When this trust is destroyed, by terrorists or invading armies, or by thieves and fraudsters. life cannot continue as before. Society fragments into little groups who know and trust each other. — unenlightened

This fragmentation is the goal for anarchism, being composed of people who have no trust in government.

So trust is a major concern for government. The concern for "law and order" is the concern to maintain trust. The concern for "health and safety" is the concern to maintain trust. The concern for keeping a balanced economy is the concern to maintain trust in the medium of exchange. — unenlightened

Top concern for the government would be to maintain trust in the government, because its subsistence depends on that.

Do you trust Google? Should you? is there any way of checking Google? Is there any way of holding Google to account? — unenlightened

No. All you need to do is look at the order of priority by which they present your search results to you, to know that Google is not trustworthy. And, I really don't think people in general would be more inclined to trust Google over trusting the government, and there seems to be a significant number of anarchists out there in the world.

If we only want to speak of intervals, non-zero durations, then what about the starts and ends thereof?
Are we going to toss it all out...? — jorndoe

That's another aspect of the very same problem. I'm not suggesting that we toss any of these things out, only that we recognize that in practise all such determinations are less than ideal. Then we might be inspired to look for solutions to the problems which result from using such deficient principles, instead of just assuming that the mathematicians have already discovered the ideals.

How do you work out the velocity at t2 if the velocity at t1 is always zero? :rofl: — Banno

Just like "t1" is an ideal, so is "t2". I thought you rejected Platonism? Do you believe in Einsteinian relativity?

We agree that an object has a location at a particular time.

We agree that the location does not change at an instant. — Banno

Actually we haven't gotten to these questions yet. As is evident in the prior post, I think "a particular time" is an ideal, which on it's own is without any real validity. What validates it is a reference to something.

What is hard to see is how those who do not ascribe a velocity at a particular time can do any basic mechanics. — Banno

I do a lot of basics mechanics. Complex mathematics is not required for basic mechanics. In fact, mathematics is generally not required for mechanics at all. Fancy that.

speaking of things at time t does not mean removal of context. — jorndoe

Time t has no context. If you say "time t", "time" is said at a different time from when "t" is said, because time is passing. So time t covers a duration of time. By the time you say "now" it's in the past. Talking about "time t" is already, by that fact, a removed from context; context being real existence in passing time. It is impossible to have a time t which is not a removal from context. That's the problem here, time t is an ideal which is not consistent with temporal existence as we know it.

It's not like we have something appearing and vanishing at t, whether talking averages or differential calculus.
How/can you differentiate things at t in the two mentioned scenarios...? — jorndoe

The problem is that "time t" is not real, it's an ideal. And Banno wants to understand these things without assuming Platonism, so we must reject such ideals, as not reality. So asking about how we might differentiate things at t is nonsense because "t" doesn't refer to anything real.

Physics can differentiate the two at time t by different motion vectors, speed and direction; by momentum too for that matter. — jorndoe

The problem is that there is no such thing as motion at time t. You might say that there is motion at an extended duration of time, and infer that because of this there would be motion at any given point during that time duration; but that would be a faulty inference. It would be like saying that at any point on a line segment, there is a line, just because we have assumed a line which goes through that point. But there is no line at any point, just like there is no motion at any point in time even though we assume that motion passes through that point. The two, motion and point in time, are incompatible, just like point and line are incompatible.

What single word would you suggest be used in this context, rather than instantaneous? — jgill

How about just calling it "velocity"? We know that "velocity" implies an average over a period of time, just like "instantaneous velocity" implies an average over a period of time. The method for figuring out the average which is called "instantaneous velocity" is just more sophisticated than the old fashioned way of figuring out "average velocity", so it may give us a more accurate or precise determination of the same thing, "the velocity". Nevertheless, the two are just different formulas for giving us the same thing "velocity". So use of the word "instantaneous" is rather deceptive, it does not properly indicate what the formula gives us..

I think we do have an economic depression now around us. Only later will it be admitted. The pandemic has only been the trigger for it. — ssu

It's only a problem if the small percentage of people who "own" the resources decide not to share them. then there's an immediate trickle down effect, resulting in no jobs. That's a type of hoarding which could be triggered by fear, as we saw with the hoarding of toilet paper. I think there would only be a serious economic depression if the fear snowballs.

