The markets surged so high, so fast lately, the correction was imminent. Analysts will always point their fingers at something as the trigger, but that's really only relevant if you could have foreseen it. However you could have seen that a correction was coming. If your company is solid it will get through.

It's the downturn, sometimes called "correction". Blame the triggering on whatever you want, it's inevitable because it's how people claim their winnings from the losers.

Continuous does not mean indivisible, it means “composed of no parts” — Zelebg

Right, so if something is divided anywhere, then it has parts, and is not continuous. The continuous is divisible, but it cannot actually be divided.

We draw a line from A to B. That line is either continuous in space / time or not, but we can divide it in either case by placing point C somewhere in between. — Zelebg

Do you agree, that if you divide that line at C, it then consists of the parts AC, CB, and is therefore not a continuous line from A to B?

I think....not a chance. Only the preliminaries for empirical cognitions function absent our awareness, which makes sense because to be unaware of the objects of cognition reason creates on its own accord is contradictory. — Mww

What about habitual actions, would you say that they occur absent of our awareness? For example, if I'm walking, I'm not actually aware of how I am moving my legs, and where I am putting my feet. Sure I'm aware that I'm walking, and I watch for things or other people who might get in the way, but the general, large activity called walking, consists of a whole bunch of small activities, and I might not actually be aware of the some of those smaller activities involved in walking. You know, I could get right into the activities of all my muscles when I'm walking, and I'm sure I'm not aware of all that.

So how would you draw a line between which activities happen absent of awareness and which activities require awareness? It appears like I can't walk without being aware that I am walking (sleepwalking perhaps?), but the activities required for walking, moving my muscles, occur without my awareness.

Draw this analogy to speaking if you will. Suppose someone asks me a question, and I answer from habit, without really thinking. I am aware that I am speaking, but I am not aware of thinking up which words to say, they just sort of roll out in response to the question. Isn't this evidence, that this part of cognition, which is coming up with the words that I am saying, is absent of my awareness, though I am still aware that I am speaking, in a way similar to the way that the activities of my leg muscles are absent of my awareness when I am aware that I am walking? So it appears like words are being used in this part of my cognition which is absent from my awareness. Do you agree? Isn't this even more evident when there are words in your dreams?

No, there are states of things independent of human judgments--namely, facts. These are signified by true propositions, which are likewise independent of human judgments. Again, a judgment is a human decision to adopt a certain proposition as a belief. — aletheist

What we are talking about with "S is P" and "S is not-P," are human statements. "S" stands for a subject, which may or may not be, in some way associated to concrete things.

On the contrary, I have consistently maintained that the principle of excluded middle applies to propositions signifying prolonged states of things (what you call "being"), but not to propositions signifying indefinitely gradual states of change (what you call "becoming"), both of which are only realized at lapses of time (not instants). — aletheist

As I said, you've provided no principles by which we might distinguish a "prolonged state" from a "gradual state of change". Any such distinction appears completely arbitrary to me. How long is a "prolonged state", a Planck time length, a second, a year, a million years? And how would you know that what you thought was a prolonged state wasn't really just a gradual state of change? So if there is a "fact" of the matter, as you claim, how do we get beyond the arbitrary judgement of when the law of excluded middle does and does not apply?

I stipulated from the very beginning that in my example, "S" denotes an existential subject, an enduring concrete thing; and "P" denotes one of the innumerable qualities or relations that it possesses at some determinations of time, but not at others. I have never been talking about any other possible referent of either term. — aletheist

As I said, I don't accept your stipulation of an "existential subject". I believe "existential subject" to be undisciplined nonsense.

I have the same opinion of your responses at this point, so maybe it is time (no pun intended) for us to call it quits. — aletheist

Unless you can provide some principles to support what you call an "existential subject", I think it's time for you to call it quits. Drop that nonsense, and start to look at time in a realistic way.

The problem was you then started talk about divisibility in terms of past, present, and future - where did you get that, some reference? — Zelebg

I got that from my own experience. Do you not apprehend the past as different from the future? I see the past as determined events, having occurred and unchangeable, while the future consist of possible events which have not yet been determined. Therefore if time is supposed to consist of past and future, there must be something which separates these two, as they are distinct, clearly not the same. Do you agree that the future must be divided from the past, at the present, in order that the difference between the future and past, which we know from our experience to be real, could be real?

Here's another way of looking at it. Take a look at inertia, or what Newton called momentum. Let's say that a thing will "continue" to exist as it was, while time passes, unless a "force" interferes. Therefore existence would be continuous, except a force might break that continuity. In physics, a force is simply another source of momentum or energy. But in philosophy we have a concept of free will, which respects the fact that a free willing human being might act at any moment, in any given way, as a force. So a free willing human being might act to break the continuity of momentum or inertia, at any moment in time. Doesn't this indicate to you, that this supposed continuity of existence, is not a true continuity?

Explain that to Aletheist. That's where his confusion is, and anything else you two are talking about is beside that essential point. — Zelebg

I'm afraid aletheist is not prepared to uphold the distinction between theory and practise, claiming that a logical subject is a concrete thing.

You can not resolve the issue by not addressing the issue, so until you start talking about continuity in terms of infinite divisibility there is no distinction what is it you two are really talking about. — Zelebg

I already explained the paradox involved with assuming that continuity is divisible, but I'll try again. If something continuous is actually divided, then it is no longer continuous. Do you agree with this basic principle? If so, you'll see that "infinitely divisible" really means that it can be divided anywhere, in the sense of an infinity of possibilities for division. However, it cannot actually be divided anywhere or else it is not continuous.

Therefore we have that issue of the difference between theory and practise here. In theory, we say that the continuous thing can be divided, but in practise it couldn't really be divided because that would just prove that it's not really continuous. So the question is whether there really is such a thing as continuity, or is it just a fiction, a convenient principle made up by mathematicians, geometers, or some other philosophers, as a map, a guide to the possibility of dividing things anywhere. I think that in reality things cannot actually be divided anywhere. And that's an indication that things are not continuous. And time is already divided at the present, so the idea of continuity is just a fiction.

It’s not a matter of opinion, but of speaking the same language as the rest of the world. The defining and most relevant aspect of continuity when talking about space and time is infinite divisibility. You have the whole internet to see that for yoursel, where do you get your information? — Zelebg

I get my information from studying philosophy, where continuity is the feature of an undivided existence. So when mathematicians look at the divisibility of the undivided, it produces the paradox I described. The paradox is maybe easier to understand in Zeno's terms.

There is no theory / practice distinction here... — Zelebg

Are you familiar with Zeno's paradoxes. The substance of his paradoxes is that what is described in theory does not occur in practise. In theory Achilles cannot reach the tortoise in the race, in practise this is not so. The paradox is resolved by realizing that the theory is based in faulty premises, the infinite divisibility of space and time.

There is an important difference between a proposition and a judgment. A true proposition signifies a real state of things--i.e., a fact--so it is true regardless of what anyone thinks about it. A judgment is one person's belief that a certain proposition is true, which is fallible. — aletheist

This is irrelevant, because it is impossible to determine what "is true regardless of what anyone thinks". All determinations of truth are judgements, and judgements are human. So you are suggesting that there is a judgement independent of human judgements, which is somehow more reliable than human judgements. That there is a God may or may not be true, but it is irrelevant to this discussion because we are talking about human judgements concerning propositions.

This cuts both ways. To make the assertion that there is a precise time when S changes from being P to being not-P, rather than accepting the likelihood that a state of change is only ever realized at a lapse of time rather than at an instant, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the reality of time, through the assertion that there must be such a precise time. — aletheist

As I explained, what this assumption does, is force the necessary and proper conclusion that reality consists of two distinct and incompatible aspects, that which "being" refers to, and that which "becoming" refers to. It does not force us to exclude "becoming" as unreal, it simply encourages us along the pathway toward accepting as true, some propositions of dualism.

You, have come to the point of realizing that the fundamental laws of logic appear to be applicable at some times, but at other times not. However, you refuse to take the analysis further, to determine which aspects of reality they apply to, and which they do not. Instead, you say that the same aspect of reality, represented as "S", is subject to predication at some times, and at other times not. Then you insist that there is nothing real (no real markers in time, as "instants") to indicate when predication is valid and when it is not. So all we are left with is completely arbitrary decisions as to when predication is valid and when it is not.

If you would take the analysis further, you would see that what is referred to by "S", varies depending on the circumstances of use. Sometimes "S" is substantiated by a physical object, and sometimes "S" is substantiated by a rational principle, a possibility, or even something imaginary. Therefore we need two distinct types of substance (what validates "S" as referent). And, we find that the one type of substance, which validates the imaginary, but rational subject, is grounded in logical possibility, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable.

But you refuse to get out of the muddled mess you are in, holding that the same substance is both subject to the law of excluded middle, and not subject to the law of excluded middle, depending on what time you look at it, while insisting that there is no valid markers in time to determine the one time from the other. All you need to do, to escape from this mess, is to recognize that the substance of the past is completely distinct from the substance of the future (dualism), and the that present is a valid marker to separate the one part of time from the other.

Indeed, and if time is not composed of instants, then it must be continuous. Instants in time, like points on a line, are artificially imposed. — aletheist

This is a blatant conclusion by equivocation. You are not adhering to how I defined "instant". An instant separates one period of time from another, but consist of no time. Therefore the conclusion that time is not composed of instants does not force the conclusion that time is continuous. Your misunderstanding of the nature of a "limit" which you demonstrated earlier, is showing here again.

No, "S" does not refer to an event at all, it denotes an existential subject; i.e., an enduring concrete thing. An event is the gradual state of things when a change is realized, which is signified by "S became not-P" (past) or "S is becoming not-P" (present) or "S would become not-P under such-and-such circumstances" (future). That is why neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true during the lapse of time at which the event is realized. — aletheist

I reject your notion of "existential subject" for the reasons given already. It does not account for the separation between the logical subject, and the object which is sometimes represented as a subject. The fact that only sometimes an object is represented, and sometimes an object is misrepresented, are sufficient evidence to exclude the notion of "existential subject". We cannot limit "subject" in the way you want. Furthermore, because of this conflation, you do not recognize the two distinct types of objects recognized in philosophy, material objects and immaterial objects. This refusal to distinguish between the two types of things which might be referenced by "the subject", insisting on an "existential subject" as a conflation of these two, appears to be at the root of your confusion.

