unless you have something more to contribute other than a simple declaration. — Xtrix

It appears like you haven't read any of my posts, because that is just about all I've been doing here, is justifying this claim.

Everyone uses the word "beetle" to refer to some unknown, inaccessible thing inside a box. You seem to accept this. It doesn't matter what the inaccessible thing in a box is, everyone calls it a "beetle" anyway. How does this change if there is nothing in a box? Everyone else's box is inaccessible and everyone would still call whatever is (or is not) in a box a "beetle" anyway. That's how the word is used and that's what it means. Your complaint that the word is supposed to refer to some positive thing and that it cannot refer to nothing carries no weight, because whatever is in a box makes no difference to the meaning or use of the word. — Luke

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote. The scenario of #4 where there is "nothing in the box", describes a completely different language-game, one completely different, and incompatible with #1, in which it is stipulated that there is something in the box. #4 contradicts #1 and is therefore not a possible scenario under the premise #1. Sure, my complaint "carries no weight" to you, because you are willing to ignore contradiction in an example. That is an indication of undisciplined philosophy. So your statement needs to be qualified, my complaint carries no wait to an undisciplined philosopher.

his is the point of the conditional, that if the word has a use in these people's language, then the word "beetle" would not be the name of a thing and this thing does not belong to the language game at all. — Luke

No, the point of 3 & 4 is stated explicitly as the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language which is other than, to refer to the thing in the box. Therefore the premises of 1&2 describe a language-game in which "beetle" refers to something in the box, and 3&4 describe a completely different, unrelated language-game, within which "beetle" is used in a completely different, unrelated way. And, these two distinct language-games cannot be united into one game, or represented as one game without contradiction.

What we can conclude from this demonstration, is as jkg20 implies, we cannot represent language, as a whole, as a language-game. This concept, that language use as a whole, can be represented as a language-game, is incoherent. We can represent distinct language-games, but since there is contradiction between these distinct games, as demonstrated by Wittgenstein's example, the idea that the distinct games being played, can be represented as one game, is a faulty idea because of this demonstrated incoherency.

As Wittgenstein says: "The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something" — Luke

The thing in the box has no place in that particular language-game, the one described by 3&4. However, the thing in the box plays an essential role in the other language-game, the one described by 1&2. Therefore the same word, "beetle", is employed in distinct language-games which have been described as incompatible with each other. Accordingly, we cannot say that the use of the word "beetle" is representable as a single language-game. That would be a faulty representation of language use.

Accepting the antecedent of the inference you make above involves accepting the concealed premise that could be expressed in the first instance as: if there is no difference between the appearance of two things, in this case types of behaviour, there is no real difference in what they are. — jkg20

This is not really what I meant to be saying with the antecedent though. I take the possibility of deception for granted. We can say that deception is a real thing which evidently happens, and, due to its nature, we do not know that we have been deceived when it occurs. That is the key point, deception is unidentifiable, because if it is identified it is not deception, only an attempt to deceive. And the other point is that deception occurs. This is what validates skepticism. Since we can never be absolutely, purely, and ideally certain, even if it's only a one in a million chance that I am wrong, I have no way of knowing in which of those million instances I am wrong. If I knew it I would have corrected it. Therefore doubt is warranted in all those instances. Each instance can endlessly be reassessed for the possibility of mistake.

So, we must assume that in every instance there is the possibility of deception. If we could describe the situation as "the person is showing one's beetle", then there would be no possibility of deception. So we cannot describe the situation like that. Therefore we need to describe it in some other way. What is the person doing then, if not showing the beetle?

Nevertheless, if one does deny that inference, i.e. if one does accept that pain behaviour and fake pain behaviour can have the exactly the same appearance but may yet nevertheless be metaphysically entirely distinct phenomena, then the difficult question is to try to explain how we can be fooled into thinking someone is in pain: it seems that there just must be some common denominator between fake pain behaviour and pain behaviour, but if we accept that, then falling back into skepticism about us ever being able to show each other our pain seems inevitable. — jkg20

This is why I proposed "representing" instead. The person is carrying out activity which appears to be "showing one's beetle", but cannot actually be described as such because of the possibility of deception.
So instead of "showing one's beetle" we could describe it as representing one's beetle, and this provides for the medium between what is expressed, and what is inside, allowing for the possibility of deception.

Furthermore, once we allow for this medium between what's inside (the beetle), and the person's actions, we can understand all sorts of possibilities for what the person is actually doing, rather than simply "representing". This idea of "representing" was proposed as a replacement for "showing", and so it was selected as similar to "showing". But once we dismiss "showing", then we have a complete separation between the beetle in the box (1&2 in my discussion with Luke above), and the 'other use' for the word (3&4). Theoretically, this 'other use' might not even be related to the beetle, as in the analogy. So we have a whole range (infinite possibility), of relations between what the person is doing, (representing, hiding, maybe even manipulating the beetle), and the beetle itself. There is nothing to indicate that any specific relation between the actions and the beetle is necessary. And this extends right to the extreme of the analogy, where the beetle might not even be related to what the person is doing. But this would imply nonsensical, random actions, so the extreme expressed in this analogy is doubtful.

The skepticism you refer to is good and healthy. It allows us to get beyond appearances and see things the way they really are. We do not know the relationship between what's inside (the beetle, or "pain" in this case), and our actions. We can talk about some possible relations, such as the actions are showing the inside, or representing the inside, and in morality we say that the inside (intention) has a causal effect on the actions, but we really do not understand these relations. There is no necessity here, in the sense of such and such inside feeling, pain for example, is necessarily expressed in this way. So, if someone claims that the person must be "showing one's beetle", in order that the person could act in a communicative way, it is good to approach such a statement with healthy skepticism, because there are many different relations between the person's actions and the beetle, which are evident in the different forms of communication. No particular relationship is necessary.

Phusis was the Greek term for being, yes. This is exactly what Heidegger says, and he's correct. — Xtrix

No, phusis was not the Greek term for being. So if Heidegger introduced a concept of Being which is supposed to be equivalent with the Greek concept of phusis, then this Heideggerian concept of Being is not the same as the Greek concept of being.

Yes, showing, for me, that the language game itself is incoherent : the meaning of "beetle" cannot be entirely determined by necessarily private objects. — jkg20

Yes it might be the case that this particular language-game, that the meaning of "beetle" is entirely determined by private objects. But it is also the case that the other language-game portrayed, the one in which the private objects are completely irrelevant, is also incoherent. Notice that there are two distinct language-games in this analogy, which are somewhat opposed in principle. Neither is acceptable as each is impossible in its own way.

For me we are being invited to conclude that people must be able to show each other their beetles, otherwise "beetle" never gets to really mean anything at all.

More tentatively, I think we are also being invited to reach for a conclusion that where we can all show each other what is inside our boxes, what is inside our boxes cannot vary too much without "beetle" losing its usefulness entirely. But there I meander a long way away from the text. — jkg20

This might be the case, that we are invited to conclude that the only real language-game is the one in which we are able to show each other our beetles. But this is where the matter gets difficult. Can we actually show each other our beetles? Now deception is relevant. If I can deceive you, then I am not actually showing you my beetle. Furthermore, if any instance of what appears to you as me showing you my beetle might actually be an instance of deception, then I can never actually be showing you my beetle. I am actually doing something else So what am I actually doing, or showing you? It can't be more than a representation of my beetle, which may or may not be an accurate representation. Now we have no real language-game at all, because we are not actually capable of showing to another one's own beetle. We might try, through the use of language, but we are actually incapable.

