one wherein emphasis has shifted from observation to simulation or modeling. — Pantagruel
Mind needs body to exist and operate, however, body doesn't cause mind for its operations.
Body is another object of mind's perception. — Corvus
Agree. — Wayfarer
There is no originals in Philosophy. All philosophy is interpretation and critique of the world.Also arising is the question of the quality of the secondary source; not all are right and some are plain wrong. And how would anyone know without access to the original? — tim wood
Long way round is the longest with no ending. What may look best today might turn out to be claptrap tomorrow. Stay open minded. :Dsometimes the seeming long way 'round is the shortest and best. — tim wood
Having said that, more importantly metaphysical entities (which the vast majority of god definitions are) defy purely physical proof. — LuckyR
You didn't prove that the word exists. All you did was proved that the representation of the word exists. — night912
That's right. And I can whistle Beethoven's Ninth. The trouble comes when folks are dismissive because of length. Short, sweet (maybe), and simple - that's how it should be. Is that what your girlfriend thinks? — tim wood
I'm suspicious of long winded writers,it's like a long list of apologies and overwrought justifications,showing how the writer is unsure of his ideas! — Swanty
mind as a product of material causation, as is everything else. — Wayfarer
I would imagine this can be proposed as a sort of argument against a classical theistic god — Brenner T
Philosophers of biology are asking whether life and mind are two aspects of the one phenomenon, and whether it is causal in a different way to physical causation. — Wayfarer
Can anyone prove a god, I enjoy debates and wish to see the arguments posed in favour of the existence of a god. — CallMeDirac
I see many people who like Kant or Hegel because it's a badge of honour to have read their supposedly difficult books. But basically they are bad writers! — Swanty
Could there be other factors involved in perception apart from the the object of perception, sensory organs, memories and experiences? — Corvus
How would we perceive them? — ssu
Yes, it is a Kantian point of view. I know that scientists claim that time and space are external entities, but as I said previously, I tried to explain that my argument was not under that frame but another perspective. The basic premise is that we try to determine a basic sense or notion, and for this reason we tend to discard dreams for several reasons. Nonetheless, we usually dream with past experiences, people, and places, and I wouldn't name these dreams as 'illusions' because I literally experienced this in the past. Otherwise, I had to admit that what I lived in the past is somehow not plausible. — javi2541997
However, the ascetic perspective is more radical, challenging the common viewpoint. The ascetic views the world as a kind of addictive drug: the more you engage with it, the more entangled you become. The attachment grows, and it grips you more tightly. True liberation, from this perspective, comes from withdrawing and reducing engagement with what ensnares us. Thus, the usual wisdom that advocates social engagement becomes, paradoxically, like a drug- poisonous over time. — schopenhauer1
Give me more than an overused cliché about escape—show me there’s substance behind your argument. Present to me that you know what Schopenhauer (or Buddhism if you want) says about asceticism and then debate the point. — schopenhauer1
Ok, what about it? You can't escape from yourself is not a response to the idea I am proposing. Are you familiar with ascetic practice? Schopenhauer et al? — schopenhauer1
That being said, I claim that the best course of action in almost all cases as a human to comport with the best life, is to live a life of withdrawal. — schopenhauer1
Yeah sorta my OP. What’s your point other than cliches? Read my op as I don’t think you grasped what I was conveying, — schopenhauer1
But this is not true with respect to consensus reality. Also the physical world, which everybody would agree "exists" because it is self-evident, has a relative (illusory/dreamlike) appearance to whatever organism is conscious of it. — Nils Loc
Withdrawal is preventative, but also a statement about not allowing oneself to inflict harms upon others — schopenhauer1
Because the human mind has the capability for creativity. Creativity often comes about by taking bits and pieces that belong to one thing, and then applying them to another. Think of a unicorn for example. Its a horse with a horn on its head. Now make a duocorn. That's a horse with two horns on its head. Keep going. That's why you can dream of things you've never seen before. — Philosophim
Not only was this ungrammatical, but it makes no sense. Kant never argued this at all—not even remotely. — Bob Ross
You should make note which version of CPR you are quoting i.e. 1st or 2nd. They have many different contents on what they are saying.It has all the editions in it, as far as I understand, and it is translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. — Bob Ross
It depends on what context he was talking about. As I said, you must make notes which version of CPR you are quoting and for your points.The former is a thing-in-itself, which is just to say they are synonyms in this sense, but the latter is not a thing-in-itself at all. — Bob Ross
Kant is never clear in CPR, because he says totally opposite things in the other parts of CPR, and 1st and 2nd edition of CPR sounds totally different. You should read some of the academic commentaries on CPR too. Not just CPR, because anyone just reading and quoting CPR only would be usually in total confusion and contradictions on what he talks about.Kant is painfully clear in the CPR that a thing-in-itself is the thing which excited your senses as it were independently of how it excited those senses and what got sensed—viz., something excited my senses such that, as an end result, I perceived a cup: whatever that is, is the thing as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross
If all the daily objects you perceive in the external world had their Thing-in-itself, then the world would be much more complicated place unnecessarily and incorrectly. For instance, when you had a cup of coffee in a cafe, the cafe maid will demand payment for 2 cups of coffee. Why do you charge me 2 cups of coffees when I had only 1 cup? You may complain, and she will retort you, "well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup." You wouldn't be pleased with that, neither would had Kant been at the barmy situationNo, you are demarcating an invalidly stricter set of real things as things-in-themselves; which are really just supersensible things—which would be noumena in the positive sense (at best).
