spatial existence and distances, rather than from this idea, that spatial existence must be recreated (therefore expanded from near nothing), at each moment.

This is why I was unhappy with your use of "body", which to me implies a material form, whereas western mysticism, such as Neo-Platonism has turned to a hierarchy of immaterial Forms which are separate, free from bodies. The immaterial Forms have providence over the changing material forms, bodies, which we may observe.

Suppose a material body consists of parts, and each part could be considered as a material body itself. Each little part, as a body itself, must have an immaterial Form which governs its continued existence through temporal extension. But a bigger body, a unity of which the smaller body is just a part, requires a Form with more governing capacity then the smaller one, because it also exercises some control over the smaller body, robbing the smaller body's Form of some degree of freedom by virtue of the smaller body being within the unity of the larger. So the Neo-Platonists start with the One, which would be the Form that corresponds with the entire universe, and they proceed from there. A Christian theologian such as Aquinas would start with God, as the One, and have a hierarchy of angels, each exercising providence over a lessor massive body.

So the mystic is concerned with the practice of developing this embryonic development within themselves. — Punshhh

I think that's a good way of putting it.

What does motion, in the everyday/kinematic sense, look like? — Kenosha Kid

Motion, in the everyday sense, looks like something not having a determinable position. We often describe it as what happens when a thing changes position. It's what happens between a thing being in one place and that thing being in a different place, it moves.

The idea that no motion cannot occur because there is nothing moving along the time axis or moving along the worldline or moving within the block is in itself a presentist notion. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, and the eternalist idea that there is motion when nothing is moving, is contradiction, plain and simple. You can try to hide that contradiction behind claims, such as the notion that kinematic motion does not require that anything be moving, but that's smoke and mirrors. Kinematic refers to the effects of motion, and not motion itself, so all you are doing is talking about the effects of something which eternalism denies exists.

I think where I stray from the philosophical definition is that I tend to use the word eternity as a substitute for divine realm. I will happily change to that if you would prefer. Naturally for me the divine realm is outside time, atemporal in relation to our word. Also I tend not to delve into that realm in discussion because we would be trying to discus things we don't understand, perhaps can't understand, which are not like our world and about which we don't have means of finding out (other than through revelation). — Punshhh

Are you familiar with Aristotle's cosmological argument? This is the argument which is used to refute both materialism and Platonic realism, and give intelligibility to "outside time", "eternal". First we might look at the nature of sensible, or material objects and see that the potential for the object is prior in time to the actual existence of the object. In later philosophy material existence is called contingent existence. Prior to the existence of the a material thing there is the potential for it, but its actual existence is contingent on the appropriate cause, or causes. However, Aristotle argues that potential cannot be prior in an absolute sense, because if the potential for existence was prior to all actual existence, there would be nothing to act as a cause, to actualize that potential, and there would be forever, for an infinite amount of time, pure potential without any actual existence. Since we do have actual existence right now, he excludes this eternal potential as impossible, and concludes that anything eternal must be actual.

Platonism is excluded when he argues that ideas are actualize by the human mind which discovers them. Ideas are given actual existence by the human mind, and if they exist prior to being discovered they must exist as potential. But the cosmological argument, above, denies the possibility of eternal potential. Therefore ideas cannot be eternal. So now we are left with very little guidance as to how to comprehend that actuality which is necessarily prior to the actual existence of material objects. The common notion of "time" is to understand it as a feature of the changing material world. Therefore the actuality which is prior to the material world must be "outside time", eternal.

For me, this creates a problem in understanding this "actuality". If it is truly actual, therefore active, then we must allow for some sort of time to account for this activity. This implies that the common notion of "time", which ties time to material existence, is incorrect, and must be adjusted to allow for this time in which the supposed eternal actuality is active, prior to material existence. Once the concept of time is adjusted, then the so-called eternal actuality can be brought into relationship with material actualities so that this actuality is no longer "outside time".