But your conclusion, that "beetle" never really gets to mean anything is not quite correct, I believe. It's more appropriate to conclude that the meaning is indefinite. Now we're right back to the beginning premise, everyone has a beetle in the box, but with one important difference, not even the person who holds the box can see what's in it. If you could, you could properly represent it and show it to others, and this is what the possibility of deception demonstrates that we cannot do. So we assume that since others appear to have a similar box, then the thing which is within those other boxes might be similar as well. So we seek assistance from others, in an attempt to figure out and understand what is within one's own box.

3. Suppose that the word "beetle" has a use in these people's language nonetheless.

4. Then the word "beetle" would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game at all. The box could effectively be empty, as this would make no difference to the language game or the meaning/use of the word "beetle". — Luke

These are the questionable statements. This use of "beetle" is something completely distinct from, other than, to refer to the thing in the box. So we have a second definition of "beetle" here, and an invitation to equivocate.

To avoid equivocation we must choose one of the two definitions of "beetle". If we choose the first, then it is impossible that any of the boxes are empty, and "beetle" necessarily refers to the thing in the box. If we choose the second, the entire "beetle in the box" scenario becomes completely irrelevant, because "beetle" has a complete different meaning dependent on some other use, and we know not what that other use is.

There is no contradiction here. He doesn't say both that there is something and nothing in the box. He says only that if the word was to have a use in these people's language, then it would have no effect on the language game if the box was empty. — Luke

Yes there is contradiction because #1 and #3 define "beetle" in incompatible ways, and that is contradiction. Either "beetle" refers to the thing in the box, or it has a meaning prescribed by some other use, but to allow two incompatible definitions of the same word is to allow contradiction.

Look at #1, "beetle" is the name of something in the box. Now look at #4 , "beetle" is not used as the name of a thing. Do you see the contradiction now? #4 is a blatant contradiction of #1. I know that you'll want to excuse the contradiction, saying #4 is some sort of hypothetical, but so is #1 a hypothetical. So we have two distinct, and incompatible hypotheticals, (1&2) vs.(3&4). If taken together as one hypothetical "the beetle and the analogy", this hypothetical is self-contradicting.

As for deception, in the case of the beetle and the box it only makes sense by somebody coming along and pretending that they even have their box: it might look like their box, but things that look like boxes are not always boxes, and if it were genuinely their box, it would have something inside it. — jkg20

What I've been addressing as deception, Is the supposed conclusion Wittgenstein makes, that the box might even be empty. This possibility comes about through your ii, "nobody can show anybody else what is inside their box", in conjunction with Wittgenstein's suggestion that the people have a use for the word "beetle", which is other than to name the thing in the box.

Notice that this suggestion of another use, is inconsistent with the premise that "beetle" is the name for the thing in the box. In effect, what Wittgenstein has done is offered a second definition for "beetle". Only if we accept this second definition of "beetle" (the other use that people have for the word), which is inconsistent with the first definition (the word refers to the thing in the box), can we proceed to the conclusion that the box might be empty. However, this conclusion contradicts the premise that everyone has something in their box. We can see that the conclusion, which contradicts the premise, is only provided for by introducing a second definition of "beetle". In other word's it's derived from equivocation.

So, the two definitions of "beetle" are completely distinct. At the beginning of the analogy it refers to the thing in the box. At the end of the analogy, it is simply indicated that "beetle" has another use. This other use, whatever it might be, is completely unrelated to, and irrelevant to the thing in the box. The "beetle in the box" is completely and absolutely unrelated to the other use for "beetle. Anyone who assumes that there is some relation here does so by equivocation. So if we apply this back to "pain", then this other use for the word "pain" would be completely unrelated to anything any person felt. But that extreme separation is sort of nonsensical.

iii the meaning of beetle is determined fully and only by whatever is in the box. — jkg20

Let me address this (iii) now. Wittgenstein has offered two distinct scenarios. One,(iii), that the meaning of "beetle" is determined solely by what's in the box ("beetle" refers necessarily to what's in the box), and the other, that there's a meaning for "beetle" which is completely distinct from what's in the box. We can see these two as the two limiting extremes for usage of the word. In reality, all instances of usage fall somewhere in between. So we can dismiss (iii) as inconsistent with reality.

This leads me to (ii), the idea that no one can show another what is inside their box. I think you and I both agree that communication is the act which shows another what is in the box. Therefore we can dismiss (ii) along with (iii). The only thing we're left with is (i), that there is something inside each box. So the analogy really tells us nothing about the relationship between language and what's inside, pain, or other feelings whatsoever, "what's in the box".

Quick addendum: re. the football player faking pain: I take Wittgenstein as promoting the idea that fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, even if it looks like it. — jkg20

This is why deception is relevant and significant. If we agree that communication is an act of showing another what's in the box, we have to account for why we sometimes there is deception, and we cannot distinguish the real showing from the fake showing. Fake pain behaviour is not pain behaviour, but we can be deceived into thinking that the fake pain behaviour is real pain behaviour. This makes our dismissal of (ii) "nobody can show any body else what is inside their box", a little bit ambiguous, needing qualification. We can show others what's in the box, but we can also hide (keep private) what is inside the box, through deception. The showing depends on how we choose to act.

What you asked me to reread is TheMadFool's hypothesis. That is what I found to be incomprehensible. Truthfully, I find your writing quite clear, but you didn't succeed in making TMF's writing intelligible. Probably because it's not.

It looks like the virus has been over estimated. The only serious problem it poses is keeping the elderly safe and managing healthcare (not a serious issue for developed countries). — I like sushi

So, countries are in lockdown, travel suspended, extreme measures of personal distancing in practise, and the virus is held to manageable levels as intended by these practises, and demonstrated by the models as what would be the case if these practises were implemented, yet you conclude that the virus has been over estimated?

Wittgenstein doesn't say that you name it. He says that the word has a use in these people's language. Anyone can learn the language, of course, and learn to use the word "beetle" accordingly. — Luke

That's irrelevant, I'm not talking about "anyone", I'm talking specifically about the person whose box is empty. That person would be practising deception, according to the contradiction in the terms of the analogy.

Unless they make it known that they are deaf, a deaf person is practising deception with any and all usage of the word "sounds"? Do you realise how absurd this is? — Luke

I'm not talking about a deaf person either, that's an irrelevant distraction you've created.

Are you back-pedalling on your former agreement that the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word? — Luke

Since you misunderstood what I agreed to, or more precisely misrepresented it for a straw man, then I must "back-pedal" to ensure that you understand what I meant.

What is irrelevant to the question of whether the use of the word depends on the contents of the box is your trivial concern regarding a particular use of the word in order to deceive. The same word or statement could be used in the same way, with the same meaning, in either an honest or a dishonest fashion. It makes no difference to the use/meaning of the word or statement. — Luke

So being honest, and being dishonest are "the same" to you? One person makes a truthful honest statement, and another person states the same words in deception, and these two people are using those words in the same way? Tell me another one.