It is perfectly intelligible once we recognize that the enduring concrete thing denoted by "S" is changing from possessing the quality or relation denoted by "P" to no longer possessing that quality or relation, or vice-versa. — aletheist

This is a blatant denial of the fact that "S' signifies a subject, and a subject is in no way defined as an "enduring concrete thing". You show complete disregard for disciplined philosophy, and blatant denial of fundamental principles.

No, my whole point is that the present is a third portion, not a limit at all. The past and present are not adjacent portions, because the present is another lapse of time between them, not an instant. — aletheist

Three portions of the same type of thing does not make a trichotomy, which requires three different types of things. So you are only trudging forward in denial of your own contradiction. Furthermore, you have already denied that there are any real divisors within that thing which is supposedly portioned, so you don't have any real portions at all.

Time is a real law that governs existents... — aletheist

Utter nonsense.

You seem to be saying much the same thing as me, in a different way. Do you think that this part of cognition which is absent from our awareness (and I would say that it's a large part), uses words?

Again, human cognition is a process, some of which is absent from our awareness. Words are never absent from our awareness, which makes explicit some part of human cognition cannot be predicated on words. — Mww

I don't agree with this division. We can free our minds from words. Try humming a tune for example. If you've ever practised meditation, you should have come to notice that we can banish words from our minds. This is an important aspect of contemplation, because if we cannot completely rid our minds of words, then we cannot have complete control over the words which are in our minds. So first we might practise banishing all words from the mind, and when we become successful at that, we can move on toward allowing only the words that we want to exist in our minds. But if you cannot successfully banish all words from your mind you cannot control which words are in your mind.

Continuity of time is just about infinite divisibility and nothing else, nothing more, nothing less. — Zelebg

If you think that continuity is defined by infinite divisibility, then you misunderstand continuity. What is really the case, is that infinite divisibility is proposed as a defining attribute of continuity. The problem though, is that division in itself is contrary to continuity, and this produces its own sort of paradox. "Divisibility" implies possible to divide, but not actually divided. A continuity is proposed as being divisible anywhere, and that's what supports "infinite divisibility". But if it were actually divided anywhere, it would not be a continuity. So the continuity, in theory is divisible anywhere (infinitely divisible), but in practise (in reality) it cannot be divided anywhere or else it would not be a continuity.

There are no sound propositions, only sound (or unsound) arguments and true (or false) propositions. Again, "S is P" and "S is not-P" can each be true at different determinations of time, but neither can be true at a determination of time when S is changing from possessing P to not possessing P. If this change is not realized at some determination of time, then it cannot be realized at all. — aletheist

I can't believe that you do not see the problem with this; saying that there is a time when S is P ceases to be true, but we cannot say S is not-P at this time, and that this is an objective property of S. "S is P", and "S is not-P" are human determinations, propositions, they are judgements made by us, and these fundamental laws of logic are there to guide us in those judgements.

Therefore, when there is a time when it appears like S is neither P nor not-P, this is a time when we do not have the capacity to make that judgement. To make the assertion that there is something about the object which we are judging, rather than accepting the likelihood that there is something deficient in our capacity to make the judgement, which is responsible for this situation, is not only completely unwarranted, but it also kills the desire and inspiration required for further analysis of the object to determine the precise time when S is P becomes S is not-P, through the assertion that there is no such precise time. Therefore it kills our desire to improve our capacity to make a judgement of whether S is P or S is not-P in these situations, by saying that this capacity cannot be improved. But this claim of yours, that our capacity to make the judgement cannot be improved, can never be justified, because no matter how hard we try and fail to make that judgement, this does not prove that we haven't just been trying the wrong approach.

As you know, I deny that time is composed of instants; but even if it were, there could be no "next" instant after any given instant, just as there is no "next" rational or real number after any given rational or real number. Otherwise, there would have to be an arbitrary and finite number of instants within any measured interval of time. — aletheist

You misunderstand my use of "instant". An instant divides two portions of time, and as I said, it is non-temporal, just like a point divides two line segments, but in no way is that point a segment of line, it is non-linear. Therefore it is impossible that time is composed of instants.

This is a clever bit of sophistry, because it distracts from the primary issue of when states of things are realized (at determinations of time) to the subordinate issue of how states of things are represented (by propositions). — aletheist

It's not sophistry, but an attempt to get you to recognize the failure of your proposition. So you clearly recognize the difference between the real state of things, and the representation. Do you accept that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are terms of representation? If so, then let's proceed to look at the problem in this way. You seem to think that these terms make acceptable representations sometimes, but at other times they do not. So we need to establish a principle of separation between which times the terms make acceptable representation, and at which times they do not.

The Aristotelean proposal is that at future times, these terms of representation are unacceptable. This is because future events have not yet been determined. It doesn't make sense to say of S, that S is P, or that S is not-P, at a future time, because this has not yet been determined. We speak of future things as possibilities, and his famous example is the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow. That future event is dependent on free will choices, which have not yet been decided, so it doesn't make sense to use those terms of representation, therefore the law of excluded middle is inapplicable to these future events.

Now we have a distinction between past events, where the law of excluded middle applies, and future events, where the law of excluded middle does not apply. Notice the difference between what "S" refers to when "S" is a representation of the past, and when "S" is a representation of the future. The future event has no real existence. In between these two very distinct aspects of reality we have the present.

No, the only real boundary is between the lapse of time at which a particular determinate state of things (signified by "S is P") is realized and the lapse of time at which an incompatible determinate state of things (signified by "S is not-P") is realized. Our disagreement boils down to whether that real boundary can be an individual determination of time (instant) or must always be another general determination of time (lapse). In other words, is instantaneous change really possible, or does real change always require a lapse of time? — aletheist

We both agree that real change requires a lapse of time. Where we disagree is in how the representations of states "S is P" etc., are related to "change", which occurs over a time lapse. As I've explained already, the only problem with a representation that consists of a time line with a point when S is P is replaced by S is not-P, is that this model cannot represent change. Furthermore, as Aristotle demonstrated, we cannot represent change with these terms at all. However, this does not lead to the conclusion you suggest. Since there is always things remaining the same, represented by "S is P", and there is always things changing, not representable by "S is P", then the proper conclusion is that we need two distinct representations, to represent these two distinct aspects of reality (dualism).

So where we disagree is in how these two distinct aspects of reality relate to each other. I am arguing, that the aspect of reality referred to by "S" as a past object or event, is always describable in the terms of "is P", and "is not P". But there is another aspect of reality which is not describable in those terms, and we cannot refer to this as "S", in the same way, because what "S" signifies has no real existence, only possible existence. You want to say that the same "S" is sometimes describable by these terms, and sometimes not. But I think that this is irrational, because "S" signifies an intelligible object, a subject, it does not signify a physical object. And, to say that neither P nor not-P is applicable to S is to render S as unintelligible, which is inherently contradictory.

What you call "being" and "becoming" are simply two different classes of states of things (prolonged vs. gradual) that are realized at different determinations of time, involving the same enduring existential subject (denoted by S) and one of its innumerable qualities and relations (denoted by P). Paraphrasing Peirce, the being of the quality/relation as form lies wholly in itself, the being of the existential subject as matter lies in its opposition to other things, and the being of the fact as entelechy lies in its bringing qualities/relations and existential subjects together. — aletheist

This is exactly what I'm talking about as the problem with your proposal. Instead of upholding the division, or distinction between the aspects of reality which can be described as "is P", and "is not P", which we refer to with "S" (subject), and the aspects of reality which cannot be described as "is P" and "is not P", which when referred to as "S" (subject), give "S" a different meaning, you want to talk about some sort of "existential subject". That is fundamentally irrational, because "S" as subject refers to something different when talking about a past object, from what it refers to when talking about a future object. There is a need to separate two distinct types of subject, rather than conflating them as "existential subject".

This is the fundamental problem with your model. Since there is no time at an instant, an instant is not a real part of time; since there is no space at a point, a point is not a real part of space. We artificially introduce discrete and dimensionless instants and points into continuous time and space for purposes such as marking and measuring. — aletheist

Right, an "instant" is not a real part of time, and that is why time cannot be continuous. There is something which breaks the continuity, which is called the "instant". You however, start with an unjustified premise, that time is continuous, and conclude that instants cannot be real, therefore you argue that all instants are unreal. But just because the human being has not yet developed the means to determine the real instants in time, does not mean that there are not such real instants. So your argued position is nothing but a vicious circle. Human beings have not been able to determine real instants in time, therefore there are no real instants, and time is continuous. Since time is continuous, there are no real instants, therefore human beings ought not seek to determine the real instants in time. I think they call that argument a fallacy of reification, or misplaced concreteness.

This is precisely what I deny. The present is neither future nor past; time is a trichotomy, not a dichotomy. — aletheist

You claim to deny it, but your definition of "limit" supports it. That is contradiction. You said a "limit" is "what two adjacent portions have in common". If time is truly a trichotomy, as you say, then "the present", as the limit, and a third distinct thing between future and past, would prevent the two adjacent portions, future and past, from having anything in common. And, time could not be continuous.

So, the problem with your proposal is that you want to inject a third distinct thing, into time, between future and past, a lapse of time when neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, and despite the positing of the intermediary, you want to claim that time is continuous. Clearly, if this third thing which separates future from past has real existence, then time is not continuous.

You know......people talk so damn much, they think that’s all they ever do. And because when they talk, they use words, so they think words are all there are. If, as you say, the source of the thing is distinct from the thing itself, it follows necessarily that the source of a word is distinct from the word itself, which grants that the concept is presented in the word or represented by the word, which either way immediately subsumes the word under the antecedent concept. — Mww

Why would you think the concept is the source of the word rather than that the word is the source of the concept?

Descriptions and definitions are propositions composed of words; words represent concepts; therefore concepts describe and define concepts, which is impossible — Mww

I disagree with your second premise, that words represent concepts. I don't see how this could be true, so I think that words are concepts. But that means the rest of your argument is pointless to me.

We have no need of definitions in pure thought. You know...pure thought....that thing we do when we’re not so busy talking. — Mww

Right, but "pure thought" doesn't necessarily contains concepts. It is only when we think in words, or other symbols like mathematical symbols, that we think in concepts. Do you think that this is a coincidence?