With the first "small business" stimulus package roughly 80% of the money went to 4% of the applicants. How did that happen? Well, US banks wanted profits, of course: — ssu

Looks like the hoarding might already be kicking in.

Nobody else in the history of this site has spent even close to the proportion of time, energy, and number of posts to support their political personality of choice. — Baden

We had Agustino here for a while, relentlessly defending Trump (Not seen for a while, may have evolved). But Agustino was a pale shadow of NOS4A2 in that capacity.

Yes, I am familiar with that definition as "velocity at some instant". I thought it should be obvious that I was implicitly inquiring if you or Metaphysician Undercover had some other definition in mind such that it might be reasonable to agree that there is no "instantaneous velocity" per that other definition. — Janus

What is not reasonable is to call any sort of velocity "instantaneous velocity" because any velocity requires a period of time, and "instant" implies a point in time. So that phrase is really self-contradicting, oxymoronic. Because physicists use that saying, it gives people like Banno the impression that they can actually figure out what the velocity of something is, at a point in time, when they really can't. So it's a misleading (deceptive) use of words.

So a physicist using classical mechanics would say that an object has only one location at an instant, but that it can have both a velocity and an acceleration. — Banno

I would say that this is obviously contradictory. Movement is change of location. Velocity is an attribute of movement. Therefore it is impossible that an object could have one location, and also velocity.

Meta has an idea - Aristotelian, perhaps, that since an object can't go anywhere in an instant, it can't have a velocity. — Banno

Yes, that is my idea, it's known as conformance with the law of non-contradiction. You might call it an Aristotelian principle, I would prefer to call it common sense. We normally reject contradiction out of common sense.

It also seems to me to be a very similar to the misapprehension he had in Sam26's discussion of rules. — Banno

If you are going to argue that language use is a matter of following rules, then it makes sense that you would actually follow the well known fundamental rules, in your argumentation. Otherwise it's hypocrisy which actually shows the falsity of what you re saying. So if we cannot adhere to the fundamental rules, the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction in our discussions of mathematical axioms, what's the point in saying that language use is a matter of following rules when actual usage demonstrates otherwise?

There's a certain coherence in what he is saying; and it is said with such conviction. — Banno

Contradiction and equivocation are abundant in mathematical systems. It's very clear that rigorous philosophical discipline has not been adhered to by those who have dreamed up the axioms. It appears like the axioms are designed to hide the problems which we have in understanding the nature of physical existence (such as Zeno paradoxes), rather than to expose these problems so that we can work on resolving them. The hiding of the problems creates the illusion that they have been resolved, which many people seem to believe as reality. But issues like the uncertainty principle demonstrate very clearly that the problems have not been resolved.

A secondary type of problem has now emerged. This is an even worse condition than the original problem, which is our inability to understand these aspects of physical reality. Since many people believe that these artists, the mathemagicians who have dreamed up the axioms that are capable of covering up the problems, have actually solved the problems, they falsely conclude that there are aspects of physical reality demonstrated by QM, which are incomprehensible. Instead of accepting the fact that the mathematical axioms which are employed are stacked with logical flaws, and this is why certain aspects of physical reality appear incomprehensible, they will defend the mathematical axioms to no end, and argue that this is just the way nature is, certain aspects of physical reality are fundamentally incomprehensible. For example, there is a commonly expressed attitude that the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is a fundamental feature of physical reality, rather than a deprivation of the mathematical principles employed. Do you see how wrong this attitude is?

Right, so the question that follows is: what happened so that we generally rejected constructivism? — frank

I'd answer that with simplicity sake.

And what are the philosophical costs of having done so? — frank

I'd answer that with significant misunderstanding, as demonstrated by Banno.

Have I got this wrong? — Baden

Banno appears to be a lost soul.

See how delta-t becomes zero? So your average is a division by zero. — Banno

What? Delta-t doesn't become zero. It "approaches zero". Can you not understand the significant difference between approaching something and becoming it? If delta-t was actually zero, it would render the whole formula as nonsensical.

