It's like my example of the caterpillar that turns into a butterfly. — Arcane Sandwich

The problem though, is your interpretation. You say "it still has the same essence". It doesn't have the same essence because the essence of an individual material object, as an individual material object , consists of all those accidentals which are changing. The object however, retains its identity despite changing. This implies that the identity of the object is associated with its matter rather than with its form. The matter is what persists through the change, as does the thing's identity.

The arrow of time outside of the boundaries of the empirical present is an abstraction. — ucarr

We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. Therefore I find "empirical present" to be self-contradicting. So I incorporate both, empirical (past), and anticipatory (future) elements into my conception of "present". You refuse to relinquish your idea of an empirical present, and this makes it impossible for you to understand my explanations.

What we have here is a complicated interplay of different frames of reference. I keep my perception oriented by confining myself to the present tense view of all three tenses, with the understanding only the present tense is, for me, pragmatically real beyond the neuronal activity of my brain. — ucarr

See, this is your supposed "empirical present" dominating your thought.

Keeping this in mind, I can ask why the future-to-past arrow and the past-to-future arrow don't both possess determinist causation? — ucarr

I wouldn't say that either one "possesses" determinist causation. Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. The lack of necessity in this efficient causation is recognized by Hume, and even Newton as well, who said that his first law of motion relies on the Will of God.

If, as you claim, the arrow of time is the same for both directions, then how could one be any less causal than the other? I ask this question bearing in mind your talk of free will. Even if we somehow inhabit the future pragmatically and thus also paradoxically, and therein exercise our free will such that the past events following this future free will decision making are caused by it, how is that an example of the future-to-past arrow of time being any less determinist that the past-to-future arrow of time? — ucarr

The past-to-future representation does not allow for the future-to-past causation, which is required for free will, because no future-to-past flow is allowed for, Because possibilities are in the future, and actualities are in the past, the flow must be future-to-past to allow that possibilities can get selected and actualized at the present. This is required for the reality of free will. Under this representation efficient causation is understood as a human representation produced from inductive reasoning, therefore lacking true necessity, as explained by Hume.

Even if we somehow inhabit the future pragmatically and thus also paradoxically, and therein exercise our free will such that the past events following this future free will decision making are caused by it, how is that an example of the future-to-past arrow of time being any less determinist that the past-to-future arrow of time? — ucarr

The future consists of possibility.

You acknowledge that time is a dimension... — ucarr

I told you, time is not a dimension, it has dimensions.

There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence.

That can't be the case in a situation with only a first and no second. — ucarr

Sure, but we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. However, that is not our perspective. From our perspective there is both, and we can judge one as prior to the other.

Now, however, another problem arises: this is a situation with no present. It follows logically that a situation with no present has no presence, i.e., doesn’t exist. — ucarr

That's correct, but it's really not a problem. Possibility cannot be said to be an existent thing. We cannot say that anything in the future "exists" nor does the future "exist" by how we define that word. But this does not mean that the future is not real, it just means that it cannot be described by that word. So we use "possible" to refer to future things, rather than "exists". This is not a problem, it's just a recognition of the complexity of reality.

We're in the empirical present - how we consciously perceive the world around us, moment to moment - which time lags behind the theoretical numerical present. Speaking in terms of the relative positions, the nearly present, our empirical present, chases closely behind what to us relatively speaking is the near future. This is a way of saying we're some tiny fraction of a second behind the numerical present. Now, to be sure, perception of the numerical present gets gnarly when we home in on its details in high resolution. We can only approach the numerical present as a changing variable traveling the highway of an infinite series. We're always approaching and never arriving at a relative future we're trying to make present here and now. Since these discrepancies at the Newtonian scale are minute, we ignore them. However, if we wish to talk scientifically, we say our position is spacetime is probable, not certain. So, now you see why the present is represented as a theoretical point of zero dimensions. — ucarr

"Empirical present" is a faulty concept for the reason I explained above. All you are saying here, is that the empirical present isn't the real present, it's the past. What I propose is that we add to this aspect of being conscious (what you call the empirical present, which is really the past), the aspect of anticipation and intention (which is really the future), to have a more complete representation of being conscious at the present. The present includes some past and some future.

"Have I ever been bodily present within either the past or the future?" — ucarr

I consider myself to be present in both future and past, because I believe "the present" to be an overlapping of future and past. This I explained days ago with my dimensional representation of the present.

We both know you know the answer is "no." — ucarr

What I've been explaining is that a thorough analysis of the nature of time produces the need to answer this question with "yes". We believe ourselves to be in the present. But analysis of "the present" reveals that it cannot be a dimensionless point, as we've discussed. This implies that the present must be a duration of time. This duration cannot be completely in the past or we'd have to call it "the past". It cannot be completely in the future or we'd be calling it "the future". So introspection reveals that this duration must be partially past and partially future.

We know we're following the arrow of time only going forward because we know from our life experience we are born young and die older; we understand this as the present going forward to the future. — ucarr

That's not true. We understand this as the passing of time. The reason why we grow old is because time passes, this is not "the present going forward to the future". That doesn't even make sense. How could the present going forward to the future cause you to grow old? And don't say because of entropy. Entropy is not a cause and we're just left with asking what causes entropy. And that is the passing of time. Here we are, entropy is caused by the passing of time when time is modeled as past-to-future.

So when we model time as past-to-future, we are stuck with "entropy". And if we ask what causes entropy, we must answer that it is caused by the passing of time. Therefore, we must conclude that the past-to-future model is wrong, because it leaves us with something, "entropy", which can only be accounted for by a different model, by representing time as a cause, actively passing, and this implies future-to-past.

You're saying the past_present_future arrow of time is self-contradicting because it cancels the free-will option? — ucarr

No, I'm saying that to choose determinism over freewill is self-contradicting.

Surely you're not surprised that examiners of your theory turn to Relativity as their paradigm. I struggle to see how it's legit to brush off Relativity as incompatible and irrelevant. — ucarr

I understand that relativity provides the go-to perspective for many people. What I am saying, is that if you want to understand what I'm proposing, you must relinquish that perspective. If you can't apprehend as "legit", examining a completely different theory, because you think that relativity has got the ground covered, then we ought to stop right now. You would have no doubt that relativity provides all the answers, so there would be no point to pitching a new proposal to you.

Since you're the one trying to overthrow it, aren't you responsible for meeting it head on with cogent arguments? — ucarr

No, That's not my MO at all. I am very confident that relativity is sorely deficient in the way that it models time. And, I am very confident that many other people will notice this as well, because it is quite obvious. Therefore, I am also confident that there will be people interested in alternative theories.

There is no need to meet that theory "head on", or attempt to "overthrow it". What is required is to work on the true model of time.

Since you fault Relativity for dismissing time-passing-without-events without empirical observation, you plan on supporting your claim of immaterial time with empirical observation. — ucarr

No, that would be impossible. Since one whole dimension of time, the future, is completely hidden from empirical observation, and the other dimension, the past, has been observed but is currently unobservable, understanding of time is based in logical reasoning, not empirical observation.

Perhaps time isn't physical, but Relativity's belief in same connects it with our lives, which are, at least in part, physical. Why should I drop my belief in the connection linking physical me with physical time? If It's something unreal - as according to your understanding - shouldn't you show me that immaterial time is somehow connecting with my physical life using cogent logic that overturns my belief. In the boxing ring, the challenger, in order to win, must knock out the champ. This is another kind of boxing ring. — ucarr

The immaterial is not unreal, so I don't know what you are asking for. Don't your plans for the future, next minute, next hour, tomorrow, etc;, connect with your physical life? These things in your plans are completely immaterial. So it seems very obvious to me how the immaterial connects to your physical life, through desires, plans, goals, intentions, etc.. Do you, for some reason, not apprehend this fact?

The distinction in this particular situation becomes a false generalization when applied to all actions involving time and objects — ucarr

There is no false generalization, because all events require time. That's a true generalization.

Its false because the objects moved can act as transitive verbs acting on time. Since time as a dimension has duration, an argument can be made for the actions of moving things acting as movers of time, with time getting moved because its duration increases. — ucarr

Again, you are just applying the incompatible premise, the premise I say is false. The thing is, events can be modeled in different ways. Each way will model the events to some degree of acceptability, depending on the purpose. But the two models cannot be mixed. Relativity theory might tell you that each way is equally valid, and this might incline you to think that one way is no truer than any other.

So it's like if I were handing you a theory about the motions of the earth, sun, moon, planets, and stars, and I was telling you that the earth is spinning, and I model those other objects accordingly. Then you tell me "an argument can be made", that these things are orbiting the earth. Sure, but how is pointing out that there is another way of modeling these things any indication that my way is wrong? The issue is that we need a model of time which allows for the reality of freewill. Your model doesn't provide this, and mine does, that's why I say mine is better.

You cannot cite me one example wherein you pass through space without simultaneously passing through time. — ucarr

I will cite you every example of motion. In each case, when something moves through space, time is passing. It is obviously not the case that the thing is passing through time, because time is passing for everything, even the things which are not moving. Therefore the proper representation is that time is passing, whether a thing is moving or not. Otherwise a thing would be moving through time only when it's moving, and not moving through time when it's not moving.

With heat death, motion stops, time becomes meaningless. — ucarr

Good thing you defined "whimsy" for me, because this is a perfect example.

I'm assuming that when a person dies of electrocution, you think it's due to time passing and not the presence of enough electromotive force to cook the person alive like a piece of meat in a hot skillet. — ucarr

The primary cause is time passing, because "electromotive force" requires this it is a secondary cause.

Logical priority exists when one category, being more broadly inclusive that another lesser category, logically contains the lesser category. If A is logically prior to B, then A is a necessary condition of B; A is the ground of B. — ucarr

Right, now do you see that "time" is logically prior to "event", "motion", and "change"? All of these, "event", "motion", and "change", are the lesser categories than "time". Time is the necessary condition for them. Further, "event", "motion:, and "change" imply "time", but "time" does not imply any of these. That is the order of logical priority.

Do you think logical priority can stand on mere possibility absent proof? — ucarr

Of course, logical priority is based in definition, no proof is required. That's why you can question the logical priority of "time" over "event", by defining "time" in a way which makes the logical priority which I described above, not hold.

The problem though, is that we can manipulate definitions, for various purposes, to the point where it doesn't correspond with reality. Sometimes we can correct ourselves by looking at common usage. So we see that in common usage "time passes", and we do not "pass through time". And if you propose a definition for the purpose of avoiding the logical priority which would prove your argument wrong, and the definition (such as "pass through time") is not consistent with our common understanding, that is a problem for your argument.

You don't think it does. I believe it does because the direction of time from future to past has the arrow of entropy moving from birth into old age to death in pre-fertilization. — ucarr

As explained above, "entropy" is just a symptom of a problematic representation of time. The proper representation of time has no need for this concept which is the result of trying to model something which is not a system as if it was a system.

From you I've learned time can exist apart from matter and energy. — ucarr

At least it wasn't a complete waste of time. And to be fair, I've learned something from you too, physicalists are not completely hopeless. Can I ask, what immaterialist premise gets through to you? What makes you think that it might be worth your while to read this? Is it the supposition of freewill?

Can you give me an example? — Arcane Sandwich

A car gets dented, it still retains its identity as being the same thing, despite that change of form.

I'm asking you why you think it's empirically true that we remember what happens before our present tense experience? — ucarr

No wonder I couldn't understand. I don't think that.

You say there's a jump from future to past, — ucarr

I never said anything about a jump. In fact i was implying that the future and past overlap, with my description of the dimensionality of the present. How is that a jump?

You are badly misrepresenting me.

Possibility is a logical understanding, whether ontological or not. In either case, the sentient experiences this awareness in the empirical present tense whereas both the past and the future are abstractions of the empirically present tense mind. — ucarr

This is what I would say is the mistaken assumption. Really, we are aware of the past, through memory. And, we are also aware of the future, through our anticipations and intentions. The "present" is just an abstraction. That's what I discussed concerning the faulty idea that "the present" is a nondimensional point which divides future from past.

Check around and you'll see, if you haven't already, that the arrow of time and the arrow of entropy point in the same direction. — ucarr

I can't see an arrow of time, nor an arrow of entropy. These are abstractions, part of a (faulty in my belief) conceptual structure.

Note - You've been very patient and very generous with your time, as I've needed a lot of repetition from you as I have corrected my misreadings of your intended meanings. Only recently have I realized immaterial time is the central part of your theory. Now knowing this, I have a better grasp of your point of view. I'm grateful to you for giving me ample chance to understand you. Also, I'm grateful for the extensive workout; I like to believe it has strengthened my ability to reason. — ucarr

You may claim to have a "better grasp" of what I'm saying, but you still badly misrepresent me, especially on the subject of the flow of time. The problem is, that you have this idea that the past is before the future, and this works as a model for determinist causation. When I tell you that it is necessary to understand the future as prior to the past, in order to understand the freewill perspective, you simply reverse the flow of time, and present that as my perspective. But I keep telling you that is not the case, the flow of time is exactly the same, whether it's modeled with past before the future, or future before the past. What is changed is the way that one understands the floe of time.

Do you agree that it is necessary to understand that the possibility for an event precedes the actual occurrence of that event? And do you understand that possibilities only exist in the future, not the past? What happens at the present is that possibilities coming from the future, are selected for, actualized, and then become past. Therefore the future is prior to the past.

The role of time within gravity does not match its role within QM. — ucarr

That's good evidence that Einstein's spacetime is a faulty theory of time.

I infer from this statement that time without a past cannot be dimensionally extended because this state of the system presupposes the system being a proper subset of itself, a cosmic contradiction. — ucarr

The "time without a past" is not dimensionless though. That's the point. It still has a future, which is a dimension of time. And, the further point is that this condition you mention, "time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. Therefore if the extension of time is not infinite, future is necessarily prior to past.

The correction to the cosmological contradiction of a pure origin - there are no pure origins - embodies as the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. This asymptotic progression toward the numerical present is evidence of QM properties being present within the Newtonian scale of physics. This is a way of saying we humans, like the elementary particles, have only a probable location in spacetime. At the Newtonian scale of physics, this seems not to be the case, and that's why Newton himself didn't include it within his physics — ucarr

Again, this is a terrible model. Why exclude "origins"? Having a model which excludes origins as unintelligible renders real origins as unintelligible. That origins appear to be unintelligible is the fault of the model, not because real origins are actually unintelligible. Origins are modeled as unintelligible, so whenever there is an origin it appears to be unintelligible. That's a faulty model.

Look, the following makes no sense:

"As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. "

Earlier, you said we are in the "empirical present". Now you say we're moving in time, but never reaching the present. What does this mean, that we are always in the past, yet empirically in the present? Well how do we ever make freewill acts to change things then? The past is already fixed as unchangeable, if we never reach the present we never have the capacity to make a freewill act.

The infinite series of the calculus and it's limit work very well. They aren't deficiencies. — ucarr

Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity.

Now we have a contradictory scenario, there is supposed to be an origin on the other side of that infinite series, but the infinite series denies the reality of the origin. Then arguments like mine which actually address the origin, can be dismissed, because the infinite series makes a real origin impossible. So all we have is 'waffle-land', deny discussions which take an origin as a premise, because the infinite series doesn't allow the origin to be real, yet also deny that there is an infinite regress by claiming that there is an origin behind the infinite series.

