All good. Half of irrational is still irrational. — Mww

Rather than this way is half of irrational, I'd say the other way is doubly irrational.

So, when I ask how many hours would pass in a year after we've all died... — S

It's just as nonsensical, to talk about years when there's no human beings, as it is to talk about hours, and as it is to talk about rocks. So this approach gets you nowhere. What "a year" is, is a human idea, and without human beings there are no such ideas. So without human beings there is no such thing as what a year is, nor is there what an hour is, nor what a rock is. And the op is nonsensical.

The scenario would be exactly the same if it had been stated as, POOF!!! All humans are gone. Are there still rocks and do rocks have the same meaning? That would have saved exactly half the argument’s intrinsic irrationality. — Mww

Half an irrational argument still leaves us with something irrational. S likes to veil behind semantic maneuvers, the simple fact that without anyone to establish a relationship between words like "rock" and "hour", and what those words refer to, the words really are meaningless. So regardless of the fact that you and I and everyone else have ideas of what a "rock" is and what an "hour" is, after we all die there is no such thing as what a "rock" is, or what an "hour" is, because what a "rock" is, and what an "hour" is, are ideas, and there would be no one who holds those ideas. Therefore it's irrational for S to speak about there being such a thing as what a rock is, and what an hour is, after everyone is dead.

In saying this however, Witty also wants to stave off another misunderstanding that may follow from this: the idea that language is somehow then a degraded or less-perfect thing than logic. The basic idea is that logic if not an 'ideal language' of which specific instances of human language are lesser forms of. In saying this, Witty interestingly sheds light not only on language, but on logic as well: following (his understanding of) Ramsey, Witty understands logic to be a matter of construction, something 'made' and not 'found'. — StreetlightX

I think that this is the importance of 81. It is a separating of the notion of "perfect" from the notion of "ideal", such that perfection can be something other than the ideal. We can characterise mathematics and logic as ideal languages, but everyday language is no less perfect in its existence as everyday language, than the constructed ideal languages of logic. So it will come out in the following sections that "inexact" does not mean "imperfect". Metaphysically, or ontologically, perfection inheres within the existence of language itself, and is not to be found in the form that it takes.

This has deep implications with respect to how we apprehend the relationship between rules and language. If we characterize ideal languages as languages whose existence is dependent on rules, and strict adherence to rules, then everyday language escapes this characterization, of "rule-based" and does not appear to be governed by rules. But if we characterize "rules" in a different way, such that the ambiguity found within everyday language inheres within the rules themselves, then everyday language can still be said to consist of rules. The two perspectives create two distinct possibilities for the relationship between language and rules. On the one hand, only ideal languages are instances of following rules, and so the construction of rule based languages follows from everyday language which is not rule based. On the other hand, all language use involves rules, but rules are inherently ambiguous, such that different people can go different ways following the same rule.

The two different perspectives create completely different interpretations of what Wittgenstein is saying at 81, and indecision as to exactly what he is saying is evident in the different translations. Here I will repost what I said about #81 last month.

81 is quite difficult, and I believe pivotal to an understanding of Wittgenstein's belief of how rules apply within language. Here's the concluding paragraph from each, ed. 3, and ed. 4

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, ed. 3

All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning
something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may
mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a
sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus
according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Hacker, Schulte, ed. 4

Notice the disagreement between "lead us", and "mislead us". I believe that this ambiguity is indicative of what Wittgenstein means when he says that someone operates according to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that what follows in the next section of the PI is indication that Wittgenstein takes the position that all language use is an instance of following rules, and that ambiguity is inherent with rules themselves. The reason for the reference to being "mislead" is found in the reference to "definite rules". Ideal languages such as logic use "definite rules", but everyday language uses more ambiguous rules. That one is not more "perfect" than the other is found at #98:

"That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence." --- Philosophical Investigations. #98

At 82 - 84 you'll see that he describes situations in which rules are being followed, even when we cannot say what the rule is which is being followed. Even if we play a game in which we make up rules as we go, we would be following rules in making up the rules. At 85, a rule is described as a 'sign-post". The sign-post does not tell you which way to go, your interpretation of the sign post tells you which way to go. From this, we can conclude that Wittgenstein opts for the position that rules are inherently ambiguous, and that all instances of using language are instances of using rules, despite the fact that the rules are not "definite rules", and the same rule (sign-post) might lead one person in one direction, and another person in another direction. Therefore the "perfection" of language is found in its very existence, as the existence of rules (signs), despite their ambiguity, and it is not found in the exactness, or the ideal nature, of any rules.

If you're not willing to engage the argument on its own terms, but instead misinterpret it and bring in your own premises, then what are you even doing here? Please go away. — S

The terms of the discussion are specifically:

There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously.

Is there a rock? Yes or no? — S

You have failed to explain how "we all died an hour previously" makes any sense at all. Who is going to determine this point in time an hour after we all died?

Set an alarm clock of some kind for an hour, kill off all the humans.......what does the alarm sound or look like? — Mww

Right, you, or S more likely, is going to set the alarm clock the moment you die, and assume that you are the last to die.

If the alarm is not sensed, the indication for the duration of an hour is not intelligibly given. If there is no intelligible indication given for an hour, there is no reason to think there would be an intelligible indication given for the duration of a day. If not an hour or a day, then no intelligible division of time at all follows. If no division of time, then there would be no indication of time itself. Humans “tell” time; no humans, no time “telling”. No time “telling”, no temporal reference frame, time itself becomes nothing. — Mww

Yes, this is what S refuses to acknowledge. Human beings "tell time", and "an hour" is a human being telling time. Not only would the ringing of the alarm not be sensed, but the alarm would not even be set. This whole talk of "an hour after all human beings died", is utter nonsense.

Nicely said. I am starting to enjoy how much I can disagree with a person in one thread, then completely agree in the next. Even if it may suggest I (or they, but I will usually assume I) have some inconsistencies in how I analyze each separate topic. — ZhouBoTong

I think we all tend to look at various different issues, or subjects individually. But the more that we can fit them all into one big picture, the more consistency we get within out beliefs.

a) that morality exists in people as “a suite of interrelated other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups (that) includes empathy, reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, and a sense of fairness”. (Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce). These have evolved and are no less a part of being human than having a thumb. I regard them as being objective in the sense that we did not chose to grow a thumb. — Brett

This is slightly different from how I interpreted your reference to objectivity earlier. When you said before, that "morality exists as an objective set of guides", I thought that you meant that there is an objective truth to what is good and bad. Now I interpret what you are saying as it's an objective truth that humans have morality. This leaves open the question of whether our determinations of good and bad are objectively true or not, or whether there even is such a thing.