The only way I see this working, is if the boundaries applied are the categories, specifically the category of quantity and modality. — Mww

Yes categories are bounded for sure.

Still, I’d hesitate to grant application of the categories creates anything, — Mww

Doesn't application of the categories create concepts? Suppose someone has a vague idea of how some categories, or boundaries ought to be constructed, and so begins to apply these boundaries. In application the problems become apparent, and the precise boundaries get determined. The vagaries get ironed out, and by determining the specifics which solve the problems of vagueness, the concept comes into existence.

.I’m going to reject the assertion that we create objects, — Mww

Look around you. How many of the objects which you see are artificial? How can you say that we do not create objects?

You've said that "the concept and the object are one and the same thing" and that "both...are created by the application of boundaries". Apples and oranges are not the same thing, despite both being created by trees (the object, not the concept). — Luke

Huh? I didn't say that two distinct objects are one and the same thing, nor did I say that two distinct concepts are one and the same thing. I meant that the concept "apple" is one and the same as the object "apple", which is the word "apple".

I don't think you'll get anywhere this way Luke, it appears to me like you are just giving me random words. Either you get it or you do not, and I don't think I can provide you with the background required. Your examples are so confusing I can't understand. Apples and oranges come from trees not horticulture. Biology defines what an apple is, and what an orange is, but I don't see your point, if there is one.

And your second is so vague as to leave me without any understanding of what you are trying to ask. I'll give it a try though. A boundary doesn't exist until it is applied. Right? Suppose someone had within their mind, the intent to create a boundary for a specific purpose. What kind of existence could we give to that intended boundary which exists in thought only? It's not a boundary at all. A person could even establish that boundary within one's own mind, like a private rule, 'step across that imaginary line, and I'm going to pound you', defend what is mine. But the imaginary line has no existence as a real boundary, and the person hasn't even told the other, so the other person cannot know the consequences of stepping forward. And, the person who thinks that the imaginary boundary is a real boundary could be called delusional, and attacks the other for no apparent reason every time the other steps across the imaginary line. Ever heard of ostensive definition? if the person keeps trying to step across, and the delusional person keeps enforcing the boundary, the boundary becomes real, and the apprehended enforcement itself becomes the concept of boundary for the other person. The person has developed a concept of boundary, and stops stepping there, or else contests the boundary and retaliates.

It's a logical conclusion implicit in continuous time, regardless of subjective experience. Present time is interval of time between past and future time, and if time is continuous this interval is not interval but an instant, i.e. infinitely small point in time. This is paradox in itself and one more reason to think time is not continuous, i.e. it is not infinitely divisible, and the present time is interval of unit time with actual defined non-zero duration. — Zelebg

To get rid of the paradox, you need only to assume that time is not continuous. And that time is not continuous is supported by the recognition that the past is substantially different from the future. Once the future is recognized as different from the past, the present must be understood as something other than the continuity of future/past, it must be understood as a divisor between them. Then we are left with three distinct things, past, present, and future.

(but if you’re desperate for toilet paper, you can) — Pfhorrest

I could, but I have plenty of books of bad philosophy, already printed and ready to go.

Only when the principle of excluded middle is true. Again, it is false during an indefinitely gradual state of change, when S is in the process of becoming not-P after previously being P, or vice-versa. — aletheist

But that's arbitrary. All change all the time is "an indefinitely gradual state of change", so it doesn't make sense to say that S is P or S is not-P are applicable in any real way.

This does not follow, since existential subjects undeniably have different qualities and relations at different determinations of time. If "S is P" is true at an earlier determination of time, and "S is not-P" is true at a later determination of time, and both propositions cannot be true at the same determination of time (principle of contradiction), then there must a determination of time in between at which neither is true. — aletheist

This is clearly illogical. If "S is P" is true at some time, and then ceases to be true, then "S is not- P" is true at this time. You might posit a time in between, during which the human being is incapable of determining which of these is true, but this is not the same as saying neither is true, it's a case of saying that we haven't the capacity to determine it.

The problem with your position is your claim that "S is P", and "S is not-P" are sound propositions at some times, but are not sound at other times. This is inconsistency. And, it creates the following problem. If at some time, people cannot determine whether S is P or S is not-P is true, they will be inclined to just accept your proposal that neither is true instead of making the effort to determine which is true. This proposal propagates intellectual laziness. Instead of working to determine the truth of the matter we just assume there is not truth to it.

The only alternative is to claim that such negation is instantaneous, which requires S to be both P and not-P at the same determination of time, thus violating the principle of contradiction. — aletheist

As I just explained, last post, which your post was a reply to, instantaneous change does not imply contradiction. S is not P follows directly in time, after S is P. They are separated by the same boundary which separates one instant in time from the next. It is only if you deny the reality of these divisions, as you do, when you attempt to model time as continuous, that the law of non-contradiction is violated.

However, your attempt to model time as continuous is faulty, because you still impose instants as boundaries to separate the periods of time which you have called "event lapses". There is a necessary boundary, an instant, when "S is P" ceases to be true, and neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" starts to be true.

Therefore your model doesn't solve any of the real problems with the nature of time. You simply replace the one boundary between S is P, and S is not P, the moment of instantaneous change, with two boundaries, one between S is P and S is neither P nor not-P, and another boundary between S is neither P nor not-P, and S is not P. Each of these two boundaries must itself still be a moment of instantaneous change or else you have the infinite regress which Aristotle elucidated.

Any time you replace the instantaneous boundary with an intermediary description, you still have the boundary which marks the end of S is P and the beginning of the intermediary, so you need to posit another intermediary at that boundary, and so on ad infinitum. This cannot be avoided so Aristotle's proposal was that S is P, and S is not-P are applicable to one aspect of reality which is completely distinct from the aspect of reality which neither S is P nor S is not-P is applicable. "Being" and "becoming" are distinct and incompatible aspects of reality, and this is the basis of Aristotelian dualism.

On the one hand, the present cannot mathematically be an instant with zero duration: — aletheist

It is only if you define "the present" in relation to the subjective experience of human consciousness, as you do, that this proposition is true. If you release your desire to define "the present" in this less than adequate way, you will see that it is possible to define "the present" as an instantaneous division between past and future. I realize that this definition does not match up exactly with the way that the human being experiences the present, but the human being is always experiencing a part of the future along with a part of the past, and we may not be capable of apprehending the instantaneous division.

Instead, the present must mathematically be a moment with infinitesimal duration: — aletheist

This is only derived from the faulty definition of "the present" explained above. If we abstract our thoughts from the subjective experience of time, to think about time as it really is, independent from this subjective experience, this conclusion can be seen as completely unwarranted.

Peirce's conclusion is based on this observation, which I accept: "consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time". It is where each of us goes from here which constitutes the difference between us. I say consciousness straddles the division between future and past, and contains part of each. And, I say consciousness has not apprehended the true boundary which is "the present". You insist that "the present" must be defined by this interval of time which constitutes the subjective experience of the present. Your pathway forward is misleading because you have assumed a subjective present, while I am seeking to understand the objective present.

Under this assumption, which proposition is true at that instant? If only "S is P" is true or only "S is not-P" is true, then that instant is obviously not the boundary between the two moments; it is within one or the other. — aletheist

I don't see why you say this. In one period of time S is P is true, and in the next period of time S is not-P is true. The "instant" is the boundary between the two periods of time. There is no time at that "instant", it has no temporal extension, like a dimensionless point in space, except in time, or a line with no breadth, separating one side from the other. You yourself allow that we can impose arbitrary divisions into time, as divisors, so we simply assume that such divisors really exist within time, so that there is a real point in time when S is P ceases to be true, and S is not-P starts to be true. You simply refuse to admit the reality of such divisors, because the human consciousness has not yet been able to determine them. But it makes no sense for you to ask about anything existing at that instant, because it is non-temporal, so there is nothing existing there.

... I understand a limit to be what two adjacent portions have in common — aletheist

Then you simply misunderstand what a limit is. When my glass is the limit which separates the water inside, from the air outside, it is not the place which the air and the water have in common. When the wall of my house is the boundary between the inside and outside, it is not the place that the inside and outside have in common. A limit is a point, or line, beyond which a thing cannot extend. It is distinct from the thing which is limited, so it is not what they have in common.

The future is substantially different from the past, they are completely distinct. Let's say that future and past form a dichotomy, all time must be either future or past, but it is impossible that any time is both future and past. What the "two adjacent portions have in common" is that they are each a distinct part of time. What they have in common is what allows us to class them together, as "time", but what makes them distinct is the separation between them. Since they are distinct, we must posit something which separates them, which forms the boundary. This is the present. Since there is no mixing of future and past, the present must be distinct and therefore non-temporal.

This is the case with the similar opposing terms, up and down, front and back, right and left, etc.. What they have in common is what allows us to class them together. However, there is necessarily a boundary, or limit between them, such that the two opposing things do not mix. To say 'I understand a limit as the place where two opposing portions mix', which is what you are saying when you say that the two have this place in common, is to misunderstand what a limit is. A limit is precisely what prevents the two portions from having that place in common.

don’t think concepts are shared. Concepts are mental stuff, yes, but the source of all immanent conceptions, the only ones to which words properly belong, because they relate to possible experience, is understanding, and, just as in consciousness, understanding is never shared; — Mww

The source of a thing is distinct from the thing itself. Just because the source of concepts is understanding, and therefore an activity of consciousness, it does not follow that concepts themselves are understanding or part of consciousness. Consciousness is the source of words. Human beings engineer buildings, airplanes, and all sorts of construction projects. Clearly the source of these things is consciousness, but that does not mean they are part of consciousness.

Concepts, in and of themselves, have a purpose and thereby a use, but not a description. If we find words where there should be concepts, we’re doing something very wrong; — Mww

Why would you say that concepts have no description? The concept of "square" for example can be described as an equilateral rectangle.

Rational evidence would seem to be necessary, nonetheless; — Mww

Since concepts are presented (rather than represented) in words and other symbols (mathematical for example), as definitions, descriptions and explanations, and the symbols or words have no necessary referent, then the "rational evidence" ought to lead us toward believing that words are concepts. Sure, a mind will associate a word with a referent, as a voluntary judgement, but where might you find a concept within that mind if it is not the word itself?

Why would you say that? How are they the same type of thing? — Mww

As I described in that post, both concepts and objects are created by the application of boundaries.