This is theosophy, in the cosmogony it refers to, it is specifically discussing the beings represented by humanity, their role in the being of the planet Earth and likewise in the being of the Sun. — Punshhh

OK, so it's a sort of analogy?

So the divine being has a body, or vehicle of expression on the atmic plane, this would necessarily be a subtle body, which is undefined on the assumption that it is beyond our comprehension. That the divine being would have a mind on the monadic plane, again undefined on the assumption that it is beyond our comprehension and that the divine being has the equivalent of a soul on the logic plane, which would be beyond our comprehension. So trying to understand the detail of these planes, or bodies etc is futile, pointless, as they are manifestations in a divine realm, for which we as humans are unequiped to understand. — Punshhh

I see that there is a sort of understanding possible through comparison or analogy. The parts of the higher three can be compared to the parts of the lower three. This is similar to what Augustine does with Plato's tripartite soul. In Plato's trinity there is body and mind, with spirit or passion as the intermediary. Then Augustine takes the mind itself and divides it three ways as memory, reason, and will. So memory in Augustine's trinity is comparable to body in Plato's. Reason is comparable to Plato's mind. And will is comparable to spirit. So we have the same type of tripartite division, but at a different level.

Well eternity is reality which from our perspective is all things to all men. It is heaven, or nirvana, for example. This I think is described as the classical interpretation of eternity. I will be more specific and define it as that realm embodied by the three higher planes of our existence. The atmic, monadic and logoic, in this realm the divine logos, or God is manifest together with the various divine beings and immortals which form the hierarchy of being. All things are born out of this realm and worlds like ours are like pearls on Ishvaras necklace.
By divinity I mean beings who dwell in eternity and their nature. — Punshhh

That's the first time I've seen "eternity" described without reference to temporal concepts. So I don't really think it's the classical interpretation. Even the ancient Greeks described it through relation to time.

In this link the seven planes are laid out. — Punshhh

Why is it called the seven planes of our solar system?

A subtle body, I don't think we can say that these beings do, or don't have a body, or what form it takes. But in line with the cosmology of the the three higher planes there will be a body constituted of the forms found on the lower of the three planes, the atmic. Something which we probably can't comprehend. — Punshhh

Are you sure there would be a body composed of the third etheric? Doesn't "etheric" imply without any body? The diagram shows will there. How can there be a body composed of will?

I have a rich narrative which I use in contemplation on this issue. What I have experienced is not that clear, but I have had a number of experiences in the form of a presence of eternity, or divinity in some way. Rather like sitting in a room and eternity is in the next room and there is frosted glass between them and I can feel the presence and dimly make out the forms. I have had experiences like soma, but not in a formal setting. Although in a heightened state in puja, there was formal orchestration of revelation, or ceremony, to a degree. — Punshhh

I'm really having difficulty with your use of "eternity"..

why would that be smuggling in religion? — jorndoe

I don't see how one can give "special metaphysical status" any meaning without referring to religious principles.

Were I to have an ineffable mystical revelation, how would a metaphysician go about applying logic? — jgill

In the way I've been describing in this thread, as interpretation. What I've said is that an individual person, as a mystic, cannot properly interpret one's own mystical experience. This is something along the same principle as Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Or a fellow mystic. — jgill

I began participation in this thread with the intent of arguing that metaphysics is a form of mysticism. From this perspective, fellow mystics would be doing the interpretation. However, other participants have steadfastly insisted on a division between mysticism and metaphysics, claiming that mystics ought not be involved in logical analysis of mystical experience. Adhering to this principle, we cannot say that a fellow mystic would apply logic toward understanding the mystical revelation.

However, Punshhh has alluded to some higher levels of mysticism, and it could be that higher level mystics might qualify as metaphysicians. We haven't really developed this possibility yet, but a few days back I was working on defining the distinction between teacher and student.