But, this morality as we understand it, is essentially the same as it’s always been. — Brett

How can this be the case though? It is quite common that two different people, or two distinct societies disagree on moral issues. And it's not just small things, some societies used to practise human sacrifice. Even in the Old Testament, God was portrayed as jealous and vindictive, He'd smite you if you were unfaithful. These are not good moral traits by today's standards.

So you say that it's an objective fact that human's have morality, that they distinguish bad from good. And, you seem to want to say that since the classifications, of which sort of actions are good, and which sort are bad, haven't changed much over the years, these distinctions which we make concerning bad and good, are to some extent, objectively true. But doesn't this really exclude the possibility of moral differences and the difference of opinion on moral issues, which exists between us? And if we downplay these differences, don't we also downplay the need to make the effort to resolve these differences? Wouldn't you agree that a big part of "morality" is being able to negotiate these differences, and work out solutions, compromise?

Oh look, another misrepresentation. I claim no such thing. I claim that an hour would pass, not your nonsense-claim that a measurement of time would pass. For an hour not to pass, time would have to stop before an hour had passed, and I don't recall you making that argument. Instead, you make the argument of a sophist where you play around with semantics like a child with Play-Doh. — S

We've been through this already. Time passes continuously. An hour is a measurement of time. You said it yourself, an hour is a unit of measurement. For there to be a point in time an hour after all human beings died, requires that someone measure and designate that point in time. Otherwise there is just continuous time without any human beings to determine specific points in time. So "an hour after all humans died" is nonsensical. Your op assumes such a point in time, and asks whether there would be a rock at this point in time. But despite your insistence, there are no such points in time. These points in time are human determinations.

For an hour not to pass, time would have to stop before an hour had passed, and I don't recall you making that argument. — S

This is very clearly false. For an hour to pass requires that someone measures an hour. Without anyone measuring, time could pass forever without any hours passing. You have reified "an hour", which you have already insisted is a unit of measurement. But time rather than "hours" is the real thing. So without humans, time passes, not hours. Regardless of your false representation of time as hours passing, there are no such hours passing, just time passing and human measurement of hours.

The reason why I say that physicalism is not the biggest problem for free will is that we could even grant that physicalism is false and idealism is true, but if it is the case that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence, then libertarian free will is still false.
Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

It's not hard to propose a theory of causation which allows for libertarian free will. It is easily done with dualist principles, and a separation between efficient cause and final cause. Final cause is what you call the "uncaused cause", and efficient cause is when one event causes another event. So a final cause is not itself an event because according to dualist principles it is not physical, yet it may cause an event.

You may well call time a dimension but Kant does not follow; he calls it a pure intuition, one of two, the other space. — Mww

Right, as an intuition, time for Kant is ideal, just like space. So uniting time with space, as a dimension, naturally follows from this act of classifying the two together. Notice that I classed space as ideal, and time as non-ideal.

Thinking away every possible property belonging to an object, such that all that is left of it is the time of it......that’s what makes time ideal. — Mww

Properties are ideal, they are how we describe our perceptions. If you think away all the properties of objects, until you are left with only one thing, time, then that is the thing which is non-ideal.

Same for space. The two things that cannot be thought away. — Mww

Space can be thought away though. That's what gives us imaginary things, and concepts in general, these are objects which have no spatial existence.

But the actual morals themselves do not change that much over time, hence my including Doestoevsky. — Brett

But my point would be that related to morality, Shakespeare is not cliche, but just outdated and wrong. — ZhouBoTong

Brett assumes the existence of objective moral principles, so the changes in moral customs over time are downplayed, human beings at some times are just not properly representing the objective principles.

I guess I’m trying to focus on two things:

a: that morality exists as an objective set of guides on our behaviour (I await the howls).

b: that art, primarily writing, explains it: Homer, Shakespeare, Doestoevsky. — Brett

The problem is that even if there are such objective moral principles, upheld by God or some such thing, then we have to allow for human knowledge of these principles to grow and evolve, just like our knowledge of the natural world grows and evolves. This means that ancient mores and customs, may now be determined as "wrong". But also we need to respect the fact that any mores and customs at any time, may be "wrong", and this applies even now. At any given time of "now", the practised customs may be wrong. If an artist apprehends an existing custom as wrong, that person must employ creative skill, tact, in shedding light on that custom as wrong, to avoid scorn by the general population.

I’m too old-fashioned for that, I guess; to me dimensions are what make standards of measurement possible. — Mww

Call "dimensions" "what make standards of measurement possible" if you like, but it's still ideal, just like the idea of "unity", or "unit" is what makes counting possible. Making time a dimension is what makes time ideal, this follows Kant. Space is ideal, time is not. I believe that such category mistakes are very destructive to metaphysics. But there is a monist approach which denies that such categories are based in anything real in the first place. To me, this produces incoherent, unintelligible metaphysics

I think you’re right about those who desire to be good but can’t resist the temptation to be bad. Except I’m not sure that they’re giving into a temptation to be bad. That’s like being bad for the sake of it, choosing to be bad. It’s possibly more like something overriding their morality, like making a decision which will enhance their position, like Eichmann, who made a career move and put his morals aside for the moment. But did he actually have morals to ignore, for instance had they not been cultivated enough by his environment? I imagine he simply pushed them aside. So the desire to be moral was not there at each one of those decision making moments. — Brett

I like to put this issue in the context of habits. Sometimes we form bad habits, and they are often difficult to break. We know that the habit is bad, and that it is good to break that habit, but one might not have the willpower to do it, and end up continuing to do the bad thing. I also believe that moral training is more than just learning good behaviour patterns, the critical part is in learning good thinking habits. Thinking is an activity like any other activity, and a large part of it is habitual. So when we're extremely young, babies, our consciousness, and therefore thinking habits are just starting to develop. At this level, where the conscious borders on the subconscious, or unconscious, is where emotions affect our thinking habits. I think it is essential to develop good thinking habits at this level, when we're very young, because it is much more difficult to break bad habits later in life than it is to develop good habits when we're young.