I always presumed that Wittgenstein's example of the beetle and the box was just to show that it is a necessary condition for "pain" to have a meaning that it refers to something inner, but that "inner" here cannot mean private and undisplayable to others. I.e. it is necessary for "beetle" to have a meaning that people have things inside their boxes, but ii. they must be able to show others what is in the box. It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20

This would make sense, and showing each other what's in the box would avoid the possibility of someone referring to the thing within the empty box, which is the deception I referred to, but this is not a condition of the analogy. In the analogy what is in the box is meant to be private, that's why it's described as in the box, and only the holder of the box can see inside. And that described privacy is why the possibility of deception looms. Further, deception is then necessitated when Wittgenstein introduces the contradiction "the box might be empty".

But I'm not sure about your use of "undisplayable". In relation to the analogy, if people wanted to display what's inside, they could open the box and show it to others, making the thing displayable. How would that work with "pain"? The display of pain is itself the person's action, which includes spoken words. How could we exclude the possibility of deception if the person cannot open oneself up, to show the thing itself, the "pain"? The sports player might be faking pain to get the opponent penalized, how could that person open oneself up to show that the pain is real? If an individual wants to ensure to another, that deception is not the case, and display one's own pain to convince others of one's honesty, how is that possible?

Because deception is possible, and it is impossible for us to convince others beyond the shadow of a doubt that we are not deceiving them concerning what's inside, your assumption that we "must be able to show others what is in the box" is not only inconsistent with Wittgenstein's example, but also inconsistent with lived experience.

It must be necessary, since if it were not, then it would make sense for everyone's box to be empty, — jkg20

It appears to make sense that everyone's box might be empty, and that's why the others in this thread fall for this deceptive suggestion. Logically though, it makes no sense at all, because it directly contradicts the opening premise, that everyone has a box with something in it. That premise excludes the possibility of any box being empty. Furthermore, the premise indicates that "beetle" refers to what's in one's box, so if the box is empty the person practises deception when using that word. Therefore, it makes sense that everyone's box might be empty in the same way that deception makes sense (it is a real aspect of language use), and it makes sense in the same way that contradiction makes sense (it is a real aspect of Wittgenstein's analogy).

If a given’s constituents are never identical across time, but only its holistic form can so remain, then the notion of identity can only apply to holistic forms. — javra

OK, just so you know where I'm coming from, I do not accept the idea of a "holistic form". I think this is an imaginary thing, and that any designation "such is the holistic form of the thing" would be arbitrary, or at least be based on principles which would have a large degree of arbitrariness.

’ve been trying to express is that the holistic form of a first-person point of view is the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different first person points of view - despite the constituents of awareness pertaining to each being drastically different, thereby being a part of what makes each numerically different first person point of view unique. — javra

Therefore I take this determination of "qualitatively identical" as arbitrary. I'll refer to my original example, you might as well say that all things are qualitatively identical, despite having drastic differences between them and being numerically different, on account of them all being things. What is the point in saying things like these are "identical"?

Maybe you no longer subscribe to realism when it comes to universals? I thought you did. Or maybe we hold drastically different understandings of these as well. — javra

I don't think I was ever much of a realist in this sense of the word.

All the same, I’m not here trying to convince you but am instead justifying my stance, which you took issue with. And I don't find the metaphysics of identity to be an easy topic. — javra

Identity is definitely not an easy topic, but you seem to have a much better understanding of it than many. I'm glad you took the time to explain your concept of "holistic form", and although I am sure that I do not adequately understand it, it doesn't appear to be appealing to me. How can the holistic form of a thing stay the same when the thing is changing. What kind of "form" is that?

There will be a time over this course of slow transformation - in which the rock turns to sediments - when the given rock ceases to be the same given rock, instead being a different rock. — javra

Here's something to consider. If you look at the rock as matter, then even after it turns to sediments, the matter is still the same matter. So in a way there is something of the rock, its matter, which will always remain the same, even after the rock is gone.

Before this time is arrived at, its sameness over time is not a result of the same unchanging total package of constituent parts - which never remains the same — javra

But the constituent parts, the matter, stays the same regardless of whether they exist as the rock, or something else. So we have something which remains the same through time, the matter. And, since the form of the object is continually changing, if we gave identity to the form of the thing, it would be a new thing at every moment. Instead, if we give identity to the matter of the thing, we can always identify that same matter, as time passes, regardless of what form it is in.

A process, maybe? All the same, as I see it, what a first person point of view is ontologically - a thing, a process, both, or neither - does not need to be in any way known by us for one to hold a rather strong certainty that such nevertheless is, at the very least in the here and now. — javra

I think I can agree with this.

The word could be used in this way, to deceive, but it need not be. However, it has been your claim that the word can only be used in this way if the sense is lacking; that any use of the word must be a deception. — Luke

What is really the case is that when you have named the thing in your box "beetle", and there is nothing in your box, the word is necessarily used to deceive. The deception pervades all usage because you are implying that there is something in the box that you have named "beetle" when you know there is not. Until you make it known to others that there really is nothing in your box which is called "beetle", i.e. that the beetle is a fiction (in which case you are not using "beetle" to refer to the thing in your box anymore), all the usage of that term will be instances of deception.

The deception is inherent within the dictates of the analogy. The name refers to the thing in the box. The person knows what's in one's box. Those two are premised. We can add the further premise, that to refer to the thing in the box when you know that there is nothing in the box, is deception. Therefore to use the word when you know that there is nothing in the box is deception.

On the other hand, when there really is something in the box, one might still use the word for deception as well.

If the "use" of the word is to refer to something which is not there, as if it were there, when the person knows that it is not there, then the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.

A person can say "I hear sounds", whether or not the person actually hears sounds. The "use" is dependent on whether the person actually hears sounds or not, because if sounds are not actually heard the "use" is deception. The person is using the words to deceive.

Perhaps I didn't make myself clear. When the deaf person is not hearing sounds yet is referring to the sounds which he or she is hearing, that is deception, like when the person without a beetle in the box is referring to the beetle in the box.

Do you understand that as deception?

Is it deceptive for a deaf person to talk about sounds and for a blind person to talk about colours? What's the deception? — Luke

If the deaf person is not hearing sounds, recognizes and understands this, and yet is talking about hearing sounds, that is deception, just like when the person with no beetle in the box, recognizes and understands that there is nothing in the box, yet is talking about the beetle in the box, that is deception.

Not true, reread what he wrote. — christian2017

Sorry, I already read it two or three times, and it just doesn't make any sense to me. It's quite plausible that my interpretation is "not true", but that's because I can't make any sense of it.

Whether or not there is something in the box is always relevant under the premise of the analogy, because what you would call "the same use" would be deception when there is nothing in the box, and therefore it would not really be the same, the use would be to deceive.

Where's my contradiction?

It's very relevant.

If you allow for the possibility of deception in the use of language, do you see that "everyone's box has something in it" , and "the box might be empty", are contradictory, and therefore deceptive?

I said that the word could still be used in the same way even if the box was empty. — Luke

As I said, it can't be used in the same way, without deception. Talking about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, is deception, and that fact cannot be avoided.

As you have agreed, the contents of the box are irrelevant to the use of the word. — Luke

There you go, changing the terms again to "contents". Didn't I point out this mistake to you already? I didn't agree that the contents of the box are irrelevant, nor did Wittgenstein imply such, in the analogy. Something is in the box, and that is very relevant. It is the premise of the analogy. How could it not be relevant? The exact nature of the thing in the box is not relevant, and that is what I agreed to. What is in the box could be anything.