The tower stands if the foundations are inviolable. — Punshhh

I call this the test of time. Ancient philosophy which has had its existence maintained until the present day is the most reliable. And within that ancient philosophy we find principles extending far back into time, prior to writing, when they were maintained by mystical practises.

Yes, but inevitably every pointer, every hint derived from the natural world, be it for a mystic, a metaphysician, a scientist, a flat earther even, is a reflection of the divine, of eternity. — Punshhh

I told you, when we first started this discussion, that time was an inescapable subject of paramount importance. Now, this is not the first time you've referenced "the divine", and "eternity", so we really need to broach this subject "eternity", to validate claims such as this. We've really avoided what constitutes "divinity" up to this point. but it seems to have become a sort of crutch for your perspective.

From where is a metaphysician drawing her sustenance? — Punshhh

From the mystics, as described already.

I would be interested in an example here. My first thoughts are that when one delves into an analysis of mystical experiences (revelations), the external world evaporates as the nature of being becomes the focus. That nature being what is referenced in spiritual cosmology. One is transcending the spheres and learning ones way around, guided on a need to know basis through the unfurling of ones being. The alignment of the chackras.

So if I were to imagine myself as a metaphysician considering this cosmogony. I would find myself documenting an organism, like a plant, and the particular geometrical relation between the petals. Like a naturalist in exploring in the jungle. Perhaps when I return to my study I might try and apply some rational thought to this, but I would have to realise eventually that all I am doing is documenting the natural shape of a flower which I have come across (by incarnating into it). Nowhere am I advancing knowledge of the origins, or principles of existence. — Punshhh

You are portraying the metaphysician as a scientist, observing an analyzing physical patterns of the material world. Are you familiar with Plato's cave allegory? The sensible world is a reflection, a representation of the intelligible world which is responsible for creating that reflection. The metaphysician's interest in the sensible world is for the sake of understanding the underlying intelligible realm.

So the external world does not evaporate for the metaphysician, as it might for the mystic, like you describe. The external world is the medium between the metaphysician and the minds of others. We can only delve so far into our internal experience, before we reach a dead end. You might claim that you reach divinity, eternity, but I cannot quite get to that point. There is a temporality of my being, associated with my material existence which prevents me from getting there. This materiality acts as a medium or division between you, and I, and also prevents myself from being divine, eternal. This is the reality which the material world forces upon me, being the basis of that division between possible and impossible which I described earlier.

This is why egotism is not an issue. The individual self cannot obtain to the level of divinity because of its temporal existence. Thomas Aquinas introduce a term, "aeviternal" which refers to a medium between the divine, eternal, and the temporal. The angels are of the aeviternal realm, which means that they were created at some point in time (by God), but they may exist forever into the future.

All we can glean of the divine realms is a faint memory of a grain of dust on the floor of the divine realm. To know more than this requires personal experience via revelation, in particular that kind of revelation in which one is lifted up and hosted in the body of a divine being, that temporarily one is transfigured by experiencing through their eyes, their mind, what life is like for them. And when one comes back down to earth how does one apply logic? — Punshhh

What we do is apply logic to the other person's described revelation, remembering that there is a material medium between us. So your description is only as accurate as the medium allows. The medium is very inclusive, involving yours and my brain, nervous system, sense organs, memory, words, etc.. The material medium is what is responsible for human deficiencies.

So when someone says something like "lifted up and hosted in the body of a divine being", I realize that it is impossible for a divine being to have a body, and so you are speaking metaphorically. What I can imagine is you taking a place in another human body, or even a body which is very much superior to the human body. But since it is a body, it doesn't get me to the point of absolute divinity, like God, who has no proper body. It doesn't even get me to the point of angelic existence, which is to exercise providence over a material body freely, without being influenced in one's actions by material bodies. Therefore I assume you use "divine being" in a metaphoric way, or a way which does not have the same discipline as theology.