In claiming free will as a self-evident truth, you're ignoring a perennial debate stretching across millennia. The continuing doubt about the existence of free will renders your following argument undecided WRT free will. — ucarr

Since the determinist perspective, and the freewill perspective produce incompatible models of time, we need to choose on or the other. I am not interested in discussing time with anyone who makes the self-contradicting choice, i.e. choosing that choice is not possible.

There's a question whether time, or any other dimension, is causal. — ucarr

You continue to misrepresent "time" as a dimension, in the incompatible determinist way. I mean that's acceptable to that model of time, but if you want to understand "time" in this model you need to rid yourself of those incompatible premises. "Time" here is not a dimension of something, it is something with dimensions.

Since time, per Relativity, is physical, in order for your conclusion to be true, you must overturn Relativity. — ucarr

Overturning relativity is not what is required, only to demonstrate it's deficiencies, like the one mentioned above. Another one which I've been arguing is that it wrongly renders the logical possibility of time without physical events as impossible. When a theory renders a logical possibility as impossible, through stipulation rather than through empirical observation, that theory must be held suspect.

Since time is a physical dimension... — ucarr

Bad premise!

You haven't shown contact between the non-physical and the physical. — ucarr

You haven't dropped your bad premise. Once you drop that premise that time is physical, what you ask for is accomplished.

You say, "we construct a physical system, according to a design." Why isn't the physical thing a system? — ucarr

The physical thing is a "system", but it's artificial. Then there's the other meaning of "system", as in system theory. In this sense we might model a natural things as a "system", but the natural things don't actually fit the theoretical system, so boundaries and things like that, need to be fudged. Both senses of "system", the physical system, and the theoretical system, refer to something artificial. Natural things just don't fulfill the requirement of "system".

This is your argument supporting the separation of activity from event? Thinking about doing something is not equal to the actual doing of the something thought about. In order to support your claim non-physical activity is prior - both logically and existentially - to events, you must show that priority, both logically and existentially. Show me, with mathematical inference, how non-physical time passes inside the Cern particle accelerator in such manner as to cause the animation of the material things that populate events. — ucarr

I've told you many times now, it's taken as a logical possibility, not as a proof. However, when we accept this logical possibility as reality, it makes freewill very intelligible. And, you can deny free will if you so choose, but then we'll have nothing more to talk about.

[

Regarding passing through time, time is the dimension of duration, so is it false to think of my temporal experience as passing through a duration? Consider that it takes one hour to travel from point A to point B. Don't you think about your travel by car as passing through the interval of time required to arrive at your destination? I think it less intuitive to picture time as a separate thing passing away from me as I remain stationary. — ucarr

No, I think of passing through the space between A and B when I travel, and I think that this takes time, i.e. time passes while I traverse this space. I definitely do not think that I travel through time in the way I traverse space, because moving from one place to another requires energy, but time passes without any effort on my part. This is a very big difference which you need to respect. We need to propel ourselves to change locations, but time passes with no effort on our part. That is because time itself is the thing which is active when we supposedly "move through time", not us.

How about I let Einstein justify it?

Time dilation caused by gravity or acceleration
Time dilation explains why two working clocks will report different times after different accelerations. For example, time goes slower at the ISS, lagging approximately 0.01 seconds for every 12 Earth months passed. - Wikipedia

Note the above is not a thought experiment. It is scientific verification with real evidence supporting a prediction of Relativity. — ucarr

I don't see how this proves anything.

Must be a piss poor model if it in no way resembles systemically the systemization of the natural thing it models. — ucarr

I didn't say "it in no way resembles..." If one thing resembles another, that does not mean it is the other. That's piss poor logic. If a natural thing resembles an artificial system, it's piss poor logic to conclude that it is a system.

Again, your argument, even if valid, doesn't necessarily establish what is factual. — ucarr

How many times do I have to tell you? I am in no way trying to "establish what is factual". I am discussing logical possibilities. Do you understand this? This is a theory based in possibilities, not based in what is actual, or factual. This is what makes it consistent with freewill, that it deals with possibilities.

The heat death of the universe is a postulated end to the universe as we know it. It is when a state of maximum disorder, or entropy, is reached; where no thermodynamic processes occur and time itself becomes meaningless — ucarr

That's very faulty. Look, "entropy" is a feature of a system, it accounts for the energy of a system which is no longer useful to that system, and cannot be account for. The universe is not a system. And, assuming a "heat death" is actually accounting for the energy which the concept of "entropy" explicitly indicates cannot be accounted for. So this heat death idea is just self-contradicting, even if you overlook the first fault, that the universe is not a system. Double bad does not make a theory good.

No doubt your understanding of time is based upon the artifice of human-centered system theory. — ucarr

Sure, but I don't pretend that the model is the thing modeled. My model is a model of possibility. You think time is the measurement, so all you are doing is modeling the model.

The problem with having it be time instead of energy is the fact time is not a force — ucarr

Again, you are just adopting incompatible premises to deny the theory. Clearly, in this theory time is a force, so your premise that time is not a force is irrelevant. Furthermore, you replace time as the force, with "energy" as the force, but energy is just a measurement, it's not a real independent thing like time is. We take measurements, and determine "the energy" of something, but that is just physical laws and mathematics. So "energy" is the product of measurements and applied mathematics, it is not a real force in the world, like the passing of time is. It appears your theory has swallowed up your reality.

"Where there's mass, there's time. This tells me time doesn't pass apart from events populated by animated things. — ucarr

This is an invalid conclusion. Like I explained, "where there's mass, there's time", implies that mass cannot exist without time, but it does not imply that time cannot exist without mass.

You need to learn how to understand "logical priority".

Logic works with proofs. How does logic, short of a proof, support a proposition? You don't have any evidence because there's no experimental verification of a half-Planck scale. — ucarr

Clearly you take one way in which logic is used, and assume that this is all that logic does. You see to be totally missing out on some of the greatest uses of it.

By contrast , the language game underlying the statement ‘water boils at 100 degrees’ cannot remain intact if this fact is questioned. — Joshs

You are neglecting the qualification "at sea level". That qualification indicates two essential conditions, temperature and pressure. So, the statement "water boils at 100 degrees" is in fact doubted by the addition of that qualification. However, the language game remains intact, only slightly changed by that doubt. If however, as in my example, it turns out that water boiling is completely a feature of external pressure, and internal temperature was just a ruse, then we'd want to rid ourselves of that language game, as being a faulty representation.

Wiitgenstein uses the word ‘doubt’ to indicate a situation where some particular feature within a language game is put into question, while leaving the game intact. This is why he says that some beliefs must be left certain in order to doubt anything. We can’t doubt the geocentric model by switching to a heliocentric model unless the two models have features that can be incorporated under the same language game. — Joshs

Obviously, I do not accept the common interpretation of how Wittgenstein portrays "doubt". I believe that we can and do doubt foundational rules. And, I also believe that the foundational aspects of the geocentric model were doubted, and this doubt is what allowed it to be replaced by the heliocentric. So I think it is very clear that we do doubt foundational aspects, and completely destroy important conceptual structures, even though vestiges of the old may still remain in our language games ("the sun rises", "the sun sets"). These vestiges become metaphors, so sometimes instead of ridding ourselves of the faulty language game, we allow it to remain in the form of metaphor.

Ok. What would be an example of that, so that I can get a clear picture of it? — Arcane Sandwich

The form of a material thing, in the strict sense of the word "form", in hylomorphism, includes all the accidental properties of that material thing. That's what gives the thing its unique "identity", as the particular thing which it is. However, the accidents are always changing, therefore the form of the material thing is always changing. Nevertheless we say that the thing maintains its identity as the same thing despite the scratches and dents that it receives.

We have to be careful with our use of "essence" because the "essence" of a particular, "what the thing is", as a unique particular, is different from "essence" as a type, "what type the thing is". This is the difference between primary and secondary substance, the unique individual being primary substance, the species being secondary substance..

Would you say that deciding to change the rules of chess in order to make a more interesting game is an example of ‘doubting’ the current foundation of chess? — Joshs

I think there is a need here to distinguish between essential and accidental properties, as a way toward understanding this question. If we say that every single rule is essential to the game known as "chess", then changing any one of them would render the new game as no longer "chess". We'd then say that any such change affects the foundation. But if, for example, we designate only the position of "check" as essential to the game, then we are free to make all sort of rule changes, still call the new game "chess", and say that we have not doubted "the foundation".

So it all depends on what is determined as "the foundation". I believe that in many conceptions, there is no such thing as "the foundation", because numerous essential aspects are brought together, therefore numerous foundational aspects. Doubting, and changing aspects of a conception generally alter the conception by degree. However, I believe that we do have to acknowledge the reality of foundational aspects, such as when we turn things right around, like the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model. Clearly the foundational belief was doubted.

Imagine if we turned the game of chess right around, so that each player started in an equal position of checkmate, with some pieces already taken off the board, and the players were allowed to move other pieces while the king was checked, and the goal was to get all the pieces back to what is now the starting place. This would render the check position irrelevant, and that change would clearly be the result of doubting the foundation, because "the object" of the game would be completely changed. In this case we can say that when the conception of "the object" is doubted, the foundation is doubted.

So, back to the main point, I would say that an Aristotelian substance cannot change its form and still be the same substance, because the form of the substance is its essence, and if its essence changes, then its identity has changed: it is no longer the same substance, it is instead an entirely different substance. — Arcane Sandwich

Aristotle's law of identity, allows that a material object has a changing form, yet maintains its identity as the same thing, through a temporal continuity assigned to the matter. A thing's identity may be its "essence", but its essence is ever changing, as form is "actual". This is why we can represent a thing as a subject for predication, and as time passes, contrary predications are true of the same subject. That is how Aristotle represented becoming, or change, as contrary predications to the same subject.

I think you misunderstand. According to , Rodi is differentiating between the judgement of "a is f", and the judgement of "I judge a is f". The former is a proper predication. The latter, in which the subject would be a self-conscious being, and the predicate would be a belief, cannot be accurately characterized as a predication.

This is the issue I argued in another thread, we cannot represent an idea as the property of a human subject in the way of predication, because this would require that we violate the fundamental laws of logic. (Peirce does this with universals.) For example, when a person deliberates while making a choice, one holds both of two contrary ideas in one's mind at the very same time. If we predicate those ideas of the subject, there would be violation of the law of noncontradiction.

This points back to what I said about how we would represent "the soul", earlier in the thread.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/958098
First, we determine that we would reject the idea that the soul is like a physical object with parts. (This was accomplished by Plato's argument against the soul being a harmony.) However, Aristotle demonstrated that "the soul" is an actuality, a substantive form. So it appears like we could represent "the soul" as a primary substance, and proceed to describe its properties in the way of predication. But because this procedure would lead to absurd conclusions, we must reject the idea that "the soul" is like an object which we can represent with subject/predicate relations.

So, the soul has "properties" of a sort, represented by Aristotle as potentia, capacities, or powers, but we see now that these capacities cannot be described by proper predication, because this creates a situation in which the fundamental laws of logic would be violated. This is the issue Aristotle came across with the proposal of "matter", and "potential" in general. To properly understand these concepts, violation of the fundamental laws of logic was required. He proposed we adhere to the law of noncontradiction, but allow for violation of the law of excluded middle.

Perhaps we don't say it, but we think it, don't we? I mean, if someone asked you, "Does time continue passing while you're asleep," you'd answer, "yes" wouldn't you? — ucarr

Of course, but I think that time passes. You, on the other hand think that the present moves through time instead of time passing. That's the issue, do you really think that you're moving through time while you're sleeping, or do you think that time is passing while you're sleeping?

Time is conventionally conceived as being a dimension. — ucarr

I know, and that's what I am arguing is a faulty conception. You can explain it to me all you want, but unless you justify it, your explanations do nothing for me.

I now suspect you're theory posits time, not as a dimension emergent from matter_energy transfer systems, but as another dynamical system in itself. — ucarr

That's right, but for the reason explained, "system" is the wrong word.

Even if it is, cast in this role, it exemplifies the animation of matter, and is therefore not apart from it. — ucarr

This is backward. The animation of matter exemplifies time, not vice versa. The animation of matter is the example. This means that the animation of matter is not separate from time, but time is separate from the animation of matter. The relationship of necessity is in one direction, but not the other.

Human beings exemplify "animal" and there is a relationship of logical necessity which means that a human being is necessarily an animal. But "animal" is separate from humane beings, and there could be animals even if there was no human beings, because there is no logical necessity that an animal is a human being. Likewise, there is a relationship of necessity which means that animated matter implies that time is passing. However, "time" is separate from the animation of matter because there is no logical necessity which implies that if time is passing there must be animated matter.

This is the "logical possibility" I demonstrated to you, which you refuse to accept. Since this is causing you difficulty, here is another way to look at it. Consider that during a period of time, it is possible that some things can be stationary relative to each other. If it is possible that during one period of time some things can be stationary relative to each other, then it is also possible that at a period of time all things might be stationary relative to each other.

If you already know this, then you need to immediately tell your reader you’re rejecting the conventional wisdom and embarking on a radically different path to discovery about the identity of time. — ucarr

Of course, I've been dismissing "the conventional wisdom" on time, from the beginning. That is the point. We started with a discussion of how "the present" as a point in time, a convention which enabled the measurement of periods of time, leads to significant ontological problems. When you appeared receptive to that analysis which demonstrated the faults of this conception, I proceeded toward explaining a possible solution. But now you seem very reluctant to leave the comfort of your convention, and so you fall back on "conventional wisdom" insisting that we adhere to it, despite the fact that you seemed to agree with the demonstration which showed that the conventional wisdom is faulty.

Sound thinking in physics says spacetime can exist without matter_energy. If it’s the source of matter_energy systems, then we ask whether time alone is a system. If so, what kind of system, how does it work, and how does it ground matter_energy systems? I think these major concepts should be put into the first paragraph of your theory. — ucarr

As I explained, systems are artificial, made by human beings, and time existed before there was human beings. So this "systems" perspective is a non-starter.

When you model an object as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, does the modeled object remain static and only appear to be animated on the basis of relative motion? — ucarr

No, it means that without the passage of time, the object would not change. It, the object in itself, is fundamentally static, and the passing of time is what causes it to be active.

Is time passing without anything happening an activity of time? I ask this question because if time makes itself pass, then to my understanding that's time being active, and thus it's an activity of time. To me these seem to be correct readings of what the language signifies. — ucarr

Correct.

Is the activity of time passing without anything happening an event? I ask this question because it seems to me that time passing without anything happening is something happening and I know events happen, so this too must be something happening, even though it's time passing without anything happening. — ucarr

No, I drew this distinction all ready. An "event" is a particular physical thing which happens. It is describable by the terms and laws of physics. That is the way we understand "event". The activity of time passing is something more general which encompasses all events. Therefore it cannot be an event itself.

Imagine that each and every event exemplifies the passing of time. It's impossible that the passing of time could itself be an event, for much the same reason that it is impossible for a set to be a member of itself.

For example, consider a multitude of particular objects which exemplify the colour red. In order for a multitude to exemplify that property, "red", there must be something which forms the basis for that category, "red". It is impossible that the basis for that category is itself a red thing, because this would mean that every object in that category would have to be the exact same as that one red thing, leaving that thing as the sole member of the category.

For those reasons, you can see why it is necessary to maintain the distinction between the particular "event", and the general activity called "the passing of time".