To be moral you would at least need the desire to be moral. Otherwise to act morally would just be an automatic action instilled in you from outside, an unquestioning act, which is not morality.
...
I guess this means that we must always chose to be moral. — Brett

I believe the relationship between choice and habit is complicated. Habitual actions are often carried out without choice, or there's a choice for a related action, which necessitates the habitual action. For example, if I choose to go to the corner store, I will get up and start moving my legs to walk. I don't really choose to move my legs when I'm walking, it just happens by habit. But my choice, and the willingness, to go to the store, makes the habitual actions take over. So the "automatic action", is instilled in me from an earlier time, when I had the desire to learn. The desire to learn allowed me to make the great effort required to learn how to walk, then it became a habit, requiring little effort. You see this in learning to ride a bike, learning to play sports, learning to play a musical instrument, etc.. these things are very hard to learn, at the time, requiring strong desire, and great effort, but once they are learned they become second nature. I think that learning good thinking habits, and learning morality are like this.

We choose, and choose agin and again. If that choice follows a pattern, it follows a rule. But then,if the choice follows a rule, is it free? — Banno

This is not a case of that person following a rule though, it is a case of the person's choices following a rule. So you cannot proceed from this premise, that the person's choices follow a rule, to make any conclusion about whether or not that person is free. That is why it is necessary to determine what it means for a person to follow a rule, before we can make any conclusions about the person's freedom. The person might have freely chosen to follow a rule in making those choices.

First, I was leaving the argument with that as the major premise to you because you brought it up, and second, I don’t think S is ready to accept the absolute ideality of time with respect to human experience. — Mww

I wouldn't accept the absolute ideality of time either. But S claims that the measurement of time, "an hour" in the op, could occur without a human being to measure it.

Still, scientists nowadays are attributing to time a reality most philosophers are reluctant to admit. Hell, they’ve even made it a dimension, of all things. Can you believe it???? — Mww

Dimensions though, are just standards of measurement. The convention is to assume a line as one dimension, and then construct other dimensions with right angles. Time is added as a fourth dimension to account for movement within the three assumed spatial dimensions. But it is not necessary to use any particular number of dimensions, as an infinity of them can be conceived.

. Rocks before means rocks after, without regard to any other conditions. Period. That’s that. I didn’t recognize the reasonableness of the argument because the reasoning is irrational, insofar as no room is allowed for explanatory or logical alternatives. — Mww

S continues in refusing to recognize the true nature of temporal existence. Human beings are living at the present, and there is a fundamental difference between past and future which makes the present a real temporal perspective, and change a reality. But this fundamental difference, and the reality of change, denies the possibility of making the deductive conclusion that what has been in the past, will be in the future.

Is it your thought that empathy has contributed to morality? — Brett

Yes, I would agree that empathy contributes to morality, but in itself as an emotion, it is neither moral nor immoral. And I believe that feelings, emotions in general, are prior to morality. Perhaps non-human animals demonstrate emotions. But one might also argue that training house pets is a form of morality.

Is the desire to be moral itself moral? — Brett

No, the desire to be moral is definitely not the same as being moral. This is demonstrated by those who desire to be good, and learn what is good, but cannot resist the temptation to do what is bad, despite knowing that it is bad. The desire to be moral would have to be classified with the other emotions, like love and empathy, which are likely necessary for morality, but do not necessarily produce morality. These emotions which are conducive to morality, because they co-exist with other unwanted emotions like frustration and hate and they feedback in a sort of bipolar way, need to be cultivated to actually bring about a moral being

This is why I think that the concept of innate morality is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept that art is important to morality. Art is a form of communication, and communication is the way that we learn things from others which we do not know innately. So if morality were innate, there would be no reason for art to express morality, and artwork could not be important to morality. But if we separate the desire to be moral, from actually being moral, then the desire to be moral may be innate, and art may help us to satisfy that desire.

If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is to hold within one's mind a principle, and adhere to that principle, then all rules are private. If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is described as something other than this, then I think it's likely that you have an incoherent description of what it means to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions.

Secondly, if you want to claim that mere logic tells us anything about the world, then provide an example. — Janus

As I said, I really don't know what you would mean by "mere logic". Human beings use logic, as a tool like S says, so there's no such thing as logic telling us something, we tell ourselves something with the use of logic.

Thirdly, when you say we can use logic to know about places we haven't been that would, if anything, only tell us what kinds of things we could possibly experience if we were there. It tells us about the forms our experiences could take, not about their content. And it cannot tell us anything about whether, as per the example, a rock is there when no one is around. — Janus

And I don't understand how you use "content" here. In such an experience, logic would be the "content". If you were at the place, your perceptions would form the content. In neither case would the supposed object being perceived, be the content of the experience.

The world is such that it is of certain ways, and we use logic to find out these certain ways. A rock is a certain length, and we use a ruler to find out this certain length. — S

You still do not seem to be grasping the reality of the temporal aspect of the world. The world is changing from one moment to the next. If the world is "a certain way", then it can only be that way for a moment in time, and at the next moment it will be another way. Due to the nature of passing time, and possibility, how the world will be at the next moment is always uncertain. So if the world was a certain way in the last moment, and how it will be in the next moment is uncertain, then at the present it is something between being in a certain way, and being in an uncertain way, or both, or some such thing. However, this is unacceptable according to the law of excluded middle. So to avoid this problem we ought not even talk about "the world" as if "it is of certain ways". Such talk only creates a situation in which the fundamental laws of logic are violated.

I think it's a profound mistake to believe that logic alone can tell us anything about the way the world actually is. — Janus

Logic tells us a lot about the way that the world is. Consider mathematics for example. But I really don't know what you are insinuating with "logic alone". Logic doesn't tell us things, it must be applied, used. When we use logic it is not the logic which is informing us, we are informing ourselves. So we use logic to find out about things, especially concerning things where we haven't been. That's why it doesn't make sense to say that if you haven't been there, you cannot know about it. We can use logic to know about places where we haven't been.

To that I simply would say: "how do you know; you haven't been there"? — Janus

It's demonstrated by logic. That's what logic is good for, telling us about things we haven't experienced. But people like S refuse the logic by finding a way to reject the premises. That way, is to reject conventional definitions of terms, and fabricate new definitions for the purpose of supporting faulty metaphysics.