I will give the example I have cited before, of a dream I had in which I was taken up by the Christ and as I looked back down to where I was sleeping I saw time layer out like a series of rooms with no roofs, so I could see my past and future laid out before me. It reminded me of the experience of my life flashing before me when I was on the point of drowning (someone pulled me out thankfully). A sequence of experiences in which I travelled through time at a different rate and was transcending time, free to move either way, in a sense.

Now what can a metaphysician say about this? — Punshhh

I would say that you've had a glimpse into eternity. It is experiences like this which open our eyes to the extremely befuddling nature of time and existence. I've had a similar experience I call my soma experience, in reference to R. Wasson's interpretation of soma. Experiences like this can have a profound effect on a person, in my case, inspiring me to continually enquire into the true nature of time as a lifelong ambition. Have you read any Carlos Castenada? Following from that first completely disorganized representation of time, which I had in that experience like you describe, I directed my attention more and more toward an organized understanding. Direction is very important in understanding the relationship between organization and time, the foundation of "order".

Show me someone, anyone, who draws and maintains the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief... — creativesoul

You could start with Plato's divided line, the divisions of knowledge, and see that the one half is knowledge which deals with Ideas or Forms. The lower side of this half uses Ideas in applications like mathematics. The higher side consists of the activity of understanding the nature of the Ideas themselves, this is thinking about thought and belief. If still you don't apprehend this, consult Aristotle's Metaphysics, and Nochomachean Ethics, where he describes the divine activity of thinking on thinking.

What you body simply is, is a machine that takes an input with your sensory organs and gives an output through organs like the muscles. — Cristopher

If the human body is simply responding, or reacting to sensory stimulation, then how do you account for intention, which is the desire to change the stimulation to something imagined as better? Do you see that there is an element of imagination here, which is not really a response to sensory input?

Kant was wrong here in the same way that every single philosophical traditional/conventional school of thought has been wrong throughout human history. — creativesoul

When what you believe is inconsistent with every traditional or conventional school of thought, don't you think it's time to reconsider?

B. How now does the brain envoke the rest of the body to move (/change)? It sends signals to organs to put the body into a new state. This may happen through adrenalin, to give us a flight or fight response or through other Hormons and systems. It though ends with the expression of an emotion. Emotion as in its etymology: the thing avoking motion. — Cristopher

Maybe you could elucidate this; it appears quite confused. It seems like you are saying that movement of the body, and emotion, are one and the same thing.

So, does this creature have a 'soul?' — Snakes Alive

All living things have a soul.

So metaphysics in attempting to apply its logic to the natural world is inevitably going to mirror in some way a mystical understanding. — Punshhh

This is not quite what I was saying. I was saying that metaphysicians apply logic to the mystical revelations. This is why metaphysics is so different from the natural sciences which have little if any regard for mysticism, only applying logic to observations of the natural world, metaphysics will apply logic to the observations of mysticism.

Although I would also point out that there seems to be a variation in understanding in metaphysics from philosopher to philosopher. A kind of sectarianism, this also happens within mysticism, although for the mystic these differences in teaching don't matter much because the primary focus of mysticism is not a philosophy, but a practice and relation to the natural world via the body (as opposed to the mind) and being — Punshhh

This is where we approach Plato's dilemma. The differences in mystical teachings manifest as cultural differences, such as differences in moral principles. But to apply logic, the philosopher requires consistency. So Plato delves into these differences by examining the different interpretations people have for the same words, "beauty", "virtue", "just", "knowledge", for example. The attempt to reconcile the differences is called Platonic dialectics.

Whereas in metaphysics the only means of refining the ideas is via the application of logic, reason. — Punshhh

Right, and this is why consistency is so important. If, for example, there is an Idea of "just", then there is reason to believe that there ought to be consistency between the interpretations of that word by different people. If people are free to interpret the word as they please, then there is really no such thing as the Idea of "just", and the application of logic is impossible. The dilemma results from recognition that the latter is reality, people are free to interpret as they please. So this subjugates logic to a lower level, i.e. a level which is lower than the inspiration to act, which is the free will, and this explains why a person can knowingly do what is wrong. Logic can tell me to do something one way, but I might still do it in a different way, contrary to the logic. Consistency is produced by conforming habituation to logic. But in the essence of human nature there is no necessity to conform, conformity must be willed.

