"1" has the superficial grammar of a noun, but this is misleading. — Banno

This depends on how you understand "1". You can understand it as playing a role in counting, as you describe, in which case we can assign some sort of priority to it. But many modern mathematical axioms remove this priority, denying that priority, assuming that mathematics is something other than a tool for counting. Measurements are not all instances of counting because we employ negatives etc..

But you can also understand "1" as a fundamental unity, and this gives it a logical priority, as the designation of an object, a unity. This is required for all logical processes which proceed from the assumption of objects.

The two forms of priority are not completely incompatible though.

So the extension of a set is the actual items in the set. — Banno

The concept of "set" requires the assumption of objects. So set theory utilizes "1" as a unity, an object. This is an issue with set theory which I discussed with someone else in another thread recently. To assume that a set has extension is to assume Platonism, because it necessitates that a number is an object, being derived from that assumption. As I argued in that thread, "infinite extension", which is what conventional set theory allows, is incoherent, based in contradiction. An object, as a unity, being unbounded, is fundamentally contradictory.

What I found in that other thread, a conclusion you may or may not be interested in, is that there is an issue with the usage of the law of identity, in formal logic. The law of identity, as designed, is intended to assign uniqueness to an object. The law of identity as employed in formal logic designates a form of equality. Equality and identity are distinct ideas. Identical might be a specific way of being equal, but being equal does not necessitate being identical. In formal logic, the latter is assumed to be the case, that being equal is the same as being identical. So the law of identity, as originally formulated, is violated by formal logic, which employs a distinct interpretation (misinterpretation) of it.

So to answer that question, you need to read, and thoroughly understand "Categories", "Physics", and "Metaphysics". To understand "Metaphysics" you'll need to understand "on the Soul".

Have you read all these yet?

...the machine of active inference... — fdrake

Uh uh.

What's that a doctorate dissertation?
Why would you think you might get help with that here?

n fact, even 'error' seems a bit of an 'off' way to talk about things. — StreetlightX

Yes, there is no reason to call this an "error", you could have stayed with difference. Difference is the active cause of evolution, so it wouldn't be appropriate to say that the same thing (difference) which is responsible for evolution can be called an error. That would be like assigning "error" to whatever it is that causes genetic difference in living beings. The real error might be cultivating one particular way as the 'correct' way.

Moreover, I like that similar ideas can be arrived at from totally different paths - it makes an idea more robust, and allows for a greater extension of the concept into new and exciting areas. — StreetlightX

This is interesting, because if true, it implies that there is such a thing as 'correct', but correct is validated by the end, rather than the means. If different paths, different ways (different means) are practised to reach the same end, it implies that the end itself is what is valued more. So you might assign some sort of correctness to the end itself.

We can draw an analogy with Wittgenstein's description of learning mathematics in PI. I'm very critical of this description because he assigns 'correct', and 'following a rule', to coming up with the right answer. But he completely neglects the process an individual uses in coming up with the right answer, describing this process as the actions of a machine. In reality, the process might be very individualistic, and even unique to the circumstances, so the phrase 'following a rule' ought to be assigned to that thought process (which might be completely different from the process which another person follows), by which the person comes up with the correct answer. As an example, check the different methods for long division. Of course the French would protect their way just to be different.

Now, in separating ends from means, we find that we can judge the differing means independently, in relation to the end. Some ways of reaching the same goal are much more efficient than others. So we judge them as better. This produces two distinct value systems, good (better or worse), which is judged of the means, and completely distinct from correct, or right, which is judged of the end.

Where this gets particularly interesting, and actually confusing, is that the particularity, or uniqueness of the end, in all its accidentals, is actually a function of being produced by particular, and differing means. This is in the sense that the effect is specific to the set of causes, and a difference in a cause will necessitate a difference in the effect. What I called the "same" goal is better described by StreetlightX's term "similar". So the end (which in the Streetlight's terms is the idea or concept), being arrived at by distinct methods, is "similar", but not the same; accepting this necessitates a rejection of Platonism. But this gives reason to be skeptical of the correctness of the end. And as Aristotle described in his Nichomachean Ethics, the end turns out to be nothing more than the means to another end, which is the means to a further end, etc., unless we assign an ultimate end like 'happiness', which is somewhat arbitrary.