But that's not right; mathematicians, even those in primary school, do apprehend infinity in their considerations. — Banno

Sure, we apprehend infinity, but not necessarily in that way. That way is inconsistent with constructivism, as I explained.

And i think that is an end to this discussion. — Banno

Yes, it seems to be approaching zero. But your capacity to argue a point is already at zero it seems.

So the rule is that for every number, one can add one. The rule only generates one new number. One has to see the rule in a different way in order to understand infinity: imagine a number bigger than any number the rule could generate... — Banno

Do you see how this notion of infinity is inconsistent with constructivism? The bigger number referred to is not something which the human mind could ever apprehend, therefore it is beyond the capacity of understanding through constructivist principles. It's something which is simply stipulated, but never grasped therefore outside the range of intelligibility for constructivism, just like the "God" of the ontological argument, which is an inverted type of the same principle. "That than which nothing greater can be imagined", is a stipulation, which by the very nature of the stipulation cannot be grasped, because we can always imagine something greater. The same thing is the case with your "bigger" number, you are simply stipulating that no matter how big a number you can come up with, there's a bigger. The number you come up with is within the grasp of the mind, and comprehensible, the bigger number is always outside the grasp of the mind, therefore not comprehensible, and outside the principles of constructivism.

In short, you are suggesting that there is something (a number) which we can understand, which is outside of our range of understanding. The principle you propose is actually unintelligible.

The page you referenced quite explicitly sets out the difference between average velocity and instantaneous velocity. — Banno

I know there's a difference between "average velocity" and "instantaneous velocity" that's evidently obvious. However, "instaneous velocity" is still an average. It's just a different average from what is called the "average velocity". Here is how the page defines "instantaneous velocity":

"It is the average velocity between two points on the path in the limit that the time (and therefore the displacement) between the two points approaches zero."

Notice the word "average" there? I don't see why this is so difficult for you. Any determination of velocity, is necessarily some type of average due to the nature of time. It requires determining the difference between two distinct sets of circumstances to produce one result, called "the velocity". That is an averaging, coming up with one description from the two, you take an average between the two.

I searched his post history expecting to find him trolling or flaming, but his posts have actually been rather cordial and subdued. — Wolfman

There is such a thing as cordial and subdued trolling. It might even be a more effective tactic for the troll. NOS4A2 often repeats directly and precisely what president Trump tweets or says, with uncanny parroting ability, sometimes even elucidating those statements, as if being the author of the statement. This elicits numerous possibilities. Perhaps NOS is president Trump. Perhaps NOS is a bot. Perhaps NOS is paid to make such repetitions. Perhaps NOS admires president Trump so much, and believes that repeating his lies and attempting to defend them will have the effect of influencing others to believe them. And of course there could be a combination of such factors.

The problem is, that no matter what president Trump says, NOS4A2 automatically, and immediately, repeats it, and defends it. It is the accuracy of that descriptive term, "automatically" which reveals the darkness underneath.

'The will' is a grammatical mistake. A modal verb mistaken for a substantive and pretending to be of any philosophical interest at all. The less it is taken seriously the better. — StreetlightX

So that would explain the reason for this, then:

I don't think anyone really understands will, it's just one of those things. There's many different ways to approach it, but you get side tracked before you get there, as if there's a forcefield which surrounds it and deflects you off this way or that way, depending on your approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's really nothing there, no such thing as the will. It appears as a big deception, created by those Christian theologians who've constructed and maintained the concept. That sure makes things a lot simpler, applying Occam's razor.

I can see why you would want to change the topic. — Banno

You're the one who changed the topic. Instead of wanting to discuss the issue, what it is that is represented by the formula they call "instantaneous velocity", you changed the subject to a question of who's wrong, physics or meta.

Your refusal to address the issue is getting rather boring. Instantaneous velocity is an average, we went through this yesterday. There is no such thing as a determination of velocity at a point in time. That's obvious, nothing moves when no time passes, so to determine any velocity requires a period of time. If this does not make sense to you, and you won't take it from me, do some reading as to what "instantaneous velocity" really is, it's an average.

