Its possibility is plausible in a idealist perspective, especially in esoteric spiritual ones. — Jack Cummins
Death involves the question of existence outside of space and time. — Jack Cummins
This is incoherent. People scream "ouch" because pain hurts. The salient feature of pain is that it feels bad. Any definition of pain which does not reference the subjective experience of hurting is incomplete. Imagine two old people from thousands of years ago talking about their various aches and pains. They know nothing about what the brain does or is. Are you saying then that their statements about their pains are nonsensical? Obviously, they can converse intelligently on the subject because when people talk of pains, they're almost always referring to the mental state of "being in pain" and not neurons and c-fibers. — RogueAI
So again, where did this new knowledge of the book come from? Not from the ink. Not from the paper. Not from new physical facts. The “aboutness,” the meaning, seems to exist in a different category not reducible to physical properties alone. — RogueAI
Your mind will be gone pretty much the moment you die. — Patterner
Saying the brain is mysterious or not fully understood today is just an appeal to ignorance. Complete knowledge of a person's brain should equal complete knowledge of their mind, right? — RogueAI
Good point, but a daft question. It is like asking why tables and chairs don't work as phones or computers? They are not designed / made to do those jobs.Why are brains conscious but hearts and livers aren't? — RogueAI
This sounds like a question for the biologist and neurologist.Why are only some brain processes associated with consciousness? — RogueAI
A purple flower and an image or representation of the purple flower is not the same existence.If the mind is identical to the brain, and I'm picturing a purple flower in my mind's eye, wouldn't that entail there's a purple flower in my brain? — RogueAI
Not all physical objects are replaceable and transparent to our understanding. Many physical objects such as radio waves, atoms, cells and the black holes, space ... etc are not things that we can fully understand what they are. Many of them are also presupposed and imagined objects from the effects or events in the world.If minds are physical, then by studying someone's brain, I should be able to gain access to the contents of their mind, right? — RogueAI
I agree. Information processing - thinking - is a physical thing. I just posted this on response to ↪Manuel
: — Patterner
"Who am 'I' and what is the relation between mind and body? According to my understanding, there exists a specific, changeable state of some components in my brain. — Pieter R van Wyk
I agree. The mind turns off at times, like deep sleep or general anesthesia. — Patterner
But our consciousness is about far more than just our physical bodies. — Patterner
My ideas seem to be based on natural logic rather than science. I don't deny science, but always be aware of the limitations of science. But yes, I do like pragmatism and intend to read Dewey, James, Pierce, Whitehead, and Strawson too.Well, that is a loaded statement, you know. There is so much philosophy in this, one barely knows where to begin. Kant wasn't wrong (though the Critique can be argued endlessly. Was Strawson right? Here and there, yes), but seriously incomplete; such is rationalism. — Astrophel
I have not read Rorty, hence I cannot comment on his philosophy at this point. I owned a book by Rorty titled "Mirror of Nature???", and read a few pages. But the book has gone missing, and cannot be located. Will try reading it again if and when I find the book. From my memory Rorty was mentioning a lot of Heidegger.So I would ask you, if you like, to ask Rorty's question of how things out there get in knowledge claims, just to begin showing the strength of phenomenology. It begins with the question of epistemology. — Astrophel
Sure, we can make those observations, but replicating human thinking in a computer program seems impossible. — Carlo Roosen
To make the move into how this constitution can be analyzed, one has to read the kind of philosophy that does just this, phenomenology. — Astrophel
For example, in what sense does "earth" in language capture the reality of the earth, being 12,714 km in diameter and having a mass of 5.9722 × 10^24 kg. — RussellA
For Wittgenstein, the world is not totally separate to the language that we use to describe it. — RussellA
I mean, think about it: what is scienctific knowledge and how does it present to me the moon as it is? One has to look not at the quantification, for this doesn't give us anything but relational structures in a system that is ontologically distinct from the presence of the moon itself. — Astrophel
Is it not the case that Wittgenstein believed that our language "is" our world, where the world is embedded in language through the hinge proposition? — RussellA
But then, what contributions does "the mind" make to "the moon" being the moon when it encounters that out there we call the moon? Clearly the moon is not simply in one's mind, but nor is the moon simply out there. It is the simplicity that spoils this response, for to say the mind "just sees it" is to ignore the question of epistemic distance as if it didn't exist. Science may do this, for this is not the kind of thing it thinks about, but philosophy? This is where philosophy begins. — Astrophel
What are the implications? We can only understand the world using language. But if the world is our language, and language cannot understand itself, then this inevitably puts a limit on our understanding of the world. — RussellA
In other words, we use the language game to understand the world, and this world is nothing other than the language game itself. — RussellA
However, other thinkers offer up several different types of knowledge. For instance, a distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how." Knowing how to ride a bike, for example, does not seem to reduce to propositional knowledge (at least not easily). Its justification is the ability to stay upright on a moving bike, which is not linguistic. It seems possible that someone who has lost their capacity to understand and produce language might nonetheless know the to ride a bike. — Count Timothy von Icarus
True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists. — RussellA
Or is it certain that the experience of me typing this discussion is happening, even if I can't be certain about it. — Kranky
I cannot doubt that I doubt, even if I am a simulation. — RussellA
True, but they don't doubt that they have the doubt as to whether the Earth exists. — RussellA
Where does Wittgenstein write that those propositions which are exempt from doubt are "lived truths"? — RussellA
In order to doubt anything, one must rely on that which is beyond doubt. In other words, one cannot exit all language games and still be capable of doubting. — Joshs
I guess you could doubt them, you just exit the language game when you do. — frank
Any part whose meaning is exempt from doubt in your mind can be called a hinge proposition. — RussellA
The whole point of a hinge proposition is that it is exempt from being doubted. Doubting a hinge proposition cannot even be considered. — RussellA
No. That's why I have pieced together my own philosophical theory of how the primal Energy (causation) and Laws (information) of the Big Bang could evolve into living and thinking beings. :smile: — Gnomon
How would you replace "exempt" by "impossible" in the above sentence? — RussellA
"Exempt from doubt" has a different meaning to "cannot be doubted." — RussellA
True, but on a thread about Wittgenstein's On Certainty, the question is, how did Wittgenstein describe doubt? — RussellA
Wittgenstein says "exempt from doubt" — RussellA