Here you're keeping activity and event distinct? Also, since time is physical, please explain how time passes without any physical event occurring. — ucarr

Time is not physical, and that's a big reason why "conventional wisdom" is so faulty. Since there is no physical thing, which qualifies as "time" we just stipulate principles, like we do with mathematical axioms. When the principles prove to be useful, they become conventional. Neither "conventional" nor "useful" implies true.

So, "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events"? — ucarr

Correct.

So, time, being immaterial, causes material things to change by passing. This, then, exemplifies the concept of "freewill" that allows for the reality of a cause which is not a physical event? — ucarr

I'd say rather, that it is consistent with the concept of free will.

The argument is simple. Inside a spaceship, the substance being forced through a membrane establishes a frame of reference wherein it's stationary relative to the substance being forced through it. Outside the spaceship, we realize the membrane, like the substance being forced through it, exists in a state of motion. Anything dimensionally extended - something you want to do to the present tense - has a variable state of motion depending upon its frame of reference. So your dimensionally extended present tense is part of the phenomenon of relative motion. How does this agree with your claim the present, dimensionally extended, is static, and thus future moves directly to past, skipping over present? — ucarr

This argument is irrelevant because you are talking about spatial dimensions, and I am talking about temporal dimensions, so the principles do not apply. You are comparing apples and oranges. And only through the incompatible premise which makes time a spatial dimension, could the comparison be made.

This shows logical possibility is not always proof of facts. So, a logically valid argument does not necessarily support a given proposition, such as time can pass in a duration closed to events. — ucarr

As I said, the logical possibility is not presented as proof. However it does support the proposition, as evidence. But freewill allows us to deny and refuse (which is your approach), even things which are necessary. But the evidence remains evidence for those who accept it, until it is proven to be actually impossible.

These foundations can be turned on their head, and then the facts become organized in a completely differently way, revealing a completely different sense of meaning, as when paradigms shift. Turning the foundation on its head isn’t doubting that foundation or making it false. — Joshs

Turning the foundation on its head requires doubting it. Only by doubting it, will we seek a better way. We will never "change our whole way of looking at things", unless we first doubt our current way of looking at things.

So for example, Witt says "water boils at 100 C". But @Banno qualifies this with "at sea level". The need for such a qualification gives reason to doubt the original way of looking at things, "water boils at 100 C". The skeptic might then propose the hypothesis that the boiling of water is a feature of environmental pressure rather than a feature of the internal temperature of the water, and experiments could be carried out accordingly. If the experiments confirm what is proposed, this could lead to us changing our way of looking at things, that foundation would be overturned. But this cannot occur without doubt, so doubt is an essential feature of shifting paradigms (ways of looking at things).

If it makes you feel better, Rodl would be correct when it comes to angels. Self-judging judgments require temporal-discursive reason. That might be my response to Kimhi and Rodl: I see your dissatisfaction with excessively compositional reasoning schemes, but it is true that we are not angels. There is a strongly compositional aspect to the way we reason. Reducing our reasoning to ratio makes no sense, but it is also wrong to reduce it to intellectus. We are involved in both. — Leontiskos

I don't see how you can make the leap from "I think like this" to "we think like this". You can judge "I am not an angel", but what validates "we are not angels"? Angels may walk amongst us, like Jesus did.

The process known as evolution is dependent on substantial differences within the multitude designated by "we". This difference demonstrates the faultiness of general conclusions concerning "the way we reason".

Absolute Idealism cannot be turned into Dialectical Materialism. — Arcane Sandwich

I wouldn't be so quick to make that judgement. But I don't see what this has to do with whether or not there is a reincarnation of Hegel.

I guess this depends on what "be turned into" means. There is a break in the continuity of identity which is implied by that phrase. And there is a special term for such a break in the continuity of identity, it is generally known as a "transformation". "Reincarnation" also implies a type of transformation, as does "transubstantiation". The concept of "transformation" has been a great gift to creative philosophers. Now there must have been some jealousy from the mathematicians, because the concept "transformation", has now been adopted into mathematics and physics, enabling lofty sophistry.

When I finished reading this sentence, I slapped my palm to my forehead and exclaimed, "Oh, man! Now he tells me!"

Given that your theory makes radical changes to the view of time, whether it's viewed through the lens of common sense, or viewed scientifically, it's belatedly clear you have neglected your responsibility to your readers.

In order to prevent them from wasting their time with many irrelevant questions aimed at clarification of your premises and their applications, you need to write a pamphlet, booklet or book exposing the foundational components of your theory and their ramifications. — ucarr

I think it was obvious what I was saying. And it's obvious to anyone who has given it any thought. What I was saying is very simple, and consistent with experience and how we commonly speak. We say that time is passing when the day of Jan 4 is replaced with the day of Jan 5. We say that time passed overnight. We do not say that we were moving through time while we were asleep

Here's another fragment from your list of radical premises: Time is an activity somehow distinct from the animation of material things. I infer from this that it's related to this: Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events.

Immediately another gnarly issue arises: there appears to be an inconsistency between: "the passing of time itself is an activity, a process..." and "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events." How is it that time as an activity is not an event? Perhaps you have a cogent answer to this question. What you've written here looks like a contradiction. In your writing, you're doing a terrible job of communicating.

So far, your rollout of your theory is a tissue of radical premises obscurely explained and embedded within a continuity containing contradictions. — ucarr

Activity is the condition of being active, an event is a thing which happens. I see no contradiction in saying that the passing of time is an activity which is not an event. This is simply to say that there is not any particular physical "thing" (event) which happens, which is describable as the activity which we know as the passing of time. It is an activity which cannot be described as "a thing which happens". Instead, we describe it by the general terms of "time passing".

I see that you have problems imagining the possibility of time passing without anything happening, and you are inclined to refuse this conception, but that's simply your refusal, your denial, having an effect on your ability to understand what I am saying.

Now you tell us material objects are not animated, yet they are being changed by the flow of time. So, a material object doesn't move. — ucarr

No, I did not say this, and this is not what I am proposing at all. As I said movement is the change of position of an object relative to another. What I said is that movement is caused by the passing of time.

You make a pronouncement that flies in the face of everyday experience, then give us no explanation why it isn't blatant nonsense. — ucarr

I think what I say is very consistent with everyday experience, and saying things like "we move through time" "the present moves through time", is what is not consistent with our experience. Really, when people say that we are moving through time, this only makes sense as a metaphor. Where is this medium called "time" which we would be traveling through? Obviously, anyone who considers the reality of the situation recognizes that time is passing, and we are not passing through time.

This contradicts: "Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events." — ucarr

It appears contradictory to you, because in your condition of denial, you refuse to allow the possibility of what I demonstrated as a valid logical possibility, that time could be passing without any physical event occurring. Therefore you refuse to accept the distinction between being active, and being an event.

The term "event" is restricted to a physical happening, but "active" is not restricted in this way. Therefore whatever it is which is active, is not necessarily a physical event. A physicalist would deny this difference, disallowing that there is anything more to reality than physical things and events. But anyone who recognizes the reality of what is known as "the immaterial", will allow for the reality of activity which is other than physical.

This is why I warned you that it would be pointless to proceed into this discussion without accepting the reality of freewill. The concept of "freewill" allows for the reality of a cause which is not a physical event. If you cling to physicalist/determinist principles, you will simply deny and refuse the principles which make this thesis intelligible, and claim contradiction, as you are doing. So, if you refuse to relinquish this attitude, further discussion would be pointless.

You say that motion is relative, and you say that the present is dimensionally extended. Since relative motion requires dimensional extension, you must explain why a dimensionally extended present is not a part of the phenomenon of relative motion. This explanation is especially important given the role of the present as a separator of future and past that moves in relation to them. How else could it separate them? — ucarr

I really do not understand what you are asking, but it appears like you are saying that any separator between future and past must be moving. I explained to you why this is false, and provided an example, the substance being forced through a membrane.

What's the value of an "example" that's merely whimsy about how the world might be? — ucarr

I told you the value of the example. It's a logical possibility. You refuse things based on your claim of "contradictory". But it only appears contradictory to you because you refuse to accept a valid logical possibility. When you accept it as a valid possibility, then your claim of contradiction disappears. It is logically possible that time can pass without any physical change occurring. You refuse and deny this logical possibility, and that's what creates problems for you. You frame it as a problem for my theory of time, but it's not. It's just a problem with your attitude.

I know your narrative overall is very complicated, but for the moment, I ask how can memories of the future not be what humans experience, given your claim time is prior to events? Since human lives consist of moments strung together, and time, as you say, is prior to all of these moments, how can our lives not be memories of what hasn't yet happened? You're the one frequently claiming the future jumps into the past. — ucarr

Sorry, I really can't decipher what you are asking here.

Firstly, understanding that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event is an awareness that happens in the empirical now, not in the future. So, the possibility of an event, an abstraction of the mind, does not reside in the mind in the future, but rather in the empirical now. — ucarr

I'm not talking about "possibility" here, as an abstraction in the mind. I am talking about ontological possibility.

Secondly, in what direction does the arrow of time for the conscious human individual move? If we say it moves from the future toward the past, then we’re also saying the conscious human individual grows younger with the passing of time. — ucarr

That's a false conclusion for the reasons I've already explained.

Since the present moves in time, it's not static. — ucarr

Your preferred model of time might have the present moving in time, mine does not. And, I explained to you why mine does not. If you want to understand mine, then you have to drop this idea, because the two are incompatible. If you insist that time must be modeled as having the present moving in time, then we might as well end the discussion right now, because I'm not interested in that model, I think it is obviously false.

Time is a dimension, not a force. — ucarr

A "dimension" is an aspect, or feature of something. If time is a dimension, then what is it a dimension of?

Time is not a system, but a part of a system in the role of a dimension. — ucarr

OK then, what is "the system" which time is a dimension of? You do realize that all systems are artificial don't you? There is physical systems, and theoretical systems, but they are all produced by human beings. Are you saying that time is simply theoretical, part of a theoretical system? I think this is what you said earlier, when you defined time as a mathematical measurement.

I explained why you have to get beyond that idea of time if you want to develop a true understanding of time. As I said, you need to drop these preconceived ideas, if you want to discuss time with me, because I am not interested in discussing time with someone who will relentlessly insist on false premises.

With this claim you validate the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. — ucarr

Again, you are applying incompatible premises in an effort to make what I say look contradictory.. The start time does not have to be "the present". It's not, that's the point of the example. As the example clearly shows, the start time is "the future". The future is first. If time started then it is necessary that there was a future before there was a past or a present. The only way to avoid this is to say that time is eternal, but that has problems.

There is the ever-closer approach to a start and to an end, but no arrival. — ucarr

I'm not interesting in discussing the deficiencies of mathematics.

No one disputes time being required for events. How does the temporal extension of events prove time is logically prior to them? — ucarr

As I said, this is not proven, That time might pass without physical events, is offered as a logical possibility which needs to be considered, instead of simply rejected as impossible.

I don't read your statement as a self-evident truth. — ucarr

What is offered as self-evident truth is free will. And, when something other than a physical event (a free will), selects a possibility, and causes a physical event, this implies an activity (cause) which is not a physical event. Do you understand this basic principle? The physical event which is caused by a free will, is not caused by a physical event, it is caused by a free will. This implies a cause which is not a physical event. As a cause, it is necessarily an activity. And, activity requires time. Therefore we have time and activity without a physical event. There is an event which is caused by that activity but such an event is posterior to that activity.

Moreover, you haven't described any action time performs apart from material things. — ucarr

This is not true. I described the activity of time, as the future becoming the past. You simply did not accept my description, insisting instead on a model which has the present moving from past to future. But, as I explained above, my model of "time passing" is consistent with how we experience, know, and understand the reality of time. Your model of "the present moving", is not consistent with our experience.

No one disputes time being required for events.

...

I don't exactly agree time is required for events. — ucarr

Hmm, what can I say about this, sloppy writing?

Events and time are parts of a dynamical system, with time supplying the temporal parameters of the system. Is time the cause of something it's a part of? This question spotlights the likely fact time under your theory's causal hiearchy is a proper subset of the dynamics of physics. If it's a cause of its own superset, then that's saying it is its own superset. The comprehension restriction of set theory prohibits a set from being the proper subset of itself. — ucarr

Let me remind you, a "system" is always artificial. In one sense of "system" we construct a physical system, according to a design. In another sense of "system" we model a natural thing according to system theory. The thing itself is not taken to be a system, it is modeled according to a system theory.

You may model a system, and include time as a part of that system, but I'm not interested in such false representations.

So you are separating events from time. — ucarr

Well of course. If you're just starting to see that now, then where were you?

So show me your measurements of time passing without events passing concurrently. — ucarr

We discussed the difference between the measurement and the thing which is measured, way back.
Now, do you agree that a measurement requires an act of measuring. There is no measurement without that act of measuring. However, the thing to be measured exists as the thing to be measured, regardless of whether it has been measured or not. Because I am discussing the thing to be measured, and an approach toward the means for making accurate measurements, your request for measurements is unwarranted.



.

You said, "The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end)." I agree, but is that understanding from the individual or another? That understanding is of interest because it can be two sided....what does it take to do that? To understand? For self to? For all to? — Kizzy

I believe that proper "justification" requires demonstration to another. However, we do use "justification" to refer when a person justifies something to oneself. There is definitely ambiguity here. We could call one a "subjective" justification and the other "objective" justification, but this produces ambiguity in our use of "objective", which could be a problem in epistemology We would now have a proper sense of "objective", meaning of the object, and a sense of "objective" which refers to properties of subjects, like "objective knowledge". The latter is better known as "intersubective", or something like that, and needs to be distinguished from the proper sense of "objective", referring to a proper object.

In our discussion, "the object" is the goal, and the question is whether a person can be acting towards a goal which they do no even apprehend. Notice, that if it is an apprehended goal, it is within the subject's mind, therefore subjective. So this is an indication that the true object, or goal, is not within the subject's mind.

We dont believe ourselves, that is uncertainty. We need to accept the unknown with trust, I said that before. BUT at other times, it happens and is knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time, conscious reassuring to self. A feeling becomes a knowing of surety when it is felt within us...we KNOW and no one can know THIS feeling like we do...some will swear they KNOW what you mean. How can they? Do you have to believe them? When would you? When it's nothing but love. Those intentions that are masked while the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what...only one outcome exists for every moment that passes...too quick to ever fully get a hold, however a quick glimpse of that is all we really only NEED. It's in the life lead of a conscious being in harmony with their nature...and in nature? — Kizzy

So I believe this sense of "KNOW" which you refer to here ("knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time", for example) is not beyond doubt at all. It's a subjective belief, where "supposed to be" is supported by the subject's apprehension of an object, goal.

But why do you say "the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what"? If a subjective goal, or failure to apprehend the true objective goal can misguide the person, such that the goal is not realized, then what validates your claim that the goal is reached no matter what? To make your claim true, we'd have to remove the reality of "the goal" completely, and instead assert that whatever obtains was "the goal". But that means there could not have been any goal prior to the consequences of the act, because whatever occurs as the result of the act is designated to be the goal.

What if intention can be justified as the morality in the acts itself, could the desire and therefore the goal be knowable or NOW known? — Kizzy

I do not understand how we could talk about the morality in the act itself. In order to be judged as good or bad, the act must be related to something, some kind of principles for judgement. Morality is based on a relationship.