Instantaneous Velocity
The quantity that tells us how fast an object is moving anywhere along its path is the instantaneous velocity, usually called simply velocity. It is the average velocity between two points on the path in the limit that the time (and therefore the displacement) between the two points approaches zero.

https://openstax.org/books/university-physics-volume-1/pages/3-2-instantaneous-velocity-and-speed

Notice the decisive phrase, the time "between the two points approaches zero". If it was truly an instant, there would be no time, the value for t would be zero, and the equation would be useless.

I explained already, the uncertainty principle demonstrates that physicists are not really calculating instantaneous velocity. Physics is wrong, they are not calculating instantaneous velocity. They might call it that, but it's clearly not what it is. Otherwise there'd be no uncertainty in the question of the momentum of a particle when it is at a specific place at a specific point in time.

You keep saying that, as if it were an argument. — Banno

I made the argument, and addressed your reference.. You rejected my argument with nothing more than "you're wrong". Sorry but it's you who has presented no argument.

Well, with a bit of work it allows us to find an instantaneous velocity... among other things. — Banno

Smoke and mirrors.

For example, here's what I posted earlier in the thread.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/404078

So the rule is that for every number, one can add one. The rule only generates one new number. One has to see the rule in a different way in order to understand infinity: imagine a number bigger than any number the rule could generate... — Banno

All you've done is offered two distinct definitions of "number". Under the first definition, we get a bigger number by adding a number. Following that rule, there is no way to get a number bigger than what is given by that procedure. Under the second definition, we must assume that there are other numbers, not derived in the first way. The bigger number in the second definition will never make it into the first set of numbers, so the two are in that sense incompatible. It's not a huge problem, just like different possible worlds, so long as we recognize the points of incompatibility. If the incompatibility goes undetected there may be a problem because each is named "number".

Here's the issue though. We can count anything we would ever need to count using the first rule, so what's the point of the second? It doesn't help us to count anything, all it says is that no matter how high we count we can still count higher. But we already knew that, because we know that we can keep adding a number. So it doesn't allow us to do anything more than we can do with the first rule, nor does it tell us anything we didn't already know from the first. It is completely useless, and on top of that it gives us a new kind of "number" which is incompatible with the rules in the system of counting. Looks like an axiom designed for equivocation to me.

Anther way to approach it that the rule "For every number, you can add one. to make a bigger number" is not generating all the numbers, but only the integers. We can find infinity by calculating 1 divided by 3, as a decimal; or by asking what number times itself makes 2. — Banno

You're looking at this in completely the wrong way. A whole number is undivided. The integers are a special formulation of whole numbers, allowing for the inclusion of zero and negatives. Now you want to divide these whole numbers into parts. These are fractions. So why not call them "fractions", because that's what they are? Instead, you want to call them "numbers". Same problem as above, we now have some sort of numbers which are incompatible with the other "numbers". Why do that? You're just creating confusion and a recipe for equivocation again. If the "numbers" are the counting numbers, and we can (in theory) divide these numbers into parts, then why call the parts "numbers" as well?

Do you recognize that "one" is a fundamental unity? If you divide one in half, this does not give you two, it gives you two halves. Why would you want to represent a half as a number, when it's clearly not a number, it's a half? Some flamboyant mathemagician artist comes along and says let's make an axiom whereby a half, along with all other fractions become numbers, wouldn't that be cool. No it wouldn't be cool because there's a big problem, some fractions cannot be represented as numbers. Instead of recognizing, well that was a mistake, let's leave a distinction between numbers and fractions, the mathemagicians just try to cover up the mistake with more and more complex axioms.

SO we learn how to count, and then we learn how to do other things with counting. — Banno

This not quite right. You should say that we learn how to count, then we learn how to do other things with numbers. The other things are not counting. We could call the other things "art", but a lot of it is more like a magic show, illusions, smoke and mirrors, deception.

Can we infer then, that emotions are not understood through the prism of logic? — 3017amen

To the contrary, I think logic is the only way to understand emotions. We can't make empirical observations of their causes, so we can only use logic.

I don't think anyone really understands will, it's just one of those things. There's many different ways to approach it, but you get side tracked before you get there, as if there's a forcefield which surrounds it and deflects you off this way or that way, depending on your approach.