So it's entirely the case that when "the background is sufficiently well known and the language games supported within it are sufficiently well travelled ... analysing how people use words isn't required to clarify the domain studied" - the exception being when we lose track of the motivations and purposes behind the uses of concepts and start reifying them (to take an example from the PI: when 'stand roughly here' becomes decoupled from the purpose of 'being able to find you again when I come back' and we engage in the fool's errand of trying to delimit the scope of 'here' in precise terms in order to understand what it means). — StreetlightX

There is a problem which arises when we take it for granted, that a particular phrase has a specific meaning. For example, if a person takes it for granted that 'stand roughly here' has a specific meaning, which is independent from the context of use, that person will be lost. Because of this need to rely on the peculiarities of the particular circumstances in any determination of meaning, and the difficulty in determining these peculiarities (accidents in Aristotelian terms), doubt and skepticism cannot be dismissed as easily as an individual who takes meaning for granted might assume.

have in mind an analogy between Kant's critique of metaphysics and the doctrine of transcendental illusion. Roughly, a transcendental illusion is an error of reasoning where a confusion occurs between necessary relations between concepts and necessary relations between things. What is particularly interesting here is that transcendental illusions are internal to the concept of reason; reasoning generates transcendental illusions through a tendency to take the objects as they are analysed as the objects themselves. The content of the transcendental illusion; what it concerns; is irrelevant to the character of the formal error of reasoning. — fdrake

What you call a transcendent illusion is a type of category mistake itself, which is very common. Distinguishing objects from concepts as if they are categorically distinct is itself a category mistake, because objects and concepts are the same type of thing. Conception begins in analysis because the act of analyzing is a dividing, and dividing is what creates the boundaries which define the concept. The boundaries here are the proposed restrictions, the rules of usage. Also, an "object" requires a boundary in the very same way, restricting what is and is not, of the object. So objects are what is created by analysis, therefore the concept and the object are one and the same thing. The illusion, is in the idea that one contains accidents and the other does not, and this illusion creates the notion that the concept is a "universal", which is somehow separate from the object. However, in reality both concept and object contain accidents. Because of the reality of accidents, the true error is in the assumption that any such boundaries are "necessary".


Your passage from Austin reveals very well the problem outlined in my reply to StreetlightX, above. This is the problem in assuming that a word has a meaning, what is called here, the "proper meaning", which is independent of the context of use.

For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate words. — Mww

Perhaps it's time for us to give up this notion that the concept is something independent from the physical appearance of the word. We tend to think that a concept is some sort of mental stuff shared between individuals. But all we can find here, as the shared property, where the concept ought to be found, is physical words. And even within an individual person's own mind, we tend to think that the word within that mind represents a concept. But it really does not. The word within the mind gets shuffled around, associated with numerous different other words, images and memories, but none of these can be properly called a concept. Therefore we have no evidence of existence of "a concept" anywhere, except as the existence of the words themselves. We may conclude, concepts are word. Then the effort to analyze the use of words, to seek and find the concepts which words signify, will be fruitless, endless, due to this reality that the concepts are the words.

What does "ds/dt" mean?

No, I post to this site, I print nothing to or from this site.

Yes, but only from the standpoint that neither P nor its negation not-P can be truly predicated of the existential subject S during that lapse of time. S continues to exist, it just has a lower mode of being in the sense that it is not determinately P or not-P when it is in the real and continuous process of changing from one to the other. — aletheist

Not only that, but it doesn't make sense to ever speak of whether P can be predicated of S, in this case, because it doesn't make sense to say S is P is true at one time, then at a later time S is P is not true, because neither S is P nor S is not-P is true. Saying that S is P is no longer true is equivalent to saying S is not-P. Therefore, at that time after S is P was true we'd have to say S is not-P at that time. But what is being claimed is that S is neither P nor is not-P. Therefore it doesn't make sense to speak of S in terms of P, at any time, if at any time S is neither P nor not P

No, this indicates a misunderstanding. Recall that a fact as signified by a true proposition is only an abstract constituent part of reality; the existential subject S is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations, but not all of them. When "S is P" is true, it signifies a real prolonged state of things with respect to that individual existential subject and that general character or relation; likewise for "S is not-P." — aletheist

As explained above, it doesn't make sense to speak of a time when S is P is true, if at a later time S is P is neither true nor false. This would mean that S is P would cease being true at that time, yet we cannot say that S is not P at that time when S ceases to be P, which is incoherent. Therefore we must maintain the categorical separation. To say S is neither P nor not-P implies that it is a category mistake to say that P might be predicated of S.

Yes, "S is P" or "S is not-P" is indeed a sound way of describing the world in most cases, because they signify prolonged states of things that are realized at any instant that we arbitrarily designate within a lapse of time during which the existential subject S is not in an indefinitely gradual state of change from P to not-P, or vice-versa. In other words, it is only during certain events that the principle of excluded middle is false of the relevant proposition; between those events, it remains true. Again, any existential subject is always changing in some respects, but unchanging in others. — aletheist

It's incoherent to say that there is a subject S, and sometimes S is either P or not-P, but at other times S is neither P nor not-P. If S is either P or not-P at sometimes, then what is it about S which would make it suddenly be neither P nor not-P? If S can be either P or not-P, then it is no longer S, but something completely different than S which can be neither P nor not-P.

With that in mind, there is some leeway for marking two particular instants as the commencement and completion of an event-lapse. — aletheist

I don't see how the marking is anything other than completely arbitrary. We could choose any physical indication whatsoever to mark the beginning or end of a time period. The only thing not arbitrary would be that the beginning must be before the end. Care to explain how you think marking could be other than arbitrary?

That is why I define the present as not only the indefinite lapse of time between the past and the future, but also the indefinite lapse of time at which anything is present to the mind; again, in my view these are one and the same. — aletheist

If the present is an "indefinite lapse of time", then that length, or time period which comprises the present is completely arbitrary. The present might be a nanosecond or it might be a billion years. Each of these is "present to the human mind". What would make one of these more "the real present" than the other? That's what I mean when I say that when you have nothing other than "the human mind" to determine the "lapse of time" the determination is arbitrary. The human mind needs a principle, based in something real, by which to determine the lapse of time which comprises the present, in order that the determination of "the present" is other than arbitrary.

Yes, but two boundaries are necessary because events are constantly being realized at the present, which is why we directly perceive the flow of time and the motion of physical bodies. — aletheist

If there are boundaries within a thing, then the thing which has boundaries within it (time in this case), is not continuous. I don't see why you have so much trouble understanding this fact. I used to think that you simply denied this in order to support your metaphysical position, but now I think that you really believe that a continuous thing can have boundaries within it. Do you not recognize that a boundary is the end of one thing and the beginning of another, and therefore, necessarily, a discontinuity?

If the present were itself a single boundary--i.e., an instant--then whenever something changed, two incompatible states of things would be realized at that same instant, violating the principle of contradiction. — aletheist

This is not true. Under this assumption, at one moment S is P is true, and at the next moment, S is P is false. The "instant" acts as a boundary of separation between these two such that one is before and the other is after, and the law of non-contradiction is not violated. The problem, as Aristotle demonstrated is that this does not allow for the existence of "becoming", or "change", because "becoming" is a temporal concept which cannot occur at an instant. Furthermore, if we replace the instant between S is P and S is not-P, with something like S is O, at that intermediate moment to account for becoming, then we'd have to suppose something like S is N to account for the moment of change between S is P and S is O, and so on ad infinitum. So when we talk about "becoming", the activity which is change in the world, it makes no sense to use propositions like S is P, because we are talking about something which is categorically different from "being", which is the type of thing that S is P refers to.

Better buy more toilet paper... — Banno

If I'm desperate I can use pages of bad philosophy, and this justifies the existence of bad philosophy. If the bad philosophy is on this forum its existence may not be justifiable.

What Wittgenstein doesn't seem to take into account, and is therefore the deficiency of such a private language argument, is that the use of any word need not be justified. If you assume that the use of any particular words needs to be justified, you will fall for the private language argument, concluding that using a symbol in a way that no one but yourself can understand, is not a case of using language. The problem is that if talking to oneself, using symbols for one's own private reference, is not a case of using language, then what is it?

That a single image can hold multiple scenes using transparency... — Zelebg

I think I know what you mean, but if this is the case, then it is false to call it a "conscious instant". There are numerous instants within what appears to be a "conscious instant". Therefore it only appears to be an instant, and that it is an instant is really an illusion. What you have called the "conscious instant" is really being conscious of numerous instants at the same (in that qualified sense of "at the same time"), and should not be called an "instant" at all.

Imagine a single photograph represents your conscious instant of visual perception. You put your finger in front and left of your nose and move it to the right. Say, during that motion you were conscious 5 times, so there are 5 of those photographs or frames, but you are only ever aware of a single one at any of those conscious instants, so how do you perceive motion / time?

First frame shows the finger on the left. Time passes until the next frame and this first picture fades, say 50%. Second frame then shows the finger a bit to the right, but “underneath” is still visible that first frame. Time passes, picture fades, third frame shows three fingers, and so on... — Zelebg

Your description is not really consistent. If the first instant only fades to 50% by the time the conscious person is aware of the second instant, then you can't really say that "a single photograph represents your conscious instant", because the person is conscious of part of the first, and the second, at one conscious instant.

No, the principle of contradiction is that they cannot both be true at the same determination of time. However, each can be true at different determinations of time, as long as there is a determination of time in between--what I have been calling an event-lapse--at which neither is true. — aletheist

The point is that if a moment of time is composed of an event, then within that event there is both S is P, and S is not-P because change occurs within the event. So, if "the moment" as an event-lapse, takes the place of "the instant", as the real "now", then "at the present time", "now", refers to a moment in which contradictory propositions are true. And since "now", or "at the present time" is the only valid or sound determination of time, the law of non-contradiction is violated.

If you proceed, as you do, by saying that there is a time period in which neither is true, then we have a time period, what you call an "event-lapse", which cannot be related to S is P. That duration of time cannot be described in these terms, because neither is applicable. Furthermore, since all time would consist of such event-lapses, S is P would not refer to anything real. This is evident also from the fact that S is P refers to a static state, so it requires an instant in time, when nothing is changing, to be true.