So, where I think, the intentions can be changed in any moment, it is the desire that is the realest thing towards knowing any truth of any reasonable matter because it is that which is the drive behind the light from the darkness and back into the dark... — Kizzy

You seem to be portraying "desire" as an underlying urge to act in a certain direction, while "intention" refers to moment to moment choices of action. So "desire" has more temporal duration, while "intentions" change from moment to moment depending on circumstances. Both of these are subjective, so where would the goal or "object" lie? Would the object be associated with the desire, or would it be associated with the intention?

But what if consciousness updates our being with a goal through the intentions that change in decision making moments, because of whatever reason? What if being conscious of the goal, or what we think is the goal changes the DIRECTION not the desire but how we move in life to get through the next day? I think its important before we or anyone implies their judgement that it's necessary to verify the credibility of the people judging and the objective nature of what comes from a judgement. A group or person may be wrong in their judgement without a standard way of verification that the judgement is necessary in the first place.. — Kizzy

If we position "the goal" in this way, as what is produced by the conscious mind, from moment to moment, as what guides our immediate actions, then how could "desire" relate to the goal? If the conscious decisions dictate our actions from one moment to the next, then it would appear that desire is totally excluded as not having any influence. However, we could allow that desire influences the conscious mind in its decision making, but how would that work?

If the conscious mind consciously apprehends the desire, and formulates its actions toward what is desired, then "the object" must be associated with the desire. But then the conscious mind would have no option but to follow the desire, recognizing that the desire is directed toward the true object, and this would rob the mind's capacity for choice. But if the conscious mind itself is what is directed toward the true object, and the desire influences its apprehension or grasp of its object, then how could the conscious mind possibly grasp and understand this influence? The desire would be interfering in the mind's domain of ruling what is the true object, and the mind would have to ignore it as irrelevant. However, the desire as the persistent underlying force which inclines one to act, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in this way. For the mind to enact such a dismissal, would be a false, not real way of dealing with the influence of the desire. Therefore the true location of "the object" remains obscured.

I will say maybe you did not follow up on my answer to your original question because of my formatting and style, that is on me then. It is properly known that my writing style can be not easy to follow, but only for those willing. Some are not willing to even read at all. Good. You should have to try and understand not just follow lines of words. They are not for everyone. Good. — Kizzy

To be honest, my reply was long and drawn out already, and I saw the mention of time, and the other thread, as a good place to curtail it, and request that part of your post be addressed in the other thread. I could go back and address it here if you want though. It was just a desire to not put too much material in one post, especially since I was running out of time and wanted to post it. That was my goal.

I'm asking you to say what you think happens as you travel in time. As you move from Jan 4 to Jan 5, do you get younger, or do you get older? — ucarr

We do not travel in time, we do not move from Jan 4 to Jan 5 in this model of time. This is the principal difference of the model. Things, or people, do not move through time, the passing of time itself is an activity, a process, and this process has an effect on us, it causes change. When you model an object as moving through time, you model it as moving from past to future, but if you model it as fundamentally static, yet being changed by the flow of time, then change and movement are caused, by the passing of time.

this amounts to saying the future causes the past to move toward the more distant past. — ucarr

That's a correct representation. I described the future becoming the past as a force. We, as human beings work to maintain our position at the present (maintaining this position is known as survival), despite the force of the future pushing against us. But the force of the future always wins, and each human being is forced into death, then further and further into the past.

We know what you’re saying is backwards, as obviously the present*, as it moves forward in time, thus moving towards the updated, newer present, doesn’t move from the past to the more distant past. — ucarr

I see absolutely no reason to believe that the present moves, or changes in any way. The present is always the division between past and future, so clearly it does not change. And, movement, motion, is an observed property of physical things, relative to each other. We do not observe any such movement with respect to the present. You are simply assuming that the present is something moving through a static medium, "time", but this is a faulty representation, because what is actually moving is time itself. Imagine a membrane, a filter or something like that, and a substance is being forced through that membrane, and this results in a change to the substance. The membrane represents "the present", and the substance being forced through is time, being forced from future to past.

*The empirical present... — ucarr

As I explained, there is no such thing as the empirical present. Sensation is of the past, and anticipation is of the future. The two might be united in experience, but this does not produce an "empirical present", it produces a theoretical present. And, as I made great effort to explain to you, our theoretical present is inaccurate.

If you're saying Jan 4 progressing in time toward Jan 5... — ucarr

This is what your model would say, the model which puts the past as prior to the future. It would say that the past Jan 4 progresses toward the future, Jan 5. The rest of that passage makes no sense.

You haven't shown time independent of the animation of material objects because your supporting example, a thought experiment based upon imagination, is not evidence. Logical possibility necessitating corresponding physics remains unproven. This lack of proof is memorialized in Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. There are logical statements unproven by the rules that generate them, and there are physical systems unexplained logically. The scientific picture of the world is incomplete. — ucarr

You just asked for an example, not proof. I gave you an example, not proof. Please don't take it as an attempt at proof.

The time lag of experience rendered though the cognitive system has sentients experiencing the empirical present as a time-lagged older present relative to an ever-updating numerical present, an abstraction. This is evidence abstract thought is emergent from memory. Abstract thought emergent from memory is evidence the ever-updating numerical present is about time_future not yet extant. Since time_future is grounded in memory, this is evidence time_future is not an existentially independent reality standing apart from phenomena, but rather a component of a complex memory phenomenon. — ucarr

This is very wrong. "Future" cannot be grounded in memory. Memory applies only toward what has happened, the past. There are no memories of the future. "Future" is grounded in our apprehension of possibilities and anticipation of things to come, not memories of things past.

Now, going back to how we relate to events, we understand that the possibility for an event must always precede the actual occurrence of that event. This implies that the event, exists as a possibility, in the future, prior to its actual existence. as the event moves into the past. Since it is the case, with all physical events, that the possibility of the event must be prior in time to the actual occurrence of the event, this is very clear evidence, "proof" I might say, that the future of every event, is prior in time to its past.

Time is not on its own, i.e. not independent, for two reasons: a) time_future is an emergent property of a complex memory phenomenon; it is tied to the material animation of memory; b) time experienced empirically as the updating present is itself a physical phenomenon, and as such, it cannot be independent of itself. Relativity is a theory of physics; it is not a theory of abstract thought falsely conventionalized as immaterial. — ucarr

Human experience consists of both memory of the past, and anticipation of the future. You are focusing on "memory" while completely ignoring anticipation, so your representation is woefully inadequate.

Time experienced as the updating present is the empirical present ever moving forward within a physically real phenomenon. This movement from the present to a newer present posits an arrow of time from present to newer present. It also posits an arrow of entropy from the present state of order to a lesser state of order. Both arrows move toward a newer state. — ucarr

Again, you are simply representing time as static, with the present moving through time. This is what I argue is the bad (unreal) representation. Any complete analysis, as I am working at, will reveal that time is really active, and "the present" is just the way that we conceptualize this activity.

Since time, being itself a phenomenon, is not prior to other phenomena, its progression is therefore contemporary with the animate phenomena it tracks numerically. — ucarr

This is no progression of time in your representation, only a movement of the present to a newer present. But if the present moves this way, along the time line, or however you conceive it, something must move it, a cause, or force which propels the present along the line. But it should be obvious to you that there is no such activity as the present being propelled along a line. The real activity is the future becoming the past, and this is simply modeled as the present being propelled down a line. Of course that model is obviously wrong because the idea that there is a force in the world propelling the present down a line, is simply unintelligible, incoherent. What is really the case, is that there is a force which causes possibilities to actualize as time passes. This is very obvious, and this is the future (possibilities) becoming the past (actualities)..

See above for my counter-narrative to your premise time is prior to the phenomena (events) it tracks numerically. — ucarr

You have provided no counter-argument, only the assertion, which I agree to, that my example is not proof. It's just an example.

Since the start of time takes time, there is no extant time without a past. — ucarr

This is self-contradicting. If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. Your claim that "the start of time takes time" is contradictory, implying that there is time prior to the start of time implying that time is already required for time to start. This is clearly wrong, all that is required is a future, and along with that the impetus which causes it to become past.

.

You seem to be separating time from occurrence of events. — ucarr

Exactly.

I think all occurrences of events happen in time. — ucarr

I agree, and we can conclude that time is required for events. This means that time is logically prior to events, but not vise versa.

Following this line of reasoning that keeps time paired with events... — ucarr

This is faulty logic. That all events happen in time implies that time is required for events, but it does not imply that events are required for time.

If your argument is predicated upon the premise events occur outside of time (which includes dates) - and that appears to be the case - then it is obviously false. — ucarr

Why would you think this, when I've been arguing the exact opposite? I have been saying that time can pass without an event occurring. You did not like my example, saying that it doesn't prove this claim. It was not meant to prove the claim, only to support it by showing that it is logically possible for there to be time passing with no events occurring.

This process of the future becoming the past has the arrow of time moving in which direction: a) the events of Jan 5 change into the events of Jan 4; b) the events of Jan 4 change into the events of Jan 5? — ucarr

I don't see what you are asking. The events of Jan 4 are the events of Jan 4, and the events of Jan 5 are the events of Jan 5. One does not become the other. However, the time marked by, or referred to as "Jan 4", itself moves from being in the future to being in the past, as does the time referred to as "Jan 5".

The difference is that in my model, time itself is assigned substantial existence, as something. What we know as "the passing of time", which is the process by which the time indicated as "Jan 5" changes from being in the future to being in the past, is reified, understood to be something real, a real process. This "something" can be understood as the cause of all events. Time passing is not the events, nor is it an event, but it is the cause of events. And, we order events as past events being prior to future events, due to the way that events are observed by us through sensation. However, when we consider time on its own, as something which can be marked with indicators such as dates, then we understand that any indicated time, is in the future before it is in the past, like the example shows.

Here's another way of looking at it, which may or may not help you to understand. Imagine that there was a start to time, time started, there was a beginning to time. At the point when time began, there was future, but no past, because no time had passed yet, but there was time about to pass. And, as time passes, there becomes more and more past, and less and less future. Imagine a wind-up toy, fully wound, and ready to go. The process of its unwinding is fully in the future, but as it unwinds, it goes into the past. This demonstrates that future is prior to past.

Since you say, “time is unidirectional, future to past,” and also you say, “the day named as tomorrow becomes the day named as ‘yesterday,’” logically we have to conclude the arrow of time moves from Jan 5 to Jan 4. — ucarr

Why do you say this? If "Jan 4", and "Jan 5" referred to events, we'd say that Jan 4 occurs before Jan 5. But these do not refer to events, they refer to dates in time. If we made a timeline, based on our empirical observation of events, we'd see that the events of Jan 4 are prior in time, to the events of Jan 5, and we might be tempted to model "the flow of time" in that direction. However, this is because we are mapping the dates as events which occur. A true analysis shows that both Jan 4, and Jan 5. are in the future before they are in the past, so regardless of the order that these dates occur to us as events, the future part of time is prior to the past part of time.

Your conclusion doesn't seem to be valid, and I do not know how you derive it. The arrow of time has it that the day named as "Jan 4" was in the future before it was in the past, as is the case with the day named as "Jan 5". Now, today, the day named as "Jan 9" is in the future, but soon it will be in the past.

Now if we look at "Jan 9" as an event, instead of as a date, we will say that this event occurs after Jan 8 occurs, and we will represent this with a number line of sorts, showing that order. But according to my explanation, that number line represents the occurrence of events, it does not represent the passing of time.

The first statement of "when the sun orbits the earth", is what we know as the rotation of the earth on its axis. The second statement "the earth orbits the sun", is what we know as the earth revolving around the sun. These two do not model the same motion.

What we model as "the rotation of the earth" is the same motion as what you described as "when the sun orbits the earth". If we know the distance between the earth and sun, and assume the earth to be a point at the centre of a circular orbit, we could calculate the speed at which the sun orbits the earth, in that model in which the sun orbits the earth.

Good stuff, the quotes below are of my particular interest and I quoted them as I read the thread...Sitting now looking at them, I am fascinated in this thinking. The thinking thoughts are now typed words that are giving me ideas [right now even holding me accountable to them].... — Kizzy

You've given me a lot to look at Kizzy, and some of this I don't quite understand. So I'm going to address firstly, the distinction you mentioned between desire and intention, to hopefully lay some ground work for a base of understanding between us.

*reason=goal or desire? i think they exists with and without a belief system but im looking at linking goals or desires to ones purpose in life, the one that exists despite knowing it. Though knowable. Morals are justification itself.

you can have intention without a goal, i say yes..but can you without a desire? i say no..for now at least. Your intent though doesnt need its own purpose, because it doesnt mean you act on it according to how you imagined you would act...Once the act occurs, your purpose could be repurposed successfully... but how much it was planned, thought of or out vs imagined or believed .[ex. my intention was/is to have fun tonight-8.20.23 522pm]] AND without parameters or constraints OR GOALS, intentions can change in decision making moments through that experience of choosing to act/acting on those intentions and how what you imagined vs what reality played out was very different

Intentions show that the individual has thought.
What happens when you bypass your intentions? COULD INTENSIONS COULD BE THE BRAIN TRICKING ITS SELF OR BODY? WHETHER WE ACT ON THEM OR NOT..PLANNED OR RANDOM, COMPLETE ATTEMPT AND FAIL, OR SUCCESS OF WHAT FROM ACTION IS JUSTIFIED? IS IT STILL WITHOUT ACTION? " — Kizzy

I think, generally speaking, we use "intention" to refer to actions motivated by a conscious goal, and we use "desire" to refer to feelings which motivate actions. This is the most common form of "intention" as used in philosophy of mind, and social sciences, which frame intention as a property of human consciousness and reason. In this case, strict adherence to definitions implies that an intentional act would require thought out reasons, and a conscious goal. This puts "the object" of intention, the goal, into the domain of knowledge, what the person knows (though it is essentially subjective knowledge). On the other hand, since a desire derives directly through emotions and feelings, it can incline, and produce an activity, where "the object" of the act, the goal is completely unknown This is the case when we are "overcome by passion". The act is based in emotion, hate, anger, lust, etc., and the object, or goal of that act may not be adequately known. In other words, the act is produced without consciously considering what the end will be.

However, this separation leaves a large grey area where the two relate to each other. In law for example, a person cannot excuse oneself from the rule of law by saying I was overcome by passion, I had no particular goal in mind when I did that, therefore it was not an intentional act, and I am not responsible. So moral philosophy relies on a much broader definition of "intention", from the one proposed by some philosophers of mind, who want to tie "intention" strictly to the conscious mind.

This definition ties intention to "purpose". The key difference here, is that when we say that a person, or even a thing, acts with a purpose, it is not necessary that the purpose is known to the the acter. So when we say that the various parts of a machine have a function, we mean that they have a purpose, and intention is implied. The "intention" is associated with the creator of the machine. This broader definition of "intention" effectively rids us of the grey area between "intention" and "desire", by bringing acts which are motivated by emotions and desires, where the goal is not adequately understood by the acter, into the category of "intentional".