Oh look, a non sequitur. — S

Do you know what non-sequitur means, or do you just use any words in any random way that pleases you? A simple statement of observation cannot be a non-sequitur, because non-sequitur refers to a conclusion drawn from previous statements. If you think that my observation is false, then say so, and explain why. But why use fancy words which you don't even know the meaning of?

People are always making the wrong moral decisions in life, despite being instructed in what is right and wrong. Why is this? It’s because it’s a continuous necessity to address it in ourselves, to consider our decisions and consequences, to look at the problem we’re confronted with by addressing previous concerns and experience and weighing up our choices. That’s who we are. — Brett

Plato demonstrated that morality is not simply a matter of knowledge, when he argues against the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. It is often the case that we know what is right yet we do what is wrong.

It’s not there to teach morality, it’s to demonstrate the continuous endeavour required by people to be moral, that the problems people may face in themselves have been around a long time and that people overcome their doubts and eventually take the moral position, or they refuse to and pay the price. — Brett

If it is an endeavour, requiring effort, to be moral, then this is inconsistent with morality is innate. I think that morality involves developing good habits and breaking bad habits. I also think that sometimes innate features will incline one toward some bad habits, and this is why it is an endeavour, requiring effort, to be moral. It is also why it is impossible that morality is innate. Morality often involves resisting desires derived from innate features.

When I say that morality is not innate, and that it is learned, I do not mean that it is "imposed" on us. I think it is learned, and learning is a product of the will to learn. So morality must come from within, as the desire to be moral, and that must be an innate tendency, but the desire to be moral is not the same as actually being moral. And this is what Plato demonstrated, one can have the desire to be moral, and learn moral principles, but still behave in an immoral way. So moral behaviour is something which needs to be cultivated, learned, but it is a distinct form of knowledge in the sense that it is a learning-how as distinct from learning-that. There is a sort of separation between what we know, and how we behave. We develop our habits of how we do things, prior to actually understanding exactly what we are doing with those methods; in many cases forms of behaviour are learned at a very young age. So when we learn a different, better way, of doing things, we may not have the will power to break the old habits and follow the new way. That is why it is important to show individuals good behaviour from a very young age.

There is plenty of research out there demonstrating the sense of empathy among young children as young as 12 months. Behaviour also observed in primates. If the answer is that it is something learned then it has to have existed prior to learning, it had to exist to enable small communities to form and thrive. — Brett

The sense of empathy may be innate, but it needs to be cultivated in order to produce morality. That is what I described in the artist's work of creating an audience. Creating an audience brings people together, and the togetherness which is created by the artist, and enjoyed by the audience, allows for morality to be produced through the cultivation of emotions like empathy which are conducive to morality.

So it's not like morality itself must have existed prior to learning, it is these emotive features, like empathy, which are conducive to morality which existed prior to social structure. The problem is that these innate tendencies toward various emotions are very difficult to describe, and they vary greatly from one person to the other, and also they are prone to develop in different directions in the very young child, depending on how the child is cared for. So to create morality the emotions must be directed. The act which directs them toward morality must be capable of grabbing the attention of (entertaining), multiple different children with various different emotional capacities. This is why there is a need for ambiguity, and the art, as well as the moral story, is presented in a general way rather than in a particular way.

Only if you don't clusterfuck off! — Janus

Really, if a piece of writing is literally a clusterfuck, does this qualify as a fallacy?

At least you seem to have moved on from much of your illogic to focus on trivial semantics. That's progress of a sort, I suppose. Let's just agree to disagree, as I don't really care about your opinion on the semantics here, and it doesn't seem worth arguing over. If your semantics is anything like your illogic, then it will leave much to be desired. — S

What? You just now realized that my objection to your thought experiment is based in semantics? Right from the beginning, I objected to your use of "an hour", saying that it was meaningless nonsense in that context. How could it take you this long to see that?

You continue to conflate length with measurement. — Janus

Length is a type of measurement, just like width, height, temperature, etc.. In the case of this op, the measurement referred to is "an hour". I said such a measurement would be impossible with no people. S tried to justify the use of "an hour" by claiming that it was not a measurement, but a unit of measurement. I said that a unit of measurement is useless without someone to apply it. S claimed that the unit of measurement "would apply" regardless of whether there are people to apply it, (as if it would apply itself, and measure and hour by itself, or something like that).

Is an anaconda longer than a maggot? Of course it is, and you don't need to measure them to see that. — Janus

That one thing is longer than another is an act of comparison which doesn't tell you the length of either one. Therefore this example is not relevant. It is not the correct type of measurement required to give you the length, and because it is not such, it doesn't provide the length of anything.

Does the "length contraction" that accords with Relativity theory occur regardless of whether it is measured? If it didn't then how would it ever be discovered? — Janus

Your question doesn't make sense. Length contraction is a feature of measuring the same object from different frames of reference. It doesn't make sense to ask whether it occurs regardless of measurement, because it is a feature of measurement.

Is clusterfuck a fallacy?

If you want to learn about logical fallacies, take an introductory course in logic, or do some reading. It's a good idea.

So, the goal of this forum is to have interesting discussions, not truthful discussions? What is "interesting" is subjective, while what is "truthful" is objective, so what is "interesting" is a matter of opinion, while what is truthful isn't. — Harry Hindu

Get real Harry. Do you know the difference between "true" and "valid"? This thread is not about truth at all, it's about validity.

You'd have to explain to me what you mean by "our morality is innate". I find this statement to be very vague, ambiguous, and actually not representative of empirical evidence. Let's start with a definition of "morality" as the capacity to distinguish bad from good, and let's assume that this capacity is innate. How is it that we are sometimes wrong in distinguishing bad from good? And why are we taught, as children, to distinguish bad from good, if we already innately know this?

Furthermore, if morality was truly innate, wouldn't all this work by the artists, putting forth the material, and creating an audience, all be for nothing? Isn't the moral message, within the art, there for the purpose of teaching morality? This would be unnecessary if morality was innate.