So what you are saying is that S is P, and S is not-P, along with terms like true and false, are not sound ways of describing the world, because the world consists of passing time, and it has no instants when such propositions could be true or false. The issue of course, is that we use such propositions, and they are very useful, so now we need to determine how such statements might relate to the real, changing world. To give soundness to S is P, we need to assume a duration, time-lapse, in which something is not changing, that something which remains the same over a period of time, constitutes S is P. This forms the basis of Aristotelian dualism, there are two aspects of reality. One aspect (form) is actively changing as time is passing, and the other (matter) is passive and does not change as time passes.

No, before the event-lapse one is true, and after the event-lapse the other is true. Again, during the event-lapse neither is true. — aletheist

These expressions, "before" and "after" the event-lapse, are not valid in this model. They require an instant, a boundary, to separate the event-lapse from the rest of time. But no such instant is allowed. Therefore the time period which is designated as the event-lapse is completely arbitrary. If you impose, and inject, such an arbitrary division into time, it has no real meaning as signifying anything true. So if you say "S is P" was true before a particular event-lapse this has no real meaning, because the designation of that event-lapse is completely arbitrary. Notice, that in reality we identify a particular time period by referring to S is P. We talk about the time when such and such is the case. If we can only identify a particular event-lapse period by referring to when S is P becomes false, then there is no need for the time lapse. And if we identify the time-lapse period by referring to when we are unsure as to whether S is P is true or false, then the beginning and end of the event-lapse is an arbitrary designation.

Yes, but all empirical observation is ultimately phenomenological observation that is always and only happening at the present. — aletheist

This is the false premise, which you propose, and I've gone through great effort to demonstrate to you that it is false. So I'll provide to you another indication that it is false. The human body has senses and a brain. Observations are made by the brain. Empirical information is received by the senses. It requires time for the brain to process empirical information. Therefore empirical observation is always of things in the past, not of things happening at the present. By the time the information is received by the brain, to make the observation, the thing being observed is in the past. So to say observation is "only happening at the present" is false and misleading, because a critical aspect of the observation, the thing being observed, is always in the past.

As I explained earlier, you need to dismiss this faulty representation of "the present" which you employ. doing such would greatly increase your capacity to understand the nature of time.

No, I hold that the "real objective boundary between future and past" is a continuous portion of time (lapse), rather than a discrete limit in time (instant). — aletheist

Do you not understand, that a "portion" requires that the piece which is portioned be separated from the rest of the thing which is portioned? Therefore to say that time is continuous, and also that there is a "portion" of time which represents "the present" is blatant contradiction.

So, I say that the present consists of one boundary which separates future from past. You say that the present consists of two boundaries, which separate out a "portion of time". You have introduced a complication by demanding two boundaries instead of one, to create a "portion" which is the present. The only reason I can see, for you to request two boundaries, is to create the illusion of a continuous time. But this is surely wrong, because you still need boundaries to support the claim of "a portion" and therefore time is not continuous.

Yes, but I never claimed that reality consists of individual events; that is essentially McTaggart's view, contributing to his assessment that time is unreal. Instead, reality consists of states of things--both facts and events realized at continuous lapses of time--which we abstract from it when we signify them with propositions: — aletheist

This is why I am trying to get you to recognize the contradiction inherent within what you say. Look, in the first sentence you claim to have never said that reality consists of events, and in the second sentence you say instead, reality consists of events and other things. See the contradiction? Either an individual event is real, (which would require boundaries to separate it from other events, meaning time is not continuous), or it is not, (which would mean that it is false to speak of reality consisting of events in any way).

am not speaking of the past, but present. Red perception is not a memory. — David Mo

You said, the perception of having injured someone. And you also said something about having to see red before you can judge that it is different from blue. What you are referring to are memories.

1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature? — 3017amen

No, I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units.

And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction? — 3017amen

There is no violation of the law of non-contradiction if the different described states are at different times. The problem occurs when we consider what occurs between the states, what the ancients called "becoming", and Aristotle addressed as "change". The "becoming" which is the event of change between one describable state and another, is neither the one nor the other state. So like aletheist explains, we are inclined to say it violates the law of excluded middle. But once we make this separation between the described states of being, and the activity of becoming, we need to establish a relationship between them such that they can both be real. The modern inclination is to affirm that activity is real, states are artificial descriptions, and assume a continuous reality of activity. However, then there is nothing to validate the law of non-contradiction, and it may be precluded from epistemology as an unrealistic way of looking at the world.

This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect. — Zelebg

If this is the case, it does have an effect on the argument, because it would indicate that the perspective of the conscious human being spans numerous instants of time. If consciousness were restricted to one instant, the present instant, then we would observe a succession of instants. To get the "blur effect", the conscious being must be observing numerous instants in what appears (from the perspective of the consciousness) as "at the same time". The consciousness is observing numerous instants "at the same time", and is incapable of detecting the division between them.

Notice that "at the same time" here is an artificial determination made by the consciousness, and does not necessarily mean simultaneous. The problem is that any determination of "a time", in the sense of "what time it is", consists of a period of duration. There is no such thing as determining a point in time, when we say "now" this consists of the duration of time required to say "now". So "at the same time" here does not imply instants which are simultaneous, it implies the succession of instants which exist within that determination of "now". "The time it is" is determined by the ability of the consciousness to determine the shortest period of time, but within that short period, there is still numerous distinct instants, which from the perspective of the consciousness, exist at the same time, because it has not the capacity to individuate them. This is why the consciousness is inclined to violate the law of non-contradiction.

No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. — aletheist

You are not understanding the issue. If "S is P", and "S is not-P", are real applicable descriptions of the world and they may be true or false, then within any lapse of time both of these may be true. At the beginning of the time lapse one is true, and at the end of the time lapse the other is true. Depending on what S and P signify we can extend this to any lapse of time. That is the problem. If time is truly continuous, and any determination of "now", "this time", or "that time", necessarily designates a duration of time, then within that time period the law of non-contradiction will be violated because there will be change within that time lapse.

So if we assume that time is continuous, then we need to face the reality that descriptions such as "S is P", and "S is not-P", have no real bearing on reality, because they become incoherent with the loss of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we proceed to the conclusion that a true description of reality would not include such descriptions, we opt to violate the law of excluded middle, and assume that reality is neither, the terms are not really applicable. But now we have a division between our descriptions and logical assessments of the world (the world can be described by true and false propositions), and what we truly believe the world is like (such descriptions cannot describe the world).

No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind. — aletheist

As I explained, this is a false description. This is very evident from the fact that we are conscious of memories of the past, and conscious of future occurrences. Defining the present as "that part of time which we are conscious" is completely subjective, unscientific, and misleading. Therefore we need an objective, scientific definition, supported by empirical observation. Since we notice that the past is substantially different from the future, we can produce a much more objective definition by defining the present as the division between past and future.

Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above. — aletheist

That's right, there is no real inconsistency between my definition and your definition, but your definition includes ambiguity inherent within, due to the subjective nature of consciousness. You say the present is determined by consciousness. But each individual consciousness might determine "the present" in its own way. Therefore there is ambiguity as to what "the present" really is. I say the present is the division between past and future, and each consciousness may determine this division in its own way. So I remove the ambiguity from "the present", with a clear and precise definition of what the present is, and assign the appearance of ambiguity to a deficiency in the human capacity to determine the present.

Here's an analogy. Your way of defining would define "sugar" as whatever the conscious being perceived as sweet (the present is what the conscious being perceives as present). So there would be some ambiguity and variance as to which foods exactly have sugar, because of a variance in human tastes. I would define "sugar" according to some principles of chemical constitution (the present is the objective division between past and future), then the ambiguity as to which foods have sugar is a function of the variance in conscious experience, not an ambiguity in nature (the ambiguity in "the present" is a feature of human deficiency, not a feature of nature).

The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant. — aletheist

This is the debatable principle, and the difference between our two perspectives can be clarified in reference to discussion of this principle. Let's assume that your description of the future as indeterminate, and your description of the past, as determinate, is a real, true description, supported by reality. There must be a separation, division, or boundary between these two, which is a real objective boundary, supported in reality. That is my definition of "the present", this real, objective boundary between past and future. Your definition of "the present" states that the present is "that part of time which we are conscious". Therefore in your definition "the present", is stated as something dependent on the conscious experience, with its subjectivities, and determined with the deficiencies of the human capacity. My definition looks beyond the deficiencies of human experience to define "the present" in relation to something within the objective world which is responsible for that experience of the present.

However, once we assume a real objective boundary between future and past, then we have real division within time, and we can no longer assume time as continuous. Recognition that the future is indeterminate, and the past is determinate is sufficient for the conclusion that continuity is not an aspect of time, because that part of time which is past must be distinct from that part of time which is future.

if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. — aletheist

Right, this is the point which you do not seem to be able to grasp. If reality consists of "events", then there is necessarily separation between the individual events, and it is impossible that time is continuous. You speak as if you believe that reality consists of events, and time is continuous. That is impossible.

Feeling is the perception of have injured someone. — David Mo

That's better called a memory. It's not what people would normally call a feeling.

I don't see why. My understanding of what is good can be supported by the feeling of empathy and result in an action that my reason recognizes as good. Where do you see contradiction? — David Mo

I already explained all this. Just because there are times when an action urged by a feeling is consistent with reason, this doesn't mean that it is always the case. When it is not the case, as is common, then there is contradiction. So, having both emotion and reason as the basis for morality allows for contradiction. Simply put, the two statements "morality is based in reason", and "morality is based in emotion" are contradictory.

To resolve the contradiction we might say, as I suggested, that emotion and reason are two distinct aspects of morality. Emotion gives us the urge to act, while reason gives us the capacity to judge what is the appropriate act. But if we separate these two like this, to allow that emotion is part of morality, we ought not confuse what each part gives us. So a feeling, such as your proposed feeling of "guilt", cannot give us the urge to do a good act. A feeling can only give us the urge to act, and reason must determine what is the good act when that feeling occurs. As I told you numerous times already, when a person recognizes oneself as being guilty (what you call the feeling of guilt), the person might choose either good or bad actions in relation to the feeling. And the same is true for all feelings.

This discussion would take us far away from the thrust of this thread. Suffice it to say that I don't believe, because I don't think there is sufficient evidence to support many of the Christian beliefs.