What you mean, is that we calculate something called "instantaneous velocity", which employs a faulty representation of "instantaneous" in relation to the philosophy of rigorous definition, and you falsely assume that this is a true representation.

Ever wonder why physicists cannot determine the position and momentum of a particle at the same time (uncertainty principle)? Perhaps you ought to consider that it has something to do with the principle I'm arguing, the mathemagician's representation of velocity at a point in time is not at true representation.

If you guys don't give up your inane arguments, I'm going to have to start referencing the uncertainty principle. You wouldn't want that would you?

Nice argument Banno. Unsupported assertions are a sign of ignorance.

No matter how you look at it, "instantaneous velocity" is an average, and does not represent a moment or instant in time, in any sense of "true" representation, unless "moment" or "instant" is defined as a period of time.

The instantaneous velocity is whatever it shows at a particular moment in time, e.g. if you took a picture. — Michael

Even taking a picture occurs over a period of time. A camera is not capable of stopping the clock at a point in time, to show how things would appear at that point.

Do you have any expertise in maths or physics? I don't, but I'm pretty sure derivatives and instantaneous velocity aren't just "approximations" and "illusions". — Michael

Do you know what a differentiation is? It requires two distinct descriptions of the same changing thing. Therefore the possibility of a single point in time is excluded.

I don't think lockdowns are a good idea for the simple reason it is never a good idea to destroy one's own economy. — NOS4A2

I lock myself down every night. It hasn't destroyed my economy yet, and I see no reason to believe it ever will.

Come on, Meta. — Banno

You seem to be one of those someones, who has been deceived by the smoke and mirrors.

If it takes me 10 seconds to move 10 metres then my average velocity is 1m/s. But it may be that my velocity was less than 1m/s for the first 5 seconds and greater than 1m/s for the last 5 seconds (because of acceleration). — Michael

Right, so what does "instantaneous velocity" mean?
The website says this:
" This is called instantaneous velocity and it is defined by the equation v = (ds)/(dt), or, in other words, the derivative of the object's average velocity equation."
The "derivative" is an approximation which creates the illusion of compatibility between a period of time and a point in time. This is evident from the fact that it is a differentiation. So the "instantaneous velocity", is derived from a period of time, and presented as a point in time. If someone believes that it is a true representation of a point in time, that person has been deceived

But it could be just the claim that this is how Aristotle saw it and described it. Except I do not think that's correct. He troubled to reason that body and soul were different. Maybe a living body has, arguably, in his terms, ψυχή, But I am unaware of anywhere he posits a dead body as having that. — tim wood

It is how Aristotle described it, and you don't seem very well versed in the principles he outlined in his Metaphysics, so I'll take the claim that you don't think it's correct, as insignificant. Are you familiar with what is commonly called "the cosmological argument"?

To my way of thinking, the best we can do is call them ideas. Are we in agreement? — tim wood

No we're not at all in agreement here. Human ideas, as dependent on the human body, are complete distinct from the soul, which the living body is dependent on. This is the significant advancement which Aristotle made over Pythagorean idealism, in response to the problems of such idealism which Plato exposed. Aristotle demonstrated that human ideas cannot be eternal, and depend upon the human mind to receive actual existence, thus refuting Pythagorean idealism, and what he called that type of Platonism, which assigned eternal existence to these ideas through the theory of participation. However, the same argument which is used in this refutation, the cosmological argument, also demonstrates the necessity for an actuality, a form, which is prior to all material existence.

So Neo-Platonists reject Pythagorean idealism (what we call Platonism), accepting the cosmological argument which demonstrates a separation between human ideas and the immaterial Forms required for material existence. Christian theologians accept this division between human ideas which require the material body, and the immaterial Forms which we are required to assume in order to account for the reality of material existence. This separation is necessary to account for the reality of human mistakes. Human ideas are often wrong, and therefore cannot be the same as the independent Forms which are responsible for material existence.