Read what Wittgenstein says about formal concepts at 4.126 - 4.128. If you can decipher that couple of pages you'll be well on your way. But on your way toward recognizing that Wittgenstein represents mathematics as unintelligible.

As do garbagemen. — Banno

Yeah but garbagemen don't approach with the pretense of knowing.

No use for what?

You do understand that Wittgenstein overwhelmingly rejected Platonism...? — Banno

I know, so do I, that's probably why we're both finitists. Did you read what I wrote? It's only those who assume mathematics consists of some sort of objects (Platonism), like set theory, who create the illusion that infinity is intelligible.

Philosophers approach the unknown. If they could agree on that they'd have agreement. But they approach it with opinions, so they kind of think that they know the unknown, and this is what causes disagreement.

So long as TPF exists for NOS to post on, the dough is rolling in.

The problem is that the nature of mathematics remains unintelligible to me as well, as it does to all philosophers. But some wrongly assume Platonic realism, insisting that mathematics consists of intelligible objects, and this is how they wrongly claim to understand infinity.

Do you have an opinion on the changes to W.'s views on mathematics between the Tractatus and PI? — Banno

I believe the nature of mathematics remained unintelligible for Wittgenstein. The quest to understand it was probably his greatest philosophical unaccomplishment. However, he provides us with a range of very good perspectives as starting points, not having found the perfect (ideal) one, which he sought.

If emotions are a learned skill, we can differentiate the emotionally learned from the emotionally unschooled. — Banno

There's a word for that, it's "manners". If you look for it on Wikipedia though, the preferred form is the French "etiquette". I guess we still look up to the French to tell us how to be polite.

The paper addresses this by trying to explain how those beliefs in emotions as discrete/partitioned entity types come about by describing a mechanism of emotion; the categorisation arises as a prediction and contextualisation of one's bodily state in a task which is cognitively, discursively and culturally mediated while weighing all those things in the light of past and current experience. — fdrake

An emotion, in its most instinctual form is the most general and vague thing, if it could even be called a thing. It becomes specified and narrowed down through intentional direction. We could take an emotion with much evidence of its nature, like desire, as an example. In it's raw form, something like hunger is a general hollow, empty feeling of discomfort, want. Without knowing the feeling, one would not even recognize the significance of that feeling, as hunger. So to apprehend it we must first narrow down the field, identify this feeling of desire, and recognize this particular type of desire as hunger. In a well cared for society such as ours, many of us might not have ever experienced enough desire to be able to recognize its existence as that hollow empty feeling of want.

In consideration of options to satisfy one's hunger, a person might narrow down the general desire further, directing it toward particular items which might be consumed. There is a force of habit which gets involved here, allowing us to short-circuit, or bypass all that narrowing down. We can get what we need without suffering the emotions because we know that we need it and it's available. But this may result in a craving for a particular type of item under some circumstances, or perhaps even a particular object. This bypass habit which directs the emotions into partitioned types without proceeding through the rational narrowing down process, may be either healthy or unhealthy, as habits can be good or bad.

I suspect that within the decade historians will look back and say we took the wrong approach. — NOS4A2

This would be a difficult call to make because we never get to see how the alternatives would have panned out. So the chosen approach really needs to result in serious disaster before it ends up being judged as the wrong approach. And even then, the trend is to blame the disaster on the circumstances beyond our control. Notice how when we look back we always seem to be either on the right side of history, or else the alternatives appear like they would have made very little difference.