If what you claim were true, then we could not be wrong in any of our measurements. The fact that multiple measurements can be taken completely independently and without any knowledge of prior measurements, and yet will unfailingly be found to agree with one another with a very small margin of error (given that all the measurements are correct, of course!) proves the point. — Janus

I don't see how that proves your point. It just indicates that the numerous people measuring the same object use the same standards, and therefore come up with the same measurement of that object. Are you familiar with length contraction in relativity theory. Length is dependent on the frame of reference. If relativity theory is true, it proves my point, length is a product of the measurement.

It is not S or me who is "fabricating fantasies"; in fact that's one of the most egregious examples of projection I have come across. Leaves me wondering if this is wilful intellectual dishonesty or rank stupidity. Be ashamed, be very ashamed! — Janus

This is what you said:

A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. — Janus

That's clearly a fabrication. One cannot equate length with measurability. That's complete nonsense. You just made that up, and spouted it out, rudely interrupting our discussion, as if you were interjecting with a fact. Shame on you!

Nope, not by my logic, plain and simple. By your logic, plain and simple. Your logic is bad logic which I reject. — S

You've demonstrated your logic. You reject conventional definitions, fabricate definitions, and even change them, as required, to support your metaphysics. And, you reject my logic as "bad" because it produces conclusion which are inconsistent with your metaphysics.

This is one of your fundamental errors: confusing your logic for mine. — S

Producing your own type of logic is called "rationalizing", and this is actually a form of being unreasonable.

That's right: a premise! And whose premise is it? Is it yours? Is it mine? Is it a premise that we both agree on? Bearing this in mind, whose logic leads to contradiction? Does my logic internally lead to contradiction? Yes or no? — S

Right, you do not agree with my premises because they are based in conventional definitions. You reject conventional definitions, (such as the one quoted, that for something to be certain it must be ascertained), and fabricate your own definitions, as you go, because this is the only way you can support your incorrect metaphysics. Conventional definitions do not support your incorrect metaphysics, and that's why your metaphysics is incorrect.

Let me know if you've figured it out. — S

I've got it figured out now. You have a particular metaphysical perspective. Normal, conventional usage of words does not support your metaphysical perspective. Conventional definitions produce premises which prove your metaphysics to be incorrect. So you've created your own way of using words, what you call your own "context", which is not the normal, conventional way of using words, it's your newly fabricated way, which supports your incorrect metaphysics. And someone like me, who adheres to conventional definitions to prove your metaphysics wrong, you say is a "sophist".

Very funny. I'm guessing that you don't see why that's a funny question to ask me, and you'll expect me to explain it to you, like you expect me to explain everything, no matter how simple or obvious it is to anyone with half a brain. Nah. I don't think so. Try to figure it out for yourself. It is not good that you need to be spoon fed everything, like a little baby. — S

When someone uses a word, in a new, unconventional way, I ask for an explanation, because I want to understand what is "meant" by that word, the purpose for using that word in the context that it was used. In a situation like this discussion, where you are trying to support a metaphysical position, if you fail to explain to me why you are using that word, in that unconventional way, I will simply conclude that you've changed the definition of that word for the purpose of supporting your metaphysical position. If you must deviate from accepted definitions, and fabricate new definitions as we proceed in discussion, to support your metaphysics, then I conclude your metaphysics is an untenable fabrication of your own imagination, and therefore incorrect.

Ooh, that's a toughie. You. Your fake conversation between us misrepresents what I'd say. Straight away, I wouldn't even say, "That rock has a measurement". I would say something along the lines of what I have been saying throughout the discussion, not what you've been so desperately trying to get me to say, or what you've simply been imagining me to say. I would say that the rock is of a certain length, and that that length could be 10cm, but that without measuring it, we won't know whether it's 10cm, even if it is. — S

The rock is not "of a certain length" until the length has been ascertained. To say that it is, is contradiction plain and simple. If you really believe that it is "of a certain length", then tell me who is certain of the length? If there is no one who is certain of the length, then clearly the rock cannot be a certain length. What are you supposing here, that the rock is certain of its own length? If not, how is the length of the rock certain?

This is not correct. A thing has length if it is measurable, it is measurable if it has length. It need not be measured to have length, In fact it must have length (i.e. be measurable) in order to be measured. — Janus

No, the length is the measurement. The object is measured, and the measurement is the length, 10cm, or whatever. Whether or not an object is measurable is irrelevant to its actual length. What is relevant to its length is actual measurement. You are simply making stuff up. Welcome to the S group, fabricators of fictitious fantasies.

This is insane. It serves only as an example of very bad logic: a test for someone to analyse, identify the errors, and write up an explanation. Besides that, it is of no value.

Thanks for all of these tests, I suppose. I remain as sharp as ever. — S

It's interesting, and very telling how you can go on and on about how such and such is bad logic, but you can never point out what is wrong with the logic. I'll tell you what's wrong with the logic. You do not like the conclusion therefore it must be bad logic. Things which you do not like are "bad".

OK, try this thought experiment. You and I are walking in the woods, and we come across a rock.
You say "that rock has a measurement".
I say, "no it doesn't have a measurement because it hasn't been measured.
You insist, "yes it must have a measurement, regardless of whether or not it has been measured".
So I cite for you the conventional definitions of "measurement", all of which require an act of measuring. And I explain to you that what you are insisting on is nonsense.
Then you say "I am not using 'measurement' in the 'usual context', and in my context, it does make sense".
But your context is the purpose of supporting a metaphysical position.

So you give "measurement" a very special meaning, within a special context, which is the purpose of supporting your metaphysical position, which turns out to be untenable without that special meaning of "measurement". The only thing which supports your metaphysical position is assuming that very special meaning of "measurement", and the only reason to assume that special meaning is to support your metaphysical position. Who is the one being unreasonable?

If the length of the wall is two metres, then the length of the wall is two metres. — S

Correct, but "length" is a measurement, and a thing only has a measurement if it's been measured. To say that it has a measurement without having been measured is contradictory.

Whether anyone has measured the wall to find out that it's two metres in length is completely irrelevant. — S

Oh no, here you go again. The wall's "length" of "two metres" is what we say about it, what we've determined it to be through measurement, two metres. Don't you see that it would be nonsensical to say that the wall is two metres if it hasn't been measured to be two metres? The wall is two metres if the wall is two metres, correct and tautological. But the wall is only two metres if it's been measured to be two metres, because "two metres" is a measurement.