By the way, I never heard sounds, it was more like a feeling or intuition. — Sam26

I think it is important to the discussion because no one has adequately described whether "basic" beliefs are derived from sensations such as whisperings, or internal feelings and intuitions. It is a significant difference, because people tell us things, and we might believe what they say, and this would be an instance of deriving a belief from a sensation such as a whispering. On the other hand one might derive a belief directly from an internal feeling or an intuition, and this would be something completely different from being told something.

If we conflate these two distinct ways of deriving belief, we are headed for problems. So for instance, you had internal feelings or intuitions, which supported your belief, but you described this as "whisperings", as if an external person was telling you to believe this. Do you see how this description could be very misleading? Where is "the voice" coming from, within, or outside? If it is from within, as you now admit, then it is improper to describe it as a whispering, or voice, it is more like a feeling or intuition.

So, on the subject of a "basic belief", we have still not adequately determined whether such a thing comes from a feeling within, or from someone telling you what to believe. These two are very distinct, and if we conflate the two, and say a basic belief is some type of mixture of these two, or something like that, we will have endless discussions, lost in confusion, never getting anywhere.

All beliefs are existentially dependent upon and include physiological sensory perception and memory both. So, there is no stronger ground for concluding that both are irrevocable necessary elemental constituents of all belief. Thus, removing either from the other(to separate the two) is to remove both from the belief itself, and this move renders what's left utterly inadequate, insufficient, incomplete, and just not quite enough to remain a belief. — creativesoul

There are degrees of dependence. So it does not make sense to say all beliefs require internal elements and external elements and to say that it doesn't make sense to classify them in this way. Since a belief can be principally internally sourced, or principally externally sourced, it does make sense to classify them in this way. This is especially true if we are talking about "basic" beliefs, because we are looking for where the support for the belief comes from.

We have a distinction between theory and practise. Of course all theory contains elements from practise, and all practise contains theoretical elements, but this does not mean that the distinction is useless and bound to mislead us.

No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example: — aletheist

OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we ought to address those arguments directly, which lead to that conclusion, to determine their deficiencies.

We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5

"The present is not an instant" is a valid conclusion if "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, as stated in the first phrase. This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time. Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies.

We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.

So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.

In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous. Failure of the human consciousness to determine the precise boundary between future and past does not provide the premise necessary to conclude that there is no such boundary. The fact that the human determination of "an instant" is an arbitrary determination, is insufficient for the conclusion that there is no such "instant" in reality. This would require the assumption that if the human being cannot produce that determination, it cannot be done, but that implies the human being is omniscient, or omnipotent.

Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. — aletheist

It's clear as day. I suggest you reread what you printed:

An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts": — aletheist

Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. — Peirce, c. 1896

Notice, that the "event" is completely artificial, constructed, it is an "approach" to existence. But since it is an approach "where contraries can be united in one subject", it is an approach which ought to be rejected as deficient.

Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change. — aletheist

All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P. It is neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P", therefore it must be described in terms other than "P". Now we have no way to relate the event lapse, which is the change between P and not-P, to the determinations of "P and not-P". It is something categorically distinct from "P and not-P". This produces a discontinuity between the supposed continuous time where P becomes not-P, and necessitates the conclusion that time is not continuous.

Alternatively, we could say that the "event lapse" is a combination of both "P" and "not-P", and this would allow for continuity. But that violates the law of non-contradiction. So it appears like either time is discontinuous, or time is continuous in violation of the law of non-contradiction.

Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? — aletheist

The problem which I've explained to you before, and you didn't seem to grasp, is that "an event" requires instants. If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events. Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial. This I believe he does, as indicated by my quoted passage above, but you do not. Grasping this is essential to understanding Peirce's approach to boundaries and the vagueness we find in boundaries. A "boundary", like an "instant" is an artificial construction, therefore the things created by these applications, whether it be an object, or an event, are also artificial constructions. The boundaries are vague due to the subjectivity of such constructions.

You have a feeling of shame or guilt. This is the psychological fact. After that you can think about what you've had and categorize it as shame or guilt. What you called "knowing" is the latter. Obviously you need to think about it to know what it is. But to be X and to think what X can be are different actions. — David Mo

OK, so here's the problem. A feeling comes without any judgement of good or bad. It has not been categorized. Then the feeling must be judged as good or bad in relation to the current situation. The same type of feeling might be judged as good in some situations and bad in others. That is the nature of a "feeling". But your supposed feeling of "guilt" already has that judgement built into it, it's always has the same categorization in relation to good or bad. Therefore "guilt" cannot be a feeling.

There are two bases of morality: reason and emotion. — David Mo

This is unacceptable. Having two distinct bases, as you propose would lead to inconsistency and contradiction of principles, therefore indecisiveness, and the inability to decide moral questions.

You can disagree but you can't say that this is a contradictory theory. — David Mo

In the sense that it supports contradictory principles, such as the ones you've expressed, it is a contradictory theory. Why do you think that a theory which allows contradictory principles to be true ought not be called what it is, a contradictory theory?

I generally agree that some people, maybe most view it like you've described. I considered myself a Christian for many years until recently, and believed that many subjective experiences I had were from God. For example, that quiet whisper of God speaking - a kind of divine sense, that some would argue all of us have. I now have many problems with this kind of thinking. I don't outright dismiss it, but I'm very skeptical of most of it, even though I still have a strong spiritual belief system (e.g., my beliefs associated with NDEs). — Sam26

I'm curious as to what happened. Do you no longer hear the sounds which you had attributed to God whispering, or do you still hear the sounds but now believe that they are caused by something other than God?

By contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce held that time is real and continuous. — aletheist

This is problematic, as Zelebg points out . That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption which forces us into violation of the law of non-contradiction. This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction:

The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896

An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts": — aletheist

This is an example of the gibberish. Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event". In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective.

Lol, you can't just tack the word "existential" unto the same argument you made awhile back and call it a response to what I laid out about roles. — Noble Dust

You seem to have a short memory. Look back to the top of the page, the "existential" approach was your argument.

Not only am I not ready to release the idea, I never suggested the idea in the first place. All I'm ever talking about is the existential reality that art requires both artist and audience, and that art itself as a philosophical concept only exists with both; mover and moved. There's no collaboration; collaboration is when two artists work together on an artwork. The reality of the artist and audience relationship is closer to a sexual relationship, by analogy.

I think I know why we disagree so much; my approach is existential, and yours is not. — Noble Dust

When one person plays both roles it's called masturbation. But there's no sexual relationship involved with masturbation because it's only one person, it's a sexual act without the relationship. So if the artist plays both roles, that of the creator and also the audience, the artwork is no longer analogous to a sexual relation, it's a masturbation.

This is so absurd. Artist and audience member are roles; clearly an artist can play multiple roles. An artist might also be their own PR person, as is increasingly the case. They may run their own record label to release their music; a musician might be a songwriter and a multi-instrumentalist and a recording engineer, fulfilling all of those roles in order to create a work. Being an audience member is another role. — Noble Dust

Yes, but we were talking about the existential status of the art. Existentially, the artist is one existent person, in relation to the existence of the art. The fact that the artist can play different roles in one's life is irrelevant to the existence of the art. But if, in relation to the existence of the art, the artist is both creator and viewer, then all other viewers are unnecessary in relation to the existential status of the art. Therefore we can dismiss all other viewers, their attitudes, etc., as irrelevant to the existence of the art.

An artist making an artist statement and attempting to dictate how the audience experiences the work is not the same thing as 3 artists describing our process and broader existential experience. — Noble Dust

Don't you see, that the artist's statement is no more of an attempt to dictate how the audience experiences the art than any other aspect of the art? If this is your argument, that the artist ought not dictate how the artist experiences the work, then you might as well argue that the artist ought not make any artwork at all. The statement is just another aspect of the work. If you perceive the statement as the artist laying down rules as to how you must experience the piece, then why don't you perceive every piece of art as the artist attempting to govern your experience?

You really need to lighten up and stop perceiving words as the rules of a dictator. Do you think that words in a piece of music are the composer's attempt to dictate how you experience the music? If having words attached, makes the art unenjoyable to you, because you're extremely paranoid that the artist is attempting to be a dictator, then go look at something else that doesn't make you feel paranoid.

We aren't forcing specific interpretations of specific work down your throat like an artist statement can be in danger of doing... — Noble Dust

Paranoia! Remember, there is no need to interpret any piece of art, relax and enjoy it. You do not need to interpret to enjoy.

And none of us are arguing that one cannot or shouldn't get meaning out of it. — Coben

Right, but what seems to be at issue is how we get meaning, from the art, if we want to get meaning, that is.

Let's say that a purist aficionado of fine art wants to get no meaning from the work whatsoever, only enjoying the inspiration derived from the aesthetic beauty. There is work hanging all over the person's house, because the person simply enjoys seeing it (but not as a status symbol because that would give meaning to it). The person feels no need to interpret the work, enjoyment does not involve interpretation. Any statement of words would probably distract from the beauty of the piece so the person would have to ignore it or avoid such a work altogether.

However, sometimes people want to get meaning from the work, maybe the artist is looked at by some people as having some special knowledge, perhaps even as a sage of some sort. The artist has something to tell us. Now, these people are looking for meaning in the work, they think that the artist has something to say. Some people even believe that artists, having a full compliment of experience, have very important things to say, so they go looking for this.

I would think that there are many ways in which an artist might respond to this fact. The artist might ignore these people completely, trying to maintain that purist perspective, attempting to produce pure aesthetic value without saying anything, no meaning. However, there seems to be a large demand for meaning in art, many people expect the artists to be saying something, and want the artists to be saying something, so they go looking for what the artist is saying. And this can be where the fun begins, for the artist, if the artist is prepared to play that game. We can start with simple tricks, hidden meaning, creating the appearance of meaning where there is none, etc., the artist can do all sorts of things. These people who are looking for meaning must see some evidence that there is some meaning there, in order to go looking for it. If an artist is playing that game, one will always be looking for new ways to create the appearance of meaning. The statement is just another way of playing the game.