Here's an example which may help you to understand this. Many people make a distinction between "the laws of physics", and "the laws of nature". Both of these refer to immaterial forms. The laws of physics are artificial, created by human beings, as descriptions of physical existence. They are wrong when human beings misunderstand. The laws of nature are the actual immaterial laws which govern the way matter behaves.

Near as I can tell from my read of Aristotle, his ψυχή is a that-which. He knows what he needs for his account, so he embodies it into a that-which meets that need as account. In accounting terms a contra-asset - not a thing in itself but an offset, something set off, against something else. — tim wood

You seem to be completely ignoring the fact that Aristotle defines the soul as a substance, trying to rationalize some other idea which makes more sense to you because you refuse to take the time required to understand immaterial substance, being consumed by materialist presuppositions. Do you accept the principle of sufficient reason from Leibniz? Each and every material object must have a reason for it being the object which it is, because an object cannot be a disorderly random occurrence. If random disorderly things existed, they would not appear to us as objects. Only orderly things appear as objects. Order is a necessary requirement of "object". And, if a thing has order there is a reason for that order, a cause of it (PSR). This necessitates the conclusion that there is a cause which is prior to material existence. This is necessarily an immaterial cause.

Yep, so you have said.

And yet, we can Calculate Instantaneous Velocity

So we conclude that either physics is wrong, or Meta is wrong. — Banno

From your referred article:

"However, this technically only gives the object's average velocity over its path."

As I said, smoke and mirrors. Neither meta nor physics is wrong, Banno's misled by deceptive word use.

That's because you confuse stopping a particle at a specific time and observing a particle at that time. Don't forget momentum. — jgill

One cannot observe an object at an instant in time. An observation occurs over a period of time. I don't see how "momentum" is relevant. Remember the uncertainty principle?

So he certainly would not have gone along with the finitism of Metaphysician Undercover who rejects instantaneous velocity. — Banno

The reason for rejecting "instantaneous velocity" has nothing to do with mathematics, the notion is self-contradictory. Velocity is distance covered in a period of time. There is no period of time at an instant. There is no distance covered at an instant. There is no velocity at an instant. There is no "instantaneous velocity". No matter what sophistry the mathemagician might apply, the smoke and mirrors cannot hide the contradiction from a trained philosopher.

Can you elucidate a bit more on that? — 3017amen

It's an age old problem for moral philosophy which Socrates demonstrated quite well in arguments against the sophists. We cannot say that virtue and morality are a type of knowledge, because people demonstrate over and over again, that despite knowing that they know it is wrong, they choose to do what they know is wrong. This means that the intellect cannot determine the will.

On the basis of that, or, arguing from that, do you hold that the soul is any kind of a thing at all? I'm not interested in what I think, or a fortiori what you think, but rather only in what Aristotle said, and meant, if we can get to it. And it could be on that we agree! — tim wood

I'll go through what he says at 412a and see if we can make sense of it:
10. Matter is potentiality, form actuality,
15. A natural body which has life in it is a composite substance.
20. The soul is a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially in it.
22 Substance in the sense of form, is an actuality, hence the soul is the actuality of the mentioned body.
23. The word actuality has two senses corresponding to the possession of knowledge and the exercising of knowledge.
25. The soul is an actuality in the sense of possession of knowledge.

So it appears clear that the soul is a substance in the same sense that a form is a substance.

I argue that "actuality" is too easily mistaken for, and has been mistaken for, understood as, something actual. — tim wood

If to be a substance is to be "actual", then I don't see the problem. An actuality, is a substance and therefore actual. Notice though that he distinguished two types of "actuality", one possessing knowledge, the other exercising knowledge. The latter is necessarily an "activity" as we use the word. But the former may be an actuality which is not an activity, and that's the type of actuality he said the soul is.

But to extract any thing actual or real from either word, I argue, is a brutal misreading. — tim wood

I think you're wrong here. He clearly states that the soul is "substance". Substance for Aristotle is what grounds logic in reality. So I don't see how you can remove reality from the soul, which is said to be an actuality as a substance. That would leave you with an odd concept of "real", if Aristotelian substance and actuality are not interpreted as real.