The hoax you guys peddled back and forth to each other for years. Man, you guys were so sure of yourself. It was brilliant. — NOS4A2

Yes sir, documented verification tends to make people sure of themselves. But we'll always find the odd sort who keep shouting 'Hoax!', regardless.

https://yeeeesh-video.tumblr.com/image/616012286752112640

Would you buy a used car from this man?

The Trump campaign has a sophisticated digital team. — NOS4A2

Oh yeah, I almost forgot about them Russians. Thanks for reminding me.

Trump seems to be thrashing around in different directions and is becoming more and more unhinged. — Punshhh

I think Trump is between a rock and a hard place with this virus. He derives a significant portion of his support from conspiracy theories, and the people who believe in them. Now he has on the one side, the idea that coronavirus is not a serious threat, it's all a conspiracy, and on the other side his own fear and realization that it is a serious threat. So he proposes the opposing conspiracy theory, that the virus is a serious threat, which was created by Chinese scientists, and intentionally turned loose into society. The two conspiracy theories are fundamentally opposed, and now that portion of Trump's supporters, likely enough to tip the election, are also divided. He must now try to appease both, so we'll see if he has any internal diplomatic skills at all.

This discussion's going well. Soon it might obtain to the level of understanding which Plato demonstrated. Emotion was proposed by Plato as the medium between body and mind to solve the commonly cited problem for dualism, of causal interaction.

In Plato's moral philosophy, the emotions, "spirit" or "passion" in common translations, might ally with the mind, controlling the body to act in a reasonable way, but in some cases the mind hasn't the necessary control over the passions, they side with the impulses of the body, causing irrational thinking by the mind, consequently irrational actions.

Plato's proposed State, in The Republic is designed around this three part division of the human being. The rulers are philosophers, applying principles of knowledge in their rule. The Guardians are that medium group represented by emotions, the police, military, enforcing the rule with spirit, ambition, and honour, allied with the rulers. He likens the Guardians to dogs, when they are well trained they obey their master, but if not they will disobey, and even turn against their master. The third group are the skilled workers, providing for the needs of all, we might call them professionals.

He also describes the corruption of the State, through this same comparison of the State to the three parts of human being. It's interesting how he goes both ways in the analogy, taking observation from the State and applying them to the individual, and taking observations of the individual and applying them to the State. This capacity to go both ways demonstrates the accuracy of the analogy. Corruption starts with the medium level, the Guardians, obtaining too much power. Positive emotions, like ambition and spirit are honoured, valued and sought by the philosopher rulers, becoming higher in priority than rational principles. This allows the Guardians who rule by emotion, to overtake the rule of rational philosophical principles. The new rulers, formerly the medium, have no more honour, that being provided for by the philosophical principles of reason, having overthrown that rule. They now start to follow money, the currency of the third group, the professionals. This turns them toward being subservient to that body of professionals, passing the power of rule over to them. This is the end State of corruption, democracy. What follows democracy is tyranny, as an effort to salvage the State from that highly corrupted condition.

So you should be coming around to seeing things my way then. We have less than perfect knowledge of pain. When someone has less than perfect knowledge about something, they might be deceived concerning that thing. Therefore we might be deceived concerning pain.

Remember, the real possibility of deception, and how to address this, was my concern. Do you agree with me, that the way to avoid deception is to obtain a better knowledge of the beetle itself, in the box, the feeling, "pain"?

"In any sense" means we'd have to consider various definitions of "know". If knowing requires absolutely excluding the possibility of mistake, then no we can't "know" anything in that sense. But if you allow that "know" implies that things which you know might turn out to be wrong, then yes, things can be known

Is it something that is learned very young and then is relatively fixed, or in her view, is it something that we continually construct as we encounter new situations and compare it to what we have seen, causing rough patterns around emotional response? — schopenhauer1

I think it's been demonstrated that smoking weed as a teenager, and sometimes even into the early twenties, affects one's emotional development. So I don't think it could be something learned very young then fixed. Puberty appears to play a significant role in emotional development.