Broadening the definition of "intention" in this way, has its own problems though. By placing the object, or goal of intention, as not necessarily grasped by the mind of the agent which is acting intentionally, we allow that all sorts of purposeful acts are intentional. Therefore we see all sorts of intention throughout the acts of creatures in the biological world. And we see intention in the parts of living beings; the heart, the lungs, etc., demonstrate purpose, and therefore intention is behind the actions of these parts. This is a problem, because knowing the object, the goal, is what makes intention intelligible to us, because the intentional act can be justified as the means to the end, in the way I described. But when the act demonstrates purpose yet the object or goal is unknown, then we just speculate as to the goal, and even question whether there is truly intention there. Furthermore, the possibility of an intentional act without an object or goal, must be allowed for, and this is completely foreign to the thinkings of the conscious mind, which requires justification for any proposed intentional act, as means to some end.

The result is, that when we allow that we may be inclined, motivated, and actually carry out acts, without an understanding of the relationship between the act and an end, as in the case of emotional acts, being overcome by passion, etc., we allow that intentional acts may be carried out without an object or goal, whatsoever. This ought to shake our confidence in all that we think we know about "intention", because the way that we've always understood "intention" is as actions directed toward goals. Now there is a need to remove the requirement of a goal, and understand intentional acts as purposeful acts without a goal. So in relation to traditional understanding of intention, this makes "intention" completely unintelligible because we need to understand an intentional act as an act without an object or goal, rather than as an act with a goal, and the goal is what makes the act intelligible.

Personal opinions are both bad and good, though no? Bias is opinion based, some outspoken far from the silence of their own wonderings within the mind...when bias or opinion based beliefs, reasons, or claims is used as an excuse to not continue towards finding that real good...lack of acceptance or awareness or willingness to see self and others. See the self in others. When our personal opinions are preventing US (together) from reaching higher levels or desires (which are, personal) then the real problem is in the excuse to NOT act towards higher levels because for some it is not easy tolerating others opinions and these tolerances are at different limits. They are valid, even when reasonable doubt arises. We doubt our selves and others, but how do you know I never doubted from the start? Does that chance exist to prove some one or our selves wrong? Right? Transcending personal opinion requires lessons to be learned, a settlement is justified in itself at that decision making moment. Maybe they never knew what they truly desired and are scared that they already foresee the truth, and it's not good. — Kizzy

I would say that we need to recognize, and adhere to the principle that "bad" and "good" are judgements. So when we talk about "the real good", and whether or not there is such a thing as "the real good", this is a judgement too. And if we maintain the principle outlined above, that intentional acts may be carried out without an object, or goal, i.e. without a good, then we have a very real problem with the assumption of "real good". This makes all your discussion of "higher levels" grounded only in the supposed good of "US (together)", but what makes "US (together)" a good itself? See, intentional acts are inherently acts which are carried out without a goal (like trial and error maybe), and from these acts goals are created. But what criteria is used to judge a goal as a good goal rather than a bad goal?

Can we break this down more? I am confused at the way you put into text the inverse statement and how it was incorrectly asserted that the motivating "object" cannot be outside the sphere of knowledge. Are you saying the justification ITSELF is justified knowledge Understood by GOD, how does one understand such things? Seeing? Learning? Observing? Living? Watching? I think it's more of a KNOWING. A knowing and a faith that goes beyond questioning, doubts, and opinions. Beyond good or bad, into.....the light! — Kizzy

I was responding to the quote from Peirce, where it was claimed that "the object" must be within the realm of knowledge. I think it's obvious from the evidence we have, of real intentional acts, that the object, or goal of the intentional act may not be known at all. In fact, from my exposé above, it may be the case that the true essence of an intentional act is an act without a goal, where understanding of "the goal" is developed after the act.

The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end). The end is completely opinion based, as explained. This means that if the act itself is liked, enjoyed, or in any way preferred by the person, whatever is produced from that act, will be claimed to be the intentional end, because this justifies the preferred act. For example, "the act produces happiness". In that way the means becomes what is desired, and the end becomes completely irrelevant, just manipulated words to support the desire for the action. This is why we need to look at the end from the other direction, not as the known object which inspires the act, and justifies the act, but as the unknown object which the act will produce. This forces the need to judge the object, end, goal, itself, rather than simply judging the means in relation to the end. The end, being opinion, is simply manipulated to support enjoyment of the activity, the means. Essentially, this is habit. The activity is what is enjoyed, and whatever is produce from that activity is rationalized as the desired end.

I have been following the back and forth with MU, it seems relevant to mention that from reading the other thread discussion currently being had encouraged me to respond HERE now. — Kizzy

I'm going to stop here, and keep the discussion of time to the other thread, which is more suited to that with the question of what does consciousness do, as a temporal question of activity. This thread asks about ideas, which are more like static things, involving objects, goals, while the other thread is about activities. Of course there is a lot of overlap, but I think it's best to make some sort of division. Maybe you can copy some of the questions from here over to there, if you want me to address them.

I did now. What about it?

Firstly, I asked you to give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. Instead, you ask me to imagine (along with you) half a Planck time. A conjecture, which has a measure of scientific and logical formalism, falls short of an example, which is evidence from the real world. The act of imagination you invite me join as proof of time's independence from measurement doesn't even have the nascent persuasiveness of a conjecture.

Secondly, even if we grant the existence of half a Planck time, such a reality of Planck time means material objects occupying that space, so how does that show time's independence from measurement via math tracking the change of position of a material object in space? It doesn't.

Your two closing lines indicate you are making your argument for time's independence by knowingly imagining something unreal and thus devoid of material objects. Of course, this argument also doesn't work, because, as I've said, unreal things don't count as evidence.

Thirdly, if we assume future technology will empower observation of material reality below the Planck scale, then continuing on this path, which you argue for logically, we make an ever more close approach to the present moment as a theoretical vanishing point with zero dimensions. I think this is the third time that your attempt to argue for your theory has you instead arguing for its refutation. — ucarr

To be clear. My example was time passing without any change occurring. I said "imagine what it means for time to pass, then imagine this happening without anything in the world changing". I then referred to Planck time to demonstrate that my example is logically possible. The example is not "unreal" as the Planck time demonstration shows. Therefore all of this criticism is misguided and not at all relevant.

our attempt to spin away from the present as zero dimensional doesn't work because your uni-directional time, future to past is just a word game. It has no effect whatsoever upon physical spacetime. We all know this because we all know that all we ever experience in reality is our asymptotically close approach to the present moment of time, and that's the very near past chasing the very near present. When you declare that tomorrow is prior to today in time, you always make this declaration in the nearly present moment. Our thoughts are not prior to our position in time, regardless of the word games we play. Even if it's true our minds make decisions before our conscious awareness of them, the neuronal activity at the subconscious level is still the near past chasing the near present. The arrow of time for the real, physical time is the near past chasing the near present. — ucarr

There is no such thing as "physical spacetime". Spacetime is conceptual. And none of this makes any sense. Your reference to "near past", and "near present" are incoherent. What could you be referring to with this other than "future"? But that would mean that you are saying that all we ever experience is the future. But that's my proposal, that we experience the future as near to the past, and you want to be arguing against my proposal. So this argument makes no sense at all.

If the arrow of time has breadth, then it is an area and not a line. How does this change time's operations within the context of relativity, which shows us some of its operations in three dimensions? You also say time has thickness; that means the arrow of time has three dimensions. Does your arrow of time merge into relativity? — ucarr

Relativity theory is not applicable, being an incompatible theory as I explained last post.

Your desire to expand the present tense (of the timeline) positions you to explain how your reversal of the arrow of time doesn't also reverse the direction of entropy. — ucarr

The arrow of time is not reversed! It's simply a different model. I've told you this numerous times now, but you just don't get it. Switching from the geocentric to the heliocentric model of the solar system does not change the direction that the planets move, it models the very same movement in a different way. My model does not change the arrow of time, it models it in a different way.

So your criticism about entropy is misguided and irrelevant, as is the rest of your criticism in this post.

And...does that mean I can't trust anything science says? — Darkneos

First, science does not say anything, scientists speak.

And of course, anything claimed as "science" ought to be approached with a healthy skepticism just like when the guy on the other end of the phone calling you says "I'm from the Windows department of your computer, you have a problem in here". This is what Socrates demonstrated the need for critical thinking. Unless we have good reason to trust and respect the person making the statements, then we ought not trust what the statement says.

There's a bit at the end of the paper that shows that theories can override our memory and interpretations even if the data is strong. — Darkneos

The way that one's attitude affects what the person remembers, is very interesting. Even a healthy person has a sort of selective memory. And that's the best scenario. A person with mental illness tends to have a creative memory. The person with the creative memory will remember things in a way which would be judged as unreal. Then, there are all sorts of variations between these two extremes.

A lot of it has to do with how a person "attends" to things, how one's attention is focused. And this focusing of one's mind is greatly influenced by one's intentions. For example, if you are speaking to a very selfish person, the person will be "intent on" (meaning having one's attention focused on) strategizing ways to get what they want from you. This will influence the way that they hear what you say. If the selfishness is to the degree of mental illness, the memory will fabricate, according to the strategy one is intend on. When you approach that person later there will be much "you said this", and "you promised me that", which is inconsistent with what you remember.

In saying we can (correctly) model the world either way, you're basing your faith in the correctness of absolute time on New Age Physics? Since absolute time encompasses the entire world, then relative time, being incompatible, cannot coexist with it. So you must be proposing a multiverse containing two incompatible universes. Isn't such a multiverse a contradiction? Please click on the link below. — ucarr

As I said, I'm basing my faith in what I believe to be a self- evident truth, free will. I don't see how this relates to multiverses.

Please click on the link below.

New Age Physics — ucarr

This theory is actually very different from mine. There is a sort of starting premise which is similar to one of mine, what I said about the passing of time being a force, the future forces itself upon us. Here's the similar statement from the New Age Physics article:

One crucial component of my ‘Theory of Universal Absolutivity’, is that the flow of Time is the source of all kinetic energy because it enables all movement. This becomes very apparent when not ‘at rest’, i.e. when subject to a force other than just the forward progression of Time. Owing to the curvature of space created by the Earth’s mass, all human beings experience the ‘force’ of gravity, that being the Earth’s resistance to our continual forward momentum through space-time towards the centre of the Earth. We still progress through the universe at exactly the same speed of Absolute-Time – (there is no other option!) – but we are in resistance to this speed because we are not in an inertial frame of reference. So, for example, when we walk up stairs, or sharply change direction in a car, the additional pressure we experience is our increased resistance to vectors of Absolute-Time.

The big difference though, is that the New Age theory does not take the very important premise of free will. It is the premise of free will which makes the future to past flow of time evident, as we seek the means to avoid being swept into the past (the means to survival), by the force of the future becoming the past. The other thing which the New Age theory doesn't provide, which is necessitated by free will, is the multi-dimensional present.

The issue of free will is what makes time relevant to the op.

If you don't at all understand what I'm asking above, then this might be evidence you, no less than I, have a fundamental problem with the rolling out of your theory in the fullness of its detail. You, like I, appear to be struggling to achieve a clear and full comprehension of some possibly important ramifications of the details of your theory. Take another look at what you posted earlier: — ucarr

Yeah sure, I agree with this. As I said, time is a very difficult subject which no one has a good understanding of. And of course, that includes me.

I think a dimensionally extended present - it contains a future_present_past timeline - entails nesting a second temporal timeline within a larger structure that also has a future_present_past timeline. — ucarr

You are not understanding the breadth of time at all. Start with this. How long is the present? That depends on context. The present might be 2025, a full year, it might be this week, today, this hour, this second, etc.. This way of determining the length of the present is completely dependent on one's purpose, so we can say it's arbitrary. Another way, to simply stipulate that the present is a dimensionless point between past and future, is demonstrably unreal, as we've discussed.

So, I propose that there is a true, non-arbitrary breadth of the present. So, not only do we have an arrow of time, the flow of time, but that arrow is not one-dimensional, it has a second dimension, breadth, the arrow has thickness. This is necessary to avoid the falsity of "the point of the present", and the arbitrariness of a duration of "the present".

This larger structure is the temporal timeline: future_present_past, including in its present, the second, nested future_present_past timeline. This multi-tiered complexity implies physical relationships whose questions about which you don't understand at all. — ucarr

So this is irrelevant being based in that misunderstanding.

If the Planck time is the shortest possible time duration, then half of that duration doesn't exist, so it can't be an example of time independent of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr

The Planck length is not the shortest possible time duration, nor did I say that it is. I said its the "shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world". Notice the difference. The limit here is imposed by the restrictions to empirical observation. However, it is not a logical restriction. A shorter time period is still logically possible. Just because we do not currently have the capacity to observe it, does not mean that we ought to rule it out as a logical possibility.

Do you speak to the deep interconnection of existing things, as in the context of the butterfly effect? — ucarr

No, I mean that if we have to conceive of the relation between space and time in such a way as to allow that some specific objects are recreated at each moment of passing time, it wouldn't make sense to also use another conception of that relation to represent the existence of other objects. We'd have two distinct and incompatible conceptions of the relations between space and time. Imagine if someone wanted to model the earth as orbiting the sun but have the other planets and stars modeled the geocentric way. It would not work.

You're committing your temporal theory to a uni-directional arrow of time featuring a future that progresses to the present, and then a present that progresses to the past? — ucarr

Not really. Time is unidirectional, future to past. This is an activity of the world, what we know as the future becoming the past, The day named as "tomorrow" becomes the day named as "yesterday" through this activity, this process of the future becoming the past. And, this activity is what is known as "the present". The real activity of this, in the assumed independent world, is what we termed "present-natural". However, "the present" also refers to how we represent this activity, for the sake of temporal measurement. That is "present-artificial". And these two constitute the two senses of "time", "time" as the thing measured being the former, and "time" as a measurement being the latter.

Does this process of continuous recreation entail an oscillation between construction/deconstruction of every existing thing? If so, why is the universe unstable in this way? — ucarr

There is no need for deconstruction. The existing things as constructed simply move into the past. Imagine a "flipbook", except each page is created at the moment of the present, instead of preexisting. The page then moves into the past. Remember what I described, the force of time is from future to past.

How are: a) Object A moves toward its future and b) the future moves toward Object A, its past decidable given that time moves in both directions, albeit in two different senses (one relative and one true)? — ucarr

As explained above. These two are incompatible. It's like the difference between relative time and absolute time, or geocentric/heliocentric. We can model the world either way, but we cannot use both because there will be incompatibility where the two overlap. So we cannot, in one inclusive model, represent object A in both ways.

Give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr

Simply imagine what it means for time to pass, then imagine this happening without anything in the world changing. Here's another way. Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible.

If this is what is already taking place, then how is your theory adding anything to the world? — ucarr

The free will activity is taking place, that is what you acknowledge. An accurate temporal representation of it does not exist because our representations are determinist. That's the problem.

Suppose you could say “Through manipulation of the timeline of time, I can calculate when the human individual can access freedom of choice at its maximum." That would be an example of you adding something useful to the world. — ucarr

This is exactly the misconception that I am trying to avoid. You are saying, instead of representing time and space in a way which allows that free will is real, let's just assume that someone, some day, will provide a way to show that determinism is true, and free will is not real. This is simply denial of the self-evident truth, which I referred to earlier, the truth of free will.

If the present is dimensionally extended, and if two different things are both in this dimensionally extended present, with one of the things overlapping this present with the past, and the other thing simply being in the present, then: a) what is the physics of the thing simultaneously in the present and the past; b) how are these two things related to each other within the present? — ucarr

I don't understand this at all.

n your context here, is movement from the past into the future a reversal of movement from the future into the past? — ucarr

It's just a different representation of the very same thing, like geocentric/heliocentric. In this case it is the determinist representation as compared to the free willist representation. One can represent either way.
But the two are incompatible so we cannot have one model which uses both, one to represent some aspects of reality, and the other to represent other aspects of reality, because things which interact between the two will be unrepresentable.