The word could still be used in exactly the same way even if the box was empty, despite your tirades about deception. — Luke

No! Obviously this is false! if you are talking to me about the thing in your box, when there is nothing in your box, and you know that there is nothing in your box, then you are practising deception. That's clear and succinct. If you fail to acknowledge this, then so be it. Most people who deceive will continue to deny that they were deceiving long after being caught in the deception. So this is not a completely unusual response from you, to claim that there is no deception where there clearly is deception.

Hopefully that was clearer. — Xtrix

Not at all. I wanted to know in what sense you were talking about "being". Are you discussing what things have in common, "being", existence, like when we say that a thing "is", instead of a fictional thing which is not? In this case "being" is a verb, what a thing is doing, existing, and I think that this is the sense which the ancient Greek's used. Or, are you talking about "being" in the sense of a thing, a being? In this case "being" is a noun. I think that this is a more modern sense, developed through Latin. You seemed to be switching back and forth between the two.

Instead of giving me a clear answer, you've introduced a third sense of being, a capitalized "Being", which appears specific to Heidegger, but you want to assign it to ancient Greece. It is not the verb I described above, because you say it is not a property of things, the activity which is proper to things as "being". Instead, you assign to it the mystical description of "emergence", or "emerging sway". The problem though, as I explained to you already, is that these concepts are better associated with the ancient Greek "becoming", rather than "being", and these two are distinct in ancient Greek conceptualization.

Translate your sentence this way: "the being of beings and the becoming of beings." You see where the problem is, I think. The equating of "being" as something changeless, as something opposite of "becoming," of all change and motion and flux -- this is the mistake. Better to say "the permanence of beings and the becoming of beings." In that case, I totally agree they're very different aspects. — Xtrix

OK, so you want to remove "being" in the sense of the verb, "the 'being' of beings" and replace it with "the 'permanence' of being". That's fine, if it makes more sense to you this way, but the problem is that we are discussing how the ancient Greeks talked about it, and they used what is translated as "being", and Parmenides described this in terms of permanence. So you cannot remove the fact that the Greeks spoke of this as the "being" of things, just because it makes more sense to you to call it the permanence of things. Furthermore, as I explained, the Greeks weren't really calling things beings, so it would be more like "the being of a man", "the being of an animal", "the being of a plant". And, since they all seemed to have this property in common, "being", Aristotle asked what is this thing "being", as being itself, which they all have in common.

The "thing" (the being) itself exists, of course -- whether changing or otherwise. It has being. "Becoming" in general has "being." — Xtrix

This makes absolutely no sense to me. Plants and animals have being, as described above. What could it possibly mean to say "becoming has being"?

Beings are nouns, yes. Being, on the other hand, isn't a noun, or a "thing." The being of beings is what we're discussing, in fact. If no-thing emerged or showed up in any way for us, there'd be no question of being at all. — Xtrix

This I don't understand either. What do you mean by "showed up"? You say here that you want to talk about the verb "the being of beings". But then you proceed to define "being" with the terms of "emerged" and "showed up", and these are the defining terms of becoming, not being. So you appear totally confused. "Being" refers to the existence of the thing, not what the thing shows through emergence. Are you familiar with the Latin distinction of existence and essence? Existence is associated with the being of the thing, and essence (what the things is), can be associated with what the things shows up as.

I agree that if there were no showing up of the thing (essence), there would be no existence of the thing. That is a fundamental ontological principle, an existing thing must have a form, essence. But we ought not confuse the existence of a thing (its being), with the essence of the thing (how it shows itself to us). Therefore it is a mistake to say that the being of a thing is what it shows up as.

They did: phusis. That's the entire point. — Xtrix

"Phusis" does not mean the same as "being". You're wrong to equate these two. They are completely distinct. So if that is your "entire point", it's wrong. Your quoted passage says that "Being" (it's capitalized, so this is the third sense, the Heideggerian sense) is equivalent to the ancient Greek "phusis". But this sense is not "being" in the ancient Greek sense of "being", it's a new sense created by Heidegger, signified by the capitalization.

He's discussing Being — Xtrix

No, "Being" refers to a concept created by Heidegger. How could Parmenides have been discussing it?

Hip hip hooray!

Taking a different route, if I’m understanding you correctly: Since no singular first person point of view remains the same over time - e.g., the you of five seconds past is not identical to the you of the present - there thereby can be no personal identity through time. Is this correct? — javra

No, that's not what I had in mine. You, as a thing just like any other thing, have small changes which occur to you over time, so your point of view changes, nevertheless you are still the same thing, and it is still your point of view. So the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, allows that a thing which is changing as time passes, might continue to be the same thing, because the thing never ceases to be the same as itself despite the fact that it is changing over time.

I should add that I don't consider the first person point of view to be a thing, i.e.a homunculus. — javra

It was you who was talking about a first-person-point-of view as if it were a thing, which could be identified with other first-person-points-of view. If the first-person-point-of-view is not a thing which can be talked about, then what is it that you are referring to with this phrase?

Simply by using the word 'beetle' one is "practising deception"? — Luke

If you are saying "I have a thing in my box which I am calling a beetle", when you have nothing in your box, wouldn't you agree with me that this is deception?

Great! Then it is also irrelevant (to the use of the word) whether a particular box contains something or not. — Luke

Did you not read what I wrote? Or do you have some sort of mental block which prevents you from understanding simple logic? The description is of something in the box. What it is, which in the box, is irrelevant to that description. It is simply stated that there is something in the box. How can you think that this means that it is also irrelevant whether or not there is even something in the box? It is described as something in the box, so whether or not there is something in the box is what makes the description true or false. How can you claim that whether or not there is something in the box is irrelevant, just because it is stipulated that what it is which is in the box is irrelevant. That is a completely illogical conclusion.

Is someone "practising deception" if they talk about unicorns or Santa Claus (since these don't really refer to anything)? — Luke

Often yes, when they talk about fictional characters as if they are not fictional, they are practising deception. When parents tell their children about Santa Clause they are very clearly practising deception. Also, if one writes a book of fiction and presents it as if it were a factual book, this is deception. However, if it is explicit, or implicit, that the fictional character is a fictional character, there is no deception. In the case of the "beetle" in the box, when there is nothing in the box, it is clearly deception, because the person talks as if there is something in the box, referring to it as a beetle, while knowing that there is not anything in the box.

Are we discussing Wittgenstein's example here, or some other scenario that is only in your mind? — Luke

Yes, this is Wittgenstein's example. Look where it is presented by jAmEs:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — Wittgenstein

What is being exemplified is "pain". But people feel many things other than just pain. Therefore there must be more than one thing in the box in the analogy. People feel pleasure, pain, all sorts of emotions, and sensations. So the analogy of "beetle in the box" is completely inapplicable in the first place, because there must be all sorts of different things in the box, beetles, ants, caterpillars, butterflies, etc., just like there are all sorts of feelings other than pain within the person. So the issue is how do we know how to give which name to which thing in the box, and this is not even broached by Wiitgenstein, who is presenting the analogy as one thing in the box. The analogy is very clearly an exercise in, or demonstration of deception, at numerous different levels. It's almost as if Wittgenstein looked for as many ways as possible to deceive people within one simple example, just to demonstrate the reality of deception. Can you not see, that what "the beetle in the box" is demonstrating is deception?