Whatever excited your senses such that you see here a cup, is a thing in reality which exists in-itself in some way—that’s a thing-in-itself. A thing-in-itself could also, in principle, if you want, include noumena in the positive sense; if by this you carefully note, in your schema, that a thing-in-itself is just a real thing as it were in-itself and a noumena a thing-in-itself which cannot be sensed—but, then, most notably, you are still incorrect to say that things-in-themselves are not that which excite our senses but, instead, right to say that some things-in-themselves cannot excite our senses. — Bob Ross
The negation "don't expect" means that we don't have the expectation. Yet you say that I "expect God to be not real". You omit the negation and thus misrepresent my claim. — jkop
I'd say my visual experience is real to me when I have it while it's not real to you, obviously, when you don't have it. But like now when we both see this dark coloured text, then we both have the same visual experience, i.e. the object that we see is the same. — jkop
Thing-in-itself is not available to your senses, ergo there is no sensation of it. If you have sensation of Thing-in-itself, then you would perceive it like you would see chairs, tables and cups. But you cannot have sensation of Thing-in-Itself.That’s the whole point of a thing-in-itself: it is whatever was sensed—and that is the limit of what we can talk about it. Viz.,: — Bob Ross
There are things that is unavailable to your senses, so there is no excitation from the things. But your reason can infer the things which exists outside of the boundary of your senses such as God, spirits and souls.Because some thing excited your senses; otherwise, you are hallucinating, which is absurd. That thing which excited your senses, was a thing, whatever it may be, as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross
Some of the concepts are A priori. Senses are not A priori.Because the way your senses sense is a priori. — Bob Ross
It's a fact that there are different types of real objects in the world. — jkop
If they are real, then we can experience them systematically, also by those of us who don't expect them to be real. But since we don't, there's little reason to assume that they're real. — jkop
No they are not at all. The word “noumena” is used in a double-sense in the CPR, and Kant is very explicit about that. E.g.,: — Bob Ross
If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves? When you have sensation of something, does it not mean that you can perceive and know them?Phenomenon, in the Kantian tradition, are sensations of things-in-themselves; which are thusly not the thing-in-itself but, rather, conditioned sensations of them. — Bob Ross
Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.That would be a noumena, in the strict sense that Kant talks about it sometimes. A noumena is an object of thought which cannot be sensed. — Bob Ross
That sounds like a tautology. How does it get sensed? Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?A thing-in-itself is sensed insofar as it is what excited the sensibility in the first place but necessarily is not migrated over into the sensations. — Bob Ross
Imaginary, nonexistent, or nonactual things such as ghosts are not real in the sense that molecules are real, nor in the sense that colours are real. Ghosts are fiction. — jkop
We are undeniably animals in bodily nature having the biological functions, desires and system.Are each of us numerically identical to an animal? — NOS4A2
Being aware of one's own inevitable death sometime in the future.Does having the capacity for existential self-awareness imply anything further than this fact? — schopenhauer1
Desiring to be morally Good.entail anything further, in any axiological way? — schopenhauer1
Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
Yes, I did. But I chose the words consciously reflecting the contents of my thoughts. In dreams, I have no consciousness of real world, hence things appear without my choice, and I have no control of the dreams.You CHOSE words and COMBINED them together to make sentences. — night912
Philosophical discussions are not about being happy. It is about trying to come to the agreed conclusion via good arguments.Happy? — night912