There is no direction from the natural world, although it is to some degree an expression of the divine, it is only a presentation of parts and complex systems of material, which is probably beyond our capacity to understand at this time. — Punshhh

I think I disagree with this statement. The metaphysician has to derive principles from somewhere. and as mentioned above, I think that the principles are derived from mysticism, and mysticism takes direction from the natural world. This is a completely different type of direction from the direction that natural sciences get from the natural world.

Because the human will is free, and the issue described above, metaphysics cannot begin with logic. Human beings do not necessarily agree on logical principles, especially when it seems like we are incapable of getting to the bottom of material reality through the application of logical principles. Because of the problems involved in understanding the nature of matter, Aristotle introduced exceptions to the law of excluded middle, one of the fundamental laws of logic, but he insisted that the law of non-contradiction ought to be upheld. Now, dialectical materialists, following Hegelian principles say that matter violates the law of non-contradiction.

This is why the metaphysician must go deeper than logic for metaphysical principles. And when I say metaphysicians apply logic to mystical understanding, it's really the inverse of this which is true. Metaphysicians really apply mystical principles to logic, such that the laws and rules of logic are formulated to be applicable to the natural world as understood through mystic practises. Epistemology follows from metaphysics, and it applies logic. But the rules of logic are derived from metaphysics so we cannot call this an act of applying logic.

In short, the middle layer is the layer at which the language takes action – and since at the first layer it has no coherent set of truth conditions, the middle layer acts as a proposal, conscious or not, to change the way one speaks, so that the same null truth conditions, involving the world as one always took it to be, are scrambled to be described in different vocabulary. Since we can create infinite vocabularies to describe the same state of affairs, this arena of changing the way people talk is endless. It's important to realize that this second stage can be more or less conscious, since we are typically not finely aware of how the claims we make do or don't have descriptive application, and we just stick to the words themselves, sort of like magic talismans, which we hold onto and say 'this is true!' Note that this also explains why metaphysicians have no subject matter, and do not investigate anything, but only converse – it is because the practice in principle only offers new ways of speaking, these proposals to speak in new ways are always available by talking. — Snakes Alive

This "middle layer" doesn't even resemble any metaphysics that I'm aware of. Are you sure that the author is not just trying to change the way that we use the word "metaphysics", and is not really talking about any real metaphysics?

I don't see how that's relevant.

Unless you are talking about the Moving Spotlight theory (which I consider to be a hybrid of Eternalism and Presentism/A-theory, rather than true Eternalism), or unless you can provide an explanation for how motion is possible under B-theory Eternalism (i.e. without temporal passage), then I think it is clear that Eternalism does logically preclude motion. — Luke

The point was that eternalism does not make motion impossible, because all you have to do is add more premises, like your spotlight theory does. Therefore we cannot say that it precludes motion.

Maybe ChatteringMonkey is right that nobody really believes in this extreme, pure version of Eternalism, and the same probably applies at the other end of the spectrum, too, but I think it's worth pointing out what those extremes entail. Criticisms of Presentism just seem to be much more prevalent. — Luke

Criticism of presentism is easy, because it is the simple position, and one simply needs to refer directly to special relativity to criticize it. Criticism of eternalism is more difficult because it requires understanding eternalism, which is a more complex position.

I don't think anybody claims that these theories of time are complete physical theories. The way I see it that they are merely theories about time that could possibly fit our experiences. And my point is that I don't see that there is anything in eternalism per se that precludes motion, unless you define it as such. — ChatteringMonkey

Nothing in eternalism "precludes" motion but the theory does not provide any principles which would allow for the actual existence of motion. So if one adheres to eternalism without any amendments, as a representation of the universe, this would be a universe without motion.