If time can move backwards in the relative sense, and yet time stays unidirectional in the true sense, are you implying time in the relative sense is something other than true? — ucarr

What I described is not "time moving backward". That is impossible. What I described is a hypothetical "thing", which could not be a natural thing, moving from the past to the future (reverse direction of time) by crossing the relational spectrum of "the present of different types of objects", essentially by moving faster against the flow of time, than the speed of the flow of time.

You're saying free choice remakes the universe? — ucarr

No, I am saying that in order for human beings to be able to act freely to change the universe at will, at any passing moment, these parts of the universe must be made anew at each passing moment. It does not makes sense to think that only some specific parts of the universe are created anew at each passing moment, so we need to assume that the entire universe is.

Consider "X exists". As time passes, at each moment, X continues to exist. Consider now, that at any moment of the present, as time passes, a free will act could annihilate X. Since it is possible to annihilate X at any moment of the present, then X cannot have any necessary existence prior to the present, i.e. in the future. If, at any moment of passing time, the existence of X at the next moment is necessary, then the free will act could not act to annihilate X at that moment. So X's existence in the future is not necessary. And since the free will could act at any moment, then there can be no existence of X in the future at any moment of the present. Therefore we must conclude that X must be recreated at each moment of passing time.

dimensional extension does not demand a specific direction, — ucarr

A specific direction is demanded. As I explained making the future prior to the past does not involve reversing the flow of time, it just involves recognizing that the future is prior to the past. For example, Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. This requires a sort of reifying of time, such that the day which we know as Jan 5 (that portion of time), can have a proper place "in time".

Are you interacting with a lot of readers who find your two above paragraphs to be a clear, thorough and easy to understand narration of your ontological theory? — ucarr

As far as I know you are the only one who read those paragraphs. And, I know from the fact that I have to repeat for you, that you have difficulty understanding me.

I claim that a good definition of time says it's a method of tracking motion by means of a numerical system of calculation and measurement. In other words, time is mathematics. — ucarr

What you are talking about is "time" as a measurement, mathematics. Aristotle, in his physics, thousands of years ago, explain how there is two distinct senses of "time". One sense is what you say here, "time" as measurement, but also there is a sense of "time" as what is measured. This is the distinction I made with present_artificial, and present_natural.

Consider for example, the existence of a clock. The clock is a device which is measuring the passing of time. So there is something real, independent from the mathematics, which the clock is measuring, the passing of time. This is "time" in the sense of what is measured, what we know as the passing of time, and this real passing of time is what grounds the so-called "arrow of time" as necessary.

On the other hand, we can also take the clock, and use it as you propose, to measure motion. This is a distinct sense of "time", because here "time" refers to principles for comparing motions using a conceptual structure. So if I time myself with a clock, and determine that it took me ten minutes to walk to the store, then what I am doing is comparing the temporal extension of that activity, to the temporal extension of whatever activity the clock is doing, calibrated by some principles, mathematics applied, and the conclusion, "ten minutes" is derived.

Notice, that in the second sense of "time", the one you describe, the real activity of time, the passing of time, is not even a required aspect for the measurement. It is implied that there is such a real passing of time, in the concept of "temporal extension", but it is not at all a required part of the measurement. The measurement is simply a product of comparing two different motions, through the application of principles.

Aside from slogging around in the verbiage you’ve been presenting, how are we to understand “discontinuity at the present, such that the world can ‘change’ at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act.”? Since this is what is already taking place, then how is your theory adding anything to the world? If, on the other hand, you could say “I can calculate when the human individual is present in the present at such time when the scope of freedom of choice is at maximum,” then, if true, your calculation would be adding something to the world. — ucarr

Sorry, I can't understand this.

Let's take the dictionary's word for that. And let's read that literally, as in, it is not open to interpretation. That being the case, if a qualification is literally a statement or assertion that makes another (statement or assertion) less absolute, then, by definition, it makes them (the statement or assertion in question) more relative. In general, to be less absolute is to be more relative, and to be less relative is to be more absolute. That, from a purely technical, formal standpoint. — Arcane Sandwich

Ucarr asked me if my temporal theory involves a unidirectional flow of time. I said yes, but since the present has dimensional breadth, the unidirectional aspect is somewhat qualified. The bread of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past prior to other types moving into the past, so that relatively speaking, if something were able to extend itself across the present (similar to acceleration in relativity theory), this thing could move from the past into the future, instead of the natural flow of time which has the future moving into the past. But this is a relative movement, which allows backward motion, across time, so time stays unidirectional in the true sense.

.

Here is a passage from Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity:

In De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle asserts that nous does not fall within the domain of physics. It does not lie within that domain, not because it lies outside it, in a different domain alongside that of physics. Rather, nous does not lie within the domain of physics because it cannot be included in any domain. For, just as the science of perception includes the object of perception, so the science of judgment – knowledge of the nature of judgment – is at the same time the science of the object of judgment – knowledge of the nature of the object of judgment. And the object of judgment is everything . . . Its object is illimitable.
— Rödl, p. 55

I know we have several Aristotelians on TPF. Could one of you tell me, first, whether this is an accurate account of what Aristotle argues, and second, whether it is a standard interpretation of Aristotle on this point? Many thanks. — J

I believe there is an important issue of translation/interpretation which needs to be dealt with here. This is a question of the way that we attribute "the powers of the soul", to the soul itself. In order to do this as a predication, we need to allow that "the soul" is an acceptable subject for predication. If we are inclined to deny the reality of "the soul" as an acceptable subject, then we simply move to avoid this predicament altogether by interpreting "the powers of the soul" as "the parts of the soul". The latter allows that "the soul" is simply the united living body, and "the parts" refers to a division of this body into separate organs or something like that. This latter interpretation allows for a materialist understanding.

From context, especially reference to "De Anima", we can see that Aristotle is proposing "the soul" as a proper subject for predication. "The soul" is proposed as an actuality in the sense of substantive form. And, that "form" itself, is substantive is supported by his "Metaphysics". This allows for the proposition "the soul is our subject of study".

However, we must respect the various ways in which propositions are presented. They are not necessarily offered as true, and what is very common with Aristotle is that he presents them as hypotheticals for the purpose of argumentation. So for example, he might be saying, "if it is true that the soul is a proper subject for study, what would be some of the logical conclusions we can derive from this premise". Then he judges those potential conclusions for acceptability, to determine whether or not "the soul is a proper subject for study" is a sound premise. I would say that this is the sort of interpretation we need to make of what is offered in the op. This is made more clear by the passage presented by

Personally, I never cared much for De Anima, but what makes it seem so odd to me, from a merely bibliographical standpoint, is that Aristotle's concept of the "active intellect" only appears once in the entire works of Aristotle, and it appears in one specific passage in De Anima. That's what most odd about that book, specifically. — Arcane Sandwich

I believe that the principle issue here is that prior to Aristotle it was understood that the human mind must be passive. This was assumed in order to allow that the mind receives the forms of objects. In perception and abstraction, it was assumed that the form of the material object was received by the mind. This represents the mind as passive in this event, and this is the common physicalist representation of today. The senses, and consequently the mind, are acted upon by the physical world, and the physical world is understood as causing an effect within the brain, or mind.

I believe Plato proposed an active component of the mind in (I think) "The Theaetetus". He described visual perception, seeing, as an activity extending outward from the eyes, meeting an activity coming from the object seen. You can see how this divides the active part of "seeing" into two distinct activities, the activity coming from the thing seen, and the activity originating in the mind. Aristotle furthers this distinction between the actuality of the physical world, and the actuality of the soul.

Post-Aristotelian thinkers had much difficulty, and consequently much discussion, as to how to properly locate both the passive and active parts of the intellect. If I understand correctly, the root of the difficulty was the problem of accounting for the reality of the passive intellect. Passivity, in Aristotelian principles is associated with matter, and allowing the intellect passivity is a move toward denying the immateriality of the intellect, and its assumed independent, eternal existence. So the difficulty was to allow for passivity, yet still allow for an eternal immaterial intellect. Aristotle's metaphysics denies that any potential could be eternal. This produced debate as to where the passive intellect is located, and depending on one's proposition for this, the active intellect would be assigned accordingly.

You need visual aides that will sharpen the clarity of what you're envisioning. — ucarr

I actually have produced some visual aids in the past, consisting of horizontal and vertical lines. These simple drawings are not difficult to produce. The difficult aspect is accepting the required premises. The reality of free will requires that some aspects of, or even the entire physical universe, must be created anew at every passing moment of time. This is very difficult to fathom, and most people prefer to just fall back on the determinist representation showing the continuity of a physical universe.

Your conceptualization of the present as dimensionally extended and bi-directional entails radical changes to establishment physics’ conventional view of time:

If the present has duration due to dimensional extension, then I ask if you’re nesting a tripartite past_present_future within the present? This is a big escalation of the complexity of the picture of time.

If the present is bi-directional,* then I ask if you’re nesting a tripartite past_present_future within the present that includes reversal of entropy. Since establishment physics’ conventional view of entropy is that it, like time, is unidirectional and only moves towards increasing disorder, then your “breadth of the present… would be a qualification to the unidirectionalness,” suggests your belief in a contrarian physics entailing a stupendous increase of complexity of the timeline of time. — ucarr

It is not the case that the time proposed is bi-directional. What I propose is that physical things come into existence (are recreated) at each moment of passing time. Once it is created at the present it cannot be changed, but until that moment it is not determined. The second dimension of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past (receive material existence) prior to others, at the present. This means that the present is multidimensional because some types of objects are already in the past (fixed), while other types are just beginning to materialize. Empirical evidence indicates that massive objects are created and move into the past first, that is why they have inertia, obey basic determinist laws, and it is more difficult for freely willed acts to change them. Massless things are created last, having their moment of the present later, and this provides free will the greater capacity to use them for change.

So consider the premise that anything, any state of being, which comes into existence at the present. must be predetermined (principle of sufficient reason) by something. Now imagine a number of parallel horizontal lines, as arrows of time, in the same direction, arrows pointing left. At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. "The present" refers to when each type of object gains its physical existence. Notice that at any moment, massive objects already have physical existence before massless objects do. This allows that a slight change to a massive object, through a freely will act, is capable of producing a large effect on massless objects. This effect we observe as our capacity to change things.

Your stupendously complexified timeline of time figures to be the centerpiece of your theory of time. If you persist in your claim the clarifying visualizations of math graphics is bad procedure for explicating the physics of time, I’ll start leaning heavily towards the conclusion you’re proceeding with a word-salad laden approach thoroughly benighted. — ucarr

Again, the key point is conceptualizing and contemplating time in such a way which allows for freedom of choice. This does not require mathematics, it requires accepting a discontinuity at the present, such that the world can "change" at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act. This implies that the physical world must be recreated at each moment of passing time. Once this principle is accepted, the dynamics of how this occurs (like the proposal above) can be discussed. Only when some of these basic principles can be ironed out, would diagrams and mathematics be useful.

Regarding your three paragraphs above, try to walk a mile in the shoes of one of your readers. You're describing a complex timeline nested within the present. The interweave of the three temporal phases (past, present, future) plus parallel lines featuring particles both massive and massless presents a very complicated concept. Visuals depicting the interactions of the parts is the right way to go.

Having to think your way through the visuals will usefully confront you with perplexities you're unlikely to see from the point of view of a verbal narrative. — ucarr

I have great respect for the "perplexities", and I've worked out a few, but I know there is far more left. If any mathematician, physicist, or cosmologist, will take the premises seriously, I would guide them through the application of their tools. However, any such effort would be pointless without agreement on fundamental premises, and this cannot be produced through mathematics or diagrams.

For Peirce, abstraction is dynamic, relational, and grounded in semiosis (the process of sign-making and interpretation). — Mapping the Medium

That sounds like nominalism to me. But I think it misses the point which separates Peirce from nominalism, making him closer to Platonist. For Peirce, the universal is an "object" and this name is supported by the assumption of "sameness", what you called "functional continuity across interpretations".

This assumed "continuity" of sameness, despite differences, is what allows the universal to be known as one object instead of many distinct conceptions in many distinct minds. This is analogous to the observed temporal continuity of the physical object which enables our assumption of "same", despite differences of change over time, instead of assuming a new object at each passing moment.

Notice that the title "object" is supported by an assumed continuity of existence, in both cases. The continuity of the physical object being supported by the assumed temporal continuity between distinct moments of existence, and the continuity of the universal being supported by the assumed coninuity produced from the use of signs.

The problem being that Peirce's semiosis, and proposed triadic structure cannot support this assumed continuity required for his determination of "sameness", and "object". By placing the object outside the relationship between interpretant and representamen, as your diagram neatly shows, as something distinct, (independent with its own continuity),having its own distinct relation between each of the other two, Peirce provides a misleading model. A true analysis of the relationship between the interpretation and the sign would reveal that the sign actually breaks any supposed continuity of the universal, between one interpretation and another.

So to make a true representation, which would support the supposed continuity of "the object", the category of "object" would have to include both interpretant and representamen as united in continuity, within "the object". This is what is commonly known as the transcendence of Platonic objects. The existence of the universal, as am object, transcends the existence of its composite parts, the sign and the interpretation of the sign. That the object transcends both, and is therefore of a distinct class produced by a unity of the other two, is a necessary condition for the the continuity of the object.

What Peirce does with the triadic semiotic structure, is remove the transcendence which supports the continuity of "the object", yet he still claims an object with continuity. This allows that the continuity of "the object" may be understood as a property of the interpretant, or it may be understood as a property of the representamen, in his proposal of ambiguity. So all we have is a nominalist sign-mind representation, with an assumed continuous "object" which may be assigned to the sign, or it may be assigned to the mind, depending on one's theoretical purpose.

This is why it is useful to refer to those who apply Peirce's triadic structure, to demonstrate the inconsistency in application, produced by that ambiguity. In "objective" science such as biosemiotics, it is evident that "the object " is a property of the representamen, yet in social applications of semiotics, it is clear that "the object" is understood as property of the interpretation. A true representation of a united interpretant/representamen, to support a continuous object, is not required, because "the object" may simply be assigned to one side or the other.

This is because Peirce takes a nominalist sign-mind model, and adds "an object" without any rigid principles of sameness or continuity. This allows those who apply the model to assign "object" where there is no support for an object. The defense of that assignment is that it is a "Platonic object", but Peirce has denied the ontological support for Platonic objects.

Peirce's approach stands out by addressing the limitations of nominalism (over-reliance on discrete categorization) and Platonism (over-reification of abstractions). — Mapping the Medium

This is exactly why Peirce' project fails. Asserting compatibility between incompatible ontologies is not a solution. Taking a nominalist structure of "discrete categorization", and imposing an assumption of continuity, without justification, just to make it more "Platonic", is not a solution to the discrete/continuous dilemma.

You're still in the hunt for an understanding of the present_natural not yet supplied by your theory. — ucarr

That's right. What we've termed "present_natural" is extremely difficult. I think the best understanding of any human being barely qualifies as a start to this subject.

It looks like a major goal of your theory is to promote freedom of choice over and above determinism. — ucarr

No, I take freedom of choice as a strong premise, being a self-evident truth, supported by empirical observation of the human condition. Argumentation in support of free will is pointless because anyone who denies what is self-evident will never be convinced by argument. The goal is true understanding.