What is in one box is not necessarily different from what is in another; only that nobody can know what is in another's box. — Luke

Of course the two distinct things in two distinct boxes are necessarily different from each other, that's what makes them two distinct things. Are you familiar with the law of identity? I went through this already with Harry. They are necessarily different from one another, as two distinct things. Why would you think they could be the same?

Regardless, if everyone assumes that what is in everyone else's box is different to what is in theirs, then the word "beetle" can only be used to refer to "the contents of a person's box", or to "the thing in the box, whatever it is". — Luke

And why would you think this? It is common practise for different people to use the same word differently in different situations. Strictly speaking we ought not even call these two distinct instances "the same word".

Therefore, it doesn't matter what particular thing is in anyone's box. The particular contents of a particular box is irrelevant to the use of the word. The word can be used only to refer to some unknown thing in the box. As Wittgenstein says "...one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is." The word could still be used in this way even if there were nothing in the box. — Luke

I agree with the first part here, "the particular contents of the particular box is irrelevant". That is why the relation between a word and a thing is somewhat arbitrary. However, the second part does not follow logically, and that is what misled jAmEs. We cannot cancel out the thing in the box, unless we are prepared to classify language use as deception.

When a person speaks about the thing in the box, it is implied that there is a thing in the box which is spoken about. The fact that the thing in the box could be anything does not mean that the thing in the box could be nothing. If there is nothing in the box the person is practising deception. One cannot proceed logically from the premise of "I've got something in the box which could be anything", through the premise of "the precise nature of the thing is not indicated by the name it has", to the conclusion "therefore I might have nothing in the box". That is not a logical conclusion.

So the situation here is that if there is nothing in someone's box, then that person is deceiving others when referring to the beetle in the box. Wittgenstein has indicated that this is a possibility, a person could imply "I have something in the box", by referring to the beetle in the box, when there is nothing in the box. Therefore it is possible that language could be used for deception. He supports this principle further, in practise, with that deceptive argument, proceeding from the premise that everyone has something in the box, to the conclusion that there might be nothing in the box. That's a fallacy. The success of that argument, in misleading people like jAmEs, is evidence of what Wittgenstein is arguing, that language might be used for deception.

Surely, "beetle" means "the contents of a person's box". — Luke

No it does not, "beetle" is the name of the thing in the box. The example states that everyone has a box with something in it, called a beetle. This statement of yours just creates the ambiguity which is required to veil the deception. "Contents of a person's box" might be construed as nothing. But that is not what is stated. So your statement appears to be like a person's statement who is defending oneself after having been caught in a lie. You are saying, it's not really a lie if you understand my words this way instead of that way, so I didn't really tell a lie if you interpret like this. But what is really at issue here is the intent to deceive, and this you cannot remove by introducing such ambiguity. Ambiguity is used to hide the intent to deceive, it does not remove it.

Otherwise, if nobody knows what anybody else means by "beetle", then how can this word be used in the language at all? — Luke

I don't see any criticism here, everyone knows what everyone means by "beetle", it's the name of the thing in a person's box. The only issue is that when we're talking we can't just refer to it as "the beetle", because we need to distinguish "your beetle" from "my beetle" from "his beetle", and "her beetle" etc.. This is no different from talking about a part of the body like a right hand. We all have one, but we can't just refer to our own as "the right hand", because there are as many right hands (almost) as there are people. In no way does this indicate that nobody could know what anyone means by "right hand".

The word does refer to what's in all (or any of) those different boxes, but the particular contents of those boxes is irrelevant to the word's use. — Luke

This statement is deceptive as well. Creating this illusion is what allows for Wittgenstein's deception to proceed. I have a box, with a thing in it called a beetle. You likewise. I know that I call my thing "beetle", and you know that you call your thing "beetle". The example does not indicate why any of us is inclined to call the thing in the box by that specific name. We cannot assume coincidence in this matter, therefore we can look for some convention, or rule being followed, if you have this box, with something in it, call that thing a beetle.

Under the foregoing framework for the example, assuming a convention, or rule, the contents of the box is irrelevant. However, that framework is inappropriate, and not an adequate description of language use, nor is it applicable to real life. It's not a real example. There is no rule, or convention, which stipulates when you have a feeling within your body (beetle in the box), you must call it "pain". There are all sorts of different feelings within your body, therefore all sorts of different things within your box. So Wittgenstein's example obscures this fact, the multitude of things in the box, hiding the need to be able to distinguish one thing from another, within one's own box, with the premise that there is only one thing in the box, thereby establishing the groundwork for the deception. Recognizing this fact brings the deception into focus.

What "other way" is there? Maybe one person could point at another while saying "beetle", or they could even say "your beetle" to make reference to the contents of that person's particular box. But the word would still only mean "the contents of your box, whatever it is". — Luke

There are countless different ways to indicate whose box , pointing as you said, "Luke's box", "the person's box who is walking through the door", etc..

And no, the word does not mean "the contents of your box", it refers to the thing in your box. Furthermore, when you put the example into context, the demonstration which Wittgenstein is making, you'll see that "contents of a person's box" makes no sense. As I explained there are really many different things within that box, and Wittgenstein has distinctly said that the word refers to something in the box. So the whole example falls apart, as a person needs a way to distinguish one thing from another within one's own box. The whole idea that there is only one thing in the box is faulty. Then the example will be seen for what it is, an exercise in deception.

To try to better explain via the law of identity: X = X. Hence, "a first person point of view = a first person point of view". — javra

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore, one person's point of view is the same as that person's point of view. Another person's point of view is not the same. I have to say that you are employing a misunderstanding of the law of identity. This law is actually meant to prevent procedures like yours. We ought not say that one red thing is the same as another red thing, just because they are both red, so we employ the law of identity to prevent people from creating a logical argument which employs this idea as a premise. Trying to use the law of identity to support this procedure just demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of identity.

Nevertheless, if you are a first person point of view, and if I am a first person point of view - this among all our other attributes which differentiates us - then (get ready) how would the "first-person-point-of-view-ness(or, -hood)" which we both share be in and of itself in any way different ... as that which we both at base minimally are as aware beings? — javra

It's just like the beetle in the box. We call it a "first-person-point-of-view", no matter who has it, but this does not necessitate that there is any specific thing about it which is the same. We are just calling different things by the same name, just like two different people might be called "John".

The thingness, or thinghood (don't laugh, these are words one can find in a dictionary), of all things is nevertheless exactly the same, this by virtue of all things being things - rather than for example being actions. — javra

I am not laughing, but this is exactly what Wittgenstein would laugh at, the idea that there is such a thing as "thingness". That's why he set up those deceptive arguments, like the beetle in the box, to lead (mislead perhaps) people away from this idea. The problem is that his arguments which appear to be intended to lead people away from this idea, are really deceptions, such that the people who are led away from this idea have been deceived. If we read deeper into what Wittgenstein is saying, we'll see that he is really trying to demonstrate what this "ness" or "hood" really consists of.

Reread the previous posts or i can re-display them. I never said this hypothetical clock was not apart of the universe in this hypothetical situation. — christian2017

But then it's not consistent with TheMadFool's hypothetical clock, which is running when there is no universe. That's the hypothetical clock which I had the problem with.