We've been through this already, a thing only has a measurement if it's been measured. The wall is two metres if it's been measured to be two metres. To say "the wall is two metres" when it hasn't been measured to be two metres is meaningless nonsense. In what instance would you ever state that a thing has measurement X, when it has not been measured to actually be X? Your statements clearly are nonsensical. After everyone is dead, there is no one to measure "an hour". That a standard of measurement "would apply", if there were someone to apply it, does not mean that a standard of measurement has been applied, and an hour has been measured.

The hour doesn't need to be measured for it to pass. — S

We've been through this too. Time passes. An hour is a measured period of time. It's nonsense to say that an hour has passed without somehow measuring an hour to have passed. When I explained this to you, you started claiming that you used "an hour" in a different way, to refer to a standard, a "unit of measurement" rather than a measured period of time. Now you appear to be attempting to create ambiguity, saying that the "hour" is the thing passed, not the standard of measurement by which the period of time is measured. Equivocation is a fallacy.

The reason I consider the point that rules are human conventions to be irrelevant is because it is of no logical relevance to my argument. I have accepted that humans set language rules. This misses the point, because I argue that there's no justified reason for believing that the rules would cease to apply. They are a human convention only in some sense along the lines that humans come up with them. — S

That's where you go into nonsense. People apply standards of measurement in their acts of measurement. The rules do not apply themselves. So "an hour", as a standard of measurement cannot apply itself, and measure an hour, after all the people are dead.

If you think that this is a matter of "begging", then I can show you endless numbers of cases where human beings apply standards of measurement in the act of measuring. Can you show me one case where a standard of measurement applies itself in an act of measurement? If not, then I suggest you drop the charge of "begging the question", and accept as reality that "an hour after all the people died" is meaningless nonsense.

What do you want to know about my position regarding how an hour could pass that I haven't already said? Why should I repeat myself over and over again at your request? Why didn't you pay sufficient attention the first, second, and third time that I've explained it? — S

I want you to explain how a standard of measurement applies without someone applying it. To me, that's quite obviously nonsensical.

So would it be used? No. Would it apply? Yes. — S

This is contradictory. To apply a rule is to use a rule. But if you mean by "it would apply", that the particular rule is applicable, or relevant, then we need someone to actually apply the rule, after all the people are dead, to measure the hour period, or else we simply have an applicable rule with no one to apply it.

Would there be linguistic meaning? Yes. Would the meaning be understood? No, there wouldn't be anyone there to understand the meaning. Would the meaning be meaningful to anyone? No, there wouldn't be anyone there to find the meaning meaningful. Why would it be otherwise? Cue the never ending circle of you begging the question again without realising the error in what you're doing. — S

Now you appear to be catching on. After all the people are dead, there is still a standard of measurement, "an hour". "An hour" has meaning as a standard of measurement, and even after all people are dead, it has meaning. But with all the people dead there is no one to understand that meaning, or to apply the standard of measurement. Now, let's ask the question, "would there be a specific rock 'an hour' after all people are dead?"

Do you agree that this specific rock would exist at some times after all the people are dead, and at other times after all the people are dead, it would not exist? So, after all the people are dead, if it is to be either true or false that the specific rock exists "an hour" after all the people are dead, then some one must interpret, "an hour", and measure "an hour" after all the people are dead. Therefore it is a nonsensical question, because the rock exists at sometimes and other times it does not exist, and there is no one to interpret "an hour", and to measure "an hour", to see how this relates to the existence of the rock. The rock may or may not exist "an hour" after all the people are dead, and it is meaningless nonsense to ask such a question. To presuppose that the question may be answered is to presuppose something impossible, something contradictory, that "an hour" can be interpreted and measured when there is no one to interpret and measure.

Then I would have explained why I consider that to be an irrelevant point. Can you think of why I might consider that point to be irrelevant? Or do I have to explain it? — S

You keep insisting that it's irrelevant, but your thought experiment references "an hour" after all human beings have died. So it's very relevant. We need to know how "an hour" fits into this scenario of no living human beings.

Why on earth would you assume that I interpret stuff like that in a manner implying subjective dependency? This is the very problem.

I don't do that. I call an hour a unit of measurement, because that's what it is, and I don't interpret stuff like that in your manner which would obviously lead me to contradiction. That's obvious, surely. I mean, come on. Really?

If it's a standard, I claim that it's an objective standard. And that's perfectly consistent with my position, and with my usage of language.

And don't even think about misinterpreting "standard" as a judgement or anything of that sort. Ask if you're not sure of something, don't just assume, or at least try to apply the very minimum requirements of being charitable in your assumptions. Don't assume that I'm a bloody idiot whose saying something which is an obvious contradiction, like that something which requires a subject doesn't require a subject.

With all due respect, I think you have a lot to learn about logic, and you should be grateful for the effort I'm putting in and my patience. — S

How does "a standard" which is used in the practise of measurement figure into your scenario of no living human beings? Your thought experiment scenario describes the existence of a standard, "an hour" after all humans are dead. How is that standard meaningful if there are no humans to use it in the act of measuring.

The church has no need of ambiguity to reach a wider audience (except as missionaries, maybe, so I see what you mean about creating a wider audience, and that’s another interesting subject; converting) or to create an audience. Each member is raised to be a member of the audience, they’re believers. As are members of the tribe.

The values and morals are instilled in them on a regular basis by, priests, elders or shamans. These values hold the community together. — Brett

This is the difficult part to understand, what constitutes being "raised to be a member of the audience"? This is the act of creating the audience, and holding the attention of the audience. The artist must create within each individual the perception that the art is important. Within the individual member is a sense of value. Do you agree with this? Let's start with the very basic assumption that this is all that is innate, just a sense of value. Let's suppose that the person is born like the blank slate with respect to what that person will value. The person will learn to value particular things, but at birth there is just a general capacity to value, and this capacity will be directed in various ways, depending on what grabs one's attention, as one grows. Therefore the artist must grab one's attention, and cultivate within each individual an apprehension of the art as something important, and the individual's sense of value will be directed in this way.

Now, let's widen the assumption of what is innate. Let's say that some people naturally look this way, and some people naturally look that way, according to some sort of natural interest, depending on the sharpness of the various senses. Each person has a slightly different physical constitution, forming a different composition, and therefore a different natural disposition. Of the senses, one person might see better than another, who might hear better than another, and so on; and then there are tastes, which influence what we eat, and this affects our internal organs which have a great influence on how we apprehend things. So I think that each person's innate disposition toward "value" is very different, depending on these physical factors.