It looks like another major goal of your theory is to develop a concept of the present that includes dimensional extensions of spacetime. — ucarr

The need for multi-dimensional time is a conclusion drawn from the two basic premises, the truth of free will, and the usefulness of the determinist principles of cause/effect.

"Spacetime" is not an appropriate concept for the quest for truth, because it makes space logically prior to time, instead of time being prior to space. In other words we can conceive of time without space, providing the potential for space, but space without time is absolute nothing, from which nothing can come. That's the point of Aristotle's cosmological argument, actuality (therefore time), is prior to material existence (therefore space). Many people dismiss this argument, but it's actually very strong. So the reason why time (therefore "the present") is so difficult, is because we haven't figured out what type of activity occurs without space.

I see clearly your need to develop your math literacy. It will facilitate the clarity and precision of the complicated details of your theory. It will empower you to provide diagrams, charts and tables that effectively communicate your ideas, analyses and conclusions. — ucarr

I firmly believe that good ontology is not done with mathematics, although some Platonists think it's nothing but mathematics.. In fact, I think that mathematics distracts from truth, and misleads, being designed and conventionalized for other purposes. Cosmological mathematics has been diverted to serve "spacetime" conceptions, so the majority is useless toward truth.

No. This is where the misconception lies. Perhaps you didn't read what I posted on the other thread. I will post it here for your review.

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Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.

Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.

Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.

Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human. — Mapping the Medium

This just demonstrates Peirce's use of "object" is not only ambiguous, but equivocal as well.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be. — Mapping the Medium

This makes no sense to me at all. I see no logical connection between a nominalist saying that the concrete existence of any specific property is nothing more than a label to be interpreted by a mind, and your conclusion that this "concretizes properties". Clearly, the only concrete thing here is the label, and it's obvious that the label is not the meaning. Also, it's clear that when we use a relational label, like "near" for example, we are not "concretizing" this property to say that it is part of the thing referred to as "near". Even with labels like "red", the nominalist respects that this is a word to be interpreted for meaning, conceptually, and it does not refer to a concrete part of a named object. That is just naive realism which you are criticizing, and that's worlds apart from nominalism.

In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.

Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism. — Mapping the Medium

I can't follow what you're saying here. The law of identity "concretizes" identity by placing a thing's identity within the thing itself. This means that a thing's identity is not the whatness we assign to the thing by naming its type, nor is it a collection of properties which we define, or anything like that. it is not even the name we give to the thing, as a proper noun assigned to that particular thing only. The thing's identity is the thing itself.

Platonism, as you describe it here, does not run a foul of the law of identity. However, when these "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world" are given identity as objects, then this is a problem. And that is what Peirce does with his conception of "sameness" which you describe as "functional continuity across interpretations". It is this "sameness" which allows a conception to have an identity as an object. But it's a qualified "sameness", relative only to the specified function. So that sort of "sameness" exists only within the domain of a specific purpose, and is not a true identity.

Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, butthe premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them. — Mapping the Medium

I agree with most of this, and that there is really very little difference between traditional Platonism and traditional nominalism. These two are just different ways of interpreting the relationship between the physical world, and the world of ideas. The big difference is that nominalism pays respect to the role of signs and symbols, as a necessary, and essential aspect of human concepts. This perspective denies the characterization of "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world". Human abstractions and conceptions are understood to rely on physical signs and symbols, this makes it impossible for them to exist independently of the physical world.

This makes the described form of nominalism and the described form of Platonism incompatible. Now Peirce wanted to pay respect to the importance of signs and symbols, in the nominalist way, but he also wanted to hang on to the benefits of Platonism (as an easy ontology) at the same time. So he proposed that triadic system which allows for that separate, independent object, as an idea or concept, along with the signs of nominalism, all together. But what this does, as I've argued, is annihilate the distinction between a physical object and a concept. And that is not a good ontology.

..proposing a more flexible and relational understanding of "object"... — Mapping the Medium

I agree with this, but I prefer the term "ambiguous" over "flexible".

You are suggesting that Peirce’s approach violates the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle, but Peirce doesn’t see these laws as universally applicable to all aspects of reality. — Mapping the Medium

That's true, these laws are not universally applicable. That's exactly what I was arguing with RusselA earlier in the thread. In the case of a thinking subject, in the process of deliberation, and decision making in general, the person has the two opposing and contradictory ideas in one's mind, at the same time. As we discussed, having opposing ideas at the same time, "I should stay", I should go" violates the law of noncontradiction. This violation is because the person has as a property of one's mind, contradictory ideas.

However, these fundamental laws of logic are intended to dictate what we can and cannot say about physical objects. A physical object has an identity, as itself, and it does not have contradictory properties. Thinking subjects though, along with all of their thoughts and ideas, are not objects. and that is why they can violate those fundamental laws with their thoughts. The conceptions we produce do not need to follow the laws which apply to physical objects. This demonstrates a very clear difference between physical objects and ideas.

Peirce, with his "semiotic framework" attempts to annihilate this difference with his "flexible" understanding of "object". But this is a recipe for problems, because it removes the boundary, the principles of distinction, which separates the aspects of reality which obey those fundamental laws and those which do not.

Instead of the simple, and very useful division between the mind which interprets, and the thing which is interpreted (be it the physical world in general, an object, or a sign), Peirce posits the object as what is represented by the sign, as in my example, the numeral 2 represents the number two. This adds an unnecessary layer, and leaves the sign itself as a distinct category, outside our capacity to understand. The sign itself is impossible to understand, because understanding consists of knowing its object. This leaves signs themselves as inherently unintelligible, because a sign would have to be represented by another sign, and another sign, in an infinite regress.

The "sameness" in Peirce’s framework is not about static, metaphysical identity but rather about functional continuity across interpretations. — Mapping the Medium

Yes, well this is the problem. An "object", as a physical object, is "the same as itself" in every aspect, that's what makes it an object, it's uniqueness. But if we look at "functional continuity across interpretations" as what defines "sameness", relying on the concept of "differences which don't make a difference", and call this the defining feature of "the object", then we have no words left to describe the reality of physical objects in their uniqueness. "Object" now has been taken to be used in referring to this new type of object, which has a compromised form of sameness. And so we must also compromise the meaning of "same" so as to exclude the relevance of differences which don't make a difference. Then "same" just means similar. Clearly this is debilitating to ontology.

He views the "object" in the triadic relation as that to which the representamen refers, not necessarily something with a rigid ontological identity. — Mapping the Medium

This is exactly the ambiguity I am talking about. A representamen could refer to a physical object, as is common in day to day speaking, or it could refer to an idea, or concept, as is common in higher education. Traditionally we'd distinguish between these two, and assign identity to physical objects, and apply the basic laws of logic in speaking about these physical objects. The other type of referent we'd understand as an idea, a concept, a subject of study, or something like that. So we'd have a clear distinction between these two.

Now Peirce allows both of the two types of referent to be classed together as "object". But since the one type, ideas and concepts, don't have a proper identity, by the law of identity, yet he wants to give them some form of identity as the object referred to, he is inclined toward a compromised meaning of "same". This is a meaning of "same" which allows for differences, and it really means similar. But "similar" will not do the task required by Peirce, to support "the object", as one rather than many.

This is not really a problem in itself, to corrupt the use of "same" this way, but it robs us of the capacity to talk about, and understand the reality of what we know as physical objects, in their uniqueness, by stealing that word "same", and giving it a different meaning. Of course, if you're a staunch idealist like Peirce seems to be, you'll deny that there is any reality to the assumption of independent physical objects, but this denies the capacity for truth, as correspondence. And so it really just produces more problems.

Thanks for your patience ucarr, sticking with me, and your encouragement to help me through this process. I think you will find that this post will elucidate a lot, and thorough reading of it should give you a much better understanding of my perspective on this.

The main premise of the theory says: a) the truth resides within the present_natural; b) the present_natural supplies the true picture of reality to the observer. — ucarr

I'd clarify this by saying that an understanding of the present_natural would supply a true picture of reality, but we do not have that required understanding.

Question - Does the future_past continuum of this theory assert a unidirectional arrow of time from future to past? — ucarr

Since it is the case, as I described, that the present must be dimensional, then this dimension (which I call the breadth of the present) would be a qualification to the unidirectionalness.

Try looking at it this way. We understand "the flow of time" from our observations of motions. And, we observe motions as relative. The relativity of our perception of motion is the important feature of reality revealed when the heliocentric model of the solar system replaced the geocentric model. We now know, from the application of relativity theory, that "the flow of time" must also be understood as being perceived as relative, and this forces unintuitive conclusions about "the natural present", produced from our perceptions which make time relative. This is demonstrated by the principle called the relativity of simultaneity.

What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.

Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide..

This is a reversal of the conventional conception of the unidirectional arrow of time from present_theoretical to future. Moreover, the flow of time from future to past feels strange and counter-intuitive. In terms of human history, this reversal suggests human progress is going backwards from sophisticated to primitive. What would be reason for that? — ucarr

Modeling the flow of time as from future to past is actually much more intuitive than modeling it as past to future. The past to future model is a learned (acquired) way, derived from empirical observation, and the concept of "causation", which is entrenched by our scientific/deterministic world view. This is the model derived from the perspective of having the present as independent from (outside) of time. When we observe the passage of time from outside of time, at a point of "the present", we observe an order of the occurrence of events. One event is seen as prior to another, meaning it goes into the past first. This inclines us to position furthest past events as first (prior) and later events as posterior.

In reality, I believe, we must actually learn to suppress our truly intuitive way of looking at time, to construct that perspective which puts the observer outside of time. This is done at a very young age with the learning of moral principles, and even earlier, derived from the act/reward process. Certain types of acts result in rewards or punishments, and this is conducive to us learning the cause/effect, determinist flow of time.

But that type of moral training suppresses our true perspective, which is a more selfish perspective, placing priority on future events, what is wanted, desired. This more natural perspective assigns priority to intentions, representing the individual as a person active in the world, attempting to do things, and get what one wants. We really have very little, if any "representation" of this, because it is inherently not a representation. it is an understanding of one's own actual role in the world, as agent.

Now, when the person understands oneself to be an actual individual within the world, the eternal present, outside of time, is gone. The person is inundated with duties, responsibilities, obligations, and simple needs, things which must be done. The future then, is a source of stress and anxiety, and the passing of time is a force of immense pressure on the person, so that the individual is inclined by instinct to rush around like a squirrel collecting nuts before winter sets in.

So from this perspective, the flow of time is an oppressive future, attempting to force all that is at the present, into the past. For us this is death, and for inanimate objects, this is their breakdown and annihilation. This is why it is ultimately more intuitive to place the future as prior to the past. The coming event, the anticipated, predicted, "future event", is in the future before it is in the past. And, there is a critical condition which must be fulfilled before it can even get into the past, it must actually occur, therefore we have anxiety and stress. So the event is in the future first, as potential. The critical condition of occurrence (with its lack of necessity, which forms the concept of "contingency") is second, the present, and the event being in the past is third, posterior to the occurrence, which is posterior to the potential..

Notice that the difference may be exemplified by the way that we understand freedom of choice. The determinist way places priority in the past, making all future events caused by the past. The free choice way recognizes a lack of necessity in the occurrence of events at the present, and this invalidates the determinist model. That produces the need for a model which includes as real, the contingency of being. This model needs to include the freely willed choice, and that puts priority in the future, because the choice is the will toward a future state.

Question - If what is perceived is in the past at the time of its perception, then there's only perception of the past. So there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Well yes, this has to be a key point, which comes from our modern understanding of light, electrical energy, and the nervous system in general. There is always a medium between the thing perceived, and the mind which perceives. You see an object a metre away, a hundred metres away, whatever, you do not see the light in between which acts as the medium. The required activity of this medium ensures that the thing seen is in the past by the time it's seen. And the same thing occurs within the nervous system itself, with the sense of touch for instance, there is a time delay, reflex time.

Question - Is there not a difference between the actual future and the anticipation of the future, a mere speculation about what the future might be? If so, then we see the present is just whatever is happening presently, including speculations about the future. So, again, there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Talking about "the future" is when words fail us. This is due to the representative nature of the most common words. We watch, and talk about what we have experienced, and when we turn around to face the future, we get absorbed into our own minds, where our own goals and intentions take priority. Since we are always looking out for ourselves, we must fend against deception when talking about the future. So, we learn the moral principles of cause/effect, described above, and this allows us to talk about the future objectively, in the sense of predictions which are grounded in good scientific principles. However, this suppresses the individual's true view toward the future, the subjective perspective, and replaces it with the false determinist perspective. This false perspective being the one imposed by educational institutions facilitates talk about the future, but in an untrue way.

So, I think it is important to note, that "the true future" is the anticipation of the future. This is the truest view of the future that we have, just like observation and memory is the truest view of the past. The other view, where we use determinist principles of causation, to project in "objective predictions" is not a true view. It's not true because it produces a view of the future which does not respect the contingency of the present, by making the cause/effect relation necessary.

The failing of words inclines us to say things like "the actual future". Because activity occurs at the present, and anticipated events of the future have not yet reached the present, they cannot be "actual" in thi sense. "Actual" here means having activity. But there is another sense of "actual" and the difference between the two was well described by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. The second sense of "actual" means real, substantial, "having actual existence" rather than imaginary or theoretical. This sense applies only to the past. What has actually occurred at the present, is now in the past, and this is real, substantial. Future events are not substantial in that way, and have no actual existence in that sense. However, under the determinist principles of cause/effect, and objective prediction, we may extend this form of "actuality" to talk about "the actual future", to say things like "the sun actually will rise tomorrow". But this way of using "actual", to refer to things which are essentially possible, having not yet crossed the boundary of contingency, the present, is really very misleading. The determinist perspective then denies the real (substantial) difference between past and future, by referring to both with "actual"..

The two above questions point to the possibility MU's language, in both instances, circles back around to a theoretical point both dimensionless and timeless as the representation of the present. — ucarr

The theoretical "present" has some truth in its representation, as a divisor between future and past. It's principal fault is the "dimensionless point" representation, which facilitates the illusion of accurate temporal measurements. That it puts the separation between future and past outside of time, causing the interaction problem of idealism, is evidence that it is faulty. So we do not need to throw away the entire conception of "present", just what is required to bring consistency between the theoretical present and the natural present.

MU's conception of the correct representation of present_natural entails a confluence of past/present/future into one unified whole. As an example, consider: the combination of red, green and blue to form gray. — ucarr

Not quite. It's not a unified whole in the sense of your example, where the distinct colours combine to make one colour. That is more like what some people think now, future, present, and past are commonly combined and presented as a unified whole, "time". But this always involves inconsistencies. So the need is somewhat opposite, to see the distinct elements, future, and past, as completely distinct, because the present exists between these two, inserting contingency. The determinist way is to ignore contingency, represent a unified past and future, and dismissed the "the present" as unreal eternalist ideal, which is problematic. But this provides no base for understanding of the natural present, and what we call the passing of time.

So instead of "unified whole", it is an attempt to establish compatibility, consistency, commensurability between distinct features which appear to be incompatible. That is, if we deny the determinist unification because of the faults that it shows, as not a true representation, we need to come up with something else. The principles which invalidate the determinist representation, essentially the contingency factor, leave the past and future as completely distinct, with a mere appearance of incompatibility. That produces a very difficult problem.