I don't think you don't have differentiated feelings. When a feeling is associated with some characteristics (of fear or guilt) - as you said - it is because they are in the very same feeling. You don't need to say "I had a panic attack" to have had a panic attack. You can rest assured: you don't need a specialist. You just need to think better about what you're saying. — David Mo

You don't seem to grasp your error, so I'll explain it to you in another way, as a category mistake. Let's assume that we can apprehend feelings like pain and pleasure, directly, as pain or pleasure, without any reflection. We know that it's pain, or that it's pleasure simply from the feeling, it's enjoyable, or unpleasant. Despite the fact that one might say it "feels good", or it "feels bad", this is not "good
" and "bad" in the moral sense. To say that it feels good, therefore it is good in the moral sense of "good", is a category error, because moral goods are determined by rational judgements, not by feelings. The category of pleasure and pain is distinct from the category of good and bad. One is a type of feeling, the other a type of rational judgement. Maintaining this distinction is what allows us to say that some pleasures are not good, and some pains are good. To conflate these categories is a category mistake.

don't see any contradiction. It's one thing to know and another to want. The person who says "I know very well that I shouldn't eat chocolate, but I can't resist" is expressing that difference. — David Mo

The contradiction is in saying that morality is based in reason, yet emotion gives us the impulse to do good. If emotion gave us the impulse to do good, then we would not need reason for morality, we could just follow our emotions, and therefore do good. Morality would not be based in reason it would be based in emotions.

You might say the person knows better than to eat the chocolate, but eats it anyway, therefore the feeling is the motivator, the driving force. But the issue is the person who succeeds in resisting the temptation. What about when the person resists eating the chocolate and eats the salad instead? Because there are two distinctly opposing outcomes from the same feeling, the urge to eat the chocolate, we cannot say that it is the urge itself, which causes the good outcome. This is why the driving force, the motivator, the "passion", what we call the "feeling", in this case we could name it simply as "hunger", is apprehended as independent from the moral good. That passion, inclination to act, urge, or feeling, may be directed towards either bad or good, but there is no good nor bad inherent within that feeling. The urge toward a particular end, to eat the chocolate, would be what is called an apparent good, like when something feels good, but that is not the moral good. There's a difference in category between things which appear as good, because they feel good, and things which are morally good.

Don't give me platonisms. Plato was very intelligent and wrote very well, but his idea of the Ideal Good seems to me to be pure illusion. — David Mo

Plato has produced the most comprehensive moral philosophy ever, and Christian ethics are based in it. Christian ethics, which tell us to be guided by eternal truths of the intellect, rather than bodily feelings, are responsible for leading the western world through the scientific revolution into the modern era. So it's foolish to dismiss Plato's work as pure illusion, it would be better described as visionary.

No, as I and Coben have said, the artist themselves is an audience member to their own work, so it's faulty to say that no audience is required. Actually it's not even the right way to express it; there's no "requirement" or not; there's just the reality of the artist as audience, which forms the basis of the symbiotic relationship between artist and audience. In other words, at minimum there's an audience of 1: the artist. From there, the audience naturally grows into whatever size it happens to become. Look to Coben's explanation of this reality in their most recent reply to you above to get a sense of why this is true (i.e. the part of their post that you didn't respond to). — Noble Dust

If you look at the artist and observer in this way, it only renders your earlier statements, that the artist makes up part of the work, and the observer makes up part, as completely nonsensical. There is now no sense in dividing the art into part which the artist contributes, and part which the observer contributes because the artist and observer might be one and the same. And if they might be one and the same then there is no point in talking about a difference between them, as if they each make up a part of the art. We can't divide the artist into two, as if part of the artist is observer and part is creator. They are simply one and the same person. So the artist is all that is required, for there to be art, because the artist acts as observer as well as creator, and any other observers are irrelevant.

So, can we start from this position, which you have described? Any member of the audience, other than the artist in person, is irrelevant to the piece of artwork, because the artist makes up a completed work of art by being both producer and observer.

From there, the audience naturally grows into whatever size it happens to become. Look to Coben's explanation of this reality in their most recent reply to you above to get a sense of why this is true (i.e. the part of their post that you didn't respond to). — Noble Dust

I didn't respond to this because under this new principle, that the artist is both creator and audience, the piece of art is entirely complete right here, at this moment in time. Any other audience, later in time, is completely irrelevant to the artwork, and whether or not the audience grows, how it grows, or how the artist views the creation at a different time, is completely irrelevant, unless the artist changes the piece, Therefore this further audience need not be discussed.

What's amusing here is we have 3 actual artists trying to demonstrate these aspects of our work, and then we have 1 (apparently) non-artist attempting to explain to us that we're wrong about our experience of our work. This is getting boring, to be honest. — Noble Dust

How ironic!
The person railing against the artist's statement, as if the artist ought not be telling the observer how to experience the art, is now insisting that the artist's experience of one's own work is the true, or correct experience of the work. Please don't make me sick. That type of irony, which might better be called hypocrisy tends to have that effect on me.

Further as we have pointed out repeatedly it's pressing the mental verbal mind to the immediate prioritized fore by having the artist's statment. You want people to have a felt and sensual experience and telling them what to think and feel diminishes this and its range and actually sets the wrong portions of the brain going when first encountering a piece of art. — Coben

If this is part of the work, then it's part of the work. Where's the problem? It makes no sense for you to say that the artist ought to set one part of the brain in motion, and not another. That, is narrow mindedness, explicitly. It's like saying that the artist should not have used this colour of paint here because it's making me think that it's the wrong colour, and this is getting the wrong part of my brain going, thereby ruining my experience. It ruins my experience, therefore it's wrong for artists to do this type of thing. If a particular technique leads you to the belief that the technique is wrong, then that is your opinion. But your opinion doesn't make the technique wrong. Who are you to say that a particular technique is wrong?

Your analogy doesn't work. Sometimes a women wants to hear "I love you" more than she wants to be kissed. We can't make the type of generalizations you want to make, that this technique is always wrong, and this one is always right. Variety is the spice of life.

That would be fine if one had to choose between aesthetic and meaning/conceptual factors, but you don't. So we have diminished one facet of great art for no reason. — Coben

You show yourself as extremely opinionated, and I don't have much respect for that. All you are saying is "my art is far superior to their art". Your expressions appear as arrogance.

I don't mean to get circle-jerky here, but as I re-read through this page of the thread, this stands out:

The intentions in the conscious mind are only a small part of what is going on. — Coben
...As being perhaps the hallmark of Metaphysician Undercover's mistake. — Noble Dust

Didn't I suggest, as a starting point, to dismiss intentions completely, and then proceed toward understanding how intention seeps in to the artwork? This is how I got rid of meaning and interpretation, What is "meant". How is it possible that focusing on intention is my mistake, when that's exactly what I said I wanted to get away from?

Yes, this nails it, along with the fact that an artist is informed by previously being a viewer of art. — Punshhh

Right, this was the point I was making. Fundamentally art is something to get inspiration from, not something to get meaning from. However, this does not mean that art is something we cannot get meaning from.

But there is also the feeling that what I am doing is wrong, which may happen in a direct or non-reflective way, as you yourself will later acknowledge. — David Mo

I do not believe there is such a feeling. That's the root of our difference. People definitely talk as if there is, "I get the feeling that this is the wrong thing to do", but I do not believe there is any such feeling.

I have never actually experienced such a feeling. I might get an uneasy feeling, an uncomfortable feeling, and associate this feeling with the judgement that the action is wrong, but I do not believe I've ever really had a feeling that what I am doing is wrong. It's always a thought that what I am doing is wrong, not a feeling.

If, in psychology they assume that there is such a feeling, then I think this is wrong. I can suppose that it is possible that you and other people have had such a feeling, but I have not, but when I do, I see that this is illogical, and so I dismiss this as people not properly describing their feelings. So I really do not believe that such a feeling is possible and I will explain why. The word "wrong" refers to a concept with an opposing term "right". And anytime we use a word to describe a particular situation, this requires a conscious judgement that the situation fulfills the requirements of using that word. So when I say "that's a house", "that's a car", "the colour of that thing is red", or "that action is wrong", I've made a conscious judgement concerning the thing.

Feelings do not come with words attached to them, such that we can take the word and say that this is the feeling. It takes a judgement to say what type of feeling any feeling is. But the judgement that such and such is wrong, or such and such is right, is a very special type of judgement. There is no real model to indicate what right and wrong looks like, to aid us in making such a judgement, so we might just assume that we "feel" what right and wrong are like. This is what you, and unenlightened as well, seem to be claiming that we just "feel" the difference between right and wrong. But I think that this is clearly a mistaken assumption. In reality we must judge the difference between right and wrong, by reference to some principles, as I explained above.

When did I say such a thing? The conciousness of something does not need to be reflexive. Although it often is. I'm aware that I'm being watched, without having to reflect on it. — David Mo

This is another example of your mistaken attitude. This is a description, "I'm being watched". You are claiming that you are aware that the situation fulfils the requirements of "I'm being watched" without reflecting on the situation. Can you see how this is impossible? In order for you, or any person to apply these words to the situation, it is necessary that you reflect on the situation and make that judgement. Even if your claim is that there is a situation which fulfills the requirements of the judgement "I'm being watched", and this situation exists independently of that judgement, how would you propose that a person might recognize oneself to be in that situation, without reflecting on it? What you are arguing is simply, and blatantly, illogical and impossible. You are claiming that recognition occurs without reflection. So you are assigning to "feeling" what can only be accomplished by a conscious judgement, and that is simply a mistaken premise.

I think this is special pleading. Take a simple conflict. I like ice-cream, but it makes me fat. Which is rational, liking ice-cream or not liking fat? I say neither. — unenlightened

Why would you say "neither" when the answer is clearly both? Both, "I like ice cream", and "I do not like fat", are conscious, rational judgements. You can see that these two contradict each other, because ice cream contains a lot of fat. But distinct rational judgements often contradict each other, due to lack of knowledge (not knowing that ice cream has fat), or simple sloppiness in the acceptance of principles or premises. So in this case you can know that ice cream contains fat, and also know that you like ice cream, therefore knowingly make contradictory statements, while each statement is itself based in a rational judgement. However, I might accuse you of being irrational, and if we analyze the two statements we might find enough ambiguity in the use of the word "like", to account for the appearance of irrationality. Then I'd recant, saying you're not really irrational, you're only using "like" in different ways.

You don't realize that I'm not in the field of morals or ethics. I'm not recommending anything. I'm explaining what moral emotions are and how they work. I mean, psychology. — David Mo

And I am explaining to you why your concept of "moral emotions" is incoherent, irrational, and unintelligible. You would need to somehow clear up, and get beyond the fundamental contradictions which you have displayed to me, in order to explain moral emotions to me. However, the problem seems to be very deeply seated, inherent within your perspective, and your desire is simply to assume that "moral emotions" makes sense, and proceed from there.