This is why it is not a simple task to raise an audience. Yes, each person must be raised to be a member of the audience, but each person is different in one's disposition toward value. The artist cannot produce a different message for each different person because this would create contradiction in the artist's overall "message", so the artist's recourse is ambiguity. This is why you should not underestimate the importance of ambiguity. Raising children to be a member of an audience is an act of creating an audience. So in the case of the Church, you cannot take the audience for granted, just assuming that the children are naturally raised to be the audience. The act of raising the children to be the audience is a continuous act of creating an audience, which requires working with ambiguities.

The values and morals are instilled in them on a regular basis by, priests, elders or shamans. These values hold the community together.

They hold the community together because it was those values that formed the tribe. The values came before the tribe because it was the values that, in evolutionary terms, “cultivated and regulated complex interactions within social groups (Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce), enabled their successful development, growth and survival. — Brett

You appear to be claiming that there are communal values, which hold the community together. But the innate disposition to value, is not necessarily directed toward any particular common value. So I do not think that the claim that the values came before the tribe is justified. This all depends on the role of ambiguity. Imagine a group of people together, as group. Each has one's own intentions, and therefore one's own values, yet they are together, as a group, a tribe. Suppose these people are working together on a project, like members of a group in an employment setting. That common project they are working on justifies the claim of "communal value". Now suppose the people are just living in proximity to each other, but need to interact on a day to day basis, like a small community. Each person has one's own values, and they manage to live side by side without any overall project that they're working on. They're just living in some sort harmony without interfering with each other, and there is no "communal values". Well, we could say that there is "communal values" if we allow a significant amount of ambiguity. The people are not fighting with each other, they are not stealing from each other, raping and killing each other, I've described the situation as "harmony", so there must be some sort of communal value. But if we were to define, or describe those particular values, we'd be lost in ambiguity. Perhaps what is valued is the sense of communion itself.

The ‘artists’ of these communities created work that contained and expressed these values. The so called art or ‘artefacts’ they created served the purpose of expressing through myths, legends or tales the importance of living those values, and never forgetting them. — Brett

So I don't think these artists of the ancient and prehistoric tribes are expressing any particular values at all. They are just expressing some kind of ambiguity. The potential audience sees the expression, and its repetition (and repetition is probably very important here), and perceives importance. The very existence of the "audience" creates a togetherness of the people, and this is a sense of communion. You'll notice that in ancient tribes, ceremonies and celebrations were very important. This is carried on and increased in Christianity and all religions. The sense of communion is not created by common values, it is created by ceremonies and celebrations which bring people together. When it is experienced, it is valued. The being together is apprehended as important, and therefore valued, because it is enjoyable and fulfilling in many ways. And from the being together there develops the ability to communicate, resolve ambiguities and produce joint projects, common values.

But then we get the enlightenment as my bifurcation. The tribe remains untouched, lost in the jungle. But in the Western world the church is challenged; God is dead. Now the audience of the church, the priests, the bible, no longer have the same audience sharing the same sense of importance. The church can never work with ambiguity; you believe in God or you don’t.

However, the values and morals are still there among the potential audience because it’s those values that successfully formed the society. The church didn’t create them, it only institutionalised them. As did the Shamans and elders of the tribe. — Brett

You'll see that I have a different perspective on this now. From my perspective, the artists did create the common values, or at least created the conditions from which the common values followed. The artists created the audience, and creating the audience was a bringing together of people. This was not done through any common values, but with an ambiguity of values. The being together in ceremony and celebration is enjoyed, therefore apprehended as important, and becomes a common value. Other common values follow from this.

So, who are to be the new priests, the new Shamans, the new storytellers that the audience seek?
My position, which I hope I’ve been able to make clear, is that our morality is innate. And we once were part of an audience that responded to the artist/Shaman/priest and their artefacts. The relationship was unambiguous.

The artist/priest/Shaman would create an audience by creating a sense of importance about those morals that the audience already held. But the potential audience is lost, they can’t find the artist who connects. Where is he today? The connection is gone, the inspiration, the tales are gone. There’s a vacuum. The vacuum must be filled. Now there’s room for real ambiguity, and only ambiguity can appeal to a wide audience. — Brett

As you can see, I disagree with this. I don't know how you would support or justify "our morality is innate". It seems quite evident that morality is learned. It is what we are taught when we are young. What I think is innate, is some sense of value, but our values naturally vary widely, and this is not naturally conducive to morality. I think morality comes about, is created by communion, not vise versa. The "vacuum" you talk about here is the self. The self is a void, and overindulgence of communal activity creates a need to retreat into the void. The need for privacy becomes more important than the need to be part of a group when overindulge in communal activity continues unabated. At this point, the feeling of togetherness, as more important than privacy, needs to be rekindled, and that's the work of the artist.

Do you remember ages ago when I mentioned units of measurement? An hour is a unit of measurement. — S

Yes I remember this. Then you went on to talk about rules, and Terrapin explained that rules are human conventions. So I thought you dismissed this line of thought. These are two different ways of using "hour". I interpreted "an hour" in your thought experiment as something measured, that's what you were insisting, "an hour" in relation to passing time, is something objective.' Now you claim to have used "an hour" as a unit of measurement. This means it is a standard, a convention for the act of measuring. After all the people die, how does "an hour", as a standard for measuring, relate to physical existence? It's just as nonsensical this way, as it is the other way.

Are you familiar with relativity theory. The meaning of "an hour" relative to physical existence is dependent on one's frame of reference. As a unit of measurement, "an hour" must be within the context of a frame of reference to have any meaning.

Of course it's not nonsense on its own terms. It's only so as a consequence of you begging the question once again. — S

I'm just trying to understand which of my premises you disagree with, and why you think it's a matter of begging the question. Then we might be able to discuss our differences on that particular issue. Is it my premise that the human temporal perspective is very specific, and unique to the human being, or is it my premise that "an hour" is a measurement of time dependent on the human temporal perspective, or both? And, please give me some indication of the fault or faults you see in the premise or premises which you disagree with.

You haven't yet told me exactly what it is that you disagree with, and what it is that I am claiming which you think is "begging the question".