I contemplate with horror a temporal complex of undecidability, e.g. an inhabitant of such a realm could not know where s/he was in time. — ucarr

The "undecidability" you refer to is due to the breadth of time, and the fact that we do not know our position on that spectrum. This is because our understanding of concepts like mass and energy is very primitive. It's comparable to the geocentric model of astronomy. We didn't know where we were in space. Now "the universe" is a temporal concept, having been detached from the idea of an eternal background, and we use it to provide us with a position in time, X number of years past the big bang. But in reality, we really don't know where we are in time because we do not apprehend the breadth of the present, so our way of relating small objects to huge masses like galaxies, is very faulty. .

Again, Secondness is not an object, as in your interpretation. — Mapping the Medium

As I said, "object" is left ambiguous by Peirce. I haven't offered any interpretation of "object" due to this problem. And you are wrong to say that secondness is not the object.

My point is to notice that he says "called' its object. He is not calling it "object", he is referring to what is commonly "called" 'object'. — Mapping the Medium

Mapping the Medium, face the reality, he is explicitly saying that it is what is commonly called "object". And he uses that term to say that it's called "its object". Why argue this. it's essential to understanding the triadic relation he proposes? Secondness is what we commonly call "object",

Now the problem is that there is ambiguity as.to what is commonly called "object". There is a physical object, and there is an object of the mind which is better known as an idea. Peirce intentionally exploits this ambiguity, because he seems to think that this will somehow solve some ontological problems.

It does not, and that is because physical "objects" have an identity according to the law of identity. Mental objects (ideas) cannot be assigned identity. So when you say "the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant", it could only be "the same object" if it was a physical object. Only physical objects have this "sameness" assignment by the law of identity. But Peirce wants this principle to apply to mental objects (ideas) as well, and this forces him to make exceptions to the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle, to account for the reality of these supposed mental objects, which are not really objects with identity, at all.

You're really touchy aren't you? It's as if you are actually afraid of being infected by the dreaded "nominalism thought virus".

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

Let me remind you, that when I engaged you above, I discussed explicitly the quote you brought from Peirce himself, and I addressed directly what I believed to be "The fault in the quoted passage". That fault is labeled as "taking the object for granted".

You told me, "Please take Peirce as a whole" as your way of avoiding my criticism of that passage. So when I then turned to what others say about Peirce, as a whole, you criticized me for using secondary sources.

How can I take your essays as anything other than secondary sources? And it appears like you will not discuss the problems with Peirce's philosophy with anyone other than someone who has read all of his material, and is able to take him as a whole, without referring to secondary sources. At this point you would probably just dismiss the person anyway, as having an incorrect interpretation, because you seem to think that Peirce has solved all the ontological problems of the world.

Here's a link to some notes I wrote some time back. .... Phenomenology or Phaneroscopy? — Mapping the Medium

So, I read the notes you linked to, and I'll show you how "the problem" I referred to above is revealed in that writing.

First, Peirce's term "Phaneron" characterizes a consciousness as an object instead of as an activity. It is the sum total of one's thoughts at any particular moment in time, rather than characterizing a consciousness as actively changing thoughts, all the time. So he uses that proper name "Phaneron" to name that object. So he starts from a mistaken assumption, a premise that the entirety of a consciousness can be taken as "an object". That's expressed here:

I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of anyone consciousness (for anyone is substantially any other,) the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value.

Then, in the quote from Merleau-Ponty we can see the difference between this perspective, Peirce's which takes the object for granted, and the phenomenological perspective. Here:

Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.

Notice the difference. What is given is an "indeterminate horizon", and from this an "object" is constructed.

The problem which develops from Peirce's "taking the object for granted" is demonstrated later in your writing about "secondness", what is described as "bumping up against hard fact". Here we find the root of the problem, what I called Peirce's category mistake. Secondness is described as the physical constraints of the material world, such as walls and doors, yet it is also describe as "hard fact", and this refers to a description of the physical constraints, "fact" is corresponding truth about the physical world. So secondness, as the assumed "object", has dual existence which crosses a boundary of separation between the traditional categories of material and ideal. The "object" may be the physical constraint which we actually bump into, or it may be the supposed "hard fact" concerning that constraint.

The problem ought to be very evident to you now, as the ambiguous nature of "object". An "object" can be an aspect of the physical world, or it could also be an idea in a mind. "Secondness" is an attempt to make it a sort of medium between the two, but as I argue, that medium is fictitious, imaginary, created as a part of the interpretant.

Referring to the quote from Merleau-Ponty, we can see that "the object" is really a creation of the mind. Now Peirce, in his desire to take the object for granted, when it really cannot be taken for granted, because it is created within the mind, introduces ambiguity with his concept of "secondness", which allows "the object" to be conceptualized as either a mental object or a material object. It really cannot be conceived as something distinct and independent from the two, as a third category, like Peirce desires with the proposal of "secondness", because Peirce has not properly provided that category which is required to serve as that medium which he desires. He's really only provided ambiguity in "object" which allows "object" to be conceived of (constructed) as on one side or the other, of the two traditional categories, depending on one's purpose.

Nominalism is deeply ingrained in Western culture (and the now-global-world in general), and it is very difficult for most to step outside of it and look at its history and influence when they are so influenced by it themselves due to 'thought as a system'. ... We are within what we are trying to examine. Nominalism tends to evoke the idea that the examination is objective. It is a case of recursive smoke and mirrors.

Again, I have written about this extensively. I don't want to spend a lot of time on it in threads here. It's just not a productive use of the forum. — Mapping the Medium

As much as you think that nominalism holds sway in the western world, I find that it has been supplanted by Platonic realism, in the last few hundred years as the ontological support for materialism, "matter" being nothing but a concept. Not only that, but all forms of realism are grounded in Platonic realism. Realism is generally the default perspective, but since it requires no philosophy, many realists refuse to admit to the Platonic premises required to support their metaphysical perspective.

Since realism is what gives importance to the idea of "objects", while "object", as a concept loses importance in nominalism, it is really Platonic realism which evokes the idea that any examination is "objective". In nominalism, interpretation by the subject, is what is important, so it is inherently a subjective perspective. If nominalists claim objectivity, then they are hypocritical or self-contradicting.

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

I've read enough Peirce to see the problems I point to. As I said, I have a lot of respect for him, being very intelligent and keenly able to expose ontological problems. The issue though, is that he proposed solutions when he ought not have, because the solutions just aren't there. So his proposals aren't solutions at all, they simply mislead. In other words, his analysis is good, his synthesis is not. His proposed solutions only blur the subject/object distinction so as to veil the category mistake which the supposed solution is built on.

I can either point you to my essays or post the very long essays in entirety here. Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

OK, post some links, quote some relevant passages, or just express some of what you think, whatever. Thank you.

If this is a mis-reading of your theory, then I'm still fundamentally unclear about the structure and logic of the continuum of past_present_future within your theoretical context. — ucarr

What I keep saying, is that there is no such past_present_future continuum. The continuum would be future-past, and the present is distinct, outside time. This is the discrete/continuous incompatibility. If there actually is a present within the continuum, it would break the continuum into discrete sections, annihilating the continuum.

I'm now inclined to think your theory can be rendered with greater clarity through mathematical language. For example, by interposing a timeless present between a temporal past and future, it makes sense to think of a timeless present as a theoretical point of zero dimensions. — ucarr

This rendering sort of works, so long as you adhere to the point you made, that this is a "theoretical present". In this particular model, there is no "natural present". This "present", the zero dimension point of the model, is artificial, a theoretical point and the "interposing" you refer to must be understood as a theoretical act of inserting the the theoretical point into the future-past continuum in various places, for the purpose of temporal measurements, discrete temporal units.

However, we must still respect the reality of "the present", the true, "natural present" which serves as the perspective of the living subject. This natural present is what the human subject has tried to represent with the artificial, conceptual "zero dimension point" which serves as the means for measurement. The natural present is much more difficult to understand.

There's some difficulty of communication of your theory because verbal language, being about actions and actors and thus being rooted in animation, does a poor job of representing non-temporal phenomena, which are, by definition, devoid of animation. — ucarr

Now we approach the key point. The "theoretical present", in its traditional form, as a zero dimension point served us well for hundreds, even thousands of years, in its service of measuring temporal duration. However, though it is useful, it is not acceptable as an accurate representation of the "natural present". The "natural present" is the perspective of the human mind, the human being, in relation to the future-past continuum. This is the natural perspective, how we actually exist, observe and act, at the present in time, rather than the model which makes the present a point in time.

The traditional representation of the theoretical present puts the human soul as "outside of time", as discussed, and this, as you say, renders it "by definition, devoid of animation". This is a representation of the classical "interaction problem" of dualism. The properties of the immaterial soul, ideas etc., being eternal, and outside of time (because they exist at the zero dimension present), have not the capacity to interact with the future-past continuum.

What this indicates is that the conceptualization of time employed, with a zero dimension point that can be inserted as the present, for the purpose of measurement, is faulty. It's not a true representation of the "natural present". To understand the natura present, we need to review the human perspective. What I glean from such a review, is that the natural present consists of both, the past, as sensory perception (what is perceived is in the past by the time it is perceived), and the future, as what is anticipated. Therefore to provide a true modal of time we need an overlap of past and future at the present, instead of a zero dimension point which separates the two.

This implies that future-past is improperly modeled, if modeled as a continuum. We need overlap of future and past, at the present, to allow for the real interaction of the living subject. This implies a dimensional present.

Can you tell me what written work of his you are referring to? — Mapping the Medium

That "unnecessary" layer is my interpretation. As I explained, it can be understood with reference to mathematical Platonism. We understand "the number two" as the object between the numeral "2", and the interpretation performed by a person's mind. I believe this "object" is superfluous, a completely unnecessary layer added into the interpretation for various reasons within mathematical theory. In other words, it's simply part of the interpretation, serving a specific purpose, rather than a separate layer.

As for Peirce's 'representamen' and triadic model, we need to recognize that he is pointing to what the sign means to the interpreter. ... It does take on a different identity than just considering what some might refer to as a specific ideal form.

For instance, here is an image that can mean different things to different cultures. ...



The 'object' is exactly the same, but the 'representamen' has a different identity. — Mapping the Medium

This issue is, why do you, and Peirce assume "an object", which is "exactly the same"? I apprehend a sign, and I interpret the sign. The sign is interpreted by me, in a way which may be different from others. For what purpose is "an object" posited? The only answer I can find for this question, is that it provides a grounding for the claim that there is a right, or correct, interpretation.

The problems with Peirce's triadic model become evident in the work of those who have followed him, and actually employ it. The issue is 'the rules for interpretation', as indicated by Wittgenstein. The rules must comprise 'the object', in order that "the object' supports a correct interpretation. In other words, the supposed 'object' is nothing but the rules for interpretation. With Peirce's model, the rules for interpretation cannot be within the mind of the interpreter because the differences between various minds would not support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same". And since there is nothing between the sign and the mind which interprets, to support the independent reality of those rules, the rules must be within the sign itself. This is evident in biosemiotics.

Placing the rules for interpretation within the sign itself is very problematic because these rules would need to be interpreted. The interpretations of the rules by various minds would differ, and nothing would support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same", unless the sign itself, and the rules for interpretation are one and the same, as 'the object'. But then there is just the interpreter and the sign, while 'the object' is superfluous, and there is no intermediate layer.

Furthermore, placing the rules for interpretation as within the sign itself is very problematic because then it is not the mind which is doing the interpretation, having no rules for that, but the sign must be interpreting itself, and this ends up leaving the interpreting mind itself as superfluous, unnecessary. And this is exactly how biosemiotics has been mislead. The sign becomes self-interpreting and the requirement of an agent which interprets is lost, as the sign is both passively interpreted, and actively interpreting.

This all indicates that the triadic model has as a premise, an unnecessary third aspect. The superfluous aspect 'the object' may be placed as desired, depending on the application. In mathematical Platonism 'the object' is associated with the mind of the interpreter, as an independent idea grasped by that mind. In biosemiotics, 'the object' is associated with the sign, as the rules for interpretation inhering with the sign itself.

Phenomenology is definitely not my cup of tea, due to it being historically influenced by nominalism that was nurtured in the arms of religious theology. — Mapping the Medium

You seem to have a strong prejudice against nominalism. Why?

There is a science of perception. — Janus

The science of perception, like every other science suffers the same problem. Why would you think that it would be exempt? Suggesting that it would be exempt only demonstrates a denial of the problem, which is a display of the attitudinal illness I referred to.

My question was as to how including considerations of the subject (however that might be conceived) would improve the methods and results in sciences such as chemistry, geology, ecology or biology. — Janus

Respecting the reality of the subjective input in science greatly improves one's understanding of the results, through an enhanced ability to recognize where deficiencies lie. This provides the scientist, philosopher, or anyone reviewing any scientific results, with an approach which is known as "critical thinking".

Accordingly, the scientist might also look for ways of minimizing the subjective input, or even devising ways of exposing it as much as possible, to be studied by philosophers. This is in stark contrast to the attempt to hide the subjective influence which results from the aforementioned attitudinal illness.

↪180 Proof :100: As I have pointed out several times science performs a methodological epoché in the opposite direction to the epoché of phenomenology. But this falls on deaf ears. I have repeatedly asked Wayfarer to explain how the idea of the subjective would be helpful in the pursuit of any of the hard sciences. He does not even attempt to answer, but rather just ignores the question. — Janus

I can give you a very clear answer to this question by way of the tinted glass analogy. When looking at the world through a tinted glass, it is necessary to determine what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation, in order to derive a "true" interpretation of the observation.

Since the method applied by the hard sciences, as "the scientific method" is carried out by human subjects, it is necessary to understand what the subject "adds" to the scientific method, as the subjective aspect of science, in the very same way that it is necessary to understand what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation.

When the existence of the subjective element is known about, and respected as a true feature, and a deficiency of the scientific method, we naturally account for the reality of this "blind spot", and there is no great problem, just a healthy scientific skepticism and a respect for the fallibility of science. But when the reality of the blind spot is denied, and the relevant deficiencies of the scientific method are ignored, that is an attitudinal illness which is a problem.

I have a lot of respect for Charles Peirce, but from what I've read, he misses the mark with his ontology of "the object". This might be due to a desire to disprove nominalism, but he allows unintelligibility to be an essential aspect of "the object" and this leads to the acceptance of vagueness as an ontological principle.

He posits an unnecessary separation between sign and object. For example, the sign is the numeral 2, and the object is the number two. There is no need for "the number two", as the numeral might serve as both the sign and the object. This unnecessary separation produces an unnecessary layer between the sign and the interpretation of the sign, the unnecessary layer being "the object".

That produces an inaccessible, unknowable, relation between sign and object. Therefore both the object and the sign, lose their otherwise assumed to be necessary identity, as identity being the same as the thing itself, by the law of identity. Neither the sign has a necessary identity, nor does the object have a necessary identity, as there is merely an undefined relation between these two. The result is that the object is no longer restricted by the law of identity, because of the assumed relation between the object and the sign which is not a relation of identity, i.e. the sign is other than the object. So if the sign, and the object are both present to the mind, these two are distinct, not the same, and there can be no necessary relation between the two, unlike when the sign and the object are one and the same by an identity relation.

I believe that phenomenology, especially as developed by Derrida, provides a better ontology of objects by allowing that the sign is the object.