I have been trying to work out whether it is the cause (of pain) or the effect (pain itself; what pain is; the meaning of "pain") to be this unknown aspect. — Luke

As I described, both of these have unknown aspects. I don't see why any of this is a problem to you. Do you believe that anything is known in an absolute sense? Doesn't quantum physics and the uncertainty principle demonstrate to you that all things have unknown aspects? I don't understand this idea that some people have, that we have absolute knowledge about things, that's so evidently false. So I attempted to use the fact that the cause of pain is unknown, to demonstrate that pain itself has unknown aspects. But both you and jkg disputed that the cause of pain is unknown.

More accurately, I have been trying to pin you down on what else there could be to explain about pain besides these two. — Luke

OK, so after my last long post with great effort to explain, hopefully you now understand.

Now you're saying that this unknown aspect of pain of yours - which turns out to be not even specifically about pain - is actually an "explanation of what a feeling is"? — Luke

Right, now you're catching on. Since we defined pain as a type of feeling, don't you agree that we need to know what a feeling is, in order to know what pain is? For example, if we defined "green" as a type of colour, we would need to know what colour is in order to know what green is. And if we defined "human being" as a type of animal, we would need to know what an animal is, to know what a human being is. If you disagree with this principle, which appears self-evident to me, can you please explain why you disagree with it.

Well, I could recommend that you look up the word "feeling" in the dictionary, or else look into the physiological causes of feelings. — Luke

As I explained to jkg already, this won't work if you're trying to prove that "pain", or now "feeling", is really known, because moving in this direction, toward the more general, the definitions get increasingly vague and ambiguous, thus demonstrating the truth of what I've been arguing, that the thing being discussed is really unknown.

You weren't interested in the narrow explanation because you weren't even talking about pain specifically. — Luke

Of course I was talking about pain specifically, "pain" as defined by us already, as a specific type of feeling. If you want to change the definition such that we are only talking bout a specific type of pain, or define pain in some completely different way, then it is clearly you who has come into this discussion intent on changing the subject. I am adhering to the conventional definition of pain which jkg and I agreed upon already. I have not changed the subject, but adhered strictly to it.

If you think this definition is unacceptable and you want to discuss "pain" under some other definition, then propose your definition and we can discuss its acceptability. But all that you are really doing, in declining the conventional definition is proving my point, that the nature of pain is unknown, because you'd be saying that "pain" refers to something different for you, from what it refers to for others who accept the conventional definition we've already been using. Therefore we couldn't even identify the thing referred to by "pain", let alone proceed in any attempt toward understanding and knowing it.

However, there is a short remark in the paper that seems to point in a new direction ("...we can only arrive at a correct analysis by what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense a posteriori, and no[t]: by conjecturing about a priori possibilities."). This seems to hint at a new method of inquiry (an a posteriori method of analysis), which is reflected in his later work. — Sam26

I wouldn't say that this is new, he distinctly says in the Tractatus that language pictures reality. The reality referred to is empirical reality, the world. That a priori thoughts cannot possibly be sensible, is clearly explained in the 3's and 4's. This is what excludes mathematics from being able to say anything sensible. Mathematics involves internal relations, relations of order, which he distinguishes from proper relations (spatial relations which can be pictured).
"2.225 There are no pictures which are true a priori.
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world"

Following this he proceeds to discuss what sort of existence an a priori thought might have, and it follows that it must not have any sense. But then he wants to give the a priori some kind of reality as a "logical form", and the logical form would have to comprise some sort of object. But logical forms are presented by philosophers as propositions, and such propositions are nonsensical. In keeping with the picture analogy, Wittgenstein insists that a proposition must show us something, rather than saying something, and this is what gives the proposition some sort of sense, by showing. But the proposition can't show us anything other than its logical form, and this produces the distinction between showing and saying. It's now determined that a proposition cannot say anything. It only makes any sense by showing us its own logical form.