In this conversation I have being trying to refer back to earlier times where most stories were passed on verbaly or visually. But what I’m exploring is the idea that, being the creatures we are, we regard the written work, and the visual work that we see today, as a continuation of that telling, we respond instinctively to it, maybe not so consciously as our forebears, but it’s still there. Language and the telling of stories, from the Indians of the Amazon, to Sophocles ‘Antigone’, to Shakespeare’s ‘ King Lear’, carry this message that I’m calling our morality.
This morality presented in the form of tales, myths, or plays and then the written form, would have reached a wide audience, which was its purpose, done in such a way so as not to be elitist, performed in special institutions, separated from the people, as Shakespeare is today for instance, compared to its origins. — Brett

I think that the main issue here is "importance" and it seems like you and I may somewhat disagree on the method of importance, how importance is important. What an individual values will be important to that person, and the person will act to bring into one's own life, and to the lives of others around them, those valued things. So I think it is important to recognize that a wide audience is a product of many individuals holding value in the artistic expression (seeing it as important). This means that we cannot approach the art, or the artists directly, to see what it is about their material which attracts a wide audience, without first understanding the audience itself. For instance, if we looked at the explosion of rock and roll music in the sixties, and the creation of a wide audience (notice that I say a wide audience is created) by bands like The Beatles, we'd be acting in an "appellative" way, seeking a common feature in that audience, a common principle of value within every member of the audience, which was appealed to by the band, and could be named. The problem is the ambiguity factor that artists use, which I described earlier. The important thing which is valued by a member of the audience, may vary from one individual to another, so there can be no such appellation. Then we see that the perception of "importance" within the audience is actually created by the artists through the use of mechanisms like ambiguity, which we might not even understand.

I tend to think the control over expression was taken from them rather than relinquishing it. — Brett

For the sake of argument, let's assume that they lost the capacity to create the perception of importance. Let's say that they could no longer keep a captive audience. With methods like "The Inquisition", the Church actually suppressed its own capacity to create importance by denying ambiguous or alternative interpretations of scripture. So if the Church was the purveyor of art, and it lost the capacity to create a wide audience, then the hole created, the need for something important, would have to be filled by other sources.

My feeling is that it’s the opposite. The tales of the past were not privileged by their importance but by their ability to reach out directly to the people. The ‘artefacts’ of today are homogenised and lacking in the sense of morality that was inherent in the tales and plays of the past, and virtually owned by institutions, who then ultimately own the message. — Brett

Right, but we need to understand exactly what this "ability to reach out directly to the people is". The "audience" cannot be taken for granted. It must be created, because you might put on a show and have no one come. So the individuals who will form 'the audience" need to perceive importance. Therefore importance is key, because without the sense of importance, there is no audience. When we approach "morality" from this perspective, art, I think it is necessary to understand these concepts of "importance", and "value" before we can even introduce "morality" into the discussion.

As you say here, modern artists may create an audience without any appeal to morality. The money-making machines produce the perception of importance, creating massive audiences, through much simpler, and very efficient means, because the end goal, making money, is much more easily obtained than the end goal of making morality. So we've come full circle now. The artist creates the audience through an appeal to the individual members' of the potential audience sense of value, by creating the appearance of importance. Now the issue is the individual's sense of value. Where does "morality" stand in the individual's sense of value, and how does this relate to the artist's capacity to create an audience?

Here's why the op is nonsensical S. The human being has a very particular temporal perspective. We don't see events which are a picosecond in length, and we don't see events which are a billion years long. We live at this particular time and we only see things within a very limited temporal perspective. If human beings are removed, then the human temporal perspective is removed. But your op talks as if you could remove human beings, yet maintain the human temporal perspective. Don't you think that's nonsense? What would maintain the human temporal perspective when there is no human beings?

Oh dear. We fundamentally disagree on so much. — S

I'm way ahead of you. I knew this from your nonsensical op. But it sure took a lot of insistence on my part, repeating over and over again that your op is nonsensical, before you came to respect this fact. What were you thinking, that you could convert me to seeing things your way? I never thought I'd convert you. It's obvious that people like you are just so wrapped up in your nonsense, that you completely reject reason.

This part is not really about morals or subjectivity. I’m trying to establish the way these original ‘artefacts’, as I call them, are the precursors to what we now regard as art. Modern art did not spring fully formed to life. For a long time these artefacts played an important art in culture: telling stories, interpreting, instructing, nurturing, as it did in Western culture with Christianity, possibly up until the Enlightenment. — Brett

If you're talking about telling stories, then I think that you have to take into account the historical limitations on written language. Prior to the enlightenment, writing was pretty much confined to those educated within the structure of the Church. And if you go back three thousand years, written language was almost non-existent. At this time, "story telling", verbally, would have been the only means for passing knowledge, information, from one generation to the next. So I think it's important to distinguish between modern times, when there is so much written material, information, everywhere, and ancient times when written material was very limited.

When things moved on from the Enlightenment art took on a different purpose. It moved away from God, the Christian message, the bible, the established view of man and his place in the universe, caught up in the idea of reason and science. It began to exist in itself. Eventually we had the idea of the ‘artist’, who produced art expressing his subjective world of feelings, perception, interpretation and so on. It no longer played the same part in society as the ‘artefacts’ did. — Brett

So I think that this movement of art away from God and the Christian message, is a reflection of the Church's release of control over written expression. Changes in artful expression coincide with the Church's relinquished control over publication.

And yet it seems possible that instinctively we still turn to these things for some inspiration, just as they did with the ‘artefacts’: the masks, chants and dances. But art is no longer like that. Commercial interests now drive art: film, television, novels, plays. The content is inspirational but in a form that does not contribute to our lives or society as a whole, it targets our narcissism and encourages the worst aspects of our nature. — Brett

When there are severe limitations in relation to what can be put on hard copy, then only what is deemed as the most important will get that privilege. But when there is much freedom and the restrictions are far less significant, we'll get a much wider variety of "artefacts".

The rest of your post completely misses the point yet again, because you fail to realise that you're begging the question by assuming premises I don't accept, and then drawing conclusions from these premises. — S

My action of "assuming premises" which you do not accept, is simply a matter of adhering to conventional definitions for interpretation of the terms used in your own premises. And, by the way, adhering to accepted definitions when interpreting premises, when no alternative definitions are proposed, is not a case of "begging the question".