This doesn't address the problem, which is the logical impossibility, of a clock which is outside the universe. A hypothetical, or hypothesis, which involves something that is logically impossible because of self-contradiction, ought to be rejected as worthless.

That's not necessarily the way we use words. — Luke

That's right, there is no necessity to the way that we use words, it is done by free will choice. But I did describe a couple of ways that people do use words, so it is not irrelevant.

So how does a person know that what they mean by "beetle" is the same as what anyone else means by it? — Luke

When everyone knows that what is in one's own box is not the same thing which is in another's box, and each person calls what is in one's own box a "beetle", why would anyone believe that what someone means by "beetle is the same as what someone else means by beetle?

Your assumption here doesn't make any sense. Clearly, under the terms of the example no one would think that any two people would mean the same thing with the word "beetle".

How can the word be used in this way? — Luke

A word is seldom used in this way, to mean exactly the same thing as what someone else means, and that's what I spent time explaining to Harry. Since "beetle" refers to what's in all those different boxes, two people would only mean the same thing when using the word, if they were both referring to what's in one particular box. If this is case, then which beetle is being referred to, would have to be indicated in some other way.

So you can see that when a word is used in this way, which you suggested, to mean the same thing as someone else means, this must be in some way indicated, that the meaning in this instance of use is meant to be the same as another instance. Two common ways of indicating this are by providing a reference, and the use of a definition.

You should understand now, why a hypothetical clock can be used in an argument like this." -me — christian2017

No, I just don't know what is meant by "a hypothetical clock". Either the clock is supposed to be a real clock, keeping time as a real part of the universe, or it's a fictional clock, in which case it's irrelevant to the universe, as fiction.

But I'm not understanding why you don't see the unity. That which emerges, that which shows itself, which "appears," is the being of entities in the Greek sense. Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing, moving or not moving -- but they all exist, they all "are." To say entities that move or change or "become" do not possess "being" is simply a mistake. — Xtrix

I think I see the problem right here. You start out by referring to "the being of entities", and that is consistent with the ancient Greek usage of being, which is a verb. The you switch to equate "being" with an entity ("Entities (beings) may be seen as changing or not changing..."), and that is to use "being" as a noun. This usage, to refer to "beings" as things, rather than "being" as the activity of a thing, I do not think is consistent with ancient Greek usage. That usage I believe developed later from Latin, the human being, etc..

So I see a bit of equivocation in your paragraph here. You are switching from "being" as a property of a thing, to a being as a thing itself, and the latter is not consistent with ancient Greek usage.

No, the Greek understanding of being is phusis. When I say "being in the sense of phusis" this means the same: phusis is the word that describes the being of beings. Heidegger says the same, and it's worth going over the reasons for this-- I can't transcribe his entire lecture. — Xtrix

So we can talk about the being of things, and the becoming of things, but this is not to talk about the same aspect of the things. There is no unity of being and becoming because they are distinct ideas, but it is supposed that the thing itself provides some unity, by having both being, and becoming.

But that's just misunderstanding what the word means. Beings show up, emerge, appear, unconceal themselves -- this is phusis, the "emerging, abiding sway." This is how the Greeks apprehend beings: — Xtrix

Now you're switching "being" to a noun, talking about "beings", and this is not consistent with the ancient Greek. So this is not how the Greeks apprehended beings, they did not actually apprehend "beings". There was this type of thing, and that type of thing, "species", and fundamental elements which all types of things were composed of, but they didn't have an overall concept of "being" which could be used to refer to any different thing as "a being".

Where in his poem are you interpreting this from exactly? He never says being "always refers to the stable aspect of phusis." He does speak especially of the Goddess "truth," however. — Xtrix

He says that what is, is, and cannot not be. This means impossible to change, therefore stable. If he said that what is, is possible to not be, then it would refer to instability.

universe is just another phrase for the known matter and energy, so if you have an extremely condensed universe one end and then trillions of miles away you have the clock that "mad_guy" was talking about, yes these terms do have meaning. — christian2017

I don't agree with this, because spatial measurements are only valid within our universe. You can't assume to step outside the universe and measure trillions of miles outside the universe, that's a nonsensical idea. Our concepts of space and time are not valid outside the universe.

I think you understand the concept but you are just playing dead like a dog. — christian2017

No, I really can't see how anyone can make sense of the concept of a clock outside the universe. It seems inherently contradictory.

if the universe was just two black holes really far apart from each other and then that hypothetical clock, was really far apart from the black holes, it would be the same situation. The hypothetical clock was put forth by another user. But there is no reason a hypothetical clock can't be used in an argument like this. — christian2017

Again, I don't see how the concept "far apart" can be applicable outside the universe. The hypothetical clock in the example must be outside the universe. But "universe" is defined as the collection of all existing things, so how could a clock get outside of this? It's pure contradiction.

What does it mean to say that our what our thoughts are about are the same, but the thoughts themselves aren't? If you only know about something by your thoughts, and they are different than mine then how do we know that we are thinking about the same thing? — Harry Hindu

The same way we know anything, with less than absolute certainty.

What would you be communicating - your thoughts or the thing your thoughts are about? — Harry Hindu

Strictly speaking, what I pass to you in communication is words. And the words might be used to reference my thoughts, or the things my thoughts are about, depending on the situation, but generally a combination of both.

We don't need to communicate with each other to understand that we are both looking at the same thing. — Harry Hindu

Yes we do, because there are many things in a person's field of vision, and without some form of communication I can only assume that your interest is the same as mine. Most likely it is not, and we are not looking at the same thing, so it would not be a very reliable assumption.

I’ll expand my views on this a little in reference to consciousness. As I was previously implying, consciousness as an abstract conceptual noun has no meaning in the absence of awareness. Although “awareness” and “cognizance” can hold different spectrums of meaning, “to be aware” and “to cognize” do not - this at least when applied to the first-person point of view (rather than a total mind): to be aware of X is to cognize X and vice versa. Here we have multiple abstract conceptual nouns that convey somewhat different concepts that, nevertheless, reference the same exact beetle that is in everybody’s box. Though we’re all uniquely informed as first-person points-of-view by information at large, this being in part what makes us all uniquely different, we all nevertheless hold an identical beetle in that we are all endowed with (else are) a first-person point of view. Granting that an ant is a sentient being and not an automaton, so too does an ant hold the same beetle in its box: that of having, else being, a first-person point-of-view. For emphasis, all first-person points-of-view will be different in form - again, partly due to the differing information they are informed by, also by biological predispositions that are genetically inherited, etc.; nevertheless, all first-person points of view will be the same, by which I mean qualitatively identical, in their one property of so being first-person points-of-view – differently worded, in being a first-person nexus of awareness. — javra

Your claim that all first-person points-of-view are exactly the same, by virtue of being first-person points-of-view, is just like saying that all things are exactly the same by virtue of being things. How is that a useful assumption, rather than a misleading assumption, in this context?

Here's the point. Just because the word is not used as the name for the thing in the box, this does not leave the thing in the box as playing no role, as jAmEs concludes. That's the way we use words, they indicate a type of thing, yet we also use them to refer to particulars. The word has a dual use. Wittgenstein is trying to exclude one of these. But that exclusion is not justified.