The problem is that he has turned the picture analogy around, so now the picture (proposition) doesn't say anything about the world, it just shows us something, and what it shows us is only its logical form, what turns out to be internal relations. This leaves us with no means for saying anything sensible about the world

What's the point? You said: "I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain". I asked why you judge it as unpleasant rather than pleasant. — Luke

Right, that's the issue I'm trying to determine, that's why I said that's the point. I think that the feeling which I call "pain" is in some way similar to a feeling I had previously, which I called "pain", so I call it by the same name. I believe that's why I call it pain, because I've already called similar feelings pain, and that was acceptable, but I'm not really too sure about that. And, I've never been asked to validate, is it really pain I'm feeling, or am I making a false claim.

don't understand. You appear to assume that a feeling of pain could instead have been a feeling of pleasure or some other feeling. Why assume this? — Luke

I assume this, because it's a part of an accepted philosophical procedure of dialectics, which we can use to find fault in descriptions. If it hasn't been demonstrated that it is impossible for the thing being described to be other than the description (in which case the description might be wrong), then we assume that it is possible for the thing to be otherwise from how it's described. Then we proceed to look for, and examine the reasons why the thing is described in the way that it is. This allows us to verify or falsify the description.

Judging by your reactions to my postings concerning deception, you do not seem to have a truly philosophical attitude toward the possibility of false description; as if the possibility of a false description (deception) ought not be a concern to philosophers.

If you're asking for something besides the cause of pain here, then what is it? — Luke

There are numerous ways that "cause" can be used, and I think you must be interpreting it in a different way from how I am using it. So I'll explain how I use it. If something exists as a unique, particular thing, we can ask why is the thing the particular thing which it is, instead of something else. Then we seek the cause of that thing being the thing which it is, the reason why it is what it is instead of something else. We can also ask the same question about a type of thing, why is a specific type of thing this type instead of some other type. In this case we have a specified type of thing, "pain", as a type of feeling, and I am asking that question. So I am asking about the reason why this type of thing, pain is the type of thing which it is. This will validate this "type", as a valid type, there are real causes for a thing being of this named type rather than a different named type.. If no valid reason can be given, as to what causes a thing to be this type rather than to be some other type, then this descriptive 'type" cannot be accepted as a true descriptive term.

Because they're different feelings? — Luke

When I ask why is pain different from pleasure, "because they are different feelings" is not an answer. It's not an answer because that assumption is already implied in the question. If I asked why is red different from green, "because they are different colours" is not an acceptable answer because the assumption that they are different colours is already implied by the question. Similarly, the assumption that pain and pleasure are different feelings is already implied within the question.

From your responses, I believe that you are not at all interested in this question. That's fine, we can just drop it if that's what you want.

It's as though you were to ask why some colours are substantially different, some being green and some red for example, but then when vision and colour perception is explained to you, you claim that you were asking a different question. — Luke

The problem is that what you think was explained to me, wasn't explained to me. I already explained that to you. The video presented what you propose as the cause of pain, but when it got to the point of what they called "variability in pain sensitivity", and this would be where the true cause of the sensation lies (what makes the sensation pain rather than some other feeling), it skipped over this, and went on to talk about the brain's responses to pain.

So it's not the case that I changed the question I was asking. You just misinterpreted what I meant by "cause of pain", as did jgk20, and you offered me a solution which related to your interpretation, rather than what I really meant. And then when I explain what I meant, you accuse me of changing the question. I'm not changing the question, your the second person that I've had to explain this very same question to already. And now I'll explain it again to you.

We are discussing here "pain", as a type of feeling, and the reasons why some feelings can be classed as this type rather than some other type. You show me through your video, how some particular instances of "feeling" are caused. The video gives no real explanation as to why the feeling which comes out of these circumstances is felt as pain and not some other type of feeling, so it does not answer the question. The reason why the video fails here is that it gives no indication of what type of thing a feeling is.