It becomes alive when its capacity to be alive is actualized (or realized), and for so long as it is alive. In this Aristotle is marking a difference with a distinction, that between a body and what makes it alive, which he calls psyche, ψθχή. — tim wood

The body does not "become" alive. It has no actual existence without a soul. There is no body without the soul. Aristotle is explicit in his metaphysics that there is no such thing as matter without a form. And, the form of a natural body is prior in time to the material existence of that body, because material things are generated, they come into being. And the form of the body must be prior to the material body to ensure that the body comes into being as the body which it comes into being as. Bodies are not random, they have ordered existence. And, a body cannot be other than the body it is, by the law of identity. Therefore the form of the body must be prior to the material body, as the cause of it being the body which it is.

But specifically I do not find in this any notion or even suggestion of anything like a Christian soul. In other words, neither actualization or that which is actualized is any kind of material or substantial thing at all. To my way of thinking, the best we can do is call them ideas. Are we in agreement? — tim wood

You make the mistake of equating "substantial" with "material". This is not consistent with classical metaphysics.

Moreover, I like that similar ideas can be arrived at from totally different paths - it makes an idea more robust, and allows for a greater extension of the concept into new and exciting areas. — StreetlightX

..the machine of active inference.. — fdrake

These two descriptions are incompatible. If there is a multitude of different processes which might derive a similar idea, we cannot describe this process (inference) as a machine. And, due to the uniqueness and particularities of circumstances, it is more realistic to assume that an idea is never arrived at in the same way. Therefore we cannot describe inference in mechanistic terms.

Some semioticians might veil this fact, gloss it over, or hide it under equivocation because there is a cross-over of terminology in systems jargon. However, the habits of a living being are completely distinct from the workings of an inanimate machine because the living being creates a unique situation with each response to circumstances, what we call difference, thereby understanding through reference to difference; while the machine is designed on principles of similarity.

St. Thomas, the Intellectualist, had argued that the intellect in man is prior to the will because the intellect determines the will, since we can desire only what we know. Scotus, the Voluntarist, replied that the will determines what ideas the intellect turns to, and thus in the end determines what the intellect comes to know. — 3017amen

Actually, Aquinas says that in the absolute sense, will is prior to intellect. If not, the will could not be free. Also if this were not the case, we could not account for the dilemma which Socrates exposed, Plato faced, and Augustine expounded. This is the fact that a man can do what he knows is wrong.

"On The Soul", BK 2 Ch 1, 412a, 20 -30.
29: "That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body have life potentially in it".

This is a very important principle and the entire description needs to be understood. First he distinguishes matter as potentiality, and form as actuality (10). A living body is a composite of matter and form. Because the soul is the form, or actuality of that natural body, it is responsible (as actual cause) for the actual existence of that natural body. "Actual" refers to the form, and the form of that natural body is an organized body, having the potential for self-nutrition and growth, along with the correlative implied by "potential", decay. The type of actuality he assigns to the soul is described as "possessing knowledge" as distinguished from exercising knowledge.

If you can make a coherent system along these lines, then go for it. — Banno

I take that as an invitation. Equality always requires a qualification, the same quantity, the same quality, the same size, shape, degree, etc.. Without that qualification "equal" is meaningless. Identity indicates "the same" absolutely, without qualification. The former, equality, Is an identification by means of reference to properties. The latter, identity, is an identification of the object itself, regardless of properties. Can you apprehend the difference between pointing to an object, thereby identifying that object without reference to any properties (identity), and stating such and such properties, and finding whatever object, or objects, which are indicated by (equal to) that description.

Notice Tractatus 4.12721, a multiplicity of objects fall under a formal concept, so a formal concept itself cannot be an object. A number "1", "2", as a formal concept cannot be an object. The law of identity indicates an object, it cannot indicate a multiplicity of objects which are equal by the terms of the concept, which is what is signified by a formal concept.

I have, my struggle is fully understanding the connection between Aristotle’s four fold distinction and his three degrees of soul. — Millie Regler

By "four fold distinction" due you mean the four ways in which "cause" is used, describe in Physics. I think the three degrees of soul are self-nourishment (vegetative), self-movement (sensitive), and intellection. Each of the three being a potency, or capacity of the soul, while the soul itself is an actuality.