So the conclusion, that the thing in the box has no role in the language game is not valid, because it does not account for that role, in which the person uses the word to refer to the thing in their own box, or to the thing in someone else's box. Furthermore, that the person's box might be empty, amounts to deception if the person refers to what's in one's own box when there is nothing there. And, as I've already explained, that the box might be empty is deception on the part of Wittgenstein, because the example stipulates that there is something in the box, so he contradicts himself here, in the effort to mislead you into thinking that the exclusion described above is justified.

I wasn't trying to make a distinction between an "external" game and "internal" understanding. — Harry Hindu

Actually, I think it was jAmEs who made that distinction, which I agreed to. The problem was, that jAmEs wanted to exclude the role of the internal understanding, as unnecessary.

Since, by assumption, the private inside is inaccessible, it 'obviously' can play no role in grounding a 'meaning' that must be public and external to be a code, a language that one can learn and participate in. — jjAmEs

This led to a contradiction in the reading of Wittgenstein. The premise of the example is that everyone has something in the box, but Wittgenstein later says "the box might even be empty". Clearly we have a contradiction here. "Everyone has something in the box", and "the box might be empty", are incompatible.

I propose that the contradiction is introduced intentionally by Wittgenstein, to mislead people like jAMeS, and perhaps Banno, who do not have a solid education in philosophy, being trained to identify such misleading examples. The faulty example, (presented with explicit contradiction), leads these undisciplined minds toward the conclusion that the internal "private" plays no role.

It seems to me that if there is no "internal" understanding, there is no "external" game. It requires at least two people to understand the rules for there to be an external game, and there requires external parts for there to be an understanding about - different pieces have different rules. — Harry Hindu

Ok, so you did not fall into Wittgenstein's trap, like jAmEs did.

MU, experiences and thoughts are about things. If you and I have a visual experience of a hamburger, are our experiences not about the same thing? If they are about the same thing, or causally related to the same thing, then how is it that our experiences of it aren't the same, or at least similar? If they aren't about the same thing, then we would just be talking past each other or living in different realities. — Harry Hindu

This doesn't make any sense. You want to conclude that if our thoughts are about the same thing, then the thoughts themselves are the same. To think about something is to create a relationship with that thing. It's illogical, that I, being a thing, would have the same relationship as you, being a second thing, to a third thing. In order for you and I to have the same relationship with another thing, we'd have to both be the same thing. You and I would be one thing. Therefore we should conclude that yours and my experiences of that third thing are not the same.

The other option you propose is that the experiences of you and I are similar. That they are similar would need to be demonstrated. I think we demonstrate the similarities, along with the differences, through communication.

Other criticisms of NDEs are equally lacking in evidence, such as, a lack of oxygen to the brain, delusions, dreams, or some other brain malfunction. — Sam26

Why do you classify a dream as a brain malfunction?

its hypothetical clock. its so far away from the condensed universe, and the clock is traveling at a slow velocity or not at all, it has almost no effect on the other part(s) of the universe. Its a hypothetical (for the sake of argument) clock. — christian2017

I don't think those terms, "far away", and "slow velocity" have any meaning outside the universe.

One such insight is that we never know exactly what we mean. — jjAmEs

Tell that to this person:

Meta's misguided reading has been pointed out before. — Banno

If "we never know exactly what we mean", how could there be such a thing as a "misguided reading"? "Misguided" would be an arbitrary determination. And you jAmEs, have already made the same accusation, so now you contradict yourself.

What would strengthen your case from my point of view is some chain of signs that demonstrates to me that you've actually absorbed the critics I have in mind. I have the sense that you are more or less shutting out ahead of time what could change your mind. — jjAmEs

When a person makes claims, and supports them by an appeal to authority, instead of backing up the claims with explanations and principles, I conclude that the person is incapable of supporting those claims. That's the category I place you, because that's all you've done, made one obviously untenable assertion after the other without providing any support.

I clearly demonstrated the fault in your claim, in my last reply to you, and you simply ignored it. So I conclude that you are incapable of supporting your position, and simply appeal to authorities whom you most likely misinterpret as well.

This and the recommendation that carers of covid-19 patients should wear masks both contradict the headline. In fact, the whole article is confusing, and it's not the fault of the article. — jamalrob

The evidence is clear that a mask will help to reduce the spread from an infected person. And, a person might be infected without even knowing they are infected. But it's not easy to get people to think, I might be infected therefore I ought to wear a mask for the sake of others. Many people, like Merkwurd, would not be inclined that way:
"If you feel the urge to wear a mask in public, then you are unfit to be in public, stay home."

So people would be more inclined to wear a mask if they thought it was giving themselves some protection. The governing agencies could use a form of reverse psychology, hinting, or openly saying, that there is some degree of self-protection involved with mask wearing, and this would make people more inclined to wear them. However, it's a double edged sword because the false sense of security would make people less careful in other ways, and this could do more harm than good because people like Merkwurd would still be out there spreading the disease everywhere anyway.

Therefore to be effective the mask wearing would most likely need to be enforced, to ensure that it was carried out by everyone who might be infected. And some people take a very negative view to the enforcement of anything.

.

The opposite of cowardly would be courage, and courage is the action of doing something that others fear. — Lecimetiere

The whole point to the doctrine of the mean is that there is no opposite to any virtue. Both the opposing things, the two extremes, are vices, and virtue is a middle point between them. So to describe cowardly as the opposite of courage, if courage is supposed to be a virtue, is not consistent with the mean doctrine, because virtues do not have an opposite. That's why we oppose cowardly with rash, as two opposing vices, and place courage in between, as the mean. You may not agree with this, but then you do not agree with the mean doctrine. But if this doctrine is the subject of your paper, you ought to stay true to it, and don't try to change it just because you don't like it.

I agree -- if we're ascribing to the word "being" as something "changeless," for example. — Xtrix

Right, this is "being" in the Parmenidean sense. Being is associated with truth, what is, is, and it is impossible for it not to be, and what is not, is not, and it is impossible for it to be. What is, i.e. "being" can be understood as eternal changeless truth.

But when you view being in a different sense -- not as the "changeless" but as that which emerges, as in phusis, then you see the original unity. Granted, they do become disjoined -- just as later they do as "being and thinking" -- but we come to understand from what they became disjoined: the Greek sense of being in phusis. — Xtrix

I don't see any "original unity". Being in the sense of what emerges is more like Hegel's "being". Are you sure that Heidegger doesn't get his sense of "being" from Hegel?

No, they both relate to being in the sense of phusis mentioned above. They're both aspects of this. Phusis -- the Greek understanding of being -- is not only "stability" or "changeless Form." If that were the case, the only entities that "are," or that "have" being, are those that don't change. But that's absurd: a river "is" just as much as a triangle, matter, or universal concept "is." — Xtrix

This seems a little confused to me. It appears like you are saying that there is a sense of being which means phusis. There is no "being in the sense of phusis". That is a misrepresentation. However, there may have been a "phusis in the sense of being".

Being relates to phusis, and becoming relates to phusis, as two distinct ways of describing what is referred to by phusis. Being represents stability, and becoming represents instability. So you cannot say that being in the sense of phusis is unstable. Being always refers to the stable aspect of phusis, as described by Parmenides, what is and cannot be otherwise, while becoming refers to the unstable aspect, what is changing.