Do you see this? If we're grounding the concept of "pain" in "a type of feeling", then we require some explanation of what a feeling is, in order to be able differentiate it from other feelings as a valid "feeling". Your video goes in a completely different direction, instead of defining "pain" with "type of feeling", it grounds pain in an identifiable type of physical occurrence, an injury. This would require that we go by a different definition of "pain", "the feeling caused by a physical injury". But that was not our accepted definition of "pain". Furthermore, this definition would exclude a huge portion of the feelings which we call "pain", things such as emotional suffering, hunger, etc.. That would be an unwarranted narrowing of the definition of pain, which would mislead us in our enquiry as to what pain actually is.

Yes, indeed. I think we have finished. I've cut to the irrationality that lies at the core of your thinking: your rejection of the calculus. And not for the first time. — Banno

You misunderstand. I don't reject calculus, I think it is very useful. But under Wittgenstein's stated principles, in the Tractatus, mathematics cannot say anything about the world. Mathematics doesn't picture anything, like a proposition does, so mathematics doesn't make any sense in that sense. So the expression "2+2=4" doesn't say anything about the world, it's not a fact, it doesn't picture anything. In the Tractatus, mathematics is an "operation". But how is it possible that "operations", from which propositions might be created, are not part of the world? Wittgenstein might give us coherency but he doesn't give us a true picture of "the world". The irony!

And there we have it. The mathematical basis of the physical sciences rejected. — Banno

So here we have the heart of the issue. We use mathematics to deal with things other than logical facts and states of affairs. We use mathematics to deal with things like velocities, probabilities, statistics and predictions. These are real aspects of the world which mathematics deals with, which cannot be pictured as states of affairs. Would you agree that Wittgenstein concludes that mathematics cannot say anything about the world, because it is used to understand the difference between states of affairs, and doesn't tell us anything about any actual state of affairs?

Why do you judge it as "unpleasant" rather than "pleasant"? — Luke

That's the point.

Weren't you asking what causes pain? — Luke

I went through this already, what I meant by "cause". We are talking about a type of feeling, and what distinguishes it from other types of feelings. The issue is what causes this type of feeling to be felt as pain rather than as pleasure or something completely different.

Well, now you know, or have some knowledge. — Luke

Further, the issue wasn't that we have no knowledge about this. Clearly we have some knowledge on this subject, that's why we have conventional definitions of things like pain and pleasure. If there was no knowledge about them, we wouldn't even be able to agree on definitions. The issue is the deficiency and inadequacy of that knowledge.

We have the feeling, and we have the underlying thing which we say causes the feeling. As I explained to jkg20, we cannot say that the injury is the cause of the feeling, because damage to an object is not sufficient to account for the feeling. Furthermore, we need to account for why the different feelings are substantially different, some being painful and some pleasurable for example.

Furthermore, I don't understand your question about "why a feeling is felt as pain rather than pleasure". — Luke

Do you recognize that some feelings are pleasurable and some are painful? If this is a true difference, then there must be something about the feeling itself which makes it painful or pleasurable. If there was not, then we could not distinguish between pleasure and pain, and we could name the particular instances of feeling, this or that, randomly. So, both of these are feelings, one is called pleasure, and one is called pain, but they are classed together, as feelings. Therefore we can ask what is it about the feeling itself which makes it felt as pain rather than as pleasure. There must be something within the feelings themselves, which allows them to be distinguished from each other, in this way, otherwise such judgements would be random.

Then why does Wittgenstein talk about pictures?

But you take this as implying that change can never occur. — Banno

No I don't imply that. I argued that change is incompatible with fact. That's the argument I presented. And before that I said that if the world consist only of facts, then change is not part of the world. But that's not how we understand the world, and use "the world". We include change as part of the world. So this definition of "the world" is faulty.

Do you accept that one can find the instantaneous velocity of an accelerating body? — Banno

No, of course not, that's completely illogical. There is no such thing as "instantaneous velocity", that would be oxymoronic. No time passes in an instant, so nothing can move or have any velocity at an instant.