Both believed that morality is based on reason, but without moral emotion there can be no impulse to do good. — David Mo

Do you not see the contradiction here? If morality is truly based on reason, then it is contradictory to say that it is emotion which gives us the impulse to do good. What is missing here is the separation of what unenlightened called "passion" from morality, which involves the distinction between bad and good. When we allow that "passion", as the motivator for action, is something separate from the faculty which judges bad and good (like the Platonic tripartite psyche), then the emotion which gives us the impulse to act, are independent from any judgement of bad or good. In the Platonic description, emotion or "passion", is simply the inclination or urge to act, and it can be directed toward either bad or good. So in the Platonic description, the person of power, ability, capacity, in a position to act, might be directed towards either good or bad.

That might serve to exemplify what I find as the deficiency in your concept of "moral emotion". Emotions are just the urge to act, independent of any judgement of bad or good. So an emotion cannot be "moral", because it has no regard for good or bad. The urge to act must be directed in order that the action go toward something good rather than bad. This implies a necessary separation between "moral" and "emotion", as "moral" is applied to that faculty which directs the emotions. And emotions themselves have no dependence on bad or good, they are properly independent of such judgements.
Therefore when we say that a feeling, or emotion gives a person the urge to act, we have no principle whereby we might say that this urge is toward something good or bad.

The artist would through the entire process be an observer, and one contruction with some but not total freedom the experienced artwork and affected by it. — Coben

But this is not an 'observer' in the sense that Noble Dust is talking about the audience. The artist, as one's own observer has inside information on one's own piece, so that "the statement" is completely irrelevant. If the artist is allowed to be one and the same as the audience, then there is nothing to discuss here, regardless of whether the artist is aware of what oneself is doing.

The contradiction is only in your head. It is not true that guilty is a judgement and not a feeling. The criminal that hide his crime just because he fears to be punished has no feeling of culpability, although he knows he has done something wrong. This is a very common fact between mafiosi and pathological killers. This contradict your claim that guilt is only a judgement. — David Mo

Exactly, the contradiction is in my head, as all contradictions are always, necessarily, in someone's head. So this does not make the contradiction any less real. The feelings I have concerning guilt are contradictory, and that is a fact.

So you again demonstrate the same contradiction here. It is nothing other than the apprehension of culpability which drives a person to hide one's own crimes. if someone did not recognize one's own actions as culpable, there would be no need to hide the action . So you are continuing with the same contradictory nonsense, to say that the person who hides one's own crimes does not feel culpability.

No agreement is possible. All so-called moral feelings involve relationships with others and a certain sense of right and wrong. Indignation, pride, resentment, guilt, shame, etc. are different because their cause is different: the evil that I have committed, the ideal of the 'I' that I have violated, the evil that has been infringed upon another person, the harm that has been done to me, the act that others approve of, etc. Consequently they are associated with different ideas and also have different effects. — David Mo

This distinction does not make any sense to me. All feelings start with "I". That is what a feeling is, something inside of me. Attempting to make a distinction between feelings which start with "I", and other feelings, is just to make a randomly arbitrary set of classifications, because all feelings start with "I". So to say that ideas associated with feelings starting with "I" are distinct from ideas associated with other feelings, is just an untenable designation.

Therefore, moral emotions are mental complexes that cannot be broken down, except analytically. — David Mo

Of course any "breaking down" is analytical only, but that does not mean we cannot make valid analysis based on sound principles. Your distinction of feelings which start with "I", and other feelings is nothing other than a breaking down, an analysis. But it is not based in sound principles.

You could escape your contradictions by eliminating the term judgement. An unconscious judgment is not a judgment strictly speaking. It would be more correct to say that there is an evaluation or perception of the situation. — David Mo

This demonstrates your continued refusal to address "conscience", and this amounts to a denial of facts. The facts are that we make judgements, and, that judgements are very closely related to feelings. Your refusal to address judgement is the "monumental error" here. You propose a division between "I" based feelings, and other feelings, when this division is nothing other than a distinction between judgement-based feelings, and non-judgement-based feelings. Now you say let's pretend that judgement is not relevant here. It is clearly you who is making pretense.

Yes, I can sympathise. judgement is commonly considered the province of the thinker, the rational faculty. But while rationality can make the measurement, and decide which dick is bigger, it cannot decide whether bigger or smaller is better, one has to have a feeling about it. — unenlightened

I'm not sure I can accept this. You are distinguishing judgement, as the measurement of does x qualify as good or bad, from the knowledge of what constitutes good and bad. I can accept this distinction, in principle. However, you then associate knowledge of good and bad with feeling, as if the difference between good and bad is something we feel rather than something which is decided by rational judgement.

What I see is that these are two distinct types of rational judgement. The knowledge of what constitutes good and bad must be given to us through rational judgement, or at least something other than through feelings or else we would not be able to judge feelings as good or bad. A good feeling would necessarily be good, and a bad feeling would necessarily be bad, and all of our judgements (measurements) as to whether something is good or bad would be based on whether the thing was producing a good feeling or bad feeling. However, ethics and moral principles are based in the assumption that we decide the essence of, or nature of, good and bad, according to rational principles, not by our feelings.

Which is to say that reason can tell you what's what and what's not, but only passion can make you care, and so only passion can make you act. — unenlightened

Now you've introduced another principle, "passion". Passion is what makes a person act, but passion is something distinct from the two forms of judgement discussed above. Knowledge of what is good and what is bad does not inspire one to act. Nor does the judgement (measurement) that a certain thing is good inspire one to act. Procrastination is an example of seeing what is good but not doing it. So we need to put "passion", which is inspiration, in a different category altogether.

Nor should it. It is a response to the situation; the character of the emotion directs the action which in the case of a 'negative' emotion is to change the situation in some appropriate way, eg to cover one's nakedness. Without the judgement that nakedness in this situation is 'bad', the cover-up makes no sense and would not happen. Reason alone is incapable of making such a judgement. — unenlightened

Sure, I see this clearly, but the problem is when the feeling inclines one toward a certain action, but the action is judged as bad, so the action must be suppressed. I cannot say that I ought to do what the feeling inclines me to do, as you seem to imply. I appeal to rational principles to over rule the feelings, and decide what I ought and ought not do, based on these principles. So the bad feeling of shame or embarrassment is telling me to coverup and fix the negative situation to make the bad feeling go away. It is inclining me toward a reflexive judgement that the situation is bad. But a rational judgement might be telling me that the bad feeling is misleading me. There is no need to coverup, I ought to suck it up and live through the bad feeling, for the sake of a higher (rational) good.

I cannot apprehend my emotions as judgements. They seem to be nothing more than feelings which relate to the particular situations which give rise to them. But they really do not seem to consist of any judgements concerning the situation. "Grab that fig leaf" is the judgement. The emotion provides motivation to make the judgement, but isn't itself a judgement.

Suppose I start feeling embarrassed. This feeling wells up inside me, but the feeling itself doesn't really give me any information about the situation, which a judgement concerning the situation would give me. It's just a strange feeling. If I reflect, I will see a pattern of various times when I get this same sort of feeling. When I do something which attracts attention to myself, this tends to produce embarrassment. So I can make a judgement that this sort of situation, attracting attention to myself, causes embarrassment. But I really can't see how there could be a judgement already inherent within the feeling itself.

However, since that feeling really only comes in that particular type of situation, I might admit that logically there must be some sort of judgement inherent within the feeling. Whatever it is that produces the feeling, must have made a judgement of the situation, in order to produce the same sort of feeling in similar situations. But in my experience, I do not make a conscious judgement of the situation being an embarrassing situation. The feeling just pops up, and sometimes I'm embarrassed when I least expect it, or not embarrassed when I would expect to be embarrassed. So whatever type of judgement this is, which causes the occurrence of embarrassment, it is not a conscious judgement, and that makes it awkward to even call it a judgement.

All I'm ever talking about is the existential reality that art requires both artist and audience, and that art itself as a philosophical concept only exists with both; mover and moved. — Noble Dust

This is the falsity which you refuse to acknowledge. No audience is required. The artist can create without an observer. The art exists with or without the observer. Your "philosophical concept" is faulty.

The reality of the artist and audience relationship is closer to a sexual relationship, by analogy. — Noble Dust

This analogy doesn't work. The piece of art exists as a medium between the act of the artist and the act of the audience. This separates the two acts as distinct. There is no such medium in the sexual act, unless you are using a condom. You need to account for the fact that the piece of art is a real thing existing between the artist and the audience.

I think I know why we disagree so much; my approach is existential, and yours is not. — Noble Dust

Your "existential" approach seems to involve a faulty definition of "exist". You require that something be observed by an audience in order to exist.

Here's an example of how we might seek to position "conscience" in this discussion. Generally, people say that "shame" is an uncomfortable feeling. But I've said, in this thread, that "shame" involves a judgement that the situation is less than ideal, deprived. So I've made the same mistake which I've criticized David Mo for here, placing the judgement as inherent within the emotion. Therefore we ought to describe shame simply as the uncomfortable feeling, and associate the judgement that the uncomfortable feeling is derived from the apprehension of a deprived situation, with conscience.

This allows that the emotion "shame" arises freely, prior to, and independent from any such judgement of good or bad. Now we can look at it, and see that we've come to associate this "bad" feeling with "bad" situations, and this is our habit, so "shame" has bad connotations. The problem though is that the situation which causes shame is not necessarily a bad situation, we've only come to look at it this way through some sort of habit of generalization. If we exchange the word "shame" for "embarrassment", we can use the new word to describe the very same feeling. But now we remove the bad connotations, because embarrassment can be felt equally in good situations and bad situations.

David Mo, I'll offer you a new starting point here, a compromise, if you'll put aside your notions of moral emotions, and guilt, as a distraction, and our discussion of this as a digression. Let's say that "shame", like "embarrassment", is associated with the way that we relate ourselves to others, just like you suggested. However, we must place this relation as independent from, and prior to any judgements such as wrong or right. So we have feelings concerning our relations with others, which are not at all influenced by moral judgements. Therefore we throw away your internal feeling of guilt, and we replace this with internal feelings which are derived from perceived relations with others, feelings which are independent from such judgements of wrong or right.