If you can make any sounds you want, then understanding isn't part of the language game. You just make sounds. If there is a language "game" then there are rules to follow when referring to certain things. — Harry Hindu

I don't dispute that the external "game" is separate from the internal "understanding". What I said is that what is important is the internal part, the understanding, not the external part, the game. The problem is that the rules cannot be attributed to the external part, they are rules of understanding, and they are not necessary. But without some sort of rules for understanding, misunderstanding is likely. The rules cannot be features of the external part, because then there would be no internal rules for understanding the external rules, and misunderstanding would be pervasive.

If our experiences are so different, then how is it that we can communicate and understand each other? — Harry Hindu

I don't see your point. You're eating hamburgers off the BBQ, and I'm hungry, two distinctly different experiences. I grunt, make various noises and gestures until you understand that I'm hungry and you offer me a burger. I have communicated something to you. Where is the need for us to have the same experience? Remember, I don't deny that similar experiences are necessary, so you might have experienced hunger at one time and this experience which was similar to mine, helped you to understand. What I deny is the need for the same experience.

How could we learn to use words the same way and then use them the same way if we are so different? — Harry Hindu

We don't use words the same way, all circumstances are unique and therefore different. We use them in various different ways, with differing degrees and features of similarity, that's why the same word may be interpreted in different ways..

We at least seem to agree that we both experience colors and sounds, but not the same colors and sounds? Why that distinction? — Harry Hindu

The distinction is for the purpose of understanding each other. There is a difference between "same" and "similar". If we are having a discussion, and you use them interchangeably, I am likely to misunderstand you, because of ambiguity or even equivocation. So before we proceed in this discussion, I want to make sure you have a good understanding of how I want you to use these terms. If you can't recognize the difference between similar and same, then we won't get very far in any efforts to understand each other.

How would we know that we both experience colors and what those are and that we are both talking about the same thing when we write the scribble, "colors" on a screen? — Harry Hindu

We are clearly not talking about "the same thing" in this situation, so I don't know why you keep coming back to this, talking as if you think that we are talking about the same thing.

Wouldn't the idea that we are both similar beings, as in human-beings, lead one to believe that we have similar experiences, at least more similar than you would with a dog or goat? — Harry Hindu

Similar, yes, but not the same. Are you starting to catch on yet? Do you think you can refrain from using "same", when you really mean similar, so that I am not confused and misunderstanding what you are trying to say? So for example, when you said "we are both talking about the same thing when we write the scribble 'colors' on the screen", what you really meant is that we are talking about similar ideas we each have, not the same idea. And if you insist that it truly is "the same" idea, in both your mind, and in my mind, at the same time, I would have to disagree with you and ask you how you think the same thing can be in your mind and my mind at the same time. Can we agree that what you meant was "similar"?

So, now I am stuck wondering about where patience fits in the mean doctrine. Obviously, patience is the mean, and impatience is the deficiency, but what would you call the excess of patience? Is it lazy or forgetfulness, no that doesn't seem to correlate correctly. Since I cannot have a discussion with my professors or peers, I am here seeking a consensus on "what is the excess of patience?"xx — Lecimetiere

I don't think you are apprehending the mean doctrine quite right here. The virtue is the mean between the two extremes, which are the vices. Courage for example is the mean between cowardly and rash, each of these two is a vise. So if patience is the mean, the virtue, then we have to represent what you call "impatience", or not being patient, as two opposing vices. I suggest that "patience" is very similar to "courage". Being incapable of waiting is like being rash, and waiting too long is procrastinating.

Having said that, I don't think you are properly answering the question unless you can show how patience is a learned habit, as "habit" appears to be fundamental to the question. So you'd have to show how being patient, i.e. not being to quick to respond, and not being to slow to respond, is a learned habit which is beneficial, or necessary for a good life.

But that begs the question of where order arises in the first place. It's natural to assume that the mind is the product of the high degree of material organisation which has developed over the course of evolutionary history. But what is the source of order? Without there being order, then nothing complex, or actually nothing whatever, could have arisen in the first place. That is not a question I presume to have an answer to, but it is one of the basic questions of metaphysics nonetheless. Even big bang theory itself can't account for the order of nature; and I don't want to argue on that account for any kind of natural theology, other than to make the observation. — Wayfarer

What I thought I explained, in the rest of that post, is that the order must come from within, in the sense of immanent within the material existence. This is bottom up causation, rather than top down. Top down doesn't work, because it requires something surrounding the object, or being, acting from the external, inward, and this is inconsistent with empirical observations, which show us that as we divide (reduce) the object, or being, to its most fundamental constituents, the acting force which accounts for its existence as a whole, is always within. So reduction is the proper way to go, but when we get to the most fundamental "particle of matter", or "primary being", we find that the immaterial is necessarily prior to this, as necessary to account for the existence of that most fundamental material thing. So, when that fundamental material body, or object, comes into existence, it is already "designed" to behave in a specific way, and this is inherent, intrinsic to that thing itself, as property of it.

In the case of a living being, the immaterial "soul" is already intrinsic within the most simple living body. That simple body could not come into existence as the specific body which it is, unless the parts are ordered to exist in that way, and the ordering must come from within each part itself, such that the part is ordered to be a part of a whole. Therefore the ordering comes from within the whole, and anything which we can apprehend as a thing, body, or object, is a whole, and it must have an inherent immaterial ordering which is prior in time to it, accounting for its existence as the whole which it is. The immaterial ordering is necessarily within the whole, as the attributes of each of the internal parts of that whole.

The idea of a fundamental material whole, which has no parts (prime matter), has been demonstrated by Aristotle to be illogical. And this "prime matter", as the fundamental building block, the "atom" in ancient science, is the grounding for top down causation. What is assumed is that there are fundamental, indivisible particles of "matter", which are acted upon by external forces, to produce structures. But this is the mistaken presupposition of materialism, which Aristotle demonstrates is untenable. So, we must turn this around, and apprehend the causation required to produce a whole, an object, or body, as coming from within the whole, thereby creating the parts required for the whole, from within. Therefore a true whole always consists of parts, and any apparent indivisibility of a whole is a function of the divider's inability to divide, not an inherent feature of the whole. So a part cannot itself be truthfully represented as a whole. Materialist reduction fails in its representation of parts as wholes.

But yes in short i agree with you. I understand we base our reality on what is happening in the present and what we percieve as having happened in the past or past presents. — christian2017

Not only that, but there is an intuitional, instinctual, built in, or hardwired perspective of what the present is. Look at it like we have a window of observation onto the passing of time, and we call this observational perspective "the present". This, what we call "the present", must be a length of time, perhaps a couple hundredths of a second or something like that. Now imagine if that window was just a nanosecond, or if the window was a million years. The world we perceive would be completely different if this were the case. So, the world we perceive, what we sense, is very much shaped by that temporal perspective.

The clock runs normally but the universe is traveling back in time. When the universe reached the Big Bang singularity, the clock reads 13.8 billion years and vanishes into the singularity. That the clock is no longer there is of no concern for even if we destroy all the clocks in the world, time will still flow. Does time stop? No, it'll continue on to before the Big Bang and beyond and had the clock survived, it would've given us pre-Big Bang time. — TheMadFool

Is the clock outside the universe then? If it continues on, it must be. But how is that possible? You are assuming a thing (the clock) which is outside the "universe", which by definition includes all things.