Failure to provide evidence or support when requested renders the proposition in question null. — tim wood

This is rather moot because more often than not, what is at question is whether what is provided constitutes evidence and support. So the person who provides evidence and support as requested, get's the response of, that's not evidence or support, and the proposition is declared null. What's the point? There are at least as many people who cannot recognize evidence and support when they see it, as there are those who do not provide it when requested.

Well, no, it isn't. Except to you. — Banno

Do you really believe that a fact is something which can change? Let's take an example. Let's assume that at a particular time, a particular identified person is infected with coronavirus. That is a fact, a state of affairs. How could that fact ever change?

Let's be clear here: do you lack knowledge of the cause or the effect? You don't know what pain is or you don't know what causes it? — Luke

"Pain" is what we called a type of feeling. What I argued is that there is an underlying process, and the feeling, which we refer to as pain has a relation to this underlying process. Further, since we do not adequately know the underlying process, we cannot claim to completely understand pain itself. Jkg20 was skeptical about this underlying thing, so I referred to it as the cause of pain. So the argument is that to completely understand pain requires that we know its cause.

Regarding the effect, you aren't making a subjective distinction between 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. You didn't invent the meanings of these words. If you are unsure what they mean, you can look up their meanings in a dictionary. — Luke

I don't think looking in the dictionary is going to help me to understand the phenomenon of pain. I went through this already with jkg20. I look up "pain", in the dictionary to get an objective definition, and it tells me that pain is an unpleasant feeling. Then I have a feeling which I judge as unpleasant and I call it pain. Clearly that is a subjective judgement.

Otherwise, if you want to know the causes of pain, then this might help to begin with: — Luke

Your referred video doesn't answer the question asked though, why a specific type of feeling is felt as pain rather than as pleasure, or something else. It even hinted at this problem with reference to variability in pain sensitivity. So notice the title, and the conclusion of the video, how your brain "responds" to pain. The narrator starts as if he is going to tell you what causes pain, but then he gets to this issue of variability, and concludes by talking about how you brain responds to pain. There's a gap, the cause of the feeling which is called pain, which is left unexplained.

If you have something constructive to say then say it.

I don't think the tractarian 'state of affairs' describes a static state, as you put it. — Pussycat

A "state of affairs", "fact", or "what is the case", is something which cannot be changed, otherwise you allow the possibility that things could be other than they are, then a fact might not be a fact. Therefore these things are static, unchanging. In Wittgenstein's premise "the world" is nothing other than a restatement of Parmenides' "being". The totality of reality is "what is", and what is cannot be otherwise, or else what is would be what is not, and this would be contradictory.

Basically it isn't concerned at all with this distinction, or with change, but with what is pictured, and so you can have a state-of-affairs that pictures a running horse, or another with a still life. — Pussycat

Right, that's why it's deficient. It misses a large part of the world in it's definition of "the world", then comes to the conclusion that we cannot say anything about this part of the world, because it's not part of the world according to the definition of the world. But that's an unsound conclusion derived from that false premise which is the faulty definition of "the world".

Bestiality? That's sick in more ways than one.

He said the world is made up of facts or states-of-affairs. — Sam26

Yes, that is the problem I'm referring to, the opening statements of the book, how he defines "the world". There is actually more to the world than states-of-affairs, there is also activity, change, what the ancients called "becoming". As Aristotle demonstrated change, or becoming, is incompatible with "states of affairs", what Parmenides called "being".

Suppose at one time there is X states-of-affairs, and at a slightly later time there is a different set of states-of-affairs, Y. This implies change. So we must account for what occurs between X and Y, the change, as a real part of the world. We could posit another set of states-of-affairs, Z, and say that Z is what the world consists of in the change between X and Y. However, we now need to account for the change between X and Z, and the change between Z and Y. Suppose we posit the set of states-of-affairs A, to account for the change between X and Z, and B to account for the change between Z and Y. What we have here is an infinite regress, and no way of describing the activity which accounts for the change between static states-of-affairs.

To say that the world is made up of states-of-affairs is to say that the world is made up of static things. This cannot be the entirety of the world, as we commonly use "the world", because our world also consists of changes in the relations which are described as states-of-affairs. These changes in the relation are categorical different from the relations themselves.

Of course what is unknown is part of reality, unless you're referring to that which is outside the world, the metaphysical, this goes beyond the world, or beyond what can be said. However, there is that which is unknown in the world, and this can be pictured too. All the facts in the world, known or unknown, are what we can talk about. Wittgenstein mapped out what can be talked about (at least in theory). — Sam26

I think it is a mistake to assert that change is something which cannot be spoken about, just because we have to use expressions which are other than statements of states-of-affairs, to talk about what change is. Can't we use the concept of "difference" to talk about this part of the world? The difference between the two states-of-affairs X and Y, cannot be expressed as a state-of-affairs, but it is something which can still be spoken about. It's just that we need to use other forms of expression. Wittgenstein seems to have come to this realization by the time he wrote much of the material in PI.

You said earlier that it was an "unpleasant feeling". Now you don't know what it is? — Luke

Correct, I can say that it is an unpleasant feeling, but I do not know in objective terms, what distinguishes a pleasant feeling from an unpleasant feeling. "Knowing" requires objectivity. The fact that I can talk about this distinction between pleasant and unpleasant, making my own subjective distinction between these two, and I can even assume that such an objective distinction might at some future time be produced, doesn't mean that I believe that there is currently an objectively defined difference between them, which I might refer to in making that judgement, and that would be required in order for me to know. Therefore claiming that I can distinguish pleasant feelings from unpleasant feelings, within myself, and refer to the unpleasant ones as pain, does not amount to a claim that I "know" what pain is. Knowledge requires more than a subjective opinion.

Luke got there before me, but I thought we were agreed that we know that pain is a certain type of feeling. Now you are suggesting we do not even know that? — jkg20

Back when I posted that, I thought that we could agree that pain was a certain type of feeling. As the discussion progressed I attempted to ground the notion of "feeling" in sensation, and we could not agree. Therefore I concluded that we do not know what a feeling is. Since we had defined "pain" in relation to "feeling", and it became evident that we do not know what a feeling is, I had to make the further conclusion that we really do not know what pain is. Attempting to prove what something is, by relating it to something unknown, instead of relating it to something better know, is a step in the wrong direction. That could be a matter of deception. "I know what pain is, it's a feeling". What's a feeling? "I don't know". See, you could replace "feeling" here with any imaginary word and the deception would be exposed.

That was the difference in perspective between us. I attempted to prove that "pain" is unknown by relating it to something more general, vague, and ambiguous, "feeling", the direction which the common definition leads us, toward the unknown. You attempted to prove that "pain" is known, by relating it to particular instances of pain which you have experienced. The difference is that I was looking to the public, objective, and conventional definition, while you were looking to personal, private experiences. What I refer to as "pain" is justified. What you refer to is not, it's a matter of personal opinion.

Second, what do you mean by "conventional definition". If you mean a definition you find in the dictionary, it is perfectly conventional to deny that vision always involves sensations. Sometimes it can, e.g. when seeing phosphenes and afterimages for instance, but that does not mean it always does. You would have to invoke some kind of argument from illusion or hallucination to get to the conclusion that all vision involves sensations, and I'm sure you are aware that arguments from illusion and hallucination are by no means generally accepted to be sound. — jkg20

Conventional definition is the one commonly accepted and used. If you insist on demonstrating contradictory definitions, each of which could be called conventional, then this just proves my point, that the thing referred to by that word remains unknown because there is contradiction within the supposed knowledge of it.

If the entirety of "the world", is what we can represent, or picture with statements or propositions, then how are we to relate to all that we cannot make statements or proposition about? This would be the unknown for example, we can't make statements about the unknown because it is unknown. Do we not normally include unknown reality as part of 'the world"?